Panzer VI Tiger - a costly failure ?

[Hans Kloss]

@ Kings Tiger

I found this:

http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=43698&highlight=tiger

but I'm sure there were other threads where Tigers were discussed too

[Tiwaz]

[QUOTE=cegorach;1445909]

Originally Posted by Tiwaz

Turrent however makes it much more expensive, difficult to build and prone to some more defects. This is the reason why Stug III for example was the only armoured vehicle operational in numerous cases - simply lack of turrent makes the weapon far easier to produce = cheaper and faster to build = more numerous.
In defense it matters a lot because this way you can cover much wider areas of the frontine, equip more units and keep those operational.

Let's forget that Stug III was pretty much conversion of Panzer III which meant extensive use of existing production facilities. And which had already been in use for so long that all technical problems were hammered out.

For record, Stug is one of great successes of war but they were NOT replacement for turreted tanks.

No you can't say that. Panthers were faster to build and easier to build. If you have only Panthers and Jagdpanthers build from the range of larger armoured vehicles it surely is far more efficient. You have pretty unified equipment so providing spare parts is easier. You do not need to divide production into additional auxiliary vehicles (recovery, special command tanks, additional specific to the new tank equipment + dozens of other things), and you can use larger research groups to make the vehicle even better.

Yes I can. Faster? Yes. Easier? Yes. But they require production lines which are designed to do this! Panthers were built at best speed from all lines which were designed to make them. Removing Tigers from equation would not have solved anything except remove effective heavy tanks from service.
THAT was the problem. And Tigers/Panthers shared number of parts specially in later phases. They were not 100% unique setups.

Furthermore, you fail to understand how tanks were designed. They were made by companies, for example for Tiger model Porsche and Henschel produced their own version of it. So by reducing number of designs you are not going to change research teams as they were "property" of different corporations.

For same reason removing Focke Wulf planes from inventory would not have doubled Messerschmit resources.

No. Every new vehicle in production means directing a part of the industrial power and it is never just a half of it. Because you need dozens of new additional machinery to produce that and keep it operational it is pretty obvious that by not dividing the efforts you will generate some surplus even if it was the case of producing two medium tanks of similar size, but it was NOT.

You fail to grasp, it appears, that in those days industrial power was not some number from which things were taken. Like I have said time after time... It was not easy or necessarily cost efficient to try to remodel production lines for new products. So by removing product of this line meant diminishing this "industrial power" as well. It did not "free" any "power" for other uses like in computer games. When machinery was there, and it was, you either used it or lost it's output.

New, heavier and more expensive tanks meant:
- new auxiliary vehicles to support it,
- new equpment to provide some new options later,
- new engine, chassis, turret, weaponry,
- different training,
- more pressure to provide different spare parts,
- different repair teams,
- and becuase there are always new projects based on a new tanks also more new combat vehicles,
+ a dozen other things

Except in many cases these things were produced in the factory line already (spare parts) since the design includes all the parts and lines were designed to make them. Training is not a question either. Crew A is trained by trainer A in vehicle A while crew B is trained by trainer B in vehicle B. It does not matter if vehicles A & B are same or different, they still have to be trained separately or assume that either one or both crews are substandard (if you try to train both at once in same vehicle by same trainer).

Repair teams same thing. They were trained to do their job. And they would be attached to abteilung which used tanks they were trained for. And equipment would be directed to abteilung they fit. Yes, logistically it is better to have everything the same but that is never going to be true.

That is even worse. Germany had to produce more and better tanks, so some sort of hobby Tiger I was (if really not for mass production) is the last thing you need.

But did they know it already? No. It was pretty much T-34 and improvements on it's concept which lead to Panther which was very much revolutionary change in whole thinking. There was no way of predicting it or being sure it would succeed. So there was no way for leaders to presume that if they did not start planning for Tiger in 1937!!!! they would come up with better model in 1942. (panther design, for which Daimler-Benz and MAN competed like Porsche and Henschel for Tiger, was rushed through)

You are trying to apply perfect hindsight on situation where it was not available. Hell, if I could make decisions for Germany from 1937 => with current knowledge there would be whole lot stuff done differently, but they did not have such clairvoyance.

[Hanny]

Turrent however makes it much more expensive, difficult to build and prone to some more defects. This is the reason why Stug III for example was the only armoured vehicle operational in numerous cases - simply lack of turrent makes the weapon far easier to produce = cheaper and faster to build = more numerous.

No. Being produced in factories outside US/Uk air attack range ment coversion of chassis to Stugs was uniterupted by airial bombardement resulting in no reduction in output while German factorties reduced ouput.

See USSBC summary or any book dealling with the German economic production.

In defense it matters a lot because this way you can cover much wider areas of the frontine, equip more units and keep those operational.

Rubbish, the fixed and finate amount of POL Geramnb had deterimes the absolute numbers of MTV it can field, an increase of them simply reduces that finate amount quicker and reduces operiotiopnl range and availability.

See http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wages-Destruction-Making-Breaking-Economy/dp/0713995661

See also http://www.amazon.com/Supplying-War-Logistics-Wallenstein-Patton/dp/0521297931/sr=1-1/qid=1169120856/ref=sr_1_1/002-6643639-9812032?ie=UTF8&s=books why any increase in overal numbers is limited by POl logistical contraisnts, btw the Tiger Bttn cost less fuel than the average Iv battn to operate in the field, but i guess German fuel consumption/reequests per Bttn and theatre and time of year showing the oposoiste of what you want to be the case are a problem for you, fourtunatly the German records are there for all to see and evauluate.

Tiger I was a failure in my opinion and Tiger II was a complete disaster, however there was one or two good ideas implemented in this nightmarish vehicle - some parts were interchangable with Panther and future Panther II and finally over 200 recovery vehicles were built to move the tanks to safety - in case of Tiger I there were such as well - the entire SIX of those !

6 for athe E series of 631 production run.

200 V1s for a runoif 6000 means your attempyt to show the Tiger was under represented by recovery vehclices is not supported by the facts, even when you omit the Tiger conversion to recovery numbers.


Your opion runs contary to the facts, do you really want to go through life with opinions like that?.


[quote]
New, heavier and more expensive tanks meant:
- new auxiliary vehicles to support it,
- new equpment to provide some new options later,
- new engine, chassis, turret, weaponry,
- different training,
- more pressure to provide different spare parts,
- different repair teams,
- and becuase there are always new projects based on a new tanks also more new combat vehicles,
+ a dozen other things /[quote]

And this is defferent for German Tigers to any other nation who all did the same?, ie adopte bigger heavier AFV.

That is even worse. Germany had to produce more and better tanks, so some sort of hobby Tiger I was (if really not for mass production) is the last thing you need.

How can it be worse?, for a weapon system that never had more than 243 in service at any one time, out of 11,000 in service, its a tiny, tiny part of the whole.

the Tiger was eaxactly what was asked for and did excatly what was asked of it, and you have provided not one whit of eveidence to the contary.

The question is would be Panther able toachieve similar success - well it had impressive war record as well.

Different question, finding your opinion contradicts extablished fact it always wise to ask a different question, but your no worried about facts are you.

Sure better not to discuss anything. Pure, undisputed faith in Tiger I shall reign forever.

Discuss?, yopu cant discuss because you dont understand the question, you give opionion and then cite the siene rreiver as the kind of example of a river obstacle the Tiger could not cross on its own, of course knowing that no AFV could cross that river kind of makes the point about you infantile argument, but you had the nerve to post the opoiste of what actually occured to boot, dont lie to someone who does have the data as your just goping to het it thrown at you.

I have faith in statistics, what they support is that the Tiger was cost effective as a weapon system. You had bored the pants of the board with your opinion, and avoided any stats.

And what were those amazing achievements of the Tigrs before Panther came to action ? Kharkov (not that the finally well executed attack had anything to do with that...) ? Anything more ?
Or maybe Kursk - the stupid waste of resources and manpower.
Germany had to replace Pz IV for sure, but they needed a modern, medium tank + something for long range support. But this something could be a modern and easy to produce heavy tank destroyer not the luxury Tiger I was.

I just gave you one example, Gen Thomas of the Geramn economic branch adviused that 36,000 88 AA guns provided to the German army to counter AFV be withdrawn with the propsed numbers of tigers to be deplyed to the Ost front.


Tigers, 0.025% of Germanies econmy to produce, Panthers 0.73%, all German AFV 7% of Geramn economy. Type XXI U baoat, 120 or so built using more industrial workers than were used to build every Tiger, 0.12% and never sunk a thing, but did become the worlds template for subs post war, and there are 43 examples of LW aircraft that cost more than a Tiger.

I suggested you read a book about the German economy and production, as its clear you never have.


You can go through life with an unecated understanding of history, or not, if you should chose to know more than you currently do, i also suggest Col Dupoy "Numbers preductions and losses" as a mathamatical basis for understanding weapons systems battlefield perforemce and hence a substaial part of its cost/benifit value.


http://dupuyinstitute.org/dbases.htm


For the answer acadimics and mil historians use for you latest questions, dont you think its a good idea to know the answer before asking what makes you appear stuip in the highest order?.

http://www.amazon.com/Germanys-Tiger-Tanks-D-W-Modifications/dp/0764310380/ref=pd_sim_b_1/002-6643639-9812032
http://www.amazon.com/Germanys-Tiger-Tanks-Production-Modifications/dp/0764302248/sr=1-4/qid=1169119917/ref=sr_1_4/002-6643639-9812032?ie=UTF8&s=books


For what anyone intreted in the Tiger ought to have a copy of, oddly enough your posts contradict almost everything in it. he even does the panther comparison you asked about in another Vol of hios work, , you wont like the conclusions, because your ignorant of the subject, as your posts clearly demostrate.

Post less, read more.

[OTZ]

Originally Posted by Hanny

Panther between US$32,000. US$39,000
Tiger US$64,000.
Sherman was $40-$60,000 depending on the model.Cheaper if built stateside as machine fitting replaced hand fitting as done in the UK.
T-34/76 ('41-'44) was US$34,000 and that of a T-34/85 US$29,597

Mark Harrison's "Accounting for War"

Isn't Harrison's book about Soviet war time production? And didn't the Tiger actaully cost approxiamately $100,000?

Presuppses that the weapons system failed in its purpose. It did not.

What was the Tiger's purpose? It was designed as a breakthrough tank - in this role it failed. Poor speed, massive fuel consumption, and excessive maintenance requirements forfeited the Tiger's role for spearheading any breakthrough attacks. The history of the Tiger in Africa will do more than enough to prove this point. The units it served in were rarely above 50% readiness, and in some cases the Tiger was used as a makeshift mine sweeper - purposely being disabled in Allied minefields - hardly an effective use of the vehicle.

Everyone has heard the qoute, "it takes 5 tanks to kill a Tiger",
this i believe is how it came about. Based on Russian vs German conflict, and a little statistal anyaysis.

As far as I know, the whole 5:1 issue is a myth that has been continually perpetuated by amateur historians. The interweb doesn't help at preventing it's spread. Your calculations are neat (and flawed, as the actual armoured-combat stat for kill/loss ratio for the Tiger is 12:1 during the war), but I would like to see the historiography behind the theory, rather than your very loosely arrived at guesstimate.

Time is fixed, it is not elastic, no one had nore of it or less of it. Tigers spent time in repair, Shermans spent time haveing parts being replaced that va tiger crew would repair, on balance the Tiger is in service more often than the Sherman, sadlyly your ignoranyt opinion is no match for historical known statistical data for servicibilty.

Comparing combat readiness of two opposing armies in such a simplistic fashion, without taking into consideration so many tangible and intangible variables, hardly makes a good argument in the Tiger's favour.

Reliability issues, many people will say yes its a good tank but was unreliable, ate gas like a pig,

All true, and doubtful the pains caused by such a demanding vehicle can be argued against.

foutunatly we have some data to test these notions. Remembering that no designs a tank to be ineffiecent at its task, to achieve its task their must inivatable be areas it performs less well in. It was engineered to be as good as they could make it.

It was engineered within the obsolete understanding of efficient tank design though - context is one variable you are not taking into consideration. Why did the Germans push for production of the Tiger knowing full well that it's design was based entirely on pre-war ideas of armoured warfare in Western Europe? They were clearly aware that the "tank" had evolved considerably in the 3 years since the start of the war, or we would not have seen the Panther come to fruition. Furthermore, the use of Heavy Tank battalions in German Armoured doctrine was geared toward offensive operations - which was becoming the complete opposite of the strategic reality of the war in Europe.

Date 31/5/44 15/9/44 30/9/44 31/10/44 15/11/44 30/11/44 15/12/44 30/12/44 15/1/45 15/3/45
Panzer
Tiger - Avail 360 312 303 327 364 308 395 377 308 244 3,298
<space> - Oper 327 248 258 226 288 238 369 293 234 112 2,593
Pz V - Avail 835 878 915 894 978 910 1228 1177 1194 914 9,923
<space> - Oper 672 622 540 570 689 635 865 770 681 464 6,508
Pz IV - Avail 1530 743 702 950 980 1025 1207 1318 1330 1496 11,281
<space> - Oper 1230 515 461 575 742 782 991 940 910 730 7,876

Tiger % runners 91% 79% 85% 69% 79% 77% 93% 78% 76% 46% 77%
Pz V % runners 80% 71% 59% 64% 70% 70% 70% 65% 57% 51% 66%
Pz IV % runners 80% 69% 66% 61% 76% 76% 82% 71% 68% 49% 70%


My beautiful table didn't quite transfer from excel to the message board the way I thought it would. I will try to edit it to look better, but in the meanwhile I will summarize the results as follows:


If we look at the % of runners vs available, the Pz IV has an advantage of around 11 points if we use weighted average, if we use an average of averages as a measuring stick, the advantage goes down to about half. The difference in runners is as little as 3% to as much as 11%. As an aside, the Tiger and the Pz IV have nearly identical percentages of runners. The dramatic downsize in runners is when major offensives are launched/responded to.

How to interpret the table?

My personal interpretation was that the % difference between the Pz IV and V is marginal if you consider that the Panther was more prone to lead attacks and come in contact with the enemy first, and that recovery of the Panther was more difficult than the Pz IV, due to the absolute number of recovery vehicles available and the number required to salvage a Panther vs a Panzer IV.
To be sure you use stats to show anything if you know how to, the fact remains though then rather look at a tech manual and say hey thats poor perfoermenc, if better data is available use that instead.

Interesting. Again, you are not taking into consideration a plethora of variables that may, or may not have had a detrimental impact on the comabt readiness of the Tiger -or any tank for that matter. Comparing number of tanks available to the number of tanks operational makes little sense for the type of detailed, statistically-based argument you are trying to make. Can you think of anything else that might influence the number of available:operational vehicles? Priority perhaps? Disposition of service units? I wouldn't consider your table to be an accurate reflection of the combat readiness of the Tiger tank, considering you are missing a significant chunk of the Tiger's time in field, as well as the various theaters it operated in. Again, if we look to the early deployment of the Tiger in North Africa, we can see how difficult it was to recover under combat conditions, and maintain in preparation for combat. Throughout it's years in service it took approxiamately 10 hours of maintenance for every hour of operation in the field - not a good track record if you ask me.

Tigers were present on the battlefield more often than any other German AFV because of the dedicated mainataince depots for them, they are the most effiecent AFV weapon for availability for operations. your nonsense posts contradict what everyone else knows and acepts, if they are intrested in the subject that is.

Not a wholly accurate statement, and if it were, it would be based entirely on conditional factors - none of which you have considered before making such a generalised statment. Furthermore, "maintenance depots" or repair and recovery units were attached at the divisional level, IIRC, and Tiger recovery units were theoretically assigned when needed - but since there were so few dedicated Bergetigers, this rarely happened.

Depends on circamstances, if there is no bridge, the Tiger is no way different from any other AFV in being able to not cross, hence your point falls flat on its face. No since it can cross 2 metres of water, and all other Germans had to be specialy fitted out to do whatthe Tiger had as stadard, im unsure you know what your talking about.

IIRC, only the first 1/3 of Tigers were fitted with a snorkel. For those units that were required to cross bridges, there were cases in whch the structures had to be reinforced in order to handle the sheer weight of the monster. Examples of this can be found in every theater the Tiger operated, and while not the the rule, it is something that can not be easily said about the lighter Panzer IV or V.

Simple question cite a single case of a Tiger not being able to cross a river obstacle, or the fording depth of a tiger against the tanks you wished to compare it against, and you will see your just making up your conclusion, not because of the evidence, but in spite of it.

I would agree that it would be clsoe to impossible to find examples of this, but as I mentioned above, there were problems related to the Tiger's weight which prevented it from crossing bridges without engineering assistance. What mipact this would have on a local battlefield, I can't say, but I think we can both agree that the Tiger did require more resources to ensure it was prepared to enter battle.

Design choice, deemed correct or incorrect on ex post fact evidence of combat performence, which US/UK evasuluations found to be extremly high at there testing grounds.

Design choice is right - but only within the context of pre-war armoured theory. The Tiger did not fit the mold or evolutionary progression of tanks. It was a throwback to bygone days, and it's vertical armour is merely one aspect of it.

contributing to that isthe nature of ballistics, the slope of the armour is overmatched on peneytartion by the size of the shell, Soviet shells of large calibre overmatch slopeing and penetrate, while thi8s overmatching does not effect the Tiger armour protection, thstas simple pyshics. Weight is the same if ist sloped or not, its where that weight is distributted for ground pressure that destermined as optimal or not, Tigers GP was extremly good, which was why it and Panthers were adopted by France post war as there MBT.

I am not quite sure if I understand what you are trying to say here. Using sloped armour instead of non-sloped armour makes little difference in weight? Care to qualify this, if it is indeed what you are trying to say?

Presopposes the Tiger was disproportiantly expensive, and that clearing mines was the Tigers responsobility. Very sad linme of argument.

Finding minefields was part of the Tiger's responsibility. Doubtful it was able to clear many, but cegorach was on the right track.

Yes and no. ballistciasly speaking the advatage of the slope can be negatted by the size of shell compared to the slope, large enough shell makes the slopeing effect null and void, thats *why* soviets used such high shell calibre against german AFVs.

Your answer should have been yes. Sloped armour was (and still is) more efficient than non-sloped armour, in terms of both weight and protection offered to the vehicle. When was the last time we saw an MBT with non-sloped armour?

Ok wider sense, one single factory produced every Tiger and every spare part, its less than .01% of all German industrys productive capacity, which is why this part of your argument is rubbish. You get what the Tiger contributes from an extremly small part of the whole. makeing it extremly cost effective from a productive point of view.

Kind of an odd way to form an argument. The Henshcel tank factory at Kassel-Mittlefield was but one of only 12 panzer manufactures in all of Germany. It is interesting that you state it represented only 0.01% of German industrial capacity, yet the USAAF deemed it important enough to be a priority target during the Strategic Bomber Offensive. How many times was the factory specifically selected as a target in comparison to the other 12 tank factories in Germany? I find your 0.01% very sketchy and probably without merit, but I'll give you the chance to show us that Henshcell and Sohn represented such a small part of the German war economy, and an insignificant contribution to the production of armoured vehilces over all.

When calculating your "cost", don't forget that the type of steel required to build a Tiger was of the highest quality - very difficult and time consuming to produce. It would be interesting to see what percentage of quality German steel production the Tiger's requirements represented.

Sadly you keep posting opinon that is the oposiste of data, Gertman AFV numbers continued to rise throught the war, not diminish.

Weird, according to German figures, the front-line inventory of tanks available for service was relatively stable almost the entire war - peaking in the summer of '44 @ 7447 for all three fronts. What surpirses me is that you lambaste Cerogach without considering the fact that although the production of German tanks did peak in 1944, the Germans were fighting on three fronts. German tank production, or availabilty never ever had a chance of keeping up with the increasing length of it's front lines, and thus any argument that cites the increase in tank production, without considering the increased demand for said vehicles is rather short sighted, no?

Except of course all the economic historians, and pretty much all mil hisorians, are in agreement as the cost benifit value of a Tiger

I would be interested in seeing some names, just so I can read some more about the Tiger. Of course you'll first have to know every economic/military historian that ever discussed a Tiger tank in their work before presenting a list here. Are you generalising, or have you actually done all the necessary reading to justify this statement?

Originally Posted by Tiwaz

WW2 production lines could not be easily changed to produce different type of equipment. Thus, manufacturing lines made for Tiger tanks could not have been modified for Panthers easily. It simply was not possible. And Tiger did do very well in tasks it was given. It did not become most feared sight for enemy tankers for no reason or by being a pushover.

The production facilities at Henshcell and Sohn had to be converted to Tiger production from something else though - why stop producing P III's and IV's for several months while the facilites are re-tooled for the Tigers? You're argument works in both directions

Originally Posted by Hanny

Asd you say, you have Tigers in action in late 42, allowing the removal of ALL Germans 88 flak batt from EVERY German ID on the Ost front and taken back to the Riech for AA duty instead of AT/AA duty with the ID, because the specialist AT role the Tigers also undertook after restoring tank supremacy on the Ostfront to Germany.

This single consideration could not be undertaken if there were no Tigers doing the same job as the 88 removed, and the V coming intoi quantity service in mid 43.

What a bizzare statement? Are you telling us that every Flak 88 in the service of German infantry units was withdrawn once the Tiger was available for front line units in late 1942? That's a mere 4 vehicles to take the place of thousands of AA batteries. Very interesting, and yet I don't know if I have ever heard this before. I can understand AA units being withdrawn gradually to combat the CBO, and being replaced by the pak 75 and pak 88 - but it does not seem logical that 300 or so Tigers on the Eastern Front in 1943 were responsible for the wholesale vacuum of Heavy Flak units from front-line service? Does this make sense?

Rubbish, the fixed and finate amount of POL Geramnb had deterimes the absolute numbers of MTV it can field, an increase of them simply reduces that finate amount quicker and reduces operiotiopnl range and availability.

Assuming of course that the course of the war would have been unaltered had the Germans decided to abandon the production of the Tiger in 1942 and instead focus on IVs and Vs instead.

6 for athe E series of 631 production run.

200 V1s for a runoif 6000 means your attempyt to show the Tiger was under represented by recovery vehclices is not supported by the facts, even when you omit the Tiger conversion to recovery numbers.


Your opion runs contary to the facts, do you really want to go through life with opinions like that?.

Unless I am completely misunderstanding what you have stated above, I beleive erogach maybe correct. Bergetiger's were very rare, if non-existent on the battlefield for recovery operations. Typically, it was another Tiger, or two, that served the recovery needs of the heavy panzer battalions.

the Tiger was eaxactly what was asked for and did excatly what was asked of it.

Sort of. It was designed as a breakthrough tank, as I mentioned earlier, a role in which it was not suited. It just happened to work well in certain local environments...

I have faith in statistics, what they support is that the Tiger was cost effective as a weapon system. You had bored the pants of the board with your opinion, and avoided any stats.

Not to dissuade your penchant for statistics, but the "stats" you have provided have been selectively chosen, and are not completely representative of the whole story. Too many things are left out of your simple equations. Cerogach's opinions may not be supported by concrete evidence, but your efforts have been equally futile.

For the answer acadimics and mil historians use for you latest questions, dont you think its a good idea to know the answer before asking what makes you appear stuip in the highest order?.

http://www.amazon.com/Germanys-Tiger...643639-9812032
http://www.amazon.com/Germanys-Tiger...e=UTF8&s=books

So you searched for "tiger tank" on amazon.com, and decided to post these titles for suggested reading? Neither of those books are intended for your casual reader, and neither debate the decision to produce the Tiger. They are technical books only, and offer very little substance to the current debate in this thread.

The decision to go forward with the produciton of the Tiger (and Tiger II for that matter) was not based on sound judgement - either from an economic standpoint, but more importantly from a military perspective. The tank was not equipped for the type of conditions experienced during the war. Yes, it achieved many local sucesses, but would the outcome of any of the campaigns it was involved in have been any different had the Tiger not taken part? Doubtful. It was slow, it was difficult to transport. It required an incredible effort to keep it serviceable - all in all, a logistical problem the Germans probably could have done without. It did not fit into German armoured doctrine that stressed mobility, and it is a wonder why the thing was ever adopted into the panzer force at all. It's range was not much furhter than that of a marching infantry division - and they probably would have been better off being allocated to IDs as part of a their organic AT unit.

What needs to be done, is a comparison between the potential output of the Henshcel & Sohn works at Kassel, to other panzer factories in the Reich. Since Hanny has access to what appears to be a large variety of resources, perhaps he can share some info. What was the Henshel plant producing prior to its conversion to building Tigers? How big was the factory? So many other questions to ask, but I'll leave it at that for now.

[OTZ]

ahh...double post...love that feature.

[Hans Kloss]

Originally Posted by cegorach

Kursk - the stupid waste of resources and manpower

Off topic but still worth posting I think:

New evidence suggests that the Germans may have been closer to victory at Kursk than previously recognized

By George M. Nipe, Jr.

Following their disastrous defeat at Stalingrad during the winter of 1942-43, the German armed forces launched a climactic offensive in the East known as Operation Citadel on July 4,1943. The climax of Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the greatest tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armor engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka), which began on July 12. But while historians have categorized Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the "gully of death" in a very different light.

The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in the Eastern Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would attack from the north flank of the bulge, with Colonel General Walther Model's Ninth Army leading the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps on the right flank and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and meet up with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by General Werner Kempf.

Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by General Nikolai F. Vatutin. The Central Front, with the right wing strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lt. Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the northern sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group South with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the center and left wing. East of Kursk, Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District (renamed Steppe Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount the counteroffensive.

If their plan succeeded, the Germans would encircle and destroy more than five Soviet armies. Such a victory would have forced the Soviets to delay their operations and might have allowed the Wehrmacht desperately needed breathing room on the Eastern Front. Model's Ninth Army never came close to breaking the Soviet defenses in the north, however, and soon became deadlocked in a war of attrition that it could not win. On the southern flank, Kempf's III Panzer Corps, commanded by General Hermann Breith, also encountered tough Soviet resistance. By July 11, however, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between Manstein's panzers and Kursk. The Fourth Panzer Army's attack on the town was led by SS General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps, General Otto von Knobelsdorff's XLVIII Panzer Corps and General Ott's LII Army Corps. Hausser's corps was made up of three panzer divisions--the 1st Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's bodyguard), 2nd SS Das Reich (The Empire) and 3rd SS Totenkopf (Death's Head). Although all three were technically Panzergrenadier divisions, each had more than 100 tanks when Citadel began. Knobelsdorff's corps was composed of the 167th and 332nd infantry divisions, the 3rd and 11th panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and Panther Brigade Decker, and Ott's corps contained the 25th and 57th infantry divisions.

Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector, with more than 650 tanks. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail E. Katukov's First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov's army had been unable to prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov's army also had sustained serious losses. On July 10, the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Hermann Priess, had established a bridgehead over the Psel, west of Prochorovka. By July 11, the division's panzer group had crossed the river on pontoon bridges and reached the bridgehead. What was left of Katukov's armor regrouped to oppose the XLVIII Panzer Corps below Oboyan or counterattack the Psel bridgehead. Reinforced with the XXXIII Rifle Corps and X Tank Corps, Katukov launched continuous attacks on the Totenkopf units on the north bank of the river.

During the evening of July 11, Hausser readied his divisions for an assault on Prochorovka. Totenkopf anchored the left flank of the corps, while Leibstandarte, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Theodore Wisch, was in the center, assembled west of the town between a rail line and the Psel. Das Reich, commanded by SS Lt. Gen. Walter Krüger, moved into its attack zone on the corps' right flank, which was several kilometers south of Tetrevino and southwest of Prochorovka.

While Hausser's SS divisions prepared for battle, there was feverish activity in the Soviet camp as well. On July 11, the Fifth Guards Tank Army arrived in the Prochorovka area, having begun its march on July 7 from assembly areas nearly 200 miles to the east. The army consisted of the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps and the V Guards Mechanized Corps. Rotmistrov's 650 tanks were reinforced by the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps, increasing its strength to about 850 tanks, 500 of which were T-34s. The Fifth Guards' primary mission was to lead the main post-Kursk counteroffensive, known as Operation Rumyantsev, and its secondary mission was as defensive insurance in the south. The commitment of Rotmistrov's army at such an early date is stark evidence of Soviet concern about the situation on the Psel. The Fifth Guards' arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka.

Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad. A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tigers' 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks. The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions' fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south.

While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps-- available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient.

The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700. On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks--Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943.

On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks. Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12. In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin. Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town.

Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself. The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.

Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.

When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated. Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte.

Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads. Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses.

Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka.

The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side--contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat. These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the Kartaschevka*Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses. Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area.

Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod*Kharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka. Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer.

Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev. They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks.

By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps.

Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the Kharkov*Poltava rail line. Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev.

After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually collapsed. The Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves and renewed their attack toward the strategically important Dnepr River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to abandon much of southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnepr. Despite the remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions during July and August, the Germans were too weak to hold the Kharkov*Belgorod*Poltava sector after their summer losses.

It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS panzer divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka. This reassessment of the battle provides food for thought regarding possible German successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had been utilized as he had intended.

To what extent the course of events in Russia would have been changed is, of course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army Group South's panzer reserve had been used to encircle and destroy the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, the outcome of the war in Russia might have been significantly different. Although it was beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the war by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have resulted in a delay of Soviet strategic operations for months or perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this pause would have lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion.

But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks possessed by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible. Due to Hausser's panzer corps' failure to take Prochorovka on July 12 and the subsequent misuse of German panzer reserves, the momentum of the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically. When Hitler abandoned Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost.

It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at Prochorovka has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of crucial primary-source information--especially the records of the II SS Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there had been no evidence to correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in previous studies of the Eastern Front.

Waffen SS formations' records of their Eastern Front operations were not declassified until 1978*1981. By that time, many of the major works about the Eastern Front had already been published. Later authors accepted the accounts of the battle as given in the earlier books and failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly. Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses.

As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German victory, thanks to decisions made by Hitler. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the German dictator, a foremost proponent of the value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern Ukraine in July 1943. Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a victory even more damaging to the Soviets than the counterattack that had recaptured Kharkov in March 1943. *

Author George M. Nipe, Jr., has conducted extensive research on the war on the Eastern Front

[OTZ]

Interesting read. I enjoy the fact that many historians are now re-evaluating the events of the war. It gives a fresh perspective on the historiography of the war, and how it has remained almost unchanged in the last 50 years.

[Morlam]

Originally Posted by OTZ

Both the Tiger I and II were a disgusting waste of resources. The Germans should have focussed their production of the PIV (and its variants) and then the Panther. Germany's late-war obsession with obscenely sized tanks is clear evidence of the Nazi's loose grip on reality. With the materiel they poured into the Tiger I & IIs, they probably could have upped production of PIVs by the thousands.

Yeah. Read somewhere incidentally that they could have produced 40.000 fighter planes for the cost of the VII project. Not sure if it was exactly 40.000, but it was in the tens of thousands.

[Morlam]

I meant the V-II rocket project to be sure

[ForgottenImmortal]

Tiger tank was a defensive tank made to slug it out and deal out lots of damage, in that role it was superb. However as a blitzkrieg or offensive tank it was very poor, as shown at Kursk especially (although to be fair it was early models). Also the Tiger tanks were heavily rushed, contributing to many of their failures. As for waste of resources, maybe, but i can think of about a dozen or so worse waste of resources the Germans had with more consequences than the Tiger tank.

I'd rate the Tiger II and Jagdtiger, Brummbar and such to be greater wastes than the Tiger if we are talking about AFVs.

[OTZ]

I'd agree on all but the Brumbar. The Germans lacked any specialty tanks designed for urban combat, and the Brumbar fit that role perfectly.

[Hanny]

[quote=OTZ;1456820]Isn't Harrison's book about Soviet war time production? And didn't the Tiger actaully cost approxiamately $100,000?

Yes, but it has plenty of German data as well for comparison. Harrison (uni of Warick and his homesite detail his many works on ww2 economics, he also has a 6 ww2 powers econoy in comparion).

No.harrison uses a complex formula wherin every WW2 tanks was costed on internationl commodty prices prevaialing and costed all to US $ for ease of reference. problems with his methodology are the slave labour costs in Germany system skew the costing for labour unit cost.

What was the Tiger's purpose? It was designed as a breakthrough tank - in this role it failed. Poor speed, massive fuel consumption, and excessive maintenance requirements forfeited the Tiger's role for spearheading any breakthrough attacks. The history of the Tiger in Africa will do more than enough to prove this point. The units it served in were rarely above 50% readiness, and in some cases the Tiger was used as a makeshift mine sweeper - purposely being disabled in Allied minefields - hardly an effective use of the vehicle.

NAfrica is hardly representative of the Tigers combat role, bearing how many were there and when. And as such proves very little.

As far as I know, the whole 5:1 issue is a myth that has been continually perpetuated by amateur historians. The interweb doesn't help at preventing it's spread. Your calculations are neat (and flawed, as the actual armoured-combat stat for kill/loss ratio for the Tiger is 12:1 during the war), but I would like to see the historiography behind the theory, rather than your very loosely arrived at guesstimate.

Formation (SPzAbt/Kompanie) - Losses - Kills
501 - 120 - 450
502 - 107 - 1,400
503 - 252 - 1,700
504 - 109 - 250
505 - 126 - 900
506 - 179 - 400
507 - 104 - 600
508 - 78 - 100
509 - 120 - 500
510 - 65 - 200
13/Pzreg GD - 6 - 100
Pzreg GD - 98 - 500
13/SS Pzreg 1 - 42 - 400
8/SS Pzreg 2 - 31 - 250
9/SS Pzreg 3 - 56 - 500
SS SPzAbt 101 (501) - 107 - 500
SS SPzAbt 102 (502) - 76 - 600
SS SPzAbt 103 (503) - 39 - 500

Total: 1,715 - 9,850

Kill/Loss Ratio: 5.74


Thats from the official German combat logs, and is the origin of anecodotal 5:1 to kill a Tiger. At 5:1 tigers is a cost effective weapons sytem. 12:1 you cite, makes it a even more so.


Where does your 12:1 come from, its not from the German records now is it. And can you expalin why a 12:1 return still makes it inefiecent or not cost effective.?.



[quote]
Comparing combat readiness of two opposing armies in such a simplistic fashion, without taking into consideration so many tangible and intangible variables, hardly makes a good argument in the Tiger's favour.[quote]

It is what it is. Its how many you have have to work with, and is used to counter the wild baseles asertions that its not availble due to a number of reasons.

It was engineered within the obsolete understanding of efficient tank design though - context is one variable you are not taking into consideration. Why did the Germans push for production of the Tiger knowing full well that it's design was based entirely on pre-war ideas of armoured warfare in Western Europe? They were clearly aware that the "tank" had evolved considerably in the 3 years since the start of the war, or we would not have seen the Panther come to fruition. Furthermore, the use of Heavy Tank battalions in German Armoured doctrine was geared toward offensive operations - which was becoming the complete opposite of the strategic reality of the war in Europe.

No it was enginered to use flat buttresing rather than sloping so as to go into production without rejigging the factorys workshops, straight lifts use simply hoists, fitting slopped armour required a full change to assembly procedures. When they switch to King Tigers and adopt slopped it because all were ready to do so, ie desigened for it, asembly plants ready for it etc.

Interesting. Again, you are not taking into consideration a plethora of variables that may, or may not have had a detrimental impact on the comabt readiness of the Tiger -or any tank for that matter. Comparing number of tanks available to the number of tanks operational makes little sense for the type of detailed, statistically-based argument you are trying to make. Can you think of anything else that might influence the number of available:operational vehicles? Priority perhaps? Disposition of service units? I wouldn't consider your table to be an accurate reflection of the combat readiness of the Tiger tank, considering you are missing a significant chunk of the Tiger's time in field, as well as the various theaters it operated in. Again, if we look to the early deployment of the Tiger in North Africa, we can see how difficult it was to recover under combat conditions, and maintain in preparation for combat. Throughout it's years in service it took approxiamately 10 hours of maintenance for every hour of operation in the field - not a good track record if you ask me.

Well at leat i have and gave some data. Wheres yours?.

sherman V took 17 hours to one, and your point is what again?.

Not a wholly accurate statement, and if it were, it would be based entirely on conditional factors - none of which you have considered before making such a generalised statment. Furthermore, "maintenance depots" or repair and recovery units were attached at the divisional level, IIRC, and Tiger recovery units were theoretically assigned when needed - but since there were so few dedicated Bergetigers, this rarely happened.

look at the table i gave, my comment is acurate to the data on the table, not acurate to whatever other factors you may want me to have introduced to be sure, but untill you present something in its place of more pertinance im afraid we are at an impasse.

IIRC, only the first 1/3 of Tigers were fitted with a snorkel. For those units that were required to cross bridges, there were cases in whch the structures had to be reinforced in order to handle the sheer weight of the monster. Examples of this can be found in every theater the Tiger operated, and while not the the rule, it is something that can not be easily said about the lighter Panzer IV or V.

First 495 E had it as standard, it was found in operational use that it was hardly ever used and discontiunued in production as standard, and all werer removed to stores and provided on an as needed basis.

I would agree that it would be clsoe to impossible to find examples of this, but as I mentioned above, there were problems related to the Tiger's weight which prevented it from crossing bridges without engineering assistance. What mipact this would have on a local battlefield, I can't say, but I think we can both agree that the Tiger did require more resources to ensure it was prepared to enter battle.

well this is a circamstances issue, put a man in hole with his arms tied and a small child with a club will kick the crap out of him. most circamstances means this issue does not apply.


Ouit of time, back tommorrow.

[OTZ]

Originally Posted by Hanny

NAfrica is hardly representative of the Tigers combat role, bearing how many were there and when. And as such proves very little.

Sure it does. It shows that the Tiger failed in the role it was deisgned for, and caused innumerbale headaches for offensive operations.

Formation (SPzAbt/Kompanie) - Losses - Kills
501 - 120 - 450
502 - 107 - 1,400
503 - 252 - 1,700
504 - 109 - 250
505 - 126 - 900
506 - 179 - 400
507 - 104 - 600
508 - 78 - 100
509 - 120 - 500
510 - 65 - 200
13/Pzreg GD - 6 - 100
Pzreg GD - 98 - 500
13/SS Pzreg 1 - 42 - 400
8/SS Pzreg 2 - 31 - 250
9/SS Pzreg 3 - 56 - 500
SS SPzAbt 101 (501) - 107 - 500
SS SPzAbt 102 (502) - 76 - 600
SS SPzAbt 103 (503) - 39 - 500

Total: 1,715 - 9,850

Kill/Loss Ratio: 5.74


Thats from the official German combat logs, and is the origin of anecodotal 5:1 to kill a Tiger. At 5:1 tigers is a cost effective weapons sytem. 12:1 you cite, makes it a even more so.

I wasn't debating your stats - I was debunking your argument about the 5:1 myth.

Where does your 12:1 come from, its not from the German records now is it. And can you expalin why a 12:1 return still makes it inefiecent or not cost effective.?.

It's not from the non-specific, interent based stats you are referring to, no. The 12:1 ratio reflects tanks killed by other tanks - not just "lost" in combat. You're 5:1 ratio is kind of weird isn't it, considering you are comparing tanks killed by Tigers, to Tigers lost by any method.

It is what it is. Its how many you have have to work with, and is used to counter the wild baseles asertions that its not availble due to a number of reasons.

I am sorry, but this doesn't work. There are reasons why Tigers appear to have been more readily available for front line service, and you are not considering them.

No it was enginered to use flat buttresing rather than sloping so as to go into production without rejigging the factorys workshops,

Where can I find this info? Henshcell and Sohn's plant was already tooled for the Tiger in 1942? You are also not understanding what I said about the Tank's design...it was engineered with vertical armour - it wasn't desinged to take into consideration what manufacturing facilities were available and what their capabiliites were. It was an old design, based on misconceptions about armoured warfare, and it was sent into production despite the complete shift in German armoured doctrine.

straight lifts use simply hoists, fitting slopped armour required a full change to assembly procedures. When they switch to King Tigers and adopt slopped it because all were ready to do so, ie desigened for it, asembly plants ready for it etc.

Using sloped armour would have meant the Tiger would have to go back to the drawing board - it had nothing to do with the layout of the factory in Kassel (or any other factory.)

Well at leat i have and gave some data. Wheres yours?.

Sure you've got stats, but they don't fit into the debate with any meaning. They are selective and do not encompass the whole story. Stats are great, but only if they mean something, and only when they are used within proper context.

sherman V took 17 hours to one, and your point is what again?.

10 hours of service for every 1 in the field, for a tank that was rarely on the front lines is a poor track record. Why are you comparing it to the Sherman, I don't understand? The Germans didn't make Shermans.

look at the table i gave, my comment is acurate to the data on the table, not acurate to whatever other factors you may want me to have introduced to be sure, but untill you present something in its place of more pertinance im afraid we are at an impasse.

Well, I am sorry you feel that way, but I really think you should try and use your "stats" within context, instead of using them as absolutes. I don't doubt that your figures are accurate, but they attempting to draw concluios from those figures.

First 495 E had it as standard, it was found in operational use that it was hardly ever used and discontiunued in production as standard, and all werer removed to stores and provided on an as needed basis.

You didn't make that clear before - in fact you stated that wading equipment was standard for the Tiger, when in fact it wasn't.

well this is a circamstances issue, put a man in hole with his arms tied and a small child with a club will kick the crap out of him. most circamstances means this issue does not apply.

I have no idea how this relates to what I said. Can you explain it a little more?

[alexdblade21]

The major problem with the king tiger was that when it enter service the germans has lost air superiority, so it was a seating duck. If the germans woulded had 100 king tiger on the east front on 1942 they woulded had won ww2!

[Hanny]

Originally Posted by OTZ

Sure it does. It shows that the Tiger failed in the role it was deisgned for, and caused innumerbale headaches for offensive operations.

How can it?, the Tigers has an absurdly small participation role.

Africa shipments (total arrived plus number lost in transit in parens):

8-10 March 41, 5 le.Afrika-Div. with 25 Pz I, 45 Pz II, 61 (10) Pz III, 17 (3) Pz IV
24 April-6 May 41, 21 Pz.Div. with 45 Pz II, 71 Pz III, 20 Pz IV

Replacements (release date given, all arrived between August and October 1941):
? April 41, 10 Pz III, 3 Pz IV
4 June 41, 15 Pz III, 5 Pz IV
30 June 41, 4 Pz II, 6 Pz III
10 July 41, 4 Pz III
19 December 41, 11 (11) Pz III, 34 (34) Pz IV

Monthly reported shipments:
January 42, 81 Pz III, 18 Pz IV
February 42, 75 Pz III, 22 Pz IV
March 42, 6 (3) Pz III
April 42, 14 Pz III
May 42, 33 (6) Pz III, 9 Pz IV
June 42, 2 (6) Pz III
July 42, 47 (3) Pz III, 10 Pz IV
August 42, 29 (3) Pz III, 10 Pz IV
September 42, 7 (9) Pz III, 12 Pz IV

Arrived November-December 1942:
Pz.Abtl. 190 with 7 Pz II, 52 Pz III, 10 Pz IV
10. Pz.Div. with 19 (2) Pz II, 89 (16) Pz III, 8 (12) Pz IV
s.Pz.Abtl. 501 with 25 Pz III, 20 Tiger

Arrived March-April 43:
s.Pz.Abtl. 504 with 19 Pz III, 11 Tiger
3./Pz.Regt. HG with 2 Pz III, 8 Pz IV

Replacements 1 November 42-1 May 1943:
68 (16) Pz III, 142 (2 Pz IV

So, if I can add them up right for once, 25 Pz I, 120 (2) Pz II, 727 (82) Pz III, 328 (77) Pz IV, and 31 Tiger.


Now you want to use 31 Tigers as representaive of the War time tigers experiece?.

I wasn't debating your stats - I was debunking your argument about the 5:1 myth.

No you asked for its histography, i provided where the 5:1 comes from, it comes from the German combat logs, and is widely quaoted in litertaure. Its not a myth and is used in Uk/USA Mil education, if you look at the CALL database, see Master's Thesis from a US Army Major (C.Wilbeck) about the employment of Tigers He takes figures from Schneider 'Tigers in Combat I & II', and gives overall effectiveness as:

Kill ratio total 1:5.74


you bolded this to draw my attention to you not knowing that lost in combat is a different number from what i posted right?,and flawed, as the actual armoured-combat stat for kill/loss ratio for the Tiger is 12:1 during the war, claiming it makes my data flawed, now get real sonny.


why does he use that numbers?, it because thats what the records show and what he has been taught at west point, he would also have been taught that using the US intpretation of a kill in combat it achieved 12:1 against tanks, and that the USA uses a different intreptation of kill in combat to the Uk and Rusian and French.As for the Western Allies they utilized a similar system the Germnays but not exactly the same( 1. available, 2. in short term repair, 3. in long term repair and 4. as total losses) The first category were for operational vehicles or those operational within 6 hours, those nonoperational but repairable within 24 hours, and then a final category of those nonoperational and not repairable withing 24 hours, including those lost or damaged due to combat.


I should point out that 12:1 uses not only those lost in combat but those in cat 4.

It's not from the non-specific, interent based stats you are referring to, no.

Biizare, i give you the German records and you think because there on the net there no acurate or specific?. I gave the specific record that created the common refrain it takes 5 tanks to kill a Tiger. I gave it to you before you asked for it, when you asked for it, now please stop asking me toi explain the same thing over and over.

The 12:1 ratio reflects tanks killed by other tanks - not just "lost" in combat. You're 5:1 ratio is kind of weird isn't it, considering you are comparing tanks killed by Tigers, to Tigers lost by any method.

I know that, it comes from US post war data comparisons not of claims of losses but losses admitted. the point remains, 12:1 in combat and 5:1 overal is the tigers record,i was conservative in makeing the cost benifit on its overall werord, but hey, ill take the 12:1 combat record if its being offered.

ill ask again 12:1 is not cost effective, if so was any tank cost effictive?.

I am sorry, but this doesn't work. There are reasons why Tigers appear to have been more readily available for front line service, and you are not considering them.

those reasons are built into the numbers available, it matters not what the reason is, its overcome or not and the availble for service is the end product of all those issues.


Some US data for you.

.........................First.Army.........MediumTank........Medium.Tanks..........Mediums....................................................................
......................... T/E.Strength..... ..Authorization........Operative ........... ...Lost
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUG 1944 - .....1358 ................1358.............. ......1282 ..................... 223
SEPT 1944 - ......1184 .............. 1138 .......... .........1026 ..................... 139
OCT 1944 - ......1454 ................1362 ................. 1201 .................... .. 132
NOV 1944 - ......1054 ................ 931 . ...................846........................ 133
DEC 1944 ..........1730 ............... 1788....................1320...................... .398
JAN 1945 -.........1400 ................1368 ........ ..........1210...................... 184
½ of FEB 1945...1064.................1064 .................... 942 ....................... 42

Where can I find this info? Henshcell and Sohn's plant was already tooled for the Tiger in 1942? You are also not understanding what I said about the Tank's design...it was engineered with vertical armour - it wasn't desinged to take into consideration what manufacturing facilities were available and what their capabiliites were. It was an old design, based on misconceptions about armoured warfare, and it was sent into production despite the complete shift in German armoured doctrine.

Henschels chief engineeer, post war interegation. He disagrees with you considerable and ill take him over you. Is hindsight your only argument?.


[quote]
Using sloped armour would have meant the Tiger would have to go back to the drawing board - it had nothing to do with the layout of the factory in Kassel (or any other factory.)


Not acording to those who had to build it.

Sure you've got stats, but they don't fit into the debate with any meaning. They are selective and do not encompass the whole story. Stats are great, but only if they mean something, and only when they are used within proper context.

My point was untill you demonstarte *why* you think as you do im unable to understand the grounds of your argument.

10 hours of service for every 1 in the field, for a tank that was rarely on the front lines is a poor track record. Why are you comparing it to the Sherman, I don't understand? The Germans didn't make Shermans.

Because your makeing the point that the Tiger was mechanicaly unreliable, ive already compared it to other German models to show it wa snot, it was in servoice more than them, since i already know the allied servicbility numbers, and most know the mechnicly reliable Sherman, what most dont know was it was in service less than the Tiger who was not as mechanicly sound.

Well, I am sorry you feel that way, but I really think you should try and use your "stats" within context, instead of using them as absolutes. I don't doubt that your figures are accurate, but they attempting to draw concluios from those figures.

Thats exactly what i have done, i have assumed a certain knowledge of readers to be sure, and not been all inclusive to be sure but ceratinly given enough explationary data to support my posistion,, but im not here for peer review or even sure im talking to someone versed in the subject matter.

Why not take your own advice?.

You didn't make that clear before - in fact you stated that wading equipment was standard for the Tiger, when in fact it wasn't.

I assumed anyone reading and inttrested would know the reference, since i had to expalin still further to you i see my mistake, should stick to feldgrau.

Standard factory production issue with aceptence for service includes the snorkel one per AFV, this was discontinued when found not to be used in field service, and the snorkles were transfered to stores and made available from stores on as as needed basis instead.

Your answer should have been yes. Sloped armour was (and still is) more efficient than non-sloped armour, in terms of both weight and protection offered to the vehicle. When was the last time we saw an MBT with non-sloped armour?

No my answer was correct as to the point being presented. Your putting a different point than our Polish friend, but still getting the wrong conclusion, slopped armour was not new in 1942 the Russian BT series had been decimated with slopped armour by the Germans, and its not the only answer now either as the same laws of pyshics still apply, the extra protection of the slope, whatever the angle of slope is on the target is dependnt on the angle of the incomming round, and the size of the round, either can nullify any extra material penetration required of the target. So yes and no is still the correct answer to your question, yes in some circamstances it offers the optimum protection but not in all circumstances, APDS for instance negate the any benfit of slope. Todays MBT are are poor comparison, the Tiger was repalced by a sloped version of itself, not because the Tiger I was badly designed, but on hand and ready for production and sorely needed, in 42 it did not need slooping armour, what it had made it the best AFV on the field of combat and would remain so for 12-18 months. Its not what we have today but what was around in late 42 to late 44 thats important to its cost effectiveness, and comparison, it did after all slaughter all slopped tanks in that period in was pitted against, untill surpassed by even more techncaly advanced machines later in the war. And that ignoring the whole deflection aspect of sloped armour btw.

Kind of an odd way to form an argument. The Henshcel tank factory at Kassel-Mittlefield was but one of only 12 panzer manufactures in all of Germany. It is interesting that you state it represented only 0.01% of German industrial capacity, yet the USAAF deemed it important enough to be a priority target during the Strategic Bomber Offensive. How many times was the factory specifically selected as a target in comparison to the other 12 tank factories in Germany? I find your 0.01% very sketchy and probably without merit, but I'll give you the chance to show us that Henshcell and Sohn represented such a small part of the German war economy, and an insignificant contribution to the production of armoured vehilces over all.

I aluded to this in an erarlier post, during normandy the western allies experienced the 90 tigers effects, this prompted the USAF to bomb the only factory producing Tigers, 106 per month June-Aug, 36 per month Aug-Oct 44 was the result. USAF added it as a priority target as a result of fighting against it by the western allies whose CoS asked for it to be added as a target to includded as one of the highest priority, it is the only German AFV factory specificly targetted by the SB campaign and the only one asked to be included by the combined chiefs staffers during the NWE campaign. pre invasion kassel was bombed, but the tank factory was not the target.

The 0.01% of German capacity cite comes from Rohland, head of the Geramn Main Committe for tanks, which provided for German industry the targets (what the varouse dept said they needed, and AH said they could have, ie munitions 40% of all expenditure, 30% Lw, and so on down to Tanks with 5% or so, and allocted the resources to achieve them,the Sept 42 target plan for the next 2 years was to provide 600 panthers, 50 tigers, 600 AG/SPG, 150 Lt tanks pcm target for industry and allocted the finance and resoutces to see it through, only to have AH change it to 900 AG/SPG and 900 panthers and Tigers combined. Rohanland argued you simply cant squeze more production from Henshel, it has no excess capacity, its working 24/7 and cannot increase production of Tigers as there is no spare capacity, and gave its capacity, and instead said to expand production numbers requires another factory to meet the proposed demand, the cost of which and time to construct was rejected by the MONTAN GmbH, (Whermachts investment holding branch who oversaw finaces of whermacht projects), so the only increrase possible would be in the normal expeded range of reduction time due to experience, ie 3000,000 man hours per Tiger in 42, to 280,000 in 43 and that was the only forsable practible means of expanding Tiger production at the plant.
Simple question, since Germany built more than 12 tank factorys during the war, where did all the pre war tanks come from?, or is 12 a number you just felt like shareing?.

Weird, according to German figures, the front-line inventory of tanks available for service was relatively stable almost the entire war - peaking in the summer of '44 @ 7447 for all three fronts. What surpirses me is that you lambaste Cerogach without considering the fact that although the production of German tanks did peak in 1944, the Germans were fighting on three fronts. German tank production, or availabilty never ever had a chance of keeping up with the increasing length of it's front lines, and thus any argument that cites the increase in tank production, without considering the increased demand for said vehicles is rather short sighted, no?

Whose figures?, the Germans are in the Bundesarchive, copies in washington libary of Congress on micro flim, and extracts of them avalaible in many books, one is Das deutsche riech und der Zweite Weltkrieg 9 vols, and has all the war time production, losses, all the data any statistican could want, one dealls with panzertruppen stengths at given points in time as provided by the Ins general of OKH. Heres some examples from it, ill use Tooze book for a scan for you.
second point, the question was put that Germany panzer strength fell during the war, you claim it was fairly stable, i find both claims to be against the German records, and discount them as rubbish. My reply to his claim was not based on production numbers but on actual numbers the Ins general cites as haveing, so im unclear where i gave you that impresion.
lastly your using front line strength, and claim it to be stable throughout the war, while at the same time telling me that fighting on 3 Fronts at the end of a long extended supply line was going to mean those numbers were not going to be as i posted, yet you here claim them to be stable througout the war. I posted numbers from the OKH Ins Gen reports, summary table given Panazerwaffen strength at points in time, it includes all panzers in service everywhere, these are the numbers i gave, which would be different from front line strength, anyone inteligent would understand the figure youve seen is going to be different from the full number that includes those held in depot for issue, accepted into service and in transit, in worshops and so on, which is what i give and commented on that grew throughn the war and didd not dimish as our Pole claimed, that OKH summary also has breakdown flow charts etc, the types of tank, its condition and so on, what your "front line inventory" number shows is that during the war front line strength was extremly elastic (down after major ops for instance) and absolutly not stable at any extended period during the war except for the phony war period. Look at Jetnz flow charts for panzer front line strengths, you do have the basic books right?, what you see is eratic front line strength throught the war, but always rising year on year from 39-44 and falling in 45.
OKH Figures.
Oct 1939 2,712
Jan 1942 4,891
June 1944 11,105


Table A4. Armaments position of the Wehrmacht
Numbers of weapons: % Increase:
,
May June January Firepower Firepower
194° 1941 1942 per man, per man,
over over over May 194° June 1941
October June January October May June over October over May
1939 May 194° 1941 1942 1939 194° 1941 1939 194°
Rifles K 98 2,569,3°0 3,228,5°0 4,372,800 4,717,5°0 25.7 35.4 7.9 7.1 13.8
MP 38 and 4° 5,711 27,800 166,700 2°5,45° 386.8 499.6 23.2 315.0 4°3.9
MGs 1°3,3°0 15°,4°° 2°3,25° 206,500 45.6 35.1 1.6 24.1 13.6
2 centimetre Flak 3° 895 1,487 2,153 2,69° 66.1 44.8 24.9 41.6 21.7
3.7 centimetre Pak 10,560 14,257 15,522 13,348 35.0 8.9 -14.0 15.1 -8.5
Light mortar 5,062 9,957 16,129 15,579 96.7 62.0 -3.4 67.7 36.1
Heavy mortar 3,959 7,°91 11,767 11,719 79.1 65.9 -0.4 P.7 39.4
10 centimetre
Nebelwerfer 179 288 1,112 953 60.9 286.1 -14.3 37.2 224.5
Light Infantry Gun 18 2,931 3,365 4,176 4,022 14.8 24.1 -3.7 -2.1 4.3
Heavy Infantry Gun 33 367 491 867 866 33.8 76.6 -0.1 14.1 48.4
L. Howitzer 16 u. 18 4,919 5,538 7,°76 6,772 12.6 27.8 -4.3 -4.0 7.4
H. Howitzer 2.,434 2.,383 2,867 2.,746 -2.1 20.3 -4.2 -16.5 1.1
Heavy artillery 21-42
centimetre 47 163 442 548 246.8 171.2 24.0 195.7 12.7.9
Infantry ammunition,
million rounds 6,665 8,459 9,774 7,176 26.9 15.5 -26.6 8.2 -2.9
Pz. U. Pak shells,
million rounds 36 77 79 69 115.4 2.0 -11.7 83.6 -14.3
Artillery shells, million
rounds 29 57 9° 64 94.7 58.2 -29.7 66.0 32.9
PzKampfW I 1,3°5 1,266 966 817 -3.0 -23.7 -15.4 -17.3 -35.9
PzKampfW II 991 1,110 1,159 996 12.0 4.4 -14.1 -4.5 -12.3
PzKampfW III 151 785 1,44° 1,866 419.9 83.4 29.6 343.2 54.2
PzKampfW IV 143 29° 572 511 102.8 97.2 -10.7 72.9 65.7
PzKampfW 38 t 122 238 754 434 95.1 216.8 -42.4 66.3 166.2
Total light tank 2,296 2,376 2,125 1,813 3.5 -10.6 -14.7 -11.8 -24.8
Total medium tank 416 1,313 2,766 2,811 215.6 110.7 1.6 169.1 77.0
Half-tracks 5,200 7,997 15,642 19,129 53.8 95.6 22.3 31.1 64.4
Wehrmacht strength 4,556,000 5,766,448 7,3°9,°00 7,648,000 26.6 26.8 4.6
Army numbers 3,7°6,000 4,347,000 5,200,000 5,428,000 17.3 19.6 4.4
Sources: Kroener, in DRZW 5/1. 731, 826, 834,959; Mueller, in DRZW 5/1. 554-5



(In late 41 Henschle expands its production capacity by 100,000 sq feet of factory space, all sub production was centalised at the factory rather than subbed out to sub contrators elswere, and introduced a 24 hour rota for its now 7800 staff, formally under half that, all other German factorys dont adopt the 72 hour work week untill end of 42 begging of 43).

So ill take the word of the Ins General of the whermacht over armour strength returns as being accurate rather than yours, his figures show it peaked at 9,702 in mid 44, but i expect yours is for 3 fronts and is derived from a different acounting method, probably adding up on hand and in stock for 3 fronts, which i would expect would be different.


Specific question is the cost/benifit of a Tiger yes?, M Harrison "The economies of WW2", statistic tabele 17 detailing all particepents expenditure on Rifles/MGs/Machine Pistols/Guns/Mtr/AFV/air etc, German economy spent 5.2% on AFV production of which i gave the break down of the Tiger and gave the 43 year of 7% expenditure which was the peak year geramny spoent on AFV with th AH panzer armamament program, i also citeied Tooze "The makeing and breaking of the nazi economy", which conatins apendix table a6 in which is a detailed brakdown of 41-45 productiopn which is itself drawn fcvrom Wagenfueher 1954 die deutshe industrie im Kriege. Basicly economist have provided the cost/number of every weapon system, all you have then to do is compare them.

Maj J J How in his study of German armour post war for the MOD. Us Studys during the war contain similar, table 1:US soldiers attitudes to eniemies weapons, weapon 88 tops the list as the most frighting, 48% of GI gave it the most frighting, 20% a dive bomber, 13% a mortor, 12% a horizontal bomber, 7% LMG and so on, then most dangerous, 62-17-6-5-4 in the same order. the fear of a Tiger is something no states can show, but in war the fear of a Tiger was worth its weight, every singe ounce of every ton.


You may not like any figures i give you, but they are all from primary data, any conclusion i post based on them is fair game, but when i give a figure, lets just assume its the same as the word of god as far as your concerned.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Tiwaz
WW2 production lines could not be easily changed to produce different type of equipment. Thus, manufacturing lines made for Tiger tanks could not have been modified for Panthers easily. It simply was not possible. And Tiger did do very well in tasks it was given. It did not become most feared sight for enemy tankers for no reason or by being a pushover.
The production facilities at Henshcell and Sohn had to be converted to Tiger production from something else though - why stop producing P III's and IV's for several months while the facilites are re-tooled for the Tigers? You're argument works in both directions

Rubbish, they went from heavy RR engines ( Germany produced over 5000 RR engines during the war) to Tigers as being about the only factory capable of doing such high stress lifts, one reason why the factory got the job was it was designed for the heavy lifting required,it went for non slopped armour and straight lifts up/down and was what it was designed for and was simpler/quicker to fabricate stright edges together rather than butresse angles togther lowerd in at the same angle as the slope causing different dynacmics of centresof gravity and load bearing. No factory went straight from light weight to heavy weight panzer production because the structual weight required to lift had to be borne by the building, and only custom built ones could do the job, or to put it simply, put a RSG in your living room and see if your bricks can support you lifting a 60 ton weight from it.

What a bizzare statement? Are you telling us that every Flak 88 in the service of German infantry units was withdrawn once the Tiger was available for front line units in late 1942? That's a mere 4 vehicles to take the place of thousands of AA batteries. Very interesting, and yet I don't know if I have ever heard this before. I can understand AA units being withdrawn gradually to combat the CBO, and being replaced by the pak 75 and pak 88 - but it does not seem logical that 300 or so Tigers on the Eastern Front in 1943 were responsible for the wholesale vacuum of Heavy Flak units from front-line service? Does this make sense?

No, im telling you that months before any were withdrawn, the policy of withdrawing them was adopted and the arguments for doing so were given, Goering staffers wanted the 88 back under LW control ( those in ID acounted for 40% of all 88 and when returned it had 90% of 88 undser its control by 43 and 81% of that was back in the riech)and in the Riech, the Army wanted them to counter the Russian tanks as they were the best counter they had at that time, the Arty wanted to have an expaned AT role for its SPG and to be given a greater remit to fill that role and thus increase its share of the mil pie of resources, they had had great succes in AG with mounting the 75 on the Czech 38 as a an emergency measure, the crews were taken from the art and remain under art control but wanted more of the same and greater autonmy of control of them rather thanbeing integrated as AT into army control. policy choices were and still are taken in expectation of events being as predicted, the on hand numbers of tigers at the time is irrelevent, its the number projjected to be onhand when the poicy is implemented thats important, of course i may have overstated the tigers role in polcy descion makeing, but AH was extremly clear that with its introduction to the ost Front, the conditions would allow the 88 to return to LW control and come back to the Riech.

Of course the actual implentation was staggered to take acount of conditions prevailing, availibility of transport back to the Riech being one such, but every 88 was removed by Autumn 43.

Unless I am completely misunderstanding what you have stated above, I beleive erogach maybe correct. Bergetiger's were very rare, if non-existent on the battlefield for recovery operations. Typically, it was another Tiger, or two, that served the recovery needs of the heavy panzer battalions.

Typicaly it was another tank that recovered another tank in all armies, it was just that Tigers had no other choice in the matter, they were needed to be combat ready, not waiting around to be recovered, and you only recover if you retain the ground in the first place. Germany simply did not have the same leave it in the ditch and someone will get a round to it later mentality. 400 Uk tanks (out of 1000 total)broke down in the first 24 hours of 2nd El Alemain, hardly the Uk finset hour in tank reliability, 65% of those was to mines, 37 did so recovering other tanks, REME post battle report on its operations during the engegement, so dont bother argueing with me, i know what i talking about and you have no clue as to tank reliability and availibilty, anyone who does is forced to conclue the Tiger was extremly reliable and avaiable, and no more prone to mines than any other tank, and no more or less likly to be recovered by a tank than any other vechicle, the data simply does not support such claims.
Given a life expectency of weeks in 43, the T34 dont need a recovery vechicle at all then i asume, it did not rate a sandblast, primer and paint job as a cost cutting excercise due to its short life expetency.

Not to dissuade your penchant for statistics, but the "stats" you have provided have been selectively chosen, and are not completely representative of the whole story. Too many things are left out of your simple equations. Cerogach's opinions may not be supported by concrete evidence, but your efforts have been equally futile.

The whole story is very simple, Tigers destroyed in combat more value than they cost to produce, irespective of any other cost benifit they accured, and i agree it is futile to attempt to pass on to some people, knowledge.
Chosen to make a point is why anyone picks a stat, yove provided one that 12:1 is what the Tiger achieved and was not cost effective, simply question, what tank was cost effective then?, and what where its kill/loss ratio?.

GDP in 42 was 4:1 in the Allies favour, ergo any weapon that is produces must match that relative imbalance or its contributing to defeat, since Germany on the attack or defence is generally creditted as killing 50% more than anyone else and derserves ahigh recognition as an effictive instrument of policy, if a Tiger was not cost effective then just what tank was?, and why are the worlds bookshops full of its wartime exploits?.

Sadly you claim what is left out means what i posted is somehow wrong. Demonstrate that to be the case, dont just claim it. I left out the simple fact that acording to the UK OH, "For the BEF, breakdowns acount for 75% of all casulaties", so its clear the BEF had a masive advantage in breakdown and non recovery in 1940 over the Tiger.
From 8-17 Feb 45 the 9th RTR and 147 Regiment fought in the Reichswald, and lost 85 tanks, 17 to enemy action, 13 to turrt failure, 3 to clutch failure, 20 to mechanical breakdown, 32 to bogged down. Does not appear to have improved by 45 either.

So you searched for "tiger tank" on amazon.com, and decided to post these titles for suggested reading? Neither of those books are intended for your casual reader, and neither debate the decision to produce the Tiger. They are technical books only, and offer very little substance to the current debate in this thread.

No, i posted them for the Pole to learn more about something he knows very little about, since ive quoted some info from them here already i believe him doing so would benifit himself. You have read them right?.

The decision to go forward with the produciton of the Tiger (and Tiger II for that matter) was not based on sound judgement - either from an economic standpoint, but more importantly from a military perspective. The tank was not equipped for the type of conditions experienced during the war. Yes, it achieved many local sucesses, but would the outcome of any of the campaigns it was involved in have been any different had the Tiger not taken part?
Doubtful. It was slow, it was difficult to transport. It required an incredible effort to keep it serviceable - all in all, a logistical problem the Germans probably could have done without. It did not fit into German armoured doctrine that stressed mobility, and it is a wonder why the thing was ever adopted into the panzer force at all.

Except that all of those making those descioons disgareed with you, (especially the German mil who pressed for ther Tiger and were exstatic at what it gave them in 42/44, just like war Uk corespondednts were forbidden to report from NWE on any aspects of Tigers after the reported its effects on morale and battlefields usage by direct orders from Monty, the only US comparable measure was to withhold reports of kamikazi attacks back from the public for as long as possible), and they had forseight not hindisght which your using to qustion there judgment. you do know that every Sherman that was upgraded was shipped back to the states and then returned to the Theatre, and was designed on the specs to fit existing naval transport ship size, just what kind of logistical nightmire was that compared to the problems of the Tiger?, some 10k shermans never saw combat action but spent the war years in transit/storage, but the allies could afford such incompetence, such as haveing an inventory of 22,000,000 jerry cans on 6 June, and only 10,000,000 in August, severly curtailing logistical supply.

It's range was not much furhter than that of a marching infantry division - and they probably would have been better off being allocated to IDs as part of a their organic AT unit.

20klms a day for an ID, a Tiger Bttn does that in under an hour. So you want to have Tigers as AT attatched to every Id, you just lost some of the credability you had built up my friend if you consider that a viable proposistion.
In the war the Geramn ministrys wanted to know how much bang it was getting for its DM, in Autumn of 43, 8000 woked on Tigers, 152,000 on all the other AFV, total 160,000 with tigers taking up such a small % of the workforce allocated to AFV production. simply quastion, is there another example of a weapons sytem produced in ww2 by such a small number of people?, that has become a houshold name?, and a wartime boggy man to those who had to face it?.

What needs to be done, is a comparison between the potential output of the Henshcel & Sohn works at Kassel, to other panzer factories in the Reich. Since Hanny has access to what appears to be a large variety of resources, perhaps he can share some info. What was the Henshel plant producing prior to its conversion to building Tigers? How big was the factory? So many other questions to ask, but I'll leave it at that for now.

Tooze book (The makeing and breaking of the Nazi economy" i mentioned earlier has some of that, i wont give you the amazon link as you can get it yourself from the title.
What needs to be done is for people to get some perspective, just under 500 billion RM spent, 5 billion gets you the V1 and 2 weapons system, which dropped 0.23% of total tonnage dropped by the western allies on Germany in the SB campaign. Typicly 5% per annum goes on all AFVs, 30% to the LW and 40% to munitions and so on. Tigers were so far down the list as to be meangless. yet everyone has heard of them, why?, Because they were an extremly formidable and cost effective component of the German war effort is why.

But more importantly, anyone claiming the Tiger was not cost effeicent needs to learn how to basic maths as no one who can, can form such a conclusion, its really that simple, did the cost to produce equal or not equal what the Tiger was responsible for removing, if it was greater by what order of magnitude was it greater, all these questions have already been asked and aswered by people able to count, leaving arguments like this i had hoped to the dustbin of history. il leave you with Karl Frydag, (senior enginer at Henshel and responsible for the production of the Tiger I there, and sat on the Main Committe for airframes as well, "Tank production and aircraft production are always being compared to one another. They cannot be compared to one another, tank production is dirt,when set against the LW, it terms of value produced or resopurc es consumed, the production of aircraft was at least 5 times more important than the output of tanks." he was scathing to the post war US intergators who were extremly intrested in Tigers.

[humble]

The Tiger kill ratio figures are worthless because the tables are unconfirmed claims rather than actual confirmed kills. There are no official figures for Tiger kills because such data would be impossible to isolate. The TII made its debut in Normandy and it had no discernable impact.

[humble]

Originally Posted by Hanny

I aluded to this in an earlier post, during normandy the western allies experienced the 90 tigers effects, this prompted the USAF to bomb the only factory producing Tigers, 106 per month June-Aug, 36 per month Aug-Oct 44 was the result.

True for the Tiger I. But then the reason was that production was stopped in August and that months total of 6 was the end of the tank.

Total tiger I/II production:

June............107
July.............109
August.........100 (end of the TI)
Sept............63
October........26
November......26
December......56
January.........40
Febuary.........42
March...........30