Decisive Battles of the World of 1500s, 1600s, and 1700s

[Incontinenta Buttox]

I'm not sure it this has been brought up already.

I would mantain that the battle of Marston Moor. (English civil war 1644)

The defeat at Marston Moor was a disaster for the Royalist cause. Destroying the aura of invicibility around Price Rupert of the Rhine, and more importantly. The Royalists lost control of north of England, from which they garned their strongest support.

This is decisive because it esounded the death knell of absolutism in England for ever. Paving the way for the modern state that went on to dominate the globe in the following century.

[Babur]

The Battle of Plassey in 1757, since it paved the way for the British conquest of the Indian subcontinent.

[Salem1]

The Battle of Plassey in 1757, since it paved the way for the British conquest of the Indian subcontinent.

I never understood how they managed to do it, but then again I haven't really read into it either. India is huge, Britain seemed to have very few soldiers there and even fewer actual native Brits there. They weren't up against slouches either as far as I can tell. The battles there always seem to have some event with them which the Brits managed to manipulate in their favour, but I still dunno. It took multiple conflicts just to take a small piece of land in Europe but in India the Brits seem to have steadily and gradually annexed the whole place, like they couldn't be resisted.

[konny]

A few corrections/clarifications:

1757 Battle of Rossbach: (...) Leaving a handful of light troops to oppose the Allied advanced post, he broke camp and moved. His swift move meant an attack upon the Allies before they could form up. Most of the allied cavalry in front was smashed to pieces by the charge of Prussian cavalry led by Seydlitz. Meanwhile the Allies tried in vain to form a line of battle. A few volleys of the iron-disciplined Prussian infantry sufficed to create disorder, and then von Seydlitz's cavalry charged. The Allied infantry thereupon broke and fled.

Frederick made a faint retreat pretending he would fly from the field without fight. This caused the allies to break camp and rush after him in order of march instead of carefully advancing in order of battle.

In fact the Prussians only retreated behind the next hill from where they attacked the northern flank of this endless column of allied infantry marching on the only road. The decisive attacks were indeed executed by Seydlitz who first crushed the Austrian cavalry at the head of the enemy column and afterwards turned around to attack the enemy infantry from the south.

1757 Battle of Leuthen: It was a decisive victory for Frederick the Great that ensured his control over Silesia. This is important battle from military point of view as Frederick used Oblique Order. This is a tactic where an attacking army refocuses its forces to attack enemy flank. The commander would intentionally weaken one portion of the line to concentrate their troops elsewhere. They would then create an angled or oblique formation, refuse the weakened flank and attack the strongest flank of the enemy with a concentration of force. First recorded use of the tactic similar to oblique order was at the Battle of Leuctra, when the Thebans defeated the Spartans. This tactics required disciplined and well trained troops able to execute complex maneuvers.

This is wrong. Frederick sometimes used the Order Oblique, but not at Leuthen. Order Oblique is preformed out of a parallel battle by shifting weight to one wing while "refusing" the other wing. At Leuthen the entire Prussian army (save for some cavalry detachements) moved around the left flank of the Austrians and attacked all together from the south while the enemy was facing west.

[jackwei]

Maybe the battle of Valmy in 1792 should be mentioned too as it ensured the survival of the French republic that ended up eventually changing the history of Europe, it also led to the creation of the First French Republic and the fall of the french monarchy. Then again susposely they say it was the first citizen inspire by nationalism inorder to secure victory over a well trained professional allied army. Very late 18th century decisive battle though

[Harold Godwinson]

some asian battles:

- Battle of Sarhu, the decisive defeat of the Ming Dynasty by Nurhaci, the founder of the Qing Dynasty. A massive battle which lasted 6 days.
- Battle of Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga revolutionises Japanese warfare by defeating the awesome cavalry of Takeda Katsuyori with guns and a non-noble army.
- The Battle of Sekigahara, final unification of the Land of the Rising Sun by Tokugawa Ieyasu.
- The First Battle of Panipat, Babur, the first Moghul Emperor, conquers the Delhi Sultanate, with use of cannons and guns.

[Herakleios]

True, the Battle of Lepanto did not break Ottoman power, but rather ended the fear of the Turks which had been generating in Christian Europe for the previous century (ies?). The Ottoman Empire could now be considered a weakening power, one which could now be beaten. I would go out on a limb to claim that the moral aspect won for Christain Europe at this battle over the Ottomans exceedes the degree of the political climate it established in the Mediterranean. However, I don't think the political potential of the Spanish/Venetian victory ever fostered to the level it could have. Didn't the Holy league begin bickering from within? But I am certain the likes of Bulgaroctonus and Mangolore exceed the degree of my knowledge of this period

Hi Spartan, how's it going?

The importance of Lepanto was not that it affected the material or geostrategic position of the Ottoman Empire as such, but rather that it essentially crippled the offensive capabilities of the Ottoman navy in the Mediterranean by depriving it of skilled and specialized manpower. Amongst the circa 30,000 troops that were killed or wounded at Lepanto, there were veteran sailors, captains, gunners, composite bowmen, Barbary Corsairs and Janissaries, many of these men the last vestige of the maritime tradition of Hayreddin Barbarossa and otherwise irreplaceable as human resources, with their loss, this tradition itself evaporated. Much like the battle of Rocroi that broke the power of the Spanish at the Netherlands, it was not the loss in numbers alone, which could be replaced, that provided the mortal blow, but the quality itself of the troops, and the tradition and sprit de corps that went with it("of the 3000 prisoners captured, the Venetians executed anyone who showed any level of skill"(Konstam, 2003). After Lepanto, the Ottomans would largely avoid open battles, and the recapture of Tunis (about which a Spain more concerned with Northern policy was hardly disposed to prevent, to the chagrin of both Don John and Cervantes) would be the last really successful offensive of the Ottomans in the Western Mediterranean, after that, they would largely be confined to the Eastern part and to the defensive in respect to Western powers(as shown by Cape Celidonia, which confirmed the decline of the Ottoman navy in both absolute and relative terms), and the threat that Islam had so vividly posed to Italy during the days of Suleyman and Barbarossa was gone for good, and if Diu was the decisive engagement in the Indian Ocean indeed, in no way it really stopped Ottoman naval aggression and expansion in the Mediterranean, (which was the Ottoman's main naval theater anyway) it was Lepanto that really broke their naval power here (and for good), even if the Ottomans would be able to wrest some of the remaining possessions of the declining Venetians int he Eastern Med. And the moral part of the victory was, of course, also important.

And in regards to the famous Armada campaign, there are so many misconceptions and myths regarding this issue that I'd prefer to simply direct you to this guy:

Top Ten Myths and Muddles about the Spanish Armada

The Defeat of the English Armada

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

(2a) Myth: The defeat of the Spanish Armada was the beginning of England’s control of the high seas. Spain never recovered from the Spanish Armada fiasco and relinquished control of the ocean lanes to the English. England’s status as mistress of the seas would be unchallenged for centuries as the British Empire grew in size, and the vaunted English navy could trace its dominance of the sea lanes to the Spanish Armada’s defeat in 1588.

(2b) Fact: One of the most common statements about the Spanish Armada, and one that is totally false. Spain recovered quickly from the Armada debacle and defeated England on land and at sea in multiple military engagements in the decade following the Spanish Armada. (In fact, an English Armada sent in 1589, the year after the Spanish Armada, suffered a crushing defeat against Spain, just as its Spanish counterpart did against England in 1588.) One of the most important consequences of the Spanish Armada was that it altered assumptions about naval warfare, since the English at Gravelines had opted for smaller, rapidly reloading, more maneuverable light coastal defensive ships in place of the heavy ocean-going galleons with single-firing cannon (followed by seize-and-grapple tactics) used by Spain. The most eager students of the English naval innovations and tactics were… the Spaniards. Philip’s post-Armada squadrons were much more agile and nimble than those prior to it. The Spaniards developed and implemented an efficient convoy system that enabled them to ship three times as much gold and silver from the Americas after the Spanish Armada than before it—indeed, Spain transported more precious metals in the decade of the 1590s than in any other! England’s buccaneering sea dogs were no longer able to raid Spanish treasure transports effectively, a fact that was underscored by the complete failure of a privateering expedition by Sir John Hawkins and Sir Martin Frobisher in 1589-1590 against Spanish shipping. Furthermore, both John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake—the most famous of England’s privateering pirates—were killed in a disastrous raid against Spanish America in 1595, a multi-pronged attack against Spanish colonies in the Americas that was anticipated and utterly crushed by Spanish defenses, one of the worst defeats that the English navy would ever suffer. Spain’s post-Armada navy was retooled and expanded, and Spain ruled the waves for most of the 1600s; in contrast, by the last year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in 1603, England remained relatively weak as a sea power, and its maritime strength during the early years of the Stuart Dynasty (James I and Charles I in the early 1600s) grew only gradually and haltingly. When Spain was finally replaced as a naval bellwether in the late 17th century, it was the Dutch who assumed the mantle of dominant sea power, defeating England in several Anglo-Dutch Wars of the late 1600s. Only in the mid-1700s does England truly emerge as the naval power controlling the sea lanes, after victories in consecutive Anglo-French wars (including the famous French and Indian War with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the victory that finally enabled England to dominate North America and spread its empire on a global scale).

(3a) Myth: Spain was eclipsed as a great power following the Spanish Armada, sinking into insolvency and rapid decline, while England became rich, prosperous, and powerful.
(3b) Fact: Spain definitely did not slip into insignificance following the Armada defeat. As noted above, Spain in fact defeated England on land and at sea in numerous battles of the decade after the Spanish Armada and retained substantial influence over affairs in Europe and the Americas well into the 1600s. Crushing debt afflicted both Spain and England as a result of their war; by the close of Elizabeth I’s reign, the English were nearly £3,000,000 in debt and had sold offices and crown lands to avoid slipping further, and Spain’s Philip II had declared several bankruptcies in parallel. In addition to the exorbitant expenses in the conflict against Spain, the English were dragged into a draining, costly, inconclusive guerrilla war against Ireland from 1594-1603 led by an Irish lord named Hugh O’Neill, the Earl of Tyrone. Late Elizabethan England also suffered crop failures, famines, and plagues that engendered severe poverty in much of the country. Most importantly, the continuation of the war with Spain drained English financial resources and hindered trade, leaving a severe financial burden for the Stuart kings of the early 1600s. This debt, in conjunction with the Stuarts’ profligacy, would contribute to the crisis between monarch and Parliament which caused the English Civil War of the mid-1600s, a particularly bitter and bloody conflict that would split the nation. As for Spain, the nation was eventually crippled in the late 1600s by internal corruption, failures in its monarchical system— marked by feeble rulers with a propensity to play favorites and indulge prodigally in festivities— and severe inflation caused in part by its precious metals shipments from the New World. However, in a military sense, the most decisive defeats it suffered were in the Battles of Rocroi and Passaro against the French in the 30 Years’ War (1618-1648), not the English. It was these land defeats that most severely enfeebled Spain as a European power, enabling the French to replace Spain as Europe’s dominant nation during the reign of Louis XIV. Meanwhile, parallel Spanish defeats against the Dutch navy enabled the Netherlands to supersede Spain as Europe's major maritime power.

Also, I would add as important battles the following:

Battle of Cerignola
Battle of Panipat
Battle of Chaldiran
Battle of Ridaniya
Battle of Mohacs
Siege of Breda
Battle of Alcantara
Battle of Nordlingen
Battle of White Mountain
Battle of Khotyn
Battle of Myeongnyang
Battle of Jiksan
Battle of Almansa
Battle of Denain
Battle of Turin
Battle of Cartagena de Indias
Battle of Fontenoy
Battle of Piacenza
Battle of Zenta
Battle of Karnal

I'm sure we could add more considering the quantities of wars that Europe saw during this period, not to mention the upheavals seen in Asia as well, such as Mughal and Qing expansion, and the Safavid-Ottoman Wars, expansion of Russia, the campaigns of generals such as Nadir Shah, Suvorov, Peter the Great, Maurice de Saxe, Eugene, Fredrick the Great, Marlborough etc. So that's jut the tip of the iceberg.

[Ludicus]

the Mediterranean, (which was the Ottoman's main naval theater)

Just a side note:
The major battle of Diu (1509) did not ended the conflict. Mediterranean interests and the Portuguese vied to displace another another and control all the trade between Asia and Europe.
The Ottoman government began to construct a naval base at Suez as early as 1517, and the Turkish domination of the Red Sea quickly followed. Another strategic area into which the the Ottomans intruded was the Persian Gulf where they were soon approached by the king of Hormuz for possible aid against the Portuguese. But here the Ottoman expansion came up against the territorial interests of Iran.
But the pause was short lived, for in the 1530s Ottoman forces subjugated Iraq, and in 1535 the gained control of the key port of Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf. Intermittent hostilities between Turks and Portuguese soon followed and in 1538, the largest Ottoman fleet ever sent into the Indian Ocean laid siege to Diu. After a failed siege, the Ottomans returned to Aden (The Portuguese held out in their fortress of Diu through two epic sieges in 1538/9 and 1546)
By the 1540s Turkish galley squadrons were appearing along the coasts of southern Arabia, off Gujarat and even in the Malaya-Sumatra region.
In 1541 Estevão da Gama set out ath the head of a sizable naval force (70/72 vessels) to track down the Ottoman Read Sea force and destroy it. Unable to tempt them into battle, Estevão tired a raid in the Suez dockyards.
In fact, the Ottoman threat to Portuguese interests was acute and eased only after a naval victory near Hormuz in 1554. A de facto Luso-Ottoman truce followed, the Ottomans controlling the head of the Gulf while the Portuguese, who retained Hormuz, dominated the lower Gulf and the Arabian Sea. THe Turks avoided to interfere with the Portuguese in the Indian ocean, while the Portuguese çleft the Readf Sea to the Turks, although there was no formal agreement between the two.

[Ludicus]

Edit:

Fact: Spain definitely did not slip into insignificance following the Armada defeat

The losses were quickly replaced, but in 1639, a nearly mortal blow to the Spanish navy: the battle of Downs.

The Spaniards developed and implemented an efficient convoy system that enabled them to ship three times as much gold and silver from the Americas after the Spanish Armada than before it—indeed, Spain transported more precious metals in the decade of the 1590s than in any other!

The Dutch disease, etc.
The decline of Spain predicted in the year 1600:
Gonzalez de Cellorigo: "Our Spain has set her eyes so strongly on the business of the Indies, from where she obtains gold and silver, that she has forsaken the care of her own kingdoms; and if she could indeed command all the gold and silver that her nationals keep discovering in the new world, this would not render her as rich and powerful as she would have otherwise been"

[Herakleios]

The losses were quickly replaced, but in 1639, a nearly mortal blow to the Spanish navy: the battle of Downs.

Yes, but the point is that, contrary to popular perception, the Armada campaign did not result in the decline of Spain at all, and The Downs came only 50 years after this supposed defeat of Spain as a sea power.

The Dutch disease, etc.
The decline of Spain predicted in the year 1600:
Gonzalez de Cellorigo: "Our Spain has set her eyes so strongly on the business of the Indies, from where she obtains gold and silver, that she has forsaken the care of her own kingdoms; and if she could indeed command all the gold and silver that her nationals keep discovering in the new world, this would not render her as rich and powerful as she would have otherwise been"

That may have been so, but you could have hardly convinced the defeated at Nordlingen, Fleurus, Saint Martin and Thionville of this. The truth is that the decline of Spain did not really become a politically relevant concept until around 1640, with the battle of the Downs, and consequent ascendancy of the Dutch at sea, the seccession of Portugal, and the revival of France under Richelieu as a land power, which culminated in the victory at Rocroi. Despite the decline of Habsburg Spain, however, the Bourbon reforms did grant Spain a renewed imperial cycle during the 18th century, during which it remained one of the leading three world powers right down to the French invasion.

[LordKainES]

I would add the british defeat at Cartagena de Indias in 1741, that avoid the british invasion to South-America.

[LordKainES]

About the Spanish armada battle in reality meant nothing for Spain, because Spanish dominion of the seas was clearly after this, but ever later when Queen Elizabeth confident with her victory sended the English counter armada, and was totally owned.

The war finally ended positively for Spanish. And Spain increased its naval power aftermaths.

[Ludicus]

Yes, but the point is that, contrary to popular perception, the Armada campaign did not result in the decline of Spain at all,

Correct, the Armada campaign did not result in the decline of Spain at all. Spain was in decline since 1580.

That may have been so, but...The truth is that the decline of Spain did not really become a politically relevant concept until around 1640,

Certainly, but the decline of Spain did become economically relevant since 1580

In fact, domestic manufactures begun to decline in the late sixteenth century. The 17th century was a period of general decline. A decline reflected, first of all, in population (several causes).
Castile, was severely affected. The economic decline, the bankruptcy of 1596, the decline of food production, corresponding rise in imports, rural depopulation in large areas. The balance of foreign trade during the second half of the century was unfavorable, and was sustained only by the re-export of American bullion. However, the decline in bullion production reduced the importations and resulted in poverty, and the intra-hispanic trade was dominated by foreign merchants.

Between 1600/1610 the Spanish colonial trade declined by 60 % and remained in that until the mid-18th (Bourbon reforms)

Source: J. Larraz, La época del mercantilismo en Castilla, 1500-1700

Take a look:
Annual Averages of the Trade with Spanish America in the Seventeenth Century:

1600-1604:
Ship departures: 55 ships - tons of goods:19,800.
Ship arrivals: 56 ships - tons of goods :21,600

1640-1650
Ship departures: 25 ships tons of goods: 8,500
Ship arrivals: 29 tons of good 9,850

1670-1680
Ship departures: 17 ships, tons of goods: 4,650
Ship arrivals 19 ships tons of goods 5,600

1701-1710
Ship departures: 8 ships, tons of goods:2,640
Ship arrivals: 7, tons of goods:2,310

---

Imports of American treasure - followed the same pattern:

1590: 7,000,000 pesos/ year
Between 1605-1625: 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 annually.
From that point they fell rapidly:
Between 1646 and 1650: 2,000,000 annually.
Between 1656-1660: 500,000 annualy.


Royal treasure receipts of American bullion began to fall earlier/rapidly:

From 1595 to 1615: 1,500,000 pesos (anually)
From 1616 to 1645: less than 1,000,000 annually.
From 1645 to1655: less than 400,000 annually.
From 1656 to 1660: little more than 100,000 annually.

Other incomes from American taxes:
Fell at approximately the same rate.

By the 17th century, the Spanish colonies had begun to develop its own production in food and simple goods, and no longer needed the products of Spain. Another blow, the progressive exhaustion of the silver mines. Another factor, the depopulation of central Mexico (epidemics/other factors, late 16th, early 17th centuries)
In the colonies, an increasing proportion of the taxes of Spanish America remained there to build defenses against foreign powers (the resistence was effective, yet used up funds that the Spanish crown would have had available for its expenses in Europe)
Finally, the pressure of Spanish taxation and the decline in national shipping further handicapped the colonial trade.
So, the decline resulted from the decline of the peninsular economy coupled with the growth of the Spanish American economy- in summary: by 1580 Castile could not produce enough grain; basque iron began to drop, basque shipbuilding declined, and by 1590 the Castilian textile was severely depressed, and then the economic troubles during the rules of Filipe III and Filipe IV. When Carlos II, ascended the throne its influence in European affairs was negligible, its economy in a prolonged depression, its armies and navies were broken,and its monarchy completely bankrupt.

Despite the decline of Habsburg Spain, however, the Bourbon reforms did grant Spain a renewed imperial cycle during the 18th century

Indeed, but we are talking about the 17th century decline.

18th century reforms-
The Iberian Transatlantic Commercial World in an era of Reform and War, 1750-1821:

Over the course of the eighteenth century, Spanish and Portuguese colonial commerce expanded rapidly with far reaching effects on the region's economies and societies. In the second half of the century, agents of the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns introduced political and economic reforms designed to "modernize" their commercial systems. The Bourbon and Pombaline reforms attacked vested interests, dismantled long-standing institutions, and lifted barriers to trade, all with the goal of boosting Crown revenues, expanding imperial commerce, and reducing territorial and economic encroachments by foreign powers. The resulting "golden era" was abruptly interrupted by the outbreak of the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon and ultimately paved the way for independence of most of the Latin American colonies.

But,
although the Bourbon reforms attempted to stimulate further growth in the Spanish economy, there was little lasting sucess: there was an increase in the volume of trans-atlantic trade, but agriculture and industry did not improve sufficiently to enable Spain to regain a dominat role in the economic life of the American colonies - Spain´s products were broadly similar to to those of colonies, and the Spanish economy proved incapable of satisfying demand in America.

[micheljq]

The battle of Ramilies 1706, during the War of Spanish succession. The Duke of Marlborough, commanding an anglo-dutch army, did win an important battle against the french in Belgium. Of the french army of 60000 men, 20000 were lost. The french army completely routed, the anglo-dutch were able to seize all the forts in Belgium and the road to Paris was opened.

On the strategic scale, the battle is not so important because the allies did not press on to advance on Paris. Tactically, it is very interesting, the Duke of Marlborough feinted an attack on a flank while the real attack came on the other flank. It is similar to one of the greatest victories of Frederic II of Prussia.

[Herakleios]

Thanks for the interesting data Ludicus, I have long been seeking for reliable sources on Spanish numbers in terms of economics, but also on military and naval resources.

Spain was in decline since 1580.

It is true that Spain had been declining economically for a long time since around Philip II, and would be a non-entity by the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, however, I do insist that when talking about decline as a general thing we don't focus specifically in decline in any particular area, it is true that the economic strength of a country is closely intertwined with its' ability to finance an army and a navy, and therefore to exert power. However, the actual, tangible successes of Spain in war and politics throughout the period 1580-1640 do show that it was no paper tiger and still by far the most powerful European nation both on the colonial and the continental theaters, so that talking about a general decline(instead of a purely economic decline) is a bit misleading since it inevitably evokes images of obsolence and ineffectiveness which are hard to reconcile with the real course of events, even if the latter would eventually (this being the key word) be influenced by the economic decay and Spain was certainly not as powerful as it had been during the days of Charles V. There was a declining Spanish economy for the period from 1580 onwards, however, I would only talk about a declining Spanish Empire for the period 1639-1701(and after that, collapse and reform), not before.

[Ludicus]

Thanks for the interesting data Ludicus, I have long been seeking for reliable sources on Spanish numbers in terms of economics, but also on military and naval resources.

You are welcome

throughout the period 1580-1640 do show that it was no paper tiger

The period of Iberian Union. Absolutely. Spain never regained the power and prestige it had enjoyed under Filipe II.The Spanish empire of the East had evaporated as a grandiose dream of the past by the time Madrid recognized the independence of Portugal.Portuguese separation was a response to the crisis of the Spanish empire, and above all, the decline of its economy.Unlike the Spanish trade in the Atlantic, that of the Portuguese was in a phase of moderate expansion and helped to provide Portugal with an economic base for independence. After 1640, the Spanish crown was in no position to build a new army for the subjugation of Portugal.
In April of 1641, the English ambassador to Madrid wrote home "Concerning the state of this kingdom, I could never imagined to have seen it as it is now for their people begin to fail, and those that remain, by a continuance of bad sucess, and by their heavy burdens, are quite out of heart"
From Filipe II to Filipe IV, Spain was almost constantly at war - as we know, military and naval undertakings cost immense amounts of money. Overcommitment in Europe strained its resources beyond their limits. As Robert Watson put in 1783: "Her power corresponded not with her inclination"

[Town Watch]

Thanks for the interesting data Ludicus, I have long been seeking for reliable sources on Spanish numbers in terms of economics, but also on military and naval resources.




It is true that Spain had been declining economically for a long time since around Philip II, and would be a non-entity by the signing of the Treaty of the Pyrenees, however, I do insist that when talking about decline as a general thing we don't focus specifically in decline in any particular area, it is true that the economic strength of a country is closely intertwined with its' ability to finance an army and a navy, and therefore to exert power. However, the actual, tangible successes of Spain in war and politics throughout the period 1580-1640 do show that it was no paper tiger and still by far the most powerful European nation both on the colonial and the continental theaters, so that talking about a general decline(instead of a purely economic decline) is a bit misleading since it inevitably evokes images of obsolence and ineffectiveness which are hard to reconcile with the real course of events, even if the latter would eventually (this being the key word) be influenced by the economic decay and Spain was certainly not as powerful as it had been during the days of Charles V. There was a declining Spanish economy for the period from 1580 onwards, however, I would only talk about a declining Spanish Empire for the period 1639-1701(and after that, collapse and reform), not before.

fascinating topic, thread seems to have veered from decisive battles to financial history. In the years 1557-1696 Spain defaulted 14 times on at least some of its debts, despite their massive silver mine in Potosí. It seems that one factor in the Spanish decline was that they didn't develop their financial institutions like Holland, England and Sweden, instead relied on silver shipments which were then sold for hugely inflated prices.

[Alhamar]

@Ludicus

Awesome post, really clear and informative. Id also add that spain by the end of the XVII siecle and the starts of the next one needed of the frenchs ships to complete the arrival of the american goods to the peninsule, i think thaat the fleet landed in France sometime in those years.

im not really sure why you link so strongly the lost of Portugal with the decline of Spain: im sure that by this time there were a lot of ''significant'' events that can be seen also like an example of spanish decline.

Sorry for the offtopic.

[Ludicus]

@Ludicus

im not really sure why you link so strongly the lost of Portugal with the decline of Spain

Oh no, not at all.The Spanish economy had begun to decline before the sixty years of incorporation in the Iberian Union. Equally clear, the union sent the Portuguese spice trade into a long decline.
If Portugal had not been brought into the Habsburg monarchy it would not have closed its ports to the northern powers (English/Dutch).
Before the union Portugal had maintained generally friend relations and traded extensively with the Dutch and English. Despite ocasional clashes witht he Portuguese on the Guinea coast, the English had generally respected Portugal´s neutrality before the union of crowns. After the union, the rules changed.
Would the English and Dutch have challenged the Portuguese outside Europe had their markets and sources of supply remained open to the northern powers?
Geoffrey Parker (hispanist and expert on military history), in The Military Revolution, Military innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 has argued it is unlikely. According to Parker, "the two protestant powers would hardly have risked the heavy investment required for direct involvement in the international maritime trade and colonising activities but for Philip´s embargoes"
Equally clear, if Portugal had not been brought into the Habsburg monarchy it would not have closed its ports to the English and Dutch.
The damage inflicted by the Habsburg monarchy on Portugal interests was enormous - the empire in the east was reduced to a shadow of its former self, and Brazil for almost a generation, was all but lost.

[Hounf of Culan]

I can't find the book that I got this source from, I only read it once for a class last year, but trust me that I'm not just pulling this stuff out of nowhere. I will try and find the book and edit this post with the source included.

The book we used in class argued for two main reasons that the Spanish economy suffered.Part of the reason that the the massive bullion imports didn't help Spain that much was that by the late 1500's and early 1600's over 2/3 of all incoming bullion was already marked to pay off debts to Spain's northern European creditors. The crown actually got a very small percent of the imported bullion to use for its own purposes. A further strain was the enormously expensive Army of Flanders that consumed over 1 million ducats every year to maintain. The author argues that these two factors were hugely important in understanding the decline of Spain as a power.