Schwarzkopf's Left Hook

[Dick Cheney.]

Just got done reading General Schwarzkopf's memoirs on Desert Storm, and I've got to tell you, I believe he got pretty lucky with that famous Left Hook maneuver and armored thrust across the Iraqi desert.

Strategically, the move makes a lot of sense. Bypass the entrenched Iraqi Army along the Iraq-Kuwaiti border, come around for an envelope, and then cut off the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard divisions still stationed in Kuwaiti. With there supply, communications, and lines of retreat completely severed, coalition forces are then able to make short work of the surrounded Iraqi armies.

Our strategy to go after this army is very, very simple. First we're going to cut it off, and then we're going to kill it," - General Colin Powell, Gulf War 1991.

Where the plan should have failed however, was in its practicality.

Known as the "Hail Mary" play between Schwarzkopf and members of his general's staff, the Left Hook involved the largest aerial and ground assaults in military history. An armored spearhead led by cavalry and infantry elements of the VII Corps would punch through 140-180 miles of open terrain into Iraq -constituting as the main attack- and then proceed to curve around another 50-70 miles of open desert (give or take) to the Kuwaiti border and onward to the Iraqi Republican Guard. However, this plan does not occur unless members of the XVIII Airborne Corps (82nd and 101st) are able to penetrate some 200 miles ahead of time and establish crucial forward operating bases and rallying points needed to support the left flank of the armored spear head, and then proceed to cover the eastern most roadways leading back into Iraq along the Euphrates River Valley.

Here my criticisms are many.

1) First, this plan was a logistical nightmare. 140-180 miles across no man's land is an incredible long way to travel for the gas-gulping M1A1 Abrams, let alone two whole army corps in less than a 100 hours, and supply lines leading back into Saudi Arabia were going to be easily overstretched. In fact, just to prepare for the attack, the Army had to set up all five of its major fuel and supply depots (some 5 by 5 and 30 by 30 miles in size) right up on the front lines - a huge no no in warfare*. But without these bases, each armored battalion was also said to have only 5.2 days of gasoline in supplies, and many of course ran out.

*http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/s...eft-hook-work/

2) Next, US and Coalition forces were WAY TOO CONSOLIDATED. I'm not sure when's the last time a commander maneuvered thousands of armored vehicles and troops right next to each side by side like the WWII days, but that just seems stupid to me. Not to mention, Schwarzkopf's "everybody goes in" philosophy seems to have used up all of his reserves.


M1A1 Abrams Tanks from the 3rd Armored Division First Brigade (From Wiki).

And just to prepare for the attack again, US forces had to move its hundreds of massive tanks ontop of a limited number of flat beds and heavy equipment transporters just to get them all into position. Needless to say, Saudi highways were backed up for weeks, and during this super long prepping stage, the coalition would have been a prime target.

Also to consider was one of Stromin Norman's main worry's: sending two densely packed army corps into the barren desert would have been the ideal target for a WMD attack or an atomic bomb. Though, Iraq didn't use its WMD arsenal, I think with my armchair general skills I would have at least tried carpet bombing! (Yes, I know Iraqi Air Force fled). Or at least some massed rocket attack or artillery barrage - which is a dangerous possibility nowadays with MLRS. Still trying to figure out what happened to Iraqi landmines.

3) Third, I don't like using Airborne divisions for shaping operations at all - which for all intent in purposes meant securing the ground and flanks needed to support the main attack-. It's too much of a Market Garden style risk for me, and I would have much preferred lighter and nimbler special forces instead. Problem was, Delta and SAS were all out SCUD hunting.

4) The only thing protecting the left flank on the left hook -if the Iraqi's had been somewhat competent- were light airborne brigades -who ended up leaving to support the main attack any way- and a light armored brigade provided by the French. Now I don't know how many reservist Saddam still had in Iraq, but it seems to me I would have come crashing down on top of the Left Hook.

Ultimately though, Schwarzkopf did good with his diversionary skills and faked amphibious assault, which held Iraqi forces in place and made the Left Hook possible. He also got lucky by having (edit) Air Power and GPS, the former wiping out Iraqi C2 and air force, and the later used to help navigate his overly grand and complicated maneuver. Had Iraq been more technologically along and more aggressive though, especially during the prepping stage and times when coalition tanks were foolishly packed together, I don't see why the conflict could not have been slightly more costly or prolonged due to intense US fears of loosing casualties (Vietnam Effect). And to close, had I been Schwarzkopf, I think I would tried Deep Battle (Soviet doctrine), no need to make a 100 mile flanking maneuver with all your reserves and supplies across the desert, just attack on all fronts and plow on through the weakest point. But alas, I'm no great general.

[Stavroforos]

Well, there's the quote attributed to Napoleon where he asks if a certain good general is lucky, and Clausewitz himself believes luck always plays a factor in these duels. Your post was very interesting though, and I'm somewhat curious as to if the US really did overestimate the abilities of the Iraqis as is commonly believed, because such a plan can be muddled up by the enemy on various of the occasions you have pointed out. Perhaps they knew that it wasn't going to be so hard all along.

[Caligula's_Horse]

I always saw desert storm less as a triumphant American victory, and more as an Iraqi military blunder. The Iraqis made pretty much every possible mistake in the conflict.

Fact of the matter, the Americans made enough mistakes that the Iraqis might have even been able to win, or at least force a stalemate if they committed their forces more intelligently (and aggressively). While the coalition was by far the stronger fighting force, there's a reason the US is where the term Vietnam Effect was coined. Put up enough of a fight far in front of the cameras, and they eventually pack up and go home under public pressure.
Though given how the Iraqis' show was run by a dictator with zero military experience, the outcome isn't surprising.

[conon394]

I'm not seeing the 'Miracle' the most expensive, professional army in the world, backed with units form all kinds of Key NATO allies, supported by a Navy and Air Force that absolute superiority, facing an enemy who was likely completely blind vs again an absolute reconnaissance ability - had better be able to execute the plan as proposed.

He also got lucky with Air Power and GPS

How either of those lucky? That's like saying he got lucky because the army had guns.

Also to consider was one of Stromin Norman's main worry's: sending two who densely packed army corps into the barren desert would have been the ideal target for a WMD attack or an atomic bomb. Though, Iraq didn't use its WMD arsenal, I think with my armchair general skills I would have at least tried carpet bombing! (Yes, I know Iraqi Air Force fled). Or at least some massed rocket attack or artillery barrage - which is a dangerous possibility nowadays with MLRS. Still trying to figure out what happened to Iraqi landmines.

Since the stated aim of both sides was limited it would have suicidal for Saddam esclate a fight to using weapons he could not win with vs the US.

For Iraq the real problem was he made a bid for status in the region but that proved utterly epic at even knowing what he wanted to do. Either he should have immediately started negotiating with Kuwait after a more limited occupation which would have made US diplomacy more difficult or rolled over the House of Saud while he could. Sure he a dictator and all and mean and nasty but his secular regime could have made a lot of the PR of having the US fighting to restore the oppression of women from the house of Saud...

http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/s...eft-hook-work/

If I recall Gus made himself quite a tidy sum with his book and speaking tours about logistics. Sure the US was the rusty after a lack of major war how long? But I suspect lots of others could have done the same job. The take away point have is the US spends a lot money on toys and not so much doing things like seeing can say deploy the 82nd and 10th Mountain division to the Philippines on a snap order and have the GAO along to make sure that there a 2 assessments. would that cost sure, but I cwould loose a couple littoral (not) combat ships to see happen

[Mangalore]

...
How either of those lucky? That's like saying he got lucky because the army had guns.

...

I would say it's a fair point in the sense that the US had guns, the Iraqis stones. GPS and air power changed the capabilities that might not have been evident on paper. More important was that the Iraqis had no GPS and their airforce collapsed without much of a fight. Total air superiority plus having something that allows everyone to navigate and target reliably is not a surprising outcome when the former was already deceisive in earlier wars.

Overall the Iraqi armed forces were drummed up based on their numbers ignoring fundamental flaws in thinking and equipment. So I would say maybe Schwartzkopf even commited overkill so it was not much of a miracle.

[Sphere]

When you out-number and out-gun the enemy in every way and have air superiority, no victory is a miracle.

Schwarzkopf was reading from the Montgomery playbook of attacking with overwhelming force, which you certainly cannot fault him for. But even the diversionary attacks directly into the teeth of the Iraqi defense along the Kuwait border went smoothly, cracking the resistance in a matter of hours (the left hook was basically unopposed).

Once the ground force build up and air campaign had been completed, almost any plan of attack would have worked.

[Aru]

I only know about this war from Wiki article, and I only got interested due to this thread. Still I have a thought.

Iraq entrenched themselves poorly to begin with, but losing all air capability simply made their troops like painted targets in the desert for both coalition air forces and artillery. By the time contact with ground troops was made, the ground troops were either destroyed, retreating (and consequently destroyed during retreat) or lacked any organisation, not knowing whether to look up or on the horizon or to run or to hide.

I wouldn't say coalition were surprised. They worked to get Iraqi forces into that state and they knew everything about the enemy, probably more than Iraqis knew themselves. Yes, sounds weird, but completely possible. Iraq was corrupt state and so was their army, a lot of political and personal interests everywhere and they were inefficient as hell. US had information from satelites, drones and spies and probably had more complete picture of Iraqi capabilities than Saddam, who added to the mess through micromanaging the army. And poorly, too.

Knowing all that, coalition could take risks which would not have been done if they faced better enemy, but they couldn't tell troops or the public how easy the war will be, you simply don't do that. Overwhelming victory looks better in public when you say you won against an enemy with more troops and tanks, and you never want to make your troops overconfident either.

Of course, while the victories in Kuwait and on the Saudi border and in the desert were legitimate, truth is that Iraqis were retreating to the cities to form defensive line. I think that taking them on in urban combat, at that time, would be a bit more tricky. In 2003 cities were largely avoided and the aim of the war was Baghdad and decapitation of government. Even with Iraqi army in much worse condition, Americans rather didn't go for conquering the cities. In First Gulf War, they'd have to do it, and it would be harder.


Reading about the war, there is something I noticed. I never saw any mention of how much troops did coalition actually face, only total numbers for Iraqi army. It seems logical that during both Iraqi wars, Iraq would have the majority of their army stationed at the border with Iran.

[Dick Cheney.]

To clarify with everybody. I consider the execution of Schwarzkopf's Left Hook Maneuver pretty miraculous, but not outcome of the war between the United States and Saddam Husein's less capable Iraqi Army.

My criticisms for the Left Hook maneuver (which are explained in the OP) were four:

1) Excesses Logistical Requirements (during planning and execution, and the largest non stop armored thrusts and aerials assaults in history).

2) Densely packed army formations (a no no if fighting an army with a modernized air force, WMD arsenal, elaborate minefields, or MLRS type rocket artillery).

3) Placing excessive trust on large battalions of light infantry and airborne troops for overly elaborate shaping operations (US airborne corps, but special forces would have been less risky if things went wrong).

4) Not having enough heavy forces or reserves left to protect the vital left flank of the main armored column. (Job was left to the French, and most reserves left were only Saudis).

So yeah, considering piss poor morale on US commanders due to the Vietnam Effect (Schwarzkopf's book mentions this alot), the super logistical challenges of conducting the longest non-stop armored thrust in history across miles of open terrain, and the fact that Schwarzkopf was fortunate enough to have air supremacy, naval supremacy, and the best C2 suite in the world - I do consider the success of Left Hook to be overwhelmingly good fortune.

I'm not seeing the 'Miracle' the most expensive, professional army in the world, backed with units form all kinds of Key NATO allies, supported by a Navy and Air Force that absolute superiority, facing an enemy who was likely completely blind vs again an absolute reconnaissance ability - had better be able to execute the plan as proposed.

Conon, given your knowledge of military affairs, which I have respect for, do you believe Schwarzkopf's Left Hook (aka the Hail Mary Play) would have been just as successful against a larger, better trained, or technologically advanced foe (either in the 90s or in the contemporary era)?

Also do you believe there might have been a simpler (less risky) alternative to the Left Hook? Again, I'm not a commander, but I think I would have liked avoiding the logistical challenges of joyriding hundreds miles in the open desert with densely packed tanks without any reserves. My alternative would have been to spread out and attack the Iraqi army on all fronts directly (more logistically friendly).

How either of those lucky? That's like saying he got lucky because the army had guns.

Because Iraq didn't have comparable counter measures, while GPS technology was also largely unproven at the time. I also believe firmly that without a working GPS, the C2 coordination for navigating a maneuver the size of the Left Hook across no-man's land is impossible.

Since the stated aim of both sides was limited it would have suicidal for Saddam esclate a fight to using weapons he could not win with vs the US.

It was suicidal for Saddam to even risk war with the United States in the first place (we did in fact bomb his house). However, -due to the Vietnam Effect- I would not have wanted to be President Bush on TV the day I found out a whole armored corps of American forces was wiped out due to a WMD attack because my commander had risked packing his tank formations in an open part of the Iraqi landscape (either by chemical or nuclear attack).

Something to remember also, is that Desert Storm was the most successfully planned operation in US military history. Virtually everyone in the public and the Pentagon was amazed at it's success. Does anybody else here know of an example of a conflict of this size and scale where virtually everything went according to plan??? A rarity in warfare.

For Iraq the real problem was he made a bid for status in the region but that proved utterly epic at even knowing what he wanted to do. Either he should have immediately started negotiating with Kuwait after a more limited occupation which would have made US diplomacy more difficult or rolled over the House of Saud while he could. Sure he a dictator and all and mean and nasty but his secular regime could have made a lot of the PR of having the US fighting to restore the oppression of women from the house of Saud..

.

Agreed. And on a side note, I do reluctantly give Saddam credit for SCUDing Israel. That was a decent chess move that diverted a lot of US Air and SF assets.

If I recall Gus made himself quite a tidy sum with his book and speaking tours about logistics.

So did Schwarzkopf and virtually every other commander.

[Aru]

I would not have wanted to be President Bush on the day I found out a whole American armored corps was wiped out due to a WMD explosion because my commander had too densely packed his formations in an open part of the Iraqi desert (chemical or nuclear attack).

Armored vehicles are made resistant to nuclear and biological pollution. They were made to fight WW3 with Soviet Union. If they were deployed, it will only make the attack more decisive and go further than beating the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The range of operation depended on public support and WMD's would give all the support they need.

[Dick Cheney.]

Armored vehicles are made resistant to nuclear and biological pollution. They were made to fight WW3 with Soviet Union. If they were deployed, it will only make the attack more decisive and go further than beating the Iraqis out of Kuwait. The range of operation depended on public support and WMD's would give all the support they need.

I'm unfortunately not aware of any DoD studies that suggest tanks, let alone lessor armored cars and trucks, are immune to NBC attack. You might be right about fallout, but I can't believe the "explosive" ordnance part, especially when commanders like Powell and Schwartkopf were losing sleep over the idea that densely packed US forces would be hit with WMD style weapons.

If US forces are actually hit with WMD in Schwartzkopf's Left Hook "open desert" scenario, then the screwup becomes one of the worst military blunders in history.

[Aru]

M2 Bradley was main IFV that ran with the Abrams tanks. NBC protection is standard on all versions.

I'm not sure what you mean by explosion. Explosions are not a purpose of biological and chemical weapons, it is the effect upon inhaling, on eyes, skin etc. Crews in tanks and armoured vehicles are protected from them in most kinds of vehicles produced since 1970's by most countries, but most obviously the US and USSR. T72's and BMP's also have NBC protection. It's mostly a matter of air purification system and stuff not getting inside the vehicle.

What was feared is that Iraqi's will use Scud rockets with B or C warheads and shoot them at American bases, both front and rear, and at infantry fighting in urban environment, should it come to that. Most of all, on Israeli cities.

[I WUB PUGS]

It wasn't a miracle nor was it particularly brilliant. It was the only route that made sense since the Iraqi forces in Kuwait either had to be attacked head on, attacked or outmaneuvered from the east (from Iran, LOL, no) or come through the desert to the west.

The Iraqis viewed the western desert as impassable and put very little there. They also did not possess any real intelligence and moreover did not have the logistical means to place forces to face against our western deployment. So they didn't have exact positions to attack us with WMD or artillery and they couldn't support any effort they may have tried to defend it with conventional forces. The Iraqi military from Saddam on down simply chose to ignore that we were there. They knew we were building up there, and that a massive attack would come from that direction, but they had no details and no ability to stop it.

I'm not really sure why you think we were saturated. The images make it look like we had this massive line of crap driving through the desert but there was spacing between units. The attack was like a hundred miles long. The French armored forces were using AMX-30 tanks and AMX-10RC wheeled guns. Both are very light vehicles designed for this type of combat. The French forces of the 80s were specifically designed to be light with a big punch. Really the ideal "far flank" force if there was to be any sort of attack from the left flank. The French could simply run away while popping their pursuers with better guns, effectively grinding down any attack against the flank.

Using the Airborne divisions to grab the airfields and block reinforcements from the north is really the only option we had. It was a huge drive into Iraq and special forces are far too light to hold a roadblock or attempt to seize a large airfield. The 101st at the roadblock would have had full air support on call from the heaviest assets in theater so they weren't just being thrown up there to die.

Really the only problem with the plan, as you've stated was the logistics of it. The only real worry was that we'd run out of gas. Look at the above map. Its nothing but Iraqi infantry sitting in the desert having to go up against Abrams and Challenger I's with accompanying infantry and air assets. Saddam put all of his armor and mechanized forces either in Kuwait or in a counter attacking position. And when it finally came down to shooting at actual "Iraqi quality troops" the Rheinmetall 120m L44 gun on the M1A1 and the Royal Ordnance L11A5 on the Challenger I had better range, accuracy and punch than anything the Iraqi T-72s (mostly T-62 and T-55) could hope to throw at them. It was an absolute turkey shoot. It was literally point, shoot, kill for those American and British tankers. They formed a line and just went to town like it was a practice range.

The whole point of the left hook was to cut the Iraqi troops in Kuwait off from the rest of Iraq and cause a withdrawal. Do remember that we had no intention of capturing Baghdad and that the UN mandate only called for the liberation of Kuwait. The Iraqis had missed their chance to attack into Saudi Arabia and deny the coalition a base of operations. They couldn't hope to break through the troops facing them in Saudi Arabia. Not with the Gulf teeming with ships and the air above swirling with death. Once their rear was threatened they could either sit there and lose everything in an encirclement or attempt to withdraw, which they did.

Which led to this.


So no, I don't think the Left Hook was a miracle or even brilliant. I think it was a decent General looking at his intel realizing he was facing nothing but strung out infantry along most of the border and that the entire Iraqi rear was vulnerable if he could just drive north faster than they could.

[hellheaven1987]

Job was left to the French

Consider Division Daguet was heavily composed by Foreign Legion I don't see the issue here.

[I WUB PUGS]

I'm unfortunately not aware of any DoD studies that suggest tanks, let alone lessor armored cars and trucks, are immune to NBC attack. You might be right about fallout, but I can't believe the "explosive" ordnance part, especially when commanders like Powell and Schwartkopf were losing sleep over the idea that densely packed US forces would be hit with WMD style weapons.

If US forces are actually hit with WMD in Schwartzkopf's Left Hook "open desert" scenario, then the screwup becomes one of the worst military blunders in history.

No WMDs, not bio or chemical or nuke would stop a Western assault. It would never stop a Soviet one either. All IFV/Armor/APC have NBC kits standard and troops are/were issued MOPP suits and gas masks. The problem is that once you put troops in MOPP suits and gas masks and you're hit with WMD is that CASEVAC becomes impossible as any puncture of the suit causes contamination and the casualty is basically screwed. It also causes additional strain on the infantryman when dismounted as heat and breathing become an issue. However a mechanized assault will not have any problem operating in a dirty environment. Those vehicles are pressurized and we have mobile DECON units that can wash them off once the dirty area is cleared.

Consider Division Daguet was heavily composed by Foreign Legion I don't see the issue here.

Not really. 1REC and 2REI along with 6REG were it. They didn't make up the bulk at all. A real mix of French forces for sure though. Marines, armor, helicopters, cavalry, Legionnaires.
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_Daguet

[Dick Cheney.]

I'm not sure what you mean by explosion.

I guess I was immediately thinking of a nuke. I went back and checked It Doesn't Take A Hero (Schwarzkopf) and it appears that was the principle form of NBC attack he was referring to. I appreciate you sharing your knowledge with me.

[Jagdpanzer]

Somehow you seem to have forgotten that the 24th mechanized division and the 3th armored regiment were also in the xviii airborne corps. They spearheaded the advance iirc. And the french division was somewhat larger than a brigade. Iraq didn't dare to use WMD's because the US had nukes and would have used them.

Consider Division Daguet was heavily composed by Foreign Legion I don't see the issue here.

Lots of Frenchman in the FFL, hellheaven. It's the no. 1 nationality iirc.

[I WUB PUGS]

And the french division was somewhat larger than a brigade.

12,500 Frenchmen with 4,500 Americans (a brigade from the 82nd along with artillery) formed the Daguet Division.

Iraq didn't dare to use WMD's because the US had nukes and would have used them.

Correct. Some time ago I posted a poll concerning the question of "Should the US use nukes against Iraq if Saddam uses chemical or biological weapons against US troops". This poll obviously had entries for 1991 and 2003. Americans and surely the world would have been willing to accept tactical nuclear weapons being used on Iraqi forces had Saddam deployed his WMDs. The polls reflected that Americans were highly in favor of using nukes in 1991 and about 50/50 in 2003. Nuclear Tomahawks were certainly deployed to the Gulf for just such a threat.






Really, Conon and Sphere have already summed this one up and my deployments map helps with the picture. We had already destroyed their communications, logistics, intelligence and overall command and support structure. We were effectively bulldozing a deaf, dumb and blind enemy largely composed of poorly trained and unmotivated infantrymen. Being the 4th largest army in the world didn't count for much at all once Saddam chose to dig in in Kuwait rather than topple the House of Saud. Once we started rolling the only concern was running out of gas and that was already planned for well in advance and we were prepared for the push. If you look at the map it looks like a big pocket of Iraqis that you have to break through. The reality is that given the bombing campaign, each one of those Iraqi units was effectively in their own bubble. They didn't have the means to know who was being attacked by what or where so they couldn't have hoped to support one another. We could shift assets to attack each unit with overwhelming force as we pleased.

[Aru]

No one used WMD's against an enemy who can retaliate with WMD's since WW1. Not even Hitler or Soviets in their darkest hour. Still, we have full right to fear of the moment when it finally happens, and to take every threat of using them seriously. WMD's are a very bad, bad thing.

The danger is not that someone will open Pandora's box and there will be a big nuclear armageddon or some virus wiping us out. It's much worse. Imagine if in every regional war we had last 70 years NBC weapons were used. Generations would live in increasingly worse off world. It would not be a quick death, but centuries of slow agony for generations of people.

[Garbarsardar]

So, the Left Hook was endangered by the use of WMD of which delivery methods were untested (or would damage much more his own troops), from an air force that did not exist, from armour that could not made any reconnaissance and had already supply problems thus negating essentially maneuver (not to mention complete air superiority of the enemy) , and all that in a situation where morale was near rock bottom.

Market Garden, was a gamble, Citadel was a gamble, Fall Gelb was a gamble. This one? I think not.

[Gaidin]

Ultimately though, Schwarzkopf did good with his diversionary skills and faked amphibious assault, which held Iraqi forces in place and made the Left Hook possible. He also got lucky by having (edit) Air Power and GPS, the former wiping out Iraqi C2 and air force, and the later used to help navigate his overly grand and complicated maneuver. Had Iraq been more technologically along and more aggressive though, especially during the prepping stage and times when coalition tanks were foolishly packed together, I don't see why the conflict could not have been slightly more costly or prolonged due to intense US fears of loosing casualties (Vietnam Effect). And to close, had I been Schwarzkopf, I think I would tried Deep Battle (Soviet doctrine), no need to make a 100 mile flanking maneuver with all your reserves and supplies across the desert, just attack on all fronts and plow on through the weakest point. But alas, I'm no great general.

Ummm, so?

Give me a reason why a General shouldn't take advantage of his technology that any enemy doesn't systematically have in place? This is like saying the British shouldn't use radar in the Battle of Britain because the Germans weren't prepared for it. Please try again.