Invincible Beast - Understanding the Hellenistic Pike Phalanx at War - review

[JaM]

Recently bought this nice book, written by (for some) controversial Christopher Matthews as his second book in series (first one was Storm of Spears: understanding Hoplite phalanx at war)

Must say, Chriss did it again. Book is full with very interesting details nobody has questioned before.. there are plenty of authors that tried to dig into Hellenic Pike Phalanx, but in the end, many authors just contradicted one another.. In this book, Chris explains a lot of (yet) unanswered questions, clears up all controversies, even had performed live tests with multiple people using Phalangite panoply at simulated combat and measuring the ability to hit the target, or measuring amount of fatigue while using the sarissa.. He also makes quite a good point about how such formation could operate, how pike was held most efficiently, how big intervals could be used, and many other details you might heard differently. It is surprising that no other historian ever considered using real live tests with weapons to measure their effectivity and actual ergonomics of their supposed theoretic use.. Yet, even Chris made few mistakes in his work, yet not in area supposedly covered by this book (one of mistakes is assumption of Linothorax being glued together, which was proven to be false, as no glue available back then would be able to resist human sweat, or even rain, instead, its more probable this armor was made of quilted linen, or even by bronze plates covered by linen)

so, to not spoil further, i definitely recommend this book to all interested in topic.

[JaM]

Here are some interesting parts specifically about Roman Legionaries facing Phalanx (Anvil in Action p.391-392):

In order to be in a position to inflict such injuries, when facing a pike-phalanx, legionaries needed to attempt the removal of the sarissa from the combative equation (as they tried to do at Pydna) in order to get closer to their opponent, or to attack from the flanks or into gaps in the opposing formation (as Polybius suggests). Polybius additionally states that one of the advantages of the legionary was that he was also effective when fighting as an individual.76 Africanus, on the other hand, states that no Roman soldier fights on his own.(Afric. Cest. 7.1.68-70) While this initially seems contradictory to the statement made by Polybius, both claims can be reconciled in the ability of the Roman legionary, in close-quarters combat, to fight somewhat singularly while, at the same time, still being part of a unit.

Additionally if, due to the variables of combat, the opposing Roman and Macedonian formations aligned so that each legionary was directly opposite each alternate file of the pike-phalanx (in effect only facing five sarissae rather than ten) this still poses little problem to the legionaries, but could cause considerable trouble for the phalanx. Even though every second file of the pike-phalanx in this scenario would not have an opponent standing directly in front of it, these unopposed files could not continue to advance lest they move forward, between the legionaries, and into a position where they could be attacked at close quarters from the sides with little chance of retaliation, and while compromising the integrity of the phalanx as a whole at the same time. Thus every second file of the phalanx is essentially nullified by the Roman open-order without having to actually engage it. The Macedonian phalanx, on the other hand, could not adopt a similar open-order deployment so that each file of phalangites faced a single file of legionaries as this would create avenues in the lines which the more mobile Romans would have been able to exploit. Thus, no matter how the enemy was deployed, the security and integrity of the pike-phalanx lay in the adoption and maintenance of an intermediate-order spacing.

Consequently, by having the Romans fight in an open order which the pike-phalanx was not able to exploit, fewer Romans were placed in a position where they could potentially be killed by pike thrusts delivered by the front rank of the phalanx. This, in turn, meant that Roman formations could be wider, and have more men placed in reserve (just as Polybius advises) as they were not needed to hold the phalanx in place. Furthermore, by standing further apart, the Roman legionaries also had enough room to use their shield to parry or deflect the pikes they were facing into the vacant gaps between their files. This could also provide many of them with the opportunity to move inside the reach of the front rank weapons and then, using the same procedure, move further ahead to where they could attack the phalangites from a close distance – again, with little chance of retaliation. It is unlikely that the Romans adopted such an open formation when engaging against other more mobile opponents like Gauls or Germans, and Polybius’ reference to the open order of their deployment in his comparison to the Macedonian style of fighting must be something specifically undertaken by the Romans in order to negate many of the advantages of the pike-phalanx.

Another advantage that both Polybius and Africanus fail to comment on is that the Roman legionary also carried several javelins. Polybius himself, in an earlier section of his work, outlines how the members of the Roman infantry carried a light and heavy missile weapon (the pilum) some 3 cubits (144cm) in length.78 Livy, who does mention the pilum in his comparison of the Roman and Macedonian fighting styles, claims that the javelin was ‘a much more effective weapon than the spear’.(Livy 9.19) As two opposing sides closed with one another, volleys of javelins would be launched from the Roman lines. The room required to cast such missiles also partially accounts for the openness of the Roman order of battle as described by Polybius. These missiles would slay many members of the opposing front ranks of an enemy formation like a pike-phalanx and, as the phalanx continued to advance over the bodies of their fallen comrades, the phalanx would begin to break apart just prior to any closer contact.
Such weapons would have dire consequences for an advancing pike-phalanx. Polybius states that the rear ranks of the phalanx held their pikes at an angle over the heads of the men in front to protect them from incoming missile fire.80 However, this would only work against missiles such as arrows, fired on a high curving trajectory from a large distance, which would rain down and then become entangled in the angled pikes. Javelins, on the other hand, were cast at a much shorter range and on a much flatter trajectory. Consequently, the front ranks of the pike-phalanx were only protected by their shields and armour and, due to the weight of the sarissa which they were carrying in both hands, could not quickly or easily raise a shield to receive or deflect an incomingpilum. This meant that the front ranks of an advancing phalanx were particularly vulnerable to the main Roman missile weapon.

Many years after Polybius, Julius Caesar would comment on the effectiveness of the Roman javelin by stating that ‘…several of [the enemy’s] shields could be pierced and pinned together by a single pilum…’( Caesar. BG 1.25) If this was as true in the Hellenistic Age as it was in 58BC when Caesar wrote this passage, then the members of the front rank of an advancing pike-phalanx, unable to deflect an incoming missile with their shield due to the other elements of their panoply, would have been considerably susceptible to injury or death from the opening volleys of Roman javelins. The removal of many of the front rank of the phalanx (where all of its experienced officers were positioned), and the partial disruption of the line caused by volleys of javelins, would have therefore ‘softened’ the phalanx and aided the Roman legion engaging with it. However, due to the depth of the phalanx, these volleys of missiles would not break the formation or destroy it completely and, by the time the javelins had found their mark, a hand-to-hand encounter between phalanx and legion was all but inevitable.

This could technically mean that at Pydna, Legionaries facing Phalanx fought it in open order, slowly withdrawing backwards, while attacking the phalanx with their javelins one by one trying to create some gaps.. Together with variable pressure on Macedonian line, where some parts would withdraw further and some Maniples would pin them down, this would eventually lead to gaps being opened in Macedonian line, which could be then exploited by Roman reserves - plus, Roman Legionaries at Pydna were men experienced with small unit combat used against Iberian tribes, therefore capable operating in small groups which when following forward into those gaps on own initiative of their Centurions, would eventually create the havoc in Macedonian lines..