What were Alexander's new tactics at his death?

[Exiled Spartan]

This has probably been done to death, as most things involving ATG, but I keep hearing people talk about his tactical innovations he was working on deploying in his future campaigns, until he died. I can't find anything about it, and am curious, he would have had a Total War type recruitment pool at his disposal with the Hellenistic units of Europe and the Asian missile specialists, elephants and such. If anyone can point me in the right direction of info I'd really appreciate it.
Thanks alot.

[hellheaven1987]

Technically it was a mixed unit with front rank as pikemen while rear as bowmen, similar as the formation late Roman Empire used.

[Ecthelion]

This has probably been done to death, as most things involving ATG, but I keep hearing people talk about his tactical innovations he was working on deploying in his future campaigns, until he died. I can't find anything about it, and am curious, he would have had a Total War type recruitment pool at his disposal with the Hellenistic units of Europe and the Asian missile specialists, elephants and such. If anyone can point me in the right direction of info I'd really appreciate it.
Thanks alot.

Basically it would have been the Seleucid roster.

The value of missile troops both mounted and foot was obvious to him.
That and he really thought elephants were cool.

The Diodachi used this new model in their wars of succession.

[Cyclops]

Is this refering to the bit at the end of Arrian where there are three or four Makedonians and twelve Persians in each subunit on review? That may have been purely a marching order for propaganda purposes, or it might reflect a new tactical evolution.

Bear in mind earlier he mentions the 30,000 young Persians given training in the Makedonian system (I suppose that means the phalanx) so I don't think the phalanx was getting the flick.

I imagine Alexander meant to have an army based on the cav/pike phalanx combo his father made so successful. He may have experimented with the spear/archer formations that the Achaemenids had used? He would have to make use of the tools at hand to rule his realm I guess. He did try some Hellene/Iranian fusion policies such as the mass weddings, so its possible a military fusion was in his fevered mind too.

On balance I think its unlikely he was completely reforming the military.

[hellheaven1987]

It is probably just common sense to have a mixed equipment within an unit though, since Roman could do it without much difficulty I don't think why Alexander could not.

[Tankbustaz]

He was clearly going for the Archer spam that I use in TATW.

[Condottiere 40K]

He probably was continuously tweaking with the original formula.

But a major reform would mean that either he has an epiphany or saw a major weakness in his army that would be exploited by the next nation he planned to liberate.

[Spartan JKM]

Well, Exiled Spartan, your loaded question is part of a very daunting aspect of Alexander's plans at the time of his death - he was reputedly coming westwards after gaining the resources of Arabia, and, as always beforehand with his military operations, it would not be undertaken in half-measures: conquering Carthage's sphere of influence and building a military road across North Africa, reaching the Pillars of Heracles no less, and even returning to Macedon along the Iberian, Gallic and Italic regions, before an expedition to the northern littoral of the Black Sea - where his general Zopyrion had recently lost an entire army north of the Danube - and a subjugation of the indigenous Scythians, all comprised his one quest to be 'lord of all the land and sea' (I'm extending Arrian's imputation to Alexander at Book 7.19.3 of the Anabasis Alexandri).

If one types in something along the lines of 'Alexander mixed phalanx' on the search-engine of Google Books, a lot of sources will come up which mention this: look for the works of Albert B. Bosworth, one of the most eminent scholars dealing with Alexander; he discusses this in his own Conquest and Empire (pp. 270-271), as well as his contributory piece discussing various aspects of the phalanx in Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives (pp. 96-97).

Some have opined that the most far-reaching of Alexander's 'Last Plans' were later forgeries, and even that he was going nowhere with anymore success, an assertion hinging in part on a belief he was now half-insane, particularly following the death of Hephaestion. I don't think so; these ambitious plans seem far too circumstantially described to be apocryphal, and sure, he was intoxicated with power as much as any ambitious leader in history, not to mention his emotions matched his appetite for conquest. Arrian does not mention the far-western ambitions, but he does give us at Book 4.15.5 of the Anabasis Alexandri the first glimpse of Alexander's desire for 'world conquest' in the winter of 329 BCE: one Pharasmanes, the king of the Chorasmians, came to Alexander and offered to help him conquer the districts near him which, he claimed, bordered on the Black Sea. Alexander thanked him, but stated that he was presently resolved to conquer 'India', thus he would possess the 'whole of Asia'. He added that when Asia was in his power he would return to Greece before undertaking an expedition to the Black Sea, at which point he would require Pharasmanes' fulfillment of his present promises until then (moreover, some other Scythians in these regions off the Jaxartes River joined Pharasmanes on this conciliatory embassy); this would be eclipsed six years later by Alexander's focus on the wider plans concerning Arabia and the western Mediterranean. Arrian also apprises us of Alexander commissioning one Heracleides of Argos in 324 BCE to build a war fleet and explore the shores of the Caspian Sea, in Book 7.16.1-2. Alexander found solace with his ambitious endeavors to conquer more than rule by administration (a criticism laid on him by none other than Augustus), and, IMHO, he's a good argument as the greatest and most diverse Captain-General amid all military history.

Alexander's monetary and human resources were now beyond exorbitant, and his admiral Nearchus, who had recently shown that it was possible for a fleet to traverse along an unfamiliar desert coast without support from the land, was poised for his task: in the spring of 324 BCE Alexander had the Achaemenid weirs along the Tigris River demolished which had rendered the river impassable to shipping, thus he enabled the Tigris amenable for an armada to pass in either direction. Moreover, he subsequently overhauled the drainage system of the Euphrates River, clearing the mouths of some of its canals and blocking others, so as tomaximize its flow for his colossal navigational purposes; a plethora of warships were constructed in Phoenicia and Cilicia before they were transported in sections to the Euphrates, a technique he had proved viable earlier in India (albeit on a smaller scale). The timbers of the Levant were to be utilized assiduously for Alexander's fleets to circumnavigate Arabia while his army conquered the littoral regions (he surely wasn't going to venture deep into Arabia with his new army, as the logistic problems would be insuperable, let alone it simply wasn't necessary; by taking the Arabian ports from the Thamūd and other tribes he would gain direct control of these trading points of lucrative resources after eliminating the middlemen who controlled the trade-routes amid Arabia's hinterlands, thus adding to his resources, wealth and, probably, an augmented element of diverse manpower capabilities (as with Cossaean infantry or Hyrcanian horsemen, light Arabic troops would be instituted into his ranks, if viable).



Above: pre-Islamic Arabia showing the ports and interior trade routes, all in Alexander's sights.

Within a year upon his arrival in Babylon, Alexander found his vast new harbor-basin in the works, reputedly capable of accommodating 1,000 warships (viz. an enormous amount, whatever the true figure). The extant flotilla transported by land from the Phoenician coast constituted 47 ships when he arrived, and he decreed the future ships built to be larger than triremes (2 quinqueremeswere already constructed, along with 3 quadriremes, 12 triremes and30 30-oared galleys; Dionysius I of Syracuse is credited with introducing the quinquerime at the onset of the 4th century BCE, and quinquerimes first appear in Athenian naval lists just a year or so prior to Alexander's death. The first attested action involving the quadrireme was indeed at Tyre, in 332 BCE). Babylon was seemingly now to be the center of Alexander's empire as 'King of Asia', and the nascent military base for the further operations in Arabia and commercial control eastwards to the Indus Delta; he would soon gain dominion of the sea routes between Babylon and Alexandria (not to mention an upcoming navigable commercial route linking the Indus Delta and the Mediterranean via the Arabian ports; imagine the alternate history this could reflect!), thus the 'new navy of 1,000 ships' meant he surely had Carthage in his sights after the Arabian operation. That he was going to 'circumvent Africa' - one his 'Last Plans' - probably meant he would indeed curiously survey what was south of what we now know as the Horn of Africa, but once it was realized the sheer physical vastness that lay before him (he would have sent exploratory missions of some sort, no doubt), both southward and inwards below the Sahara (the best he could extrapolate), he would have probably solidified his position of control of the Red Sea heading up to the Mediterranean, and he surely would have exploited and finished the Canal of the Pharaohs, which linked the Red Sea and Mediterranean via the Nile. It seems Darius the Great never finished this invaluable engineering conduit fully back in histime. As we know - whatever the apologetic and reserved judgments - the logistic capacity of Alexander's forces were extremely efficient, a legacy of his great father Philip II - a martial asset which greatly augmented the strategic range of the army designed for conquest; from Babylon to, perhaps, the straits between Iberia and Mauretania, water would now be included as a conduit of supply, etc. - much more conducive to logistic military and commercial operations than via land, on which he already succeeded remarkably the past 13 years, albeit certainly not without privations, from the Hellespont to the Indus and back to Carmania!

Now, the remodeled army mentioned by hellheaven, Echtelion and Cyclops, indeed, was a novel, makeshift 'mixed phalanx' very similar to Arrian's own defensive array he himself forged to check the encroaching Alani in Cappadocia, while he was governor for Rome there in 135 ACE (see Arrian's Ektaxiskata Alanoon or Acies contra Alanos; the Order of Battle Against the Alans). That Arrian (cf. Anabasis Alexandri, Book 7.23.3-4) does not elaborate on this element of Alexander's new army of 323 BCE could mean it was never extensively drilled, and it certainly never saw action after Alexander's death; the Successors annulled all these ambitious plans as they subsequently began fighting with each other. It reveals Alexander's moves towards creating a Macedonian-Persian core army; unlike at the 'mutiny' on the Hyphasis River in India, this time the discontent by the core Macedonians at Opis in 324 BCE was thoroughly handled by Alexander's ingenious psychological shock-tactics, by which he basically told them he didn't need them and told them to simply go before shutting himself in his pavilion, refusing to see them until they essentially begged. Boy, did they change their tune! They now had not the leverage they possessed before, and there are signs that he used his promotions of Persians to crush discontent among the disgruntled elements of his Macedonian army. Alexander subsequently introduced 1,000 Persians into the court guard of hypaspistai (the elite 'shield-bearers'). But there was no attempt yet to integrate his Macedonians and Persians into a unified body; if anything, it looks like a deliberate design to balance one against the other. After subduing the Cossaeans of the Zagros Mountains in his last campaign, Alexander now had access to the vaunted Nesean Horses, and he was administering Iranian mounted soldiers as part of the hetairoi (the Companion Cavalry; Arrian even gives the names of nine nobles who were drafted into the elite cavalry agema, the king's guard, cf. Book 7.6.4-5.). Select mounted Persians would now fight with the xyston rather than their traditional throwing javelins, with a fifth hipparchy being created entirely composed of them. This was in conjunction with the decreed ceremonial mixed marriages at Susa between Alexander's core Macedonians and daughters of the Iranian nobility. When he had entered the Punjab after the intense campaigns in Bactria-Sogdiana (329-327 BCE), Alexander had incorporated into his army diverse mounted elements from Arachosia (southern Afghanistan), Parapamisadae, Bactria, Sogdiana, and the Dahae-Scythian territories (cf. Arrian, Book 5.11.3 and 5.12.2), and they were supplemented by levies supplied by friendly Indian princes as of a year later. In 325 BCE, Alexander ordered his governors to dismiss - not demobilize - their mercenary armies, seemingly to fill his own service (cf. Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.106.3 and 17.111.1, who connects the policy to a security measure to suppress satrapal insubordination), to balance the loss of troops in his field army after the numerous settlements in the north-east regions and India and the constant need for garrison forces in thesatrapies. Arrian tells us that within a year and a half of the order to disband the mercenary armies there were convoys of such forces reaching the heart of the ‘empire’, culminating inthe arrival of armies from Caria and Lydia, as well as the 20,000 Epigoni ('inheritors') with Peucestas from Persis, reinforced with hardy mountaineers from theZagros and Elburz ranges: the Epigoni were the positive product of the 30,000 Persian youths whom Alexander ordered four years earlier to be recruited and trained ina concerted program of training under Macedonian arms and discipline. These menwould soon become the heirs to Alexander's phalanx, by 324 BCE almost superannuated. Alexander was as indefatigable and focused as ever, without any baseless optimism, IMHO. Seemingly, Alexander had in mind, basically, to weld his plethora of forces into an 'international' army without attachments to race or domicile, loyal to himself alone. This seems far-fetched, looking at historical traditions, but this is Alexander 'the Great', a man whom in 324 BCE much of 'Asia' and 'Europe' waited on his every word, hence all the embassies of placation and concern which arrived from Greece, who came with divine honors, from Ethiopia, from Libya, from Carthage, from the Bruttians, Lucanians and Tyrrhenians, from Iberia, even from 'Gaul'. A delegation from Rome came, too, if the embellished story of this can be accepted by Arrian (cf. Anabasis Alexandri, Book 7.15.5-6; independent of this, Pliny the Elder states more briefly that, according to Cleitarchus, Rome did send envoys to Alexander, cf. Natural History, Book 3.57). But none from leaders in Arabia; IMHO, Arabia and Carthage were in trouble, hence the lack of delegates from the former, and the support for Tyre in 332 BCE (although no direct martial involvement, as it turned out) from the latter.

On sea and land as he ventured into Arabia and westwards into the Mediterranean, it seems, hypothetically, Alexander could recruit, train and command a smorgasbord of the most prodigious horsemen as contingent military circumstances demanded (some Arabs and Numidians, both peoples among many could be hired, under Alexander? Interesting). The backbone, as usual, would be the phalanx: the re-brigaded phalanx as of 323 BCE was to constitute an effective safeguard to sedition, as well as a measure to husband his aging core Macedonians and utilize an abundance of Persians (trained since 327 BCE, but certainly not yet molded in sync with the Macedonian tradition of success in battle). This is the first recorded instance of Macedonians and Persians integrated into planned battle array (cf. Arrian, Book 7.23.3-4), and I think it was designed for service in the west, after dealing with the lightly armed Arab tribes. It would also be well suited to fight the lighter-armed Carthaginian armies which attacked Agathocles in 307 BCE, described by Diodorus (cf. Bibliotheca Historica, Book 19.106.2). The new phalanx was arranged as 16 files deep. Each filed comprised 12 Persians armed with their traditional bow and throwing javelins. They were arrayed behind 3 files of Macedonians armed with sarissai. The rear files were brought up by Macedonians. The front-line Macedonians would bear any brunt of resistance in a frontal assault, and would be supported by missile-power from the Persians. Thus any heavy infantry would be dealt with by the Macedonians, enemy infantry already pelted with arrows and javelins, while attacks which may come from lighter enemy troops could also be fended off by the Persian projectiles of arrows and javelins, all this in conjunction by Alexander's cavalry actions, which would now be as diverse and strong as ever, it seems. Though flexibility could be feasible with the combined aspects of missile power and shock, this makeshift phalanx would lack the prior capacity of complex maneuvers or changes of front and depth on the march, as was so evident in the earlier Illyrian and Issus campaigns. But the monetary and manpower resources would be available for Alexander's vast ambitions, and he could adapt and adopt as the challenges arose. But could he effectively protect his strategic routes of supply and reinforcement from his eastern realms the further he traversed westwards? Was his empire in need of serious political stabilizing, and was Macedon, now dealing with a rising upheaval led by Athens, capable of any support? Diodorus explicitly and parenthetically tells us that Macedon was 'short of citizen soldiers because of the number of those who had been sent to Asia as replacements for the army' (cf. Bibliotheca Historica, Book 18.12.2) in 322 BCE when Antipitar met defeat by an Athenian-led coalition under Leosthenes. But Macedon won the Lamian war once Craterus' veterans returned to aid Antipitar. However, did Alexander need primarily Macedon anymore, with what he set out to accomplish? That debate carries serious considerations, and can certainly be entertained…

Hope this helped a little, James