Great stuff! But, specifically, my friend Magister Militum Flavius Aetius, I do not agree that Adrian Goldsworthy overgeneralizes things - in that he gives us an incomplete, let alone superficial, account of the relevant backdrops (if that's what you intimated); I feel his style simply constitutes a cut-and-dry, more succinct method devoid of deep extrapolations which entail evidence less nebulous, obscure, or - in his mind - unnecessary (of course, this ancient history!). However, if he is all we had, our beloved topics here would be much less entertaining! The likes of John F. Lazenby and Peter Heather, etc., are far more conducive to elaborate study.
Ian Hughes is overall excellent, but somewhat by default, due to the lack of other, multiple works on Flavius Aetius and Belisarius. But he fumbles, IMHO, in his overall judgment of Belisarius as not one of the greatest generals of all time. Hughes' acceptance of the accounts of John Malalas and Zacharius of Mytilene over Procopius - in undermining Belisarius' generalship at the Battle of Callinicum - is purely arbitrary, and he overlooks that Procopius' concise and objective accounts (cf. Belisarius: The Last Roman General, p. 64, I find to be a misplaced verdict) were compiled for presentation to Justinian, not a laudatory angle to praise Belisarius (Procopius actually bestows less praise on Belisarius than he does for the much less famous and less participating general Chilbudius). Moreover, Procopius' more personal Secret History indicates a resentful disposition towards Belisarius. Thus from the full and intricate reflection of Procopius we are availed to judge Belisarius, we have on the greatest generals of all time, in terms of tactical balance, strength of opposition, comparative minimal resources provided for him, and strategic success. IMHO, though dated, The Life of Belisarius by Philip Stanhope (Lord Mahon) is a more judicious bio on the great general. Peculiarly, Hughes' brief bibliography, compared with that of his bio on Aetius, on whom the fountainhead of sources are exclusively pangyric and far more obscure, does list Mahon, indicating he discarded what I presented (Goldsworthy even tells us amid his footnotes where another historian's opinion is in contrast with his own, and tells us why, especially a deep work related to the same subject); he should have acknowledged what Mahon wrote (cf. The Life of Belisarius, p. 14 and relevant note 13 - yes, footnotes amid an historical work from 1829!). IMHO, Belisarius did not lose the Battle of Callinicum in the manner many judgments indicate, though it was a much closer fight than his virtuosic masterpiece at Dara a year prior. His subordinates and troops were seemingly a little too hawkish from the verdict of Dara, and he was compelled to fight earlier than he wished (cf. John B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire, Vol. 2, p. 87). His anchoring of his infantry on the Euphrates to form a shield-wall and drive off the Sassanids was superb and impromptu generalship (the accounts of Malalas and Zacharias contra Procopius - that Belisarius fled and left his army to their own fate after the Sassanids won the opening cavalry duel - are simply unacceptable, given the overall conduct of Belisarius throughout his very long and incredible career), and subsequently the Sassanid king Kavadh I rebuked and relieved Azarethes of command after realizing the Sassanids had suffered so heavily (Malalas and Zacharias report of an Imperial enquiry over Belisarius' conduct, and they even tells us - though I think their accounts are to be ignored due to the stark contrast they present with Procopius - that Belisarius was cleared of any direct blame, though relieved for the time being). More in-depth circumstances and specifics are required, of course, to present as acute as possible reasons for cause and effect under such conditions, but as of 531 ACE the eastern borders were secure enough for Justinian to decree the famed conquests of Belisarius in the West.
Forgive me, my friend, but Belisarius hardly invoked 'Hunnic tactics' akin to what Aetius certainly administered (in retort to your comment on the Commanders thread, suggesting Belisarius was nothing more than a slavish imitator of Aetius); albeit invaluable for their purpose, the Huns comprised some 200 men in Belisarius' army, hardly sufficient to contribute anything more than an ancillary role in his battles, and he was involved in major field battles involving frontal engagements, with any hit-and-run tactics not comprising any major role in his tactics. Belisarius was far more diverse with engineered entrenchments and a balance of horse and foot (the latter more defensively) action. Absolutely nothing in the panegyrics and chronicles we have for Aetius reveals he was even close to the great general Belisarius was, who was almost always outnumbered and encompassed by his enemies, save for the Nika Riots and masterful stymying of the Kutrigurs in his last battle, which Hughes mentions rather prosaically devoid of even an iota of appreciation (cf. pp. 239-240). Coupled with the defeat of the encroaching Kutrigurs, Belisarius' great naval ruse to take Panormus would have doubtless been appreciated by Hannibal himself! Aetius was surely a good general from what we can glean, and I still acquiesce that I placed him too low; he maintained his army and marched adeptly to beat back incursions into his Gallic 'fiefdom', so to speak. But what did he accomplish to enable any assessment to hold that he 'far exceeds Belisarius in skill' (your words not verbatim)?? I'm sorry, but that's far, far too misguided, IMHO, and you seem to exercise strong conviction in that judgment. You wrote 'there was no excuse' for placing Belisarius (it may be the other way around). The battle he is famous for was a tactical stalemate (Attila was amid a rearguard) of which he shared command with his allies (notably Theodoric I). It seems he was bested by Aspar near Ravenna in his first command in battle on record; he certainly lost to Boniface. He certainly never began his career like Philip II of Macedon (eg., the supreme and novel victory over the Illyrians in 358 BCE), to name an example of a figure lauded with merit. Why the extreme reverence for Aetius? Perhaps because he was a good leader who efficiently delayed the 'inevitable' fall of Rome in the mid-late 5th century ACE, and the glamor of his time and place per se has led to an over-appreciation (depending on one's criterion on judging these things) - in the sense he was a great general (the famed Theodor Mommsen, however, did view Aetius as overrated, relayed by Bury, note 3 on p. 241, in Vol. 1 of his great History of the Roman Empire).
This is where Goldsworthy is succinct and discerning where the likes of Heather and Hughes are arbitrarily too presumptive, IMHO:
Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell, p. 330,
"...Aetius dominated the Western Empire for two decades. He went on campaign in virtually all of these years, fighting against, amongst others, the Visigoths, Alamanni, Franks, Burgundians and Suevi, as well as the rebels known as Bagaudae who had appeared in north-western Gaul. Just like Stilicho and Constantius before him, court poets celebrated his bravery, skill and sweeping victories in the grandest of styles...Yet the very frequency of operations reveals that his successes were limited and almost never decisive..."
OK. That's not an overgeneralization (depending one's definition), but rather a compendious overview. Peter Heather opines that Aetius' achievement in dealing with the mess of the 430s ACE was 'extraordinary' (cf. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, pp. 283-285), and to 'shed light' on this 'extraordinary' achievement Heather writes that 'we have a few sparse entries in the chronicles' (something not supportive of such a strong conclusion), subsequent to which he splendidly apprises us of a Medieval source for one Merobaudes, a rhetorician who lists the military achievements of Aetius of the 430s ACE (this is still far from having a Procopius as a veritable source of detail). The list reveals what Goldsworthy stated more so, IMHO, than Heather's reflection of Aetius being a great general (emphasis on great) because the 'record is impressive', where successful 'campaigns' followed another.
Let's take a look at the record, and ask what occured:
In c. 425 ACE Aetius, after obtaining military assistance from the Huns, was ordered by the western usurper Joannes to attack the rear of the eastern army under Aspar after it entered Italy; Aspar was sent by the eastern emperor Theodosius II to Italy to supplant Joannes in support of Placedia (the regent for the child-emperor of the West, Valentinian III). In the region of Ravenna, Joannes was captured and executed a few days before Aetius arrived. Indeed, Aetius attacked with, perhaps, an advantage (if he engaged in sync with 'falling on the rear' of Aspar's army, a reflection, indeed, of Hunnic methods), and all we now have on record is that 'there was heavy slaughter on both sides' (cf. Olympiodorus of Thebes, Books of History, fr. 43.2). Not an auspicious beginning, but also not any indication of Aetius being a less than good general at this early stage.
In c. 426 Aetius, appointed by Placedia as the field commander of Gaul, where conditions were grim with threats on many sides, marched to Arles (NW of Massilia) to face the Visigoths who had laid siege to the city. Aetius marched to face the Visigoths with celerity, but the circumstantial action does not validate the display of a great general. We have but two surviving sources of the event, comprising the same number of sentences; Prosper of Aquitaine wrote that Arles 'was assailed by the Goths with great violence, until, threatened by Aetius they withdrew not without losses'; the Chronicle Gallica of 452 -a continuation of the famed works by St. Jerome - simply reads, 'Arles was freed from the Goths by Aetius'. As brief as this is, it's revealing enough that the Goths attacked Arles and sustained losses in doing so, and only upon Aetius' arrival did they withdraw. Hughes agrees (cf. p. 65), but writes in his valuable Outline Chronology that 'Aetius defeats Goths besieging Arles' (cf. p 208), rather than 'Aetius compels Goths to flee Arles upon his arrival' (I think there is a difference which should be clarified). Mission accomplished, but let's not credit Aetius with a great victory by just appearing and compelling the enemy to retire.
In c. 428, Aetius marched to the Rhine in attempt to expel encroaching Salian Franks under their king Clodio, who recently defeated the stationed Romans around Cambrai and joined the settled Franks already here in northern Gaul on the Rhine; Aetius seemingly checked Clodio (near modern Arras, or perhaps Hesdin), but the Frankish king maintained his position and within a few years had apparently extended his power westwards. The sources we get here are Philostorgius (Church History 12.4), Prosper of Aquitaine (s.a. 425 and 428), the Chronicle Gallica of 452 (102 and s.a. 427) and Cassiodorus (Chronica, s.a. 428). The gist from these brief excerpts reveals no decisive victory whatsoever (perhaps not Aetius' intent). He would have to come back later to deal further with this.
In c. 430 Aetius returned near Arles and stopped the threatening moves of the Visigoths under one Anaolsus, probably sanctioned by his king Theodoric I; our primary source for this is Hydatius (Chronicon 430). We have no details, including the fate of Anaolsus, but this was a battle victory for Aetius, whatever the fashion.
In c. 430 Aetius marched NE to the Roman province of Raetia (modern central and eastern Switzerland), where he defeated a rebellious force of Iuthungi (Alamanni); through Hydatius (Cronicon 430), the Chronicle Gallica of 452 (s.a. 430), and Sidonius Appollinaris (Carmina 7.233), we have no material to judge the nature of the battle or Aetius' strength of opposition. But the speed under which two victories were achieved, while supporting the aspect that Aetius skillfully exploited a warlike manner of Hunnic-style maneuver and attack (ambush and surprise seems to be his forte, as we may see), is also is reflective of Goldsworthy's identification that these were small battles against encroaching and rebel brigands. But the pattern of solidifying Roman realms is evident.
In c. 431 Aetius swiftly put down a rebellion in Noricum, a province just east of Raetia. Nothing from Hydatius (Chronicon s.a. 431) allows us to even extrapolate prodigious tactics evident of a great field general. It can only be assumed that a good leader moved his army accordingly to suppress a small uprising (comparatively speaking).
In c. 432 Aetius, now consul, marched to the Rhine to face the Franks again, this time retaking Tournai and Cambrai. Hydatius reveals that an agreement with Clodio was reached (cf. Chronicon s.a. 432), but if he knew that information, why cannot he have know if he actually faced Clodio in the field in a relatively major battle, and if so, how did he defeat them? We are availed not even sparse details of any battle action. Without such data, how can anyone profess that Aetius far exceeds one such as Belisarius in skill as a general, of whom we have concise enough details to rate as a supreme general (even those who disagree Belisarius was not as great as I deem him, it is undeniable he was very good)? Regardless, it seems Aetius more forcefully checked, at the very least, the Frankish threat.
In c. 432, Aetius meets Boniface in battle in the region proximate to Ravenna and Rimini (Ariminum), and is defeated. Although the chronicler John of Antioch claims Aetius was victorious (cf. Historia Chronice, fr. 201.3), the more contemporary chronicles of Prosper and Marcellinus Comes tell us enough that Aetius relinquished his charge and retired to his estates in Italy before fleeing eastwards, after an assassination attempt, to the friendly confines of the Huns under Rua (probably within the lands of Dalmatia or Pannonia). Boniface surely won the battle, but later died of his wounds. It's a shame for the Roman cause that these two were at odds rather than allies. A seasoned Aetius was now beaten by a worthy foe of equal strength, who crossed to Italy from Africa no less. Not a positive point to place Aetius with generals throughout history of the highest tier. Aetius returned a year later and was reinstalled as magister millitum.
In c. 435 Aetius defeated the Burgundians under their king Gundahar in a swift campaign in Gallia Belgica (cf. Prosper, s.a. 435; Cassiodorus Chronica s.a. 435), and terms were imposed. Again, we don't have any words of Aetius' tactics or manner of battlefield control.
In c. 436, the Burgundians broke the treaty and were again attacked, if not a doublet of Aetius' success against them the year before, and 'crushed' by Aetius (Prosper's words, but no battle-action detail); they were then separately and more forcefully overrun by the Huns, effectively destroying their kingdom. This same year saw Aetius' subordinate Litorius defeat the Visigoths under Theodoric I, who were besieging Narbonne (on the coast of southern Gaul); Litorius had earlier effected a collapse in northern Gaul by the rising Bacaudae by capturing their leader Tibatto, hence was able to rush south with his Hunnic allies (some, however, broke away to plunder and were stopped by a Gallic leader named Avitus) and surprise the Visigoths. Interestingly, the chronicles here give us at least a glimpse of how things unfolded: Prosper tells us that Litorius ambushed the Visigoths at their siege-lines, thus they could not form a coherent battle-line, and that Litorius ordered his men to carry two measures of wheat for the citizens of Narbonne (cf. Prosper s.a. 436). From this brevity we can at least assume Litorius effectively utilized the element of surprise on the enemy's positions not marshalled for a field battle. We are not provided even such miniscule details regarding Aetius' actions so far. This is perhaps significant, because the next year's campaign we get a glimpse of Aetius' methods from the aforementioned Merobaudes.
In c. 438 Aetius won a battle against a Gothic enemy which seems to illustrate his mark as a good general, and, as would be assumed anyway given his close association with the Huns as a young man, a display of Hunnic martial influence. According to Hydatius, Aetius slaughtered 8,000 Goths, and Merobaudes mirrors this - though surely exaggerated - in telling us that Aetius 'killed the greatest part of the enemy' after he 'surprised them - as is his custom'; he provides the detail that the Gothic infantry units were routed and that he followed hard on the scattering enemy cavalry (cf. Merobaudes, Panegyric 1, fr. IIA). 'As is his custom'. This is instructive and welcomed detail (just a few words such as this is what helps enormously; I'm not asking for something along the lines of what a 20th century war correspondent would provide!); as Aetius was in distant sectors of Gaul for every campaign, we can use such unambiguous phrases to assume he surprised his various enemies with a rapid approach sans any major pitched battles and/or sieges, and in this case, he clearly effectuated a probable superb battle victory over a relatively large and marshalled enemy (this was almost surely the Battle of 'Snake Mountain'). But it didn't work earlier against Aspar and Boniface. Perhaps at this later time it would...
It seems Aetius' only successful action thereafter - before the Catalaunian Plains - was an ambush of the Franks in c. 445, after which he led a victory procession through the streets of Rome the following year.
Forgive me if this was somewhat dry - against my custom, if I may - but I just appreciate Goldsworthy's (who is, after all, the subject of this thread) precise recognition that Aetius' prolific record needs to be gauged, if it needs to be at all, within its context, and not just from a quantitative perspective.
Sorry my friend, I concede that Aetius should be TIER 2, but he's not on par with Belisarius, IMHO. You have my word that, though I don't get around to posting as much as I used to, I enjoy often reading yours and others' fine and deep works on these great topics both here and on RAT. Should you undertake a comparison of the two arguing otherwise, I'll see it, peruse it, and get around with my retorts! Moreover, everyone, comparing these two greats of later Roman history (generally speaking, taking into consideration the distinction of Byzantine identity) could be as illuminating as it could be tantalizing, but not in an x vs. y mode, nor in an elaborate manner on this thread.
Thanks, James 
Adrian Goldsworthy: Opinions
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Originally Posted by Markas
ing books there are arguing the same 
