[History] A Bridge Too Far

[Atterdag]

Author: Garbarsardar
Original thread:A Bridge Too Far

A Bridge Too Far

But, Sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far.
Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Arthur Montague Browning

In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.
Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success.
HRH Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands

The cost has been heavy; the casualties in a single division have been grievous; but for those who mourn there is at least the consolation, that the sacrifice was not needlessly demanded nor given without results.The delay caused to the enemy's advance upon Nijmegen enabled their British and American comrades in the other two airborne divisions, and the British 2nd Army, to secure intact the vitally important bridges, and to form a strong bridgehead, over the main stream of the Rhine at Arnhem.

"NOT IN VAIN"

May be the pride of those who have survived and the epitaph of those who fell.
Sir Winston Churchil,
House of Commons, September 28, 1944

Introduction

Sunday the 17th of September 1944 was by all accounts a bright and sunny day. Four hours before the sunrise the largest airborne operation in history was launched. The columns of aircraft stretched for 94 miles (150km) in length and 3 miles (5km) in width. There were a total of 1,051 troop carriers and 516 glider / tug combinations (2,083 aircraft in all). Escorts amounted to 934 Spitfires, Tempests, Mosquitos, Thunderbolts, P-38 Lightnings and P-51Mustangs. Eight days later it was over. More than 17.000 allied soldiers were killed more than 6.000 captured. The 1st Airborne had ceased to exist. The strategic objective was not reached; it would take another six months of bitter fighting to achieve the same strategic and operational objective. Despite the innumerable acts of heroism MARKET GARDEN was a total failure. In the following post I will attempt to answer to two questions:
A. Was MARKET GARDEN a necessary operation?
B. Who is responsible for the failure?



Backgound-The Plan

Europe, September 1944. The German army is effectively defeated in France. It is interesting to consult a map of the European Theater of Operations during the end of August, 1944. In northern France, from Dieppe to Mantes (north to south) were Crerar and the Canadian Army; Dempsey and the British Second Army; and Hodges and the First American Army. These three Armies constituting Montgomery's 21st Army Group occupied a front of about 150 linear miles. Contiguous to them on the south was Patton’s Third Army.



As you can see and given that the objective was the German surrender, the situation presented the Allies with three options: a direct advance into Germany from the south west; a bypass of the Ziegfried line and the Ardennes through Liege and towards Aaachen ;a crossing of the Rhine through the Netherlands. Eisenhower and the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) planners under the documented pressure of Montgomery decided on the third option. It was expected that capturing Rhur, the industrial heartland of Germany, would bring a quick end to the war. The plan would be a “daring” operation called MARKET in which a number of bridges would be simultaneously captured by airborne troops (the American 101st and 82nd airborne and the British 1st Airborne, while the XXX Corps (comprised of the 2nd Household Cavalry Regiment, Guards Armoured Division, 43rd Division, 8th Armoured Brigade, 50th Division and Royal Netherlands Brigade 'Prinses Irene') would advance to link with the airborne forces with endpoint the final bridge at Arnhem. The second part was christened GARDEN.
The expected opposition was in operational terms minimal. Around 6000 “new recruits”, “demoralized”, “practically on the run” according to Montgomery. As we will see this was not the case. Especially for Arnhem as it was far behind the front line it was predicted that the local garrison would consist of approximately one hundred and fifty men of the Home Guard variety, largely consisting of First World War veterans and Hitler Youth; nothing of concern to an elite airborne division of 10.000 men.



In truth, when discussing the Allied plan of attack, Rundstedt and his generals agreed that Eisenhower would favour Patton, so they expected an attack from the south. The troops of the 9SS and 10SS Panzer divisions from the 17th Army in front of Patton were in no condition to fight, so they were ordered to rest and refit in the rear. A suitable quiet spot was selected, which happened to be Arnhem. The expected full operational strength of each of these divisions would have been approximately twenty thousand men; however they had both been so severely mauled during the Normandy fighting that they now mustered a combined force of approximately six thousand men. Although numerically weaker to the 1st Airborne Division, they possessed a range of tanks, self-propelled guns, other armoured vehicles and artillery pieces, and their men were all excellently trained and battle-hardened.

One would ask how it was possible that the British Intelligence was unaware of the presence of such large formations in the area of the most vital target. Why the Dutch resistance did not inform the Allies of their presence? As I will demonstrate later this was again, not the case.



On the other hand, the Germans had absolutely no plan. They were expecting an allied attack from any other direction than the one it finally came. Model, a capable soldier and brilliant defensive strategist had only taken the inadequate measure of deploying Student’s Fallshirmjagerarmee in the Netherlands. This was a weak formation of 3000 men was the only force to face the route of advance of the elite armoured division and the four infantry divisions of the XXX corps. He and Runstend made multiple requests for reinforcements that Berlin could not (or would not) hearken too.



Action!
The objectives:
US 101st Airborne Division, (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor):to take the bridges near Eindhoven at Son and Veghel.
US 82nd Airborne Division, (Brigadier General James M. Gavin): to take the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen and the
British 1st Airborne Division, (Major General Roy Urquhart ) and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade: to take the road bridge at Arnhem and rail bridge at Oosterbeek.
XXX army corps: To arrive on the area of 101st on the first day, 82nd on the second and 1st on the third or fourth day.

Sunday, September 17th; D-Day.
13:40, 1st Division: The gliders carrying half the 1stDivision land at LZ-S. 10’ later the Ist Parachute brigade touches the ground at DZ-X. 8000 men are more or less in place around Arnhem. (see map) They approach the town from the North West and manage to capture the northern end of the bridge with small resistance. At the same time the first problems arise due to poor performance of the communication systems. Small contingents gets lost especially after dark. Attempts to capture the southern end of the bridge meet unexpectedly stiff resistance.
14:00, 101st: Four out of five bridges are captured, however the bridge at Son is destroyed.
14:35, XXX AC: The armoured units start advancing with considerable delay since the commander awaits confirmation of the capture of bridges. Furthermore he refuses to advance after dusk. At the end of the day XXX corps is still 15 miles south of Eidhoven
15:00, 82nd: Again all the objectives are met but one;the bridge at Nijmegen. Due to delays the Germans manage to occupy defensive positions.
21:00, German headquarters. General Model reacts quickly and forms a plan for reaction to the allied offensive. Apart from the elements of the two refitting panzer divisions he takes under his command the 2nd Panzer. Student manages to incorporate in his Paratroopers army motley units, even sailors.

Monday, September 18th; D-Day+1.
1st: Lt. Colonel John Frost's force holds firm on the northern end of the bridge and repulse the first German attempt to cross it. However, little progress is made both in the south and Osterbeck. Heavy casualties. All attempts to approach Arnhem are repulsed. However the second airlift even if delayed is successful and another full brigade has landed.
101st: Attempt to capture another bridge after the loss of the Son one fail. Late in the evening contact with XXX corps, which is now 36 hours behind schedule.
82nd: Many setbacks as German counterattacks capture the landing zones. They are recaptured but the second airlift is delayed until 15:30.



Tuesday, September 19th; D-Day+2.
1st:Lt. Colonel John Frost's 2nd Battalion numbering around 600 men still holds the northern end at Arnhem. However all attempts at reinforcing him are met with stiff resistance resulting in heavy casualties and disintegration of many units. The 1st division has now lost any offensive capability. The airlift of the Polish Brigade is cancelled due to adverse weather.
101st: German counterattacks are repulsed. A “Bailey bridge” is in place for the tanks.
82nd: Despite the assistance of armoured units from the XXX corps the bridge at Nijmegen cannot be reached.

Wednesday, September 20th; D-Day+3.
1st: Colonel John Frost's situation is becoming desperate. There is no food, no water, no medical supplies and no anti-tank ammunition. The Germans are systematically reducing to rubble every building around the bridge. A 2-hour truce is granted so the British can evacuate the wounded to the care of German doctors. Later in the day when the ammunition is over, they fight with knives. At dusk the bridge is captured by the Germans after been defended for almost three days by less than 800 soldiers. The initial plan was for 10000 soldiers to defend the bridge. No one can disagree about the heroism of the British paratroopers.
82nd: A coordinated attack by boats and armoured units manages to capture Nijmegen bridge with heavy losses. However XXX is now 4 days behind schedule.
101st: Continuous German counterattacks along the road destined for the XXX corps.

Thursday, September 21th; D-Day+4.
1st: The division or better the 3600 men that remain of it are surrounded in Osterbeck but continue to retain a defensive perimeter. The Polish Brigade is finally airlifted to the south of bank of the Rhine (Driel) but is unable to cross the river as the northern bank is held by the Germans.
82nd and XXX corps, Nijmegen: Although the bridge is clear XXX corps delays its advance for 18 hours. This was a controversial decision by General Brian Horrocks that has received much criticism. It is still unclear why exactly the XXX was unable to advance, but probably Horrocks was just reflecting the usual over cautiousness of his immediate superior: Montgomery.

101st: The “corridor” or euphemistically “highway” reserved for the advance of XXX corps is under constant attack from Student’s troops. "Our situation reminded me of the early American west, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any point along great stretches of vital railroad" according to Major General Maxwell Taylor.



Friday, September 22th; D-Day+5.
1st: The Division is now left with little more that 3000 men. German reinforcements are pouring in the area. Elements of the XXX corps make contact with the Polish at Driel; that is 4 days behind schedule.
Eisenhower calls for a conference in Versailles which actually puts the tombstone on Market Garden. The operations will now shift to the south and a defensive perimeter will be established at Nijmegen. Montgomery’s main concern is to stop any advance of Patton’s Third Army.
Saturday, September 23th; D-Day+6.
In a courageous move 200 polish soldiers cross the river to join the surrounded British. General Urquhart notifies the allied headquarters that his position is untenable and requests evacuation of his troops.

Sunday, September 25th; D-Day+7.
The 1st division can be now supported from the artillery of XXX Corp and since the weather permits it by air cover. However King Tiger tanks of the 506th Heavy Tank Battalion arrive in the area and that finally tips the balance on the German side.

Monday, September 26th; D-Day+8.
The remnants of the 1st Division are evacuated across the river. From a fighting force of 10600 men 2300 are still alive. More than 300 wounded are left to the Germans.



Results

The 1st Division ceased to exist. It lost 1160 men with a further 6450 being captured. The Poles took 378 casualties, with 101st Airborne suffering 2,110 and 82nd Airborne suffering 1,432. The British ground forces suffered some 5,354 casualties, while the German casualties, like their unit strengths are almost impossible to calculate accurately, but are likely to range somewhere between four to eight thousand. In total the Allies lost almost 18000 men. 164 aircraft and 132 gliders had been lost with USAAF IX Troop Carrier Command suffering 454 casualties, RAF 38 and 46 Groups another 294 casualties.

Consequences

Amongst all the “what if” types of questions about battles being fought and lost MARKET GARDEN features always in a prominent position. So the first issue would logically be “what if MG was won?”. This would probably mean a rapid advance to Germany’s industrial heartland, the collapse of the Nazi state and probably a very different post-war Europe since the Soviets were months away from Berlin. The failure of this operation not only lead to a prolonged winter of attrition but permitted to the Germans to launch the Ardennes counteroffensive and prolong even more the war. It also deprived the Allies of fighting forces that could play a substancial role later during their advance into Germany. An even more important question is “what if another battle had been fought instead of it?” Another battle?

Was the Operation MARKET GARDEN necessary?

"The 29th of August, 1944 was, in my opinion, one of the critical days of the war. Hereafter pages will be written on it, or rather on the events which produced it. It was evident that then there was no real threat against us as long as we did not stop ourselves or allow ourselves to be stopped by imaginary enemies. Everything seemed rosy when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gasoline which we were supposed to get for that day did not arrive. I presented my case for a rapid advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. It was my opinion that this was the momentous error of the war."
General Patton

Indeed, Patton was probably right. One of the justifications for MG was the distance of supply lines and the need for a second port near the front. All this did not apply in Patton’s case. At the end of August General John C.H. Lee, the commander of COMZ, (supply command) decided that it was the perfect time to move his non-combatant headquarters to newly liberated Paris. During the move, Lee used hundreds of trucks, tons of supplies, and thousands of gallons of gasoline that were desperately needed by the Third Army's thirsty tanks. General Omar Bradley quietly remarked, "No one can compute the cost of that move in lost truck tonnage on the front." At the same time there was no shortage of fuel for a single thrust. Why this had to be the Netherlands is anyone’s guess. Still many analysts support that it was another move from Eisenhower to placate Monty’s histrionics. It was not the first time. Less than a month earlier Patton’s 3d army having advanced 250 miles in 17 days was ordered to stop at Argentan so Monty’s 2nd Army could close the Falaise salient and trap the German 7th Army. Monty having advanced 20 miles in 72 days of course failed to seal the gap of 10 miles through which the whole 7th army escaped. And it would happen again. Four months later Monty would claim that he saved the Americans in the Battle of the Bulge . Winston Churchill, speaking before the House of Commons, publicly repudiated Montgomery and his statements but it was too late. Monty got the push to the Ruhr for himself and that was not a fast advance either.
But it was not just Monty. Eisenhower was under pressure to mount an airborne operation before the end of the war as a large scale live-fire exercise. Furthermore the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) planners did not trust the operational initiatives common with Patton.

So why did it fail?

The failure of MG can be attributed to three factors: Mistakes in the Strategic planning, mistakes in the operational planning, miscalculation of the German forces, miscalculation of the terrain.
Mistakes in the Strategic planning: “At the beginning of September, commanders at all levels from Eisenhower down were talking of the war being over before Christmas. For that to happen without having ever made full use of the airborne force, to whose creation so much expense and effort had been devoted, was unthinkable.” The operation that was about to bring the German collapse was planned not according to the realities on the field but according to the wishes for employment of a specific operational asset. And as we have seen on the previous section political and not military considerations.

Mistakes in the operational planning: The plan for MG was daring but feasible. The main problem was that for a success of the operation 100% of the operational objectives had to be met. While a 75% of even a 50% is often enough (see the Normandy landings) in this particular scenario one failure would nullify each and every success. And it was unfortunately so.

Miscalculation of the German forces, miscalculation of the terrain: Those are the simplest reasons to deal with. For both the key is intelligence. So did the Allies have the information needed for this plan? It has been often claimed that the presence of strong German formation was a surprise or a stroke of bad luck. It was not so: Defeat at Arnhem was in part due to the fact that Allied paratroopers were told to expect light resistance from no more than 2,000 new recruits, when instead the Allies were met by 6,000 battle-hardened veterans, equipped with artillery and tanks. Major General Roy Urquhart, the commander of 1st British Airborne Division, was in charge of planning airborne operations into Arnhem. His superior, LTG Browning, told him that his forces .were not likely to encounter “anything more than a German brigade group supported by a few tanks”. In fact, the 10 September 21st Army Group intelligence summary (INTSUM) stated that “elements of the Second SS Panzer Corps, the 9th (Hohenstaufen) and 10th (Frundsberg) SS Panzer Divisions, were reported to be refitting in the Arnhem area”. This was corroborated by reports of the Dutch resistance. Browning again dismissed the evidence and he continued doing so even when Urquhart presented him with aerial photographs of the Panzers; “the reports were probably wrong, and in any case the German troops were refitting and probably not up to much fighting…”
Furthermore Montgomery was warned on two separate occasions by his chief of staff and Eisenhower’s CoS that there were Panzer concentrations in the Nijmegen area. Both warnings “were ridiculed”.
The terrain could have been easily assessed receiving information from the Dutch underground. Let us not forget that the advance of the XXX corps along a narrow track with trees on both sides and thick vegetation as well as the problematic landing zones at Arnhem were not unknown to the resistance. However the British intelligence community did not trust the Dutch, believing they were infiltrated by the Germans.
Of course we should add to that the misperceptions about the German resilience. Seven months later in Seelow heights a motley assortment of units managed to halt the onslaught of three soviet armies. And that was after Germany was reduced to debris by the Allied bombings.
In conclusion, there was plenty of intelligence. What was missing was the will to use it and that weighs both on Monty and on Eisenhower.

Epilogue

To: Major-General R. E. Urquhart, D.S.O., Commander, 1st Airborne division.
In this war, there has been no single performance by any unit that has more greatly inspired me, or more highly excited my admiration, than the nine days action of your division between September 17 and 26.There is no question, that these sentiments are shared by every soldier, sailor, and airman, of the entire Allied Expeditionary Force now battling against the western boundaries of Germany.
Before the world the proud record that your division has established, needs no embellishment from me, but I should like every survivor of that gallant band to realize, not only how deeply this whole command appreciates his example of courage, fortitude and skill, but that the division's great battle contributed effectively to the success of operations to the southward of its own battleground.Your officers and men were magnificent.
Pressed from all sides, without relief, reinforcements or respite, they inflicted such losses on the Nazis, that this infantry dared not close with them. In an unremitting hail of steel from German snipers, machine guns, mortars, rockets, cannon of all calibres and self propelled-guns, tanks and artillery, they never flinched, never wavered. They held steadfastly.For nine days they checked the fury of the Hun, and when, on 26 of September, they were ordered to withdraw across the river, they came out a proud and haughty band - paratroopers, air landing men, glider pilots, clerks, cooks and batmen, soldiers all - less than two thousand strong out of ten thousand five hundred that entered the battle. The Allied Expeditionary Forces salute them.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Supreme Commander. Allied Expeditionary force.



Major-General R. E. Urquhart


References


Betts, Richard K. “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable.” In Power, Strategy, and Security. Edited by Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Hamilton, Nigel. Monty. New York: Random House, 1981.
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. Jr. Captains Without Eyes. London: The Macmillan Company,
1969.
Piper, Maj Arnold C., USA. “Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market-Garden.” Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.
Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.

And some nice websites:
http://www.marketgarden.com/2010/UK/frames.html
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/spring98/Dutch.html
http://www.rememberseptember44.com/rs44.htm