Battle of Tannenberg - 100th anniversary

[hellheaven1987]

I am too lazy to write a full article so I would just write a short introduction. Battle of Tannenberg was a WWI engagement between German 8th Army and Russian 2nd Army. Russia, despite the prediction of Schlieffen Plan, was able to assemble two armies to try for a push into East Prussia at the opening of war. Fortunately for German, due to bad communication the two Russian armies were not well-coordinated, and worse still the radio messages were intercepted by German hence German were aware the plan and weakness of Russian. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, realized the plan of Russian, decided to use "divide and conquer" strategy - concentrated 8th Army against one Russian army first before move to against another. The result was two battles - Tannenberg (August 26 ~ August 30) against Russian 2nd Army and First Masurian Lakes (September 7 ~ September 14) against Russian 1st Army. In the end, German 8th Army was able to eliminate Russian 2nd Army while pushed 1st Army out of East Prussia (Ludendorff was planning to do some crazy encirclement of Russian Poland after that but then AH screwed themselves in southern front so German had to save Austrian's butt).

Tannenberg campaign was interesting because:

- It was, arguably, the only successful strategical encirclement during WWI and the first German victory.

- It was the first campaign of Hindenburg/Ludendorff partnership.

- Perhaps the most important, however, was after Schlieffen Plan failed the "Going East" faction within German military, headed by Hindenburg, was able to gain influence slowly within German government using Tannenberg campaign as propaganda. In the end, the Going East faction would win the control of German military strategy completely after the failure of Verdun.

[Hresvelgr]

As you alluded to, the German victory owed a lot to the two Russian generals in charge, who greatly hated each other and were bitter rivals since the Russo-Japanese War, where one of them (Samsonov) accused the other (Rennenkampf) of not coming to his aid at a crucial moment and losing them the battle. Apparently neither of them learned anything from that since their lack of cooperation was a major factor for the Russian defeat which was so crushingly massive that Samsonov actually killed himself in shame.

Despite the stereotypes, the Russian army in WW1 wasn't really that bad, or at least it had a significant amount of potential. They were one of the first, maybe even actually the first, to adopt a light machine-gun for standard issue, developed (sort of by accident) the first assault rifle, developed good squad-based tactics, created the first (and for perhaps most of the war the best) heavy bomber plane, and even had a great design/prototype for a tank in 1915. But throughout the war the Russian commanders seemed to just do away with a lot of these advantages. They stuck to outdated infantry tactics such as the "chain", failed to fully develop their own tanks, didn't make many assault rifles or even much ammunition for any of their weapons, and so on. Tannenberg is like the monument to Russian failures in the war though. I don't think they suffered a defeat quite as horrible as that later on (and I'm pretty sure they regularly beat the Austrians and Ottomans around), but I don't think they were fully able to get over their defeat there either before they were forced to pull out of the war.

[hellheaven1987]

The encirclement of Russian 2nd Army was partially an accident anyway; it seems Ludendorff's original plan was simply pushing it back instead eliminating it.

[Turtler]

First and foremost, while this is a very good thread and a worthy subject..

@hellheaven1987

1. It's not even arguable that there were more successful strategic encirclements. If nothing else, things like Kut, the fall of the Baltic States, Southwest Africa, West Africa, the Balkan Western Allied offensive trapping the CP troops in Serbia, and the cornering of the German army in the West on the bank of the Rhine, and Megiddo.

2. It wasn't really the first Gemran victory of the war. That was won earlier, and even on the same front by von Francois.

[Ecthelion]

Great post.

And indeed Tannenberg is one of those often ignored battles (at least in the West) that actually had huge consequences. Had the Russians prevailed, and indeed they very well could have, the entire situation in East Prussia would have been dire for the Germans as they simply didn't have enough men on station to halt a full blown Russian advance. The bulk of the German army was already committed in the West and there were few strategic reserves to stop a Russian push to Berlin, or at least across the Oder.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Now the real question is: can you see the difference in terms of Russian command and organization between Tannenberg and the 1916 Summer Offensive?

In many ways we can! The officers in 1916 were being supervised directly by the Tsar who came to direct operations as the Supreme Commander. This allowed many of the rivalries among the higher ranking generals to evaporate almost (inevitably they would come back just like the rain, from time to time). The other reason beigng the Tsar's ability to appoint whoever he saw fit to certain positions which were for the most part sound decisions on his part.

The fact that he would appoint an experienced officer like Brusilov to relative importance was significant. More so he was able to provide this June offensive with a well organized supply system and many more times the correct equipment that was previously unavailable. Regardless even the Brusilov Offensive, which was directed to the southern flank of the German-Austrian front, came to a halt when Ludendorff sent in a sizable amount of reinforcements into that choke point at Kovel.

[hellheaven1987]

Stavka was the one which really produced and directed Russia strategy during first two years of war.

[Condottiere 40K]

Had the outcome of Tannenberg been more ambiguous, the Germans would have needed to divert more Army Corps from the West. and may have persuaded the Kaiser to go the diplomatic route.

[DarthShizNit]

The story of Samsonov and Rennenkampf's dislike of each other is an unsubstantiated rumor that has somehow turned into fact. Where the real case of disorder and lack of communication comes down to is to the Russian Theater Commander Zhilinskiy. It was this man that pushed Samsonov and his army deep into Prussia without ensuring support from Rennenkampf who had halted his operations after the costly victory at Gumbinnen. He repetaedly ignored Samsonvo's distress, and failed to properly coordinate Rennenkampf's advance once he started moving again.

All in all, Samsonov and Rennenkampf performed as well as any General in their situation could probably hope to, being ordered into an attack into hostile territory unprepared and under-supplied. Samsonvo obviously should have just told command to off and leave him alone, but hindsight's 20-20.

[Erebus Pasha]

The story of Samsonov and Rennenkampf's dislike of each other is an unsubstantiated rumor that has somehow turned into fact. Where the real case of disorder and lack of communication comes down to is to the Russian Theater Commander Zhilinskiy. It was this man that pushed Samsonov and his army deep into Prussia without ensuring support from Rennenkampf who had halted his operations after the costly victory at Gumbinnen. He repetaedly ignored Samsonvo's distress, and failed to properly coordinate Rennenkampf's advance once he started moving again.

All in all, Samsonov and Rennenkampf performed as well as any General in their situation could probably hope to, being ordered into an attack into hostile territory unprepared and under-supplied. Samsonvo obviously should have just told command to off and leave him alone, but hindsight's 20-20.

Rennenkampf has to take a share of the blame - his caution after a rather bloody encounter at Gumbinnen is understandable, but even slightly more urgency on his part would've given the command team of Hindenburg and Ludendorff serious food for thought. They were occasions when Ludendorff was almost overcome by panic during the Battle of Tannenberg due to false reports of First Army advancing.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Ludendorff had issues keeping his cool. So I can understand the Hindenburg role throughout the career of the duo. Hindenburg seems to have been good at dealing with the politics of the military aristocracy and providing authority.

Ludendorff does not appear to have been an authoritative figure but he was most definitely the brains of the operation. Of course delegating to a lower level of command might have been necessary when things were so complex that Hindenburg did not have a clear answer or when Ludendorff was seized by a panic attack of sorts or even when another brain was required for staff work or strategy.

Overall though I'd say Lundendorff usually got his hands full of work. I can't imagine how difficult it must have been to send orders to Falkenhayn for a breakthrough in the West and trying to stall the Russian offensive in 1916 simultaneously.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

A battle largely won thanks to the actions of von Francois, one of the greatest tactical commanders of Germany during WWI. He was a brilliant example of autonomous thinking and action, although this was not particularly promoted at the time. Von Francois' actions during the battle enabled Germany not only to score a significant victory, but also allowed Hindenburg and Lundedorff to be presented as the actual perpetrators of this victory. They were thus easily catapulted to higher positions.

[hellheaven1987]

A battle largely won thanks to the actions of von Francois, one of the greatest tactical commanders of Germany during WWI. He was a brilliant example of autonomous thinking and action, although this was not particularly promoted at the time. Von Francois' actions during the battle enabled Germany not only to score a significant victory, but also allowed Hindenburg and Lundedorff to be presented as the actual perpetrators of this victory. They were thus easily catapulted to higher positions.

More precisely, it was because von Francois' moved too slow, which allowed Samsonov to push the center further yet unable to break it, created an opportunity for von Francois to encircle Samsonov (von Francois was on the right wing of German force). The move actually was dangerous as the German center was in serious risk of be broken by Samsonov, and if it happened, von Francois' flanking attack would not work well.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

When it came to staff work neither Hindenburg nor Lundendorff can be considered slouches. More so for Ludendorff who's strength really was thinking things through. The difference between the two might be that Ludendorff viewed many things only from a militarist point of view where as Hindenburg might have appreciated the bigger picture a bit more. Even then Ludendorff's strengths really were military strategy and staff work, the man serving as a highly skilled engineer before being moved around the theatres in various command positions.

I mean I can't really say either that von Francois deserves the credit for a flanking maneuver. That would be like giving the credit for Cannae solely to Mago for outflanking the Romans. Aside from him though, there were several other staff officers and other army commanders who served in good capacity at Tannenberg too (Max Hoffman or August von Mackensen maybe).
But I do agree that with von Francois' rather unpredictable decision the battle turned much more in Germany's favour. It was a serious risk however and that should also be acknowledged, that Francois might overstretch himself in the flanking maneuver and not come down hard enough on the Russians, maybe even wrecking his own troops in the process or not show up in time so that the centre and left might be smashed or forced to withdraw. I recall Francois did something similar (disobeying Ludendorff yet again) at the Masurian lakes but not to the same effect.

[hellheaven1987]

But I do agree that with von Francois' rather unpredictable decision the battle turned much more in Germany's favour.

His decision was largely based on his units were all understrength (German suffered quite some casualty during previous engagement); in fact Lundendorff might partially right that von Francois might think about retreat more than attack. An interesting thing was that pretty much every corp level commander of 8th Army went panic at least once during August, hence Moltke's decision to send reinforcement to East Prussia was not too unreasonable since 8th Army did seriously doubt its ability to hold Russian during August (including Lundendorff).

[Erebus Pasha]

As subsequent memoirs show there was some massive egos in the German 8th army at the time. Ludendorff, Hoffmann and Von Francois all wrote accounts showing themselves as the true architects of German victory in East Prussia during 1914. Hoffmann was especially disingenuous to Hindenburg later on showing visitors to the battlefield where the avuncular general slept before,during and after the battle.

An interesting thing was that pretty much every corp level commander of 8th Army went panic at least once during August, hence Moltke's decision to send reinforcement to East Prussia was not too unreasonable since 8th Army did seriously doubt its ability to hold Russian during August (including Lundendorff).

Prittwitz and his chief of staff Von Waldersee(iirc) did panic in the aftermath of Gumbinnen although the majority of 8th army staff and the corps commanders in the field were confident of overturning the situation or at least holding the Russians at bay until reinforcements could arrive. The Germans were confident in their logistical system - they would be operating on interior lines, whilst the men were largely familiar with the terrain and highly motivated to defend East Prussia at all costs. German military staff had rehearsed war games in the region prior to 1914 based on a similar strategic situation i.e a two pronged Russian invasion of East Prussia and were confident in their ability to handle matters. Still I think the overwhelming German victory at Tannenberg came as a surprise to the commanders of 8th army. I think their intention was to at least stall Samsonov and at best to severely maul him. The almost complete destruction of the Russian 2nd Army was a shock.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Yes you are right, it was the German intention to hold the line at all costs and at most push the Russians back in a frontal push all across the line. The Kaiser's staff had hoped that the enemy could be encircled but Ludendorff did not believe that this would be possible in the long run. So there really was no immediate goal of encircling any part of Samsonov's second army. The goal of the high command to do this was only a best case scenario.

If I recall however Hoffman's memoirs published after the war was the first in depth account of von Francois' maneuver. So I'm not actually sure how much credit Hoffman gave himself. Someone else might better clarify this issue.

[DarthShizNit]

Hoffman gave the orders that put the 8th army into the position of attack it carried out, before Ludendorff had even excepted command. When he did, he quickly proceeded to just verify the orders Hoffman had given. All in all, though Tannenberg is the battle that made the duo of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, it's probably also the one they deserve the least credit for. Not saying they didn't contribute, but the excellent staff at the 8th Army and the varying corps commanders should get the larger portion of the credit IMO.

[hellheaven1987]

Hoffman gave the orders that put the 8th army into the position of attack it carried out, before Ludendorff had even excepted command. When he did, he quickly proceeded to just verify the orders Hoffman had given. All in all, though Tannenberg is the battle that made the duo of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, it's probably also the one they deserve the least credit for. Not saying they didn't contribute, but the excellent staff at the 8th Army and the varying corps commanders should get the larger portion of the credit IMO.

Yes, although John Keegan mentions that it was actually a pre-set strategy among German military and had been constantly practicing in war game before the war. 8th Army went panic during August generally had to do with Russian made a move that German did not predict before.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

There was a lack of creativity in terms of strategic planning by Germany. In 1916, von Falkenheyn attacked Verdun to bleed the French army white, supposedly causing 5 casualties for every 2 German ones, a plan that failed miserably. In the first half of 1918, the war was certainly more likely to be won by Germany, but lack of creativity killed German hopes. About 45 divisions were freed from Russia to be transferred elsewhere. Instead of launching an attack through Switzerland (a very likely scenario according to Petain), attacking in Italy or in Salonica, or even preserving the reinforcements for defensive operations, Hindenburg and Lundedorff decided to launch a predictable attack in northern France. The French had already been making defensive preparations for much of 1917, and after the Russian collapse, they had ceased offensive activities in order to improve their defenses and amass reserves. Yet, Kaiserslacht made significant gains, demonstrating how close the Germans were to victory. Perhaps, if Germany had better strategists in her disposal, the war would have indeed be won.