Why Religion Cannot Be Measured by Modern Rationality - A Critique of Rationalism, Scientism and Post-Modern Metaphysics

[fkizz]

Transubstantiation will never be understood without the concept of something becoming Consecrated.

To make something consecrated is an ancient art, if wine and bread become consecrated, with a specialized cleric and a big amount of people wishing so, it can easily represent the body and blood of Christ, yes.

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/consecrated

The concept of having something consecrated is ancient and even pre-Christian. Transubstantiation just adds a little more to that.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Transubstantiation understood in the Eastern Orthodox aception is a mystery of the faith, the priests can do it by virtue of their consecration as priests, but they know of no way to explain it physically.

Either way, "Transubstantiation" itself is a Scholastic and Latin concept, first devised in the Middle Ages, that nonetheless acknwoledges the real presence, but the rationalistic and totalizing tendency of Scholasticism kinda paves the way for sort of rejection that the Protestants do, because the Protties are individualists, nominalists, ultra-rationalists (and paradoxically fideists) who reject anything that cannot be grasped or defined by the individual in doctrine.

From an authentic Christian POV, said of course by someone who has studied both EO and RC, "Transubstantiation" was a forceful attempt at trying to put a sort of ontological essentialism, of trying to grasp rationally and analitically a mystery of the faith. Just that. This kind of attempt only got through with the RC church.

Of course from a genuine, and often neglected and pilloried POV nowadays - reflecting the letter of Orthodoxy, as in "correct, proper, straight belief", anyone who doesn't follow the first 7 ecumenical councils of infallible character is also not a Christian, anyway. He might be a theist, deist, Jesus-worshipper, but whatever, not a Christian.

Since protestantism of course blurred this distinction, placing excessive faith on subjective human experience, judgment, and rationality, prottieism could be seen as a sort of predecessor to the moral and ontological chaos of modernity, where everything is relative, nothing is true, everything is permitted. Ergo, "nihilism".

This actually adds in to what I said: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam, work within the framework not only of Revelation, but also base their speculations upon the paradigm of Being qua Being, as in Aristotle, and thus their philosophy is more useful, real, realistic, and solid than the decay of modernity into pure, locked, solipsistic subjectivity. But that said, the paradigm of philosophy as ontotheology is only the upper crust, and does not exhaust the mystery qualities of these religions.

And let's add, neither it reaches to the gnostic quality, particularly in Sufism and Shia Islam.

[basics]

When Jesus took up the bread and broke it he said, " This is my body which is given for you." Was it His body? No it was still bread so why did he say it? Well, they had all come back from the temple after making sacrifices of animal or bird and feasting about it as was normal for Jews. He was differenciating between them and what He was about to do at the cross through His body and blood. So when they ate bread and drank wine they were to remember what He did do for them when and only once it happened which was at the cross in a once only sacrifice. If these articles did actually become the body and blood of Christ, in effect it would mean Him being sacrificed over and over again and His crying out " It is finished," as going against the Scriptures meaning that His sacrice was incomplete which it wasn't. Those that think along the lines of transubstansiation have then to explain why all the Old Testament saints never had the opportunity to practise the same?

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Hi @basics, St. Ignatius of Antioch tells us this: "I desire the bread of God, the heavenly bread, the bread of life, which is the flesh of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who became afterwards of the seed of David and Abraham; and I desire the drink of God, namely His blood, which is incorruptible love and eternal life."[11]

On heretics, he says "they abstain from the Eucharist and from prayer, because they confess not the Eucharist to be the flesh of our Saviour Jesus Christ, which suffered for our sins, and which the Father, of His goodness, raised up again."[8]

St. Justin Martyr, circa 150 AD: "Not as common bread and common drink do we receive these; but in like manner as Jesus Christ our Savior, having been made flesh by the Word of God, had both flesh and blood for our salvation, so likewise have we been taught that the food which is blessed by the prayer of His word, and from which our blood and flesh by transmutation are nourished, is the flesh and blood of that Jesus who was made flesh."

St. Augustine, quoting St. Cyprian writing 200 years before: "For as Christ says 'I am the true vine,' it follows that the blood of Christ is wine, not water; and the cup cannot appear to contain His blood by which we are redeemed and quickened, if the wine be absent; for by the wine is the blood of Christ typified, ..."

There's no authoritative way of denying the Real Presence. That is, unless you become a subjectivist of the protestant fashion, and start to reduce everything to the individual level while neglecting the institutes and the tradition of the Church.

THAT SAID, the first time the term "transsuubstantiation" is used to refer to a "change in substance of the bread/wine during the act of consecration", is in Paschasius Radbertus, circa 840 AD, who was a clergyman working for Charles the Bald king of West Francia.

This work is quoted by the Council of Trent to give strength to the definition of "Transsubstantiation" in the terms that I wrote above.

BUT, and here's a very specific issue:

TRANSSUBSTANTIATION is not used in Eastern Orthodoxy, being a Frankish-concocted term, and in EO, the real presence occurs through a process of change which is a mystery, and happens not during the specific act of consecration, BUT, as a result of the celebration of the liturgy up to the Epiclesis.

[Muizer]

Here's a fair attempt at measuring religion by modern rationality.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/2019...eligion-evolve

[Prodromos]

Of course from a genuine, and often neglected and pilloried POV nowadays - reflecting the letter of Orthodoxy, as in "correct, proper, straight belief", anyone who doesn't follow the first 7 ecumenical councils of infallible character is also not a Christian, anyway. He might be a theist, deist, Jesus-worshipper, but whatever, not a Christian.

Since protestantism of course blurred this distinction, placing excessive faith on subjective human experience, judgment, and rationality, prottieism could be seen as a sort of predecessor to the moral and ontological chaos of modernity, where everything is relative, nothing is true, everything is permitted. Ergo, "nihilism".

This is the Cartesian false dilemma of infallible certainty vs absolute skepticism. In reality it doesn't have to be one or the other; even though we can't be infallibly certain what the one true Christian teaching is, we can be certain beyond a reasonable doubt, which more than suffices, since we don't need infallible certainty whether in theology or most other areas of life. Whether epistemic certainty is obtainable is a question more suited to philosophy than theology; it is a question divine revelation was never intended to answer.

The Reformers' view was that man, aided by fallible reason, could comprehend divine revelation witnessed by the apostles and handed down to us in infallible Scripture, just as you use fallible reason to understand infallible Councils regarding the correct interpretation of Scripture. It's perfectly valid to utilize reason in understanding Scripture, the writings of the Church Fathers, the Greek and Hebrew languages, Jewish culture, ancient Middle Eastern history and other facts that aid us in interpreting and understanding revelation.

This is affirmed in the Bible, which says nature is a source of revelation; nature reveals both God and his will/law in a way accessible to reason, as evidenced by the fact that pagans like Cicero, Aristotle, and others, could clearly grasp these truths using their natural reason alone and without special revelation from God. Therefore, reason is a valid method for interpreting revelation and obtaining theological knowledge.

It's incoherent and self-refuting to reject fallible reason and rely on infallible Church pronouncements instead: even if we had an infallible Church or Council, we'd still need to use reason to interpret and understand what it's saying. But if fallible reason isn't sufficient for understanding the meaning of infallible Scripture, how can it be sufficient for understanding infallible Church pronouncements defining the meaning of Scripture?

In rejecting reason as a method for interpreting infallible revelation (whether Scripture or your Church Tradition), you're effectively left without access to any infallible source of theological knowledge; a far cry from your claim that the Orthodox possess even more sources than Protestants do.

In brief, it's actually your arguments against Protestantism that when taken to their logical conclusion end in nihilism. Protestantism itself sees no conflict between theological certainty and reason, since it rejects the false choice of either infallible certainty or total nihilism, whereas you accept it. And since you can't obtain infallible certainty...

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

I'll answer this in detail, but it deserves to be replied.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

This is the Cartesian false dilemma of infallible certainty vs absolute skepticism. In reality it doesn't have to be one or the other; even though we can't be infallibly certain what the one true Christian teaching is, we can be certain beyond a reasonable doubt, which more than suffices, since we don't need infallible certainty whether in theology or most other areas of life. Whether epistemic certainty is obtainable is a question more suited to philosophy than theology; it is a question divine revelation was never intended to answer.

That is true, but let us say, one cannot be completely skeptical of external reality as in the Cartesian postulates.

The Reformers' view was that man, aided by fallible reason, could comprehend divine revelation witnessed by the apostles and handed down to us in infallible Scripture, just as you use fallible reason to understand infallible Councils regarding the correct interpretation of Scripture. It's perfectly valid to utilize reason in understanding Scripture, the writings of the Church Fathers, the Greek and Hebrew languages, Jewish culture, ancient Middle Eastern history and other facts that aid us in interpreting and understanding revelation.

No, the Ecumenical Councils are not exercises in rationalism, rather they are authoritative statements centered upon the paradigm of Tradition, the consensus of the clergy, and finally the Revealed truths of faith analyzed partly through the lens of Aristotelian rationality.

This is very different from protestant subjectivism. Notice that in EO, the Bible is not considered to be "The Word of God", but rather a Revelation that came thru its writers, from the Septuagint OT to the Gospels of Mark, John, and etc...

Scripture itself is not "infallible", but a guidemark. And of course, there is no genuine interpretation of Scripture without the living Tradition, consensus, and teaching of the Church:

In the New Testament, Christ not only provides the correct interpretation of the Bible, He also allows the believers themselves to be directly enlightened by the Holy Spirit and to be themselves “the letter from Christ. … written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone, but on tablets of human hearts” (2 Cor 3.3). Thus is fulfilled the prediction of the old covenant that in the time of the Messiah “they all shall be taught of God” by direct divine inspiration and instruction (Jn 6.45, Is 54.13, Ezek 36.26, Jer 31.31, Joel 2.28, Mic 4.2, et al.). It is only within the living Tradition of the Church under the direct inspiration of Christ’s Spirit that the proper interpretation of the Bible can be made.

Scholars of the Bible can help men to understand its divine contents and meaning. Through their archeological, historical, and literary studies they can offer much light to the words of the scriptures. But by themselves and by their academic work alone, no men can produce the proper interpretation of the Bible. Only Christ, the living and personal Word of God, Who comes from the Father and lives in His Church through the Holy Spirit, can make God known and can give the right understanding of the scriptural Word of God.

In other words, Scripture is interpreted through the kerygma, the consensus, and the tradition, instead of relying on subjective perspectives alone.

More on this:

b. In Matthew 23:2-3, Jesus teaches that the scribes and Pharisees have a legitimate, binding authority based "on Moses' seat," but this phrase or idea cannot be found anywhere in the Old Testament. It is found in the (originally oral) Mishnah, which teaches a sort of "teaching succession" from Moses on down.

c. In 1 Corinthians 10:4, Paul refers to a rock that "followed" the Jews through the Sinai wilderness. The Old Testament says nothing about such miraculous movement. But rabbinic tradition does.

d. "As Jannes and Jambres opposed Moses" (2 Tim. 3:8). These two men cannot be found in the related Old Testament passage (cf. Ex. 7:8ff.) or anywhere else in the Old Testament.

To give two examples from the Old Testament itself:

a. Ezra, a priest and scribe, studied the Jewish law and taught it to Israel, and his authority was binding under pain of imprisonment, banishment, loss of goods, and even death (cf. Ezra 7:26).

b. In Nehemiah 8:3, Ezra reads the law of Moses to the people in Jerusalem. In verse 7 we find thirteen Levites who assisted Ezra and helped the people to understand the law. Much earlier, we find Levites exercising the same function (cf. 2 Chr. 17:8-9).

So the people did indeed understand the law (cf. Neh. 8:8, 12), but not without much assistance not merely upon hearing. Likewise, the Bible is not altogether clear in and of itself but requires the aid of teachers who are more familiar with biblical styles and Hebrew idiom, background, context, exegesis and cross-reference, hermeneutical principles, original languages, etc. The Old Testament, then, teaches about a binding Tradition and need for authoritative interpreters, as does the New Testament (cf. Mark 4:33-34; Acts 8:30-31; 2 Pet. 1:20, 3:16).

More on this here: https://www.catholicculture.org/cult...fm?recnum=7185

This is affirmed in the Bible, which says nature is a source of revelation; nature reveals both God and his will/law in a way accessible to reason, as evidenced by the fact that pagans like Cicero, Aristotle, and others, could clearly grasp these truths using their natural reason alone and without special revelation from God. Therefore, reason is a valid method for interpreting revelation and obtaining theological knowledge.

Yes, but only very partially.

It's incoherent and self-refuting to reject fallible reason and rely on infallible Church pronouncements instead: even if we had an infallible Church or Council, we'd still need to use reason to interpret and understand what it's saying. But if fallible reason isn't sufficient for understanding the meaning of infallible Scripture, how can it be sufficient for understanding infallible Church pronouncements defining the meaning of Scripture?

In rejecting reason as a method for interpreting infallible revelation (whether Scripture or your Church Tradition), you're effectively left without access to any infallible source of theological knowledge; a far cry from your claim that the Orthodox possess even more sources than Protestants do.

See above.

Etc...

[Prodromos]

Okay. Can't guarantee I'll respond, though; I tend to avoid inter-denominational debates, and these sorts of discussions are pretty time-consuming. But you can post your response.

[basics]

Marie Louise von Preussen,

Think back to the Old Covenant rituals because context and flow are the key to understanding what Jesus actually meant on the night He made them at the feast. Let's lay aside the traditions of men for a moment because it was traditions like that that He despised. The rituals were that the Jews partake to cover their sin from God yet they never saved anyone. Yes, they had to eat parts of these rituals yet not one could claim to be saved according to the Scriptures. Jesus not long before told a woman that He was the water of life and had she known it she would never die. Does anyone make claim to be saved by drinking water? No, because it was a figure of speech used because of water's importance to life and in this case eternal life. So, the message that Paul gives us is that the bread and wine are a remembrance to born again people of what He did for them on that cross. And, if my memory is correct it was each time they broke bread and took wine which could be every meal not just inside a church building overseen by a priest. The born again already have Jesus and the Spirit inside their hearts and minds so why would they need to sacrifice Jesus over and over again? This tradition has become like Jewish tradition a way of locking people into their system.

[fkizz]

And let's add, neither it reaches to the gnostic quality, particularly in Sufism and Shia Islam.

Would you agree there's a similarity between the Theosis of the Orthodox Church and the Gnosis? On their abstract framework at least? It's someting that seems to make sense but I'm curious on your intake on this, given I'm not certain.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

On the abstract, yes. The thing is, the definitions of doctrine and their permanence within EO are existential, phenomenologic, and have much less to do with rationalism or abstract concoctions. For one thing, the doctrine of Essence-Energy exists since primordial times, but it has nothing to do with a purely dianoetic, analytical approach and framework.

In sum, the phemonelogy, the existential approach, the conception of the human in Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy took different turns. This is due, in great amount, to the fact that the Greco-Latin patrology split apart, and the Orthodox didn't know Augustine, while the Catholics knew *ONLY* Augustine. The end result is the doctrine of original sin, the different mystical approach, the absence of a true conditioned ascesis, and also the differences between the beatific view and theosis.

It would be safe to say that the Roman Church, ever since John Cassian, has had - due in no small part to the Dark Ages, but also due to the influence of Augustine - developed a different view. There are still many points in common, BUT, the differences are visible. And such things like the Filioque also contributed to the splitting during the 1054 schism.

Of course Protestantism reflects itself as a totally different matter, but the roots of its understanding primarily sprung up from Catholicism.

There was no significant protestant division in the East, neither there was a significant influence, particularly within the boundaries of the old Byzantine Empire. There were some communities, but they were never large at all.

[basics]

Marie Louise von Preussen,

Protestantism came about by Roman Catholics who saw from the Scriptures that their church was wrong on many matters and so we had the split known as the Reformation. Today the problem remains the same as even Protestants get it wrong, why? Because as Peter says Scripture can only be expressed or understood by the indwelling of the Spirit of God Who is the Person that leads into all truth that truth being that Jesus Christ died once for all them that He had or will save even as many as the Lord God shall call. It is God Who saves and saved by the principal thet " We believe You are the Christ the Son of the living God." That's the Rock upon which the church is built, nothing else, and it is solely a work of all Three Persons of the Trinity. The church's role was then to go out into all the world and preach this message. It follows that each person who does so carries equal value for it is what they say that is the power of God unto salvation not them themselves and that power as we can read was beyond comprehension at varied times.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

I disagree, you have no proof for your statements. Rather, the main issue is: your statements contradict what Jesus himself said. There's also the fact that the Early Church didn't write the Gospels for many decades after Jesus death, but still already existed as a spiritual body.

[basics]

I disagree, you have no proof for your statements. Rather, the main issue is: your statements contradict what Jesus himself said. There's also the fact that the Early Church didn't write the Gospels for many decades after Jesus death, but still already existed as a spiritual body.

Marie Louise von Preussen,

Dear friend, I have every reason for that is what is written in the Bible. To begin with Jesus said, " No man can come to the Father except by Me, and no man can come to Me except the father draws him." He also said, " A man must be born again of the Spirit of God if he is to enter heaven." From these two verses we can surely see that salvation is solely a work of God. Where man comes in and that must be in his saved position is by following Jesus' last command to them and that was, " To go out into all the world and preach the Gospel," which was that He as the Son of God died on a cross and after three days rose again and was seen for forty days by over four hundred people before leaving to rejoin His father in heaven. His death on the cross was to save many from their sin and thus to restore them to God.

The question then asked is if that sacrifice was complete in every aspect and that is proved when He cried out, " It is finished." There wouldn't be any more sacrificing for the souls of men so having people believe that what He did was not sufficient as the Catholic church system maintains is quit wrong. There is no Biblical reason for anyone to pray to Mary, to saints or icons for the souls of any as Jesus completed everything from the cross. That only left the unsaved to hear the Gospel, believe and be born again of the Holy Spirit to give the assurance that they are saved. As they have already been baptised by the Holy Spirit at their regeneration it follows that their water baptism is but a sign by them that they have given their lives to Christ, the water being a symbol of the grave from which Christ arose. The fruit of that as James says will be in their works of emulating Christ Jesus in all that they do until called away. The fear that the New testament writers all had was that false preachers would pass off false docrtines and I'm afraid that is exactly what has happened.

Concerning the Biblical writings we know that from Pentecost on writings were sent out to all the infant churches so the very idea that nothing was written for many years after is also quite wrong. For a start as these churches were mainly Jewish the writings would have been most likely in Hebrew but as Gentiles grew in number in these churches the Gospel would have to be translated into the tongues that men could readily understand and so it was. It's one of the reasons that Paul could speak in many tongues and needed to if men were to understand him. So, there never was a time when there were no writings about Jesus Christ and with all the persecutions it follows that many of the real originals were lost until that is it was decided a Bible be drawn up. As we know the scrolls left were what composed that, some with great error that they couldn't be used without contorting the basic rules of understanding the Gospel, them being context and flow which has to be correct from beginning to end. So the excuse that Scripture didn't start until many years after Christ's death and resurrection is also quite untrue.

[chriscase]

Hi there,
Regarding the proposition presented in the OP, I'll play dumb a bit because I'd like to understand if this line of thought has any relevance beyond academic considerations of students of philosophy.

So let's suppose I'm a product of what the OP describes as post-modernism, "scientism", rationalism, and whatever other ideological foundations one might want to assign to late 20th century liberal arts education. I have some passing familiarity with western history and philosophy, the likes of which one would expect out of a standard western civilization curriculum. I have some superficial recall of Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas, but certainly nothing profound. I took my liberal arts degree and parlayed it into a career in technology, and try to stay somewhat informed on cultural and scientific currents, all the while attempting to raise my children and hold together a family and household.

Needless to say, this means I have no familiarity whatsoever with any of the sources the OP has provided. I've never even heard of any of them. However, the OP appears to be claiming there is a terrible void in our intellectual lives, which causes us to be fundamentally incapable of appreciating religion in the way it's supposed to be, or perhaps the way our ancestors did. What difference does it make to me if this is the case? Is this shortfall of appreciation for religion a bad thing? Perhaps modern people lack this way of thinking because it's simply not of any use. I don't know what all the components of a horse buggy are either, and it doesn't seem to matter. If this conceptual shortfall is fundamental to modern intellectual frameworks, how do we know anyone - even the OP - can overcome it?

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

Hi, chriscase, the thing in question is: the understanding of reality that was brought by the Enlightenment, Secularism, Western ontotheology, and the likes, is naturally deficient and cannot cover the shortcomings in our understanding of the universe that Traditional Metaphysics addressed. If you want a primer on what "Traditional Metaphysics" consists, Aristotle and Aquinas perhaps are the best introduction.

In other words, and this critique has been especifically created by Heidegger, and also by Catholic Thomists like Maritain: modern philosophy in the West has locked man inside his own subjectivity, a sort of solipsistic cage. Modern philosophy ignores the question of Being (ergo, Heidegger's question: "What is the Being of beings?"), and thus ignoring the question of ontology, it is nihilistic and only an exercise in redundancy, mental "circling" (for lack of a better term that is censored here) and inconsequential observations between the observer and objects.

This is actually well built up in Ahmad Fardid's critique of Western scientism, rationalism and philosophy. Let's look at some of the things he said, in regards to shia Islam vs. the West:


My wish is to be free from the modern cave, which is filled with self-founded nihilism, enchantment by earthly gods (taghutzadegi), and historicism. This is my ideal, and wherever I see a lack of angered fists and the prevalence of compromise, I will be disappointed... because to possess and insist on a position is the right move.

In accordance with Heidegger, I put forward a historical position [mowghef]. Mankind is in a historical age when God is absent, the true God... Now, human is the Truth which is apparent, that, human is god, and the Greek taghut [idolatry] embodies the human. This is the humanism that I previously mentioned: humanism and human taghut [idolatry].[12]

Mysticism's one eye has been blinded by wahdat al-vojud ("the Unity of Being') [note: this is a concept specific to Islamic philosophy not very much known in the West], and the other one has been blinded by Bergson. According to Bergson, there is turbulence in the world. Where is presence ? Where is God ? I hope the human dies of the unrest. This intrinsic (natural) wisdom [esnokherad], which is like darkness, appears like lightness for Bergson. Bergson's gnosis one of the examples of Westoxification. In fact, there is no gnosis in the West. During the last four hundred years, philosophy in the West has focused on the actually existing reality (mowjud). In fact, you can not find any question about "existence" [vojud] in the nineteenth century, and all discussion were centered on mowjud.

In other words, Western philosophy of rationalism, and the ground of its metaphysics, is concerned only with an abstract, phantom world of mental objects of representation, and does not ask genuine questions of Being qua Being as the Ancients, namely Plato and Aristotle did. As such, since it does not have any questions on Being, it is not concerned with "Truth" in the strict sense, but only the useful.

Of course Heidegger and Fardid would rise another question, and this is visible in his last quote: the scope of the Western metaphysics of presence in conjuring the present out of the "turbulence", the immanent changing becoming. In other words, how much the Ancient philosophers were capable of conjuring Being out of the turbid immanent Becoming. Heidegger deals a lot with it, and if we approach Eastern "metaphysics" (for the lack of a better term), we know they have better answers for this question than eg. Aristotle or Aquinas did.

In other words, the Question of Being is the question of what constitutes authentic Knowledge or Gnosis. Since this element is present in Shia Islam, it's obvious that Fardid would be aware of it, and would formulate his critique in these terms, which are decisive.

As @basics,, I'll find some time to tackle it and reply to it later.

[chriscase]

Hi, chriscase, the thing in question is: the understanding of reality that was brought by the Enlightenment, Secularism, Western ontotheology, and the likes, is naturally deficient and cannot cover the shortcomings in our understanding of the universe that Traditional Metaphysics addressed. If you want a primer on what "Traditional Metaphysics" consists, Aristotle and Aquinas perhaps are the best introduction.

In other words, and this critique has been especifically created by Heidegger, and also by Catholic Thomists like Maritain: modern philosophy in the West has locked man inside his own subjectivity, a sort of solipsistic cage. Modern philosophy ignores the question of Being (ergo, Heidegger's question: "What is the Being of beings?"), and thus ignoring the question of ontology, it is nihilistic and only an exercise in redundancy, mental "circling" (for lack of a better term that is censored here) and inconsequential observations between the observer and objects.
...

In other words, Western philosophy of rationalism, and the ground of its metaphysics, is concerned only with an abstract, phantom world of mental objects of representation, and does not ask genuine questions of Being qua Being as the Ancients, namely Plato and Aristotle did. As such, since it does not have any questions on Being, it is not concerned with "Truth" in the strict sense, but only the useful.

Of course Heidegger and Fardid would rise another question, and this is visible in his last quote: the scope of the Western metaphysics of presence in conjuring the present out of the "turbulence", the immanent changing becoming. In other words, how much the Ancient philosophers were capable of conjuring Being out of the turbid immanent Becoming. Heidegger deals a lot with it, and if we approach Eastern "metaphysics" (for the lack of a better term), we know they have better answers for this question than eg. Aristotle or Aquinas did.

In other words, the Question of Being is the question of what constitutes authentic Knowledge or Gnosis. Since this element is present in Shia Islam, it's obvious that Fardid would be aware of it, and would formulate his critique in these terms, which are decisive.

In my limited experience, the concept of existence is simply an axiomatic property we assign to objects within models.

In the mathematical context, it's fairly clear why we do this. We have to stipulate some axioms to work with, or we become lost in an infinite regress of cascading proofs. The question of whether a particular collection of axioms is suitable is evaluated post facto in two ways: consistency and utility. Can we produce a logical flaw or contradiction, and does the set of models produced by the axioms shed light on any real world problems. The classic example of this is non-Euclidian geometry, which started out as a purely mathematical experiment, and afterwards was found to have applications in general relativity.

It seems to me that this approach to understanding the world and our ideas about it is not solipsistic at all. Our mental models have existence as mental models, and the collections of sensory phenomena that possess the required characteristics of independence and consistency to qualify as objective have their own existential status - which we also assign - but via collective negotiation. Contemplation of something beyond this might appeal to a desire to have a higher degree of certainty, but I think that sells short the gestalt of the models we already have, and which work quite well. Why do we need a higher degree of assurance than that? And, if we thought we had that higher level of assurance, how could we test whether it is founded on a mistaken assumption?

Now I can anticipate that you might simply point at my summary above and say, "there, that's the problem I'm talking about." And if you would further say that this mindset I'm laying out excludes some appreciation of religion, I suppose I'd agree with you on that point. I find no particular use for religion in my own life.

[Marie Louise von Preussen]

In my limited experience, the concept of existence is simply an axiomatic property we assign to objects within models.

This is wrong. Yet another problem with the post-Cartesian, Enlightenment thought. A Thomist could well reply: you cannot confuse and reduce the Being (Esse) to an Entity (Ens) and its innate properts. In other words, you cannot reify an ontological property into an actual spatial object.

In the mathematical context, it's fairly clear why we do this. We have to stipulate some axioms to work with, or we become lost in an infinite regress of cascading proofs. The question of whether a particular collection of axioms is suitable is evaluated post facto in two ways: consistency and utility.

Wrong. And here's again another problem with the post-Cartesian mind: since reality is deemed "unknowable" and "inacessible", the true only becomes useful.

To cut it short, absolute skepticism of the external reality, in detriment of a moderate realism, cannot answer us questions as to what pertains this reality. Absolute skepticism is unjustifiable, as it undermines the very meaning of "consistency" and "utility".

Can we produce a logical flaw or contradiction, and does the set of models produced by the axioms shed light on any real world problems. The classic example of this is non-Euclidian geometry, which started out as a purely mathematical experiment, and afterwards was found to have applications in general relativity.

Another mistake would be to reduce the essences of objects to their superficial quantitative properties. Not that "essences" exist, I'm not an essentialist and this would be counterproductive, but let's just say this: one of the errors of atomism constitutes in the preconceived idea that a thing can be entirely reducible to the sum of its parts, thereby allowing a purely quantitative approach that reduces time into space, neglects qualia, and forgets basic (one would say, "essential" questions), like the meaning of the word "meaning" and so on.

Contemplation of something beyond this might appeal to a desire to have a higher degree of certainty, but I think that sells short the gestalt of the models we already have, and which work quite well. Why do we need a higher degree of assurance than that? And, if we thought we had that higher level of assurance, how could we test whether it is founded on a mistaken assumption?

... We have not gone beyond the physical. We have established a theory that can work out the underpinnings of the physical universe, but we do not know how to define what is "knowledge" in the first place.

So the radical consequence of reductionism, of scientism, is this: a barebones universe, stripped of qualia, stripped on anything that is not reducible to mathematically definable quantities. A sort of gigantic abstract blackboard full of numbers, of equations, and we are not even sure if these equations correspond fully or merely partially to the realities that we have tried to define.

So to underpin the basics: even though numbers themselves are a fundamental part of reality, and in a Platonic, Pythagorean fashion they really precede material reality, the inevitable consequence of the atomistic-mechanistic model is that the very spatial model, the very postulate of a mechanism, loses its meaning completely in a purely quantitative framework. The numbers just sit there, and we only talk in numerical terms, being uncertain of any safe manner of defining their relationship with reality, or what reality is.

Why do we need a higher degree of assurance than that? And, if we thought we had that higher level of assurance, how could we test whether it is founded on a mistaken assumption?

How can you go from purely subjective sensory experience, towards certainty? Numbers might do it, but they don't tell the whole story. Rather, how can one - in a Heideggerian fashion - conjure presence out of a genuinely Heraclitus-like flow of ever changing things pertaining to immediate manifested immanent reality? Or would we have to, simply, you know, deny the existence of anything beyond immanent reality, in a very Nietzschean manner, and thus destroy any possibility of knowledge falling into complete nihilism?

Again, this is a problematic that Heidegger tackles well too.

Now I can anticipate that you might simply point at my summary above and say, "there, that's the problem I'm talking about." And if you would further say that this mindset I'm laying out excludes some appreciation of religion, I suppose I'd agree with you on that point. I find no particular use for religion in my own life.

I think you neglect the fact that ontology was born out of religion, and that the most brilliant philosophers of knowledge have came out of a religious background. Let's just say this: there's more to it, than the immediate sentimental crust.

[chriscase]

How can you go from purely subjective sensory experience, towards certainty? Numbers might do it, but they don't tell the whole story. Rather, how can one - in a Heideggerian fashion - conjure presence out of a genuinely Heraclitus-like flow of ever changing things pertaining to immediate manifested immanent reality? Or would we have to, simply, you know, deny the existence of anything beyond immanent reality, in a very Nietzschean manner, and thus destroy any possibility of knowledge falling into complete nihilism?

I hope you won't mind if I try to single-thread (or perhaps reduced-thread) our discussion. I find zebra-quoted threads really tedious. If I haven't addressed something you think is really important it's not because I'm trying to ignore it, but I think there is something else that's more relevant, or perhaps more important to discuss.

What I find in my own thought process around subject-object, quality-quantity, and similar dubious dichotomies, is what I'd call (creatively) a conceptual inversion. For example, I'd point to the construction of objective reality, which those of a philosophical background seem to revel in attacking.

If we accept Berkeley's criticism of naive materialism and refine the definition of objectivity:

A perceptive nexus (apparent object) is objective if it passes the bar of independence and consistency. The object must appear sufficiently similar to multiple independent observers.

So the notion of inversion I have here. Traditionally we'd say that the concept of objectivity is metaphysical in as much as it asserts a (perhaps) unfounded level of absolute existence to objects. The inversion I am speaking about does away with this notion by identifying it with the new definition of objective reality. When we say that consistent, independent observation has taken over the role of the (less defensible) concept of absolute existence, we are not removing the sense of certainty and predictability we have previously assigned to objective existence. Even better, we are placing a rational governor of doubt into the foundation of the concept, where it belongs.

Rather than compromising on previously established notions of objectivity, we have laid a more sound conceptual framework that abstracts exactly the properties we would rely on in the earlier model, without its non-verifiable assumptions. In every perceptible way that matters, the object that consists of an independently consistent nexus complies with the previous notion of absolute objective existence, which means we have not overturned any of the long list of accomplishments in empirical studies. We have only removed a conceptual liability which has turned out to be unnecessary.

In hindsight, we can say that "objective existence" was a conceptual shorthand, which we can make more precise by specifying its criteria: consistency and independence. As with many conceptual shortcuts, it brought in a problematic assumption, but we have no need to discard any of its utility by substituting a more precise definition. The trick is to realize this in a profound manner: everything we used to rely on from a phenomenological, observational, and interactive perspective is subsumed under the definition of object. We give up nothing.

Note that the existence of multiple independent observers is itself a presupposition, as is a language by which to communicate observations. The bar has to include a collective of independent observers, so it's also inherently social. Hence, contrary to previous assertions, this definition is distinctly connected, and fundamentally inconsistent with solipsism. Now does this mean that an instance of objective reality is infallible? Of course not. We can make mistakes, and observations can be misinterpreted.

This also does not mean that non-objective perceptions (hallucinations, non-ordinary states of consciousness, observations that cannot be verified through independent observation) are fundamentally non-objective. I'd say they are much more likely to be fundamentally objective, except their existence lies in the realm of the mind (rooted in the nervous system). So lack of objectivity has more to do with contextual misinterpretation than fundamental lack of existence.

However, the accusation that this definition excludes too much of the human experience assumes that this definition of objectivity limits itself to some pared-down, ultra-rational subset of the universe. There is no reason to believe this is the case. In the old way of thinking about subjective vs objective reality, the notion that all reality is objective means the exclusion of a broad range of human experience. However, this interpretation is smuggling in the old dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity, which is exactly what is being questioned. If all existence is fundamentally objective, it means that the full range of human experiences is also. We may not ever exhaustively understand the underpinnings of every single experience a person might have, but the field does seem to yield, incrementally, to observation.

Similarly, I'd say that notions of essence yield to a pragmatic empiricism. If the notion of essence has proved illuminating in the past, but it has yielded to a more morphological approach, some portion of that abstraction and its benefits ought to be subsumed by the new approach, not simply discarded.

All that being said, I think practice trumps theory. Even if there is something lost here, what difference should it make to me?