The Greatest blunder in the Second World War?

[Cyclops]

While the Nazis had a lot of Wunderwaffen I wonder if that is a bit of a distorted view. They lost so sure their Wunderwaffen were lunacy. But Brits and Americans have tons of pretty crazy weapon projects and their ideas of super huge land fortresses or crazy equipment as well. I mean the Manhattan project is nothing different, just the lucky shot of one tech that actually could change the strategic landscape....

Nazi wunderwaffen were often the idea of a single individual and they certainly depended on funding from a single individual with a decidedly short purse. In fact the most decisive factor in a lot of German ideas 1933-1945 was if Hitler turned up for the demonstration. The R&D was haphazardly funded and vital ingredients were often in short supply because of Germany's terrible strategic and resource situation. When attention from higher ups was directed to the project it would usually be to make insane demands , demand impossible production numbers or completely redirect the projects goal.

OTOH allied R&D went through committees but they were generally sound and they were funded to the hilt. Nutty ideas like Habbakkuk got to the point of a first tech trial and were dropped. Manhattan did not get the go ahead because one dude was sold an elevator pitch, it went ahead because they asked everyone including Einstein who had a clue and they mostly said it would fly.

Manhattan was 2 billion well spent, I think it represented an amount equal to 10% of German GDP at the time. This is why the notion of the Nazi bomb is so ludicrous, even if we grant them some efficiencies (not demonstrated IRL) to compensate for materiel shortages as well as agreeing that with less than half the elite scientists available to the WAllies they still have to cut everything else by 10%. Given the Eastern Front was hanging by a thread for the better part of 3 years I'd say that puts the Soviets in Berlin as the first bomb rolls off the line. Maybe they get to burn a Soviet front in atomic suicide but its not a war winner.

Most WAllied funnies were simple practical measures (like rams on tanks to cut through the bocage and landing craft), or else high dollar value solutions to logistical problems (like PLUTO and Mulberries). Soviet solutions were much simpler and cheaper, and typically relied on mass. The Nazis have airborne brigades (OK I know they had 13 Fallschirmjager divisions on paper but they never dropped more than a brigade or two at a time)? Build an Airborne Corps. Nazis have some nice medium tanks? Outproduce them 2:1, and make the tanks simple and soldier proof. Nazi airforce is effective? Compensate for inferior engineering with overpowered engines and winterisation.

[conon394]

@Hetzed: the whole offensive was a blunder. Even if by some empirical from the evil Axis Nazi - German lines would been so overstretched as to be open easy counter attack [recall the Norther had been stripped of a lot of equipment that was sent south]. Second there was there no way get oil to Western Refiners Various economic and military intelligence analysts issued those reports) Not only but the tiny wells the Germans did capture The Russian did cap, and blew all infrastructure in the lesser places Germany did take. Germany should have used a close enough advance to do what their air power could to damage to Bake and far back every place (north front and South) a so as t fight war of maneuver with much shorter lines Declare total war and wait for the next season.

[humble]

The greatest blunder of World War 2 took place on 1 September 1939, when Britain and France declared war against Germany. They had no plan for the war, nor did they lift a finger to help the Poles.(see below *) They had already secretly agreed that nothing would be done to help Poland (which was the whole point of entering the war in the first place). Entering the war under such conditions was a colossal blunder and waste of lives.

The promise by the UK was to preserve a country called Poland and to ensure its place ona post war map. Last I checked that promise was kept,

[Sphere]

Dunkirk was a blunder from the Germans. As I've always seen it portrayed, it was a case of Goring convincing Hitler that the Luftwaffe could take care of the situation while the overextended and tired armies took a break and reorganized. It would have been interesting to see how Britain would have continued if it had lost its army at Dunkirk, though I do not think they simply would have let Germany off.

That's because Von Rundstedt was alive to write his version of Dunkirk and Hitler/Goering were not. Contemporary documents show the call for a pause came from below not above, and with good reason. The armored units were not in a good enough condition to make an immediate assault.

And people forget that the ground battle for Dunkirk was one of the bloodiest, hardest fought actions in the whole of the French campaign, with the German army and air force taking very serious loses trying to prevent the evacuations. The evacuation was never just allowed to happen.

But more to the point, the idea that the half strength German forces available were ever going to walk over the best divisions of the BEF and French army like they had the second tier French units in the Ardennes is a little preposterous. The whole thing is mostly Von Rundstedt trying to protect his legacy.

I tend to agree with Ambrose that the construction of the Atlantic wall in general was far greater blunder. The amount of money/material/manpower etc. is absolutely staggering. It gets forgotten about today because of who built it, but it truly was one of the greatest construction projects ever undertaken in all of European history. And it held up the allies for all of an afternoon. A complete waste.

Far worse than the much maligned Maginot Line. The Maginot line actually did exactly what it was intended to do; Force the German invasion to come through Belgium/Netherlands and do so using minimal French manpower. It was the defensive plan in Belgium which was screwed up, not the Maginot line.

[conon394]

the German army and air force taking very serious loses trying to prevent the evacuations. The evacuation was never just allowed to happen.

Could worse for Germany and Better for the UK if The RN had gotten the chance to fund the kind of developments like the f4f Wildcat (longer range - more loiter time and still competitive with land based Fighters.)

[Stavroforos]

That's because Von Rundstedt was alive to write his version of Dunkirk and Hitler/Goering were not. Contemporary documents show the call for a pause came from below not above, and with good reason. The armored units were not in a good enough condition to make an immediate assault.

And people forget that the ground battle for Dunkirk was one of the bloodiest, hardest fought actions in the whole of the French campaign, with the German army and air force taking very serious loses trying to prevent the evacuations. The evacuation was never just allowed to happen.

But more to the point, the idea that the half strength German forces available were ever going to walk over the best divisions of the BEF and French army like they had the second tier French units in the Ardennes is a little preposterous. The whole thing is mostly Von Rundstedt trying to protect his legacy.

I tend to agree with Ambrose that the construction of the Atlantic wall in general was far greater blunder. The amount of money/material/manpower etc. is absolutely staggering. It gets forgotten about today because of who built it, but it truly was one of the greatest construction projects ever undertaken in all of European history. And it held up the allies for all of an afternoon. A complete waste.

Far worse than the much maligned Maginot Line. The Maginot line actually did exactly what it was intended to do; Force the German invasion to come through Belgium/Netherlands and do so using minimal French manpower. It was the defensive plan in Belgium which was screwed up, not the Maginot line.

I've learned better than to trust what German generals have said on their accounts since then.

[Sphere]

Could worse for Germany and Better for the UK if The RN had gotten the chance to fund the kind of developments like the f4f Wildcat (longer range - more loiter time and still competitive with land based Fighters.)

The main problem was the RN didn't actually have control over naval aircraft development during the interwar years. The RAF did. And within the culture of the RAF during that time land based bombers were given top priority, with land based fighters second. When budgets got tight the first thing they skimped on was planes for the navy.

That's how the pioneering nation in naval aviation entered WWII with obsolete biplanes.

[Condottiere 40K]

Training naval aviators was a lot harder than pilots, because you can't afford to get lost over water, and then you have to crash land on a small moving deck; I think the Japanese insisted on being able to do a five mile swim, in case you ditch. Not a community that you would allow to shrink in the meantime.

But to be fair, a lot of general staffs were operating in the dark, even when some theorists were right, and more or less right.

The one lesson that you can take from the interwar years, is that you have to keep your military industrial complex at a critical mass, and plan to convert civilian manufactories to a full war footing.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

That's because Von Rundstedt was alive to write his version of Dunkirk and Hitler/Goering were not. Contemporary documents show the call for a pause came from below not above, and with good reason. The armored units were not in a good enough condition to make an immediate assault.

And people forget that the ground battle for Dunkirk was one of the bloodiest, hardest fought actions in the whole of the French campaign, with the German army and air force taking very serious loses trying to prevent the evacuations. The evacuation was never just allowed to happen.

But more to the point, the idea that the half strength German forces available were ever going to walk over the best divisions of the BEF and French army like they had the second tier French units in the Ardennes is a little preposterous. The whole thing is mostly Von Rundstedt trying to protect his legacy.

I tend to agree with Ambrose that the construction of the Atlantic wall in general was far greater blunder. The amount of money/material/manpower etc. is absolutely staggering. It gets forgotten about today because of who built it, but it truly was one of the greatest construction projects ever undertaken in all of European history. And it held up the allies for all of an afternoon. A complete waste.

Far worse than the much maligned Maginot Line. The Maginot line actually did exactly what it was intended to do; Force the German invasion to come through Belgium/Netherlands and do so using minimal French manpower. It was the defensive plan in Belgium which was screwed up, not the Maginot line.

I find it interesting that the two generals which had hitherto won every campaign (Poland and France), Fedor von Bock and Gerd von Rundstedt, found themselves out of their depth and at times almost helpless during Operation Barbarossa. Though Gerd von Rundstedt benefited greatly from having a competent staff, especially the up and coming staff officer Erich von Manstein. The other rising star was Erwin Rommel who had actually demonstrated his ability in the field and was almost immediately after sent to command the troops in Africa. Though Hitler could have chosen von Manstein (staff officer and part time panzer commander) or Eduard Dietl (army commander in Norway) for the same job. Heinz Guderian was only really promoted to commander of a Panzer Army after that and got no more actual promotions except maybe for Chief of Staff.
Both Rundstedt, Manstein and Guderian were bull s in their memoirs, however Guderian less so. It is more sad that Model didn't get a chance to write his memoirs, he was ignored for decades even by contemporaries. Could have been jealousy from Manstein. But had Hitler won then the state would have been shooting out propaganda about the glorious leader and the exaggerated victories on the Eastern Front and the massive Bolshevist hordes.

[gabeman27]

Germany's harsh treatment of partisans and occupied areas. This was such a idiotic blunder blinded by fascism. I believe as I've heard others say if the German general staff of World War 1 was at the helm Russia likely would have fell within the year. Manstein comments about it being a great failure. The Soviet Union really was a rotting structure but replacing it with a even more rotting structure was a mistake. They would have been welcomed as great liberators if they brought bread and peace. This is overall a diplomatic failure typical of Hitler throughout. He was gambler not a diplomat.

Hitlers constant involvement with military details and not letting his generals be generals was another huge one. His demagoguery influenced the general staff greatly and what they decided upon.

Another mistake made was lack of recon in Russia and Hitlers constant dismissal of Guderian.

[Mayer]

That's a myth actually. Germany's occupation policy wasn't so fleshed out to be much more than the necessity to take supplies for the army and carry out punishments for partisans and bandits. The infamous comissar oder was cancelled after just one year for having detrimental effects on the war effort (boosting soviet morale). The Soviet Union wasn't rotting but a highly militarized state with complete control by the politburo, it wasn't as susceptible to revolts and war weariness as the late tsarist Russia (soviet underestimation was indeed a huge blunder by Hitler, which he admitted when having a diplomatic meeting with Mannerheim). Wehrmacht soldiers were greated as liberators in some villages in Ukraine and the Baltics, you can find footage of it in Wochenschau newsreels. Rosenberg favored abolishing the system of collective farms to gain support of the peasantry, but Hitler was opposed to it because they made confiscating agricultural goods easier, so they didn't actually replace anything.

You shouldn't believe everything Manstein and Guderian were writing after the war. Like Nobunaga said, they made a lot of stuff up.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

The Hitler cabinet after Operation Barbarossa could be divided into two cliques. Those who were for Ukraine and those who were for Russia. Hitler was basically in the middle and undecided on the issue. But of the most outspoken about this was Bormann, Rosenberg and Himmler. By the time that Hitler seriously considered making a Russian or Ukrainian state or any sort of compromise it was already 1943 and the Ukrainians had started to arm themselves against both the Germans and Soviets. Hitler's reasoning prior to that was essentially that he did not want to reduce German strength in the area or industrial production, basically as Mayer said the Germans required the agricultural output from the bread basket of the Ukraine to feed the war machine so the locals had become tools to increase the production of the state but with the key difference that they had no loyalties to said state. This created a food shortage and increased resentment later on which was one of the major reasons for why so many of the Ukrainians turned on the Germans. However the Ukrainians also went and killed Nikolai Vatutin so that place was a hostile zone in general.

But when you really think about it had the Germans made a Ukrainian state then the Germans would not e able to feed their war machine, would ultimately be fighting for limited gains and would have to also depend on much weaker allies. Which as we saw with the Hungarian, Italian and Romanian combat deficiency would have been disastrous.

[Cyclops]

That's a myth actually. Germany's occupation policy wasn't so fleshed out to be much more than the necessity to take supplies for the army and carry out punishments for partisans and bandits.

Indeed there wasn't even a uniform occupation policy (Hitler's usual MO). Northern France 1940-1942 was under Wehrmacht control and the treatment of the locals was meticulous: I think looting was at a minimum, reprisals measured but few incidents occurred because of the propriety of the German army (in France). Across the border in the Netherlands the SS was given the administration and the looting was shameless and wholesale, and repression much harsher leading IIRC to more resistance than France at least in 1940-1942.

In the east the Protectorates pursued a pretty shameful policy which resulted in (aside from the horrendous war crimes) few economic benefits for the Reich, with the exception of Baltic states, where some resources were extracted successfully.

The infamous comissar oder was cancelled after just one year for having detrimental effects on the war effort (boosting soviet morale).

It also had severe demoralising effects on the Wehrmacht, IIRC the representatives rom OKH were shocked by the effect on the ordinary soldier of the wholesale out-of-hand murder of civilians, I think part of the reason it was industrialised.

The Soviet Union wasn't rotting but a highly militarized state with complete control by the politburo, it wasn't as susceptible to revolts and war weariness as the late tsarist Russia (soviet underestimation was indeed a huge blunder by Hitler, which he admitted when having a diplomatic meeting with Mannerheim). Wehrmacht soldiers were greated as liberators in some villages in Ukraine and the Baltics, you can find footage of it in Wochenschau newsreels. Rosenberg favored abolishing the system of collective farms to gain support of the peasantry, but Hitler was opposed to it because they made confiscating agricultural goods easier, so they didn't actually replace anything.

Yes the military collapse of the Red Army in the first three months of Barbarossa confirmed Hitler's delusion that the Soviet state was a sham. As withy France specific doctrinal and local political issues played into the hands of the Wehrmacht, but the Soviet leadership was not divided like the French so surrender could not come on the back of a sudden shock.

You shouldn't believe everything Manstein and Guderian were writing after the war. Like Nobunaga said, they made a lot of stuff up.

There's an entire industry of Nazi figures who nearly won the war/knew it would never work but tried anyway because reasons/never trusted Hitler and only went along with him for 14 years because they assumed he wasn't serious etc etc. I don't know enough about the details to sort them out, but from the little I have read Manstein gives himself a lot of kudos but forgets to mention when he was getting whupped.

On the Allied side its all about "How I could have won the war faster if it wasn't for Nimitz/Monty/Eisenhower/whoever" except for Churchill who just wrote about "how I won the war".

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

You will never hear about all of the times that Erich von Manstein agreed with Hitler but then went back and said he didn't. Or when Walther Model upstaged him but didn't mention it and his followers called Model a yes man. Or maybe when Nikolai Vatutin was giving Manstein an ass whooping even when Manstein was on his own initiative but then blamed command or someone other than himself.
Manstein goes on a rant about Operation Citadel and how he didn't get to do what he wanted but he apparently had lots input into Colonel Zeitzler's plans for that operation.

Where as for the Soviets there were so many generals who tried to give the illusion that they won the war. In reality all of the Soviet generals were under the control of STAVKA and all of them followed STAVKA's orders. By Stalin's mandate Zhukov was given the most credit in the propaganda but even so he was kept on a short leash. He had gone from commanding the entire war effort in the West (Ostfront) to commanding one of the many armies that attacked Berlin and regularly crashed with Ivan Konev and Konstantin Rokossovsky. Meanwhile Aleksandr Vasilevsky was promoted to command the entire front in the Far East and the Manchurian Offensive. Vasilevsky had actually shared the top STAVKA commands with Zhukov for a long time.

[Cyclops]

You will never hear about all of the times that Erich von Manstein agreed with Hitler but then went back and said he didn't. Or when Walther Model upstaged him but didn't mention it and his followers called Model a yes man. Or maybe when Nikolai Vatutin was giving Manstein an ass whooping even when Manstein was on his own initiative but then blamed command or someone other than himself.
Manstein goes on a rant about Operation Citadel and how he didn't get to do what he wanted but he apparently had lots input into Colonel Zeitzler's plans for that operation.

Where as for the Soviets there were so many generals who tried to give the illusion that they won the war. In reality all of the Soviet generals were under the control of STAVKA and all of them followed STAVKA's orders. By Stalin's mandate Zhukov was given the most credit in the propaganda but even so he was kept on a short leash. He had gone from commanding the entire war effort in the West (Ostfront) to commanding one of the many armies that attacked Berlin and regularly crashed with Ivan Konev and Konstantin Rokossovsky. Meanwhile Aleksandr Vasilevsky was promoted to command the entire front in the Far East and the Manchurian Offensive. Vasilevsky had actually shared the top STAVKA commands with Zhukov for a long time.

It seems like Stalin did loosen up a bit over time.

My pretty uninformed impression is that as the war progressed Hitler began giving more and more specific orders (down to company level at times eg Stalingrad) as he can to believe only his decision making mattered, whereas Stalin began (in mid 1941 that is) with incredibly detailed orders across his front denying local commanders any autonomy and initiative, and by the end of the war he was permitting a degree of flexibility in achieving operational goals. He didn't exactly become a trusting soul and still kept a tight grip on assets (eg ordering that tank armies operate in pairs after the "Miracle of the Donetsk" saw the 5th Tank Army badly mauled) but he wasn't strangling the Red Army's ability to fight the way Hitler was by 1943.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

That is a fair assessment of German and Soviet command I would say.
Though I would stress just how much control Stalin exerted over operations, just that as the war ended he allowed more initiative and autonomy for his generals to carry out operations so long as they were within the limits demanded by STAVKA or Stalin personally. Though even in 1943 and 1944 you can find Stalin forcing generals to stick to STAVKA plans exactly, he just did not hinder their operations as much. In the case of the Romanian offensive he more or less gave Zhukov free reign to carry out the campaign as the marshal saw fit. Rather than this becoming another slog fest Zhukov danced circles around the Romanians and Germans and encircled their armies all throughout that country. But it must be said that the Soviet generals were fiercely obedient 90% of the time. If given an order they would carry it out regardless of how bad. Sometimes the generals also managed to screw up on their own. At least half the time though the blunders on the part of Zhukov were due to his strict adherence to STAVKA's orders, though sometimes he gave bad advice or plans as was the case at Rzhev.

[gabeman27]

That's a myth actually. Germany's occupation policy wasn't so fleshed out to be much more than the necessity to take supplies for the army and carry out punishments for partisans and bandits. The infamous comissar oder was cancelled after just one year for having detrimental effects on the war effort (boosting soviet morale). The Soviet Union wasn't rotting but a highly militarized state with complete control by the politburo, it wasn't as susceptible to revolts and war weariness as the late tsarist Russia (soviet underestimation was indeed a huge blunder by Hitler, which he admitted when having a diplomatic meeting with Mannerheim). Wehrmacht soldiers were greated as liberators in some villages in Ukraine and the Baltics, you can find footage of it in Wochenschau newsreels. Rosenberg favored abolishing the system of collective farms to gain support of the peasantry, but Hitler was opposed to it because they made confiscating agricultural goods easier, so they didn't actually replace anything.

You shouldn't believe everything Manstein and Guderian were writing after the war. Like Nobunaga said, they made a lot of stuff up.

This isn't Manstien. This isn't Guderian. This is realizing simple facts and knowing the situation. I only mentioned Manstien because he mentioned it as a mistake. The Soviet Union as the Tsar was a rotting structure. Look at it afterwards. Throughout the cold war. It was deeply troubled state for the rest of the century. The Iron boot the only thing keeping it under-heel. Look what happened when the boot was lifted. It fell apart. It just fell apart. The Soviet fall of 89-91 was a long time coming and could have been done during the invasion of 41. Bringing bread and peace instead of rounding up enemy troops and treating them like dogs. The whole sell destruction of villages and harsh treatment of any partisan activity ultimate doomed their strategy of killing the rotting structure. You cannot end totalitarian rule by replacing it with even harsher totalitarian rule.

I entirely disagree. The Soviets had no control over their own people and only the few had true loyalty to the Soviet state. This was a blood state by this point. How ridiculous is a statement(Talking about disunity and disenfranchisement) that it wasn't given the Soviet horrors just years prior? The unhinged Stalin going after countless people. These seeds of dissent weren't given water. They were stomped on by German rule that was hardly any better. They(Germans) were greeted as liberators in some villages and would then burn them down the next day on orders.

Hitlers comments on partisans were taken them as a good thing, as much we can kill them all. German policies were ridiculous in countering partisans and unlearned from the first war. They didn't try to win any hearts and minds. They tried to crush the whole of the people. Hitlers comments on the war were as a war of total annihilation. He was fervently against supporting or helping these people in real meaning, I'm unsure of where you get they somehow attempted to be any better then the Soviet state. And I'd say that's almost entirely why when the Germans came in with guns not peace they effectively lost a huge part of the war.

Also what about other older staffs comments on this or in their diaries, or some German infantry men and the horrors they had to do? That we Germany shouldn't win this war because of the harshness of its conduction? This isn't fabricated or made up. German rule was totalitarian. harsh, brutal and lead to millions of deaths that served no help towards the war effort.

Germany need to have had a massive propaganda campaign and backed up every word of it and brought peace, local authority and many other things. And to the many troops they captured on the initial days they should have treated them as equal warriors. The 'Gallantry' of World War 1 was strikely gone and simply death was given. The brutality of the Nazi state lead to them basically giving an entire field to the Russians. The Soviets securely had the people, the land, the resources, and general winter. I believe if Germany was able to take away one of those the Soviet structure would have fell apart. You can argue if it would or not from there. But the idea the Germans didn't just hand the Soviets a entire theater of war is ridiculous to me.

German nazi ideology stopped a huge chance of destabilizing the Soviet Union. Ideas of ethnic superiority damaged and limited the ability of the German state and anything that would say other then German superiority would be very conflicting with their propaganda. Their enemy(Soviets) had already committed great crimes against its people and those people were aware. But instead of bringing bread and peace they brought guns.

I wouldn't say this was valid if their weren't sufficient evidence beyond one or two generals comments, its evident in the death toll, personal diaries, sites, and Soviet commentary. In fact it is a justified lamentation of Manstein. Rommel's methodologies and performance(His chivalry) on the African front could have been greatly needed in the brutality of the Eastern front. This wasn't just these two guys. There were countless pains and hurt from the Prussian generals and in the conduct of the war. Very clearly saying the conduct of this war is unacceptable. The ignoring of the Hague treaty among others sufficiently support this.

All Germany succeeded in doing was putting the Soviet people in between a rock and a hard place. I believe Mansteins admitting this actually tells two things. Not some bold face lie or made up fact. It tells which side he really was on. That we was okay with the German despotism that flourished behind the advancing Panzers.

Overall my point this is far far far from a unique to him and goes much deeper then that. German's own ideology defeated itself and this is exemplified in the East. A common sense position: A basic agreed upon rules are totally ignored in a effort that only ends up causing more damage to your own Army. Its a huge blunder that should have been learned during the first world war. That instability greeted by harsh treatment only serves to spur further destruction. The Russian revolution shows that the people will revolt once sufficient horrors are given. I believe those aims were gained but the Germans played perfectly into the Hunnish stereotype of them and stopped any major dissent or change. The same can be said of the Soviets also. Their equally harsh treatment of prisoners was also a mistake that played into Hitlers gotterdammerung.

[Mayer]

War is not a welfare affair, and civilian deaths are expected when the troops live of the land (just look at the ernormous devastation and depopulation which the Thirty Years War brought to Germany), also life in Russia was fairly backwards and harsh when compared to western standards. Hitler wasn't fighting for the freedom of the people under soviet control but the establishment of a german colony in the east akin to british rule in India (only after he finally abandoned his plans in late '44, he allowed the formation of the Russian Liberation Army headed by Vlasov). Even if Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad were under german control, it is possible that Stalin and the politburo moved to other places, like the bunker complex in Samara and it would require the capture of the massive steel plant in Magnitogorsk and other industry in the Ural mountains to finally deprive the Red Army of the means to fight a convential war. While opposition in the USSR was seething, it did not erupt until after the death of Stalin, the deified tyrant. Terror and Purges had such a lasting effect on the population, that even his enemies were writing of forgiveness to Stalin in a quasi-religious manner. Obviously that is not comparable to the rule of Nikolaus II. who was fairly benevolent by merely exiling radicals like Stalin to Siberia (who would later joke that the czar was weak) and establishing a parliament with independent parties after the desaster which was the Russo-Japanese War (for which he was personally being blamed). Continuing agitation and riots eroded his support by the people.

[bigdaddy1204]

The promise by the UK was to preserve a country called Poland and to ensure its place ona post war map. Last I checked that promise was kept,

After the war, Poland ended up under Stalin, a ruthless dictator who had murdered millions. Historians still debate who was the worst monster between Hitler and Stalin; according to many estimates, Stalin killed more people than Hitler did. Poland remained under Soviet domination for the next 45 years, with all the ruthless apparatus of the secret police and the iron fisted rule of dictatorship to keep the people in their place.

That seems a pretty poor outcome for Poland, the country we supposedly went to war to protect. Particularly since in 1939, both Germany AND the Soviets invaded Poland; why didn't we declare war against the Soviets too, if we wanted to defend that country?

The whole second world war was a disastrous misjudgment that could have been avoided and led to senseless waste of life. Don't get me wrong, Germany was the aggressor and the Nazis were the ones stirring up trouble. But Britain and France should have stayed out. That would have meant America also stayed out, the Italian front most likely never existed, and only Germany and parts of eastern Europe would ever have experienced German rule. The millions of jews in France and other occupied western countries would have been spared, since in this timeline Germany never invades the west.

[Condottiere 40K]

You also had a change of leadership; Churchill was ousted by Labour, and Roosevelt seemed taken in by Stalin.