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Thread: [History] The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Post-War Settlement

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    Default [History] The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Post-War Settlement

    Title: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Post-War Settlement
    Author: Dr. Oza



    Ottoman Post-War Dissolution
    The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Post War Settlement

    The Role and Influence of Woodrow Wilson and the United States in the 1918-1922 Middle East Peace Negotiations


    June 15th, 2011

    The Ottoman Empire was for centuries the unquestioned master of the Middle East, even when most of their European possessions were lost. This was upheld as a rule of European foreign relations, the sick man was to be “propped up” and maintained[1], as such, in the midst of the Crimean War or the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1877-1878, when the Empire was on the verge of collapse, the European powers saw it to their benefit to “prop up” the Ottoman regime[2]. However, with such figures as Lloyd George and great assumptions, reputations, careers and imperial aspirations at stake, the European scramble for the globe finally caught up with the Sublime Porte[3]. The Ottomans had been caught up in the First World War alongside Germany and Austria-Hungary and ultimately lost to the British-led allied forces in the Middle East. In the subsequent peace negotiations, the allies carved up the modern map of the Middle East and influenced the direction of the region for decades. An officer under General Allenby’s command, leader of the British Palestine campaign, remarked upon the war’s end: “after the war to end war, they seem to have been pretty successful in Paris at making a Peace to end Peace[4].” Throughout the process by which the Treaty of Sevres was forced upon the Ottomans, Woodrow Wilson, the Fourteen Points and the United States were all influential; Wilson’s brief but intense involvement in the Middle East negotiations helped mediate the imperialist ambitions of the allies. In the period leading up to the final peace agreement, Woodrow Wilson guided to an extent the overall Allied peace negotiations. However, Wilson’s ideals compromised with the realities on the ground and with the aspirations of the other allies. In effect, the peace “won” at Sevres was as fragile as the famous Parisian suburb’s easily shattered fine china [5] and it would take the Turkish war of Independence, rapid population movements, and a follow up Treaty and Conference at Lausanne in 1923 before the “Eastern Question” was decided once and for all.
    The beginning acts of the war in 1914-1916, had largely been conducted by the British with ever present imperialist ambitions in the Middle East. In fact, it could be argued that the entire British involvement in the Middle East during the war was a continuation of “Great-Game-esque” politics and considerations. However, by the last quarter of 1916, Britain’s position changed. In April 1916, the much idealized British forces had been decisively defeated at the siege of Kut in northern Iraq by Ottoman forces commanded jointly by Nurredin Bey and Baron von der Goltz, a highly regarded German military advisor- this was not a strategically decisive loss for the British but it symbolized their initial lack of commitment to the Middle Eastern theatre and increased commitment could only come with success in the Western Front and that too was not the case. The Germans and the Allies were at a stalemate and the needs for Total War ate into the British Treasury, so much so that by late 1915 , early 1916 the Allies had “become dependent upon the United States not merely for supplies but for financing as well.”[6] The condition was getting so drastic that John Maynard Keynes, speaking for the Chancellery of the Exchequer in 1916 warned that “the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country.”[7] Thus disposed, the British and the Allies were in an awkward position. The President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson was not a pragmatist nor was he an imperialist, he had been elected more by a split amongst the rival political party’s supporters than on his own volition and he himself was an austere and morally upright man. Taking seriously his commitments to democracy Wilson was far from the partner the European Allies yearned for in their quest to carve up the Middle East, he was opposed to the Allies’ imperialist ambitions, more than that, he sought to “thwart” them. [8]
    Early on in the war, the President had asked the allies and the central powers to state their war aims, Secretary of State Robert Lansing led Lloyd George and Clemenceau to believe that Wilson was merely looking for a basis under which “he could bring the United States into war.” [9]And so the allies complied, claiming that in regards to the Middle East, their goals were no less than “The liberation of the peoples who now live beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks, and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, which has proved itself radically alien to Western civilization.” [10]This statement was laced with the theological innuendos that resonated to Wilson, yet it did not convince him. American missionaries had already been very active in the Ottoman Empire and institutions such as Roberts College[11] were influential in Ottoman society. In fact Wilson had a number of personal contacts to the American Missionary Society; these American missionaries repeatedly lobbied the president against involvement in the Middle Eastern theatre of the war- they feared damage to the American colleges, schools and hospitals that were operated by the missionaries and Wilson himself saw that the “aim” of the allies was more a “war cry” than a logically and morally-supported course of direction. On the other hand; however, and in general, Wilson held very baseless assumptions about the relationship between Muslims and Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In appointing the American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1913, Henry Morgenthau, a prominent American-Jewish businessmen, Wilson was influenced more so by his “ assumption that Jews somehow represented a bridge between Muslim Turks and Christian Americans,” than by the former’s diplomatic achievements. [12] This represented the faulty assumptions under which Wilson approached the Middle East.
    For Wilson and the United States, the Middle Eastern theatre of the First World War was a sideshow to Europe. The United States had never had extensive relations with the Ottoman Empire or the Middle East before the war and there was hardly an official American policy dedicated to and concerning the Ottoman Empire, this would all change in a few years.
    America entered the war on April 4th, 1917 and under the auspices of German aggression and violation of USA’s neutrality. Wilson repeatedly emphasized that the rationale for American involvement in the conflict mainly centered on the German violation of neutrality, as such, Wilson and America did not make war upon Austria Hungary [13]or on the Ottoman Empire. [14] However, once the war began, Wilson expanded the initial casus-belli to take on a grander sense when he declared to the US Congress that the German state had “constituted a war against all nations,”[15] a war which would only and could only be resolved by “making the world safe for democracy,” carrying on to state that the United States would “fight for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples…” to achieve these aims. The key note of this iconic oft-quoted speech in regards to the Ottoman Empire was this: “We have no selfish ends to serve. We seek no indemnities for ourselves no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make.” [16]This was an implicit reference to European Imperialism and the intention of the United States to not engage in such behavior.
    From the beginning and before America was even involved in the War, there was a Perception by Wilson and the United States that the Allies were planning on carving up the Middle East by the war’s end. Pressured by a divided government at home, particularly the Progressives and Socialists as well as the Republicans, Wilson made inquiries into possible secret treaties the allies had made amongst each other concerning the future of the Middle East. [17] Domestic political forces accused Wilson of willingly and knowingly associating and allying the United States with nations waging a war of imperialism- which American public opinion was strongly opposed against. In fact, the British and the French had already agreed upon the Sykes-Picot agreement, which was for the large part secret. This agreement was made in 16 May 1916 [18] and was the basis by which Britain and France would divide up the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces following the war’s end; Czarist Russia was also privy to the agreement. At this point, Wilson already believed that the allies had made secret pacts and instructed Colonel House, his trusted foreign affairs advisor and close political confidante, to make inquiries, in response, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, sent copies to Washington on 18 May 1917.” Colonel House later recalled remarking to the president that “It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making it a breeding place for future war.”[19] Another secret agreement was also revealed to Wilson, made between France, Britain and Italy, the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne (August 18 – September 26, 1917), under its provisions, Italy would receive southwestern Turkey, including present day Izmir and France would receive the Adana region of southern Turkey.This agreement had been made to secure Italian troops for the Middle Eastern theatre.[20] These all presented problems for President Wilson. Private negotiations yielded nothing and the allies would not give up the lands they had claimed for themselves in these secret agreements. [21] At this point, the Picots-Sykes agreement in particular was still “secret,” on 23 November 1917, however, the Bolsheviks who had just seized power in Russia, released the texts to the public. Soon printed in media outlets throughout the western world, the document caused much embarrassment for the Allies and revealed the radically different goals that Wilson, on one hand, possessed as opposed to those of the European Allies. This incident provoked Wilson to quickly respond lest his reputation and the American moral standing be tarnished. The answer was the Fourteen Points.
    Most the fourteen points are well known and not particularly relevant to the Ottoman Empire, Point 12; however, was dedicated solely to the Ottoman question. It states, merely, that “the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”[22] Quite interestingly, in an earlier draft, “Wilson had proposed to wipe Turkey off the map.” [23] Thus advised by his aides to alter the statement, Wilson’s objectives for the Ottoman Empire were made public; America was suggesting the dismemberment of a nation with which it was not at war. In regards to Wilson’s position on the Ottomans, his missionary interests were also made clear, Wilson, like Lloyd George took particular offense at the supposed massacres of Christians by the “barbarous and autocratic Turks.” [24] Theirs was a view as shaped by contemporary international politics as it was by a biblical and romantic understanding of the Middle East, which would become clear following the peace conferences. At the time; however, Point number twelve of the fourteen points “was in line” with Wilson’s criticism of Allied imperialism and his propagation of self-determinism if even it applied primarily to Christian minorities. As was already evident, the British and the French disagreed with Wilson’s assertion that the Ottoman Empire should be split into autonomous regions ruled by autonomous people.[25] Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech went further in saying: “An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.”[26] The allies took no regard at all to these “idealistic” proclamations. Wilson had not even consulted the Allies before making his public announcements, Lippmann, a close advisor of Wilson, thought that Wilson attempted to appeal directly to the European people to “put pressures on their own governments.” But it was all futile. America’s position; however, stood individually, apart from the allies and as a contradiction of sorts of the Allies’ aims. [27]The United States would not support imperialism in the Middle East, but at the Peace conferences Wilson would have to compromise. There were still some amongst the British and French diplomatic circles urging Wilson to declare war on the Ottomans but as in the beginning of the war, Protestant missionary lobbying, particularly Wilson’s friend and financial supporter, Cleveland Dodge succeeded in convincing the president that War with the Ottoman Empire would not be in America’s interests.[28]
    There were other forces at play however and it was British and French soldiers who were occupying much of the Middle East by 1918, not American. The British had made many promises to the Arabs, in the so called McMahon–Hussein Correspondences. [29]Britain had promised the Arabs that if they rebelled, they would receive independence. Specifically, the British had courted Hussein bin Ali, and though the Sykes-Picot Agreementrevealed the double-sided promises of the European allies. As late as 1918, with the aftermath of the Arab revolt, the Arab sheikhs and princes were being promised sovereign states. The Greeks too had their eyes on the western Anatolian city of Smyrna (modern day Izmir) and both Lloyd George and Wilson were “enchanted by Elutherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, and were won over to his vision of Greece’s historic mission,”[30] the Greek aspirations though ran contrary to the Italian aims made clear in the secret agreement St.-Jean-de-Maurienne, and so the Allies slowly began coming apart. The Armenians in the Eastern part of Turkey were of particular interest to the British and the Americans. Seen as oppressed and “massacred” during the war, their claims to land were sympathetic especially amongst the theologically inclined, such as Wilson himself. The British were hoping to set up a new Armenian state as a protectorate under the Americans so as to tie down U.S. interests into line with British interests, but this would later be rejected by the American Congress on April 20th, 1920.[31]
    On 30th of October 1918, with the Empire in ruins, the Ottomans surrendered on the British warship, the Agamemnon, with the signing of the Armistice of Mudros. They had earlier attempted to contact the French who had less extensive claims on the Ottoman Empire than the British and even before that they had tried the Americans, but all attempts failed and communications never got through. As a last resort, the Grand Vizier released captured British general Charles Townshend to communicate the Ottoman desire for the ending of hostilities. [32] The Young Turk cabinet was dissolved and the discussions on Peace began. The Ottoman delegation under Rauf Pasha was misled into believing much gentler terms would be put upon the Empire than actually were. The French were immediately outraged that an armistice had been signed without their consent. On 12th of November 1918, “two weeks after the armistice”, the British navy sailed passed the previously impregnable Gallipoli forts and into Istanbul. [33]The Peace negotiations thus began.
    The British and French had tolerated the American goals for the Middle East throughout the war lest they antagonize an ally against the Germans but now that the war was over, Lloyd George attempted to move as fast as possible to exclude America from the peace negotiations and conclude affairs on grounds favorable to France and Britain. Lord Balfour; however, was of a different view, he pointed out the irrationality of Lloyd George’s actions, “Their deliberate effort to exclude the Americans from any effective share in the world settlements... is neither in our interest nor in that of the French themselves... House (colonel) is undoubtedly anxious to work with us closely as he can …” Balfour believed quite rightly, as events would show, that “the stability of the peace settlement would require American participation,”[34] true American participation with real contributions. The Prime Minister thought differently and claimed that it was Britain’s right to play a dominant role in the Middle East, “recalling that at one point or another two and a half million British troops had been sent there, and the Americans had not been there at all.”[35] Furthermore, Lloyd George attempted to play “the French off the Americans and the Americans off the French” while he secured the juiciest prices for Britain. Yet the end of the war meant that armies were dwindling, allies were disappearing and the once friendly leaders were either becoming otherwise or were being replaced. “The Americans felt that the British had cynically betrayed the ideals for which the world war supposedly had been fought for, “and on the other hand, Britain felt betrayed that the Americans would not support them as much as they had expected. Woodrow Wilson approached the entire negotiations with a “lack of skill’ and Lloyd George did so with a “lack of scruple.” [36]
    Wilson made the Allies uneasy when he decided to come personally to the peace negotiations in Paris, arriving at Paris without a Senate under his control[37], Wilson was beset by domestic worries, even if he got an agreeable peace, could he get it ratified? More so, though, the President’s greatest downfall was that he had too many general idealistic goals and principles to set in place a peace for the Ottoman Empire but not enough actual solutions or proposals.[38] The President responded to British or French drafts and rarely contributed original or practical ideas. His inaptitude in compromising and his inflexible nature also complicated the peace negotiations. Wilson’s knowledge on the Middle East was very limited; his King-Crane Commission [39]was conducted on a faulty basis and run by unqualified people. It was marred by biases, indifference to the reality on the ground and a strictly American Christian point of view. Colonel House urged Wilson to compromise with Britain and France and also with the Senate in order to make an agreeable peace but Wilson refused. Lloyd George craftily planned it so that the agenda questions regarding British occupied Middle Eastern provinces would not be given much attention. And so, Italy and France lost a disproportionate share of their claims as opposed to Britain. Wilson reacted strongly against the Italian invasion and landing in southern Anatolia and their claims were not recognized. This was again a clever move by Lloyd George to preoccupy Wilson with the claims of Italy and not those of Britain. Wilson was already predisposed to prefer Greek claims on southwestern Turkey because of the sizeable Greek minority in the region and Britain encouraged this. Wilsonian idealism thus became a tool for British imperialism. Greece was merely a puppet of Britain. Wilson was again used by the British to oppose the “imperialist” French designs on Syria, so that the imperialist British designs through their puppet Faisal could be realized[40]. Wilson’s lack of concrete ideas and proposals and his abundance of general thematic beliefs lent him easily to manipulation by the more experienced Lloyd George. Wilson thus unwittingly excluded France from much of the Middle East while strengthening Britain and British puppets. Even Wilson’s King-Crane commission had often interviewed people handpicked by British officers. Ibn Saud, the Gulf States, Iraq, Arabia, Mesopotamia, etc, were not even discussed and all were held by or controlled by Britain. [41]Millions of Turks in lands allocated to Armenia, Greece and the Allies were also ignored, as were the Arab people. Wilson’s influence soon waned as he returned to America to market the Treaty of Versailles and the League; he collapsed and became incapacitated on October 2, 1919 following a major stroke.
    The Treaty of Sevres, signed and forced upon the Ottomans and reluctantly signed by Damat Ferid Pasha and Refik Pasha on 10 August 1920, was everything Wilson had worked against and everything he had unwittingly worked for. The European Allies split up the Middle East based on imperialist designs, much to Wilson’s final admonishment, the Peace Congress in Paris had been exhausting for him and his ideals were manipulated by the Allies. A Tripartite agreement was signed, secretly, between France, Italy and Britain that split up oil concessions, with the majority going to Britain. The peace with the Ottoman Empire had been the longest one to conclude, a full sixteen months after the war had ended. The Ottoman Empire was totally and completely partitioned, representing the failure of Wilsonian idealism. Hedjaz was granted independence; “Wilsonian” Armenia was established covering much of Eastern Turkey; League mandates were set up over much of Syria, Mesopotamia, Iraq and Transjordan; Anatolia itself was further split up by the major European Allies, to Britain went special concessions in south-eastern Turkey and the Marmara region, to France went the centre-southern portion, to Italy the south-western areas of Antalya. Istanbul, the capital was occupied by France and Britain but primarily Britain. Ottoman Finances were controlled by the Allies. The Ottoman Army was reduced to 50,700 men; hundreds of Ottoman officials were sent to Malta to be tried, hung and/or imprisoned; the size of the Ottoman Empire was reduced from 613,724 to 174,90… amongst other conditions.[42]
    Woodrow Wilson predicted that “the peace would not endure if its terms were not basically fair to all sides.”[43]The terms of the Treaty of Sevres appeased no one, except perhaps the British. Greece had already invaded by 1919 and demanded more. Armenians also wanted more land in the East. Italians and the French settled in and even began encroaching on what little Ottoman land there was left. However, something forgotten by the imperialist Allies was the fact that the majority in most of Anatolia were still Turks. Deprived of self-determination and carved up viciously by the Allies, Turks began coalescing around the charismatic and Brilliant Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had humiliated the British at Gallipoli. Launching a “Turkish War of Independence” Kemal Pasha overturned the Greek, French, Italian, and Armenian gains and fought off a war against almost insurmountable odds. Launching a Grand Assembly in Ankara and rebelling against the Sultan, Kemal and the Nationalist forces showed that “Peace would not endure if its terms were not basically fair to all sides.” Led by a Turkish nationalism and sense of coherence thought impossible by the Allies, the forces under Kemal took Lloyd George in surprise and very quickly changed what was supposed to be a new “British Ottoman Empire” in the Middle East. By 1922, the Sultan had been overthrown, the caliphate soon followed that fate and a secular Republic had been formed. Anatolia and modern day Turkey was unified and liberated. The subsequent Treaty of Lausanne gave the Turks equal representation and overturned much of the Treaty of Sevres. In the rest of the Middle East, Arabs had uprisings in Baghdad, Syria and Egypt. The borders of all the regions except those of Turkey, Iran and Egypt were made up arbitrarily by the Allies and the resulting disunion created forces of instability that would plague the region for decades. Overall, the peace agreements were not successful. However, Wilson had had blunder after blunder and his failing of instituting a “Just Peace” allowed the British and the French to institute their own brand of Peace. One thing was certain, that the Peace had been made, the “Peace to End All Peace, “between all of this, the Zionist concessions, the region became and still is one of the most unstable in the world.




    Works Cited
    Americanism; Woodrow Wilson's Speeches on the War--Why He Made Them--and--what They Have Done ... Chicago: Baldwin Syndicate, 1918. Print.
    Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2004. Print.
    Fromkin, David. A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922. New York: H. Holt, 1989. Print.
    Helmreich, Paul C. From Paris to Sèvres: the Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920. Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1974. Print.
    House, Edward M. What Really Happened at Paris, the Story of the Peace Conference: the Story of the Peace Conference 1918 - 1919. Paris: Payot, 1921. Print.
    House, Edward Mandell, and Charles Seymour. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1926. Print.
    Levy, Leonard W., Kenneth L. Karst, and Adam Winkler. Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2000. Print.
    Monroe, Elizabeth. Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1971. London: Chatto & Windus, 1981. Print.
    Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2007. Print.
    Sachar, Howard M. The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924. London: Allen Lane, 1970. Print.
    Wilson, Woodrow. The Bases of Durable Peace. [Chicago, Ill.]: Union League Club of Chicago, 1918. 16-17. Print.

    [1] Particularly the British who sought to answer the “Eastern Question” by maintaining the status quo and preventing increased European Involvement (other than themselves) in the Middle East, L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (London: Hurst and Co., 2000), p. 248-250.

    [2] The British & French Intervention during the Crimean War (October 1853 – February 1856), and also, the Berlin conference held by Otto von Bismarck in response to rapid Russian gains during the Russo-Turkish War o 1877-1878 in which the Russians came in site of Istanbul.

    [3] Alternate name for the Ottoman Regime, “Sublime Porte” was the gate of the Topkapi Palace by which foreign diplomats interacted with the Ottoman state.

    [4] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, Introduction

    [5] Sevres, a suburb of Paris, was famous for its brittle fine China, a famous French diplomat made a similar remark in his memoirs regarding the Peace Negotiations.

    [6] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin (pg 253 )

    [7] Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaign for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) pp. 179-180

    [8] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin p. 253

    [9] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin p. 254

    [10] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin p. 254

    [11] Founded in 1863 by two Americans, philanthropist and missionary Christopher Rhinelander Robert and Cyrus Hamlin

    [12] Oren. Power, Faith, and Fantasy, p. 333.

    [13] The United States did not declare war on Austria-Hungary until 7th December, 1917

    [14] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 256

    [15] Americanism, Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches, Oliver Marble Gale, 1918 p.37-50

    [16] Americanism, Woodrow Wilson’s Speeches, Oliver Marble Gale, 1918 p.25-34

    [17] A peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 257

    [18] Text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the WWI Document Archive (http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement)

    [19] Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, Vol. 3, p. 45

    [20] House, Edward Mandell, and Charles Seymour. What Really Happened at Paris; the Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919, (1921),p. 186-87. Print.

    [21] House, Edward Mandell, and Charles Seymour. What Really Happened at Paris; the Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919, (1921),p. 188. Print.

    [22] Wilson, Woodrow. The Bases of Durable Peace. [Chicago, Ill.]: Union League Club of Chicago, 1918, p.16-17. Print.

    [23] Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, Vol.2 p. 415

    [24] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.258

    [25] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.258

    [26] Wilson, Woodrow. The Bases of Durable Peace. [Chicago, Ill.]: Union League Club of Chicago, 1918, p.11-16. Print.

    [27] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 259

    [28] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.260

    [29] Cleveland, William L , A History of the Modern Middle East, p. 157–160

    [30] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.393


    [31] NY Times Archives, April 20th 1920 ,”Congress Opposes Armenian Republic”

    [32] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.368

    [33] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.373

    [34] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 374

    [35] Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence of the Middle East: 1914-1924, p.246

    [36] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 389

    [37] In the November 1918 elections, the Republicans gained control of the U.S. Senate and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

    [38] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p. 391

    [39] Commissioned by Wilson in 1919 , “It was conducted to inform American policy about the region's people and their desired future”

    [40] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin p.393-394

    [41] Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s moment in the Middle East: 1914-1917 p. 37

    [42] Helmreich, Paul C. (1974). From Paris to Sèvres.. p. 320.

    [43] A Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin, p.399
    Last edited by Lord Thesaurian; April 26, 2020 at 09:38 PM.

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