Primicerius
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Is there any convincing evidence that Hitler was crazy, or was he just an over-inflated ego immersed in, and in control of, issues way above his level of competence after he and his cronies consolidated a centralised authoritarian power structure around themselves?Originally Posted by Cyclops
大信皇帝
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
It is interesting because though Manstein had wanted the attack in early April it was postponed due to poor weather. Then on the 30th of April Hitler delayed the operation indefinitely until the Panzer divisions could be reinforced. The Germans threw in something like 60% of all available armour at the time because they expected the Soviets to make a response in force. So after being unable to use April they must have figured that the opportunity for a rapid attack had ended and required some sort of response to a Soviet spoiling attack. A Soviet response was not something which had been considered when planning the operation and that is to Manstein and Zeitzler's detriment as operational planners. It was not until July 5 that Hitler ordered the attack and then on July 16 he called it off, so even Hitler was having his doubts. Even in that case the Soviets were given all of April, May and June to prepare an adequate defense of the salient and an adequate counter attack.
When Operational Citadel was planned by Kurt Zeitzler and Erich von Manstein it was conceived in order to encircle the Kursk salient. What this meant in strategic terms was that Hitler had intended to take some 5 or 6 Soviet armies (500,000 men) which would have been a major loss to Soviet manpower. At this point Hitler had pushed his view that the war was necessarily one of attrition. This in turn would have led to the construction of a defensive line with Kursk as part of the bulwark. This would have created a meat grinder the kind which had generals such as Zhukov taking massive losses and retreating. In such a scenario the Germans would always have the operational advantage due to their experience in stellungskrieg during WW1. The main failure of this operation was due to the Soviets discovering German targets, many of the operational plans and the end result was the Soviets building up defenses that severely hindered the Germans during the campaign (such as at Prokhorovka where Manstein was successfully held back by Vatutin). The Soviets also planned a counter offensive that well may have caught the German flanks off guard had the Germans not halted to consolidate their positions (as per the persistent suggestions of Model and contrary to the wishes of Manstein).
The Germans had a long history of stellungskrieg (defensive position warfare) and the fixation on bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) was a more recent occurrence from the 1930's on. It had been pushed successfully on all levels of command and had become the basis for German offensive operations. Naturally someone like Manstein (who characterized the bewegungskrieg) would have wanted a reliance on a mobile defense based upon the idea of maneuver as well, however such a thing had never been done and there was no idea as to how to conduct it. Manstein himself never provided adequate means to systematically adopt such a defense. In fact throughout the war generals such as Erhard Raus, Walther Model and Albrecht Kesselring did a better job at employing this idea of "mobile defense", though not quite in a systematic fashion, with some variations on how to do it and also with a mix of positioning and mobility depending on the commander.
Ultimately though the failure of the mobile defense had to do with the fact that the Germans did not have the means or resources to constantly maneuver in order to riposte at their Soviet adversaries. Besides if the Germans had made such plans there is no reason to believe that the Soviets would not have discovered them and countered them appropriately. The Soviets had proven that they could outmaneuver the Germans, which they would do in the operations after Kursk excellently and only halted when the Germans took a defensive stance. Soviet Generals such as Vatutin had also demonstrated the flaws with maneuver, namely that these maneuvers had the potential to create a vacuum, one that could be filled by a Soviet massed attack against German forces caught in the midst of these movements. While it is true that a defensive line would require more resources to be compromised at a given time this was a long term investment that could be done and would in fact be beneficial as it played against Soviet weaknesses and on the 20 something years of accumulated knowledge of these German officers.
So then why did the Germans not attempt this from the start? As it so happened Wilhelm Keitel suggested that the Wehrmacht begin to dig in and prepare a defensive network and a consolidation of the rapid territorial gains on the Eastern Front as well as the construction of a logistical network. This was done in November of 1941 just prior to Operation Typhoon. This idea was almost universally rejected by the German staff (particularly the OKH Walther von Brauchitsch and OKH chief of staff Franz Halder, as well as other generals such as Rundstedt, Guderian, von Bock) and the German generals in command of these operations which prompted the start of Operation Typhoon.
The reasons for this were largely due to the Prussian officer corps' mentality that emphasized operational success, while this stems back to Helmuth von Moltke in a manner of speaking, it was never more obvious than during WW1 and WW2. However this also takes us to the preference for bewegungskrieg at this time. Maneuver warfare had also been popular since the time of Helmuth von Moltke (or more appropriately due to his success) and this was evident at the start of WW1 with the Schlieffen Plan. Eventually the Falkenhayn point of view had won out and this emphasized positional defense as well as an attrition type of warfare, though never the less discredited due to the defeat of Germany and the starvation that was bought about during this war. As such maneuver and fast wars returned as well as the additional emphasis on shock tactics that were introduced at the end of WW1. This more or less became the basis for German strategy when WW2 broke out but also the reason why attrition and positional strategies were looked down upon by the generals of the Wehrmacht. This further explains the officer's mentality to rely on quick operational success rather over all strategic success and the reason why so many of these officers overlooked factors such as attrition on German and Soviet lives and manpower.
The Soviets on the other hand had the recent history of mobilizing the populace at large in order to bring about social change through revolution and so were not as averse to the concept of total war mobilization. Though on the operational level they most likely would have succumbed to the superior German understanding of stellungskrieg (which mind you almost bled the French dry during WW1). It was the perfect counter to Soviet offensive warfare but I absolutely must stress that for the Germans to succeed they had to be willing to also take losses in order for this positional form of warfare to succeed, something many Wehrmacht officers were not willing to do. Incidentally the Soviets understood the need to spend lives in order to defend their position (or attack for that matter) but they mistakenly understood this to mean that the means to success was to rely on vast quantities of lives and spend them as they saw fit. The idea being more or less that if both sides spend as much as possible then even when all of the Germans are dead there would still be some Soviet soldiers left alive due to their inherent numerical advantage. Obviously the generals who realized that other factors such as preparations, tactics and the use of reserves played a role became the most successful (such as Nikolai Vatutin at Kursk or Walther Model at Rzhev, Orel and Hurtgen or Albrecht Kesselring in Italy and on the Rhine). What separated Model and Kesselring from the others was that they were able to implement their defensive ideas systematically, which the "mobile defense lobby" had proven incapable of doing (or arguing for that matter).
Last edited by Lord Oda Nobunaga; November 13, 2017 at 04:47 PM.
"Famous general without peer in any age, most superior in valor and inspired by the Way of Heaven; since the provinces are now subject to your will it is certain that you will increasingly mount in victory." - Ōgimachi-tennō
Comes Rei Militaris
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
The problem with a defensive posture against the Russians, or Soviets in this case, is that they then have the initiative to set up their artillery parks and choose their breakthrough points, while keeping you pinned all across the front.
Eats, shoots, and leaves.
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Apologies, lazy language on my part. I mean Hitler was making high risk (to the point of being irrational) decisions in 1939, so its reasonable to expect similar high risk decisions in 1943. As to Hitler's mental health, I am not a professional. Maybe he was just pure evil? Maybe he wanted Germany destroyed and kept rolling the dice till it was.
I think while WWI saw the armies of the second Reich excel at static warfare their natural game was still manoeuvre. This goes back to Frederick the Great keeping his boys in the field later than anyone else and darting about all over the map seizing places like Silesia and Bohemia whenever possible. The Napoleonic defeat and rebuild confirmed the lesson of dynamic mobility and local initiative as the soul of Prussian as well as Second and Third Reich warfare.
From Moltke the elder to Schlieffen's chess moves to Fell Weiss and Gelb, the name of the game is manoeuvre.
Great point and one not acknowledged enough in this discussion: for all Hitler's warmongering the Soviets entered WWII with more groundwork done, and despite massive tactical defeats and enormous loss of territory remained on a stronger war footing throughout. From political measures like Red Army purges (which ensured there were no coup or assassination attempts, unlike the multiple attempts on Hitler), diplomatic measures (making an unthinkable pact with Hitler that divided Nazi Germany permanently from the West), to industrial relocation and incredibly bloody minded decisions on manpower, the Soviets were in it to win from the word go.
Yes, late 1942 all over again. Nazis will shred one or two massive attacks but the third one will blow straight through. IIRC for Saturn there was one Tank Army, in 1943 there were three and in 1944 there were five, the difference kept escalating whether they annihilated the tank army 9as they did in Jan-Feb 1943) or not.
A pure defensive posture maybe slows the Soviets down by six months, maybe not.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
Comes Rei Militaris
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Mach Allemand Gross Again.
Hitler wanted war, just not then, but I think more in the realization that no one just gives up land, and perhaps macabrely. the need to proof German manhood in blood to prove they deserved getting that land.
Eats, shoots, and leaves.
Primicerius
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Is this a thread about the battle Kursk or about a turning point in the war? If it is about a turning point, is it from the perspective of the Russians or the Germens?
The Russians had probably reached the turning point in their mindset a bit earlier with Stalingrad. Kursk just confirmed to them that the war was now winnable.
大信皇帝
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Going to strongly disagree on this point. While it is true that maneuver was a staple of Prussian armies since the time of Frederick I think that if anything many of Frederick's campaigns as well as the Prussian's performance during the Napoleonic Wars proved that the French could match their maneuvers. As we saw at Rossbach the commander Charles de Soubise was able to outmaneuver Frederick. The same in many of his campaigns, despite being able to outmaneuver the likes of Daun the Prussians still found themselves struggling to contend with Austrian position warfare. It was Napoleon and Helmuth von Moltke who defeated this type of position warfare by making broad maneuvers in order to bypass and encircle defensive positions.
Not only that but the maneuver campaigns carried out during WW1 all failed. From the 1st Battle of the Marne to the 2nd Battle of the Marne the only successful German approach was when they depended on a defensive stance. Though the popularity of maneuver and bringing about rapid operational success was a major reason in removing Falkenhayn from power and installing Hindenburg and Ludendorff in his place. It was then that the Germans reworked their army into using shock tactics while still relying on the operational maneuvers and largely disregarding other strategic considerations, yet despite all of that it failed. So when it comes to the majority of these generals they had lived and fought during a period in which stellungskrieg had proven itself to be more successful than bewegungskrieg. But because the stellungskrieg style of warfare necessarily depended on the waiting game and hence attrition and a greater look at grand strategy. The Germans always took operational concerns first and foremost and so this was an inherent problem with the application of stellungskrieg. The other problem is closely tied to this, namely that stellungskrieg required compromising more troops to the immediate defense, unlike bewegungskrieg which could allow for troops to move about freely and bring about a rapid victory, rather than risk a prolonged war and starvation. This of course was the main reason why Hans von Seeckt determined the best course of action to modernize the style of bewegungskrieg. As far as the Germans were concerned, bewegungskrieg had provided them with the victories of 1939 and 1940 however this had been an extremely short amount of time and when the war machine began to slow down the stellungskrieg of WW1 had already proven itself on the operational and tactical levels since 1914 to 1918.
I think a large reason for why Hitler did not want to mobilize the nation for total war was due to the economic weakness of Germany at the time. In addition to his fear of discontent among the population that is. The idea must have been that if the Germans were to all of a sudden begin to put the state and economy on a total war footing it was a clear sign to the populace that things were going badly. Ultimately it was the need to replace their losses that led to mobilization to factories and to the front line. Though I'm sure that a large role was played by Himmler and Goebbel's insistence that getting the population involved directly in the outcome of the war would renew the national fighting spirit, which to an extent was true and it helped to dispel feelings that such a move would result in uprisings. In fact the opposite; before total war there were riots and demonstrations and after total war there was barely any dissent, also for obvious reasons.
The Soviets never displayed any real ability to deal with German stellungskrieg and their near suicidal performances I think proves this. At their worst performance the Germans only gave equal losses to what they took and given the circumstances of these engagements it was actually impressive (such as at Orel). Now imagine if the Germans had the adequate preparations in place to try and hold these areas indefinitely. The Germans had demonstrated their ability to defend these areas such as at Rzhev, Kharkov and Orel. A determined general who was willing to fight and use their superior stellungskrieg knowledge could match the Soviets blow for blow. While many Soviet generals proved their willingness to spend lives they also did so with reckless abandon. The only real problems with the idea of stellungskrieg wasincluded the scale of these defensive works. Could the Germans successfully build a defensive line that stretched from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea? Well there are a few ways to work around this, for starters the Germans could build their defensive networks on a more contained local level and with the idea of a defense in depth. Mostly what the Germans needed were various layers to their defensive lines and a strong reserve to throw into the fray at the crucial moment. In many ways it was also a sort of flexible defense but far more cost effective and with a systematically feasible implementation. The Soviet generals had a penchant for over extending their offensive line or compromising their shock troops or armour too early which allowed the Germans to throw in their reserves, shock troops, air power or armour and cutting up their attackers piecemeal. Such a defense might also have the option for a limited retreat or counter attack which indeed was staple of generals such as Model and Kesselring.
I think if anything these generals proved that the desire to retreat in the face of the enemy, in order to pull off some kind of trick maneuver, was not always well founded. But due to the fact that stellungkrieg was so easy to implement and formulaic in its tactics and preparation it meant that it was easy for generals to learn, unlike bewegungskrieg which always had with it a degree of uncertainty and a need to be constantly unpredictable and imaginative. Despite the ease with which a general might be able to use said defensive tactics, the Soviets never truly demonstrated an ability to deal with them. The common approach of concentrating an attack against a point in the German line proved ineffective (suicidal almost) and the only way in which the Soviets could contend was by playing to their doctrine and attempting to make a large sweeping maneuver behind these fortified positions to attack them from behind. However given that it was a defensive network the Soviets would not have been able to easily exploit any gaps in the line. Since the German method was efficient it was a decent way to beat out the difficulties of an attrition war and in fact the Soviets would have played into their hands because Stalin was too impatient. Even before Kursk he had already decided to begin attacking the area south of Smolensk, though it makes sense given that the terrain favoured attacks and maneuver warfare. As we established the Soviets could match the Germans perfectly in maneuver warfare and so any attempts that did not mitigate said advantage played into Soviet hands.
Last edited by Lord Oda Nobunaga; November 13, 2017 at 09:21 PM.
"Famous general without peer in any age, most superior in valor and inspired by the Way of Heaven; since the provinces are now subject to your will it is certain that you will increasingly mount in victory." - Ōgimachi-tennō
Campidoctor
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
I think one of the difficulties by the time we reach July 1943 is that whatever the Germans do, they are facing the combined might of the Soviet Union, the British Empire, and the USA all at once. I’ve seen statistics that suggest Germany’s production of aircraft and tanks would be roughly equal with the British… but with the USA and the USSR also in the war, the odds were overwhelmingly against Germany.
By the time we reach battles such as Kustrin in 1945, the Germans were outnumbered 11 to one by the Soviet forces attacking them. So any strategy for the summer of 1943 essentially needs to do two things:
1. Eliminate an enemy nation from the war
2. Conserve as much strength as possible
These objectives are to some extent contradictory. The problem with a defensive strategy is that it may simply allow more time for the overwhelming weight of enemy numbers and production to overwhelm the Reich. One can see the idea of a quick, decisive victory is not entirely un-rational, given then overall strategic picture. We see the same again with the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, although by that time there was no real prospect of success, barring a miracle.
The best outcome I can envisage from a Kursk scenario is where the battle happens in reverse, with the Soviet attack gaining initial ground before eventually failing and a German counter-attack inflicting heavy losses. Whether Stalin would have agreed to peace in such a scenario is an interesting question. Assuming he rejected any peace offer and decided to continue the war, it is difficult to see what the Germans could have done about it. Other than perhaps dig in and wait for the next attack. But time was not on Germany’s side. Sooner or later, Germany was going to need more resources in the west to deal with the Americans and the British, and eventually it seems sheer attrition would make German defeat almost inevitable.
大信皇帝
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
The idea though was to conserve strength by adopting a defensive stance. As we had seen in previous and later operations the maneuver defense was not efficient and was very risky. It had also meant that ground had to be given up on the odd chance that the Soviets could be pulled into the vacuum and defeated in a counter attack. However certain areas, particularly in the Ukraine, were crucial for providing resources to sustain German industry. Hence a defensive line was required and in my opinion should have been done since 1941 instead of Operation Typhoon.
It is true that the Soviets had an advantage in terms of manpower and resources, however on the operational level that is only to their advantage in a war of maneuver. The Germans could push at the Soviets and then in turn the Soviets would recoil and push them back. Operationally the Soviets could also match the Germans in maneuver quite well and this would continue to be the case so long as German manpower and resources continued to decline. So the insistence on a maneuver defense was an all or nothing mentality, how does one conduct such a campaign on a front as broad as the Ostfront without a crack being made somewhere across the line, that was never answered by any of its proponents. The idea of giving everyone the local initiative was also flawed since many of these generals often overestimated their capabilities (both in what they could pull off and in terms of their resources) and because it is an approach that focuses on an operational perspective rather than a more appropriate strategic perspective.
In that regard the Germans were at a massive disadvantage as they could produce as much as possible but would consume their resources sooner or later. Meanwhile the Germans were fighting on multiple fronts against some of the largest empires in the world. This was a long term problem however it was not an immediate problem with regards to the eastern front. The Soviets undoubtedly had more resources but the idea was that if they continued to carry out offensive operations (which were imminent) against a German stellungskrieg that could not effectively be demolished they would continue to rack up casualties. Without the necessary manpower to carry out the war then resources were worthless. So in effect this was a "bleed them dry" strategy comparable, but not at all exact, to Verdun in WW1. The way that they are similar is that both operations fail ultimately due to the inability to anticipate their opponent. In the case of Kursk the Germans had no real way of knowing how, when, what or why the Soviets would attack or even with how many troops. All they could really know was that a Soviet attack in the south was imminent but that is a shot in the dark, which means that planning a reactionary response to Soviet movements would be futile. So the idea to take a general approach and use the stellungskrieg method makes sense here. Actually I think that the Germans should have also used similar methods in France since stellungskrieg does not inherently mean sitting still but rather "position warfare", so the Germans could have planned to withdraw from France gradually to various positions in order to create a meat grinder and then finally anchor themselves firmly on the Rhine.
"Famous general without peer in any age, most superior in valor and inspired by the Way of Heaven; since the provinces are now subject to your will it is certain that you will increasingly mount in victory." - Ōgimachi-tennō
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Fair enough I see your point, happy to agree to disagree.
I still feel the decisive moments in WWII were the moments of manoeuvre, but the Nazis outperformed the Soviets decisively in fixed position defence in 1941 (along the line) 1942 (in the late winter/early spring attacks and Mars, only faltering for Saturn) and in some places in 1944, so I can see why you would argue that as a decisive element.
The Soviets enjoyed a massive intel advantage, essentially Hitler was making strategy in the dark and tended to ignore intel anyway. I recall reading of the complete surprise Torch achieved during the Stalingrad campaign: the Spanish reported to him a US armada steaming into the Mediterranean, and OKW and OKH had no idea where they were headed (there was panicked speculation about a landing near Rome, but they ended up bagging PAK in Tunis-a loss more significant than the 6th at Stalingrad in many ways). OTOH Stalin enjoy such clear intel he thought some of it was fake (eg ignoring Sorge's intel on Barbarossa including the start date): this was as true of WAllied plans as Nazis, with Communist sympathisers in most regimes reporting to Moscow.
Another point here is Stalin's increasing trust in his commanders, match by the increased interference from Hitler in even company level operations. So its unlikely Stalin would be taking any bait, or interfering in his field commander's decisions negatively, or being bluffed into peace when the Nazis position was deteriorating so rapidly.
I'd say the Molotov Ribbentrop pact made Nazi defeat inevitable, as it meant there could be no anti-communist crusade.
Jatte lambastes Calico Rat
大信皇帝
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
They certainly were the key victories achieved by the Germans, they did after all provide the defeats of Poland and France as well as the early success of Barbarossa. The 3 generals that were in charge (Leeb, Rundstedt and Bock) during 1939 and 1940 were the same ones that were in charge during 1941, which further adds to their traditional mentality (which extended to other areas but I digress). However these operational achievements did not bring about the defeat of the USSR or victory in WW2. What was required was a strategic perspective of the Ostfront and the war as a whole. The German obsession with operational success was ultimately to their detriment and it was also the main reason why they fixated so much on waging an unsustainable war of maneuver (together with the experiences during the blockade in WW1).
"Famous general without peer in any age, most superior in valor and inspired by the Way of Heaven; since the provinces are now subject to your will it is certain that you will increasingly mount in victory." - Ōgimachi-tennō
Campidoctor
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
I think Fall Blau was an unrealistic plan given the logistics involved. That was about manoeuvre and capture of oil to enable more movement. But the army couldn't be supplied effectively and the Stalingrad disaster was the result.
What were the other options possible in 1942?
大信皇帝
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Case Blue worked as a concept in my opinion but was extremely problematic in its execution, that is to say the inherent operational problems that would result from it. I don't know what the Germans could have done instead, maybe they should have started carrying out a logistics build up and fortified their positions instead. But really that is something that should have been done in 1941 instead of the costly and disastrous Operation Typhoon. If somehow the logistical side of things could be remedied as a result then perhaps attacks into the south could be carried out as the idea of going to the Volga and cutting off the Caucasus sort of makes sense given what depriving these areas would mean for the Soviets. Though the idea of sustainability always comes to mind and I don't know that the Germans could succeed in a Case Blue scenario without control of the Black Sea to ease logistics and communications.
"Famous general without peer in any age, most superior in valor and inspired by the Way of Heaven; since the provinces are now subject to your will it is certain that you will increasingly mount in victory." - Ōgimachi-tennō
Comes Rei Militaris
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
I think it's timing, which in hindsight requires crises not involving Germany, and distracting other major powers, say in the Far East, and before the invention of the atomic bomb.
Eats, shoots, and leaves.
Comes Limitis
Re: The battle of Kursk: turning point of WW2?
Short answer is no. Germany essentially lost when Hitler declared war on the United States (which imo is the real turning point). This mean that the Allies would have overwhelming superiority in resources, and Hitler had no way of taking the fight to them. It became the two front war that he, ironically wanted to avoid and I am still puzzled at why he made that decision as there was plenty of opposition in the US for intervention. To the point: A German victory at Kursk would only prolong the conflict and might even open up the horrific possibility of nuclear attacks on German cities. The thing is that the operational plans and objectives for the war against the Soviet Union changed too often and did not have adequate logistical merits to succeed, and were also impacted by a wide range of events that wasn't predicted - from weather, to size of the Russian forces, and their willingness to fight on despite the cataclysmic stomping they received in the early stages. Not even to mention the problems that the Nazi leadership caused in terms of effectiveness. That said, if German was to have any change of winning a war against the Soviets they had to attack sooner than later - which was a paradox.
Last edited by Holger Danske; November 21, 2017 at 09:43 AM.
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