Why has Germany been so powerful compared to other European nations throughout history

[Hresvelgr]

I seem to recall imperial Germany's problems tended to come from the fact that their "Diplomacy" seemed to consist of bullying, threats and an astounding lack of delicacy and tact. We're talking about the people who once proposed to the king of Belgium, in public, that he should let them through whenever they fought France and they would give him a chunk of it.

There's also the other famous bit of German diplomatic ineptitude with the Zimmerman Telegram, wherein Zimmerman suggests the ambassador to Mexico suggests the Mexican president to invade America once America declared war on Germany. This despite both Mexico and Germany knowing that Germany absolutely could not follow up on any of its unreliable promises of support and that Mexico was woefully outmatched by the United States, but Zimmerman was still confident the Mexicans would do it anyway.

[TWWolfe]

Not to mention letting the alliance with Russia lapse, building a Navy and mouthing off Britain, Various attempts at gunboat diplomacy that always backfired and never really worked, telling Austria they would back them carte blanch, the alliance with Italy, the repression in Alsace Lorraine, the kaiser seesawing wildly on what he wanted at any given moment....

[Mangalore]

Jesus, Kaiser Willi wasn't smart but really? Haven't read so much biased stuff in a while.

I seem to recall imperial Germany's problems tended to come from the fact that their "Diplomacy" seemed to consist of bullying, threats and an astounding lack of delicacy and tact. We're talking about the people who once proposed to the king of Belgium, in public, that he should let them through whenever they fought France and they would give him a chunk of it.

This is an astounding simplistic summary of the politics of pre WW1 Germany. The only thing which is true is that Britain was better at it and Germany was bad at it because the German empire had an ill defined role on who or what should formulate policy leading to conflicting messages.

Also sure, let's ignore everything before 1888 to make this stereotype work.

As for one monarch suggesting to another that he could benefit from siding in a war: You know what a megalomaniac the Belgian king was? Just look at what this guy did in Congo.

There's also the other famous bit of German diplomatic ineptitude with the Zimmerman Telegram, wherein Zimmerman suggests the ambassador to Mexico suggests the Mexican president to invade America once America declared war on Germany. This despite both Mexico and Germany knowing that Germany absolutely could not follow up on any of its unreliable promises of support and that Mexico was woefully outmatched by the United States, but Zimmerman was still confident the Mexicans would do it anyway.

Do you actually know anything about the Zimmermann telegram? It was an internal communique between the German embassy and Berlin what to do when the US enters the war as part of an endevour to keep the US away from Europe. They didn't care about Mexico or what's what, they cared about the US staying out of Europe as long as possible.

It's not diplomatic ineptitude on the German part, it's brilliance on the British code breakers and diplomats part how they used it. The German ineptitude may be the guy who encoded the message.

Not to mention letting the alliance with Russia lapse, building a Navy and mouthing off Britain, Various attempts at gunboat diplomacy that always backfired and never really worked, telling Austria they would back them carte blanch, the alliance with Italy, the repression in Alsace Lorraine, the kaiser seesawing wildly on what he wanted at any given moment....

- The Russian alliance lapsed because of an inability to reconcile Austria's and Russia's Balkan interests that had been temporarily bound together in the three emperor treaty . Hence Germany had to choose and Austria still was culturally and historically closely linked to it so while not smart from a power perspective it was the only choice.
- The charte blanche was never something else but support for a punishment of Serbia. There are very confusing letters by German politicians about the matter, including the Kaiser thinking the crisis was over when Serbia agreed to most demands of the Austrian ultimatum. They didn't behave as if they thought of it as an unconditional charte blanche. Attacking France and Russia became a military necessity for other reasons than Germany fulfilling their unconditional support claim.
- The alliance with Italy had a similar problem, in essence France and Britain managed to trigger Italian greed for Austrian territory and pulled them into an industrial war their country wasn't equipped for. They were essentially the one nation Austria was still capable to beat. Prussia had been allies of Italy just 40 years earlier. Thus they were on good terms, including Italy also having squabbles with France.
- A navy was considered necessary for any claim of Great Power status and Britain and Germany had worked out their disagreement in 1912 so while a point of tension before that point it was actually on the decline by 1914 and new squabbles between Russia and Britain saw an increase of relations between the two.
- Germany didn't mouth off to Britain. Britain saw the rise of German economic power (plus said fleet) as a a possible threat but more importantly it didn't see germany but France and Russia as an imminent imperial threat, thus making deals with those two which is the Entente cordiale (which is not an alliance of any formal kind). Again by 1914 Britain was actually considering Germany as a possible ally because agreeement with Russia were starting to breack down in the Middle East.
- Gunboat diplomacy did not always backfire. I don't think you know how normal that was for European powers. Germany did plenty.
- repression of Alsace Lorraine is a simplistic view. It was as nice/bad as any annexation which others had done as well. https://books.google.de/books?id=4Qs...rraine&f=false
- finally something one can slightly agree on... though again it is very simplistic to assume the Kaiser's moodswings changed German policy day to day.

[Condottiere 40K]

Willi seems naive and penile envious.

The Czar appears to be able to relate.

[Cyclops]

... The Russian alliance lapsed because of an inability to reconcile Austria's and Russia's Balkan interests that had been temporarily bound together in the three emperor treaty . Hence Germany had to choose and Austria still was culturally and historically closely linked to it so while not smart from a power perspective it was the only choice....

This point really throws Bismarck's true brilliance into perspective. Prussia had a knife in its back in the shape of Russian Poland. Austria despite harsh struggles with Prussia/Second Reich had a cultural affinity that many people in all parts of Germany wanted to see become a union.

Bismarck was able to forge a lasting alliance with the Tsars, returning to the realpolitick of the post-Napoleonic settlement despite the associated humiliation (Prussia had been Russia's hand puppet from 1813-1815). At the same time he held aloof from Balkan entanglements as "not being worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier". I think only a genius could have pulled that off.

Even Bismarck could resist the tide of triumphalism in 1871 when the Prussian government insisted on taking Alsace: in 1864 and 1866 he took great care to leave no lasting wounds on his enemies that they might be future friends, or at least not committed enemies.

In the charged in environment of the early 20th century with Empires tottering on the verge of collapse, and vast fields of conquest opening up to the eyes of ambitious statesmen its understandable ambitions would collide.

Russia and Austria both faced nationalist threats from within. England had a constitutional crisis in the British Isles looming and the eggs that had hatched in Dublin were being laid in Delhi. Meanwhile the British were merrily scoffing large chinks of Africa, most notoriously stealing the Dutchmen's gold in South Africa in as naked a bit of greedy imperialism as the world has seen: seriously it was as bad as the US theft of Cuba and the Philippines. The attempts of the UK to appear as a disinterested honest broker in any European squabble were as false as Russian declarations of goodwill.

In the late 1870's Britain had been happy to sit on the fence in the Russo-Turkish war, then sit in on the Congress of Berlin and pick up Cyprus at the table. It seemed clear from the Boer war that the British didn't like a hard fight and were in it solely for the money: the Kaiser was relying o this sort of cynical opportunism when he invaded Belgium.

Given the weakness of the Tsars from the 1890's onward the Kaiser's switch to Austria probably seemed smart: the Russian failure in 1905 against Japan (which was a deep humiliation) probably confirmed the "wisdom" of the decision. Austria OTOH had achieved a sort of embalmed stability under Franz Joseph, although its similar to the current British monarch's reign: a charming ruler being allowed to serve out their term before the deluge.

On the Dreadnaught race, the British started that. A lot of is talked about Germany ensured WWI would start when Tirpitz started building dreadnaughts, its absolute rubbish. The Royal Navy sought to perpetuate an unsustainable and aggressive military hegemony (eg the "two fleet" doctrine) which made alliances with Russia, France and the US difficult, without recognising the ability of the US to out produce the UK as had happened by the early 20th century (although parliament hadn't noticed until about 1915). IIRC there was a supply bill put together and the War office wanted to by everything the US had to offer ij war materiel: it suddenly dawned on them the US could produce for export more than the UK and France combined could afford.

I can see there were sound short term arguments for most of Kaiser bill's decisions, and in his place I doubt I would do better (except at wearing jackets with equal length sleeves, I have him covered there).

[Condottiere 40K]

Until the Dreadnought, the Royal Navy preferred to let others work out the bugs of any new concept, and then play catch up. Which the French found out, even with a head start, the British did it better and finished faster. And more often.

Essentially, the Dreadnought was a confluence of existing concepts, expedited by what Tsushima confirmed, and driven by a need to consolidate resources, primarily seamen and other operational costs.

Tirpitz's strategy was never to match the RN, but to create a fleet that would place the sea communications of the United Kingdom at risk, which considering it's an island nation, the British would never tolerate. Outside of which, the British created Belgium specifically to keep the channel ports out of the hands of the French, and certainly didn't want them in the hands of the Germans.

So the Germans created an unnecessary strategic hazard.

[TWWolfe]

Jesus, Kaiser Willi wasn't smart but really? Haven't read so much biased stuff in a while.

I'm aware my post was quite biased and simplistic. Mostly i was just A Running with the joke and B. Bringing up the whole "who the heck is running the diplomatic show here" aspect.

Wasn't trying to paint the king of Belgium in a good light, more to draw on the whole "did you really just say that in public" Apparently the King thought it was a joke, so the Kaiser followed up right there with a plan of exactly what parts of France they could have.

I do know that pretty much all of Europe employed gunboat diplomacy to some extent. My point bringing that particular item up was more that , paraphrasing one author "The Germans could not hear of a conflict somewhere and not want to stick their head in it" The issue being it seems half the time they would send people simply to show the flag and rattle sabers, which likely didn't endear them to anyone while not benefiting them in any concrete way. Not to mention making the rest of Europe a tad sketchy.

[Marcus Aemilius Lepidus]

Beeing not united only meant that German strenght was used by others. Germans as soldiers often played a key role in the most empires except maybe France. In other realms like the Russian Empire germans or Russian with german background played a key role on government level. We had a high culture which was in my opinion created because we were so diverse. Like the greek polis states we had a lot of competition which lead us to great innovations on many fields.

[Cyclops]

Until the Dreadnought, the Royal Navy preferred to let others work out the bugs of any new concept, and then play catch up. Which the French found out, even with a head start, the British did it better and finished faster. And more often.

Essentially, the Dreadnought was a confluence of existing concepts, expedited by what Tsushima confirmed, and driven by a need to consolidate resources, primarily seamen and other operational costs.

Tirpitz's strategy was never to match the RN, but to create a fleet that would place the sea communications of the United Kingdom at risk, which considering it's an island nation, the British would never tolerate. Outside of which, the British created Belgium specifically to keep the channel ports out of the hands of the French, and certainly didn't want them in the hands of the Germans.

So the Germans created an unnecessary strategic hazard.

I think the Second Reich was attempting to create a navy to secure its few scattered colonies from the aggressive and greedy British Empire. The Kaiser was extremely undiplomatic about it all, swerving from sycophantic imitation to sabre-rattling imitation, but really Germany drew British ire for being good at industry and wanting a small slice of the colonial pie that Britain had already grabbed the largest portion of.

Itsnot quite correct to say "the Germans created an unnecessary strategic hazard", that's like saying France created an unnecessary strategic hazard by wanting Alsace returned. Germany sought a place among the colonial nations, and British naval policy required complete British hegemony at sea. Accepting British naval hegemony as just is like accepting the Spanish Armada as just.

Holding unreasonable aggressive doctrinal positions helps start wars, and Britain did their bit along with the rest.

[Condottiere 40K]

Bismarck understood that you can't really change the internal borders without upsetting it's internal balance, and eventually, aligning everyone else against you, but his strategic goal was the minimization of Austrian influence in Germany, and the consolidation of Germany proper into one nation state, which required two gambles.


At this point, Germany could have aligned itself with the British goal of maintaining a balance of power on the continent, and expressed concern with the instability of the Balkans, and just concentrated on building up a navy optimized for overseas service and placing either the French or Russian sea communications at risk, who were the primary concerns of the British. Since the break up of the Austrian Hungarian Empire seems inevitable, they could have had a long term plan to absorb Austria, and negotiated some form stabilizing mechanism in the Balkans that kept out the Russians and the Turks.


South America was out of reach because of the Monroe Doctrine, though the British might have closed an eye, though the most viable areas left were the Ottoman Empire and China, which a long term plan might well have allowed the Second Reich to establish influence and in the case of China, establishment of large stretches of colonies, if the Great War hadn't been kicked off.

[Cyclops]

Bismarck understood that you can't really change the internal borders without upsetting it's internal balance, and eventually, aligning everyone else against you, but his strategic goal was the minimization of Austrian influence in Germany, and the consolidation of Germany proper into one nation state, which required two gambles.


At this point, Germany could have aligned itself with the British goal of maintaining a balance of power on the continent, and expressed concern with the instability of the Balkans, and just concentrated on building up a navy optimized for overseas service and placing either the French or Russian sea communications at risk, who were the primary concerns of the British. Since the break up of the Austrian Hungarian Empire seems inevitable, they could have had a long term plan to absorb Austria, and negotiated some form stabilizing mechanism in the Balkans that kept out the Russians and the Turks.


South America was out of reach because of the Monroe Doctrine, though the British might have closed an eye, though the most viable areas left were the Ottoman Empire and China, which a long term plan might well have allowed the Second Reich to establish influence and in the case of China, establishment of large stretches of colonies, if the Great War hadn't been kicked off.

Fair points. Where could Germany really expand without pissing off Britain and France? If the Kaiser even looked at North Africa you get the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911 (the second of which really should have kicked off the war, some kudos to Germany for backing down).

Your call on China is a fair one, and predicted on very smart diplomacy (maybe a Japanese alliance?) and some luck. It would not take too much luck for the British and French to fall out again, or Russia to wet the bed of the Triple Entente with some mad central Asian scheme. Definite potential.

In hindsight the fall of the Hapsburgs seems inevitable but the Empire had been a dead duck since about 1809, and happily zombied...OK not happily, maybe "shakily zombied"? its way through more than a century before it died. Germany might be able to make hay there but probably wouldn't be thinking about it

After being humiliated in 1911 Russia was winding it up for the king hit in 1916 but if the French or English were detached from the Entente I think the Reich could take the blow, and Poland. With their stupid defeat in 1905 by the Japanese and not being able to "get it up" ion time for the party in 1911 Germany might actually be thinking it was a possibility,. They just had to deal with the French assault that would instantly spring the moment Germany went to war with anyone. I think France would not to be in alliance with anyone to attack Germany: they missed their chance in 1866 and had been kicking themselves since.

I think the preset positions were: Serbia would go nuts on Austria, and vice versa. France would go for Germany no matter what. Germany had an eye on Russia and (so long as there wasn't a constitutional crisis, the king didn't marry a divorcee or the channel ports were not held by one power) Britain could be relied upon to cynically stay out until there was some advantage. As for the Russians, they just needed revenge on someone. Anyone. Everyone.

I wrote in the other thread IMHO Austria started the war that became WWI but Russia made it into WWI. They are the culprits, as easy as it is to ride out on the corpse of dead man, because when France Britain and Germany clashed in South Africa and Morrocco, despite serious powderkegs and stupid dropped matches, those three talked the war out of kicking off. It took the Austrians to open fire, and the Russians to push the first unstoppable domino (full Russian mobilisation) over.

[ArmoredCore]

There is a difference between "Germany" and "Germanic". Germanic peoples have been powerful in the rise of Europe since the fall of the Roman empire long before "Germany" existed. Their rise is largely tied to their size and strength in warfare and later on their ability to absorb and master the learning from other cultures in order to produce the Rennaissance. In terms of most European historiography, it is the Germanic Urheimat that is the basis for the nostalgia around the history of modern Europe in the rise of the "northmen" or Germanic tribes. The modern European feudal system based on the HRE which was a network of Germanic blood kin. The HRE under Germanic kings and princes was the precursor to many of the modern European royal lines, from before the concept of most modern European nations existed. Once these nations did arise those Germanic bloodlines stayed in place in many of the royal families across national boundaries. It is this old Germanic mythos that led to the rise of the "Germany" as the nationalism of the superior intellect and military prowess of "Germanic" people in modern times.