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Thread: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

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    Default Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Hi,

    recently I complemented my library with Rafał Radziwonka's Ramilles 1706, which I can truly recommend You (of course if You know Polish ) and started to wonder about one issue - the use of cavalry in this battle.



    The thing is, that I was always thinking that the beginning of 17th century was a time of "retreat" of cavalry, because of growing advantage of infantry fire. Well even if we look 50 years earlier (here experience from recently read Peter Englund's books - again truly recommend them ) we can see how Polish-Lithuanian army couldn't handle Swedish infantry formations.
    A good example here is a battle of Wojnicz 1655, where Polish cavalry masses simply frontally charged Swedish lines, what ended in disaster. Furthermore the last major cavalry victories achieved by PLCs armies took place in 1605 in Kircholm and Kłuszyn in 1610 and since that days cavalry slowly started to lose it’s superiority.
    The renaissance of cavalry took place during Napoleon’s times, but still except few exceptions like Prussian Iława (extreme weather conditions) or Waterlo (disaster for cavalry) cavalry didn’t fight as standalone units and always cooperated with infantry.

    Now let’s go back to the main topic – Ramilles and have a look on the map:


    Between Ramilles and Traviers Villeroi placed 82 squadrons of cavalry and only 3 brigades of infantry! And how much cavalry did Overkirk on the opposite had? 86! And after Radziwonka’s calculations we can see that there was 33 thousand cavalry out of 122 thousand soldiers in total, what gives us 27 %!

    So my question is clear here. How did cavalry fight in 17th century? Because from what I understand and remember from the book (read about a month ago) these cavalry forces simply charged against each other without almost any cooperation with infantry. Why did the commanders place so much cavalry in one place? If the opposite side would play defensive and formed squares or some other defensive formations they would be totally useless!
    How did the cooperation with infantry look like? Or did it even existed?

    PS: I know that this battle is very similar to it’s predecessor – Blenheim-Hochstadt, where Marsin also massed a big cavalry forces in one place, but he wanted to charge against disorganized infantry during river crossing. So the opposite of Ramilles situation where we have an open field!

    PS2: BTW.
    If there are any Poles I encourage You to my other topic about Blenheim on Polish TW forum here, where I put some doubts in Marlborough’s “brilliant” Blenheim battle plan (too risky, ended well because of Marsin’s faliour) and as I have mentioned check these two great books by Radziwonka about Spanish Succesion War:
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 





    Cheers

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    ...
    The renaissance of cavalry took place during Napoleon’s times, but still except few exceptions like Prussian Iława (extreme weather conditions) or Waterlo (disaster for cavalry) cavalry didn’t fight as standalone units and always cooperated with infantry...
    Certainly in Napoleon's time the three arms (l'arme blanche, that is the cavalry: the infantry: and the artillery) achieved a rare balance of importance and it took a genius to make best use of all three in harmony. You're quite right no arm could stand alone, although infantry probably had the best chance: there are of course bizarre exceptions such as unsupported French horse artillery mowing down Russian infantry (ordered to stand their ground to prevent a cavalry flank manoeuvre- they weren't stupid, they were amazingly brave) at Friedland, or the surrender in the 1813 campaign of an entire Prussian regiment to polish Uhlans (the infantry had their powder wet by a sudden downpour, and were unable to fire: their bayonets were shorter than the lances, so surrender seems the best option).

    I would observe that earlier in the 18th century in the period of the Silesian wars that cavalry began to return to importance on the battlefield it had not seen since the 16th century. Frederick the Great in particular promoted a brilliant mixture of light and medium cavalry to augment the excellent infantry he inherited.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    ... So my question is clear here. How did cavalry fight in 17th century? Because from what I understand and remember from the book (read about a month ago) these cavalry forces simply charged against each other without almost any cooperation with infantry...
    IIRC both cavalry components had a high proportion (50%?) of dragoons, but of course by this period dragoons functioned as (cheap? English dragoons were paid less than other types) medium battlefield cavalry rather than mounted infantry. Certainly cavalry actions occurred but I think medium/heavy cavalry also had a role to charge disorganised infantry and unprotected artillery.Guns were expensive and in the early 18th century not numerous on the battlefield (there were about 200 guns between the two armies at Fontenoy, mostly light, Napoleon had 50 more than that at Waterloo).

    There is a sense in which 17th/18th century warfare sees the cavalry gallop about on the flanks while the infantry sort the battle out, but the cavalry had battlefield and grand tactical/strategic roles as well. At Fontenoy the superb French cavalry, having cleared the allies from the field, undertook repeated pinning attacks on the Allied infantry square which made little impression (as the infantry were unshaken-a bit like the British squares at Waterloo) but this gave the French infantry time to reform, and the artillery time to re-site so the British could be driven from the field (unlike Waterloo, where Napoleon could not get his guns and infantry forward up the muddy slopes between the impediments of Hougemont Papellote and La Haye Sainte).

    Outside the battle cavalry served to rapidly occupy positions and detect the enemy. once again this role was perfected in Napoleonic times, but we see cavalry dashing madly about in campaigns from Turenne's superb campaign on the Rhine to Saxe's defence of Northern France in the year before Fontenoy. While formed and unshaken infantry was practically impenetrable to cavalry the presence of enemy horse did require infantry to form up, breaking them out of march column and slowing their advance.

    Cavalry might be a light screen, but it was an impediment nevertheless and could restrict the ability of the enemy to scout positions. IIRC there's a battle near Prague in the first Silesian war where Prussian light cavalry detected the advancing Austrians in time to prevent a defeat in detail, and Prussian cuirassiers played a moderately important role on one flank in the following battle although the brilliant Austrian cavalry had successes too and the battle was ultimately won by stubborn Prussian infantry advances and fire.

    On the matter of cavalry proportions, I think in some of Turenne's campaigns (1640's-1650's?) the proportions (admittedly for small forces, say 20K) were as high as 50% cavalry, but I may be wrong.
    Jatte lambastes Calico Rat

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Thanks for Your answer

    Still from what I see You also seem to recognize cavalry as mainly a supporting formation for the infantry with exceptional example of it’s individual use.
    The problem is that in this battle both sides seem to understand cavalry as a standalone formation! Was it a common thinking in that time or an extraordinary one? Was the understanding of cavalry as a big, massed fist common in the period?
    Well of course we see examples of standalone cavalry charges with some success, but they are really rear or were performed by Polish winged hussars, who are for me an acceptable example especially when we compare their ordnance.
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 




    No doubts winged hussars has bigger chances of breaking the enemy lines.
    A good example here is a battle of Kliszów in 1702 where Saxon cavalry under Flemming couldn’t break through Swedish infantry, while the hussars in the same battle managed to break some of them.
    But still even this heavy knights of the era simply needed some support and if not infantry, than the light cavalry. Polish cavalry tactics were mainly focused on multiple cavalry charges combined with light cavalry skirmish support and close combat assistance. In fact I even read that the hussars had formations similar to Rome’s maniple’s:



    Where they provided spaces between the units to make sure they can easily reinforce or reorganize.
    So even the heaviest cavalry of it’s times, who gained the biggest fame of the period did not fight alone!
    How does it look in compare to Ramillies big standalone cavalry masses?

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Thanks for Your answer
    You are welcome. I hope it makes sense, I come from a history background and am merely an amateur when it comes to military history.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Still from what I see You also seem to recognize cavalry as mainly a supporting formation for the infantry with exceptional example of it’s individual use.
    The problem is that in this battle both sides seem to understand cavalry as a standalone formation! Was it a common thinking in that time or an extraordinary one? Was the understanding of cavalry as a big, massed fist common in the period?
    You are quite correct, in this period cavalry stood to support the infantry actions that largely determined the outcome of battles. they still played a role clearing the enemy cavalry from the field (if possible), and could be deadly against disorder or retreating infantry, or unprotected artillery.

    There are a couple of relevant points here. First the units on the battlefield do not occupy the space occupied by the symbols on the map, the cavalry were likely sprinkled in small troops across the areas I question, and the infantry definitely had vedettes, "skirmishers" (although at this time there was no formal skirmish doctrine as such, but there would certainly have been sentries etc.). Even taking this into consideration we see only half the cavalry on each side is concentrated, the rest sits behind the infantry in support, I suppose to counter charge a breakthrough by the enemy or follow up a friendly breakthrough.

    Secondly the separate formations typically did not intermingle but rather stood separated, and pains were taken to keep units separate from one another. A battalion if it crossed paths with another friendly battalion or a cavalry squadron would very likely become confused and lose its ability to take orders from its commanders: it might fight or run away in a mass but it was unlikely to be able to perform complex military evolution until it was reformed.

    Given the increasing importance of fire in this period its likely the cavalry was kept separate so it would not charge into the beaten zone of friendly units. Friendly fire was a difficult problem in the period: Napoleon overcame it by having his divisional squares form as diamonds at Jena, so no French firing line faced another.

    You'll note the cavalry concentrations face one another across the only open portion of the field: the terrain is dictating where the cavalry forms up and can be meaningfully used: there is still cavalry reserves in packets behind the infantry.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    But still even this heavy knights of the era simply needed some support and if not infantry, than the light cavalry. Polish cavalry tactics were mainly focused on multiple cavalry charges combined with light cavalry skirmish support and close combat assistance. In fact I even read that the hussars had formations similar to Rome’s maniple’s:

    Where they provided spaces between the units to make sure they can easily reinforce or reorganize.
    So even the heaviest cavalry of it’s times, who gained the biggest fame of the period did not fight alone!
    How does it look in compare to Ramillies big standalone cavalry masses?
    Indeed although the cavalry positions of both armies here have flanking forces of infantry as well as some artillery to support them: both sides have apparently agreed there will be a cavalry action in the open portion of the field (or at least the Anglo-Austrians have dictated this by their approach from that quarter, and the French have had to respond), and the stream, woods, and buildings are to be contested by the infantry (as the ground is unsuitable for cavalry to attack). Neither side exposes their infantry to a clear line of approach so the Anglo-Austrians have their work cut out for them: they prove up to the task as we know.

    You are quite right about effect use of combined arms being increasingly important : we see this with Frederick the great, the Marechal de Saxe and above all Napoleon (whose army could be made ot perform military magic). I recall an endgame cavalry tactic attributed to Frederick where he would send a column of heavy cav followed by the line of light cavalry against an enemy infantry line (hopefully exhausted and shaken after a long battle): if the heavy charge failed the force could retire behind the screen of lights and reform for another effort, but if the heavies punched through then the lights could sabre the broken infantry to pieces. This tactic reminds me of the combination you mention regarding the hussars.
    Jatte lambastes Calico Rat

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    You are welcome. I hope it makes sense, I come from a history background and am merely an amateur when it comes to military history.
    It’s always nice to run a constructive conversation
    Personally I always wanted to study history, but ended in electrical engineering, so I would rather consider myself as a lost journeyman occasionally wandering around the vast fields of history.
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    A battalion if it crossed paths with another friendly battalion or a cavalry squadron would very likely become confused and lose its ability to take orders from its commanders
    Sure thing. This is also why deploying an army took often several hours. In fact during both Blenheim and Ramilles the French were surprised by the allies and had to quickly deploy their troops, what partly explains why they had some inadequacies in deployment, besides the fact that generally they made quite a decent job here.
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Friendly fire was a difficult problem in the period: Napoleon overcame it by having his divisional squares form as diamonds at Jena, so no French firing line faced another.
    Could You elaborate this part, especially with an emphasis of influence of divisional squares on friendly fire?
    From what I know Napoleon introduced a divisional system to the military, where the main assumption was, that it consisted of all three types of arms and counted around 20-30 thousand man, what gave a big self-sufficiency for this unit.
    And the only thing about the diamonds that I remember is that Napoleon’s corpses often marched in a system, where Napoleon was in the centre and rest of the corpses around him.
    So I generally associate these terms with more strategical understanding.
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    both sides have apparently agreed there will be a cavalry action in the open portion of the field (or at least the Anglo-Austrians have dictated this by their approach from that quarter, and the French have had to respond)
    And this is where my answer is I guess.

    But what’s interesting, I made some research on Wikipedia about Blenheim and found out, that the centre of the allied forces also consisted in a large number of cavalry. Only here, we have slightly different situation from Ramilles, because on the opposite side Tallard massed a big cavalry fist to repulse the allies, who should be disorganised after crossing the river (what reminds me about Wagram, where Austrians also wanted to let some French units to cross the river and then crush them on the shore and emperor Franz Joseph wrote to archduke Charles “good plan, just don’t let too many of them to cross the river”… well it seems he did ).
    The centre, commanded by the Duke's brother, General Charles Churchill, consisted of 18 battalions of infantry arranged in two lines: seven battalions in the front line to secure a foothold across the Nebel, and 11 battalions in the rear providing cover from the Allied side of the stream. Between the infantry were placed two lines, 72 squadrons of cavalry.
    Well, this is where I put some doubts in Marlborough’s “brilliant” maneuver, because if the main Tallard forces would simply defend the river, just like Marsin and Bavarians on the left wing the battle would ended in a stalemate. Second of all, after crossing the river Marlborough advanced with success because of Clérambault’s incompetence, who massed 14 000 man in Blenheim and didn’t send them to fight, what would threaten Marlborough’s flank. And last it was Tallard’s mistake to put so small forces in his centre, where his and Bavarian forces were sticking.
    So we see here an allied attack, without anything extraordinary with it and French failures. More luck, than genius for Marlborough. What won’t change the fact, that he was a great general of course.

    And by the way, the next quote from wiki shows us how these units would cooperate:
    This line would then form and cover the passage of the horse, leaving gaps in the line of infantry large enough for the cavalry to pass through and take their position in front.
    So infantry is responsible first for beginning advance and then seond as a cover for cavalry, who could strike from the behind of it and if defeated, to withdraw behind them.

    And when it comes to the final strike:
    By 16:00, with the enemy troops besieged in Blenheim and Oberglau, the Allied centre of 81 squadrons (nine squadrons had been transferred from Cutts' column), supported by 18 battalions was firmly planted amidst the French line of 64 squadrons and nine battalions of raw recruits.
    We have again cavalry used as a main force for a frontal attack and infantry responsible more for cover, rather than it’s own actions.
    The question is did they both place cavalry because they had no more infantry to deploy or was it a specially chosen tactic? How would for example a line of British infantry handle with an advance on French line of cavalry?
    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops”
    a column of heavy cav followed by the line of light cavalry against an enemy infantry line
    Something interesting I found about Kircholm battle in 1605. Chodkiewicz divided his forces into three lines.
    First include entrenched infantry with heavy and light cavalry filling the gaps between them.
    Second with both heavy, reiters and light cav.
    Finally the third one… With only heavy cavalry!

    I definitely have to examine this battle slightly more!
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 



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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    It’s always nice to run a constructive conversation
    Personally I always wanted to study history, but ended in electrical engineering, so I would rather consider myself as a lost journeyman occasionally wandering around the vast fields of history.
    Well its nice to discuss these things but I hope others will contribute input as I come here to learn, and I'm very happy to have my errors corrected.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Sure thing. This is also why deploying an army took often several hours. In fact during both Blenheim and Ramilles the French were surprised by the allies and had to quickly deploy their troops, what partly explains why they had some inadequacies in deployment, besides the fact that generally they made quite a decent job here.
    I think the French position was well chosen, but the Allies by attacking with a degree of surprise dictated the direction and timing of the battle.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Could You elaborate this part, especially with an emphasis of influence of divisional squares on friendly fire?
    In Egypt the French forces had adopted an enormous square formation in the face of the vast Mameluke army. The square proved almost invulnerable but IIRC there was a smaller square detached from the larger one that had to be removed a distance so it was out of the field of fire of the large square, that is volleys from the line of infantry wouldn't whizz past the Mameluke cavalry and hit the French line opposite it. In fact the smaller square was penetrated by Mamelukes and practically annihilated: as individuals the Mamelukes carved their French opponents apart when fighting broke down into a disorganised melee, and the small square was too far from the large one to be rescued or helped in any way.

    In 1806 the French were going up against the Prussian army: they'd had a small win at Valmy in an artillery duel 14 years before but they hadn't cracked the famous Prussian infantry or destroyed the Prussian cavalry, seen as the finest and deadliest in Europe at that time. One tactic Napoleon decided on was to form infantry squares to resist the Prussian cav but rotated 45' so the infantry squares could be closer together without the fear of friendly fire. I will try to draw a diagram, here goes:

    [ ] [ ] If you have two squares side by side, both have one side facing the next square, so if they deliver a volley they may hit the other square

    /\ /\
    \/ \/ This is a sorry arse attempt at two diamonds, you my note their fields of fire are less likely to fire directly into the other square. So the infantry can form square to resist cavalry without diminishing their fire potential, and remain close to allow them to rapidly redeploy to resist an infantry attack.

    Of course both square and diamond had artillery posted at the corners (the crews could retire into the square if attacked)

    Napoleon had little need for the tactic at Jena, he was only facing the Prussian vanguard: he aggressively struck out at the flanks and (after a little trouble on Ney's flank) ate the Prussian force whole.

    At Auerstadt though Davout was facing the main body of Prussians who outnumbered him more than 2 to 1. He positioned his infantry divisions in diamond (ie squares tilted on their edge) and tore the Prussian cavalry assaults to shreds as they came on. The Prussians seemed to have been in a hurry and saw they faced only a fraction of Napoleon's army so they attacked as they arrived on the filed, allowing Davout's forces to defeat them in detail. His infantry were able to redeploy to met infantry attacks and then move to attack themselves. Davout had defeated two thirds of the best army in Europe with one corps before lunchtime.

    It was the finest of Napoleon's battles, it didn't cause a thunderclap like Austerlitz (where he threw back two emperor's best armies) but in terms of perfect outcomes it was his best. He made the Prussians evaporate: after the event there's a lot of analysis that the Prussian forces all had old commanders thinking they were still fighting for Frederick the Great and the infantry lacked tactical flexibility, but at the time it was an even battle between the French upstarts and the proven European champions.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    From what I know Napoleon introduced a divisional system to the military, where the main assumption was, that it consisted of all three types of arms and counted around 20-30 thousand man, what gave a big self-sufficiency for this unit.
    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    And the only thing about the diamonds that I remember is that Napoleon’s corpses often marched in a system, where Napoleon was in the centre and rest of the corpses around him.
    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    So I generally associate these terms with more strategical understanding.
    The French introduced divisional organisation in the middle of the 18th century, I have a vague memory that the Marechal de Saxe came up with the idea. The basic idea was to give a group of infantry regiments a dedicated artillery component so they could operate as a mini army on and off the battlefield. The corps system was developed in the revolutionary wars with bundled together infantry (and the more recently invented cavalry divisions plus more attached artillery) so a cluster of divisions under a corps commander (and the French had a bunch of brilliant corps commanders) was a small army, capable of conducting all arms operations.

    IIRC Napoleon removed a lot of the divisional artillery and placed it under the corps commanders or in the Reserve Artillery, a massed battery capable of awful battlefield carnage (as at Wagram). Most armies kept divisional and even regimental artillery as it gave infantry better moral to have a few guns beside them. In the Waterloo campaign I think Napoleon had to distribute a lot of his guns back to the divisional level because French moral in1815 was quite shaky.

    Under Napoleon huge units were capable of integrated and at time fluid operations. The assault of the Middle Guard (whose failure cost him the battle) in the last hour of Waterloo was a column of division, basically the two Middle Guard divisions marching as units.

    At Eylau Murat actually led a charge of an entire corps in column, the most awesome cavalry charge in history some say (it was 11,000 men launched in a huge body) fitting talking place in Poland where smashing charges were so often launched.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    And this is where my answer is I guess.
    I hope I have this correct.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    But what’s interesting, I made some research on Wikipedia about Blenheim and found out, that the centre of the allied forces also consisted in a large number of cavalry. Only here, we have slightly different situation from Ramilles, because on the opposite side Tallard massed a big cavalry fist to repulse the allies, who should be disorganised after crossing the river (what reminds me about Wagram, where Austrians also wanted to let some French units to cross the river and then crush them on the shore and emperor Franz Joseph wrote to archduke Charles “good plan, just don’t let too many of them to cross the river”… well it seems he did ).
    The sheer discipline of the French to hold their position under fire of the crescent of Austrian forces at Wagram was extraordinary. The actions of Davout, the French artillery massed toward the centre and the final assault (I forget who conducted it) required steely discipline and perfectly timed initiative.



    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Well, this is where I put some doubts in Marlborough’s “brilliant” maneuver, because if the main Tallard forces would simply defend the river, just like Marsin and Bavarians on the left wing the battle would ended in a stalemate. Second of all, after crossing the river Marlborough advanced with success because of Clérambault’s incompetence, who massed 14 000 man in Blenheim and didn’t send them to fight, what would threaten Marlborough’s flank. And last it was Tallard’s mistake to put so small forces in his centre, where his and Bavarian forces were sticking.
    So we see here an allied attack, without anything extraordinary with it and French failures. More luck, than genius for Marlborough. What won’t change the fact, that he was a great general of course.
    Greta generals maker use of their luck. he had a competent ally on his side, I think the French opposition were generally good rather than great. Remember of course Clausewitz's observation that it is quite an effort to be even mediocre in warfare.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    And by the way, the next quote from wiki shows us how these units would cooperate:

    So infantry is responsible first for beginning advance and then seond as a cover for cavalry, who could strike from the behind of it and if defeated, to withdraw behind them.

    And when it comes to the final strike:

    We have again cavalry used as a main force for a frontal attack and infantry responsible more for cover, rather than it’s own actions.
    The question is did they both place cavalry because they had no more infantry to deploy or was it a specially chosen tactic? How would for example a line of British infantry handle with an advance on French line of cavalry?
    AFAIK Infantry against cavalry would advance in close order line with bayonets fixed. I'm sure there are examples of other tactics, eg fire and advance\,and I know at Waterloo the English skirmishers if caught in the open sometimes lay prone when the cavalry advanced, as horses tend not to step on people deliberately and the skirmisher was out of range of the sabres of the French cavalry. This tactic would be less useful against lancers of course: Napoleon's lancers (including the famous Polish Uhlans) were rightly feared by cavalry and infantry alike.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    Something interesting I found about Kircholm battle in 1605.
    Polska, Bialoczerwomi!

    Not that I'm Polish, but some of the actions of the Commonwealth and Polish forces have been extraordinary.
    Jatte lambastes Calico Rat

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Well its nice to discuss these things but I hope others will contribute input as I come here to learn, and I'm very happy to have my errors corrected.
    Yeah, I also expected slightly wider response in this discussion or at least a bigger crowd in history section is something I remember from my “old TWC days” few years ago. Although with over five hundredth views it seems that the topic caught some attention, there’s just only more people who’d like to learn something, than this would like to participate and have ability to share their knowledge, what would be a great thing here, especially that my knowledge allows me to take part in discussion and share some opinions, but definitely not to conduct deep polemics :/
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    [ ] [ ] If you have two squares side by side, both have one side facing the next square, so if they deliver a volley they may hit the other square


    /\ /\
    \/ \/ This is a sorry arse attempt at two diamonds, you my note their fields of fire are less likely to fire directly into the other square. So the infantry can form square to resist cavalry without diminishing their fire potential, and remain close to allow them to rapidly redeploy to resist an infantry attack.
    Outstanding work friend!
    Thanks for info, very helpful and valuable piece of informations here!


    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    It was the finest of Napoleon's battles
    Not so sure to call them that way. Auerstadt was an outstanding Davout’s victory (despite the fact Napoleon saw this battle as a flank fights of Jena), but from what I remember Jena was a very chaotic fight. It’s hard to count it among his finest battles, when compared to such brilliant masterpieces as Austerlitz, Friedland, Wagram, "Ulm manovers" 1814 France campaign or Marengo, just to count few of them, where he show his pure genius in action
    But his Prussian campaign and these battles are one of the few, I have only general knowledge based on some wider elaborations without in-depth analysis. So still this one awaits for me :
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 



    But of course in terms of results... Jena and Auerstadt were truelly almost incomparable

    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    IIRC Napoleon removed a lot of the divisional artillery and placed it under the corps commanders or in the Reserve Artillery
    From what I remember from Peter Englund’s Years of War the well known fact, that Gustavus Adolphus deployed his famous leather cannons around his close combat regiments is true, but the Author noticed, that with the time he started to partly withdraw from this idea and begun to mass artillery in bigger, standalone batteries.
    So one big artillery battery obviously gives much bigger advantage, than more dispersed system, especially during the assaults. Experiences of first world war also show, that the commanders started to mass all artillery together, to prepare a solid barrage.
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    because French moral in 1815 was quite shaky.
    Hmm, I’m not sure. Despite the fact that Napoleon had plenty of fresh soldiers I read that he managed to inspire them enough to have confidence they won’t fail. Besides Waterloo campaign from the beginning was prepared as a fast offensive, with a strong focus on quick battle allowing to annihilate the allies. Together with Napoleon’s doctrine of artillery usage and advantages of transportation one massed battery I guess he didn’t change his approach here.
    If I’d have to choose somebody who did it I would pick Wellington, who preferred more defensive doctrines and had plenty of uncertain soldiers.
    But again these are only my guesses here
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Under Napoleon huge units were capable of integrated and at time fluid operations.
    It seems I found quiet an interesting side about his formations:
    http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napole..._tactics_4.htm
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Greta generals maker use of their luck. he had a competent ally on his side, I think the French opposition were generally good rather than great.
    Full agreement here!
    I just think that Ramilles is a good example of battle, where Marlborough managed to deceive the enemy and totally surprise him with his strike. In Blenheim the responsibility for the result goes totally to French, who decided to take some risk and allowed Marlborough to take the initiative in purpose to catch him in a trap. Unfortunately the trap was unsolid and collapsed under it’s own inadequacies.
    A solid defence, like on Bavarian left wing would result in a stalemate no matter how Marlborough would try to push the French. Just like in his 1705 campaign.
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Not that I'm Polish, but some of the actions of the Commonwealth and Polish forces have been extraordinary.
    Well, in terms of mounted arms this would be absolutely unfait not to mention The ANZAC Mounted Division from WW1
    Last edited by Salvo; July 10, 2016 at 10:17 AM.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    ...[re: French morale in 1815]
    Hmm, I’m not sure. Despite the fact that Napoleon had plenty of fresh soldiers I read that he managed to inspire them enough to have confidence they won’t fail. Besides Waterloo campaign from the beginning was prepared as a fast offensive, with a strong focus on quick battle allowing to annihilate the allies. Together with Napoleon’s doctrine of artillery usage and advantages of transportation one massed battery I guess he didn’t change his approach here.
    If I’d have to choose somebody who did it I would pick Wellington, who preferred more defensive doctrines and had plenty of uncertain soldiers.
    But again these are only my guesses here
    ...
    At Waterloo elements of the reserve artillery abandoned their guns under the pressure of Uxbridge's charge and did not return to the field: their pieces had to be manned by elements of the Middle Guard. in their turn the Middle Guard broke in the final assault on Wellington's reverse slope positions.

    No part of the Guard Infantry had ever broken before in any of Napoleon's battles. While a lot was asked of them in the final assault the fact they did not even make contact with the allied line speaks volumes about diminished morale.

    While French gunners had been driven from the their guns in previous battles for them to flee the battle altogether was unprecedented also: Allied gunners who were driven from the their pieces by French cavalry returned to their guns once the cavalry fell back as was expected.

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    ...Well, in terms of mounted arms this would be absolutely unfait not to mention The ANZAC Mounted Division from WW1
    That's a very kind comment. Interestingly the Australian forces in WWI were in fact British formations. While "our" units were given national designations the equipment (aside from emu feathers), training, doctrine and a lot of the officer corps was British standard issue. Our political leaders made sure the Australian units received extra training (they were able to insist on this because Australia contributed so much money to the war effort: I think our Canadian friends cut a similar deal) and got to take part in important operations.

    Australians have shown bravery in battle but we are not a warlike people and we have not had to strive with hostile neighbours just to keep our country alive. We have a few soldier heroes (there was a man called Jacka in WWI who won a VC for killing 7 opponents (five shot and two bayonetted) to save four injured mates) but Polish warriors of renown seem to be common.

    Speaking of Waterloo there was the Polish (although the English sources call him French, a silly error as the Cheveau-Leger of the Imperial Guard were formed from the Polish lancer units) lancer who captured an English general in Uxbridge's charge, and when the man (having surrendered ) called three Scot's Greys to rescue him the Pole slew the general and then all three Scots with his lance. Those lancers were feared and respected by their foes, true heirs to the Polish hussaria tradition.
    Jatte lambastes Calico Rat

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    No part of the Guard Infantry had ever broken before in any of Napoleon's battles.
    Agree, but lets face the fact, that their use in previous battles was completely different. They were meant to be a decisive striking force that launched a final strike, when enemy run out of reserves and was already bonded with other French units throughout the battlefield. In Waterloo they were send as a desperate last chance striking force into well prepared and defended allied positions with enormous numbers of artillery (there are rumours that one of the French generals deserted and told Wellington the exact Napoleon’s plan about the guard use, so he could prepare his trap). Their use would have much better results if Napoleon would agree to Ney, who asked for them after the capture of La Haye Sainte, many historians (fe. Chandler) claim that he would definitely win the day if he would send even half of the guard, because Wellington’s centre was very close to collapse and many broken Hanoverian hussars fled to Brussels claiming that the battle is already lost. Napoleon didn’t do it because he wanted Wellington to use his last reserves first. Napoleon’s doctrine was always to say the last word.
    And of course, as You have rightly said – out of the Middle and Old guard only he first were in combat by it’s all force, while some of Old Guards didn’t take part in the assault, let’s remember that after the strike’s failure they protected the retreat of French troops, didn’t flee from the battlefield. So there’s nothing wrong with their morale in compare to the other battles, they just didn’t want to act a suicide mission
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    While French gunners had been driven from the their guns in previous battles for them to flee the battle altogether was unprecedented
    But of course maybe I’m wrong here, because it’s hard to fight with this charge
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    That's a very kind comment.
    Well, I remember them from old Young Indiana Jones series, where one instalment was dedicated to them. And also recently The Great War channel on YouTube reminded me about them. There’s mainly only brief info about the war, but still the series is very good to watch
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    Those lancers were feared and respected by their foes, true heirs to the Polish hussaria tradition.
    Thanks But the most famous act of Polish mounted arms in Napoleon’s campaigns is for us The Battle of Somosierra, where 125 Polish Chevaux-Légers captured fortified Spanish positions passage through the Sierra de Guadarrama shielding

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    I got limited knowledge of the tactics used in the Spanish war of Succession but in the Great Northern War I know that it was at least somewhat like rock, paper and scissors.
    • Infantry in close formation was almost impervious to cavalry charges but vulnerable to artillery.
    • Cavalry was deadly to unorganized infantry but unable to break close infantry formations.
    • Artillery was very deadly against infantry in close formation.


    If we look at the Swedish cavalry it was mainly deployed on the flanks to shield the advance of the infantry and defeat enemy cavalry. This allowed the infantry to attack in the centre without becoming disrupted by enemy cavalry. As 1/3 of the Swedish infantry carried pikes it was very important that the infantry could advance quickly and charge the enemy where the Swedish emphasis on hand to hand combat gave them an advantage even when outnumbered. If the Swedish cavalry was beaten then the infantry advance would most likely stall as they were forced to deal with enemy cavalry attacking their flanks, this stall would then give enemy infantry and artillery the time necessary to destroy the Swedish infantry from a distance. So from a Swedish perspective cavalry was mainly valuable on the flanks while the infantry fought in the centre.

    On an international level I imagine that cavalry and skirmishers could serve a similar role. Loosing the battle on the flanks would force the army to divert resources to defend the flanks and thereby weaken the centre. This could then give the enemy the opportunity to either break the weakened centre through a charge or through a prolonged firefight as the army losing the flank battles is forced to divert firepower to the flanks.
    Last edited by Adar; July 13, 2016 at 11:12 AM.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Adar View Post
    I got limited knowledge of the tactics used in the Spanish war of Succession but in the Great Northern War I know that it was at least somewhat like rock, paper and scissors.
    • Infantry in close formation was almost impervious to cavalry charges but vulnerable to artillery.
    • Cavalry was deadly to unorganized infantry but unable to break close infantry formations.
    • Artillery was very deadly against infantry in close formation.


    If we look at the Swedish cavalry it was mainly deployed on the flanks to shield the advance of the infantry and defeat enemy cavalry. This allowed the infantry to attack in the centre without becoming disrupted by enemy cavalry. As 1/3 of the Swedish infantry carried pikes it was very important that the infantry could advance quickly and charge the enemy where the Swedish emphasis on hand to hand combat gave them an advantage even when outnumbered. If the Swedish cavalry was beaten then the infantry advance would most likely stall as they were forced to deal with enemy cavalry attacking their flanks, this stall would then give enemy infantry and artillery the time necessary to destroy the Swedish infantry from a distance. So from a Swedish perspective cavalry was mainly valuable on the flanks while the infantry fought in the centre.

    On an international level I imagine that cavalry and skirmishers could serve a similar role. Loosing the battle on the flanks would force the army to divert resources to defend the flanks and thereby weaken the centre. This could then give the enemy the opportunity to either break the weakened centre through a charge or through a prolonged firefight as the army losing the flank battles is forced to divert firepower to the flanks.
    Yeah that's my basic understanding. Of course there are other factors in play: cavalry have a scouting role but are the least effective against fortifications, infantry are cheaper so there is often more of them, artillery are bloody expensive and slow and can't charge (until you put them on a tracked vehicle), and of course technology and doctrinal changes develop over time: oh you can put a spearpoint in the end of a musket! Light cannons pulled by two horses for quick deployment? Arm the infantry with more muskets than pikes? No pikes? Put armour back on the cavalry? Bring back the long lance? What if we give the big blokes a bomb? Call them grenadiers? Now take away the bomb but keep the name? Gosh those Croats can't form a line to save themselves, but they are good shots, should we train more like them...and so on.

    What is interesting at Ramillies and Blenheim is the deployment of cavalry toward the centre of the line (explained in part by peculiarities of the terrain). This flies in the face of centuries of battlefield doctrine. Practically every battler of the English civil war begins with blocks of pikemen in the centre and a cloud of horsemen on each flank. The horsemen would gallop about madly until one or the other side runs away (with the victors galloping away after them or looting the baggage) which has little or no influence on the infantry struggle in the centre (with the odd exception such as Marston Moor where confusion allowed the cavalry to charge effectively on occasion).
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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Adar
    As 1/3 of the Swedish infantry carried pikes
    What was result of a very aggressive Swedish infantry tactics, but still it’s strange they didn’t transfer to the bayonet solution in the same measure like on the western fronts. During the war in France 1696 appeared reports that pikeman simply started to drop their pikes and arm in anandoned enemies muskets. I’m curious if during GNW similar activities took place. Especially that I heard , that Danes after the lost in battle of Halsinborg in 1710 again started to rearm their troops in pikes, so much Swedish infantry impressed them.
    BTW, here’s a nice pic about Swedish standard infantry advance formation
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Looks interesting, when we compare it to the battle of Halsinborg’s infantry composition, especially in light of mentioned pike revelations.
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Quote Originally Posted by ”Adar”
    On an international level I imagine that cavalry and skirmishers could serve a similar role
    Quote Originally Posted by ”Cyclops”
    and of course technology and doctrinal changes develop over time: oh you can put a spearpoint in the end of a musket! Light cannons pulled by two horses for quick deployment? Arm the infantry with more muskets than pikes? No pikes? Put armour back on the cavalry? Bring back the long lance? What if we give the big blokes a bomb? Call them grenadiers? Now take away the bomb but keep the name? Gosh those Croats can't form a line to save themselves, but they are good shots, should we train more like them...and so on.
    Yeah and especially the transformations of dragoons from mounted infantry into a cavalry, what I guess was quite a confusion in use at the time, especially in Russia, where they very popular at the time.
    From what I read they were mainly used for skirmishes and harassing the enemies, like cossack formations, but were still used as infantry. What’s interesting, unlike their western counterparts who fought in dispersion, when dismounted they formed four man deep lines with fairly impressive fire power, what even stopped the Swedish charge in Leśna 1708.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    If that might help:

    "The (infantry) line has a higher shooting value, than the column; but is better to use for defense than for attack. It's flanks are week, it's resistance against cavalry very low. (….)
    From the cavalry of a corps you only put a part into connection with independently operating infantry divisions. (…)
    Hardly will the futuristic cavalry have the same successes, as in the former century at the time of the line-tactics. During this time it was a common custom, to put the infantry, nearly without exception, into two thin lines for a meeting in the middle; the cavalry to both sides of the wings and the artillery (…) Everything was placed in a line of a yarn and marched this way in a deep order into each other. The cannons had no big impact. The cavalry was disallowed to leave the flanks, but it was so more devastating, if it beat the opposing cavalry force."
    Manual for infantry and cavalry officers (1800).

    "Close/Melee engagements:
    1. Cavalry vs. Cavalry (...)
    2. Cavalry vs. infantry
    Everything depends on the attitude of the infantry. A horse runs in fast trot good three close standing men in a line down; on the other hand seems it impossible to disorder a battalion-platoon, that holds tight, and to ride it down, because even the power of a horse has its borders. Would a rider want to ride into such a human mass, he would stuck in between them like in mud. (...)
    The infantry's best option is to do independent battalion squares; because to break four battalions it does not require more cavalry, than to break one. In general are small battalion-platoons better, as big brigade platoons. (…) The French formed at Waterloo sometimes fire-lines of up to ten to twelve battalions, the English artillery caused tremendous damage on. - If you could take away the fear of horses from the infantry – which will only cease so longer they deal with them (horses) – it could open fire at 20 steps and in this case even the bravest cavalry would turn.
    In the moment the dust and powder does not hinder the view onto the front anymore, we would like to advise a veteran infantry not to shoot at all, or first if the cavalry retreats.
    The concern, that the fire opens any moment at a effective range, might be a cause that a cavalry might turn. (…)
    A strong willed cavalry was able to achieve the most unbelievable. (…) The regiment Bayreuth succeeded over 21 battalions, made 2000 prisoners, 66 flags and five cannons while having 22 casualties and 66 wounded."
    Manual for officers and officer-cadets of the infantry (1853).

    "The charge begins at 200 steps away from an escaping enemy or 600 steps from an engaging enemy; first at the end a signal or the command March! March! will be given to begin the attack.
    (…) The people have to be motivated and to be told that the success relies only on their explosive attack to break an enemy and to finish him in melee combat."
    The most important parts of war-sciences (1831)

    "That cavalry may never await an attack, but instead counterattack , even in a minority, is an old glory tradition of the branch, everybody has to uphold."
    Decree for the commanding of cavalry, based on decrees of Frederic the Great (1744)

    "Should cavalry operate on a battle-field, with bigger independence, it requires the support of artillery as well as strong reserves to replace each other, till spread parts unite again after an attack. (…)
    To achieve disorder by devastating fire force the cavalry has no instrument. So it has to take this instrument from other branches or to achieve this goal by a sudden and strong attack, that is achieved by throwing itself in tight formation and fastest speed onto an opponent.
    (…) it has to begin 100 to 200 steps away from an opponent – the further 400 to 500 steps it is already in range of fire has to be crossed in parts with trot and in parts with gallop to leave the opponent no chance to prepare himself for the attack."
    Study of tactic for officers of all weapons (1861)

    "In case of a cavalry attack (…) skirmishers, (…) if a retreat to the main group is impossible, try to find the advantage in the swiftness of their feet. In general are specific maneuvers nearly impossible to suggest (…)
    In such circumstances it is advisable that the main-group assembles its loose parts to build a compact pile.
    The formation by itself is good enough to counter a cavalry charge, with concentrated well armed, but rare shots, till the enemy is in range of 20 to 30 steps and a full opening of the fire-line can be done. A cavalry will withdraw, but in case it does not its bravery shall be countered by bravery to achieve the same goal."
    A trial of a manual for tactics of light infantry in connection to battle-field operations (1830).

    I could line you up many – many more and these are just the dates of the print. Some are reprints and go back into the 18th century.

    So more you go back into the 18th century so bigger is the value of the cavalry, as the weapon designs were not progressed – nevertheless do they all advise the same.
    There is another older one – I do not know the title anymore, otherwise I would have listed it for you as well – there they wrote, that the only obstacle to prevent a cavalry charge is a deep river, because you do not have the freedom of see them coming.
    There is an anecdote of one higher officer (major, general I do not know anymore) that told, that he stopped his line-infantry from shooting, by grabbing into the guns, as they were 90 steps away from the enemy – but there was so much smoke and dust that they did not hit each other anymore. And he stressed that he came with his sixteen or fifteen adjutants and none got hurt, while being in the first row of the front-line, to explain the absurdity of the situation.
    If that would not have been a friendly officer, but two dozen hostile riders – they could have crashed into them, before they would have realized what was going to happen.

    In general does a cavalry force more damage than it takes casualties. That's the math.
    So the infantry tries to rise the casualties. That's the tactic.
    Skirmishers were employed to counter cavalry – because they had weapons that could shoot 300 steps. As you see above is the charging distance always 200 steps and they calculated that a horse does 10 steps a second.
    That is why the square idea is nice – but you have 20 seconds if the cavalry charges, to put your boys into position to aim and shoot - and it will only charge if it sees an advantage. This is why we need to pay attention to details. Veteran infantry. That is modern KSK, Navy Seal etc. status. These guys do this without flinching, the ordinary GI does not.
    There is no difference in cavalry fighting since the bronze age.
    The only difference is the development of armor and weapons. That's how cavalry died out.
    The weapon design of missile weapons (projectiles) overcame them.
    First the knights (loosing a knight to a guy who can hold a gun – is a waste of a knight)– and then again in the age of the industrial warfare.

    I translated that from 18th century German books to English – if I got some terms wrong, that it is because this time-frame is not my major and simply do not know the correct English words. So sorry for that. But you can find the same manuals in all European languages and they say all the same and have chapters how cavalry is used and was used even with anecdots of the 18th century.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Thx Hunin, would rep you if I could.

    From an earlier period the Marechal de Saxe wrote his Reveries prior to becoming a French general but is a remarkable work on military matters. He proved many of the points valid by his own victories (eg organising a useful divisional system), advocating infantry attacks in column (something he was unable to use with his substandard French infantry of the day, but a tactic used to great effect by Napoleon) etc.

    There are one or two howlers, he stated it was impossible for a general to command an army of more than about 80,000 effectively: to be fair he was thinking of the command structures of his own day (before his ideas of divisional command were implemented), Napoleon using the corps system was able to very effectively command 200,000 men at Leipzig and the allies almost half a million (albeit less effectively and spread across four or five commands).
    Jatte lambastes Calico Rat

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Wow, good discussion, keep it up guys!

    One also has to take into consideration the terrain as well, as in later years light cavalry became more useful, naturally.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Cyclops
    Thx Hunin, would rep you if I could.
    And I will, thanks for the content!
    Quote Originally Posted by Blastoise Groudon
    Wow, good discussion, keep it up guys!
    Thanks, feel free to join
    Last edited by Salvo; July 15, 2016 at 01:26 AM.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    Quote Originally Posted by Salvo View Post
    What was result of a very aggressive Swedish infantry tactics, but still it’s strange they didn’t transfer to the bayonet solution in the same measure like on the western fronts. During the war in France 1696 appeared reports that pikeman simply started to drop their pikes and arm in anandoned enemies muskets. I’m curious if during GNW similar activities took place. Especially that I heard , that Danes after the lost in battle of Halsinborg in 1710 again started to rearm their troops in pikes, so much Swedish infantry impressed them.
    BTW, here’s a nice pic about Swedish standard infantry advance formation
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Looks interesting, when we compare it to the battle of Halsinborg’s infantry composition, especially in light of mentioned pike revelations.
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    The picture you show is from Alf Åbergs book Karoliner which is probably one of the most sold history books in Sweden among the older generation (I inherited it from my grandmother). But the picture depict the defensive formation of Carolean infantry which was mainly used to keep the enemy at bay.

    The standard formation was that the pikemen formed the centre of the battalion and that the musketeers formed up on their flanks. 1/3 of the infantry in each battalion was pikemen so a battalion with 600 soldiers would have 200 pikemen in the centre with 200 musketeers on each side. In such a formation the pikemen have an incredibly aggressive role as the idea is to charge the enemy and break through in the centre. In a firefight the Carolean battalion would only have two thirds of the firepower of an enemy, but in hand to hand combat enemy musketeers with a 2 m long weapon would be forced to stand in a tightly packed formation and try to defend themselves against pikemen with 6 m long weapons.

    There are however several reasons for why the pikes were abolished as soon as Charles XII died and the Great Northern War reached its final years.

    1) Pikemen are less flexible than other infantry. Pikes are heavy to carry and major battles are few and far between. Pikemen discarding their weapons and armour was a common issue even in the early 17th century and the bayonet made musketeers able to defend themselves without the support of pikemen. So highly aggressive tactics and an emphasis on field battles was necessary to justify the usage of pikes.

    2) The Carolean school of war involved a very small number of generals that formed the closest circle around Charles XII. The system was based on the military reforms of Charles XI who maintained an isolationist policy after his participation in the Scanian War (1675-1679). Meanwhile many members of the nobility served in foreign armies during the 9 years war and would later join the Swedish army after the 9 years war ended in 1697. Charles XII was popular among soldiers but had a very strained relationship with most of the Swedish nobility who served as officers and this created a huge doctrinal gap between the small clique of dedicated officers he inherited from his father and the nobility which had served in continental armies.

    This was perhaps most evident in how the Council in Stockholm tried to reform the Carolean army according to a more continental pattern while Charles XII was taking refuge in Turkey after the disaster at Poltava. This attempt failed thanks to the concentrated efforts of Charles XII and Magnus Stenbock. At the end of the Great Northern War both where dead and command of the armies was given to prince consort Frederick of Hesse-Kassel who was married to the queen. With the "Carolean" officers dead or replaced by "continental" officers the Swedish military doctrine shifted to the tactics dominating continental Europe and the pike was therefore abolished.

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    Default Re: Cavalry Tactics in 17th Century - Ramillies 1706

    The fact is in 17th Century it saw a return of shocked cavalry in Western Europe, introduced by Swedish; several battles in 30 Years War were decided by cavalry winning the flank before making a final assault on center. The issue why shocked cavalries declined in West during 16th Century was due to lack of solution to break mass heavy infantry block, but to counter this Spanish simply introduced more firearms, resulted common adoption of firearm in Europe. Gustavus' innovation was by adding firepower into cavalry force by introducing mobile artillery and musket fire support into cavalry rank, deployed so called "suppressive fire" to disrupt enemy formation before heavy cavalry made a charge. This formula largely remained in use in heavy cavalry units for next 200 years until rapid long range firing by infantry became possible.

    By the way using firearms to create suppressive fire before a melee charge was not new nor only in Europe; I remember Scottish troops during 16th Century already knew this technique (fire musket first, dropped the musket and charged with claymore), and during Sengoku period Japanese also deployed similar tactic.
    Last edited by hellheaven1987; July 20, 2016 at 05:37 AM.
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