Why was there never a plan for Germany to invade Russia first?

[RedGuard]

Its always seemed weird to me that Germany always found Russia as the greater threat but then sent most of its troops to the western front to fulfill the Schlieffen plan. I understand that it was probably necessary for Germany to take out France eventually, but Ive always wondered why Germany didn't fight Russia first considering they knew at the time that it would only take Russia about 3 years to have railroads that could match Germany. It would take Russia much longer to mobilize than France, Which means the Germans getting hundreds of miles into Russia before they even have 400,000 troops to face them, and the capital could even be invaded by the Baltic, which was essentially a german lake at the time. I feel like Germany may have had much more success in early 1914 if they had planned to Invade Russia at the outset rather than declare war on France, go through Belgium antagonizing and forcing Britain to fight (thereby adding another unnecessary enemy). It always seemed to me an overly convoluted way to win the war and I think besides the technological advancement outpacing the war-plans, was probably among the reason why Germany lost.

Of Course I could see the downside: Russia would require at least a million troops to occupy (as it did in 1917) that would better be served against France, however if Russia was defeated quickly before it could mobilize, it is possible that France would think twice about joining the war to stop Germany, or if they did would be under the imperitive to attack Germany where Germany would have the advantage. The war would be a stalemate and would cost France millions of troops and would probably end in some kind of truce, albeit Germany with more leverage than they did at the end in 1918. The British blockade would be ineffective, as grain could be shipped from the Ukraine and Russia (as it was in 1917 but the damage had already been done) not to mention oil. It just seems to me the much more obvious choice.

Then again I also have the benefit of hindsight. Still, even in sports doing the same plan twice or even three times rarely works out (unless you have some kind of new game changing tech such as the panzer and Blitzkreig in ww2)

[TWWolfe]

Its always seemed weird to me that Germany always found Russia as the greater threat but then sent most of its troops to the western front to fulfill the Schlieffen plan. I understand that it was probably necessary for Germany to take out France eventually, but Ive always wondered why Germany didn't fight Russia first considering they knew at the time that it would only take Russia about 3 years to have railroads that could match Germany. It would take Russia much longer to mobilize than France, Which means the Germans getting hundreds of miles into Russia before they even have 400,000 troops to face them, and the capital could even be invaded by the Baltic, which was essentially a german lake at the time. I feel like Germany may have had much more success in early 1914 if they had planned to Invade Russia at the outset rather than declare war on France, go through Belgium antagonizing and forcing Britain to fight (thereby adding another unnecessary enemy). It always seemed to me an overly convoluted way to win the war and I think besides the technological advancement outpacing the war-plans, was probably among the reason why Germany lost.

Of Course I could see the downside: Russia would require at least a million troops to occupy (as it did in 1917) that would better be served against France, however if Russia was defeated quickly before it could mobilize, it is possible that France would think twice about joining the war to stop Germany, or if they did would be under the imperitive to attack Germany where Germany would have the advantage. The war would be a stalemate and would cost France millions of troops and would probably end in some kind of truce, albeit Germany with more leverage than they did at the end in 1918. The British blockade would be ineffective, as grain could be shipped from the Ukraine and Russia (as it was in 1917 but the damage had already been done) not to mention oil. It just seems to me the much more obvious choice.

Then again I also have the benefit of hindsight. Still, even in sports doing the same plan twice or even three times rarely works out (unless you have some kind of new game changing tech such as the panzer and Blitzkreig in ww2)

there actually was a plan to invade russia first. or at least, to fight russia while leaving border defences on the french frontier. due to the constant drills and the military control over the railroad, this plan could theoretically have been activated and switched over to with a minimum of disorder. but that also assumes a willingness to abandon the Schlieffen plan and all the things the General staff had laboriously planned out to follow that plan. On the very eve of the war, the Kaiser went to von Moltke and asked him if it would be possible to fight the war against russia alone. and Moltke, faced withed abandoning THE PLAN, with rearranging deployments and trains, said no. the Kaiser's words to him when he heard that?
"Your uncle would have given me a different answer."
Perhaps a more dynamic commander, willing to take more risks, and not afraid of the shadow of his uncle, might have said yes.

[Morifea]

Uncle, not father.

Everything else is correct and well pointed out.

[TWWolfe]

Uncle, not father.

Everything else is correct and well pointed out.

Sorry about that, was writing that all down off of memory at the time. fixed it.

[Dude with the Food]

I'm not an expert but it's much further from the German border to Moscow than Paris. Then you have to occupy Moscow and other important cities which are spread across a vast area and then race back across the majority of Europe before France has mobilized and overwhelmed the western front. Every minor oversight or minor setback takes away vital time that Germany needed - the whole point of the Schlieffen plan was to minimize the time it took to take one enemy out of the war.

[vikior]

I'm not an expert but it's much further from the German border to Moscow than Paris. Then you have to occupy Moscow and other important cities which are spread across a vast area and then race back across the majority of Europe before France has mobilized and overwhelmed the western front. Every minor oversight or minor setback takes away vital time that Germany needed - the whole point of the Schlieffen plan was to minimize the time it took to take one enemy out of the war.

I'm not sure I agree. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk clearly shows us that the Germans didn't actually need to occupy all those areas to kick Russia out of the war. This isn't WW2 we're speaking of. Inflicting massive defeats on the Russian forces early in the war (which should have been possible had the entire German army been present in the East) could have kicked the Russians out before 1916.

[Dude with the Food]

Fair enough. Like I said, I'm no expert.

[Cyclops]

There was a plan, it was Karl XII's.

[Kyriakos]

This alt timeline doesn't seem to bother with the russian civil war at all, though

[RedGuard]

there actually was a plan to invade russia first. or at least, to fight russia while leaving border defences on the french frontier. due to the constant drills and the military control over the railroad, this plan could theoretically have been activated and switched over to with a minimum of disorder. but that also assumes a willingness to abandon the Schlieffen plan and all the things the General staff had laboriously planned out to follow that plan. On the very eve of the war, the Kaiser went to von Moltke and asked him if it would be possible to fight the war against russia alone. and Moltke, faced withed abandoning THE PLAN, with rearranging deployments and trains, said no. the Kaiser's words to him when he heard that?
"Your uncle would have given me a different answer."
Perhaps a more dynamic commander, willing to take more risks, and not afraid of the shadow of his uncle, might have said yes.

very interesting. It begs the question then what if it had been his father? It seems that the beginning of ww1 is marked by mediocrity on all sides. Without Conrad von Hotzendorf its unlikely there would probably never even have been a war considering that Serbia accepted all but 1 of Autria's demands.

[TWWolfe]

very interesting. It begs the question then what if it had been his father? It seems that the beginning of ww1 is marked by mediocrity on all sides. Without Conrad von Hotzendorf its unlikely there would probably never even have been a war considering that Serbia accepted all but 1 of Autria's demands.

I think the issue is less with the mediocrity of the participants and more that everyone spent the years going up to the war assuming it would go a certain way and making one big plan, and then riding that plan down in flames when it started regardless of whether or not that plan was the right one.

Germany? TIme for war, lets kick france in the face again. to make sure they join in, lets demand they give over all thier border fortresses to us. Oh, and lets make modifications at the last minute because we have no confidence in the plan at all actually.
Russia? Help the french, invade quickly! who cares if we only have enough shells for a weeks fighting we have treaty obligations to meet!
Austria-Hungary? keep existing, lets squash serbia and rely on Germany to back us up.
France? Revanche! take back Alsace-Lorraine, don't worry about Lanrezac's complaints about the entire German Military rolling down on him.

There were plenty of chances for it to turn into just another Balkan War, but it was adherence to the plan that made the war really start and resulted in the way the early months played out.

Moltke's encounter with the Kaiser is interesting because he always seems shaken and unsure after that. Transferring troops to the Russian front at the last minute, strengthening the center at the expense of the right, letting the Crown Prince go on the offensive in AL.

[RedGuard]

I think the issue is less with the mediocrity of the participants and more that everyone spent the years going up to the war assuming it would go a certain way and making one big plan, and then riding that plan down in flames when it started regardless of whether or not that plan was the right one.

Germany? TIme for war, lets kick france in the face again. to make sure they join in, lets demand they give over all thier border fortresses to us. Oh, and lets make modifications at the last minute because we have no confidence in the plan at all actually.
Russia? Help the french, invade quickly! who cares if we only have enough shells for a weeks fighting we have treaty obligations to meet!
Austria-Hungary? keep existing, lets squash serbia and rely on Germany to back us up.
France? Revanche! take back Alsace-Lorraine, don't worry about Lanrezac's complaints about the entire German Military rolling down on him.

There were plenty of chances for it to turn into just another Balkan War, but it was adherence to the plan that made the war really start and resulted in the way the early months played out.

Moltke's encounter with the Kaiser is interesting because he always seems shaken and unsure after that. Transferring troops to the Russian front at the last minute, strengthening the center at the expense of the right, letting the Crown Prince go on the offensive in AL.

I read somewhere that Moltke was commited to the Schlieffen plan, then undermined his own efforts by shipping almost 200,000 troops to the eastern front rather than stick to the plan he recommended to the Kaiser. Id he had kept those 200,000 men its possible there could have been a breaktrough really early in the war, but the spectre of Russia stood over them. The two fronts really killed them. Which is why I wondered if the military planners were really thinking clearly when they decided to attack France and Belgium...but I guess like everyone says the planning was thirty years behind the technology. The American Civil war should have been a clue to the Europeans.

[TWWolfe]

I read somewhere that Moltke was commited to the Schlieffen plan, then undermined his own efforts by shipping almost 200,000 troops to the eastern front rather than stick to the plan he recommended to the Kaiser. Id he had kept those 200,000 men its possible there could have been a breaktrough really early in the war, but the spectre of Russia stood over them. The two fronts really killed them. Which is why I wondered if the military planners were really thinking clearly when they decided to attack France and Belgium...but I guess like everyone says the planning was thirty years behind the technology. The American Civil war should have been a clue to the Europeans.

that was half of his undermining the Schlieffen plan, theres a second one you tend to hear less about. the original plan called for a weaker right/center that would fall back as the French advanced, giving up territory as they did. As Schlieffen thought, it didn't matter in the end how far the French got, since they would just be caught in the sack as the strong right swung in behind them. and given how gung ho the French were about going in through AL, it might have worked. But is successors really didn't like the idea of giving up any German territory, so they strengthened the troops in the center/right, again taking troops from the left wing.

Then in the opening days Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, seeing the French starting to falter, requested permission to go on the offensive in the center, and Moltke gave it to him, leading to the battle of grand courrone. this was really the final nail in the Schlieffen plan, since it meant even more troops were diverted from the right into a slugging match in the center.

[Col. Tartleton]

As Moltke the Elder correctly predicted, the next war would last 30 years.

[Sir Adrian]

The german high command always believed that France could be knocked out quickly and that Russia would be the big hurdle of the war, so they tried to secure their flank before taking on the mammoth.
That belief is understandable in 1914 what with the experience of the Franco-Prussian war and the outdated but still valuable experience of Napoleon.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

The old Moltke had actually drawn up such a plan, he eventually chose to abandon it and focus on a limited offensive against France.

[Nikitn]

Because everybody thought at that time that Russia was far more powerful than France, and that'd be probably true if not for the incredible incompetence of the Russian generals (that's what you get when you promote based on "breeding" and contacts, instead of merit). And while sure, in the west eg British generals were pretty horrific too, you have to remember that once the trench war started in the western front generalship didn't matter much, whilein the east the war was always mobile so good generalship was critical.

Practically the only good general we had in the east was Brusilov.

[SorelusImperion]

What about Yudenitsch ? He seemed to have done well on the Caucasus Front.

That beeing said bad Leadership was not the only problem the Russian logistics were not in proper shape either had it been the revolution might have been delayed just long enough to secure a place at Versailles.