Did Hitler know better than his generals?

[Hanny]

Great, now you're lying. Besides, you're making an assumption you can't possibly prove.

Incorrect, your own posts content demonstrate your inability to comprehend the written word, so your own actions have proven my comment to be accurate.

It's not all about army logistics. There's plenty of other factors to consider in politics.

Its the answer to the question of cost/benifit from ideological imperatives on military actions, try comprehending the question and then the answer will make sense. Or is math another concept that you have trouble grasping, you seem unable to comprehend that a logistical gain of c4000 tons a day, compared to a cost of 60 tons a year of munition was a benefit. Or that the economic transfer pre war of 1 million tons of cereals to be increased in 42/3 to 2.5 million when that was all the SU agreed to provide when AH asked for 5 million, was rejected, and planned to take 8 million when occupied and under control so as to insure the food supply for Germany who was food importing region unable to sustain itself without food imports.

Maybe you want to read it again.

I dont need to, i know what is says, and what its used to teach, ( civil servants course of why democracy is a superior form of government) and you have again failed the class.

[athanaric]

Incorrect, your own posts content demonstrate your inability to comprehend the written word, so your own actions have proven my comment to be accurate.

You can continue to make assertions about other people that you cannot possibly prove (because you lack meaningful data), or you can try and stick to the rules and try to argue like a civilized person. Your very first post in this thread is a rude remark to the OP, and it only goes downward from there. If you cannot understand that, maybe you should ask someone you know IRL to explain why.

Its the answer to the question of cost/benifit from ideological imperatives on military actions, try comprehending the question and then the answer will make sense. Or is math another concept that you have trouble grasping, you seem unable to comprehend that a logistical gain of c4000 tons a day, compared to a cost of 60 tons a year of munition was a benefit. Or that the economic transfer pre war of 1 million tons of cereals to be increased in 42/3 to 2.5 million when that was all the SU agreed to provide when AH asked for 5 million, was rejected, and planned to take 8 million when occupied and under control so as to insure the food supply for Germany who was food importing region unable to sustain itself without food imports.

Which is a very narrow point to make about a broad situation.

I dont need to, i know what is says, and what its used to teach, ( civil servants course of why democracy is a superior form of government) and you have again failed the class.

There is no class and you aren't teaching anything or anyone here. This is a wargaming forum where people of all backgrounds are allowed to LARP as military analysts or historians. Don't be delusional.

[Hanny]

You can continue to make assertions about other people that you cannot possibly prove (because you lack meaningful data), or you can try and stick to the rules and try to argue like a civilized person. Your very first post in this thread is a rude remark to the OP, and it only goes downward from there. If you cannot understand that, maybe you should ask someone you know IRL to explain why.

You provided the data, i commented on it. Its how conclusions are formed. If you dont like the conclusion, change the content of your posts.

Which is a very narrow point to make about a broad situation.

Its the specific answer to question, using data.

There is no class and you aren't teaching anything or anyone here. This is a wargaming forum where people of all backgrounds are allowed to LARP as military analysts or historians. Don't be delusional.

Point was you have no idea of how the subject is taught, i do, used it to inform you, and you claim it means the opposite and that i should re read it again.
Second point is your the delusional one thinking you determine the boards rules for others.

[Anna_Gein]

Great ! A battle of quote. It keeps getting better.

I didn't bring it up, someone else started insulting everybody else on the thread as a "wannabe" and then bragged about attending an "elite" institution.

I did not bragged about attending an "elite" institution. For the record, any student can integrate the History curriculum of Paris IV Sorbonne, renamed Paris - Sorbonne last year, following the completion of a Baccaulaureate General (equivalent to a British A-Grade ).

The point was to highlight that I followed a cursus in history. There I learnt the history methodology.

Neither you nor Hanny have any business commenting on other people's reading comprehension, professional qualities, careers, or other personal stuff, not only because it's against the ToS but because quite frankly, you lack the necessary quality and quantity of data to do so. It's impossible to make an informed judgment about someone else's profession or skill level based on a few comments on the internet, and if La Sorbonne is everything it's made out to be, you should know that.

It is definitively possible to observe when someone disrespect the most elementary academical norms n history with a handful of forum message. Any student in history from whatever university of the world should be able to do so.

Since the start you are the only one dragging the issue to twc users irl activities and qualifications.

Why are you singling me out specifically?

I did not single you out specifically. Athanaric did by mentionning you so I replied.

Originally I asked you a question about the increased deployment of German forces in Tunis because I thought your affirmation about a "maneuver war obsession" to be particularly bizarre. To be frank I could have picked someone else odd affirmation to illustrate my rant. There is nothing personal against you.

On the bright side of things I would be happy if you could support you claim with sources (primary or academical second hand). Like many people I find some decision from the WW2 German high command such like the sudden increase of commitment to the African Front to be particularly odd. Even more odd that a generals like Kesselring, mostly know for his defensive leadership in Italy and frequently presented as an anti-Rommel, did support the increased resources in Africa and pushed for an aggressive posture in Tunisia only a few months before the Axis final defeat on this continent.

I also think this subject is a core aspect of the OP question as it defines how did Germany high command proceed and how much influence Hitler wielded on the German grand strategy and operational level with the example of the last months in Africa.

Where did I ever say that?

What I said was that the Germans would not have wanted to fight a war of attrition in Italy, at that time. Which was in response to conon's post. The German officers had an aversion to WW1-esque scenarios despite the fact that such a strategy was the correct move and so ultimately it made sense to replace Rommel with Kesselring.[/QUOTE]
I quoted you ...

My question about your sources still stand.

A detailed counter argument rather than a vague statement would be more welcome. What is a specific criticism of something which I've said. My personal statements, because you mentioned me by name.

The criticism I did were precise enough. Since you have studied history in an academical institution, you surely know what teleology is and why it is anathema in the academical field. Everybody can understand what history fiction and off-topic are.

I repeat my criticisms were not targeted on you personally but broader. Which is why I expressed it without quote and why I said it was unfortunate rather that accusing someone of dragging the quality of the sub down.

I never claimed I was a historian. While I attended university for 4 years with a major in Classical History and a minor in Political Science I dropped out because there was no money to be made and I couldn't afford $20,000+ per year. It's not like you need to have a degree to go to a book, open up the bibliography and then track down a source. Which is all I did.

You should tell that to Athanaric.

I think a degree is definitively most welcomed to know which book to open, what you should look for in said book and how much value you should put in the information you found.

Overqualified talking heads like Ian Kershaw and Antony Beevor are such academic stooges that they didn't even read their sources, which is what I'm pointing out.

Funnily enough Antony Beevor is not an historian.

[Condottiere 40K]

Without command of the sea, and at best contested air superiority, you need a logistics light force African expeditionary force; I think the Germans lost the equivalent of another Stalingrad by doubling down.

[Cookiegod]

Without command of the sea, and at best contested air superiority, you need a logistics light force African expeditionary force; I think the Germans lost the equivalent of another Stalingrad by doubling down.

I heard people argue that Malta should've been taken, which would've eliminated one of the crucial bases of the Brits in the Mediterranean. And yeah, supplies were a problem, and that problem could only be fixed once the British navy had been cleared out of the area, i.e. retreated past the Suez canal.

I don't have any actual insight into the matter, so I can't have an opinion on what approach would've been best.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

The point was to highlight that I followed a cursus in history. There I learnt the history methodology.

What methodology wasn't carried out?

It is definitively possible to observe when someone disrespect the most elementary academical norms n history with a handful of forum message. Any student in history from whatever university of the world should be able to do so.

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you give specific examples?
Point form is fine.

I did not single you out specifically. Athanaric did by mentionning you so I replied.

You said I was a bad historian because... I don't know why, you didn't make an argument.

Originally I asked you a question about the increased deployment of German forces in Tunis because I thought your affirmation about a "maneuver war obsession" to be particularly bizarre. To be frank I could have picked someone else odd affirmation to illustrate my rant. There is nothing personal against you.

You could have just looked at Rommel's plans for campaign in Italy. It was Kesselring who opted for prepared defenses a la Falkenhayn in WW1. Which undoubtedly was the correct decision and should have been carried out on the Eastern Front as well after 1942. All German generals who attempted maneuver were summarily defeated and all the ones who attempted defensive campaigns were far more successful.

However these guys in general really did have an aversion to WW1 scenarios. The other thing is that they actually were obsessed with maneuvers. Everything since Frederick, Clausewitz, Napoleon, Moltke were maneuver oriented. It was ingrained into their minds from the beginning and WW1 seemed to confirm their bias. By contrast the Soviets were the result of revolution and mass mobilization. Russia in general was characterized by a desire to fight to the death, and that is exactly what we saw throughout Operation Barbarossa and Case Blue.

On the bright side of things I would be happy if you could support you claim with sources (primary or academical second hand). Like many people I find some decision from the WW2 German high command such like the sudden increase of commitment to the African Front to be particularly odd. Even more odd that a generals like Kesselring, mostly know for his defensive leadership in Italy and frequently presented as an anti-Rommel, did support the increased resources in Africa and pushed for an aggressive posture in Tunisia only a few months before the Axis final defeat on this continent.

Although I wasn't talking about Tunisia, rather the aversion to fighting a defensive war on Italian soil. Personally I would have opted to withdraw into Italy. But not attempted to hold Sicily more than necessary. As many meat grinders as possible, then withdraw to another stronghold. Maybe the Japanese should have attempted this as well but the reality in the Pacific was a lot more complex.

I also think this subject is a core aspect of the OP question as it defines how did Germany high command proceed and how much influence Hitler wielded on the German grand strategy and operational level with the example of the last months in Africa.

In the Mediterranean? Not much, that was Mussolini's domain. Albrecht Kesselring was appointed because he got on well with the Italians and was generally more capable than anyone else in field command in that area. So Mussolini is at the top, then Ugo Cavallero and then Kesselring. The Italians wanted to defend Tunisia at all costs to prevent an invasion of Italy. Hitler supported their decision because he wanted to put up a strong resistance against the Allies in the aftermath of Stalingrad (hoping to dissuade the Allies from invading Europe). Afrika Korps and 5th Panzer Army lacked oil to supply them in the field. As we know from Kesselring's messages to the HQ. Mostly this move was in reaction to Operation Torch however. The loss of Tunis was a major setback to the naval considerations.

However I don't really get why they cared since the Axis navies were unable to prevent Operation Torch in the first place.

It was Rommel who asked for Army Group Africa to be withdrawn, as they gradually had to do towards Tunis but the Axis could not pull off its own Dunkirk and lost about 200,000 men. A massive disaster which albeit the Italians had not considered. Diplomatically the Germans didn't want to lose their main ally. But on the other hand the loss of Italy provided the Germans with captured oil reserves. Rather than large military setbacks I think the Mediterranean theater provided the Germans with several headaches in trying to figure out what to do down there. Since they constantly changed their approach based on the circumstances.

My question about your sources still stand.

The meetings of Italian High Command. Including the writings of Ciano. I find it curious that Ciano and the Italians were so hostile considering that the Germans were taking the time to help them in a side theater, and of Italy's initiative since they made the calls down there.

The correspondence of Kesselring with HQ in which he points out supply problems.

The correspondence of Rommel with HQ in which he asks to withdraw (as he had since after 2nd Alamein consistently).

Doenitz correspondence with HQ. He advocated to focus entirely on the Atlantic to chip away at the Anglo-American supply base and to weaken Britain. Which was a more consistent policy than Erich Raeder's. However I'm left wondering whether Raeder's insistence in '42 to focus on the Mediterranean had some merit. Even if it was an impossible and poor plan. The German navy couldn't operate effectively in the Med and a U-Boat campaign there would have been foolish. It made more sense to focus on the Atlantic so that they could eventually starve them out. Changing focus would have removed the pressure on the British Isles.

The criticism I did were precise enough. Since you have studied history in an academical institution, you surely know what teleology is and why it is anathema in the academical field. Everybody can understand what history fiction and off-topic are.

I repeat my criticisms were not targeted on you personally but broader. Which is why I expressed it without quote and why I said it was unfortunate rather that accusing someone of dragging the quality of the sub down.

To be honest they didn't teach a whole lot. Which was one of my motivations for dropping out.

As for the motivations and goals, I suppose that should be the largest consideration rather than what led to what.
For instance lots of people mentioning the common cited misconception that if the Germans gave all the Slavs an olive branch then they would all rise up against the Reds. But that is to ignore that the Reds were not universally despised within Russia. That the Germans had to sustain their presence by taking contributions from the locals. And finally that the Germans didn't intend to offend the locals, but which obviously happened anyway. The Germans didn't have to do much to piss off their new subjects, naturally if someone came into your house and subjected you to military occupation, you wouldn't like them either. It really has anything to do with General Plan Ost or superiority complex or anything of that sort. Actual uprisings were put down brutally by the Soviets during the war, lets us not forget this crucial point.

I think a degree is definitively most welcomed to know which book to open, what you should look for in said book and how much value you should put in the information you found.

Not really. Just look at the citations and keep following that rabbit hole. Ultimately history is dependent on the availability of sources. In 1950 we had a few sources on the war. Gradually archives were opened every decade. The 1990's saw access to plenty of archives in the Eastern Bloc. We've yet to see even half of the total documents which are all tucked away in Russia. Generally anyone who is smart enough can figure out how to piece it together. Even better would be to have connections which could get you access to all these archives. If anyone has Putin's phone number, let me know.

Funnily enough Antony Beevor is not an historian.

... Beevor attended Sandhurst, went up the military curriculum, has taken multiple professor jobs and writes history for a living.

[Cyclops]

... Beevor attended Sandhurst, went up the military curriculum, has taken multiple professor jobs and writes history for a living.

Indeed, in a thread full of bizarre statements that one ("Beevor is not an historian") puzzles me as much as any of them.

Its a shame that such a promising and thoughtful OP has drawn a bunch of negative nonsense. +rep to Cheney, keep up the good work. [edit bother apprently I "must spread some rep around" first]

Hitler was a regimental messenger in WWI, his knowledge of strategy, history and diplomacy seems to have been on the level of "the man in the street". he was a skilled propagandist but OP asks about his conduct of the war which was poor. As the war proceeded he increasingly interfered in campaigns, operations and even issued company level orders (!) in complete contravention Prussian doctrine.

There are numerous examples where his blind risk taking resulted in surprising victories, but even more noticeable are his utterly suicidal decisions that doomed Germany to near total destruction, humiliation and partition. There are occasions he went against expert military advice and its likely on balance he did much more harm than good by doing so.

For example when Rommel wished to deploy his armour across the Seine to counter Overlord, when Manstein urged Hitler to negotiate in 1942, the futile commitment of armour to street fighting in Stalingrad (I think it was Hoth who objected), the stupid "fixed point defense" that cost so much armour in the winter of 1941 etc. The insanity of a two-front war as a folly to be avoided at all costs was a standing article of faith for the German military thought through the third and Second Reichs going back to the nightmare of the Silesian wars and confirmed by WWI that Hitler blithely disregarded.

Some of this may be after-the-fact exculpation (Manstein seems like an awful self promoter) but the fact is the Heere hatched multiple assassination attempts against the Fuhrer on account of his suicidal lack of professionalism. This is a sure indication they felt they knew better than Hitler and given the Wehrmacht's history of capable military operations up to (if not including) strategic level I'd back them over the evil monster any day.

[Hanny]

Beevor is not an historian, well yes and no.

Has he had any academic training?, No he has not, he failed A level history at school ( but some of the worlds best historians never had academic training either, but so do some of the worst) all are honary awards, he left the UK Army to pursue a literary path rather than be posted to Ireland back in the troubles. He had been taught by clumpy Kegan about military history as Sandhurst. He is fluent in English only and relies on everything to be translated for him, and faces arrest if he again goes into Russia for the contents of his works.

[Morticia Iunia Bruti]

The German navy couldn't operate effectively in the Med and a U-Boat campaign there would have been foolish.

Not true. German U-Boats were very successfull in the mediterraean, especially against the supply convois for Malta:

13 November 1941 - As Force H returned to Gibraltar after flying off more Hurricanes from "Ark Royal" and "Argus" for Malta, the famous and much 'sunk' "ARK ROYAL" was hit by one torpedo from "U-81". Next day she foundered in tow only a few miles from home. One man was killed. "U-81" was one of four U-boats that had just passed into the Mediterranean.


25 November 1941 - Force K hunted for Italian convoys to North Africa supported by the Mediterranean Fleet with battleships "Barham", "Queen Elizabeth" and "Valiant". In the afternoon north of Sidi Barrani, "BARHAM" (above) was hit by three torpedoes from "U-331" and as she slowly turned over and capsized, split apart in an almighty explosion. Recorded on film her apparently calamitous end is often used in naval films and documentaries. Although over 800 men were lost with her, a remarkable number were saved. Just before this tragedy, Force K had sunk two more Axis supply ships west of Crete. At this stage 60 percent of Axis North African supplies were being lost to attacks by British aircraft, submarines and warships.

13 -20 Dezember 1941 - First Battle of Sirte and related actions - Italian convoy operations to Libya led to major Royal Navy losses over just a few days. A first Axis convoy bound for Benghazi set out on the 13th, covered by an Italian battlefleet. On receiving the news, Rear-Adm Vian left Alexandria with a cruiser force to join up with Force K from Malta. On the evening of the 14th, submarine “Urge” torpedoed and damaged battleship “Vittorio Veneto” off the Sicilian Strait of Messina and the Italians cancelled that operation. The cruiser forces returned to their bases but as they did, Adm Vian's “GALATEA” was hit by three torpedoes from “U-557” and went down off Alexandria that night. Adm Vian was out again late on the 15th to escort fast supply ship “Breconshire” from Alexandria to Malta. On the 17th they met Force K off the Gulf of Sirte, and shortly encountered Italian battleships covering a second convoy, this time to Tripoli. The two cruiser forces attacked and the Italians withdrew in what became known as the First Battle of Sirte. “Breconshire” reached Malta on the 18th and Force K left harbour to search for the second convoy still making for Tripoli. Early on the 19th off Tripoli, the British force ran into an Italian minefield. Cruiser “NEPTUNE” hit three or four mines and sank with only one man surviving. “Aurora” was badly damaged and “Penelope” slightly. Trying to assist “Neptune”, destroyer “KANDAHAR” was mined and had to be scuttled the following day. Out of a three cruiser and four destroyer force, only three destroyers escaped damage.

11 March 1942- Adm Vian's cruiser force returned to Alexandria after searching for Axis shipping and covering the passage of cruiser "Cleopatra" from Malta. North of Sidi Barrani, flagship "NAIAD" was torpedoed by "U-565" and went down.

12 -16 June 1942 - Malta Convoys 'Harpoon' from Gibraltar, 'Vigorous' from Alexandria - Six escorted merchantmen passed through the Strait of Gibraltar covered by battleship "Malaya", carriers "Argus" and "Eagle", cruisers "Kenya", "Charybdis", "Liverpool" and destroyers - this force comprised Operation 'Harpoon'. Attacks by Italian aircraft on the 14th led to the first merchant ship going down south of Sardinia. "Liverpool" was also damaged and had to return. Later that day at the entrance to the Strait of Sicily, the big ship cover force turned back. In the morning of the 15th, south of Pantelleria, an Italian two-cruiser squadron in conjunction with Italian and German aircraft attacked the by now lightly defended convoy. The five escorting fleet destroyers headed for the Italians, but "Bedouin" and "Partridge" were disabled by gunfire. Three more merchantmen were lost to bombing attacks and Italian torpedo aircraft finished off BEDOUIN. Later that evening, as the seriously depleted convoy approached Malta, it ran into a minefield. Two destroyers and the fifth supply ship were damaged, but Polish escort destroyer KUJAWIAK was sunk. Just two of 'Harpoon's' six ships reached Malta for the loss of two destroyers and serious damage to three more and a cruiser.

Meanwhile the Operation 'Vigorous' force of 11 ships and their escorts sailed from Haifa and Port Said, and were met on the 13th off Tobruk by Adm Vian with seven light cruisers and 17 destroyers. By the 14th, two ships had been lost to air attack and two more damaged. That evening Vian learnt an Italian battlefleet with two battleships, two heavy and two light cruisers plus destroyers had sailed south from Taranto. The chances of driving them off were slim. Early on the 15th the first of five (1-5) course reversals were made as 'Vigorous' tried to break through to Malta. As the convoy now headed back (1), German E-boats from Derna launched torpedo strikes. Cruiser "Newcastle" was damaged by "S-56" and destroyer HASTY sunk by "S-55". Around 07.00, when the Italian fleet was 200 miles to the northwest, the convoy turned back for Malta (2). Attacks by Malta-based aircraft were made on the main Italian fleet without serious effect, although they disabled heavy cruiser "TRENTO" which was finished off by submarine "Umbra". Between 09.40 and noon on the 15th, two more course reversals (3 & 4) were made so that once again the convoy was bound for Malta. All afternoon air attacks were mounted; and south of Crete, cruiser "Birmingham" was damaged and escort destroyer AIREDALE sunk by Ju87 Stukas. The convoy was now down to six ships when Australian destroyer "Nestor" was badly damaged. That evening 'Vigorous' finally turned back for Alexandria (course reversal 5). Now into the early hours of the 16th, cruiser HERMIONE was torpedoed and sunk by "U-205", and NESTOR had to be scuttled. At this time, as the Italian fleet headed back for Taranto, a RAF Wellington from Malta torpedoed and damaged battleship "Littorio". None of the 'Vigorous' ships reached Malta. One cruiser, three destroyers and two merchant ships had been lost in the attempt.



10-15 August 1942- Malta Convoy: Operation 'Pedestal' (map below) -For Malta to survive another convoy had to be fought through. The biggest operation ever was mounted from the Gibraltar end. A total of fourteen merchantmen, including two American and the British-manned tanker "Ohio" (Capt D. W. Mason) had a massive escort. Close in under Rear-Adm Harold Burrough were cruisers "Nigeria", "Kenya", "Manchester" and "Cairo" and 12 destroyers. Covering were the three fleet carriers "Eagle", "Indomitable" and "Victorious" each with their accompanying cruisers "Charybdis", "Phoebe" and "Sirius", battleships "Nelson" and "Rodney", and another 12 destroyers. Eight more destroyers sailed with the force - to give a total of 44 major warships. The opportunity would be taken for carrier "Furious" to fly off 38 Spitfires for Malta. The Mediterranean Fleet would try to distract the enemy at the other end of the Mediterranean. In overall command of 'Pedestal' was Vice-Adm E. N. Syfret. The convoy passed Gibraltar on the 10th and from the next day was subjected to increasingly intense attacks by submarines, aircraft and later coastal forces. Early on the afternoon of the 11th, "Furious" sent off her Spitfires and later that day headed back for Gibraltar. On the 12th one of her escorting destroyers "Wolverine", rammed and sank Italian submarine "DAGABUR" off Algiers. Still on the 11th and now north of Algiers, "EAGLE" was torpedoed four times by "U-73" and went down. Air attacks took place later that day and early on the 12th, but not until noon, south of Sardinia, did they gain their first success. Italian and German aircraft slightly damaged "Victorious" and hit a merchantman which later sank. More submarines then appearred and the Italian "COBALTO" was rammed by destroyer "Ithuriel". Once the convoy was north of Bizerta, Tunisia, submarine, aircraft and Italian MTB (mas) attacks came fast and furiously.

At 18.30, still on the 12th, aircraft badly damaged "Indomitable" putting her out of action and destroyer "FORESIGHT" was torpedoed by an Italian bomber and scuttled next day. The main Royal Navy cover force next turned back at the entrance to the 100 mile wide Strait of Sicily. The convoy carried on, still with 13 of the original 14 merchantmen afloat and its close escort of four cruisers and 12 destroyers. Disaster struck soon after 20.00 to the northwest of Cape Bon. Three out of the four cruisers were put out of action by Italian submarines. "Axum" and "Dessie" hit cruisers "Nigeria" and "Cairo" and the vital tanker "Ohio". "Alagi" torpedoed the "Kenya". "CAIRO" was scuttled and "Nigeria" headed back to Gibraltar. Around this time aircraft sank two transports. Cruiser "Charybdis" and two destroyers left the the main cover force and returned east to replace the lost ships. In the early hours of the 13th, the convoy was hugging the coast south of Cape Bon when Italian MTBs struck. Four merchantmen were sent to the bottom and the last of the original close escort cruisers, "MANCHESTER" was hit and scuttled. Air attacks later that morning accounted for one more merchantman and disabled another which was finished off in the evening. And to add to the torpedo hit, "Ohio" loaded with its highly inflammable cargo was now damaged by bombs and a crashing Ju87 Stuka. Including her, just five ships were left. Now into the afternoon of the 13th, three reached Malta. The fourth struggled in next day, but the crippled "Ohio", lashed to destroyer "Penn", only made port on the 15th. (Capt Mason was awarded the George Cross.) By now the close escort had just returned to Gibraltar.
Earlier, an Italian cruiser force set out to add to the convoy's miseries, but turned for home. North of Sicily on the 13th it was sighted by submarine "Unbroken" (Lt A. C. G. Mars) and heavy cruiser "Bolzano" and light cruiser "Attendolo" torpedoed and damaged. Only five out of fourteen transports had got through to Malta for the loss of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer sunk, and a carrier and two cruisers badly damaged. But the supplies delivered - and especially "Ohio's" oil - were enough to sustain Malta as an offensive base at a time critical to the coming Battle of El Alamein. More was still needed however, and only two days after "Ohio's" arrival, "Furious" flew off more Spitfires while submarines continued to make supply trips.

https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed2.htm

1. February 1943 As cruiser-minelayer "WELSHMAN" sailed from Malta to Alexandria after minelaying operations in the Strait of Sicily, she was sunk by "U-617" north of Bardia.

https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed3.htm

FEBRUARY 1944

Italy - In the Second Battle of Cassino, the attacking Indian and New Zealand troops took heavy losses for zero gains. Throughout the month the Germans launched more attacks at Anzio to prevent the Allies breaking out of the beachhead. By early March they had exhausted themselves and moved over to the defensive. Royal Navy ships continued to suffer casualties during the Battle for Anzio: 18th - Returning to Naples, the seemingly indestructible cruiser "PENELOPE" (HMS 'Pepperpot') was torpedoed and sunk by "U-410". 25th - A week later destroyer "INGLEFIELD" was hit off the beaches by a Hs293 glider bomb and went down.

https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed4.htm

German Submarines sunk in the mediterranean (confirmed by the Allies):

1 Battleship
2 Aircraft carrier
5 Cruiser
19 Destroyer
13 Escort Warships
116 Merchant vessels with 472 825 Tonnage
24 Merchant vessels with 175114 Tonnage damaged
24 Clipper

Karl Alman "Graue Wölfe in blauer See - Der Einsatz der deutschen U-Boote im Mittelmeer", Page 311

This book is also about the missions of the german torpedoboats and speedboats/e-boats in the Mediterranean from 1941-1945.



If this thread is about german strategy in WW II could we please talk with more facts and less history fiction?


Fact is, Rommel's DAK was sent to Libya to defend Libya and prevent a allied invasion in Sicily and so to stabilize Mussolini's rule in Italy.

After the loss of Libya and Tunisia and the invasion of Sicily Mussolini was overturned, Italy made a separate ceasefire with the Allies and the italian armies and the big italian navy changed the sides. Much more new german forces needed to be sent to Italy from the eastern front.

Ergo: Exactly that happened, what the DAK should prevent, so the decision for sending forces to Libya was right, but to less and Malta, which was also on the route of the german-italian supply convois, was not taken, although the time in spring/early summer 1942 was fortunate because of the losses of the RN and the combined airraids of Luftwaffe and italian Aeronautica on Malta in Spring 1942 (Malta Blitz).

At this time the Axis had the less losses in their convoys to Libya.

[conon394]

Beevor is not an historian, well yes and no.

Has he had any academic training?, No he has not, he failed A level history at school ( but some of the worlds best historians never had academic training either, but so do some of the worst) all are honary awards, he left the UK Army to pursue a literary path rather than be posted to Ireland back in the troubles. He had been taught by clumpy Kegan about military history as Sandhurst. He is fluent in English only and relies on everything to be translated for him, and faces arrest if he again goes into Russia for the contents of his works.

As there as far as I know no formal world guild of historians I not really sure of thrust of you post. Fluency can be a knock but there is an endless number of historians who lack fluency in all things. The only question is if that leads a particular historian to ignore sources or fail to find an effective collaborator.

and faces arrest if he again goes into Russia for the contents of his works.

Yep the Russians were like saints when they left Russia (oh and LL was a waste of time).


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Fact is, Rommel's DAK was sent to Libya to defend Libya and prevent a allied invasion in Sicily and so to stabilize Mussolini's rule in Italy.

It remained logistically costly. Particularly so after Rommel turned it into a vain glorious attempt to take Alexandria. That was beyond the logistical reality. It distracted focus from Russia to no avail. Ships, fuel, men should have been in Russia. Garrison Italy its not like the allies had vast amounts of amphibious ability laying about in 19432 or even early 1943. Even if allow it was useful effort in response to Compass after El Aamein Germany should have written off North Africa. Edit: for example every Fallschirmjager lost in North Africa was the loss of highly trained and skilled soldier who should have been fighting in the decisive theater of the war not a side show with no real strategic significance.

[Morticia Iunia Bruti]

After El Alamein North Africa was surely lost and every division sent to the new Army Group Africa was wasted, but the two german panzerdivision ( 15th and 21th) in North Africa wouldn't have changed the course on the Eastern Front in 1942. Fall Blau was nonsense, as german forces in Russia had lost 750000 soldiers and outdated equipment like the 3,7 centimeter antitankgun or the Panzer III with the 5 centimeter short gun, which was not competitive with the T 34, had to replenished.

Fall Blau was another bad idea from Gröfaz.

[conon394]

After El Alamein North Africa was surely lost and every division sent to the new Army Group Africa was wasted, but the two german panzerdivision ( 15th and 21th) in North Africa would haven't changed the course on the Eastern Front in 1942. Fall Blau was nonsense, as german forces in Russia had lost 750000 soldiers and outdated equipment like the 3,7 centimeter antitankgun or the Panzer III with the 5 centimeter short gun had to replenished.

Fall Blau was another bad idea from Gröfaz.

True when you focus only on a few divisions. The diversion of transport trucks, fuel , attrition of aircraft (and pilots), and all the Italian effort, was costly to the war effort where it mattered.

Fall Blau

Executed as simply a limited effort to destroy oil production in Baku with no intent to hold ground it could I think have been a reasonable offensive waiting for 1943 assuming Germany went all total war rationalized production.

[Morifea]

Executed as simply a limited effort to destroy oil production in Baku with no intent to hold ground it could I think have been a reasonable offensive waiting for 1943 assuming Germany went all total war rationalized production.

This, or if executed in 1942 with the only target of Blocking the Wolga.

[Morticia Iunia Bruti]

Or a campaign by Luftwaffe to neutralize Baku or mining Wolga.

[Cyclops]

Executed as simply a limited effort to destroy oil production in Baku with no intent to hold ground it could I think have been a reasonable offensive waiting for 1943 assuming Germany went all total war rationalized production.

Hitler didn't do "no intent to hold ground".

Fell Blau as written called for occupation of Baku, and Stalingrad to be "neutralised" IIRC. It was a stretch, but given the advances in 1941, possible. The decision to turn Stalingrad into an ideological battle requiring complete occupation instead of just interdicting the Volga bargeway meant large forces were absorbed into street fighting instead of romping across the steppe. Stalingrad is a perfect example of Hitler over ruling his generals to create a disaster.

[Morifea]

Or a campaign by Luftwaffe to neutralize Baku or mining Wolga.

Rememeber the last time the Luftwaffe promised to do something on their own? cough*Dürnkirchen*cough

[Cookiegod]

After El Alamein North Africa was surely lost and every division sent to the new Army Group Africa was wasted, but the two german panzerdivision ( 15th and 21th) in North Africa wouldn't have changed the course on the Eastern Front in 1942. Fall Blau was nonsense, as german forces in Russia had lost 750000 soldiers and outdated equipment like the 3,7 centimeter antitankgun or the Panzer III with the 5 centimeter short gun, which was not competitive with the T 34, had to replenished.

Fall Blau was another bad idea from Gröfaz.

So what should he have done? Sit and wait for the Soviet counteroffensive?
It is a plan that, if it had succeeded, could've changed the war significantly. Germany would've had oil all of a sudden. And the Soviet none if that.
If you say it's stupid, you have to present us an alternative.
Btw. it's not like Soviets were fighting with KV's & T-34 only at that time. Especially not in the Caucasus. The 3,7cm & 5cm guns were still capable against most enemies they were facing.

Or a campaign by Luftwaffe to neutralize Baku or mining Wolga.

Yeah, because even the RAF and USAF with their huge bomber forces couldn't neutralise key German industries, so naturally the Luftwaffe would've able to do just that... Nope.

Executed as simply a limited effort to destroy oil production in Baku with no intent to hold ground it could I think have been a reasonable offensive waiting for 1943 assuming Germany went all total war rationalized production.

This destruction would've been reversed within a very short time regardless. And again: They never even got that far. However, taking it and try to hold it is sensible when that's the ressource you lack the most.

Hitler didn't do "no intent to hold ground".

Fell Blau as written called for occupation of Baku, and Stalingrad to be "neutralised" IIRC. It was a stretch, but given the advances in 1941, possible. The decision to turn Stalingrad into an ideological battle requiring complete occupation instead of just interdicting the Volga bargeway meant large forces were absorbed into street fighting instead of romping across the steppe. Stalingrad is a perfect example of Hitler over ruling his generals to create a disaster.

We have Hitler literally on tape saying it had nothing at all to do with the name. Furthermore, we know he became furious once he heard of the Germans scaling the Elbrus because he felt this was a senseless waste of precious resources. So no, he didn't do it for propagandistic purposes.

Merely being in the vicinity of the Volga effectively blocked one of the major Soviet transport arteries, yes, but Stalingrad had a tank factory in it and the Soviets would've most certainly used it as forward fortified supply base from which they could launch their attacks. Merely holding a few hundred Meters of shore flat land would've been untenable in the long run.

"Romping across the steppe" was what the Germans had done far too much already. They were running out of oil, and their troops were starving long before the encirclement even began. They kept romping through the Steppe further south as long as they could, but to be able to do so, they needed a secure flank. Stalingrad was chosen as an anchor point for that.

Under such conditions it's no surprise the Germans decided to seek a battle, even if it was a bloody one, and also try to bind as many troops as possible.


It's really easy to play general hindsight, especially if you haven't fully comprehended the situation they were in.

[conon394]

It is a plan that, if it had succeeded, could've changed the war significantly. Germany would've had oil all of a sudden. And the Soviet none if that.

No it would not. Even with the widely optimistic assumption that the USSR would walk away from its facilities leaving them intact, Germany would still have no oil for the foreseeable future. German intelligence and staff had already pointed out that Germany had no capacity (or very little at best) to move the crude to refineries. I would have been a viable plan to attack toward Baku with the sole intend top destroy soviet production. That would be via some combination of Air power, direct action and or simply forcing the USSR to do it as part of a retreat. But I was s fool's errand to think that Germany would get oil and plan to hold ground.

[Morifea]

No it would not. Even with the widely optimistic assumption that the USSR would walk away from its facilities leaving them intact, Germany would still have no oil for the foreseeable future. German intelligence and staff had already pointed out that Germany had no capacity (or very little at best) to move the crude to refineries. I would have been a viable plan to attack toward Baku with the sole intend top destroy soviet production. That would be via some combination of Air power, direct action and or simply forcing the USSR to do it as part of a retreat. But I was s fool's errand to think that Germany would get oil and plan to hold ground.

Exactly this. The only possible option was to deny the Baku oil to the sowjets, either through bombing, conquering or let the russians do the work themselves during the retreat.
Except NaziSpacebatdrivenmobileraffineries in Heeresgruppe Kaukasus of course.