Last Saturday, a particularly bloody attack took place in Ahvaz, the capital of the Khuzestan province, Iran. The five perpetrators targeted the ongoing parade, shooting indiscriminately against the bystanders, the participating soldiers and the honoured veterans of the Iran-Iraq war. In total, the attack claimed 25 victims, while all five perpetrators were killed by the security forces. There was a confusion regarding the number of the terrorists, usually ranging from four to six, but now it is estimated that nobody has remained alive. The identity of the group behind the hit remains controversial, but, most likely, it concerned the Arab separatist movement that exists in the province. According to official statistics, which are not completely objective, but whose estimations are generally recognized as sufficiently reliable, Arab-speakers compose approximately one third of the total population.
Unsurprisingly, the coexistence between Arabic and Iranic speakers is not 100% serene, despite the absence of major religious differences. Usually the problems arise when the nation-state attempts to erase local particularities and reinforce cultural homogeneity through the education system. However, in Iran, ever since the imperial regime was overthrown, its revolutionary successors have decided to make the teaching of Arabic a mandatory course of the school's curriculum, in order to establish a closer link between the Iranian society and the Quranic tradition. Consequently, most of the differences revolve over little injustices during everyday life. Tribalism certainly place a noteworthy role, but, in my opinion, the most crucial factor is nepotism, corruption and client politics. Because the most financially lucrative businesses and highest administrative positions are dominated by Iranian families (not necessarily originating from Khuzestan), many residents of Ahvaz feel that their opportunities and rights are stomped by the elites. This also explains the form of the struggle adopted by the Iranian Arabs, peaceful protests. Violent insurgencies, albeit essentially omnipresent since the establishment of the Qajar dynasty, are quite limited and never seriously threatened Iran's territorial integrity after the rise of Reza Shah. The "usurper" monarch violently suppressed the virtually independent Sheikhdom of Mohammerah and the various nomadic tribes of SW Iran, which were sponsored by British petroleum monopolies. Even during the brief occupation of parts of Khuzestan by the Iraqi invaders in the '80s, the vast majority of the population was uncooperative and a large number of Arab Iranian prisoners of war were summarily executed, after having refused to desert the Iranian army and join the aggressors.
The war between Saddam's Iraq and revolutionary Iran is also clearly the symbolic target of the terrorists. Khuzestan suffered a lot during the war and many atrocities were committed there, without taking into account the extremely destructive urban warfare. Therefore, military parades for the memory of the Iranian resistance, like the one that was attacked, symbolise the resilience of the civilians, as well as the success of Tehran in defending its sovereignty. As a result, the massacred civilians and soldiers held a lot of ideological value for the separatist cause. However, there's actually great controversy concerning the culprit. Both ASMLA (Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz) and ISIL claimed responsibility, the latter also publishing visual evidence where three of the perpetrators were supposedly depicted. Personally, I am skeptical, because ISIL is notorious for arbitrarily endorsing terrorist attacks made by irrelevant groups or lone-wolves, in a desperate effort to gain some much needed publicity. Its video also looks a bit random, common sense says that they could release more concrete evidence and, last but not least, ASMLA, or better the sub-group Ahvaz National Resistance, was the first to endorse the massacre. After all, the leadership of ASMLA denounced the attack and instead blamed some dissidents who had been expelled from the organisation.
In my opinion, the overall context of the attack clearly portrays the separatists as the likeliest suspects. The intention of the perpetrators was obviously to provoke the fragmentation of the Ahvazi society and encourage the rise of ethnic tensions (Shiism is overwhelmingly strong in Khuzestan, without facing any linguistic obstacles), in order to exploit the subsequent chaos. Ahvaz National Resistance seems to be either a small team of radicals determined to kill indiscriminately to fulfill their goals or a proxy of ASMLA, similarly to the relationship between PKK and Freedom Hawks in Turkey, which allows it to follow very controversial tactics, without being subjected to popular outcry and losing the sympathy of the most moderate elements. Meanwhile, Iran has implied that Gulf Emirates and the United States are somehow involved in the affair, but the credibility of these accusations is quite flimsy, in my opinion. An Emirati official approved of the terrorist hit in twitter, but such admissions hardly reveal anything more than empty bragging and sectarianism, although the relations between UAE and Iran are very cold currently. Basically, the "partisans" of Khuzestan are so weak, that there no point wasting resources to aid them, in contrary to the Kurdish and Balochi guerillas of the Northwest and teh East respectively.