25.14, Second Punic War - Paelignian cohort:
The Paelignian cohort happened to be in closest touch with the enemy, and their commanding officer, Vibius Accaus, snatched up a standard and flung it across the enemies' rampart, at the same time invoking a curse on himself and his cohort if the enemy got possession of the standard. He was the first to dash over fosse and rampart into the camp. Now the Paelignians were fighting inside the lines, and Valerius Flaccus, the commanding officer of the third legion, was rating the Romans for their cowardice in letting the allies have the glory of capturing the camp, when T. Pedanius, a centurion in command of the leading maniples' took a standard out of the bearer's hands and shouted, "This standard and this centurion will be inside the rampart in a moment, let those follow who will prevent its capture by the enemy."
25.21, Second Punic War - ala/left wing of allies:
The first legion and the left wing of the allies were drawn up in front and the line was extended far beyond its proper length.
26.5-6, Second Punic War
Realising their critical position and the danger of leaving a portion of their lines unprotected by concentrating their defence in any one direction, the Romans divided their force; Appius Claudius confronted the Capuans, Fulvius was opposed to Hannibal; the propraetor C. Nero with the cavalry of the six legions held the road to Suessula, and C. Fulvius Flaccus with the cavalry of the allies took up a position towards the Volturnus...
27.1, Second Punic War:
The Roman commander - his equal in courage, but far inferior to him in tactical skill and in numbers - hastily formed his line and engaged. The action was begun most vigorously by the fifth legion and the allies on the left wing.
27.2, Second Punic War:
The troops who were first engaged were, on the Roman side, the first legion and the right wing of the allies; those under Hannibal comprised the Spanish infantry and the Balearic slingers.
27.12, Second Punic War, allied contingents and extraordinarii or 'special levies:'
After more than two hours' fighting the allied contingent on the Roman right including the special levies, began to give way. As soon as Marcellus saw this he brought the 10th legion up to the front. They were slow in coming up, and as the others were becoming unsteady and falling back, the whole line was gradually thrown into disorder and ultimately routed. Their fears got the better of them and they took to flight. 2700 Romans and allies fell in the battle and during the pursuit
27.14, Second Punic War:
The contingents who had formed the Roman left and the cohorts who had lost their standards were fighting in the front line, and the twentieth legion was stationed on their right...out of the two legions some 1700 men were killed and 1300 of the allied contingents,
27.41, Second Punic War:
told off five cohorts strengthened with five maniples of Roman troops to mount the hill by night and take their station in the dip on the other side. He placed T. Claudius Asellus a military tribune and P. Claudius a prefect of allies in command of the party, and gave them instructions as to the moment when they were to rise from ambush and attack the enemy. At dawn of the following day he led out the whole of his force, horse and foot, to battle.
29.2, Second Punic War, Scipio in Spain:
Of the Romans and allies a little more than 200 fell, mainly on the left wing. The Spaniards who had been routed on the field or driven out of their camp, dispersed amongst the fields, and finally returned to their respective communities.
31.21, 201 BC:
By this time the consular army in Gaul had been transferred from Arretium to Ariminum, and the 5000 men of the Latin contingent had moved from Gaul into Etruria. L. Furius accordingly left Ariminum and hastened by forced marches to Cremona which the Gauls were at the time besieging...Furius had formed the allied troops into two divisions, and the right division was stationed in the first line, the two Roman legions forming the rest...
Failing in this, they endeavoured to work round the flanks and envelop the enemy's line, which, considering their numbers and the fewness of their opponents, seemed an easy task. When the praetor saw this maneuver he extended his front by bringing up the two legions in reserve to the right and left of the allied troops, and he also vowed a temple to Diovis, in case he routed the enemy that day. He then ordered L. Valerius to launch the Roman cavalry against one wing of the Gauls and the allied cavalry against the other to check the enveloping movement.
34.14-15, 194 BC Spain, picked cohorts:
The cavalry on the two wings were the first to get into action, but those on the right were immediately repulsed and their hasty retirement created alarm amongst the infantry. On seeing this, the consul ordered two picked cohorts to be taken round the enemy's right and to show themselves in his rear before the infantry became engaged.
34.47, 193 BC, picked cohorts:
The Gauls had broken through the quaestorian gate, and after meeting with the most obstinate resistance had killed the quaestor, L. Postumius Tympanus, M. Atinius and P. Sempronius, praefects of allies, and nearly 200 men. This side of the camp was in the enemy's hands until one of the "special cohorts" which had been sent by the consul to defend the quaestorian gate drove them out of the camp after killing many of them, and stopped those who were breaking in. Almost at the same moment the fourth legion, with two of the special cohorts, forced their way out of another gate.
35.5, 193 BC, picked cohorts:
[35.5]The action began about eight o'clock. The left wing of the allied cavalry and the "special" corps were fighting in the front line, and two generals of consular rank - M. Marcellus and Tiberius Sempronius; the latter had been consul the previous year - were in command of them. The consul Merula was at one moment at the front and at another holding back the legions who were in reserve, lest in their eagerness they should go forward before the signal was given. Two military tribunes, Q. Minucius and P. Minucius, received orders to take the cavalry of these two legions outside the line and when the signal was given to deliver an attack from the open. Whilst the consul was making these dispositions a message came from Ti. Sempronius Longus informing him that the special corps were not able to withstand the onslaught of the Gauls, a great many had been killed, and the survivors, wearied out and dispirited, had lost all heart for fighting. He asked the consul, therefore, if he approved, to send up one of the legions before they were humiliated by defeat. The second legion was sent up and the special corps was withdrawn. The battle was now restored, as the legion came up with its men fresh and its maniples complete.
39.30-31, 185 BC:
The losses of the Romans and the allies in the battle amounted to 5000, and the enemy armed themselves with the spoils taken from their bodies...
40.27-28, 181 BC, extraordinarii:
. The military tribunes Sextius Julius Caesar and L. Aurelius Cotta were in command of this legion. Q. Fulvius Flaccus, a staff officer, was posted with the right division of allied troops at the quaestorian gate. Two cohorts and the triarii of the two legions were ordered to remain and guard the camp...
To the four praetorian [Latin text reads extroardinariis] cohorts he added two others with M. Valerius, one of his staff officers, in command, and gave them orders to sally from the praetorian gate.
Livy 40.31, 181 BC, picked cavalry:
When the Roman praetor had satisfied himself that after so many days' inaction the enemy would not expect him to take the initiative, he ordered L. Acilius to take the division of allied troops and 6000 native auxiliaries, and make a circuit round the mountain which lay behind the enemy's camp. When he heard the battle-shout he was to charge down on their camp. They started in the night to escape observation. At daybreak Flaccus sent C. Scribonius, the commander of the allied troops, with his "select" cavalry up to the enemy's rampart...
Their centre was being closely pressed by the fifth legion, but they advanced with more confidence against the Roman left where they saw that their own countrymen were posted, and it would have been repulsed had not the seventh legion come up in support. The troops left to hold Aebura appeared in the middle of the battle and Acilius was in the enemy's rear. Between the two the Celtiberi were being cut to pieces; the survivors fled in all directions. The cavalry were sent after them in two divisions and caused great slaughter among them. As many as 23,000 men were killed that day, and 4700 were made prisoners; 500 horses and 88 military standards were captured. It was a great victory, but not a bloodless one. Out of the two legions rather more than 200 Roman soldiers fell, 830 out of the Latin allies, and 2400 out of the native auxiliaries
Livy 41.1, 178 BC, Placentia cohort:
. On the side facing Histria the emergency cohort from Placentia was posted permanently; M. Aebutius, one of the military tribunes, was ordered to take two maniples from the second legion to the river bank between the camp and the sea to protect the watering-parties; two other military tribunes, L. and C. Aelius, took the third legion along the road leading to Aquileia to protect the foraging and wood-cutting troops...When they saw that only weak pickets were posted in front of the camp and that between the camp and the sea there was a crowd of unarmed traders busy with their traffic and without any protection either on the land side or towards the sea, they made a simultaneous attack on the pickets, the Placentian cohort and the maniples of the second legion.
[i]Livy, 44.40-2, Battle of Pydna:
There was a river, not a large one, near the enemy's camp from which both the Romans and the Macedonians drew their water, protected by detachments stationed on either bank. [b\On the Roman side were two cohorts, Marrucinians and Paelignians, and two squadrons of Samnite horse under the command of M. Sergius Silus. Another body was stationed in front of the camp under C. Cluvius; these consisted of Firman, Vestinian and Cremensian troops, and two squadrons of cavalry from Placentia and Aeserna. Whilst all was quiet at the river, neither side offering any provocation, a mule broke loose about three o'clock in the afternoon from the men in charge and escaped to the opposite bank. Three soldiers went after it through the water, which was up to their knees. Two Thracians were dragging the beast out of the river back to their own bank, when they were followed by some Romans, who killed one of them, recaptured the mule, and went back to their posts. There were 800 Thracians guarding the enemy's bank. A few of these, enraged at seeing a comrade killed before their eyes, ran across the river in pursuit of those who slew him; then more joined in and at last the whole body, and with them the . . .
[44.41]. . . led them into battle. His men were deeply impressed by reverence for his authority, the reputation he had acquired, and, above all, his age, for though more than sixty years old, he took upon himself to a large extent the duties and dangers which are usually the lot of younger men. The interval between the "caetrati" and the divisions of the phalanx was filled up by the legion, and thus the enemy's line was interrupted. The "caetrati" were in their rear; the legion were fronting the shieldmen of the phalanx, who were known as the "chalcaspides." L. Albinus, an ex-consul, was ordered to lead the second legion against the phalanx of "leucaspides"; these formed the centre of the enemy's line. On the Roman right, where the battle had begun, close to the river, he brought up the elephants and the
cohorts of allied troops. It was here that the Macedonians first gave ground. For just as most new devices amongst men seem valuable as far as words go, but when they are put to a practical test and have to be acted upon they fail to produce results, so it was with the elephants; those of the Macedonians were of no use whatever.
The contingents of the Latin allies followed up the charge of the elephants and repulsed the left wing. The second legion which had been sent against the centre broke up the phalanx. The most probable explanation of the victory is that several separate engagements were going on all over the field, which first shook the phalanx out of its formation and then broke it up. As long as it was compact, its front bristling with levelled spears, its strength was irresistible. If by attacking them at various points you compel them to bring round their spears, which owing to their length and weight are cumbersome and unwieldy, they become a confused and involved mass, but if any sudden and tumultuous attack is made on their flank or rear, they go to pieces like a falling house. In this way they were forced to meet the repeated charges of small bodies of Roman troops with their front dislocated in many places, and wherever there were gaps the Romans worked their way amongst their ranks. If the whole line had made a general charge against the phalanx while still unbroken,
as the Paeligni did at the beginning of the action against the "caetrati," they would have spitted themselves upon their spears and have been powerless against their massed attack.
[44.42]The infantry were being slaughtered all over the field; only those who threw away their arms were able to make good their escape. The cavalry, on the other hand, quitted the field with hardly any loss, the king himself being the first to flee. He was already on his way to Pella with his "sacred" cavalry, and Cotys and the Odrysaeans were following at his heels. The rest of the Macedonian horse also got away with their ranks unbroken, because the infantry were between them and the enemy, and the latter were so fully occupied in massacring the infantry that they forgot to pursue the cavalry. For a long time the slaughter of the phalanx went on in front, flank and rear. At last those who had escaped out of the hands of the enemy threw away their arms and fled to the shore; some even went into the water and, stretching out their hands in supplication to the men in the fleet, implored them to save their lives. When they saw boats from all the ships rowing to the place where they were they thought that they were coming to take them up as prisoners rather than slay them, and they waded further into the water, some even swimming. But when they found that they were being killed by the men in the boats, those who could swim back to land met with a more wretched fate, for the elephants, forced by their drivers to the water's edge, trampled on them and crushed them to death as they came out. It is universally admitted that never had so many Macedonians been killed by the Romans in a single battle. As many as 20,000 men perished; 6000 who had fled to Pydna fell into the enemy's hands, and 5000 were made prisoners in their flight.
Of the victors not more than 100 fell, and of these the majority were Paelignians; the wounded were much more numerous. If the battle had begun earlier and there had been sufficient daylight for the victors to continue the pursuit, the whole force would have been wiped out. As it was, the approach of night shielded the fugitives and made the Romans chary of following them over unknown country.
[RESEARCH] Romans
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