Tactical options for Europeans facing a Mongolian army.

[Marvzilla]

I read your post. Many of your suggestions I incorporated in my post. Usually the only way to beat a Mongol is to out Mongol the Mongols. The alternative is just to sit on Mount Everest, dig a trench around it and fortify it with a million archers and heavy infantry. But massing cavalry in one flank and watching the entire Mongol column crumble to a surprise attack is usually a must, the issue is catching the Mongols by surprise which I suppose can be done in forests a la Stefan Cel Mare killing Poles and Hungarians or at a river crossing which should have been Mohi but better (although I remember when Conrad von Hoetzendorf tried to outflank the Russians at Warsaw 1915 when they were crossing the Vistula he utterly failed, strangely Manstein succeeded with this at Kharkov so say what you will cause I can't make heads or tails of it).

Roma mentioned the lack of the best Mongols at a given time thus leading to a defeat. A big con for the Mongols is the lack of actual Mongolian troops to begin with. As time progressed highly skilled Mongols had to be replaced with all sorts of Turkic tribes and Cumans and what not, a true disgrace among horse nomads.

Sorry I was a bit aggravated by the replies describing european armies of the time only as knights and then some rabble, so I skipped some posts. What happened with the Magyars, not only done by the Ottonians but also the Luitpoldinger Dukes of Bavaria before them, was to ambush and force them to battle at unfavourable points for the Magyars, when they were on the return to the steppes. To only entrench oneself like the Khwarezmids did has proven to be fatal. Henry I. first did so in 926 when Magyars raided Saxony and he had to no other option but to sit it out in Werla, and only when his troops captured an Magyar captain (due to unknown circumstances as the sources dont tell us anything about this) he was able to force an truce with the Magyars.

He did beat them in 933 at the famous Battle of the Riade, though it were two seperate divisions of an Magyar army that were defeated then. He more or less screened his heavy cavalry (Loricati) with lighter cavalry so that they could close with the horse archers.

One of the most important things a army has to possess is to remain disciplined if fighting against an army of this kind. Otto the great won the Battle of the Lechfeld but only allowed his army to pursue the (in good order) "fleeing" Magyars for a short distance. This way he avoided their tactics of the feigned retreat, which brought disaster to generals before him, such as the Eastern Franks in the Battle of the Lechfeld in 910. What destroyed the Magyars were the many points of resistance, along rivers and fords and forests. From their castles and fortresses the Bavarians harassed and forced the Magyars to battle when they split into smaller groups by then.

[Roma_Victrix]

Its like no one read my post and says generalised stuff which has already been disproven especially about the composition of European armies of the 13th century (where most of the army was paid for, for example due to scutage).

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the scutage taxation system was only applied in medieval England, yes? For that matter, not every medieval European army was trained and recruited in the same way. Compare the Kingdom of France and northern Italian city-states, for instance. The former was the prime model of feudal knight-service, while the latter relied heavily on semi-professional urban militias and mercenary condottieri.

[Marvzilla]

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the scutage taxation system was only applied in medieval England, yes? For that matter, not every medieval European army was trained and recruited in the same way. Compare the Kingdom of France and northern Italian city-states, for instance. The former was the prime model of feudal knight-service, while the latter relied heavily on semi-professional urban militias and mercenary condottieri.

If I am not totally wrong it also applied for the HRE in many cases. 13th mid- Century is a bit too early for Condotierri I think. Atleast not in the form we see them later. You see that I havent fiddled with High Medieval Europe for quite some time as my interest is primary with the 10 and 11th century. But the notion of peasant rabble infantry on a large scale was discarded, as there were Man-at-Arms and the usage of mercenaries. German Emperors were reliant on Ministeriales and especially the Clergy as they were the most reliable source for military personnel in form of afore mentioned Ministeriales.

[hellheaven1987]

I have read before that Otto did some military reforms and hence the Ottonian military system was different than Carolingian military system, what were those reforms?

[Marvzilla]

I have read before that Otto did some military reforms and hence the Ottonian military system was different than Carolingian military system, what were those reforms?

That was his father Henry I.

Ill come back on this later with more. I can already say these reforms were about the agrarii milites, and the development of the deep defense strategy, which was already successfully employed by the Bavarian Dukes.

[Roma_Victrix]

If I am not totally wrong it also applied for the HRE in many cases. 13th mid- Century is a bit too early for Condotierri I think. Atleast not in the form we see them later. You see that I havent fiddled with High Medieval Europe for quite some time as my interest is primary with the 10 and 11th century. But the notion of peasant rabble infantry on a large scale was discarded, as there were Man-at-Arms and the usage of mercenaries. German Emperors were reliant on Ministeriales and especially the Clergy as they were the most reliable source for military personnel in form of afore mentioned Ministeriales.

From what I gather, condottieri were a late 13th century creation with almost ronin-style wandering soldiers, thanks to the winding down of the Crusades and veterans of those wars continuing to look for work. In the late 13th century, you had some condottieri like Malatesta da Verucchio, Roger de Flor, and Castruccio Castracani. However, you are right, the golden age of the condottieri was the 14th and early 15th centuries with the likes of John Hawkwood and many others.

[Cyclops]

At this point, if we are talking about the 1240s and 1250s, Constantinople was already in the pocket of Western Christendom, considering how the Latin Empire birthed from the Fourth Crusade still held the city. It wasn't retaken by the scattered Byzantines until 1261, by Michael VIII Palaiologos during his (somewhat) successful attempt to revive the empire. Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, therefore would have only had to worry about making nice with the Islamic powers in the meantime. He built a good track record of doing just that when peacefully and diplomatically acquiring Jerusalem from the Ayyubid Egyptian Sultan Al-Kamil during the Sixth Crusade (1228-1229).

Yes Frederick II was quite the guy. He had a chance to make a very centralised state on the back of Sicily, with its established ERE bureaucrats preserved by the Emirs. However as usual the guy in the silly hat in the Vatican made trouble, and Italian cities and German nobles maintained their tradition of changing sides every few years.

Still his people feared/hoped/imagined Frederick might achieve authority over Europe not seen since Big Karl, so it might have been possible for him to do so.

The Western Xia, Jin, and Southern Song empires divided China for starters, making it weaker than it was a century before when most of China was controlled by the Northern Song dynasty (minus the territories controlled by the Wester Xia and Liao dynasties). Also, by virtue of being Mongolia's neighbor, it was far easier logistically speaking for the Mongols to launch invasions into China, Korea and Central Asia from their home base in Mongolia than it was to send armies all the way to Muscovy and eastern Europe. It's astonishing how much the Mongols were able to conquer so far from home, including all of Persia, Mesopotamia, the Caucuses, etc. That is honestly owing to the fact discussed here about their armies' professionalism and ability to recruit on a massive scale that other empires couldn't compete against, especially not with expensive hired mercenaries who would just as easily join the other side for better pay or when it became obvious who the victor would be.

Apologies, I typed "Did United China" when I meant "Disunited China": I'm well aware the Middle Kingdom was in pieces for the great Khan to pick up piecemeal.

You're quite right, Genghis was able to maintain huge armies in the field for years, combining steppe mobility with discipline and experience (bordering on professionalism, in that fighting under strict orders was the day job of many thousands of his followers). The great Chinese empires fielded giant armies with fascinating weapons, as well as deploying diplomatic finesse on par with the ERE: most enemies found reasons not to attack, or fell to fighting among themselves before they made it to China.

The Mamluks under Sultan Saif ad-Din Qutuz won at Ain Jalut in 1260 because, just like the earlier withdrawal of the main Mongol forces to Mongolia from Poland and Hungary a decade and a half before, there was a new succession crisis. Möngke Khan had just died, and Hulagu Khan along with the bulk of his troops traveled back to Mongolia to settle the succession of the next great khan. When the Mamluks fought Kitbuqa at Ain Jalut, the latter only had about one tumen (10,000 soldiers) left to him by Hulagu. Their limited numbers (and the fact that the most seasoned Mongol troops were absent) was just one advantage the Egyptian Mamluks had. They also had the logistical support and "neutral" cooperation of the Crusader Kingdom centred at Acre, which allowed them to pass through their territories unmolested and to resupply.

Yes again its a good point that the Mongols achieved a devastating level of operational efficiency through cavalry mobility combined with complete central control of extensive forces. Its also an indication (OT I know) of Genghis' sound diplomacy, isolating and destroying opponents individually, he ranks with Bismarck on this score. I wonder if he had faced a united and diplomatically engaged Chinese emperor, how would he have faired? I think he was a match for any ruler in his own time in diplomacy, as well as in military genius.

Therefore, in order to defeat the Mongols, both the Islamic and Western Christian powers would basically have to absorb the largest, hardest hitting Mongol force and wait until the moment was opportune to pick a good weak spot and attack it with favorable conditions and difficult terrain that didn't give the Mongols' horse archers an advantage. In the forests of Germany and Alpine country of Central Europe this could certainly be done, but I don't think they could have relied entirely on holing up in castles considering the Mongols' siege tech borrowed from Persians and Chinese. I'd think a somewhat impregnable fortress like Salzburg could stand even prolonged battering, but it too could fall simply with the ravages of time, starvation and rationing for the besieged.

Marvzilla offers some sensible tactical options below (like Otto's light cav screen vs the Magyars, and others have mentioned ambushes in the Carpathians). The Mongols certainly enjoyed an extremely high level of discipline across large forces, but the problem fighting the Mongols is not simply (or even principally) tactical.

Its not coincidence there was a defeat of Mongol forces at Ayn Jalut (not a total defeat, but one of regional importance as it drew a line under movements into Egypt. The Mamelukes fielded a sizable cavalry force of I won't say professional, more vocational warriors, at least on par with knights or Mongol nobles in their level of resourcing and training, supplied by an organised bureaucratic "civilised" state and supplied with a ideology and identity to inspire them (Islam as well as their status as Ghulams).

The example of Lechfeld is very interesting. A powerful European ruler adapts his proto-feudal forces to defeat a steppe people-by analogy a high medieval ruler with a similar level of control could surely confront and with luck defeat a souped-up steppe army. This is confirmed by Ayn Jalut.

On the other hand the Magyars (like the Avars before them) did not enjoy the level of centralised control the Mongols had. A serious defeat put a stop to the cycle of raiding/plundering/recruiting that swelled the ranks of raiders from the Hungarian plain. Genghis' polity was not a loose coalition impelled forward by a direct cycle of immediate reward: one serious defeat saw both he Avar and Magyar storm centres collapse, whereas Genghis' Tumens could sustain blockades and adapt to sieges, or maintain discipline on huge foraging raids over several years across swathes from northern Iran into Russia.

So regarding Ayn Jalut, it is often mentioned the Mamelukes were saved by Mongol disunity, and this is a fair point: had several Tumen returned instead of the Mongol realm beginning its steady fragmentation under less able rulers, Egypt would have heard the thunder of steppe ponies hooves and felt the weight of the Mongol yoke like Iran, Turan, Cathay, and Rus.

[Roma_Victrix]

Still his people feared/hoped/imagined Frederick might achieve authority over Europe not seen since Big Karl, so it might have been possible for him to do so.

Big Karl, I like that. Christopher Lee approves too.

Apologies, I typed "Did United China" when I meant "Disunited China": I'm well aware the Middle Kingdom was in pieces for the great Khan to pick up piecemeal.

No worries, I actually didn't misinterpret you at all and was merely stating what I thought was obvious but should be stated regardless for clarity and for anyone here unfamiliar with East Asian history, at least as it pertains to the Mongols.

Yes again its a good point that the Mongols achieved a devastating level of operational efficiency through cavalry mobility combined with complete central control of extensive forces. Its also an indication (OT I know) of Genghis' sound diplomacy, isolating and destroying opponents individually, he ranks with Bismarck on this score. I wonder if he had faced a united and diplomatically engaged Chinese emperor, how would he have faired? I think he was a match for any ruler in his own time in diplomacy, as well as in military genius.

Given that they conquered everything else around it minus their failed forays into Burma and Vietnam, I think the Mongols would have eventually conquered all of China even if it had still stood totally unified by the Song dynasty. The military machine of the Mongols under Genghis and his successors was simply far more capable than Song armies and their more-than-usual ineffectual military commanders. One could blame this on Emperor Taizu of Song and the civilian establishment that put a stranglehold on the military. This was clearly thanks to the rotten legacy of the jiedushi military governors of the late Tang dynasty and subsequent Five Dynasties, Ten Kingdoms period. In either case, the Song would have had to completely reform their military and command structure before giving serious thought to a long-term defence strategy against the Mongols. This never really happened and the fact that the country was politically split apart at the beginning of the 13th century didn't help in the mustering of resources to counter the Mongols effectively.

The example of Lechfeld is very interesting. A powerful European ruler adapts his proto-feudal forces to defeat a steppe people-by analogy a high medieval ruler with a similar level of control could surely confront and with luck defeat a souped-up steppe army. This is confirmed by Ayn Jalut.

On the other hand the Magyars (like the Avars before them) did not enjoy the level of centralised control the Mongols had. A serious defeat put a stop to the cycle of raiding/plundering/recruiting that swelled the ranks of raiders from the Hungarian plain. Genghis' polity was not a loose coalition impelled forward by a direct cycle of immediate reward: one serious defeat saw both he Avar and Magyar storm centres collapse, whereas Genghis' Tumens could sustain blockades and adapt to sieges, or maintain discipline on huge foraging raids over several years across swathes from northern Iran into Russia.

Yes, this distinction definitely needs to be made between the Magyars and the Mongols. For instance, Kublai Khan's navy disastrously failed to invade Japan twice, each time having his armada wrecked by the recurring typhoon (reminds one of the foul weather working against the later Spanish Armada). Yet Kublai still managed to experience relative stability on the continent afterwards. There weren't giant rebellions against him following this, like the rebellion that toppled the Chinese Sui dynasty thanks largely to their failed attempts in 598 and 612 AD to conquer Goguryeo in Korea (expending vast amounts of resources and manpower in the process). Even with the Mongols splitting the empire into several different domains and hordes, I still find it amazing they lasted as long as they did politically on the world stage. That was all thanks to the incredible military organization established by Genghis Khan. The Chinese didn't kick them out until 1367 with the Ming dynasty and the Muscovite Russians took even longer to expel the Golden Horde completely (with the great standoff on the Ugra river in 1480).

[hellheaven1987]

Currently I am reading Edward Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (an intriguing but disturbing work); in the book he argues that one of chief advantages of steppe military was strategical flexibility. In the book, he suggests that steppe military like Huns and Mongols could, in favorable condition, marched 50 ~ 60 miles (around 75 ~ 90km), or even beyond that, per day and continued for several more days in that speed. That sounds pretty BS consider the "high speed" during WWII was around 50 ~ 60km per day, and the "quickest" of WWII in my memory was somewhere around 80km per day, achieved by Soviet during Operation August Storm. In other words, Luttwak suggests that steppe military could operate strategically in a speed that was quicker than WWII mechanized force - a pretty terrified idea I think.

[Mangalore]

I think an interesting fact is that after the near entire destruction of Hungary apparently most fortified towns and castles had withstood the Mongols and while the rural population had suffered greatly the Hungarians actually harrassed the Mongol army as it left so while severly decimated could still fight to some degree. While Mongols could assemble impressive siege corps usually made up of Chinese or other professional apparently they did not have it readily available for everything.

The resurgence of Hungary after the invasion despite severe population loss is at least impressive as is the construction of defensive works within a decade of the invasion. Maybe the decentralized nature of feudalism had some benefits in the sense that you had no centralized state that would crumble after a devastating defeat though it might have anything to do with the Hungarian king being quick on his feet and able to escape the Mongol forces trying to capture him.

[Marvzilla]

As I said, Castles are not only a point of defense but also of attack. Those numbers stated seem bogus, but the strategical flexibility of steppe armies after they have plundered and are heavily laden with loot diminishes somewhat.

[+Marius+]

I believe people are making a huge mistake comparing fortifications of Asia and those of Europe.

It is wrong to level as a similar factor of defense the fortified settlements of the East and a completely different universe of medieval deathtraps, each a feat of military ingenuity, masoned out of stone and designed from scratch, from the basement to the top of the highest tower to make the assaulting army have a very, very...very bad day.
Then one should also multiply these fortifications in the hundreds spanning across every single political entity west of Moldavia.

There is a very good reason why the forces of the Golden Horde, who'd often visit Europe with forces of thousands and sometimes even tens of thousands, had extreme difficulties assaulting even the smallest of Polish/Hungarian fortifications whose garrisons were numbered barely in the hundreds, in many occasions even less than a hundred.

[RollingWave]

I believe people are making a huge mistake comparing fortifications of Asia and those of Europe.

It is wrong to level as a similar factor of defense the fortified settlements of the East and a completely different universe of medieval deathtraps, each a feat of military ingenuity, masoned out of stone and designed from scratch, from the basement to the top of the highest tower to make the assaulting army have a very, very...very bad day.
Then one should also multiply these fortifications in the hundreds spanning across every single political entity west of Moldavia.

There is a very good reason why the forces of the Golden Horde, who'd often visit Europe with forces of thousands and sometimes even tens of thousands, had extreme difficulties assaulting even the smallest of Polish/Hungarian fortifications whose garrisons were numbered barely in the hundreds, in many occasions even less than a hundred.

The difference is actually more in political structure than design, because most Asian fortifications revolve around walled cities, which were similar and on average better walled than their western counter part (even small towns usually have stone / brick walls) .

There were specialized defensive castles also, if anything Mengke Khan died while attempting to take one such mountain fortification in China (reportedly due to diastase, but rumor or being hit by arrow / stones are also abundant.) , but politically it was simply not allowed for those to become any more of that, for the obvious reason of preserving central authority.

Likewise, the mid eastern states also had such fortifications, but because they were generally not tied deeply into the local political establishment, it's ability to last long term was far more compromised.

Western castles came as a compromise itself , needing to stay at least close enough to the populated area, and also it's size were often built to impress more than a real strategic consideration. indeed if one is simply going to built something that's super effective on a per man basis then much less glamorous structures built in more extreme terrains would be more ideal.

Currently I am reading Edward Luttwak's Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (an intriguing but disturbing work); in the book he argues that one of chief advantages of steppe military was strategical flexibility. In the book, he suggests that steppe military like Huns and Mongols could, in favorable condition, marched 50 ~ 60 miles (around 75 ~ 90km), or even beyond that, per day and continued for several more days in that speed. That sounds pretty BS consider the "high speed" during WWII was around 50 ~ 60km per day, and the "quickest" of WWII in my memory was somewhere around 80km per day, achieved by Soviet during Operation August Storm. In other words, Luttwak suggests that steppe military could operate strategically in a speed that was quicker than WWII mechanized force - a pretty terrified idea I think.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tevis_Cup

In this modern riding event of 100 *miles* (160 km) over rather unfavorable conditions, many winners finished at around *13* hours. so don't underestimate how far you can travel with a horse.

The modern military have much heavier equipments that often require specific level of road / bridge to travel.

I am to believe that description is quite real, some description even say the Mongols virtually can just sleep on the horses and keep going, which would make beating that mark even easier.

[Cyclops]

I believe people are making a huge mistake comparing fortifications of Asia and those of Europe.

It is wrong to level as a similar factor of defense the fortified settlements of the East and a completely different universe of medieval deathtraps, each a feat of military ingenuity, masoned out of stone and designed from scratch, from the basement to the top of the highest tower to make the assaulting army have a very, very...very bad day.
Then one should also multiply these fortifications in the hundreds spanning across every single political entity west of Moldavia.

There is a very good reason why the forces of the Golden Horde, who'd often visit Europe with forces of thousands and sometimes even tens of thousands, had extreme difficulties assaulting even the smallest of Polish/Hungarian fortifications whose garrisons were numbered barely in the hundreds, in many occasions even less than a hundred.

The Golden Horde didn't have the same access to Chinese auxillia as Genghis' horde, so their performance in seige warfare shouldn't be expected to match that level.

IIRC the best fortifications in the medieval world were those of Constantinople. The castle of Alamut had a famous reputation which Mongol siege engines dispelled. In the early 13th century there was a patchwork of fortified keeps and some substantial royal castles, but that's not the same as hundreds of medieval death-traps spanning Europe.

[Colossus]

The Golden Horde didn't have the same access to Chinese auxillia as Genghis' horde, so their performance in seige warfare shouldn't be expected to match that level.

It is not really correct to talk about the Golden Horde at this stage, given that the empire was still unified under Ogedei. Land was assigned to various princes (such as Batu), but this dated from Chinggis's time anyway. These were centrally directed invasions. For example, one wing of the Mongol army was led by Subetei, who had just finished off the remnants of the Chin in northern China.

Regardless of whether Chinese engineers were present, primary sources make it clear that the Mongols certainly did have catapults during the invasion.

IIRC the best fortifications in the medieval world were those of Constantinople.

In Europe, certainly, owing to the geographical position and multilayer walls. Whether the failing Latin empire would have done a good job of defending it at this stage is another question.

The castle of Alamut had a famous reputation which Mongol siege engines dispelled

You are aware that Alamut willingly surrendered as soon as the Mongols surrounded it? Rukn-ad-Din had already been captured by that stage. It would have proved a difficult obstacle had the Mongols assaulted it, given that Maymun Diz certainly did.

I'm not convinced about the castles argument. The Mongols took some fortifications, while others proved troublesome. They were seemingly more concerned about catching Bela than any sort of gradual process. This was an extremely rapid and coordinated assault, not a lengthy and thorough conquest. For example, the Mongols were besieging Klis, which did prove a challenge, but apparently left when it became apparent Bela was not there. Then they suddenly left altogether, though the rationale for that is debatable, if you do not accept the death of Ogedei as being the cause.

[Cyclops]

It is not really correct to talk about the Golden Horde at this stage, given that the empire was still unified under Ogedei. Land was assigned to various princes (such as Batu), but this dated from Chinggis's time anyway. These were centrally directed invasions. For example, one wing of the Mongol army was led by Subetei, who had just finished off the remnants of the Chin in northern China.

Regardless of whether Chinese engineers were present, primary sources make it clear that the Mongols certainly did have catapults during the invasion.

Indeed, whereas the Golden horde incursions Marius touched on did not. I was responding to Marius' point about the Golden Horde, wasn't that clear from the quote I included in my post?

In Europe, certainly, owing to the geographical position and multilayer walls. Whether the failing Latin empire would have done a good job of defending it at this stage is another question. You are aware that Alamut willingly surrendered as soon as the Mongols surrounded it? Rukn-ad-Din had already been captured by that stage. It would have proved a difficult obstacle had the Mongols assaulted it, given that Maymun Diz certainly did.

The Mongols neutralised the Ismaili fortresses in the Alamut valley by bombardment, encirclement and diplomacy, showing they were conversant and capable siege warriors. I imagine they could have overcome the Latin Empire including Constantinople had their centralised structure remained intact long enough for it to become a target.

I'm not convinced about the castles argument. The Mongols took some fortifications, while others proved troublesome. They were seemingly more concerned about catching Bela than any sort of gradual process. This was an extremely rapid and coordinated assault, not a lengthy and thorough conquest. For example, the Mongols were besieging Klis, which did prove a challenge, but apparently left when it became apparent Bela was not there. Then they suddenly left altogether, though the rationale for that is debatable, if you do not accept the death of Ogedei as being the cause.

Good point about Bela, Genghis' strategy was intensely personal, as he targeted foreign rulers for submission rather than attempting to take land per se.

The centralised command of the Mongol Horde depended so much on the man at the top. The horde's strength remained intact for a generation but by the time of Kubilai the structure fractured irrevocably: he was able to hold half the empire, but no one came close to re-forming the tightly bonded dominion of Genghis.