Fleet in Being.

[RNV]

Hello,
I was reading about convoy war in the Mediterranean during the second world war and decided to ask for your opinions about the doctrine of existence of the fleet that was used by Italy. Was is effective for you?

Considering that the italian fleet sunk more tonnage than the british in the Med. and managed to bring at destination most of the convoy's ( I don't have data at hand if necessary I'll post something later) I think it was.
Sure it was not all a deliberate choice, the Navy lacked fuel to operate the surface ships at full time and consequently in mid-august battle in 1942 scored only a tactical victory as the presence of all the italian battlefleet would have scored a lethal blow to the RN in the Mediterranean.

So, well, I would like to know your opinions about this doctrine, did it work in the war?


Note: please refrain to say it did'nt because the Axis lost, it does'nt add anything to the discussion if you don't articulate how a different approach could have changed at least the tactical situation.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Yes but the British under Andrew Cunningham also annihilated the Italian Reggia Marina. Perhaps the Italians were at a disadvantage the entire time but I believe just from principal they should have attacked the British fleet and cleared the Mediterranean.

[Condottiere 40K]

Fleet in being is meant to be a deterrence, restricting an opponent's options.

The RN had a tradition of victory, and plenty of practise in handling their ships.

It would have to be a political decision, and no supreme leader wants to read in the papers the next day that his beloved battleships are resting at the bottom of the sea.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Which ended up happening anyways, and it's not like the Italians were at the same disadvantage that the Germans faced when confronted by the Royal Navy.

The fleet in being might have been a winning strategy mind you, but that would have required the Axis to make all the right moves with time and resources being at a disadvantage. They should have used their resources to take a chance in a full out attack (or at least larger than what was attempted) which they would have run out of anyway. Might as well do something with them than a waiting game and the hope that the army in Africa would accomplish every single one of its objectives. Italy's production being particularly weak to handle the situation and couldn't at all replace its significant losses in ships and planes. They could barely make up for lost tanks (which were all light desert tanks).

Instead of Rommel pushing into Egypt they should have had Kesselring capture Malta to at least support the decision of the fleet in being.

[Cyclops]

Fleet in Being doctrine automatically puts you on the back foot. However as part of Grand Strategy it has a place, keeping enemy elements on station. In WW1 had the Imperial German Navy gone hard at Heligoland I don't think they'd have broken the blockade as they'd probably lose as many ships as they sunk, with less rebuild capabiluty. The UK still had enormous fleet reserves, albeit of older ships. Basically they'd free up a few resources for the land war for both sides.

The Royal Navy has such a brilliant tradition of winning naval wars with decisive battles, it'd give anyone pause. The Anglo Dutch wars in the 17th century were the last time they were whipped I think? The Duch concentrated their fleet elements, and only lot a bit of colonial real estate. I know Charles II strategy invoilved privateering and colony pinching, did he disperse his fleet or concentrate it?

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Yes I don't think that the British suffered any significant naval losses until the American Revolution and even then it was no Trafalgar type of defeat.
Despite many times almost losing their grasp of the sea throughout the 1800s they quickly bounced back in the arms race against Russia, France and finally Germany.

I believe Charles II concentrated his fleet when he fought the Dutch (the Second Anglo-Dutch War) despite there being engagements fought in the North Sea, the mouth of the Baltic and around the English Channel along the English and Dutch coasts. It was more of a Dutch onslaught against the English coast and the English occasionally bringing the fight back to the Dutch. But most of the time it was a fully sized fleet defending their naval bases. The war in the North Sea near Norway and Denmark being more like raids against smaller foreign Dutch naval bases and their allies.

Really the reason the Royal Navy has such a reputation for being undefeated was more to the style of war at the time after the Napoleonic Wars. Very rarely were the British faced by another first rate fleet like their own and it had much to do with gunboat diplomacy. Even the Russian navy which briefly had a reputation after the Napoleonic Wars and even after sinking the Ottoman fleet at Sinope chose to either scuttle their ships or keep them blockade in a harbor. Of course they had little chance against the more renowned French fleet and its new technologies and the already famous British fleet. Operations in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Pacific were carried out more like bombardments of unadvanced peoples which were all the rage at the time.

I think if an actual war between France and Britain broke out the Royal Navy wouldn't have been so lucky. Poor administration and a lack of technological innovation put it as somewhat of an overpriced blowfish (except in sailors and ship numbers) when compared to... I guess France was the only other country that really had a navy which was considered modern for the time. All throughout 1848 to around 1870ish this was known but widely kept secret by the government. From then on the British really got hold again and then there came the arms race with Germany which was probably already won with the creation of the Dreadnought and the absolutely crushing size of the RN.

Italy's one real advantage was that the war was carried out in its own turf on the Mediterranean and the Royal Navy was split between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. I think Andrew Cunningham was right in adopting an aggressive approach in the long run and took the war straight to the Italians whenever possible. This part sort of breaking the concept of the fleet in being since the Italians couldn't make up the losses to their larger ships and made them waste time and resources, which the Italians could hardly afford to do.

[Condottiere 40K]

It may really come down to professionalism, political will, industrial base and capacity, as well as doctrine.

While senior promotion tended to require a certain patronage and networking, all officers had an apprenticeship as Midshipmen, and merit was recognized.

The English recognized that national security and prosperity was based on controlling shipping lanes, and built up the industrial base to support a large navy. It helped that a natural suspicion of large standing armies and a wide moat released capital to be allocated elsewhere.

The Admiralty encouraged aggressiveness and a certain initiativeness in their officers and crews by shooting those who were found lacking it, and incentivizing it by paying the going rate for prize ships.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Interesting. So ruling the waves is like a pendulum effect to building more ships and ruling the waves some more.

[Condottiere 40K]

Especially in the Age of Sail, where technology didn't make the last generation of ships obsolescent, so numbers count.

[Cyclops]

I think the Royal Navy learned from their drubbing from the Dutch, and enjoyed strong attention from the Parliament (with a formal Admiralty since the ealy 1600's). Credit to them for learning the lessons, not every armed force does that.

I have to say the Dutch must've been awesome sailors, they made up a ridiculous proportion of the Carribean pirates and pinched most of the Portugeuse Empire (who weren't bad sailors themselves). I guess England had a larger and more secure base, and once it united Britain and Ireland the Dutch stood no chance.

Especially in the Age of Sail, where technology didn't make the last generation of ships obsolescent, so numbers count.

I really wanted to disagree but you're completely right. The Ironclads and Dreadnoughts in turn seem to have completely outclassed existing fleets, and we know the next gen Cruisers and Battlecruisers in WW1 were streets ahead of the previous classes (eg the Goeben basically taking on the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the East Asia Squadron roaming unchecked until the met modern RN fleet elements at the Falklands).

WW2 is the same story again, with the massive BB fleets reduced to amphib support roles and target practice for dive bombers, as CVs ruled the waves.

Compare that to the Anglo Dutch wars where the English forces had superuioir numbers and classes of ships, often newer, yet the result turned on seamanship and aggression.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I would assume France played a major role in not allowing the Dutch to club the British continually like a defenseless baby seal. France's fleet was able to join up with the English from time to time or even did small indirect attacks and commerce raiding as per the instructions of Louis XIV and Vice Admiral Abraham Duquesne. Jean Baptiste Colbert was unable to push his agenda for independent all out long distance and long term naval capabilities. Besides it was expensive to do that, most of the money was required for the army and raiding practically funds itself. Not to mention that France already had the largest fleet in Europe and Louis never expected that some day in his reign he would have to go it alone, the English fleet of Oliver Cromwell and Charles II was there for him after all.

The other important factor was the French army and the fact that large funds needed to be used for defense. French attacks on the upper areas of the Rhine slightly disrupted the naval activity and the mobility displayed by guys like Turenne made not even Germany a safe border. Funny how the Netherlands finally succumbed to the French in 1795. Serious middle finger to England for starting the First Anglo-Dutch war for no reason, which gave nobody anything except for expenses and losses in ships. There was absolutely no decisive event throughout this entire war, the victories won by England were more or less nominal and gained no actual advantage. The whole damn thing was a back and forth clubbing match between the Maarten Tromp and Robert Blake (Blake made the serious mistake of splitting his force half way into the war but the Dutch were unable to exploit it entirely). This war along with the other factors probably had boat loads to do with why the Netherlands couldn't compete long term. They just couldn't make up their losses.

[Condottiere 40K]

Another factor with a fleet i being is that it remains an immediate threat, that gives little or no warning when it sails into contested waters.

That's why the High Seas Fleet was an immediate threat to the British Isles, forcing the Royal Navy to concentrate it's battle fleet in the North Sea, and the unintended consequence of hardening the British attitude to Germany.

[RNV]

Thanks guys I like the way the discussion went through .

Anyway, yes I think Cunningham found the right way to undermine italian will to fight but must be noted that the Regia Marina still had practically all her battleship and lost only heavy cruisers, so while the losses were high they did'nt destroy the navy's threat, I think that during Husky operation the threat posed by the RM was still considered a possible problem for the operation.

WWI is probably the best example of how fleet in being works even if, in the end, it was useless: as Condottiere said the Hochsee flotte was a direct threat to British isles and that imposed to the RN to concentrate on the North sea, that said, Oda Nobunaga makes a good point when he says it is a strategy that needs perfect decision making and that is usefull only if you don't have the resources to rebuild a fleet (like Italy's case in WWII and marginally Germany's case in WWI).

[Poach]

The Regia Marina forced the Royal Navy to maintain a fairly large and powerful presence in the Mediterranean throughout the war despite a pressing need for ships in both the North Atlantic and Far East. On that count I'd say the 'Fleet in Being' strategy used (albeit not deliberately) by the Regia Marina can be regarded as a success.

That said, strategically, the Regia Marina failed to stop the Royal Navy, or British in general, from doing anything important. Egypt remained supplied, Malta remained supplied, and Axis forces in North Africa were eventually cut off. So while the 'Fleet in Being' forced the British to retain their own battle fleet in the theatre until 1943, it didn't accomplish any objectives in the field.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I think the one objective that the Reggia Marinna accomplished was the relatively successful attack on Alexandria.
It couldn't even keep the British from sinking their own supply ships though.