Fierce as Fire, Immovable as a Mountain: Oda Nobunaga's war against Takeda Shingen

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Introduction "Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage and changes through segmenting and reuniting" - Sunzi Bingfa, Chapter 7, passage 16:


A war which has been immortalized in the Japanese epics and reminiscent as the struggle between great clans and the warring past against the seemingly inevitable future (in hindsight).
The interest of this conflict most likely stems from the participants, the "general without peer" Oda Nobunaga and the legendary "Tiger of Kai Province" Takeda Shingen, seasoned conquerors in their own rights with codes such as the Oda "Tenka Fubu" (seize the realm through martial force) and Takeda "Fū-Rin-Ka-Zan" (Wind, Forest, Fire, Mountain). There was also the pivotal battle of Nagashino where Japanese samurai armed with muskets entered the modern era and decimated the "antiquated" mounted samurai. However this war in the east was a particularly bloody war waged over a period of 10 years though the argument of "if Takeda Shingen had not died then he could have defeated the Oda clan" is often presented it honestly never made sense as the events themselves seem to contradict this statement. The strategic situation only ever lent itself twice for Shingen to even be able to confront Nobunaga in the first place (Asakura-Azai-Takeda attack in 1572 and a hypothetical total victory at Mikatagahara 1573). Assuming that Shingen had not died all of these setbacks would have still been true, as they occurred during his lifetime and Shingen's allies to the west would still have been annihilated piece meal as this was in every way part of a larger war. Shingen could not have won otherwise by simply existing and moreover neither of these two ever faced each other in a field of battle, this was not a war waged solely between Shingen and Nobunaga as Ieyasu and Katsuyori played main roles and all players earned some merit.

PART 1 "Its rapidity is that of the wind, its silence that of the forest" - Sunzi Bingfa, Chapter 7, passage 17:

Takeda Shingen holding his commander's fan; he allied with Nobunaga's enemies the Asakura, the Azai, the Ikko Ikki sect and the Ashikaga Shogun while simultaneously allied with the Hojo clan in Kozuke province and the Shiina, Jinbo and Anegakoji clans against Uesugi Kenshin in Hida and Etchu provinces

Having denounced the Shogun Ahikaga Yoshiaki in 17 points for his misconduct during the early autumn of 1572 the Shogun revealed himself as the secret architect of the existing coalition against his subordinate Nobunaga, who in 1568 had defeated the Shogun's enemies and placed him in power at Kyoto, and began to appeal for Takeda Shingen to join his coalition. So too did the abbot of the Ikko temple at Ishiyama Honganji, Kosa Kennyo, appeal for assistance against Nobunaga. Afterwards Shingen pledged his allegiance to Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki; most contemporaries agreed that Shingen wanted nothing less than to drive toward the national capital of Kyoto.
The conflict itself began in November 1572 when Takeda Shingen declared himself to be for the anti-Oda Nobunaga coalition thus openly breaking his alliance with the Oda and Tokugawa (an alliance in which Nobunaga's son Nobutada married Shingen's daughter, Shingen's son Katsuyori married one of Nobunaga's daughters and Ieyasu's son Nobuyasu married another of Nobunaga's daughters; the alliance of Takeda, Oda and Tokugawa was aimed against the Imagawa clan). This anti-Nobunaga coalition at the time included the Ikko Ikki Sect (particularly those based at the Ishiyama Honganji temple complex near Osaka who fought Nobunaga since 1570), the Azai clan, the Asakura clan (both of whom Nobunaga had warred with since 1569) and Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki however Shingen was still at war with Uesugi Kenshin to his north (a legendary conflict that had started in 1553 though no clear victor had arisen). Prior to Shingen's invasion Nobunaga had been busy campaigning to his north west against the Asakura in Echizen province (as far north as the fort of Yogo) and Azai in Omi province, raiding this province with his fleet in Lake Biwa, from August to October. Nobunaga had overrun their defenses in Omi province and then sought to attack the Azai capital at Otani castle to give them the knock out blow. Azai Nagamasa's forces held out in and around Otani castle. Azai Nagamasa and his father Azai Hisamasa panicked and asked for assistance from their Asakura allies. The Azai claimed that Nobunaga's return route to Mino and Owari had been cut by Ikko rebels from Ise province and that if Asakura Yoshikage reinforced them they could destroy the Oda army. As Asakura Yoshikage rushed to relieve his allies he realized the strength which Nobunaga had at this time and camped nearby on mount Ozuku. However Nobunaga reacted by trapping the Asakura on that mountain, the Asakura only escaping during a night breakout. Nobunaga then ordered fortifications to be made in Omi province at Toragoze and Miyabe. Another huge setback for Asakura Yoshikage; his vassals Maeba Yoshitsugu and Tomita Nagashige defected to Nobunaga. Upon being informed that a Takeda invasion was imminent Nobunaga broke off his campaign in October and retreated back to Mino, leaving a weakened enemy in his wake. Takeda Shingen had rapidly advanced into the Tokugawa lands of Totomi and began to take key Tokugawa castles and fortresses such as Futamata and dispatched a detachment, under Akiyama Nobutomo, into eastern Mino forcing the Oda castle of Iwamura to surrender. Shingen's advance guard, under Yamagata Masakage, had also marched into Mikawa province from Totomi. After Shingen invaded it was decided that the Asakura-Azai armies would attack across Omi and into Mino province while the Takeda army would march through Mikawa and into Owari and Mino catching the Oda clan in a pincer and leaving the Tokugawa behind either as puppets or completely in tatters. It was not so simple and when the Asakura and Azai began their march through Omi and towards Mino their nominal leader, Asakura Yoshikage, halted and was not willing to do battle against the Oda troops at the fortified positions of Toragoze and Miyabe instead hesitating and then retreating to their own castles in Echizen and Omi (as Asakura Yoshikage had been campaigning for five straight months this may have been a factor). Due to this lack of coordination Shingen was forced to concentrate on the reduction of the Tokugawa before him systematically.
Finally Nobunaga decided to act against Shingen, now that their alliance was certainly broken. At the end of the year Takigawa Kazumasu was dispatched with a contingent of a couple thousand men to support Ieyasu along with a set of orders for Kazumasu and Ieyasu among which included not giving battle to Shingen.


Battle of Mikatagahara; Shingen's army smashed through the centre and a detachment attacked Ieyasu's right flank, routing the overstretched Tokugawa line (January 25, 1573)


Tokugawa Ieyasu after his defeat at Mikatagahara, despite Nobunaga's warnings Ieyasu gave battle to Shingen and barely retreated to his castle at Hamamatsu, henceforth he would become "a cautious old badger"

At the start of the year 1573 Takeda Shingen had already lost the margin for a fast and overwhelming victory by not accomplishing his strategic and operational goals at the Battle of Mikatagahara. Tokugawa Ieyasu chose to sally from his castle in Hamamatsu but was heavily defeated on the Mikata plains, ignoring Nobunaga's wishes. Despite this Shingen had no way to seize Hamamatsu as raids from his enemy, lack of supplies and the current winter forced him to withdraw from in front of the fortress and capture weaker more isolated castles. Shingen advanced west to the border of Mikawa province and personally oversaw the capture of Noda castle but failed to capture Takatenjin in Totomi province. However after the Battle of Mikatagahara, Nobunaga prepared an army to relieve Mikawa province and prevent Shingen from advancing into Oda lands, instead the Takeda commanders opted to withdraw rather than face the Oda army in the field. While they still persisted to be a major threat to the Tokugawa and something greater than a mere nuisance to the Oda clan itself. Nobunaga took the time first to defeat the Shogun's forts in western Omi province and then besiege, eventually capturing Kyoto, he banished Ashikaga Yoshiaki and ended the Ashikaga Shogunate. Next he did away with the Asakura and Azai clans to his north west capturing their capitals at Ichijodani (Echizen) and Otani (northern Omi) and killing their leaders, thus closing off that front once and for all. In Settsu province the Miyoshi clan tried to declare war on Nobunaga as they had previously been at war but signed a peace agreement, the Miyoshi retainers instead killed their lord Miyoshi Yoshitsugu rather than having to fight Nobunaga again (they would eventually retreat to Shikoku island and ask for Nobunaga's protection). The Takeda seemed perfectly willing to capture some castles, garrison their newly captured areas within the Tokugawa lands and retreat back into the mountains of Kai to regroup altogether and end the campaign season. They decided to wait and wage minor campaigns throughout the coming years. The Takeda were long gone before the Oda army could even arrive. Takeda Shingen however met his demise later that year due to illness (despite the claims of the Tokugawa that he had been shot by one of their gunners at Noda, this might be mere propaganda). It was said that upon his death Shingen told his son Katsuyori to not undertake any major offensives "Do not move, a mountain does not move". In 1573 Nobunaga had seen the demise of many enemies: Asakura Yoshikage, Azai Nagamasa, Azai Hisamasa, Miyoshi Yoshitsugu, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshiaki (who was forced to become a monk) and Takeda Shingen. Nobunaga finished off his campaigns in 1573 by attacking the Ikko sects to his south in Ise province.

PART 2 "Its invasion and plundering fierce like a fire, it is immovable and unconquerable like a mountain" - Sunzi Bingfa, Chapter 7, passage 18:

Shingen the immovable mountain's double at the Siege of Takatenjin, led by Katsuyori, as depicted in the film Kagemusha


Takeda Katsuyori had taken part in his father's campaign in Mikawa and Totomi (1572-73) then upon succeeding his father led a successful campaign against the Tokugawa (Totomi 1574), having faced multiple setbacks and defeat in the Nagashino campaign (Mikawa 1575) he held on for the survival of his clan as the Hojo clan also turned on him, invaded from every side he committed Seppuku in 1582; history has not looked kindly upon him

Shingen's successor Katsuyori campaigned again the following year (1574) and besieged the fortress of Takatenjin (a castle that Shingen had been unable to take the previous campaign) in Totomi province while simultaneously sending a smaller force to attack Mino province in the Oda lands and seize Akechi castle, waging something more towards a war of attrition rather than seeking a major engagement, neither did the Tokugawa seek to do battle and preferred to defend their castles.
The Oda relief forces were unable to arrive at Akechi before the castle fell to the Takeda force and instead retreated back into central Mino. Another relief attempt failed as the Tokugawa held Takatenjin castle in Totomi province fell before the Oda force could reach it, Takeda Katsuyori then withdrew his army rather than to do battle with Oda Nobunaga. Nobunaga gained success and faced setbacks in this year as well. Yamato province in the west surrendered to his rule however a massive Ikko sect revolt in the northern part of Echizen province killed the deputy military governor.
The last campaign of the year saw Nobunaga wage massive and brutal war in Ise province again and after the fourth campaign there the Oda clan destroyed the Ikko fortress of Nagashima along with all of its defenders.


The Takeda charge falters as 3000 gunners fire in volleys along the small bank of the Rengogawa river, behind which Oda Nobunaga has built a palisade which would bear the brunt of multiple charges eventually becoming the fighting area between both sides in close combat


The Battle of Nagashino; slaughter of the Takeda by the Oda pikemen and gunners in front of the palisade, the Takeda right flank was then overwhelmed by an infantry and cavalry assault, meanwhile some detachments advance on the other side of the Toyokawa river to relieve Nagashino castle still under assault by a couple thousand troops (June 28, 1575)

In 1575 Katsuyori sought to give a major blow to the Tokugawa by attempting to capture the provincial capital of Okazaki in Mikawa province, being offered to open the gates by a retainer in the Tokugawa ranks, Oga Yashiro, he brought some 15,000 troops or more on a rapid march into Mikawa province but also sent over 10,000 troops north into Shinano in case Uesugi Kenshin attacked him from behind. His plan was foiled as Oga Yashiro's treason was discovered and he was executed, there was no way to enter Okazaki so Katsuyori's attention turned to Yoshida castle in southern Mikawa. Yoshida was heavily defended by 5,000 troops due to Ieyasu's foresight that Yoshida would be a target as it controlled part of the coastal road. Yoshida could not easily be assaulted so after a brief siege Katsuyori instead marched north east and attempted to capture Nagashino castle with its 500 troops. Nagashino castle however was placed under the command of a Tokugawa vassal, Okudaira Sadamasa, who had surrendered to Shingen during the earlier Takeda onslaught however upon Shingen's death Sadamasa rejoined the Tokugawa but was punished by Katsuyori with the execution of his family. It was this enmity that existed between Okudaira Sadamasa and Takeda Katsuyori that made Ieyasu believe that if Nagashino castle was under the command of this vassal then it would not easily surrender. The Tokugawa asked for reinforcements from their Oda allies and the response was extremely quick, 30,000 Oda troops rapidly joined with 8,000 Tokugawa troops at Okazaki before Katsuyori had begun his attack on Nagashino castle. Upon receiving word that Katsuyori had started to besiege Nagashino the allied armies marched from Okazaki to the relief of Nagashino castle. As the Shinchokoki states "Lord Nobunaga went with the intention of killing them all" which implies that at this point Nobunaga had decided that the time was right to force a major engagement which could become the decisive battle of this war. Despite his campaign having been advised against by his generals, Katsuyori had been extremely optimistic throughout the entire campaign (so too was Shingen before Mikatagahara in 1573). Katsuyori believed that in this campaign the Tokugawa might be knocked out of the war and later on that Yoshida castle and then Nagashino castle might fall, even going so far that he might defeat the Oda-Tokugawa force when this army came to contest his siege of Nagashino. However one should note that Katsuyori never intended to force a major battle but rather hoped that he might quickly capture Okazaki and changed his strategic and operational goals to the capture of Yoshida then again changed to the capture of Nagashino. In truth Katsuyori was simply caught off guard as he did not expect the Oda clan to make such a quick response and much less so with an allied army 38,000 strong. When the Oda-Tokugawa army marched out in front of Nagashino the veteran generals of the Takeda clan advised a retreat but Katsuyori was determined to defeat Nobunaga and Ieyasu or at the very least to capture Nagashino before a withdrawal would be ordered. Katsuyori's defeat at Nagashino was a massive blow because he lost about half his force, many veteran officers (such as Yamagata Masakage and Baba Nobuharu) and had no gains to show for it, however the war continued as an attrition war and the Takeda had not yet collapsed. The castles of Iwamura and Akechi in Mino had also been recaptured by Oda Nobutada later in the year. Meanwhile Nobunaga rapidly marched his army from the south east towards the north west and then swung north east, the aim of this operation being to retake Echizen province which had been overrun by Ikko sect rebels. This campaign could be described as a brutal massacre and as Nobunaga stated "I have destroyed them in every valley and in every mountain", this did not mean however that the pacification of Echizen was complete and perhaps would not be until 1580 (the year that the Ishiyama Honganji surrendered) or 1581 as Nobunaga's generals brutally suppressed the Ikko Ikki adherents and would move onto the neighboring provinces of Kaga and Etchu to fight them and the Uesugi clan there as well.

PART 3 "It is unknowable like the darkness, in movement it is mighty as the thunder" - Sunzi Bingfa, Chapter 7, passage 19:

"Tenka Fubu": Oda Nobunaga had waged constant war since 1568 until his death in 1582 for control of Kyoto; in 1573 he banished the Ashikaga Shogun and declared a new reign known as the Tensho Era on the 28th day of the Seventh month saying "Those who are at peace with nature bring all under Heaven into its correct pattern"

While Tokugawa Ieyasu and Takeda Katsuyori faced each other in the slow war along their mountainous border, during the period of 1576 and 1577 the Oda armies had focused their campaigns against the Ishiyama Honganji temple complex. In late 1577 Nobunaga had also dispatched Shibata Katsuie with an army from Echizen province with the intention of conquering Noto province. This expedition resulted in a battle between general Shibata Katsuie and the daimyo Uesugi Kenshin, the latter of whom achieved the upper hand at the Battle of Tedorigawa. The fighting ceased afterwards with both armies fortifying their sides of the Tedori river and Shibata continued his campaign to suppress the Ikko rebels behind him. During the exact same time Matsunaga Hisahide rebelled in Yamato province and Nobunaga dispatched his heir Nobutada with an army to quell this revolt. A major disaster was averted since both Matsunaga Hisahide and Uesugi Kenshin would not be attacking Kyoto from the south and north east respectively. These years were momentuous because Nobunaga had begun to establish his rule in the capital of Kyoto. The year also saw the entrance of the Mori and the Uesugi into the war against Nobunaga; Uesugi Kenshin had been allied to Nobunaga and been at war with the Hojo (in Kozuke), Ikko Ikki (in Etchu and Kaga) and Takeda (in Shinano and Kozuke) but now made peace with the latter two enemies and entered into a stand off along the Echizen-Kaga province border with the Oda clan (he would die the next year). Nobunaga responded with his own political move by making an alliance with the Hojo clan far off to the Kanto plains in the east against the Takeda and Uesugi. From 1578 onward the Oda began campaigns against the Mori clan and their allies in the Chugoku region. There still remained the opposition from the Ikko Ikko sectarians in Kii province and Settsu province to the south west but also to the north east in Echizen and Kaga provinces. Though this period also saw another uprising in Settsu province from Nobunaga's vassal Araki Murashige, fortunately many of Murashige's retainers surrendered to the Oda clan and Itami castle was captured. The majority of campaigns being conducted against the Ikko Ikki sects and the Mori clan up to 1580 when the Ishiyama Honganji surrendered but the Takeda clan taking a relative back seat. In 1581 Iga province in central Japan was also taken after a long struggle against the various small clans within the mountains and swamp lands. From 1580 until 1581 the combined Oda-Tokugawa forces began to completely push the Takeda from the Oda and Tokugawa lands recapturing the major castles of Noda, Takatenjin and Futamata (among others). Takeda Katsuyori was now surrounded as he was fighting a war with the Hojo in the east, the Tokugawa in the south and the Oda in the west. A massive campaign was undertaken in 1582 to destroy the Takeda as these three clans led their armies on every side through the mountains into Shinano and Kai provinces overwhelming all of the castles that lay before them: "On the third day of the Second Month, Lord Nobunaga proclaimed his intent to attack along all access routes. From the Suruga approach Lord Ieyasu; from the Kanto region approach, Hojo Ujimasa; from the Hida approach, Kanamori Gorohachi would be in command of operations; while from the Ina approach, Lord Nobunaga and Lord Sanmi no Chujo Nobutada would invade the Takeda dominions in two separate thrusts. This was the plan laid down by Nobunaga". The fate of the Takeda had been sealed and Katsuyori along with most of his family died that year. Katsuyori and his immediate family killed themselves in the forest while being pursued by Oda troops. The Oda took control of Shinano and Kozuke provinces and rewarded the Tokugawa with control of Kai and Suruga provinces. 1582 was a highly eventful year since not only was the Takeda clan exterminated but there were massive offensives against the Uesugi clan in the north east (by Shibata Katsuie in Etchu) and Mori clan to the south west (as far as Bichu province in the south west by Hashiba Hideyoshi), of course this was also the year that saw the end of Nobunaga as he was killed by a rebellious vassal, Akechi Mitsuhide, in June within the capital of Kyoto... he did not have long to savour his victory against the Takeda.

We can discern a few things from these wars. First that Shingen's plan to wage war against Nobunaga hinged on his alliance with Asakura Yoshikage and Azai Nagamasa.
Second that Shingen and Katsuyori underestimated the resilience of Tokugawa Ieyasu, the Tokugawa after all did most of the grunt work from the period of 1572 until 1580. Even though the Tokugawa received great assistance from the Oda in 1575 it was not until after 1580 that the Oda committed their forces to the active and systematic reduction of the Takeda forces from the territory of the Tokugawa and the eventual destruction of the Takeda.
Third that neither Takeda Shingen nor Takeda Katsuyori were willing to engage in pitched battle with the Oda clan, choosing instead to retreat when the Oda tried to relieve their allies, Nagashino in 1575 came as an unexpected battle for the Takeda.
Fourth that after the failure of Asakura Yoshikage to attack the Oda in 1572 and the failure of Shingen to destroy the Tokugawa in 1573 the nature of this war became that of a long attrition conflict.
Fifth Nobunaga realized his precarious position since he did not seek to fight Shingen immediately after he attacked their mutual Tokugawa allies. The Oda tried to mediate the conflict and put a blind eye to Shingen's attacks so as not to be commited to a new front while the Oda were still fighting their other enemies to the west. His diplomatic efforts completely failed and it was clear that Shingen was aiming to destroy the Oda clan's dominance in central Japan. Nobunaga was also motivated to support the Tokugawa as he could not afford for them to get wiped out or surrender to the Takeda. During this time Nobunaga wrote to his other ally Uesugi Kenshin asking him to coordinate his efforts with him and Tokugawa Ieyasu against Takeda Shingen. Even after the massive victory of Nagashino the majority of Oda Nobunaga's operations were executed against his enemies to the west and the Takeda seemed to take a back seat after the death of Shingen (or arguably after Nagashino).

Here is an interesting excerpt from the Shinchokoki (Chronicle of Lord Nobunaga). The conclusion that Shingen (or Ota Gyuichi the writer as we can't be sure if Shingen said this) seems to come up with is probably the most interesting part. In trying to understand his future opponent Shingen is troubled upon discerning that Nobunaga is indeed a powerful general. Since this is anecdotal who knows if Takeda Shingen ever said this or if this conversation ever happened, our only source is secondary in the form of Ota Gyuichi who was an Oda retainer. The fact that this comparison is even made causes me to think that there was a sense of competition and rivalry between the two from the beginning, or at least the need to compare one great general with another. The excerpt seemingly wants us to believe that as early as 1558 a personal rivalry existed between the powerful Takeda Shingen and the newcomer Oda Nobunaga.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[+Marius+]

Well, I would not suggest that Nobunaga would lose the war, but a possible stalemate could have occurred.

It does depend on the actions Shingen would take post 1574 though, as Nagashino was indeed avoidable.

Ultimately, Nobunaga was the superior player in the story and the everlasting issue of who has more guns(he does) does get in the way of a possible setback in favor of the Takeda.

The best they could hope for is to survive alongside the presence of Nobunaga until he dies...somehow.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

After both failing to coordinate an attack against the Oda with his Asakura and Azai allies and then failing to knock the Tokugawa out of the war at Mikatagahara the whole strategic situation was due to Shingen.
So I don't get why the argument comes up that Shingen could have still won if he hadn't died. There's just no way Shingen could have actually done anything to change the tide of the war after Mikatagahara. Shingen would probably have to just wait for an opportunity or wait out the Oda since neither he nor his son Katsuyori were willing to sit in the open while an Oda force attacked them.
No matter what though the Oda would have still utterly crushed the Asakura and Azai and this was completely a team effort if Shingen wanted to get anywhere. Maybe if Shingen lived until 1577 he could have coordinated his efforts with Uesugi Kenshin to the north and the rebellious Matsunaga Hisahide to the south west but that is only assuming that Uesugi Kenshin would attempt to cross the Tedori river into Echizen province and carry on the offensive.

Even Katsuyori attempted a similar move to Mikatagahara (early 1573) in 1575 to seize the Tokugawa castle of Okazaki which was the provincial capital of Mikawa province (however the Tokugawa capital was Hamamatsu which was further east in Totomi province) thinking that a Tokugawa vassal was actually one of his double agents and would open the gates for him. This turned out to be false so he took his 15,000 troops south to instead try and capture Yoshida castle, Ieyasu preempted this movement and garrisoned it with 5000 troops and made it unassailable. Katsuyori then marched east to Nagashino castle which would only have been a minor advantage to the Takeda and he was incapable of capturing it in time. Ieyasu purposely had Okudaira Sadamasa defend this castle with 500 men, Sadamasa was a former Takeda vassal who greatly despised Takeda Katsuyori (mosto f all because after Sadamasa defected Katsuyori had his family killed) so Ieyasu figured that Nagashino would not surrender. Not only that but Katsuyori only brought 15,000 troops thinking he would accomplish his original goal rather quickly, having sent a detachment northward to guard Shinano province in case Uesugi Kenshin took this time to attack from behind. He literally had no idea that the 38,000 man relief force was coming, as 30,000 Oda troops marched all the way from Omi province and he probably figured that the Tokugawa were unwilling to do battle. So not only did Katsuyori split up his force but he was operating under the assumption that all of this could be done fairly quickly and easily. A few of his generals getting killed the next day along with his army being decimated he must have realized how stupid this zerg attempt was.
Then by 1580 he was also actively fighting the Hojo clan so he was downright screwed and no doubt Shingen would have little response now that he was surrounded on almost every side, he might have attempted an offensive against the Hojo but it would have accomplished little since the Hojo couldn't be knocked out of the war no matter what (probably only a joint Uesugi-Takeda invasion could have beat them).
But the massive campaign to end the Takeda in 1582 was I think the first operation of that year, literally being announced on the "third day of the Second month" (lunar calendar) so the margin for an actual victory against either the Tokugawa or Oda was extremely small and Shingen totally missed it.

Honestly there isn't even a comparison in my opinion. We have the Oda popping 30,000 men on every front, 60,000 against the Ishiyama Honganji monks and supported by probably up to 15,000 Tokugawa (a field army numbering 8,000 to 10,000 and a further 5,000 men as garrisons perhaps). Then we have Shingen and Katsuyori with a total force of 40,000 maybe (50,000 at their peak) with about 30,000 (maybe only 28,000) serving as a field army. This is basically a side theatre compared to the stuff going on in the areas from Settsu in the west to Omi in the east and Echizen/Kaga in the north. In every one of those years the Oda waged multiple campaigns on multiple fronts so it's not like the Takeda ever occupied the majority of their attention at any given time. After Nagashino the Oda army made a rapid march north west and then east into Echizen, they didn't even try to keep fighting the Takeda. As this rapidly became an attrition war it became evident that the Oda could mobilize far more men and resources.

[hellheaven1987]

During Battle of Nagashino Takeda charge did successfully break through the palisade line at several points, some even nearly reached Nobunaga HQ; however Nobunaga did expect this and created a trap for those breakthrough by deployed reserve, particularly gunners, to attack those intruders' flank, resulted a stagger for those breakthroughs (kindly like WWI "breakthrough").

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Yes when people think of the Battle of Nagashino they tend to think of a bunch of horses charging at a palisade and getting mown down by Rambo side shooting at all of them. When in reality the cavalry troops dismounted when they reached the palisade and were accompanied by attendants on foot and some infantry troops. On the right flank the Oda cavalry troopers dismounted to support that flank as one of the later Takeda charges was aimed at outflanking the enemy left. There was also the problem that some fog had obscured the battle field earlier that day so Takeda Katsuyori had trouble getting information about the Oda-Tokugawa position. There was also a rain storm the previous night so he just assumed that the Oda gun powder had gotten wet.
I would say personally that any battle between the two sides in 1575 was doomed from the start during this campaign. I say this because Katsuyori had ordered 10,000 troops under Kosaka Masanobu (like half his army) to northern Shinano province to fight Uesugi Kenshin rather than bring his forces together south into Mikawa and I think he may have sent another force to attack the Tokugawa on the other side east in Totomi province as a diversion (possibly, not sure on this). However Katsuyori was not expecting to fight a major battle and all of his moves were literally preempted by Tokugawa Ieyasu in his apprehending the traitor in Okazaki, reinforcing Yoshida castle and then sending Okudaira Sadamasa to command Nagashino castle with Nobunaga finally going in for the kill. Later on Kosaka Masanobu would march all the way down from Shinano with his 10,000 troops to cover Katsuyori's retreat back into Takeda lands. Even after Nagashino the war still lasted for another 7 years and on the whole lasted between 1572 and 1582 which is a full decade. Actually the Ikko Ikki Buddhist sects also held out from 1570 until 1580 when the Osaka area Ishiyama Honganji monks surrendered and some religious adherents fought on until 1582 in the northern provinces of Kaga and Etchu. By comparison the Azai and Asakura clans lasted only from 1569 until 1573.


Here is the more Hollywood style depiction of Nagashino from the film Kagemusha


This depiction from the show King of Zipangu is probably more accurate

[Roma_Victrix]

Can I just say that the title of this thread is totally badass? That allowed?

Nice work, Oda! You've done some thorough research here. And you have a clip from Akira Kurosawa's Ran, which earns you double points.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I probably could have tried to give more details like the battles themselves and the sieges but I didn't want to do research that thorough and I wanted to focus more on the strategic situation rather than the battles and sieges.

I totally got the title from the Takeda/Sun Tzu FuRinKaZan banner. It was also a sort of inside joke since Takeda Shingen was described as a mountain as well as supposedly having said to his son "do not move, a mountain does not move" however Oda Nobunaga seemed to have the destructive power of a volcano having destroyed Mount Hiei with fire and sword, burned down the Ise Nagashima temple fortresses, systematically exterminated the Ikko Buddhist adherents, wiped out clan after clan and cut down the Takeda at Nagashino through fire power before perishing in a blazing inferno at Honnoji temple, not sure if poetic justice but certainly fierce like fire.

For each part I also added quotes from Sun Tzu's the Art of War in chapter 7 where for some reason the Takeda only used the passages 17 and 18 (wind and forest; fire and mountain). Instead I added the whole saying from Sun Tzu's the Art of War and put each passage at the start of every section and honestly I think these apply for these wars on the whole especialy the section I put each quote in:
"Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage and changes through segmenting and reuniting.
Its rapidity is that of the wind, its silence that of the forest.
Its invasion and plundering fierce like a fire, it is immovable and unconquerable like a mountain.
It is unknowable like the darkness, in movement it is mighty as the thunder." Sun Tzu the Art of War chapter 7

rapid like the wind, silent like the forest = 1572 Takeda Shingen invades the Oda and Tkougawa, Nobunaga attacks Azai and Asakura, retreats to hold Mino when he finds out Shingen will invade. 1573 Battle of Mikatagahara (according to the Japanese lunar calendar then Mikatagahara would be the equivalent of the last month of 1572 but due to the Gregorian calendar it would be first month of 1573, January in other words) where Ieyasu gets wrecked by Shingen since he chose to give battle rather than hold out in his castle, Nobunaga invades and destroys the Ashikaga Shogun, the Azai and the Asakura.

fierce like fire, immovable like a mountain = 1574 Takeda Katsuyori invades in the follow up to his father's previous campaign successfully capturing Oda and Tokugawa fortresses but chooses not to give battle to the Oda forces and likewise Tokugawa Ieyasu learns his lesson and chooses to defend his castles rather than give battle to an opponent he cannot beat.
1575 Katsuyori again invades leading a massive raid to take over Mikawa province and begin to defeat the Tokugawa at a much faster pace. Again Ieyasu defends but this time much better preempting every one of Katsuyori's moves, unexpectedly Nobunaga goes for the kill but Katsuyori not heeding advice attacks completely unable to move the Oda-Tokugawa army from the field.

unknowable like the darkness and in movement mighty like the thunder = 1576 up to 1582 where every move becomes a killing move, all of the Oda clan's enemies get a kick in the dick followed by decapitation, massive operations are undertaken to the corners of Japan most of which cannot be predicted and the enemy clans crumble under their weight.


Gotta say though Nobunaga must have had one hell of an intelligence network if he found out that Takeda Shingen would be attacking at any moment. He broke off his campaign against Azai and Asakura in late October and about 10 days later in November Takeda Shingen was rushing out of the mountains kicking Ieyasu's door in.
I still don't get why Shingen was attacking in November since wouldn't the campaign season have ended by then (hell Asakura Yoshikage might have ended his campaign due to this reason)? Maybe this was what made his attack so unpredictable but he stuck around until the early spring of 1573 when he finally retreated back into his mountain province and kicked the bucket due to some reason.

I also find it strange that Ieyasu and Nobunaga kept trying to coordinate their campaigns with Uesugi Kenshin but Kenshin seems to have done little in the way of actually fighting the Takeda at the time. Instead he went into Etchu province and starting fighting the Ikko sect, the Jinbo, the Shiina and the Anegakoji clans (who were allied to Shingen in order to undermine the Uesugi clan). But then the year after Nagashino he straight up switched sides allying with Takeda Katsuyori but didn't even try to invade the Oda clan really, that's just so odd.

[Inkie]

Quite detailed and informative posts here, dude. I would recommend breaking up some of those paragraphs a little more, maybe to opt for a bit more of a narrative flow as well, but perhaps that's just me.

Anyhow, I'd pretty much agree, I mean not counting Nobunaga's genius, as you said he had huge resources by the time he was fighting the bulk of his enemies, also benefiting from interior lines, and so being able to concentrate on the weaker coalition members when given the opportunity. I think you may be going a little harsh on his enemies for their poor coordination, given the facts explaining that weakness, such as often poor relations, sometimes having allied to defeat a common enemy, communication difficulties considering the date and especially through mountainous regions and Oda territory, different priorities and different convenient times for campaigning against Oda, etc.

To be fair to Katsuyori, he inherited the greatest domain in eastern Japan, also what was seen as the best army of its day, and his father's legacy. I'd probably be a little overconfident too if I was in his shoes

Either way, I think what it really comes down to is, at the risk of making a sweeping statement, that Kenshin and Shingen were both traditional daimyos fighting conventional warfare of their time, content with incremental gains and merely seeking to protect and gradually expand their borders. I mean I wouldn't even be confident to say that guys like Takeda Shingen or Imagawa Yoshimoto were really driven by an overarching urge to march on Kyoto and dominate the country even though that's often assumed to have been the case. What really stands out about Oda Nobunaga is (aside from his ambition, innovations and eccentricity) is that as you say, his wars were so relentlessly tempestuous, risky, unpredictable that he could easily catch his enemies off-guard. A bit like when you look at the French Revolution and Napoleon's methods compared to their enemies'.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I did want to have more paragraphs but opted to just put each chunk based on the year. I thought I would run out of space but I can certainly keep cleaning this up.

Yes Nobunaga's basic strategy here seems to have been very Frederician in nature using interior lines to reinforce any point that was under heavy fire. When he captured Mino province in 1567 and southern Omi and Kyoto in 1568 he had a direct route from Tokugawa's lands all the way to the provinces around Kyoto.
Allegedly the conquest of Mino province allowed Nobunaga to raise 60,000 troops to march on Kyoto. Whether this is true the point is that Nobunaga's army started at about 4,000 in Owari, 13,000 after invading Mino for about a decade and maybe 30,000 to 60,000 after the total conquest of Mino.

The thing that most strikes me is the sheer speed by which Nobunaga carried out his operations. Initially I believed that the Battle of Okehazama 1560 was the exception but his campaign against the Miyoshi clan to seize Kyoto was also incredibly fast. Every campaign against the Azai clan Nobunaga was more or less a stone's throw away from their main castle at Otani and in 1573 he rapidly knocked out the Asakura and Azai. Then of course we have 1575 with the advance to Nagashino and the equally rapid operation right after from Mikawa all the way to Echizen. Despite the fact that most of these wars were attrition wars full of sieges his rapid movements and campaigns were extremely successful. Even if a siege failed however his immediate response would to secure the area for further sieges, raid the surrounding country side and execute or resettle the populace in that area. It was said that he personally could rapidly cover the ground from Kyoto to Mino on horseback in a surprisingly short amount of time.

The lack of coordination between Asakura Yoshikage and Takeda Shingen was definitely a major issue for their campaign. Yes it had very much to do with the distances involved however Asakura Yoshikage's retreat in 1572 rather than attacking Toragoze fortress in Omi province is presented as being cowardice. It is even stated that Azai Nagamasa and Azai Hisamasa had to lie to him out of desperation that Nobunaga's retreat had been cut off by the Ise Nagashimo Ikko Ikki and that pumping in his 20,000 or more Asakura troops would turn their situation into their favour. This is probably unfair as Asakura Yoshikage had answer Azai's call and a result had not only received a severe beating but also had campaigned for months now and November was about to start, certainly one has to question why Shingen chose November to March as his campaigning season.

Takeda Katsuyori basically intervened in a succession struggle in Echigo province siding with Uesugi Kagekatsu (Kenshin's nephew) against Uesugi Kagetora (the seventh son of Hojo Ujiyasu). After Kagekatsu became daimyo and Kanto Kanrei (sort of Viceroy of Kanto region, which the Hojo controlled by this point) Hojo Ujimasa made an agreement with Oda and Tokugawa clans against Uesugi and Takeda for the death of his brother. Takeda Katsuyori also waged minor campaigns along the border against the Hojo clan and was slightly successful, There was also a naval battle near Suruga province against the Hojo which ended in failure.