The main issue was the Kingdom of Italy barely met the requirements of the elitist "Great Powers" club. Italy could have been stronger than Portugal or Bulgaria, but she could never hope to compete, in financial, industrial and military terms, with the likes of France, Germany or the United Kingdom. These weaknesses were clearly reflected upon the efficiency of her armed forces, from an extremely fragile system of logistics to sloppily trained soldiers and an amateurish officer corps, completely unable to instill a vigorous filling of solidarity inside the regiments and to launch fruitful strategic and tactical operations. Superficially, the Italian army may have seem superior to the Hapsburg navy in Lissa or the Ethiopian army in Adoua, but reality proved otherwise. Even in neighboring Libya, the Italians effectively controlled only the coastline inside the artillery range of their fleet, while the skeleton Ottoman garrison and the Libyan irregulars demonstrated their flexibility in Tobruk and Sciara Sciat. In 1935, fascist Italy benefited a lot from technological advancement, unlike her adversary, which is why the conquest of the country and the expulsion of its royal dynasty became much easier. Lethal gas, especially, was particularly effective, as it decimated the men, destroyed their morale and disrupted their formations. In that case, Italy piously copied the methods of the Spanish during their struggle against the Rif Republic in Morocco.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia was an organised empire, with a long tradition of statehood, while also possessing a central authority (according to African standards), capable of mobilizing several institutions, in order to defeat various invaders. The Empire could deploy a numerous army, reinforced with modern weaponry and able to execute a demanding campaign and complex manoeuvres in the battlefield. Of course, it remained feeble, when compared to the possibilities of an industrialised power, while "feudalism" was far from being eradicated, but when all these factors are explained, as well as Oreste Baratieri's obvious mistake of dividing his forces, the disaster of Adua can be explained somewhat convincingly. In any case, the Ethiopian achievement should be recognized as great and remarkable, as, in contrast to Isandlwana, it involved a decisive victory of the entire European force and not the neutralisation of just a detachment.
France has always had colonial ambitions... in Italy.
Well, that's not correct, at least not for the relevant period. In fact, the opposite was true, as Italian nationalism was marked by a particularly aggressive spirit against France, despite the crucial role the Second Empire played at unifying the peninsula, contrary to the wishes of the Hapsburg monarchy, the Bourbon dynasty and the Papal domination. To be more specific, the Italians were furious (Tunisian bombshell) at the establishment of a French protectorate in Tunisia (which they bizarrely considered as Italy's "rightful territory), while some extremists (Garibaldi included) even advocated for the conquest of Corsica and Savoy. All this ideological "imperialism" was partially fueled by a remarkably jingoist press, whose influence on the electorate was so strong that it could determine foreign policy and the careers of ambitious politicians.
Any particular reason France and Russia in particular would help someone fight against the Italians? Were the Italians unpopular during this period?
Well, in addition to what I mentioned in my reply to Athanaric, Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance (together with Germany and Austria-Hungary), which was diplomatically hostile to the French-Russian alliance (the predecessor of the Entente in WWI). In what concerns East Africa, Russia's attitude was pure indifference (a small private colony named "New Moscow" had already been dismantled), but France certainly preferred an independent Ethiopia to an encirclement of the French dominion of Djibouti by the Italian colonies of Somaliland and Eritrea. However, that being said, I doubt global geopolitics played any significant role to the Ethiopian army being equipped by French and Russians. Such initiatives were very low priority, while their goals were generally defined as economic, opportunistic and comparatively short-term, namely the growth of the domestic arms industry, the increase of foreign political influence inside Ethiopia, the encouragement of investment and the opening of a new market for the industries of France and Russia. The consequent misfortune for Italy was essentially a coincidental byproduct (albeit not necessarily an unwelcome one), but it had nothing to do with the original objective. |