Did Germany really have a chance of winning WWI

[hellheaven1987]

Other than the prattlings of Lloyd George I don't think it was too great a problem.

Except David Lloyd George was able to act without hand tie because there was a strong public support. The fact was, after Passrachendaele British public realized the nature of Western Front and hence supported Lloyd George's "East First" strategy (I am not completely sure what was Churchill's role in this mess though) in order to avoid Haig sent their dear one to another high casualty operation. The result was Lloyd George simply arrested the necessary manpower replacement to BEF after Passrachendaele and went even further to cut down the size of it. Hence in spring 1918 many BEF units were understrength, contributed one major reason why German could pushed so much during Spring 1918 Offensive campaign.

[Cyclops]

Umm Haig enjoyed enormous popular support throughout the war, as well as from the Palace and Horse Guards.

Churchill was dumped from the Admiralty after the botched Gallipoli campaign (a trifle unfairly as it was the Army who buggered it up).

In late 1917 Lloyd George bypassed Haig and helped place Foch at the helm, and this position was strengthened once the Michael breakthroughs occurred.

The reason British units were depleted in 1917 was not because the manpower was being diverted its because the UK and dominions were running out of bodies, as were the Germans, French etc. Part of the reason for not consolidating divisions was resistance on the part of the soldiers. For example several Australian divisions "mutinied" in that they offered passive resistance to consolidation, preferring to remain as undersized units and retaining their original unit designation.

Lloyd George was a very astute politician and seen as the ruthless sort of character required to win the war, but don't confuse that with popularity. He was a corrupt self serving scheming egomaniac and everybody knew it.

Haig's failures were the failures of the British Army system that promoted cavalry officers (generally from high born backgrounds) to high command in preference to actual ability: the British had been fighting colonial wars (generally COIN ops) exclusively for about 70 years and were dreadfully unsuited to mass European warfare in 1914. Haig's desire for the infantry to punch a hole in the enemy line was based on an out-dated notion that the cavalry would swarm through the breach and roil up the line. When this was shown to be a pipedream he adapted to the shocking notion of attrition warfare as a war winning strategy: in fact the Royal Navy won the war with the inhuman cruelty of the blockade, but the Army could not just sit there and do nothing (unless it was Gallipoli, a Navy idea, in which case they would undermine the operation by sending dead generals).

Someone mentioned an "east first" policy? Not sure if this was ever expressed as such but there was an agreement at the highest level (that eventually became open policy after the failures of 1915 and 1916) that the western front was too crowded for decisive action (pace Haig) and the Axis was best destroyed from the periphery where Entente strengths like naval dominance and experience in Middle eastern theatres would count. This "sort of" worked in that German forces were detached to the eastern and Southern sectors but the Entente lost allies faster than Germany did until 1918.

[Darkhorse]

As mentioned, Haig was liked, very much so.

Robertson was another who vehemently opposed Lloyd George (and for that matter, the French), and with Gallipoli, Kut, and Salonika you can see why. The Navy also opposed this style of campaign, and actually were more of a manpower drain than these other theatres, which shows how limited the resources diverted to them were and in turn why they were unlikely to be successful.

What Lloyd George didn't account for was that British officers generally backed Haig, including Robertson (until around about his resignation in Feb 1918, what is even more remarkable is that Haig and Robertson disliked each other and Haig would enjoy far better working relations with Wilson, a strong critic). Jan Smuts was amongst their number backing Haig, as was Milner and Curzon - the very men on Lloyd George's War Council. The Italians also pushed for attacks on the Western Front, Foch wasn't exactly unopposed to them, he just wanted to wait for the Americans before a breakthrough was forced.

I don't agree that Haig was particularly flawed, no more than any other officer in his position would have been, and I note that is not the claim you make, but it is important. Haig was however, pushy and entirely focused on the big offensive, he overestimated how close Germany was to collapse and he had real fears that war would be lost if the British in particular couldn't break German lines - this is despite warnings of manpower shortages from his key backer, Robertson.

The political-military web here is complicated, but basically, the general's, with the notable exception of French and Wilson, pretty much had Haig's back covered while Allenby, Maude, Murray and the Russians worked their magic in the Middle East, pleasing Lloyd George but to the displeasure of Robertson. However, with Robertson in place, who was the main target for Lloyd George's displeasure - criticising him for being distant and inexperienced, the actual impact of Lloyd George on Haig's campaign is somewhat limited, as mentioned the Navy gave him reason for greater concern. Robertson was never going to give in to the Prime Minister, especially with the backing of most the generals, the press, and of the King, that much is clear. He simply refused to divert resources to other theatres such as Italy - Foch and Cadorna shared his sentiments - until Caporetto at least, but Robertson sanctioned only the smallest of deployments there. Kiggell even handed Haig a note explaining that his offensives were beneficial to relations with the wider allies.

Lloyd George's influence on the military was simply limited, especially while Robertson was in post and as he couldn't work with him, it is the active undermining of Robertson by Lloyd George which saw the CIGS go (and saw two journalists charged under the DORA act). The peace process George sought, where Germany would give up most of her colonies but keep the Baltic, was not backed by his ministers either. He was not in a particularly strong position. Worth mentioning that Lloyd George also had Trenchard and Jellicoe removed - he wanted complete control over the military (having deputy CIGS and other service equivalents taking their orders directly from the war council) and the commanders were not going to let that happen easily.

As you explain, Passchendaele is important. No one can deny that 3rd Ypres was a disaster. but it was for the Germans as well. Flanders was the weak point in the British line. The ground was awful, any successful result from an attack there was only going to be limited, and the supply network into the area was dreadful. Haig was encouraged to attack, although it didn't need much encouragement, at a time where all knew manpower was at its most critical. As it happens, Byng did okay, Gough floundered a little, but at the time the British were the only major ally capable of mounting an attack, and Robertson was keen to exploit this. German generals could not effectively counter British tactics, and were probably the only major combatant where manpower was greater crisis problem than in Britain. Germany could not afford to only fight on British terms, and Cambrai came so close to shattering the German line. This is why the Spring Offensive was so important, so all out, and counted for so much when it failed - they knew the Americans were coming and the British and French were recovering. The public blame on the Spring Offensive fell squarely on Lloyd George, and there was one hell of a media backlash targeted at the Prime Minister.

Through the work of people such as Ivor Maxse and Robertson, the situation for British troops improved, which is what is important during this stage of the war. It is also worth remembering that the generals, in particular Robertson, foresaw the Spring Offensive while Lloyd George was convinced such an offensive was impossible, it's probably a very good thing that Robertson was able to prevent a large chunk of resources at the time. Lloyd George was in serious trouble anyway with Asquith likely to make a come back - and it was the increased praise and freedoms award to generals which saved him.

[IrishBlood]

Let's revive this thread.

For argument's sake, lets say that Germany defeated Russia by doing the Schleffein plan in reverse like I posted a few pages back (Turtle up on the western front, don't attack Belgium to keep the UK out of the war for a couple of years and throw everything at Russia).

It's 1916 (I'm pulling this date out of the air) Russia has fallen to revolution, Ukraine, Latvia, Poland, etc have been ceded to Germany/Austria and puppet governments with limited autonomy are set up (as IRL). The Caucasus front has completely collapsed and the Ottomans advance until their supply lines are stretched to the limit. Austria-Hungary can now redeploy their troops from Russia to the Italian front. The Ottomans can redeploy their troops to Mesopotamia and Palestine. Germany redeploys to the static Western front.

Now what happens? Do the French/Italians sue for peace before the German uber doomstacks launch a final offensive?
Actually, for that matter, if Belgium was never invaded and the UK doesn't join the war (at least for a year or so) would Italy have also stayed out of the war?

If Russia was knocked out before the worst of the blockade shortages began to take their toll (again, assuming the UK doesn't join the war for at least a year) and before Austria-Hungary began to collapse from within, what happens then?

[Darkhorse]

Presumably the French would have built the Maginot Line about 20 years earlier.

We know from Verdun that and numerous other battles that such defences are not impenetrable, but if the French actually suitably man, equip, and supply their defences and the early German gains seen at the actual Verdun are avoided, they'd have a better chance of holding. It turned into a bitter mess as it is, and it would be years of pressure and tactical development (and arguably the effects of blockade) before such positions would fall Hindenburg Line style.

[KEA]

For argument's sake, lets say that Germany defeated Russia by doing the Schleffein plan in reverse like I posted a few pages back (Turtle up on the western front, don't attack Belgium to keep the UK out of the war for a couple of years and throw everything at Russia).

This is one assumption I don't buy: The UK wasn't mad on Belgium, means didn't threw herself unperpared in an all or nothing war with the mightiest warmachine on the planet because someone invaded poor little Belgium - or in return would had sat on her hands watching Germany shreddering the Entente as long as everyone leave Belgium alone.

It's 1916 (...) Germany redeploys to the static Western front.

So, what had happened on the Western Front all those years? French military doctrine in 1914 called for offensive at all costs. Until 1916 the French would had either anhilated themselves in futile attacks (what was the German idea behind starting the Battle of Verdun in the first place) or would had been parading Unter den Linden meanwhile.

Actually, for that matter, if Belgium was never invaded and the UK doesn't join the war (at least for a year or so) would Italy have also stayed out of the war?

Would it had mattered?

If Russia was knocked out before the worst of the blockade shortages began to take their toll (again, assuming the UK doesn't join the war for at least a year) and before Austria-Hungary began to collapse from within, what happens then?

It is pretty simple: France in 1914 was as incapable of winning a war against Germany on her own as she was in 1870 or 1940. So, if you set up a scenario that eliminates all of France's allies, 1914 (or in your scenario: 1916) would have gone the same as 1870 and 1940 did.

[IrishBlood]

This is one assumption I don't buy: The UK wasn't mad on Belgium, means didn't threw herself unperpared in an all or nothing war with the mightiest warmachine on the planet because someone invaded poor little Belgium - or in return would had sat on her hands watching Germany shreddering the Entente as long as everyone leave Belgium alone.

The invasion of Belgium was a major recruitment tool. The UK didn't introduce conscription until 1916 and relied on a volunteer army prior to that. If Belgium's neutrality was not violated and France's territory was not invaded (assuming a Russia first priority) then I don't think the UK would declare war on Germany immediately and if they did it would take them much longer to get the same number of volunteers as they did IRL. They would eventually, but how long is the question. If they stayed out of the war until 1915, it would take much longer for the blockade to cripple Germany and much longer again before Italy could be convinced to join the war.

If Germany/Austria achieved the same result they did IRL on the eastern front by a year earlier, would the newly conquered lands be enough to keep their economies ticking long enough to get a white peace?

[KEA]

The invasion of Belgium was a major recruitment tool.

because it was there. This doesn't necessarily follow that without Belgium the Brits would not had volunteered for service.

If they stayed out of the war until 1915, it would take much longer for the blockade to cripple Germany and much longer again before Italy could be convinced to join the war.

Again, Italy was completely irrelevant to the outcome of the war. Austria held her at bay with local militias and border police until a proper army was marshaled of what was available elsewhere (amongst them young Captain Rommel). The Italian army suffered horrendous casualties without achieving anything or without even binding a considerable amount of German forces.

If Germany/Austria achieved the same result they did IRL on the eastern front by a year earlier, would the newly conquered lands be enough to keep their economies ticking long enough to get a white peace?

The (military) effect of the blockade is often exaggerated in English literature. While it made the population suffer and is held responsible for about 800,000 starved civilians during and short after the war, it did not hinder operations of the German army in a decisive way. The Imperial Army still was full operational in March 1918 at the beginning of the Spring Offensive, and only after this decisive battle was lost high command came to the conclusion that the war no longer could be won urging the government to ask for peace.

[IrishBlood]

The (military) effect of the blockade is often exaggerated in English literature. While it made the population suffer and is held responsible for about 800,000 starved civilians during and short after the war, it did not hinder operations of the German army in a decisive way. The Imperial Army still was full operational in March 1918 at the beginning of the Spring Offensive, and only after this decisive battle was lost high command came to the conclusion that the war no longer could be won urging the government to ask for peace.

I'm pretty sure that the rations that German troops received were significantly worse than their British or French counterparts and that some elements of the German army were on the verge of starvation during the spring offensive to the point that they ignored objectives and instead gorged themselves on captured enemy supplies. I could be wrong, but I have read/seen that from more than one source.

[KEA]

The question is not whether or not they had a bad time but inhowfar that contributed to the outcome of the war. I have no information about major operations during Spring Offensive not being executed as planned because the soldiers were lacking food. Actually one good thing with going on offensive is the chance of looting supplies from your enemy.

[Cyclops]

I'm pretty sure that the rations that German troops received were significantly worse than their British or French counterparts and that some elements of the German army were on the verge of starvation during the spring offensive to the point that they ignored objectives and instead gorged themselves on captured enemy supplies. I could be wrong, but I have read/seen that from more than one source.

The Michael offensives suffered from an enormous rate of attrition once they broke the Entente lines, and tended to slow down rather than accelerate was expected. The brilliant implementation of infiltration tactics by the experienced and well led German forces in 1918 could not overcome their own lack of supply lines (and German supply capacity at this point was pretty meagre, the Home Front was starving and only designated attack formations received anything like a meat ration) and the temptation to actual sit down and eat something.

I think its in Remarque's fictionalised account that one soldier observes "everything is corned beef and brass and rubber" once they hit the British supply dumps. Ludendorff gets a lot of criticism for the way his attacks lost focus after the first breakthrough, and how he kept launching breakthroughs down the line one the initial attacks petered out, but frankly he was dealing with a very brittle army running on empty, not the inspired (if inexperienced) army of 1914 capable of outmarching its supply line, fighting terrible battles and rebounding to hold the line.

Ludendorff did set objectives like rolling up a portion of the line and pushing the British into the sea, but by this stage I think he was relying on breaking the national spirit of the UK by pummelling their armies (it worked in Russia and partially worked on the French at Verdun), rather than scooping up the lot for a super Cannae. Of course I could be wrong, but the various leaders had promised total victory based on certain outcomes ("I will sweep behind Paris and bad the lot" "No I will grind their bones in a triangular trap!" and so on) so Ludendorff probably had to offer those things simply to stay in power.

The failure to secure supply lines across enemy fronts was the fatal point: soldiers could happily forage enemy dumps but this was not a strategic supply option as at some point the British would stop delivering tins of corned beef into German occupied areas. Continuous mass supply meant very few armies could be destroyed in the field or outmanoeuvred: this did happen on the Eastern front where there was more room and lower unit density so actions like the Tannenberg Lakes and the Rumanian campaign were possible.

Germany's failure to keep its right wing supplied in 1914 was a very similar flaw to the one that slowed its advance in 1918: without mass road transport faster than walking pace the attacking army's ability to advance an manoeuvre was crippled.

[KEA]

The Michael offensives suffered from an enormous rate of attrition once they broke the Entente lines, and tended to slow down rather than accelerate was expected.

The slowing down was a direct result of Ludendorff's decision to reinforce the failure in the north instead of strengthening the success in the south. Once the offensive had lost its shock momentum it allowed the Allies to recover and the battle could no longer be won. Here again, the German army was seriously under-supplied but still capable of delivering decisive blows. But in return, there is no reason to assume a better supplied army would had caused a different outcome.

Germany's failure to keep its right wing supplied in 1914 was a very similar flaw to the one that slowed its advance in 1918: without mass road transport faster than walking pace the attacking army's ability to advance an manoeuvre was crippled.

The exact opposite would be correct: because the right wing moved too fast and, if you like, manoeuvered too much in the decisive moment there was a gap between First and Second Army. Also in this battle supply was a problem but not to a degree where it made the difference.

[Cyclops]

The slowing down was a direct result of Ludendorff's decision to reinforce the failure in the north instead of strengthening the success in the south. Once the offensive had lost its shock momentum it allowed the Allies to recover and the battle could no longer be won. Here again, the German army was seriously under-supplied but still capable of delivering decisive blows. But in return, there is no reason to assume a better supplied army would had caused a different outcome.

Fair enough, I guess the Michael offensive had to remove the British army and I think the only army that was destroyed in the field in WWI was the Serbian army (and even then elements escaped through Montenegro). That said Ludendorff really needed to dislodge the British all along the line to crush them against the coast.

Supply to the front exceeded supply past the front so even drastic differences in army quality rarely led to Cannae style annihilations.

The exact opposite would be correct: because the right wing moved too fast and, if you like, manoeuvered too much in the decisive moment there was a gap between First and Second Army...

Quite right, thank you for the correction and I also expressed myself poorly. I meant to say the German right wing in 1914 advanced beyond its ability to supply and reinforce itself so its advance became attenuated and weak. Certainly the gap between the armies seemed fatal and was a factor in the German treat but I'd argue the entente forces facing the advance were initially equally dispersed, and the ability to manoeuvre rapidly using rail was a factor here.

...Also in this battle supply was a problem but not to a degree where it made the difference.

I would say that the Entente forces falling back toward and around Paris fell onto their supply lines as the Germans left theirs, complicated further when they diverted inside Paris and away from the planned routes to the south. While the affair of the Paris taxi cabs is the stuff of legend rather than of tactical importance it does demonstrate the transport resources available to the entente (they held three of the six major lines running into Paris at this point, IIRC the Germans had only just occupied the two leading south from Belgium). So I would say resupply and reinforcement availability seems to have been a factor.

We see a similar importance in East Prussia where command of interior lines including rail lines helped Hindenburg and Ludendorff complete the coup planned by the previous 8th army commander (was it Mackensen? I know he featured later in the East). What's amazing about the initial German advance through Belgium into Picardy is it cuts across a lot of rail lines and relies on road transport, a strongly limiting factor. It was a courageous and unexpected action, obviously a gamble but its frustrating when so much planning gets canned as futile because as a result of enemy action a bloodbath results.

Germany was in a desperate position diplomatically and needed a swift way to win the war. this talk about east first was rejected by the German general staff for very good reasons. Both major campaigns into the heartland of Muscovy and Russia to that point by a western power had failed to bring the Russian army to heel and had usually resulted in the loss of that army. Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon were the outstanding leaders 9of nations at the height of military dominance, and were known for swift brutal conclusions to short wards: the Russians gave them a long war. Had the Germans gone East in 1914 they could have expected to spend years chasing tsarist tail across the steppes, years the French and possibly British would not give them.

By comparison short sharp incursions with definite limited objectives (the Poles in 1610 put their man on the Russian throne with a quick stab, the Swedes in the 17th century grasped a lot of Estonia, Napoleon in 1807 caught and beat Bennigsen at some risk) had tempted the Russians out, and exposed their army to tactical defeats that added up to a decent "war score" to use a gaming analogy. Under Frederick the Great Russian invasions could be endured as they came from further away and moved slower than strikes from deadlier opponents West and South. Its very easy to see why the Germans decided the Russians could be left for another day whereas the French demanded immediate desperate attention.

Yes the French shredded themselves against the German frontiers, but this was unexpected, and a massive war plan cannot be re-written overnight. Had Russia first been the plan I guess more Russian armies would have been bagged but the default Russian strategy of deep defence might have delayed the revolution longer, who knows? The Germans did expect Britain might well stay out, but we know that was highly unlikely: the blunder of alienating Britain and Russia lies at the heart of German failure in WWI and they happed decades earlier. Without the change to Bismarck's brilliant balance of power the most likely war would have been a widely approved German incursion to curb French republicanism, with maybe some colony sharing afterwards.

[KEA]

The problem at the Marne (1914) was that Kluck's (1st Army) task in fact was to offer flank protection against Paris. That was after the Schlieffen Plan was altered insofar that right wing was seriously shortened in order to free additional forces for the East Front. Kluck simply ignored all orders by Moltke to fall back behind Second Army to prevent from a possible sally of Paris' huge garrison. As a 4-star general, he should had released that on his own account without being told to, but he was so driven away by his "wild hunt" of the BEF that he pretended the French forces on his right flank wouldn't exist. Until it was too late. Then he committed the second blunder and, instead of retreating force-marched behind the right wing of the Second Army, pulled his corps out of the front one by one to throw them north-west (the opposite direction where they belong to!) against the new threat. That opened the gap in the front the BEF used to counter-attack and finally break the German offensive.