Strategy in War pt. I

[unfortunate crow]

Strategy in War pt. I

The first installment in a series of articles relating to campaign strategy for Rome : Total War. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone, drawn from many years as a novice military historian. This article will deal with the difference between Strategy and Tactics, and with Economy of Force.

Strategy in War : part I

The Difference between Strategy and Tactics

To begin this discussion, I will call attention to these two terms which are often used in place of one another and swapped as the writer sees fit. It is important to explain the distiction between these two elements.

When two armies meet one another on the field of battle, this is called an engagement. Strategy is the school of all that occurs leading up to the engagement, and afterwards; think "big picture". Tactics is the school of all that happens during the engagement, dealing with specific movements of the army, small scale use of the terrain, etc... I will furnish an example to illustrate my point.

The general mobilizes his army to march on a campaign objective. Thus far, no engagement has been offered by the enemy, who has taken appropriate estimations of his own force and decided to hold back in defense of this objective, rather than attempt a pre-emptive attack...but I digress.
Our General must look at the "big picture" in the strategic sense, even as before he offers an engagement to the enemy. The first decision to be made is the objective itself. For instance; If the objective is taken, can it be held? What options does the army have for replenishment of troops, etc, if the army occupies the objective? Is there a clear line of retreat from the objective? Meaning, if the army offers an engagement which the Defender accepts, and is defeated, will the army be harried by enemy troops along the line of retreat, further increasing the calamity? Furthermore, there are many other decisions to be made by the general. Should the army take the most direct route to the objective, thus saving time, or take a safer, divergent route. An example:

Enroute to his objective commanding a large cavalry force, the general has deemed that taking a direct route to the objective would have the army march through dense forest terrain which would pose difficulties for the cavalry force. Instead, the general has chosen to follow the course of a major river, which by it's nature protects one of his flanks, thus preventing an unexpected attack from that direction, and allows his cavalry better ground to fight on should an engagement be offered.
After arriving at the objective (which in this case we will use a settlement as an example), the general must make another set of crucial decisions. The objective settlement the general wishes to attack is located just east of another enemy settlement, and so the general decides to attack from east of the objective, so that if an enemy force marches from the western settlement, he has effectively denied them his army's rear.
Next, the general must decide if he wishes to lay siege to the settlement, or assault it. Does he have the equipment neccessary to assault, or must he build it (meaning a siege will need to be laid at least temporarily). Can the general afford to wait for the time neccessary to see the siege to it's completion? If the general decides to attack, what are his chances of success? Accounting for probable losses, will victory be worth more than if the general's forces had been preserved? What advantages will control of the objective contribute to the overall campaign? The general must make a great many decisions such as those above, all of which fall under the school of strategy.

As I have said before, Tactics relates to all aspects of the engagement itself. Formations, disposition of forces, and manuever. Terrain has the unique quality of crossing into both schools, as it can have a direct outcome upon the engagement itself, but also whether an engagement is offered at all. This I will explain in a later installment. I believe we have no covered in detail the difference in Strategy and Tactics.

Economy of Force

Another expression which is widely misinterpreted. Many consider the definition of this concept to mean that one does not commit with any more force than is required to win an objective. This is not correct.

Most generals are familiar with the idea that to ensure victory, one must converge upon the point of decision with the greatest possible concentration of force, and indeed this is true in both the strategic and tactical schools. Knowing this, our first definition becomes quite contradictory, does it not?

Economy of Force is an easy concept to understand, but as I have shown is widely misinterpreted. The true meaning of this concept is that all forces are are contributing to the overall campaign at any given time. This means that the forces at the disposal of the general are always doing something which is increasing the general's possibility of a victory. Sometimes, an army may contribute to the campaign simply by being somewhere. A stationary army is in effect offering an engagement to the enemy. The enemy must accept the engagement if it wishes to pass which could lead to it's destruction or at the very least delay. Otherwise the enemy is forced to divert around it, which may open the enemy to attack later. In the latter case, by merely offering the engagement, our stationary army has exerted a degree of control over the enemy; a sort of victory.
Armies that languish in the homeland's interior generally do not contribute to the campaign on the frontier. The notable exception to this rule is in the case of garrison troops, who's role is somewhat outside the sphere of our campaign and as such we will not go into any further.
It is important to keep one's armies in the theatre of operations active, offering engagement upon the enemy (though as we have shown it is not neccessary to actually fight the engagement) so that they are constantly forcing the enemy to take them into account. This is all I believe I need to say regarding Economy of Force.

Closing Points

- Select Objectives Carefully
- Plan the Army's March in Advance
- Always Offer Engagement, even if it is not accepted

If anybody has any questions or would like to suggest topics, I will gladly cover them in my next installment.

Thank You
- Crow