The earliest date that Germany lost WW2? October 1813.

[bigdaddy1204]

Good points - so you're in the 1 September 1939 camp, then? I've sometimes thought along similar lines, namely that getting into a war with Britain and France was a major failure of foreign policy, especially as it was a war which Germany did not have the ability to win. There was no prospect of defeating Britain outright, because Germany lacked the naval strength to invade. The defeat of France was incredibly lucky and it obscures the fact that Germany was now in a dangerous war with the British Empire which was like a festering sore that would always come back to damage Germany at every opportunity.

Imo the decision to invade the USSR while Britain was still in the war was a mistake. It was a reckless gamble and it should never have been taken; focusing on the Mediterranean and Midlde Eastern theaters of operations to end the war with Britain would have been the correct move. A German statesman of greater foresight and ability would have recognised this. It's difficult to imagine someone of Bismark's stature making the same mistake. A scenario where Germany adopts a "Britain first" strategy and concludes some sort of peace in say 1941 or 1942, perhaps following victory in the Mediterranean/Egypt, would have reset the clock and allowed a halt to the escalation before it was too late.

If the invasion of the Soviet Union still goes ahead then, there will be no British and American supplies to the Soviets, no trucks, tanks and planes, no boots, no food and no fuel from the Allies. There will also be no distracting theatres of war bleeding away the Luftwaffe's strength and no need to garrison the west with substantial manpower. The outcome then might be hard to predict. Treating the Ukrainians and other subject peoples of the Soviet Empire well and winning them over with support, rights, self-determination and friendship as part of a liberation effort would have been an incredibly smart move, too. The Axis forces were initially greeted as liberators by these people and if the right approach had been taken, their help could have been enlisted to free a large part of the Soviet Union willingly. This would have achieved the primary war aim, to defeat the Soviet state, and would have created new German allies that were very favourably disposed to Germany. It would have been an eminently sensible policy. But of course, the Hitlerists lacked the wisdom to see that.

[hellheaven1987]

If the invasion of the Soviet Union still goes ahead then, there will be no British and American supplies to the Soviets, no trucks, tanks and planes, no boots, no food and no fuel from the Allies.

Or the opposite, since British and American could put their full industrial capacity supporting USSR and China to fight their proxy war. Besides how can we forget Treaty of Amiens?

[KEA]

Imo the decision to invade the USSR while Britain was still in the war was a mistake.

The war with Russia was out of question. There was no chance that Hitler and Stalin could have peacefully co-existed on the same continent. There also was no chance that Stalin would had patiently waited until Germany somehow manged the miracle to successfully land in Britain and got her back free in the West. On top of that, with the US entering the War being on the horizon, time certainly not was working for Germany.

I don't know what the latest state of historical research is concerning Stalin's plans in 1941, but regardless whether or not Stalin was about to invade Romania, German High Command believed that a Russian attack was imminent. It is the same with Total War games: when the AI has several unemployed full stacks in provinces adjecting yours, you better don't wait what will be happening next....

The thing is that Hitler never expected France and Britain to seriously declare war on him for Poland. Once he was in this war even all Kaunitz', Metternichs, Bismarcks or Genschers in history wouldn't have gotten him out of this mess. But since Hitler desperately wanted a war to show how badass a general he was things came as they had to come.

[RangerGxi]

Good points - so you're in the 1 September 1939 camp, then? I've sometimes thought along similar lines, namely that getting into a war with Britain and France was a major failure of foreign policy, especially as it was a war which Germany did not have the ability to win. There was no prospect of defeating Britain outright, because Germany lacked the naval strength to invade. The defeat of France was incredibly lucky and it obscures the fact that Germany was now in a dangerous war with the British Empire which was like a festering sore that would always come back to damage Germany at every opportunity.

Lucky? Poor French planning and Rommel seizing the initiative were pretty key.

Imo the decision to invade the USSR while Britain was still in the war was a mistake. It was a reckless gamble and it should never have been taken; focusing on the Mediterranean and Midlde Eastern theaters of operations to end the war with Britain would have been the correct move. A German statesman of greater foresight and ability would have recognised this. It's difficult to imagine someone of Bismark's stature making the same mistake. A scenario where Germany adopts a "Britain first" strategy and concludes some sort of peace in say 1941 or 1942, perhaps following victory in the Mediterranean/Egypt, would have reset the clock and allowed a halt to the escalation before it was too late.

What would a Britain first strategy entail? They had already lost the Battle of Britain (and even more American help was flooding in) and the royal navy was far too formidable. Britain wasn't about to starve and a landing was practically impossible. Correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't most of the German airforce unable to operate across the channel anyway?

If the invasion of the Soviet Union still goes ahead then, there will be no British and American supplies to the Soviets, no trucks, tanks and planes, no boots, no food and no fuel from the Allies. There will also be no distracting theatres of war bleeding away the Luftwaffe's strength and no need to garrison the west with substantial manpower. The outcome then might be hard to predict. Treating the Ukrainians and other subject peoples of the Soviet Empire well and winning them over with support, rights, self-determination and friendship as part of a liberation effort would have been an incredibly smart move, too. The Axis forces were initially greeted as liberators by these people and if the right approach had been taken, their help could have been enlisted to free a large part of the Soviet Union willingly. This would have achieved the primary war aim, to defeat the Soviet state, and would have created new German allies that were very favourably disposed to Germany. It would have been an eminently sensible policy. But of course, the Hitlerists lacked the wisdom to see that.

Lend lease didn't really benefit the soviets until after Barbarossa. British, American and Canadian tanks were pretty helpful but the Soviets had plenty of tanks of their own after 42.

Dunno about the liberation strategy. I'd argue that they did attempt to do give off the a liberator vibe to some extent by creating anti-stalinist divisions and recruiting people into the SS. Plenty of people in these regions were proud communists so there would be resistance no matter what

[bigdaddy1204]

Or the opposite, since British and American could put their full industrial capacity supporting USSR and China to fight their proxy war. Besides how can we forget Treaty of Amiens?

Which one, the 1423 or the 1802? Thing is, the British and Americans wanted Communism to fail. They only helped the USSR out of convenience while they were at war with Germany. The British had sent forces to fight against the Red Army in the Russian civil war prior to 1922 and Stalin had not forgotten this.

The war with Russia was out of question. There was no chance that Hitler and Stalin could have peacefully co-existed on the same continent. There also was no chance that Stalin would had patiently waited until Germany somehow manged the miracle to successfully land in Britain and got her back free in the West. On top of that, with the US entering the War being on the horizon, time certainly not was working for Germany.

I don't know what the latest state of historical research is concerning Stalin's plans in 1941, but regardless whether or not Stalin was about to invade Romania, German High Command believed that a Russian attack was imminent. It is the same with Total War games: when the AI has several unemployed full stacks in provinces adjecting yours, you better don't wait what will be happening next....

The thing is that Hitler never expected France and Britain to seriously declare war on him for Poland. Once he was in this war even all Kaunitz', Metternichs, Bismarcks or Genschers in history wouldn't have gotten him out of this mess. But since Hitler desperately wanted a war to show how badass a general he was things came as they had to come.

I'm not so sure things were quite as set in stone as that. Stalin was a cautious opportunist but not a gambler. It's one of the reasons he won in the end. I still think Germany could have forced Britain to make peace, not by invading directly but by defeating the British convincingly in Egypt and taking Malta and Gibraltar and Cyprus in the Mediterranean.

Lucky? Poor French planning and Rommel seizing the initiative were pretty key.

What would a Britain first strategy entail? They had already lost the Battle of Britain (and even more American help was flooding in) and the royal navy was far too formidable. Britain wasn't about to starve and a landing was practically impossible. Correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't most of the German airforce unable to operate across the channel anyway?

Lend lease didn't really benefit the soviets until after Barbarossa. British, American and Canadian tanks were pretty helpful but the Soviets had plenty of tanks of their own after 42.

Dunno about the liberation strategy. I'd argue that they did attempt to do give off the a liberator vibe to some extent by creating anti-stalinist divisions and recruiting people into the SS. Plenty of people in these regions were proud communists so there would be resistance no matter what

Agreed. No landing nor invasion was possible. See points above. Mediterranean/Egypt theatre would be the place to beat Britain.

Also, on the liberation point, see the holodomor. I think most Ukrainians would gladly see the Soviet Union destroyed after what happened from 1932 to 1933. It was motive enough to fight the Soviets for revenge.

[Kyriakos]

Given that Germany prior to declaring war to Russia was effectively occupying most of the rest of Europe, they already had overstretched. If we assume that Russia would declare war at some point, there doesn't seem to be a way for Germany to win ww2. They just didn't have the resources/land/population/fleet to do it. Even mass production of V-2 missiles wouldn't matter. And afaik Germany developing an atomic weapon first was not realistic.

US/allies didn't even need an atomic weapon so as to win. And maybe they would have won even if Germany had created one such weapon and used it against Britain.

[KEA]

I'm not so sure things were quite as set in stone as that. Stalin was a cautious opportunist but not a gambler. It's one of the reasons he won in the end.

apart from the question what other option Stalin had in the end, you missed the point: As soon as the German High Command was convinced that Stalin was about to attack (and it seems they were right), going first was the best option for Germany. Yes, states do have the choice to not wage war against each other, but no, the situation in the early 1940s between Germany and Russia did not allow for peace.

I still think Germany could have forced Britain to make peace, not by invading directly but by defeating the British convincingly in Egypt and taking Malta and Gibraltar and Cyprus in the Mediterranean.

Britain didn't ask for peace after every ally was steamrolled and all of Europe either conquered by or allied to Germany. Why should she collapse once Germany conquered a few more islands in the Mediterranean (Crete didn't impress the Brits either). The importance of the African theater is anyways much exaggerated by British historians. It basically kept busy two otherwise unemployed armies (Italians and Brits). Even if the Axis somehow had managed to capture the Suez Canal not much would had changed: the main supply routes for the Allies was across the Atlantic and transports from Asia anyways avoided the Mediterranean as much as possible because of the Luftwaffe operating from Italy. Even the supply for the 8th Army usually was shipped around Africa and from there through the Red Sea to Egypt.

[Owlparrot3]

Another meaningful point is that Hitler overestimated Mussolinis capacity to fight in the southern europe and north africa theatre .Face the fact,even after 20 years of stable rule,Mussolini could not do much to improve the military .

[Cyclops]

Lucky? Poor French planning and Rommel seizing the initiative were pretty key...

The stars did line up for Hitler in the broader sense, with Stalin timing his showtrials and rebuild in 1937 (IIRC his army reforms were supposed to be complete late 1942) neutralising the Soviets, French internal divisions preventing decisive action (against Germany or into Spain for that matter), as well as the colossal Maginot blunder, and the rising Japanese spectre keeping France and Britain's attention split between Europe and East Asia. The confusion of his foes and the stream of money the west was willing to lend lasted exactly long enough for Germany to kick off the war with their own rebuild mostly complete and their enemies rebuilds incomplete.

There are a lot of steps along the way that would see Hitler fall IMHO that turned his way, often against the likely current outcome: stack up all those odds and his career is a pretty long shot. Multiple instances of French and British non-intervention, opportunistic alliances with the Soviets, even the way the French and British came into the war saved his bacon. The OKW and in particular the army leadership believed very strongly that a war with France was unwinnable: if Hitler had attempted to initiate one he would surely have been killed immediately.

[Kyriakos]

Read a little on the Ardenne/Holland campaign, and i would like to ask just why/how did Germany have clear (at least numerical) air superiority to the combined british-french forces.

Not that France sending its main tank forces to Holland was a good idea (Holland fell before they could get there, and later on they were stuck in Belgium).

[KEA]

Read a little on the Ardenne/Holland campaign, and i would like to ask just why/how did Germany have clear (at least numerical) air superiority to the combined british-french forces.

"local superiority" was the key to success. Germany had much less planes and tanks (and these mostly Pz I and Pz II junk) in total, but always superior numbers wherever it mattered.

[Cyclops]

"local superiority" was the key to success. Germany had much less planes and tanks (and these mostly Pz I and Pz II junk) in total, but always superior numbers wherever it mattered.

Indeed the German interdiction and close support doctrines had no parallel in the WAllied forces. They went in with a numerically inferior air force but managed to establish total air superiority quickly: once the French adjusted to counter mobile armour forces that the Wehrmacht was deploying by establishing their own dedicated armour forces (they actually had in many cases better tanks, and there had been advocates of massed armour with infantry support in the French army so the doctrine had been discussed) it was too late, they had no air cover.

The French and British had maintained decent air forces from WWI onwards and these had proved useful in certain colonial situations (eg Iraq tribal insurgencies were bombed into submission by the RAF), butt his meant they carried a weight of obsolete craft as well as newer models. The Germans built a force from scratch, tested some of the new doctrines in Spain, so the Luftwaffe was cherry ripe, with a similar level of experience but overall a newer force answering to a single authority ultimately.

I'm not saying Hitler had brilliant doctrinal development skills but he had a clear attraction to mobile armoured forces supported by aircraft and the necessary tools were made available to his generals.

By comparison the French were saddled with an enormous fortress complex that covered only one of their foreign borders (and not one that had been seriously penetrated in WWI). They had a large well equipped army but saddled with older generals and a government that distrusted the historically mostly aristocratic/ultra catholic officer corps. The tank forces were numerous but the old men in charge wanted them distributed to "stiffen the morale" of the infantry. French artillery remained a great strength but had been designed more with WWI in mind (curiously in WWI the French were probably the lightest, nimblest most aggressive army, probably more suited to WWI campaigning than the rest).

So Germany had an advantage in the modernity and cohesion of its air force, and the cooperation of the air force with the ground forces (especially the tanks). The infantry and artillery remained of a consistent high standard established by the Prussians of old, able to roll up the pieces the newer forces had severed fro their supply lines or dislodged through rapid advances.

To offer a couple of superficial observations I have come up with over the years:

The French won their last war so they prepared to fight it again, hoping for the same result. The Germans lost their last war and realised they had to fight a very different one to have any chance.

Also, the French surrendered swiftly for a number of reasons, but surely one was this: the Germans attacked with incredible decisiveness because they knew the price of defeat: the French did not defend as hard because they knew the price of victory and were not prepared to pay it this time.

In the end the price of victory was beyond Germany's ability to pay as well: to some observers this was clear from before the start. I would say Kemalist Turkey saw this clearest: when the Germans seemed several times on the point of impossible victory (with the Fall of France, Barbarossa and its success, Fell Blau and the dagger in the Caucasus all stunning miracles to contemporary eyes), they remained sure of their judgement and stayed neutral .

[Kyriakos]

Thank you both for the replies

[KEA]

I'm not saying Hitler had brilliant doctrinal development skills but he had a clear attraction to mobile armoured forces supported by aircraft and the necessary tools were made available to his generals.

No need to attribute that to Hitler: the advanced German tank tactics were developed by Guderian already in the 1920s. The plan for the campaign of 1940 was developed by Manstein. Hitler's own planning, or the plan produced by OKH that Hitler preferred, was a copy of the Schlieffen-Plan. Only because that plan accidentally landed in Belgium, Hitler ordered the Manstein Plan to be used instead.

By comparison the French were saddled with an enormous fortress complex that covered only one of their foreign borders (and not one that had been seriously penetrated in WWI). They had a large well equipped army but saddled with older generals and a government that distrusted the historically mostly aristocratic/ultra catholic officer corps. The tank forces were numerous but the old men in charge wanted them distributed to "stiffen the morale" of the infantry. French artillery remained a great strength but had been designed more with WWI in mind (curiously in WWI the French were probably the lightest, nimblest most aggressive army, probably more suited to WWI campaigning than the rest).

That's an interesting development in France, both for 1914 and 1940. In 1914 French military favored suicidal attacks and avoided fortifications at any costs. That was a direct reaction to the war of 1870/71 when the French armies had locked themselves up in the (false idea of) safety of the eastern fortresses. As a result those armies finally had to surrender one after the other to the Germans. So, France entered WWI with a military doctrine that was completely useless for the warfare of that time (no heavy artillery, frontal charges into prepared enemy positions etc). The lesson France learned from WWI was that modern warfare was all about static fortifications. Result: the Maginot Line. Again, a military doctrine unsuited for the period in question.

[Cyclops]

Yes a lot of swings and roundabouts in the history of warfare. At Rocroi, Valmy and Jena Auerstadt the French rode the new wave to victory against enemies who had seemed invincible on the eve of war. 1940 was the other side of that coin.

[bigdaddy1204]

Interesting point. But perhaps if the Germans had attacked the Maginot line directly, or if the French had simply extended it all the way to the Atlantic, the result might have been a major German defeat in 1940. That would have changed the war beyond all recognition. The actual defences themselves may well still have worked; it was the fact that they could be outflanked and therefore made irrelevant that rendered their doom.

[RangerGxi]

Given that Germany prior to declaring war to Russia was effectively occupying most of the rest of Europe, they already had overstretched. If we assume that Russia would declare war at some point, there doesn't seem to be a way for Germany to win ww2. They just didn't have the resources/land/population/fleet to do it. Even mass production of V-2 missiles wouldn't matter. And afaik Germany developing an atomic weapon first was not realistic.

You could argue that the USSR was "occupying" large amounts of territory as well. Keep in mind that the Germans benefitted from the occupation of these territories. They were given millions of capable workers and access to resources.

[conon394]

apart from the question what other option Stalin had in the end, you missed the point: As soon as the German High Command was convinced that Stalin was about to attack (and it seems they were right), going first was the best option for Germany. Yes, states do have the choice to not wage war against each other, but no, the situation in the early 1940s between Germany and Russia did not allow for peace.

I would agree.

Critically here is where Germany needed the best in alliance management. Keeping the Duce on a short leash and never letting the Med suck away critical resources (as did eventually very much so in 42/43 when they were needed in the East for example). More vital still Japan needed to be on board for Russia - Its defeat was the only viable way for Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to survive. Japan had to cut the Pacific corridor, and do something anything to tie down some USSR resources in Manchuria. Given how many man Japan was willing to consign to certain death across the Pacific at other times or wasted in China, concerted if costly action in Manchuria in late 41+ would have vastly more helpful than biting on the foolishness of the Midway plan.



---

In any case...

@Wulfburk

Thats the whole german kriegsmarine fleet still up

What you are joking right?

(did the US even sink a german capital ship?)

It had any in 1941 - capital ships that is. It is in fact rather funny to imagine the Nazi's 2 battles ships and one I suppose Light CV sortieing out into the Atlantic to fight the USN. The ill trained air wing of theoretical Graf Zeppelin alone is a joke. Lets see that would be

10 Bf 109s
20 Ju 87s and
20 Fieseler Fi 167s

vs (allow me the Ranger and the Yorktown).

~based on the airings at the time and capacity

36 TBF Avengers
36 F4F Widlcats
72 SBD Dauntless

The German fleet simply could not sortie beyond coastal ranges. Its air attack range with at least some fighter cover [sufficient cover to face the expected US CAP would require leaving the German fleet completely vulnerable] would be ~900 km. At ~1500 km if the 87s and 167s were sent out on a one way trip err un-escorted mission. By comparison a USN fleet could send a strike force escorted at around 1800 km that could likely swamp any German CAP and retain both a CAP and a Avenger force (with escort) able to operate at around 1200 km. And before I hear any talk about Devistators and 1941 or no drop tanks for the F4Fs those were all actually available in 1941 vs pure maybe fantasy of even just a a single German CV in 41/42 at maximum possible theoretical capacity - physical/mechanical/storage/doctrinal (I have not added deck overload for the USN CVs for example - a policy the USN did use in practice at the time and I have never seen any indication Germany ever considered let alone ever used on a working ship). Also I argue here in broad stokes so the range of and doctrine use of the USN includes and assumes the lines of what the USN actually had in place for air operations vs what Germany very much did not. For example time to fly around around and radio for help before ditching as part of what is considered combat range. Given how many German pilots ended up in the drink during the Battle of Britain I rather lean toward not being impressed with the at sea not suicidal mission combat ranger of the Bf109 on the version of the plane Germany actually made.

and the 550 u boats the british destroyed in ww2, plus 90 italian subs, wont get their fate as in real life (in contrast with just 160 german subs the US destroyed). Not only lend lease to the USSR would have been impossible with no british victory in the battle of the atlantic

LL aid mostly went via the Persian and Pacific corridors well out range of most German abilities to bother.

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edit

@ Cyclops

The French and British had maintained decent air forces from WWI onwards and these had proved useful in certain colonial situations (eg Iraq tribal insurgencies were bombed into submission by the RAF), butt his meant they carried a weight of obsolete craft as well as newer models. The Germans built a force from scratch, tested some of the new doctrines in Spain, so the Luftwaffe was cherry ripe, with a similar level of experience but overall a newer force answering to a single authority ultimately.

I don't see quite that much of a clear line. The Germans got very lucky with a modest first mover advantage and facing the UK and France who started rearming a bit late. And vitally really a massive lack of political will on the part of France. The reality is if Reynaud had thunderously declared France would fight on from Algeria or wherever than the German air force would look none to fine. Honestly all Hitler's defeat needed was for Reynaud to be willing to play Hyperides and chew his own tongue off and spit it down at the feet of Antipater err Hitler while he was sarcastically was playing la marseillaise (or something). In any case a French air force actually deployed and used for final defense of the Metropolitan would have shattered much of the myth of German Air Force (and shattered it in reality it had no reserves or capacity for the the fight it would have lost).

[hellheaven1987]

Which one, the 1423 or the 1802? Thing is, the British and Americans wanted Communism to fail. They only helped the USSR out of convenience while they were at war with Germany. The British had sent forces to fight against the Red Army in the Russian civil war prior to 1922 and Stalin had not forgotten this.

British dislike all this "New Order" in Europe most; Communism is just a problem in east.

[TWWolfe]

Just to add to the discussion, what really killed the German ability to launch even a theoretical operation sea lion was Norway. "one of the Kriegsmarine's two heavy cruisers, two of its six light cruisers, 10 of its 20 destroyers and six U-boats."

So after that the Germans were left with all of... 7 real naval ships.

frightening that. truly the allies are up against fearful odds they may never overcome. But wait, theres more! the Germans have new, top of the line battleshi- oh wait one just got crippled by a biplane, hide the other one in norway! she must never be found.

perhaps the Italians could help out with thier own flee- nope, crippled by biplanes too.