Faction Leader Title: Khalifa Faction Heir Title: Crown Prince
Start Settlements:
- Baghdad: Capital, Large City
- Basra: Castle
UNITS
Code:
Abbasid Nubian Spearmen
Abbasid Nubian archers
Arab Tribal Warriors
Kurdish Javelinmen
Faris Axemen
Bedouin spearmen
Bedouin Archers
Faris Archers
Faris Cavalry
Arab Tribal Cavalry
Bedouin Camel Warriors
Abna Heavy Spearmen
Abna Infantry
Faris Lancers
Abbasid Heavy Swordsmen
Caliph's Guard
Dimounted Caliph's Guard
SYMBOL AND BANNERS
NAMES
Code:
MALES
Harun
Mansur
Muhammad
Zahir
Nasr
Jafar
Mutawwakil
Ahmad
Abdullah
Hamza
Ammar
Amin
Ali
Umar
Uthman
Muawiyah
Marwan
Yazid
Sulayman
Qutaybah
Walid
Yahya
Issa
Ibrahim
Mussa
Hisham
Abdarahman
Hakkam
SURNAMES
al Rashid
as Saffah
al Mahdi
al Amin
al Mamum
al Malik
Abu Suffyan
ibn Harb
ibn Marwan
ibn Muhammad
ibn Mutawwakil
ibn Zubayr
ibn Malik
ibn Muhallab
ibn Muslim
al Walid
ibn Issa
al Azzam
al Assad
of Baghdad
of Basra
of Nasiriyah
of Mosul
of Samarra
of Damascus
of Mecca
of Medina
of Yemen
of Hijaz
of Sana
of Muscat
of Bahrain
of Tikrit
of Karbala
of Buraydah
of Jubayl
FEMALE
Aisha
Fatima
Lama
Hira
Dana
Yasmin
Aziza
Aidah
Ayah
Umm Banin
- Same as vanilla, just reskinned to look better and a bit more colorful
Peshmerga Warriors
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
- Kurdish Tribesmen in the service of the Abbasids
- Lamellar
- Same model as Kurdish Javelinmen, except will have a sword and round shield instead.
- Will double up as a merc unit.
Arab Tribal Warriors
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
This will be an early level attack infantry. Good on attack, mediocre on defense, good stamina, good morale, and desert bonus.
I'm really not sure what model to use, CA didn't really give us much to work with. I'm guessing a good model could be either urban militias, the model used for the naffatun, perhaps berber spearmen from the moors or dismounted arab cav. I'm really no expert on this so its your call.
Protection: Partial mail or Scaled Lamellar at most. We don't need upgrades.
Sheild: Large Round Shield with traditional arabic on it. Like in the above pic on the right.
Abna Infantry
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The guy in the middle is an Abna Infantryman.
Summary: Heavy spearmen, excellent for defensive and can hold the line very well. Medium in attack.
Models: The picture above shows a bulky individual. Is it possible to "mix and match" Lansnkecth Pikemen with Lamtuna Spearmen bodies? Perhaps the "hat" can be exchanged with a conical helment. I really need to know what AlphaDelta can do with the mesh editor and what he can't before we go any further.
Primary Weapon: Medium Spear (not as long as tercios/landsnekhts, not as short as dism arab cav), preferably in some sort of spear wall formation.
Secondary Weapon: Mace. Alt clicking will result in them engaging with maces.
Protection: Light Mail -> Heavy Mail. Or just heavy mail. Whatever you prefer Alpha.
Abbasid Swordsmen
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
- Expensive armoured swordsmen, dismounted qapukulu model with straight sword and lamellar.
- Very low yield/pool size.
- Available at last citadel barracks.
- Same as Tribal Arabs except on camel
- Sword
- same shield
Faris Cavalry
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Ahiga posted this earlier.
Basically they will be a more expensive, slower and horse archer unit.
I like the idea of the above cavalry on the right. He looks very unique and colorful. If we could remodell, reskin Arab cav and give them a bow and that kind of sheild it would be awsome. Also make the horse saddle the same pattern as the dude on the right.
- Costlier cav unit
- Slower horse
- Good melee stats (like monaspas for the georgians)
- Lower rate of fire
- Lower ammunition
- Alright charge, not as bad as horse archers, not as good as ghulams.
Protection: No armour on horse. Padded up to lameller or partial mail. Helmet similar to the cavalry on the right in the pic above.
Here's another pic that should give you an idea of the rider:
Primary Weapon: Bow, much lower ammunition and rate of fire.
Secondary Weapon: Charge and Melee fighting with lance. (if possible)
Shield: Varying colors of the cavalryman on the right in above pic.
Ghulam Cavalry
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
- Medium/Heavy Cav unit
- 3 UG levels. Its worth it since they will be featured for multiple factions. MORE SOON
Summary: Elite Archers with a powerful attack and stakes ability. The Zanj are black slaves bought from East Africa to work as hard labourers in Egypt and Iraq. The lucky ones get to fight/die for the Sultan. Melee will be mediocre.
- Basic Reskin of egypts 'Nubian Archer'. Will be available to Egypt and Abbasids.
- The second upgrade (padded) for the Nubian involves the original african model becoming covering and looking just like desert archers. We will avoid this.
- UG0: Nubian Archers simply recoloured and retextured as you see fit.
- UG1: Same as above but with a mail vest of some sort. Keep African looking model though
Dismounted Faris
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
- A dismounted version of the above Faris cav.
- Similar to Ottoman infantry
- Start as non-skirmisher archer
- Good Melee
- Good Attack
- Secondary weapon: Mace or something cool like that.
please give muslims good archers
egyp's and moor's archers are lame...and this is one of the two reasons i didnt liked playing muslims on vanilla (the secend is the lack of good caslt units for egypt)
please give muslims good archers
egyp's and moor's archers are lame...and this is one of the two reasons i didnt liked playing muslims on vanilla (the secend is the lack of good caslt units for egypt)
Nubian/Zanj Archers will be the elite archers with the best attack and stakes ability. They won't be as strong in melee though.
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Added reference images for Bedouin Warriors and Arab Swordsmen.
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This is a first draft for the Abbasid Faction symbol. Will need to photoshop this into a beauty.
and the same lack of armour. They will scare infantry.
This wasn't really necessarily true. Once the Arabs following Muhammad's successors got mail, they used it and were pretty well armored. There was a story about a duel between two arab champions where they could not kill one another because the mail pretty much covered their bodies, and it was only when one of them could find a weak spot, rip it or exploit it and stab the other was the duel finished.
I don't think we should necessarily consign this unit to be lightly armored. I'll try and look up information on the Abbassids soon, since they are one I do have information on (Check one of the ebooks I sent) Something the armies of islam 7th-11th century (out of date but still) book I sent you mentions is that Arab cavalry seemed more adaptive or ready to fight on foot than on horseback (Compared to their byzantine foes). It might do good to feature a sort of axe or sword wielding dismounted arab cavalryman. It's a bit difficult right now without editing meshes, but perhaps if you could dismount the cavalry units which feature bow, shield, and mace (or just bow, shield and axe), we could have a good dismounted cavalryman without a spear. Heck, we could even use a european unit assuming the shield's match up - Burrek made an eastern european spearmen look thoroughly andalusian moorish.
Here we go, go to page 19-20 of the Armies of Islam book I sent you. It mentions "Ahdath" or city militias, though this is for the Abbasids. Details though are sketchy. It then mentions what could make for a really good unit, the Abna, some sort of prestigious military corps based in Baghdad. It mentions their weapons, which includes a long pike, and says that they were usually armored, but would fight without cuirass or shield. On 21 it mentions a Khurasani infantry, another professional infantrymen from Iran that seems to be wielding shield and bow. I can't say if this is meant for the Abbasids or not, since the book is on 7th-11th century Islam.
By the way Mirage, This wasn't really necessarily true. Once the Arabs following Muhammad's successors got mail, they used it and were pretty well armored. There was a story about a duel between two arab champions where they could not kill one another because the mail pretty much covered their bodies, and it was only when one of them could find a weak spot, rip it or exploit it and stab the other was the duel finished.
I don't think we should necessarily consign this unit to be lightly armored. I'll try and look up information on the Abbassids soon, since they are one I do have information on (Check one of the ebooks I sent) Something the armies of islam 7th-11th century (out of date but still) book I sent you mentions is that Arab cavalry seemed more adaptive or ready to fight on foot than on horseback (Compared to their byzantine foes). It might do good to feature a sort of axe or sword wielding dismounted arab cavalryman. It's a bit difficult right now without editing meshes, but perhaps if you could dismount the cavalry units which feature bow, shield, and mace (or just bow, shield and axe), we could have a good dismounted cavalryman without a spear. Heck, we could even use a european unit assuming the shield's match up - Burrek made an eastern european spearmen look thoroughly andalusian moorish.
Here we go, go to page 19-20 of the Armies of Islam book I sent you. It mentions "Ahdath" or city militias, though this is for the Abbasids. Details though are sketchy. It then mentions what could make for a really good unit, the Abna, some sort of prestigious military corps based in Baghdad. It mentions their weapons, which includes a long pike, and says that they were usually armored, but would fight without cuirass or shield. On 21 it mentions a Khurasani infantry, another professional infantrymen from Iran that seems to be wielding shield and bow. I can't say if this is meant for the Abbasids or not, since the book is on 7th-11th century Islam.
Sorry bout the late reply, I kind of missed this post.
As the arabs conquered more they did indeed aquire heavy armour for their horse and for infantry.
But the bedouin warriors represent just the the native desert tribes and their rank and file serving the caliph.
The Arab swordsmen represent the settled higher arab classes of Iraq and Egypt and will be armoured well.
The Abna sounds like an excellent idea. We could reskin the pike militia of the Europeans into more of an arab look. That could be the first defensive phalanx for the Arabs. This is not completely ahistorical. The Arabs and Berbers that conquered spain regularly employed phalanx formations, or so I've read.
Perhaps we could name them "Abna Pike Militia" and have them trained from the highest city palace.
I'm unsure if the pike formation was like a european one, but yeah, that would be a very distinctive and 'exotic' unit for a muslim faction. We can try and look up what their city militias were armed like soon.
And my bad about the tribal arabs.
Something that's been nagging at me too is the faris units. It seems like the bow was not as pivotal to the arabs as it was to the turks. I've come across more than a few mentionings of the lance and sword actually being the primary arms of an arab or non-turkified near eastern (Not including Persia) Muslim cavalryman.
That Persian cavalry unit you wanted to feature for the Transoxanians could work for a Faris Cavalryman too, though using a different model (I'd say the lower of the mail and plate upgrades. The Tier 1 instead of the tier 2).
Also, the osprey books deal often with the subject of horse armor. You or I should look through it. It seems to say that in lieu of metal armor, felt was often used.
I'm unsure if the pike formation was like a european one, but yeah, that would be a very distinctive and 'exotic' unit for a muslim faction. We can try and look up what their city militias were armed like soon.
And my bad about the tribal arabs.
Something that's been nagging at me too is the faris units. It seems like the bow was not as pivotal to the arabs as it was to the turks. I've come across more than a few mentionings of the lance and sword actually being the primary arms of an arab or non-turkified near eastern (Not including Persia) Muslim cavalryman.
That Persian cavalry unit you wanted to feature for the Transoxanians could work for a Faris Cavalryman too, though using a different model (I'd say the lower of the mail and plate upgrades. The Tier 1 instead of the tier 2).
Also, the osprey books deal often with the subject of horse armor. You or I should look through it. It seems to say that in lieu of metal armor, felt was often used.
The thing is I don't want to give too strong cav units to the Abbasids. Its a game balance issue. Their strength should lie in their massed infantry, powerful nubian archers, advanced naffatun and pretty good melee swordsmen (arab swords and bedouins).
But I guess you're right about the archery part. Should we make the Faris stronger or weaker than the existing ghulams then?
I would imagine that the bow was not as important for the settled arabs that dominated Syria and Egypt, etc...as generally it is not for settled people (sans the english/welsh, apparently). Likewise, the Ottomans were not exception due to their bowmen as opposed to the sheer efficiency (pre-janissary revolts, heh) of the military machine...
Well, I'd keep the faris horse archer unit, and I understand your reasoning behind it. It's a difficult line to tread of balance with accuracy and or simply 'fun'. I'm of a belief that you can have factions feature a wide range of powerful units but find a hindrance to still provide some balance. There were some issues in RTR or EB where the romans could recruit heavy cavalry that was pretty darn powerful, but they were limited to the Italian Pennisula. With some of the new features of MTWII (Unit pools being a specific number, requiring a certain amount of time to replenish), we could find a way to better make things balanced.
Some methods of balance would be:
Abbassids have smaller recruitment pools and longer refreshing times for their spear faris.
Abbassid Lance Faris lack the armor that makes Transoxanian cavalry or Ghulams (Possibly horse armored, whether felt or metal) able to really stand up in a melee, and forces the Lance Faris to operate in the attack-retreat-attack Arabic Fighting style.
Abbassid Horses are less heavy (Lower mass = Less formation penetration and shock power) than Transoxanian or Turkish horses.
AOR (Not sure how this could work though given there wasn't really an AOR concept behind recruiting cavalry)
What I would do is make the Caliph's Guard non-recruitable and limited to Generals only. After that, I'd possibly make the Faris lancers into a light-medium cavalry, and the ghulams into a medium-heavy cavalry. The Ghulams would have felt horse armor (Cloth) and be heavy cavalry, but less heavy than other Heavy cavalry.
The Abbassid Faris Lancers and Ghulams would have low recruitment pools and take awhile to refresh, encouraging or enforcing players to rely more on their infantry than their cavalry. The beauty of recruitment pools is that you can make it as plentiful or as rare as you wish. Perhaps their pools are only 2 units and it takes 5 turns for it to refresh by 1 unit. Or perhaps it takes 20 turns to refresh by 2 units and their pools are 2 units. In the span of X amount of turns, Seljuks could recruit a large amount of cavalry, Transoxanian's a medium amount, and abbassids a small amount. With cost as well as this, you can still force the Abbassids to rely on their infantry, but feature a very prized and very limited amount of cavalry, not superior to their more cavalry-inclined neighbors but not utterly nerfed.
I would like to have a unit in black uniform with golden calligraphy on their sleeves. On the head, a black turban on a helmet. This can be a specific unit you can look on the film kingdom of heaven with saladin and the woung man who wants to attack jerusalem. I like this uniform
I'd want to note it was a mistake on my part regarding the Faris lance cavalry. It seems that was the tradition of the Fatimids (And may or may not have carried over to the Ayyubids) to fight with lance and sword on horseback, it may not have been as pivotal or critical to the Abbasids.
That being said, I still would suggest a change where they have Faris Lancers (Light-medium cavalry), Ghulams (medium-Heavy) and a non-recruitable, general-unit Caliph's Guard (Heavy-Superheavy). You can feature balance methods (low horse mass, or my preference being low unit pools and long refresh rates for Abbasid cavalry) to keep the infantry preference of the Abbasids. It bears mentioning that it seems that the Ayyubids inherited the heavy infantry reliance of the Fatimids, though. Have we checked to see if there's historical contet for the Abbasids to be infantry-focused? Or is that just a preference for the mod to add diversity?
I'd also suggest a possible medium-tier archer unit. The English had longbowmen for low, medium, high, and ultra high quality, and while we don't need something as extensive, I do think it would be proper to feature a middle of the road bowmen unit.
My suggestion would be (Without any historical backing on this right now) an ottoman-Infantry kind of archer. Probably something of a middle class bowmen militia.
You are right. Islamics factions were destroyed by ottomans but if they other faction survive so the technolgoies and units upgrade. It's logic.
That is the problem of MTW, devs stop the evolution of units with the end of the faction. But in my alomhad campaign, I'm in 1400 and my units are older...
It's a problem... And in this mod, it's a good idea to make evolution of units for all factions.
Yes one of the main hypocracies in M2TW is the fact that it is a game about changing history but the units in certain factions represent the factions being destrioyed like they were historically. The Byzantines for example, don't you think that if by 1300 the Romans had conquered most of the world again they would use gunpowder also? Please include a list of units for every faction that stretches into the late period.
I'd want to note it was a mistake on my part regarding the Faris lance cavalry. It seems that was the tradition of the Fatimids (And may or may not have carried over to the Ayyubids) to fight with lance and sword on horseback, it may not have been as pivotal or critical to the Abbasids.
That being said, I still would suggest a change where they have Faris Lancers (Light-medium cavalry), Ghulams (medium-Heavy) and a non-recruitable, general-unit Caliph's Guard (Heavy-Superheavy). You can feature balance methods (low horse mass, or my preference being low unit pools and long refresh rates for Abbasid cavalry) to keep the infantry preference of the Abbasids. It bears mentioning that it seems that the Ayyubids inherited the heavy infantry reliance of the Fatimids, though. Have we checked to see if there's historical contet for the Abbasids to be infantry-focused? Or is that just a preference for the mod to add diversity?
I'd also suggest a possible medium-tier archer unit. The English had longbowmen for low, medium, high, and ultra high quality, and while we don't need something as extensive, I do think it would be proper to feature a middle of the road bowmen unit.
My suggestion would be (Without any historical backing on this right now) an ottoman-Infantry kind of archer. Probably something of a middle class bowmen militia.
Yeah we could give them a infantry archer unit. I'm thinking this:
Desert Archers : Mediocre missle attack (6), crushed in melee (3,3)
Nubian Archers : Best missile attack (10), mediocre melee (6,10)
Ghulam Infantry: Good missile attack (8), good melee (8,13)
If you look at my last post at the third picture and the #1 fellow, I think hes a good basis, except with some chain mail (he's also holding a helmet).
The following might be of interest to you regarding the Abbasids, either as sorces for names, or as reference books you might be able to get from the library (I'd try the Bulletin first, as some are in French, and I don't know if they have been translated yet, and I don't read French myself. Spanish, some Russian, and some German, yes, but I suck at most of the "Romance" languages, so even Latin and Ancient Greek are, well Greek to this historian LOL):
Pre-Modern History
Reprinted from the Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, Summer 2002 (with changes in orthography to HTML standards).
Copyright 2002 by the Middle East Studies Association of North AmericaLa Principauté Ayyoubide d’Alep (579/1183-658/1260), by Anne-Marie Eddé (Freiburger Islamstudien, 21) 727 pages, bibliography, index, maps. Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999. (Paper) ISBN 3-515-07121-0
On first inspection, La Principauté Ayyoubide d’Alep appears to be an impressive tome, consisting of over seven-hundred pages, including ninety-two figures providing a plethora of maps, illustrations, and tables. Closer reading indicates that this appearance is not deceiving. Eddé has produced not only an excellent study of Ayyubid Aleppo, but also a valuable sample study of a Levantine Muslim principality during the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries.
The introduction to Eddé’s work begins by highlighting some of the questions the author proposes to consider, then gives a detailed examination of the sources available for study of the topic. The main body of the work is divided into two parts. The first part gives a detailed political history of the principality during the period considered, and is subdivided into chapters dealing in turn with the reign of al-Zahir (579/1183-613/1216), the regency of Tughril and reign of al-`Aziz (613/1216-634/1236), and the effective regency of Dayfa Khatun and reign of al-Nasir (634/1236-658/1260), including the loss of the principality to the Mongols. An epilogue describes the defeat of the Mongols and reconquest of Aleppo by the Mamluks in 658/1260-659/1261.
The second and larger part examines the institutions, economy, and society of the principality in three chapters. The first considers the powers and institutions of the state, including the powers, rights, and institutions associated with the Ayyubid princes, state defense, and civil administration. The second chapter deals with religious and cultural life, including both mainstream Sunni practice and institutions, and also the positions of ascetics, Sufis, Shi`ites, and dhimmis. Literary and scientific activities are also studied. The third chapter examines rural and urban life, including how water was obtained, land-use by both settled and nomadic inhabitants, crafts and commerce, and finishing with a survey of Aleppo and its territory. Eddé concludes her work by drawing attention to certain features of the history of the principality, including the position of women, the extent and character of Ayyubid power and institutions, and the economic, religious, and cultural life of the region. Finally, she places the period of Ayyubid rule within the greater context of the history of Aleppo. The appendices to the work include family trees, tables containing lists of revenues, emirs, jurisprudents, and other important figures from the period, maps, and illustrations. A bibliography concludes the volume.
Eddé’s use of sources is wide and thorough. While she makes particular use of Arabic primary sources, she also uses works from Persian, Syriac, Armenian, Latin, and Hebrew literature, in addition to non-textual sources, including architectural, epigraphic, numismatic, and artistic evidence, and secondary works by modern scholars. The result is a detailed work covering a wide range of topics in the history of Aleppo, which will also be of great value to students and scholars of the Ayyubid era in general.
Niall Christie Cornell University
Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography: Harun al-Rashid and the Narrative of the `Abbasid Caliphate, by Tayeb El-Hibri. (Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization) 236 pages, bibliography, index. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999. $64.95 (Cloth) ISBN 0-521-65023-2
This fascinating book interprets historical writing on the early Abbasid caliphs as attempts “to provide commentary on a certain political, religious, social, or cultural issue that may have derived from a real and controversial historical episode” (p. 13). In a series of chapters on Harun al-Rashid, his sons Amin and Ma`mun, and the civil war between the sons, El-Hibri analyzes dozens of anecdotes, dreams, and prophecies recorded in the historical sources. His careful attention to details of grammar and style, and his encyclopedic knowledge of the texts, allow him to draw surprising, and often convincing, conclusions about the ultimate goals of these accounts.
In an important introductory chapter, El-Hibri points out some obvious inconsistencies in the sources, including their fascination with certain events (such as the fall of the Barmakids) over others. He then adds stylistic and intertextual analysis, arguing that “these texts do form a cohesive array of narratives that were meant to be read in a specific way, even when that way is in itself indeterminate” (p. 15). His method of identifying and ascribing meaning to specific tropes has a powerful cumulative effect, as images of death, water, and judgment recur in visions and prophecies throughout these accounts. El-Hibri demonstrates the ways that these narratives expressed anxiety over regicide and also a longing for an era of orthodoxy before the divisive inquisition (mihna) of 833-48.
Despite the significant achievements of the book, El-Hibri works with some implicit presumptions about historical writing that could be problematic for his project. First, he argues that the sources are not intended to provide factual information. Those who want to know the true events of Harun’s life will have to settle for a “slimmer version” of some three or four pages (p. 21). Yet we are given few guidelines for accepting the factual claims that El-Hibri does make, such as that the purpose of Harun’s journey to Khurasan in 809 was “to use his own appearance as a charismatic counterweight to other rebellious pretensions” (p. 28).
A second, more complicated methodological issue arises with El-Hibri’s arguments that certain anecdotes exemplify “symmetrical approaches of depiction” (p. 35), serve as “literary inspiration” for others (p. 63), or even “can only be understood in light of another fragment of medieval thought” (p. 117). These arguments rest on a theory of discernable narrative strands within larger texts, such as those by al-Tabari. One should, therefore, be able to identify these narrators, their historical situation, and their possible influences; indeed, El-Hibri occasionally seems to hint at such identification (pp. 65, 89), but does not undertake a thorough source analysis, reducing what must be a large variety of voices to a collective description (p. 219). As a result, the arguments for symmetry or inspiration sometimes come across as intuitive and impressionistic, and El-Hibri’s analysis seems, by his own skeptical stance, to be merely another imaginative reconstruction, one that raises questions about the intention of the medieval sources, but can provide us no answers. I doubt El-Hibri would be satisfied with this conclusion, however, and a methodological introduction would have helped clarify these issues while enhancing the usefulness of this book for non-specialists.
Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography is an important reading of early Abbasid history, but it presumes a detailed knowledge of the period, and often of Arabic as well. These facts, combined with the lack of methodological introduction, will restrict its readership. Nonetheless, it points the way to a new appreciation of these texts, and should be required reading for any serious student of Arabic historiography.
Jonathan E. Brockopp Bard College
The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Military of Samarra (A.H. 200-275/815-889 C.E.), by Matthew S. Gordon. (SUNY Series in Medieval Middle East History) 303 pages, notes, bibliography, index. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. $26.95 (Paper) ISBN 0-7914-4796-0
This political and social history of the Samarran Caliphate fills a long-standing need in Abbasid history. Building upon Helmut Töllner’s work, Die türkischen Garden am Kalifenhof von Samarra, Gordon undertakes a close examination of the Samarran Turks not only as soldiers, but also as privileged members of a Turkish community within the Abbasid empire who achieved considerable political power, developing its own patronage networks and accessing various sources of revenue.
Gordon’s thorough and detailed knowledge of contemporary and nearly contemporary Arabic narrative sources, combined with insights gained from archaeological and numismatic studies as well as non-Arabic sources, enables him to create a more complete picture of the Samarran Turks than we have seen before. The evidence that illuminates their lives is scattered widely throughout the work of compilers many of whom, as Gordon notes, had ambivalent attitudes toward the Turks. Furthermore, much of this evidence is suggestive, rather than conclusive. Nevertheless, Gordon weaves disparate bits of information together masterfully, building thoughtful and plausible arguments.
Following a historiographical introduction, Gordon divides his examination of the Turkish guard into two periods. The first begins with its creation in 200/815-16 during the caliphate of al-Ma‘mun. The second begins with the foundation of Samarra in 221/836-37 under al-Mu‘tasim and concludes with the end of the Samarran caliphate. This periodization allows Gordon to place the Turkish guard in historical context and to examine how it developed over two generations. Thus, he is able to look beyond the Mamluk system and explore the role Turkish soldiers played in the complex internal politics of the Abbasid caliphate. He argues that Abu Ishaq began to create a Turkish military corps in the early third/ninth century by acquiring Bagdadi Turks, that al-Ma’mun supported his efforts, and that by the end of al-Ma’mun’s reign the Turkish guard exercised significant military power within the empire. Gordon goes on to examine the ways in which this power depended upon the relationships Turkish leaders developed with each other, members of the rank and file, and prominent Abbasids. Gordon explores the idea that changes in the land-tenure system by the middle of the third/ninth century provided Turkish leaders with increased revenue that furthered their power, but also notes that the weakening imperial economy impacted them along with everyone else. He suggests that the politicization of low-ranking Turks contributed to the end of the Samarran caliphate, observing that the authority of Turkish leaders depended upon their acceptance as defenders of Abbasid lands. It was not legitimated in terms of the urban Islamic institutions of the Abbasid Empire.
Gordon’s arguments engage all of the relevant secondary literature. The appendices that detail examples of retainer forces in early Islamic history and notable Turkish families are useful and the maps and illustrations are well chosen. This book demonstrates, for the first time, the complex roles Samarran Turks played in Abbasid history.
Kate Lang University of Wisconsin—Eau Claire
Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, by Roy P. Mottahedeh. 209 pages, index. New York, NY: I. B. Tauris, 2001. $24.50 (Paper) ISBN 1-86064-181-4
This is a revised edition of Mottahedeh’s classic study of the political culture of the Buyid period. For the most part, however, there is little here that is revised. In his introduction, the author indicates that he has corrected a few typographical errors, but, with the exception of the addition of a brief introduction, the text is largely unchanged.
Given that more than twenty years have passed since the publication of the original edition, it is fitting that the author devotes his new introduction to the critical response the original edition received. He notes that while critics correctly recognized that he intended to critique traditional Orientalist ideas about medieval Islamic political culture, they failed to recognize the significance of his methodology, namely to uncover the political practices which people of the period employed to structure their interactions. He attempts to expose such practices through an examination of anecdotes that appear in the chronicles of the Buyid period. In so doing, he consciously rejects a focus on the ‘unrealistic’ political theories devised by the jurists and theologians. He also implicitly rejects the thesis that medieval Muslim societies had a cynical and pessimistic view of politics that resulted in the absence of real public life.
Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society is divided into four chapters. The first chapter examines the development of political thought up to the Buyid period. Mottahedeh stresses that the political culture of the period is based on relationships between individuals, rather than between collectivities, thus distancing himself from Marxist theories of class agency as well as theories that emphasize the development of institutions as fundamental to political life. The second chapter deals with ‘acquired loyalties,’ analyzing the ways in which men formed bonds of political patronage through covenants, vows, ‘foster parentage,’ and so forth. The third chapter, “Loyalties of Category,” examines the social and political categories which the chroniclers used to describe the society in which they lived and to explain its political life. Here, the author widens his scope to include larger sectors of society (merchants, scholars, commoners, and so forth). The final chapter deals with kingship. Here the author emphasizes that the urban societies of the medieval Islamic world never considered the idea of self-government per se, rather they “yearned to be ruled” by a king who would respect their local prerogatives while at the same time guaranteeing their safety. This attitude was consonant with the increased decentralization of the Buyid period.
Mottahedeh’s book has suffered few serious challenges in the years since it was first published. In part, this lack of opposition results from the fact that many of the book’s arguments are widely accepted. At the same time, few scholars have taken up the challenge to examine Islamic political culture in its own terms. The basic premise of the book, that Islamic political culture is best described in its own terms, is not without problems (what would our understanding of American political life be like if we accepted its self-definitions at face value?), but the author’s approach is sufficiently critical to avoid naïve conclusions. One hopes that a new generation of scholars will take up the task of examining medieval Muslim political culture, and bring new periods, sources, and tools into play. Until then, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society will serve as an admirable introduction, and is still thought-provoking in its conclusions.
Adam Sabra Cairo, Egypt
The Berbers and the Islamic State: The Marinid Experience in Pre-Protectorate Morocco, by Maya Shatzmiller. 280 pages, notes, bibliography, index, appendices. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishing, 2000. $26.95 (Paper) ISBN 1-55876-209-4
Author of a previous study on Marinid historiography,[21] Shatzmiller has here assembled more of her already published articles on the history and historiography of the Marinid period (thirteenth-fifteenth centuries). Although the original articles treat a range of topics, the author succeeds—with some revisions and an excellent introduction—in creating a cohesive monograph that persuasively challenges the assumption that Berber cultural identity was absent from the Islamic legacy in the Maghrib.
From their capital in Fez, a Zanata Berber confederation created the Marinid dynasty, the last of the three major Berber dynasties that ruled present-day Morocco and other parts of the Maghrib. The subtle argument in this book is that while the Berbers participating in the formation of the Berber-Islamic state by becoming an integral part of the Islamic community, the process of acculturation to Muslim norms and institutions gave expression to Berber particularism. Since Berbers did not write in their own language, as was the case with other ethnic groups of the Islamic world, the particular Berber contributions to culture have eluded historians. Shatzmiller traces Berber resistance to acculturation through the instruments of acculturation themselves: the Arabic language and Islamic institutions. Berbers attempted to inscribe themselves in the Islamic legacy by creating a myth of their attachment to the Prophet and early conversion to Islam that ran counter to the official version of Berber revolt against Arab conquest. Yet interestingly, the myth of the Arab origin of the Berbers, cultivated by Muslim historians in the east, was not widely adapted or believed by the Berbers themselves, and this failure itself, according to Shatzmiller, demonstrates the slow Arabization and Islamization process of all but a small minority of the population.
Challenging the prevailing view that the Marinids’ rise to power lacked ideological and religious motivation, Shatzmiller suggests that the new dynasty used Islam to legitimate its rule; yet state building also required recognition of the urban religious establishment. Because of the not infrequent hostility of the Arab Fasis to the Marinids, the dynasty sporadically relied on Jews in the financial administration of the state, or as court physicians. Shatzmiller refutes the notion of a benign attitude towards the Jews, for when the Marinids were able to gain greater support from the Fasi elite and ulama, they were quick to replace Jews with Muslim officials. The Marinids sought to exude an image of Muslim piety by increasing the public role of ulama, while preventing the clergy from gaining too much independent power and influence. Similarly, the Marinid state greatly expanded Islamic institutions, such as introducing madrasas to Morocco, yet appointing Berber ulama to challenge the privileged status of the Fasi religious establishment. The Marinids’ effort to control and expand religious endowment (waqf) was an even more powerful means to assert their role as legitimate Islamic rulers.
Much of the discussion in The Berbers and the Islamic State focuses on Fez and historical sources produced in Fez, and there is little discussion or evidence on how the Marinid state was received by or interacted with the vast majority of the Berber population that resided in the Moroccan countryside and in other cities. But the focus on Fez is for a good reason: if the perseverance of a Berber cultural identity can be detected within the Arab intellectual core in Morocco, then surely this is strong evidence for the enduring resistance of Berbers to Arabization, relevant, as the author reminds us, to the politics of Berber identity in today’s Maghrib.
Daniel J. Schroeter University of California, Irvine[21]L’historiographie Mérinide: Ibn Khaldûn et ses contemporains (Leiden, 1982).
FACTION: The Abbasid Caliphate
Abbasid Nubian archers
Arab Tribal Warriors
Kurdish Javelinmen
Faris Axemen
Bedouin spearmen
Bedouin Archers
Faris Archers
Faris Cavalry
Arab Tribal Cavalry
Bedouin Camel Warriors
Abna Heavy Spearmen
Abna Infantry
Faris Lancers
Abbasid Heavy Swordsmen
Caliph's Guard
Dimounted Caliph's Guard
Originally Posted by kobi118
