Byzantine Attitudes Toward Warfare

[Basileos Leandros I]

It started in the 11th century, the slow decline of trading - Italian Republics were quickly gaining power and military force within the Mediterranean, and it was in the interest of both sides to trade. Eventually, they took it over, but much later as you've mentioned.

[Cyclops]

http://www.doaks.org/research/byzant...yzantine-world

Its an interesting summary albeit one that telescopes a thousand years of history. In the fourth century Constantine made war like Julius Caesar had, complete with (barely depaganised) triumphs. This pattern continued until after Justinian, and really only became Christianised when Heraclius led his fervent Christian troops against the Persians. There's a radical shift in Roman thought at that time, and some see the reign of Heraclius as the beginning of the ERE which would make this new exclusively Christian world view the defining characteristic of ERE thought: in that sense the summary is correct.

There are shifts in the balance of thinking with the later Emperors and their panegyrists truly glorying in war, absurdly so in the last two centuries of the Empire's existence. However the ERE empire did generate and maintain for a long time the remarkable outlook that killing was wrong and cold only be waged by necessity. this is even evidenced in the treatment of heresy and political prisoners: opponents were more often mutilated than slain.

[Marcus Aemilius Lepidus]

Although the only option at the time, under Alexios the imperial military reetablished by the Makedon Dynasty was replaced by private Armies. It is some kind of feudal system where your armies were lead by nobles instead of carrier Generals. A career like emperor Justin from soldier to Emperor was at that point impossible. That proves at one point positive for the imperial finances, but on the other hand makes you dependend on nobles and you don't necessarly get the best commanders. Replacing them either isn't are real option.

[ArmoredCore]

Warfare in Byzantine Society

Introduction:

Perhaps best illustrated by Edward Gibbon in his masterwork The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, early Western attitudes toward the study of the Byzantine Empire were often harsh, judgmental, and simplistic. Remnants of this derision toward the eastern Romans can be seen in our language, even to this day. The very word "byzantine" has become a synonym for an overly complex and bloated political system, where treachery and schemes are behind every corner. Unlike western Christian thought, which quickly developed a "just war" doctrine, the Eastern Roman Empire, and the eastern Christian church saw such ideals as antithetical to the Christian message, and preferred the use of diplomacy and bribing to fighting war. In contrast to the west, where war, especially against so called "infidels," was highly esteemed by both secular and religious authorities, the Byzantine tendency to avoid warfare earned them a reputation for cowardice and deceitfulness in the west, a reputation which still lingers to this day.

While there is no concrete date that separates "Rome" from "Byzantium," for the sake of convenience I'll put the dividing line in CE 330 when Constantinople was founded. As Christianity slowly came to dominate Roman social, political, and military life, old attitudes and practices regarding warfare and soldiers began to be examined and ultimately changed. The Christian tenets of turning the other cheek and pursuing peace seemed to clash with the old Roman marshal spirit, along with old Roman customs regarding the pagan pantheon. The early Christian world was divided on what role the army played in society, and how the Church should react to the army. Early Christian writers, notably Clement of Rome, wrote favorably of the Roman army, admiring the discipline it displayed, and urging Christians to emulate it with regards to the "spiritual warfare" all Christian believers engage in. Other early Church fathers such as Gregory Nazianzus saw the army and soldiers as wholly un-Christian and incompatible with the Christian belief system. To compound the problem, Christian thinkers from the East and West began to diverge in their understanding of exegesis or how scripture should be read and interpreted. In the West, a more literal and contemporary understanding of scripture was favored, while a more allegorical interpretation was favored in the East. The Old Testament, filled with many instances of battles and violence, was therefore seen much differently by Eastern and Western Christians. For example, a Western Christian may read the account of King David leading Israel's armies to victory as a literal military campaign whereas an eastern Christian may see the military campaigns of the Old Testament as allegorical struggles against the passions and man's sinful nature. The differences between Eastern and Western Christendom can be clearly seen when one looks at St. Basil of Caesarea and his writings.

St. Basil of Caesarea:

Born sometime around 330 CE, St. Basil the Great was the Bishop of Caesarea in the central Anatolian region of Cappadocia in modern day Turkey. A prolific scholar and theologian, he is honored by both the Catholic and Orthodox Church as a saint and Church Father. So influential were St. Basil's writings that very many of them were passed into Orthodox canon law and remain so to this very day. Basil formulated war as a necessary evil that should only be undertaken as a last resort. Soldiers should not shirk their duties to defend their homes and loved ones should a hostile force threaten them, but glorifying in violence was sinful.

” Our Fathers did not consider the killings committed in the course of wars to be classifiable as murders at all, on the score, it seems to me, of allowing a pardon to men fighting in defense of sobriety and piety. Perhaps, though, it might be advisable to refuse them communion for three years, on the ground that they are not clean-handed”

As illustrated by the above quote, the policy of the Byzantine Church toward soldiers who killed in battle was to abstain from the Eucharist for three years as a form of penance. Even powerful soldier emperors like Nikephoros Phokas, who wanted to make every Byzantine soldier killed in battle equal to martyrs, had to bow to the judgements of the Byzantine Church, whose Patriarch replied to his request with;

“How could they be regarded as martyrs or equal to the martyrs those who kill others or die themselves at war, when the divine canons impose a penalty on them, preventing them from coming to Divine Communion for three years.”

While by no means a pacifist society, as the exploits of Heraclius, Basil II, and others attest, the concept of a “just war” was simply foreign to Eastern Christian theology, and society. Warfare was to be undertaken defensively and with great regret.

The Army in Byzantine Society:

Despite the stigma attached to warfare and violence, the Byzantine people and Church honored their soldiers, and the cults of various soldier saints such as St. George, St. Demetrios, and others were among the most popular, and remain so in today’s modern Orthodox world. Triumphs, a relic of the Roman past, were held as late as the 11^th century when Basil II held a triumph in honor of the reconquest of Bulgaria, complete with processions of prisoners and war booty. Sources like the 6^th century Strategikon of Maurice and the 10^th century Tactika of Leo (military manuals) describe clergy accompanying the army into battle, and holding religious services and blessings on a regular basis. The army, seen as defending Christianity and the Roman oikoumene from the “barbarians” that constantly assaulted the Empire was also honored in various hymns and religious songs. The Cross, seen as a symbol of victory over death, was a common motif in these hymns;

“Lord, save thine people, and bless thy inheritance!
Grant victory to the emperor, over the barbarians!
And by the power of thy cross, preserve thy commonwealth!”

Under certain militarily minded emperors, the army was sometimes used as a powerful political force, enforcing Iconoclasm for example.


Conclusion:

Far from the cowardly depictions of the Byzantine army and accompanying Byzantine society that were too long the popular image held by Western scholars and observers, the true nature of Byzantine reluctance to engage in warfare is finally getting the attention it deserves. When Constantinople finally fell in 1453, the army was a pathetic shell of its former self, but under a strong emperor with competent generals, it was perhaps the most effective fighting force of late antiquity into the early middle ages. After all, a thousand year existence, while surrounded by hostile enemies on all sides, is an impressive achievement for any nation.

I don't see how anyone could claim the ERE was "soft" especially since they fought so many wars for so long during their existence.
In fact, what would Western Europe be today were it not for the Byzantines acting as a buttress against various hordes flooding into Western Europe?

Most would say that the propaganda about the ERE comes from the political struggle over the seat of power in the person of Constantine as the early ruler of the Christian church. This ultimately led to the schism between Eastern and Western Christianity which culminated in the sack of Constantinople during one of the crusades. And in fact the crusades themselves were called as a result of a cry for help from the ERE against said hordes. Many in Rome viewed moving the seat of power to the East as sacrilege and did everything to bring it back to Rome in the figure of the Pope and used the resurgent Church to bolster the Germanic kingdoms as the "new Roman Empire" in the west. And every since then they have almost disavowed the Eastern Empire.

[Cyclops]

Sadly the French Enlightenment fostered a chauvinistic attitude toward possible rivals to the legacy of Alexander and Julius Caesar. While the ERE attracted the sort of hostility from Franks that we see toward the WRE from...well...Franks the Eastern Empire has been allowed to lapse from popular historical memory. Our understanding of the Renaissance and Enlightenment largely ignores the role of the Roman Empire in sustaining classical culture to the extent the Renaissance is attributed entirely to Islam by some.

[Condottiere 40K]

Diplomacy seems to buffer the existing establishment, whereas opting for the military solution allows social mobility, permitting percolation of the more talented and lucky of the lower classes to positions of power and responsibility.

Richard the First used both, leveraging victory for better terms when he recognized that force was unlikely to gain him what he sought in the Holy Land, whereas in France, Philippe knew he was screwed.

[bigdaddy1204]

Our understanding of the Renaissance and Enlightenment largely ignores the role of the Roman Empire in sustaining classical culture to the extent the Renaissance is attributed entirely to Islam by some.

Really? I'm intrigued. Where have you seen that?
I'm all for appreciation of the Golden Age of Arabic science, but attributing the Renaissance entirely to Islam seems a bit of a stretch. While there were indeed significant contributions by Arabic scholars, such as Khwarezmi's work being cited by the Italian mathematician Fibonacci as a source for his own work on algebra (itself an Arabic word), I wouldn't say the Renaissance was "entirely" caused by Islam. That seems quite a bizarre idea - I'd be interested to see who put that forward

[+Marius+]

I don't see how anyone could claim the ERE was "soft" especially since they fought so many wars for so long during their existence.

Not soft, more like comically incompetent in certain periods.

In fact, what would Western Europe be today were it not for the Byzantines acting as a buttress against various hordes flooding into Western Europe?

What hordes did the medieval Romans actually stop though?

The Seljuks were stopped by crusaders, the Magyars by Germans, the Avars by Croatians and Franks, the Pechenegs/Cumans/Mongols/Tatars etc. by Hungary and Poland.

Really? I'm intrigued. Where have you seen that?

Usually white guilt ridden westerners who despise their own ancestors and culture.

[bigdaddy1204]

Usually white guilt ridden westerners who despise their own ancestors and culture.

Ah, you mean the intelligent ones then.

There is something missing in this thread. We forgot to consider the Byzantine attitude to warfare on an organisational level. I think that is important, because the early and mid Byzantine structure under the themes allowed a lot of local autonomy under local theme commanders. This was a brilliant and very effective type of defence. It helped to prevent enemies such as the Arabs ever establishing a hold in Anatolia. Of course, the cost was provincial rebellions, but overall it was still a good system.

The later Byzantine system from the 12th century onward, however, was not like that at all. It became very centralised, with not really much chance of local commanders acting on their own initiative. This wasn't so good, since it meant the emperor had to actively defend his own lands, which only works with a good emperor. And it pretty much prevented any chance of expansion. Whereas enemies such as the Turks were able to expand partly because they were decentralised and were often acting under local commanders on their own initiative.

[+Marius+]

Ah, you mean the intelligent ones then.

[Abdülmecid I]

Of course, the cost was provincial rebellions, but overall it was still a good system.

Personally, I am not even sure, if the theme system had the downside of encouraging rebellions. In fact, an advantage of structuring an army by deploying independent farmers, who cultivated their own land and did not pay a loan or a percentage of their agricultural production to local magnates, is that the soldiers were not controlled by the local aristocracy. Sure, there were revolts, initiated by ambitious generals, but the situation could be worse, in case that the soldiers owned their living not to the central authorities, but to the feudal lords. When the deterioration of the theme system was sped up, after Basil's II costly and aggressive campaigns, which forced him to depend on the collaboration of the landed nobility, revolts became continually more and more frequent, and they often targeted not at the usurpation of the imperial throne, but at the creation of independent local entities, a typical result of the rise of the power of the local elites, to the detriment of the stateSome of them, like the cases of Trabzon, Cyprus and Peloponnese were essentially successful before the fall of Constantinople, during the 4th Crusade.
Consequently, I would say that the theme system was very fruitful, especially for defensive campaigns and effective reaction against sudden raids, but it was doomed to fail, as the balance of financial and political power between the central authorities and the nobility began to shift in favour of the latter, for whatever the reasons, from economic recession to gradual concentration of land into fewer and fewer hands.

[Dr. Chet Manley]

but it was doomed to fail, as the balance of financial and political power between the central authorities and the nobility began to shift in favour of the latter, for whatever the reasons, from economic recession to gradual concentration of land into fewer and fewer hands.

Is this comparable to what happened after the 2nd Punic war? Years of campaigning left the militia without fields to return to - eventually triggering a sequence of events that would culminate in the Marian reforms

[Abdülmecid I]

Is this comparable to what happened after the 2nd Punic war? Years of campaigning left the militia without fields to return to - eventually triggering a sequence of events that would culminate in the Marian reforms

Frankly, I don't know of any specific cases, but I am sure that the absence of the head of the families would have surely exacerbated the phenomenon, as the magnates would have fewer difficulties in forcefully adding their temporarily unprotected fields to their estates. However, the concentration of land (and wealth) in steadily fewer and fewer hands is a natural procedure, as the richer you are the more easily even richer you become, thanks to your already accumulated financial strength (usually accompanied by political and social influence). On the other hand, the theme system had actually more ambiguous consequences, since the monarchy relying on free small landholders to limit the threat presented against it by both foreign states and the domestic elites, encouraged Constantinople to protect them from their greedy rich neighbors. The Isaurian legislation is a typical example. That's why I insist that the plans of expansions of Basil II played such an important role, because the emperor needed the cooperation of the nobility as well. Just like in Republican Rome's case, where the Marian reforms were initiated, as a result of both the lack of available recruits and the fact that a permanent, professional army was needed to safeguard and increase the dramatically augmented territory controlled by Rome.

[bigdaddy1204]

This talk of Byzantine expansion and its consequences has got me thinking. The parallels between the Byzantine empire and the Islamic Caliphate of Cordoba in Spain are interesting.

• In both cases, the frontiers stayed pretty much unchanged for 300 years. In the case of the Byzies, from 670 to 970. In the case of Al-Andalus, from about 740 to 1040.
• In both cases, around the year 1000 a great leader expanded the state and defeated foreign enemies. In Byzantium, this was Basil II, in al-Andalus it was Almanzor.
• After the death of the great leader, both states entered a period of stasis, followed by civil war and collapse in the 11th century. Both then lost a great deal of territory.
• Both experienced a limited revival in the 12th century which stabilised things on a reduced basis.
• Then both once again collapsed at the end of the 12th century, and both faced utter ruin in the 13th. By the mid 13th century, Al-Andalus effectively no longer existed, as everything except Granada had fallen to the Christians. In Byzantium, the fourth crusade had conquered the empire and all that was left was fragments in Nicaea, Epirus and Trebizond.
• Both came to a final end in the 15th century with a climactic siege of the last remaining city, in Constantinople in 1453 and in Granada in 1492.

Interesting, the parallels? There are more as well:

• Both were the heirs to a much larger empire: the Umayyad Caliphate for al-Andalus; the Roman Empire for the Byzantines
• Both were rich and advanced civilisations for their time
• Both cultures were eventually wiped out and disappeared entirely from Turkey/Spain, but both continued to exist in Greece/Morocco
• Both are looked back on with nostalgia by their descendent cultures, while the defeat of both is celebrated by the cultures that replaced them

[+Marius+]

Interesting comparison, though, the Caliphate of Cordoba ceased to exist in 1031, Hisham III was the last person to ever hold that title.

The Almoravids and Almohads were definitely not the offspring of Andalus, Muslim Spain was a province to them, not their main base of rule.