Did Hitler know better than his generals?

[Condottiere 40K]

I'm pretty sure that Hitler and Napoleon had different war aims, Napoleon's being the less ambitious finding leverage to force Russia to stop trading with Britain, whereas Hitler was going for Lebensraum.

I'm by no means an expert on Napoleon, but I believe he would have preferred that the Russian armies go looking for him near Poland, rather than he has to chase them into the steppes.

Whereas Hitler needs to occupy as much as possible of European Russia and consolidate it at strategic locations, so that the Russians would be forced to expend energy, material and men trying to crack through the German defensive line, and he keeps fire brigades in reserve to strengthen the points they want to breakthrough.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I'm pretty sure that Hitler and Napoleon had different war aims, Napoleon's being the less ambitious finding leverage to force Russia to stop trading with Britain, whereas Hitler was going for Lebensraum.

I'm by no means an expert on Napoleon, but I believe he would have preferred that the Russian armies go looking for him near Poland, rather than he has to chase them into the steppes.

Whereas Hitler needs to occupy as much as possible of European Russia and consolidate it at strategic locations, so that the Russians would be forced to expend energy, material and men trying to crack through the German defensive line, and he keeps fire brigades in reserve to strengthen the points they want to breakthrough.

It's not really the goal. Their means ultimately would have to be the same. Napoleon was trying to maneuver in Russia with 600,000 men (more like 200,000-300,000 as part of the main force). The only real way to fight in Russia is with a much larger army to occupy (economic victory) and push all across the front (military victory).

Now imagine Frederick trying to fight this war (with an army of like 180,000 men). It would have been a travesty. Regardless of what his military goals might have been.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

About Dunkirk:

On May 23 Rundstedt gave the order for his tank units which were advancing on Dunkirk to halt, against the desires of the Division commanders and the OKH. Halder and Brauchitsch really didn't want to deviate from the original Case Yellow, ironic since they both initially opposed the so called Sickle Cut. This disagreement prompted Hitler to visit Rundstedt's headquarters and agreed with the assessment that the infantry should attack east of Arras. Whereas the panzers to deploy along the axis of Gravelines, Aire, Bethune, Lens and St. Omer. The idea being that if the tanks could deploy there, instead of taking high casualties on a frontal assault towards Dunkirk, then they could double back and close the encirclement on the Allied forces being push towards them by Army Group B in Belgium and cut off their retreat. Since the tanks were deployed on the hills there it also made for a defensive perimeter to keep the BEF from pushing out. The greater change to the plan (which I mentioned above) was that the encirclement would be completed in north-eastern France rather than in Belgium. However Hitler also brought up the need to to conserve the panzers in order to begin Case Red and give the death blow to France rather than focusing on the BEF.

Then Halder and Brauchitsh went to the OKW to ask Hitler to change the tank deployments carried out by Rundstedt. Hitler of course refused and gave them a lecture on the need to allow the panzer units to recover from their losses and to resupply. However Hitler ultimately left the decision to Rundstedt and his staff. Hitler then made these orders one of his Fuhrer Directives so that Halder and Brauchitsh would not attempt to override his orders and pressure Rundstedt. Halder of course opposed all of this because it deviated from Case Yellow; Army Group A was to hit the Allies from behind but after the halt near Calais it was Army Group A to keep the Allies from retreating and Army Group B to hammer them. According to Hitler and the OKW this was because the tank force would struggle to carry out attacks in Belgium due to the various canals which the Allies could use as defensive obstacles, as well as the delay in these tanks to cross them. In this way the original Sickle Cut had been derailed. Well sort of... the drafted plan Aufmarschanweisung No 4 had changed Manstein's proposal significantly but the gist of it was the same.

While the tank forces of Army Group A were under orders to halt, the infantry and air force were still attempting to chip away the defenses around Dunkirk and Calais. In the meantime the Allies began to build defenses and evacuated the 199,000 strong BEF at Dunkirk (along with some 139,000 French forces). Calais was surrounded on May 22 and surrendered on May 27. By May 26 Hitler actually ordered the panzer forces to continue the push towards Dunkirk from their defended positions. The French attempted to counterattack towards the north and Kleist was simultaneously forced to divert some of his panzers to support the German line. Regardless the French counterattack in the north halted on May 23. The BEF successfully evacuated from Dunkirk and the city fell to the Germans after heavy fighting on June 5. On that same day Hitler ordered redeployment to the south and the beginning of Case Red, now that the Allies had been completely defeated and surrounded in Belgium and northern France. The subsequent thrust to the south-west led to the capture of Paris on June 14 and the armistice on June 22.


About Barbarossa and Moscow:

German planning did take the onset of winter AND Rasputitsa into account (as they could draw on the experience of Napoleon). Which is why their operational schedules were between June and September. In other words they invaded June 22 (Napoleon on June 24, not a coincidence) and wanted to end their campaign by September. This was in part to avoid the spring and autumn mud and to end the campaign before the winter. The Germans had accounted for winter clothing, but due to the incompatibility of German rail with Russian rail could not send it forward on schedule. Walther von Brauchitsch and Franz Halder mismanaged these logistical organizations and did not send this equipment prior to the first snows. Though it is fair to say that the German generals ignored logistical considerations in favor of operational field battles, and continually over stretched themselves in order to carry out maneuvers and achieve encirclement. However it was Hitler and Keitel who wanted to wait in order to consolidate and improve the logistical situation. By the time of Smolensk and Kiev, in July and August, Hitler wanted to abandon the original time table as in fact Operation Barbarossa had failed to achieve victory prior to September. It was the generals who wanted to keep the plan going, but shift entirely to a thrust on Moscow as was consistent with the 1940 Marcks Plan... but horribly outdated.

The Germans were not looking for negotiation. They wanted capitulation. This was not France 1940, it was not a war of maneuver whereby taking Moscow the Soviets would merely negotiate a peace. The USSR simply would not have given up from the loss of Moscow. Operation Barbarossa required the removal of the Red Army as an existential threat, taking Moscow and negotiating would not have solved this issue. The Soviets would have needed to be pushed back all across the front to a safe distance, as far as Archangelsk and the Volga. However Hitler also makes it clear in Directive 21 that the encirclement and destruction of Red Army formations is the priority, not simply the occupation of territory.

Which then begs the question why these generals were so obsessed with Moscow anyway. They were not even following the general idea of Operation Barbarossa, the plan did not call for a single attack, it required for all three Army Groups to advance in the same direction, which was ambitious but necessary. Plus looking at Operation Typhoon, they didn't even have the means to attack or reduce Moscow. Their units were in need of equipment, in need of rest and lacking in reinforcements and organizational cohesion, insufficient rail lines to carry out the operations, and somehow they expected to outflank larger Soviet formations and then siege out Moscow and hold it? Besieging Moscow would have been as costly if not more so than Leningrad and Stalingrad and a Soviet counter offensive in mid-winter would have been imminent. The Soviets still had like 100 divisions forming up and 58 divisions at their disposal near Moscow (which still was more than the 50 or so German divisions in Operation Typhoon), where as the Wehrmacht was overstretched and frozen. The front line just for this operation was massive, it stretched all the way from Kalinin to Kursk.

But OKH and OKW had already predicted this, which is why their entire plan was to destroy Soviet divisions west of Vyazma and Bryansk in order to even outflank and attack Moscow. This was not feasible at the time for all of the aforementioned reasons, in addition to the fact that the Soviets didn't risk all of their divisions west of Vyazma and Bryansk where they could be outmaneuvered and ripped apart by the Germans. After clearing 4 armies from this area (with difficulty, due to resistance and Soviet withdrawals), the advancing Germans were met with the unpleasant surprise that the Soviets still had a considerable number of divisions directly in front of Moscow from Kalinin in the north to Kursk in the south and so the German double flanking maneuver required to encircle Moscow (which was required to go through Kalinin and Tula) was slowed at the Mozhaisk Line and stopped dead in its tracks at the lines just behind that one. Except this wasn't that surprising because the German staff officers at OKH and OKW already knew this would happen, this late into Operation Barbarossa. Despite knowing this these Prussian geniuses said to Hitler "nah we'll just wing it bruh", everyone from subordinates like Guderian to Army Group commanders like von Rundstedt and von Bock and the heads of the OKW von Brauchitsch and Halder advocated and conspired to have their way, just to attack Moscow. They deviated from every plan, came up with their own foolish operational battle and gambled on the unlikely chance of accomplishing tactical success at Moscow, really to no end as the strategy behind this decision was nonsensical.

This is really where Case Blue comes in and the experiences of 1941 informed the events of 1942. The loss of 80% of Soviet oil AND oil production, the inability to directly transport supplies to Soviet troops and industry, the Red armies being pushed behind the Volga which would create a large gap between those formations and Moscow (thus severely weakening the line and Moscow's southern flank), the imminent collapse of Soviet production/war economy and domestic economy, cutting off Lend Lease through the Caspian-Caucasus-Volga corridor, the ability to supply the Wehrmacht with oil via Rostov and the Black Sea and a huge positional advantage with which to outflank Moscow if that was ever meant to be an aim (as Soviet concentration would necessarily be higher in the center rather than far south across the Volga).

The capture of Moscow was not a foregone conclusion. Usually one gets this impression from people like Guderian et all. But in actuality Moscow was not going to fall in 1941, without securing the flanks in Kalinin and Tula there was no way to actually attack Moscow or encircle Soviet forces there. So really these guys were gambling on a frontal assault. Where as all these generals were commanding Operation Typhoon, it was Hitler who then took command of his own campaign in the south in order to achieve strategic gains. Notice that in these memoirs and accounts of Operation Typhoon Hitler's direct actions are rarely mentioned. That is because Hitler left them to their own devices and personally took command of the effort in the south, overseeing the push across the Dneipr towards the Don and ordering the invasion of Crimea. Crimea was a major strategic position because it gave the Soviets a position from which to carry out aerial attacks against Ploesti as well as naval bases to raid German logistics. Not only did Hitler succeed for the most part, but these generals who were given free reign utterly failed to accomplish their aims. Neither the Rasputitsa nor General Winter were the main culprit for German defeat as much as fierce Soviet resistance and a more defensible position which the Germans were unable to overcome through encirclement.

Both southward campaigns in 1941 and 1942 actually made strategic sense. The Germans had not secured their positions in the south by the time of Operation Typhoon, it made sense to secure the Dneipr and the Don Rivers. Especially if the goal was a push into the Caucasus the next year. Part of the reason Case Blue was postponed was because Sevastopol was still holding out in 1942 (which threatened Ploesti via Soviet aerial range in Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet). By contrast defending Moscow was considered secondary to defending the Caucasus. Which explains why Stalin desperately tried to defend Kiev early on, but also the Don at the same time as Operation Typhoon. As has been admitted by Soviet generals, losing Moscow would not be as serious to the Soviet Union's strategic efforts. Also taking into account that the main Soviet counter attacks in 1943 and 1944 started in the south rather than the north, in spite of operational concerns which would give precedence to the northern sector. But either way the Germans had no way to take Moscow in 1941, it just wasn't feasible and Operation Typhoon was wasted effort which resulted in crippling casualties for the Germans. Even if they did take Moscow it wouldn't have seriously hurt Soviet efforts anyway, the Germans had no way to actually capitalize on that. The focus really should have been on destroying the 58 Soviet divisions defending against Operation Typhoon, but that wasn't possible as the Soviets did not expose all of those division west of Vyazma.

[Hanny]

Some facts against the thesis of armchair historians without scientific sources or at least war memories of leading german persons:

German Fuel production 1939-1944:

1939: 8,2 million tons (synthetic fuel: 2,2 million tons, 27%)
1940: 7,6 million tons ( synthetic fuel: 3,348 million tons, 44%)
1941: 10 million tons (synthetic fuel: 4,116 million tons, 41%)
1942: 9,5 million tons (synthetic fuel: 4,920 million tons, 52%)
1943: 11,3 million tons (synthetic fuel: 5,748 million tons, 51 %)
1944: 6,83 million ton (synthetic fuel: 3,83 million tons, 56% )

Sources:

Dietrich Eichholtz: Geschichte der Deutschen Kriegswirtschaft. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1985, Band 2, S. 354.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsc...tisches_Benzin

In 1943 there were twelve producing hydrogenation plants. The hydrogenation plants covered most of the fuel needs of the Wehrmacht and were the sole source of jet fuel for the Luftwaffe.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsc...tisches_Benzin

So the Wehrmacht could have fight at the eastern front a flexible defense strategy in 1943.

Different opinion is baseless talk.

Except thats production, without knowing that Germany every year from 41 consumed more than it produced you end up with a false understanding of the oil situation. Planned 41 consumption for the East front was 250k tons a month, actual consumption was 310k tons a month. To cover this required using stocks, without pre war stocks Germany would have had run out, because consumption always exceeded supply, which was why Romania was forced to export more than it wanted, and civilian consumption in occuppied nations fell by as much as 90%.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...%20oil&f=false

Taken from the Reich own figures https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qim...d33288e29c0610

[Hanny]

Great, now you're lying. Besides, you're making an assumption you can't possibly prove.

Incorrect, your own posts content demonstrate your inability to comprehend the written word, so your own actions have proven my comment to be accurate.

It's not all about army logistics. There's plenty of other factors to consider in politics.

Its the answer to the question of cost/benefit from ideological imperatives on military actions, ie logistical gain compared to logistical cost to acquire the 8 million tons of cereal crops we require from Ukraine and cannot obtain through diplomacy, try comprehending the question and then the answer will make sense.

Maybe you want to read it again.

I dont need to, i know what is says, and what its used to teach, ( civil servants course of why democracy is a superior form of government) and you have again failed the class. 60 tons a year munition requirement as opposed to c4000 tons a day logistical gain.

[Hanny]

AH following the 21 directive went for Kiev, to gain the resources Germany required, Halder post war says this was a mistake, yet he provides the very sound logistical reasons why going for Moscow was beyond the capabilities at the time.

Halder "According to our opinion, ‘the materiel has to serve the spiritual. Accordingly, our quartermaster service may never hamper the operational concept.’


Germany in the East required 32,000 tonnes a day, thats 24 train loads a day each AG.This represented only fuel, ammunition, and limited food/fodder, making no allowance for replacement men, horses, or equipment. POL to munition was a 2:1 ratio.

Try Halder diary, page 203 6th July AGC requires 21 trains a day. Page 242 Wagner gaurentes 14 @6300 tons. Page 246 what that translates into combat loads."To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied".

Ie between 6th and 18th July 14*12=168 promised, 146 deliverd.

So 6th AGC requires 21*12 days.
QM promises 14 a day, 14*12=168
QM delivers 146/12= 12 a day, =146.


32,000/24 =1333
AGC 21*12 =252*1333=335916 tons.
QM promises 168*1333=223944 tons
QM delivers=146*1333= 194618 tons.

AGC requires 335916
QM delivers 194618

58% of requirement met.

[Morifea]

Another important Source for Oil were the captured stocks in France.... And in Italy later. Those buggers complained the whole time they couldn´t do more with their navy because of lack of Oil... When Fall Achse kicked in, the Wehrmacht found huge depots of oil (for naval usage though, as far as I know not that useful for Panzers).

Oil Production is one problem, another is the distribution to the Front.... All Benzin in the Reich won`t help your dry panzer, if the Truck with the Gas doesn`t show up.

[Hanny]

Was Napoleon also starving russians? He did so as well.

Napoleon moved more men over a sparsely populated region, which was unable to support that number of extra people, thats why he failed. Outcome was never in doubt.


http://www.indiana.edu/~psource/PDF/...ettArticle.pdf


living of the land and moving on to supplies rather than being proppelled forward by supplies, its how armies had always operated before supply from base had to be adopted due to the level of munitions expended when armies became firearm equipped, and munition in weight became the dominate feature of logistics.


Punic wars 2, Hanny has 90k foot 10k horses, and 4k mules mules to carry his supplies, he is in Spain and wants to arrive in italy.

What his army consumes per day.
Food/lbs per day3lbs per man, 10lbs per horse/mule)
90,000*3=270000 a day.
14000*10=140000 a day.
Day requirement 410000

Whjat his Army can carry per day.
Forward lift per day mules carry 250lbs, foot 10lbs
Mules 2040*250=510000
90,000 (foot)*10=900000
10,000 (horse)*20=200000

forward lift per day:
1610000

This gives 4 days carried by the Army. How does it sustain itself as it marches to Italy.

How many people live in a sqaure mile?, using a 2 crops per year: lets start with 45 per sq mile, thats 180*3*45=24300 lbs of grain per sq mile the army moves through that exist to keep them alive till next harvest.

So after marching for 10 days, Hanny consumed 4100000, and passed through 243000 per sq mile as he manovered to draw replenishment from.

How much ground has Hanny covered in 10 days?, and how far on either side of his main column, has his manover elements gathered into supply for him?.
Primary sourc es give us "90 miles in 10 days" when slowly manovering across southern Gaul.

So that 90 miles forwards, if the forgers go no more than 5 miles either side of the column, a very conservative number, we get Hanny`s army moving through 90*10=900*24300=21870000lbs of grain, of which he needs 4104000 to maintain his stock, leaving 21459960 still to feed the pop he moved through, he has required roughly 20% of the food supply of the region.And still has 4 days with the army.

Is 45 per sq mile too large a number?, lets try 4 ( a single family) a sq mile:180*3*4=2160*900=1944000, which is a deficit of 2160000, and his start stock of 3210000 has been reduced to 1050000lbs and he has removed 100% of the supply from the region he manoeuvred over.

Lets try 1 person a sq mile: 180*3*1*900=486000 and 3210000 carried, and 4104000 consumed= -408000.

So at 1 a sq mile, to feed iself the foragers have to cover a greater distnce either side of the main column, lets try 10 miles each side, meaning the army covers a 20 mile frontage as it advances, 90*20=1800 sq miles covered instead of 900. 180*3*1=540*1800=927000 plus 3210000 minus 4104000 =376956 in hand. Hannys moved 102k men and moved forward 90 miles,on a frontage of 20 miles, meet 1800 Gallic people and removed all there food, to keep his Army close to its start supply.

What if he moves faster?, at the more usual 15 miles a day? over 1 person per sq mile.
150*20=3000 sq miles covered, 1620000 plus 3210000 minus 410000=441860 surplus, and Hannys left some behind and still carrying all he can carry.

Polybios gives us the distance Hanny moved to get to the Rhone,c700 miles, which is 14000 sq miles, so we have 180*3*1*14000=7560000 and 3210000 carried, which is a total of 10770000 and 4100000 consumed every 10 days, means that on day 26 Hanny has consumed all supplies he has moved over and carried. He has met 14000 people, and taken all there food.

A good reason why Armies move at different speeds is the pop density of the ground they move over, lower density the army has to extend to the flanks to increase the sq miles covered to bring in the required supplies, if its a higher density, this is not required and a faster pace forward can be used.

Nappy went over ground in Russia with 5 times the amount of people that could live on it, and came back the same way, the outcome was never in doubt.

[Anna_Gein]

It is unfortunate how this kind of discussion immediately degenerate to arguments to a quarrel between armchair-generals and wannabe historians who think they are smarter than everybody else.

This was largely a result of the maneuver war obsession which many of these officers had. Also a fear of ceding too much ground so that the Allies would be able to stage a landing or bring their bomber in range of key areas.

In 1942 the leaders of the Kriegsmarine asked Hitler to open the main front against Britain in the Mediterranean. They were tired of Britain not capitulating from merchant raiding and wanted to make indirect attacks on Britain. That and the fear of Britain winning in Africa, knocking out Italy and leaving Germany with a new front which might divert even more resources.

I would like to see you source to support your argument about Heeresgruppe Afrika being formed out of "maneuver war obsession". Whatever that is supposed to mean in your mind.

[athanaric]

That is incorrect.

Great, now you're lying. Besides, you're making an assumption you can't possibly prove.

No, that is again, incorrect, as i already pointed out, the logistical gain dwarfed the logistical cost to the Heer in 41/2 as the evidence shows.

It's not all about army logistics. There's plenty of other factors to consider in politics.

Except it does not, i used it to show it was policy, i had alreacdy established for you the logistical burden to the Heer in carying out the policy.You provided nothing whatsoevever except uniformed opinion.

Maybe you want to read it again.

It is unfortunate how this kind of discussion immediately degenerate to arguments to a quarrel between armchair-generals and wannabe historians who think they are smarter than everybody else.

Speak for yourself. I might be an armchair general like everybody else in this thread, but I'm not a "wannabe historian". And I'm pretty sure Oda isn't one neither.

[Anna_Gein]

Speak for yourself. I might be an armchair general like everybody else in this thread, but I'm not a "wannabe historian". And I'm pretty sure Oda isn't one neither.

Somehow I was expecting this kind of reaction from you Athanaric. You and Lord Oda Nobunaga must be terrible historians then. There is far too much teleology, history-fiction, off-topic (Napoleon) and a general lack of rigor for this thread to be anything than a discussion between wannabe historians. If you do not realize it then you must be terrible irl too. Then again there are terrible people with high degree and office. In La Sorbonne, my lecturer in Roman History thought the Parthians immediately succeeded to Alexander III Argead ...

I get this is a casual discussion in a forum of video games. Not an historical research paper. But a minimum of rigor and historical methodology would be most welcomed.

And frankly I doubt you or Lord Oda Nobunaga are historians for the WW2. So you can drop the card "I am an historian". The point was not about each user CV but the general quality of submission and worked putted into it.

[athanaric]

Then again there are terrible people with high degree and office. In La Sorbonne, my lecturer in Roman History thought the Parthians immediately succeeded to Alexander III Argead ...

Everyone is ignorant of something.

I get this is a casual discussion in a forum of video games. Not an historical research paper. But a minimum of rigor and historical methodology would be most welcomed.

That's right, and I'm not getting paid to comment here, or conduct any research for the forum. Though if anyone wants to LARP as a historian here and publish minute details, why not. As long as they refrain from gaslighting or insulting others...

And frankly I doubt you or Lord Oda Nobunaga are historians for the WW2.

Well you got me there, WW2 and Nazis is as far from my field of interests as pretty much any of the popular historical topics can be. I think that more than enough has been said on the topic IRL by the experts in the field, and people on the internet should move on to discuss more interesting areas of history that deserve an in-depth analysis. Mostly though, I'm here to comment on the Hitler and Nazi (and Totalitarian in general) apologism going on in this thread and on the forum in general.

So you can drop the card "I am an historian". The point was not about each user CV but the general quality of submission and worked putted into it.

I didn't bring it up, someone else started insulting everybody else on the thread as a "wannabe" and then bragged about attending an "elite" institution. Neither you nor Hanny have any business commenting on other people's reading comprehension, professional qualities, careers, or other personal stuff, not only because it's against the ToS but because quite frankly, you lack the necessary quality and quantity of data to do so. It's impossible to make an informed judgment about someone else's profession or skill level based on a few comments on the internet, and if La Sorbonne is everything it's made out to be, you should know that.

[Morifea]

I (as a armchair General and wannabe historian) think athanaric has said everything that has to be pointed out and he did this in a polite and objective manner.
Can we move along?

[Cookiegod]

Did read almost nothing in this thread. Just want to ask a quick question:
Is anyone here of the opinion that there was any military way in which the German defeat could've been avoided?
If so: Could you specify that and explain to us who if any in the German leadership argued for it?

Because if you, just like me, don't see any way then the entire premise of this thread is meaningless.

Also: Halder and the other generals (including Manstein) have done everything to talk their own positive attributions up and blame others for their mistakes. Halders claim that, if Kiev had been avoided, a victory could've been accomplished through the conquest of Moscow, lacks any substantial basis whatsoever. The Soviets made a huge effort to defend Moscow, and many more passive preparations were never tested, as the Germans just barely reached the vicinity of the city. Secondly, the Soviets expected their capital to fall, and there are no substantial arguments that show this would've broken their neck. Thirdly, the German advance was quick enough as it already was and logistics could barely hold up. Fourth: Keeping the Ukraine with its wast resources would've been a huge boon to the Soviet war effort. And finally: Having this huge army threatening the flank of the overextended push would've likely caused disaster and/or bound troops regardless.

People also like bashing Hitler, which I get, cuz yeh, he bad. But you can only do maneuver warfare if you have the oil and the ressources, which Germany did not. But he's still the main reason Germany went to war against impossible odds in the first place. If you take Stalingrad for example, then you have a general who's generally described as capable yet also criticised as being too cautious. Manstein smeared him a lot and blamed him for not trying the "Ausbruch" even though records prove Paulus begged him to be allowed to do so, which Manstein did not. And even if he'd been allowed to do so, the outcome was dubious at best. The 6th army was starving and had started eating their horses long before it'd been encircled. So the outcome was likely inevitable no matter what. Which of course those generals who did their memoirs never want to admit, since all they want to talk about is them having won the war if so-and-so hadn't stopped them.

And it's not just the German war machine falling apart that turned the tide. Brits and Soviets made huuuge strides not just in quantity and quality of equipment, but also in their doctrines and the know-how of their staff.

[Condottiere 40K]

With Hitler, he did some crazy stuff towards the end, and never got an after the game interview to get an indepth analysis for his decisions, and obviously, after the fact, not being around, an easy scapegoat for anything that went wrong.

Scorched earth and trading space for time are a Russian tactic, and the Germans seemed to rely on capturing depots of material in order to advance their next campaign; both Napoleon and Hitler found their armies in the middle of nowhere desperately scrambing for supplies in the vast Russian steppes, and even if they had more men, they would still have to find a way to supply them.

Why Napoleon's original plan made more sense, is that his left flank would be the coast, which would permit one way of resupply, and make only right flank vulnerable.

The Mongols succeeded, and to a certain extent, the Germans in the Great War, but they were facing less unified opposition; also, how far Lend Lease contributed to the margin of Soviet war effort and eventual victory, which the Germans might not have anticipated.

[Cookiegod]

With Hitler, he did some crazy stuff towards the end

Which ones?! That's where you have to be specific.

Scorched earth and trading space for time are a Russian tactic

Incorrect.
One of the easily debunked, yet often repeated myths of our time. It's annoying frankly.

the Germans seemed to rely on capturing depots of material in order to advance their next campaign

Again: Not really.

both Napoleon and Hitler found their armies in the middle of nowhere desperately scrambing for supplies in the vast Russian steppes

You probably don't know this, but the only part of the "vast Russian steppes" Germans occupied were in the Russian and Ukrainian south. Napoleon never set foot in it, and had he been able to, it might have saved some more of his troops.

and even if they had more men, they would still have to find a way to supply them.

That one is the only thing I agree with.

Why Napoleon's original plan made more sense, is that his left flank would be the coast, which would permit one way of resupply, and make only right flank vulnerable.

Not really, given that he had basically no navy to speak of.

The Mongols succeeded, and to a certain extent, the Germans in the Great War, but they were facing less unified opposition; also, how far Lend Lease contributed to the margin of Soviet war effort and eventual victory, which the Germans might not have anticipated.

Mongols succeeded because the Rus were weakened after a great deal of civil wars, infighting, outside wars, such as the crusades (not just the Teutonic one, but more the 4th crusade), the disruption of trade routes, the hitherto never experienced highly mobile, yet very large armies. The Germans were dealing with an empire that had not participated in the preceding arms race and thus lagged behind. The mobilisation was only expected to be finished around 1918. The Russians were gaining in strength throughout the war, as the war industry started to kick in.

Point being: You can't equate any of those wars you have named. Arguably the ones who came closest to conquering Russia, even taking Moscow, were the Poles in the war til 1618. But these wars had little if anything in common. Napoleon's campaign and Barbarossa are often compared, but due to technology and industry, almost everything is different.

And whenever supplies are brought up: Most people forget that the Russians and Soviets always had the same issue. Whenever a frontline advances, new logistical routes have to be established. Those don't appear out of nowhere even if this used to be "your" land. The single reason why that helped the Russians was that this worked in their favour during the surprise attacks in Unternehmen Barbarossa and Fall Blau, and once those had been stopped, the war had already been decided.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

It is unfortunate how this kind of discussion immediately degenerate to arguments to a quarrel between armchair-generals and wannabe historians who think they are smarter than everybody else.

Why are you singling me out specifically?

I would like to see you source to support your argument about Heeresgruppe Afrika being formed out of "maneuver war obsession". Whatever that is supposed to mean in your mind.

Where did I ever say that?
What I said was that the Germans would not have wanted to fight a war of attrition in Italy, at that time. Which was in response to conon's post. The German officers had an aversion to WW1-esque scenarios despite the fact that such a strategy was the correct move and so ultimately it made sense to replace Rommel with Kesselring.

Somehow I was expecting this kind of reaction from you Athanaric. You and Lord Oda Nobunaga must be terrible historians then. There is far too much teleology, history-fiction, off-topic (Napoleon) and a general lack of rigor for this thread to be anything than a discussion between wannabe historians. If you do not realize it then you must be terrible irl too. Then again there are terrible people with high degree and office. In La Sorbonne, my lecturer in Roman History thought the Parthians immediately succeeded to Alexander III Argead ...

I wasn't the one who went off topic. I was doing so in response to someone else and pointing the inherent similarities between Napoleon's campaign in Russia and Operation Barbarossa.

I get this is a casual discussion in a forum of video games. Not an historical research paper. But a minimum of rigor and historical methodology would be most welcomed.

A detailed counter argument rather than a vague statement would be more welcome. What is a specific criticism of something which I've said. My personal statements, because you mentioned me by name.

And frankly I doubt you or Lord Oda Nobunaga are historians for the WW2. So you can drop the card "I am an historian". The point was not about each user CV but the general quality of submission and worked putted into it.

I never claimed I was a historian. While I attended university for 4 years with a major in Classical History and a minor in Political Science I dropped out because there was no money to be made and I couldn't afford $20,000+ per year. It's not like you need to have a degree to go to a book, open up the bibliography and then track down a source. Which is all I did. Overqualified talking heads like Ian Kershaw and Antony Beevor are such academic stooges that they didn't even read their sources, which is what I'm pointing out.

[conon394]

Is anyone here of the opinion that there was any military way in which the German defeat could've been avoided?

Depends what you mean by avoiding defeat. In general as long as the US/UK and USSR maintained the stability of their war time alliance and maximum commitment to it than no Germany certainly could not win.
Now it depends on what military changes to what actually happened to say if Germany could have achieved something less than total defeat. In broad strokes the US and UK had a growing edge in radar (and thus night fighting) and while they could only toss about 3 atomic bombs in 1945. By early 1946 they would have been able to deliver a steady steam of them. Any indication that the 262 was produced earlier or more often (reading mail) would have seen the Vampire accelerated. Given the range advantage and better engines the Germans would not see some jet advantage golden age in 1945 or 46.

So I would say the question is could the Axis have avoided total defeat before early 1946 when the Allies who demonstrably in history willing to inflict the full scale of total war on them to exact absolute capitulation and would have the means to do it a low cost of blood.

It is possible but not probable.

Excluding political or diplomacy issues and also German and Japaneses internal policy in conquered states and narrowing down it to just military reduces the odds. Essentially the then the question is can the Germany and Japan bleed the Allies enough before 1946 that the alliance cracks.

Maybe - but I think not with the above exclusions. Best case situation -

Germany invests not one bit of effort in North Africa. Fortify Sicily and Italy. Every tank, plane, truck and man (Italian [mostly defending their home back in the boot] or German) and bullet wasted there should have been on the eastern front. 1942 should always just have been an attack to deny Baku to Russia. To sustain Russia with partial replacement fuel would have taxed US logistics to the breaking point slowing the war everywhere. Japan has to not screw up so badly at Midway. Even an even exchange of CVs at Midway stops the US from the grinding battle around Guadalcanal and leaves Japan room to act in the Indian ocean still. And more time to get their next generation of fighters in the air. A disaster or not victory at Midway would focus US attention on Japan. That's something Stalin quite un versed in the logistics of Pacific war would be angry at. A Japanese victory at Midway and a German not waste of resources in north Africa - and the destruction of Baku production... That gets to the point where the US and UK can't open a second front on the time frame they did and Stalin thinking they are letting the USSR bleed intentionally. That might crack the alliance. But if not again its still a lost in mid 1946. Just we have a lot more atomic bomb memorials.

Now if you allow them to use the velvet glove during the fighting and only bring out the iron fist after winning than maybe that is a different story.

Edit: Oh of course Japan needs to bail on its pointless war in China and attack Russia and kill Pacific LL at any cost. Sending it subs to attack the Mideast route would be a bonus. The simple fact from from the axis perspective the one not realizing an atomic bomb was feasible, there was only one decisive strategic victory and that was defeating the USSR. To the extent anything was prioritized over that was asking to loose. Thus per the OP the V weapons were a waste of resources since they could not even deliver an attack comparable to 1941 and had no impact on the Russian front. Tanks and subs and anything else that could have been useful were not made.

[Condottiere 40K]

It really comes down to logistics, and the logic behind that was driving both Japanese and German war aims, securing raw materials to continue their campaigns.

And of course, industrial capacity, which desperately would need those materials.

Assuming that the Germans managed to perfect and accurately aim their Vee Two missiles, Churchill wouldn't hesitate to nuke Berlin.

[Cookiegod]

Excluding political or diplomacy issues and also German and Japaneses internal policy in conquered states and narrowing down it to just military reduces the odds. Essentially the then the question is can the Germany and Japan bleed the Allies enough before 1946 that the alliance cracks.

Given that both countries were aggressive and any peace agreement would've resulted in them rebuilding their militaries again with the aim to attack again... Nope. Wishful thinking on the part of the German high staff.

Maybe - but I think not with the above exclusions. Best case situation -

Germany invests not one bit of effort in North Africa. Fortify Sicily and Italy. Every tank, plane, truck and man (Italian [mostly defending their home back in the boot] or German) and bullet wasted there should have been on the eastern front. 1942 should always just have been an attack to deny Baku to Russia. To sustain Russia with partial replacement fuel would have taxed US logistics to the breaking point slowing the war everywhere. Japan has to not screw up so badly at Midway. Even an even exchange of CVs at Midway stops the US from the grinding battle around Guadalcanal and leaves Japan room to act in the Indian ocean still. And more time to get their next generation of fighters in the air. A disaster or not victory at Midway would focus US attention on Japan. That's something Stalin quite un versed in the logistics of Pacific war would be angry at. A Japanese victory at Midway and a German not waste of resources in north Africa - and the destruction of Baku production... That gets to the point where the US and UK can't open a second front on the time frame they did and Stalin thinking they are letting the USSR bleed intentionally. That might crack the alliance. But if not again its still a lost in mid 1946. Just we have a lot more atomic bomb memorials.

I disagree here. Taking Suez could've had some tangible effects on the Brits, and clearing the Mediterranean would've freed up one front.
Send more men to Baku and you'd have more men starve to death there. It wasn't so much the lack of manpower that caused Fall Blau to fail. It was the lack of supplies. And for that they lacked transport vehicles and oil.

Now if you allow them to use the velvet glove during the fighting and only bring out the iron fist after winning than maybe that is a different story.

If Germany still had existed, the Americans would've likely used the nukes on them. Germany on the other hand was nowhere near getting nuclear weapons. Another myth.

And you can't just decide to "win the battle of Midway". That's not how it works.

Oh of course Japan needs to bail on its pointless war in China and attack Russia and kill Pacific LL at any cost. Sending it subs to attack the Mideast route would be a bonus. The simple fact from from the axis perspective the one not realizing an atomic bomb was feasible, there was only one decisive strategic victory and that was defeating the USSR. To the extent anything was prioritized over that was asking to loose. Thus per the OP the V weapons were a waste of resources since they could not even deliver an attack comparable to 1941 and had no impact on the Russian front. Tanks and subs and anything else that could have been useful were not made.

What Japan did wasn't really in the power of German high command, was it? The Japanese had already done that, had already been beaten at Khalkin Gol, it's 1) somewhat unlikely they'd have had that much success, and 2) that it'd've harmed the Soviet war effort in the west, as long as they'd still committed enough troops to defend Moscow, 3) that the Japanese would've had a reward commensurate to their efforts. It's still Siberia we're talking about.