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    ARMIES OF AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
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    Short study concerning social and economic aspects of army composition.

    The first thing we have to be aware of is a fact that in United States there weren't military schools like ones that existed in European countries (mainly France, Russia and Austria). In ante bellum United States most dominate school that had any reference to war was West Point. However we should not think that West Point was in fact military school. It was mostly engineering school with something we could call “army application of engineering principles and studies”. On the other hand it isn't fair to say it had loose ties with waging war or principles of campaigning but I have to stress that syllabus of West Point was “inferior” to the syllabus of present day military schools of Europe.

    The annual intake at West Point was really small, classes were often numbering less than 100 students. Number of graduates (who finished 4 years of study) was even smaller. In 1861 there were 239 cadets at West Point. 80 of them were from the Southern States, and 76 of them resigned or were dismissed for they refused to take oath of allegiance to Union. Considering the number of population, we can say that South was over-presented in the West Point. That fact was even more noticeable in the Federal Army, where South had many officers. 313 officers resigned their commission in the Federal (later Union) army and “went with their states”. That left only 440 West Point graduates in Union service. Total number of graduates of serviceable age (over 17 and under 30) was under 3,000. Many West Point graduates returned to duty from retirement. They were usually appointed as commanding officers of volunteer or militia regiments (such was the case of Ulysses S. Grant who was commander in Illinois). Of all West Point graduates 300 became generals in Union Army, and 150 of them became generals in Confederate Army.
    In the South existed some number of “private” military colleges. Most important were: Virginia Military Institute (VMI), South Carolina Military Academy (known as Citadel), North Carolina Military Institute, Arkansas Military Institute, West Florida seminary. VMI was most important for it yielded 455 graduates in 1861, there were 1,902 graduates of VMI altogether. Of that number 1,791 fought in American Civil War, and it provided one third of all field officers in Confederate Army (majors and colonels).

    When it comes to rank and file, it is interesting that both armies were predominantly raised from farming communities. Bell Irvin Wiley, while conducting his study of Confederate Army (CA) soldiers on the 9,000 soldiers in 28 Confederate regiments, discovered that half of them described themselves as farmers (50%), 474 entered the CA as students (both school and university), 472 entered as labourers, 321 as clerks, 318 as mechanics, 222 carpenters, 138 merchants and 116 blacksmiths. More than 50 entered as sailors, doctors, painters, teachers, shoemakers and lawyers. Some entered themselves as “gentleman”, they probably belonged to planter class, and they were notoriously hard to control by unit commanders. The same study was conducted in Union Army (UA). The sample was 12,000 soldiers and the results were exactly similar. However, UA did have considerably more members that entered as teachers, painters etc. This can be credited to higher literacy of Northern population (in region of New England before the war literacy was 95%).
    Source
    Bill Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (New York, 1952), pp. 303-4, 304-5


    The North had considerably larger population of foreign-born people. In 1860 there were around 1,000,000 Germans in the North. They also supplied 200,000 soldiers in Union Army (10% of total number of soldiers at the end of war). Alongside German soldiers there were 150,000 Irish-born soldiers, 45,000 English-born and 50,000 Canadians. In the South no one counted number of foreign-born soldiers in CA regiments. However, scholars believe that Irish, German, Italian and Polish born soldiers totalled tens of thousands. It is safe to assume that number was lower than 100,000 but we can’t be certain.

    With outbreak of war Confederate administration (in 1861) couldn't have mobilised an army to challenge the Union. However, men came unbidden and joined the ranks either as volunteers or as members of militia units. Militia units varied in experience and existence. Some were indeed good and reliable soldiers who have been together for quite some time, while others were quickly assembled as war became reality (from early 1860). The volunteers were so numerous that Confederacy had no need to legislate conscription until April of 1862. In North, there was widespread of volunteering in large numbers. People came from militia units or simply volunteered themselves for the Army. Union soon took legislative attempts to regularise this popular response. This was necessary to raise money for pay and equipment of the soldiers.

    On March 6 1861 Confederate Congress authorised creation of 100,000 strong Army. The Army was pretty much already assembled. In May 1861 Army was increased to number of 400,000. Even so War Department was forced to refuse more than half volunteers for lack of weapons and other equipment. It is interesting to point out that Confederates never formed regular army. CA consisted of state forces supervised by War Department. On April 15 1861, Lincoln called to service 75,000 militiamen to Federal service for 90 days. However, state offerings exceeded all expectations. To give you some perspective: Indiana was required to raise 6 regiments, while Governor promised at least 12, Ohio was required to raise 13 regiments, and Governor informed Lincoln that he can’t organise less than 20 regiments. On May 3 1861, Lincoln asked for 42,000 more volunteers to serve with Army for 3 years and 18,000 for the Navy. He also enlarged regular force by 23,000 and Congress sanctioned enlistment for 1,000,000 men for 3 years. Within a year from Fort Sumter incident, Union assembled an Army of 700,000 while Confederacy assembled 400,000 men. This numbers are circumstantial at best because exact numbers are hard to obtain. At the beginning it was quite lucrative to join the Union Army. Volunteers were paid 1000$ on enlistment so calculated desertion and resigning could bring you a fortune. Desertions weren't problem at the beginning, but in the South they began early. This was result of many soldiers being farmers so they left the ranks in order to harvest their crops, many of them had sincere intention to rejoin once they finish their farm jobs and the really did rejoin.

    However, at the start of ACW , principal problem was equipment, or lack of it. This proved troublesome for Confederacy especially. Some arms were obtained from seized Federal Arsenals, but those were mostly old-fashioned muskets (unrifeled and flintlocks). They could be rifled and redone to use percussion cap but that took time. For Confederacy main supply of modern weapons was Europe, and acquiring them was main task of Confederate blockade running. In 1861 South started to produce weapons of its own in arsenals at Harpers Ferry, Richmond and Fayetteville. Confederacy especially excelled at improvised munitions production. Two out of three ingredients for gunpowder (charcoal and sulphur) were easily available. However, the third ingredient (saltpetre/nitre/potassium nitrate) wasn't. When Josiah Gorgas was named Chief of Ordnance in April 1861, he decided to find the source of nitre in Confederate territory. Source of it was found in southern Appalachian Mountains. In fact Confederacy never was in danger of defeat through shortage of powder. Purpose-built powder mill in Augusta (Georgia) supplied CA with powder for entire duration of ACW. In 1861 there were around 600,000 small arms in United States; of that number around 240,000 were in Confederate possession. The largest Union small arms producer was Springfield Armoury. Pre war annual output of weapons was around 20,000. When the War broke out it was increased to 200,000 rifles per year (almost 17,000 rifles per month). Both North and South bought weapons overseas. But when Union’s production picked up pace it imported less weapons. South, was hampered by lack of funds and depreciation of Confederate Dollar (it lost 9,000 of its value at the end of war, making it trash and not currency), so by August 1862 Confederacy bought only 50,000 rifles while Union bought 726,000. By the end of ACW Confederacy managed to purchase only around 580,000 rifles.

    I tried to summarize this study as much as I could... I have to say that some sources and relevant numbers are really hard to come by, but I did my best.

    Minas Moth

    Sources
    John Keegan, The American Civil War (London, 2010), Vintage
    John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary (New York, 1958)
    Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-5 (Boston, 1901)
    James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York, 1997)




    SKIRMISHERS OF 19TH CENTURY AND AMERICAN CIVIL WAR


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    By definition skirmishers are/were infantry or cavalry soldiers stationed ahead or alongside a larger body of friendly troops formed in skirmish line to harass the enemy. The skirmish line is a battle formation used by rifle squads, platoons, and companies during an advance. In such a formation, troops are deployed in a single line along the front at intervals of 6–8 m (eight to 12 paces). An individual may move slightly forward or to the side to improve his fire position or to better adapt to the terrain, as long as he neither breaks the general continuity of the formation’s front nor hinders his neighbors.1

    Skirmishers are known from ancient times, however, our point of interest are 19th Century skirmishers that were used in American Civil War period. In the 18th Century, development in gunpowder weapons enabled introduction of skirmishers armed with muskets. In 18th Century two conflicts were of paramount importance for development of skirmishing branch of infantry. Those were the Seven Years War (French and Indian War) and American War of Independence. What made these two conflicts great for development of such tactics was primarily enemy (especially in Seven Years War) and lack of trained troops (War of Independence).

    In Seven Years War, British and their colonists faced French and their Indian allies forming Seven Nations of Canada (Mohawk, Abenaki, Huron and Onondaga). French relied heavily on their Indian allies who were very interesting fighters. They didn’t fight in European style of closely packed battalions of soldiers but were more inclined to act as individuals, using cover, ambush and other such tactics that will later be known as skirmishing. The way to fight such an opponent was to adopt his tactics and turn it against him. This was a process that took some considerable time but will be perfected in North America. British colonists were quick to adept such style of warfare. Even their militia battalions (Minutemen) excelled in such skirmishing duties and soon prominent shots and frontiersmen became widely known figures.
    In Europe, situation was different. Except for Austrians, most of European powers didn’t use skirmishers as part of their armies, nor did they pay much attention to incorporate them in their fighting force. Most countries did organize militia units that did rely on skirmishing but they were often mistrusted by their own commanders. It is known fact that Friedrich the Great didn’t trust his Freikorps troops. He explained this by their lack of training he so highly admired. British, who could see potent force of this style of war first-handed, adopted it in their military system by seasonally drafting light infantry regiments as temporary units during field operations. However, when American War of Independence broke out, British still relied on line infantry deployment. Number of skirmishers used by British in their campaigns was confined to dragoon regiments, Indian allies and small number of skirmishers.

    On the other hand, Continental Army relied heavily on units that performed skirmisher role. As mentioned above, Minutemen militia really excelled as such operations. There were some highly specialized units of skirmishers also; most known were Morgan’s Riflemen (a band of 96 excellent marksmen that specialized in picking off British officers). To say that skirmishers won the Independence War would be pompous statement at best. But we must acknowledge this tactic as a great contributor to United States independence. Conclusion for such a statement comes from contemporary military observers from Europe who, when witnessing French and Indian War, War of Independence, 19th Century Indian Wars and Mexican War, made term American way of fighting. This way relied more on loosely packed groups of men and didn’t follow European doctrine of tightly packed bodies of men.

    When French Revolution broke out; French took skirmisher tactics to entirely new level by devising light infantry doctrine. French also divided light infantry into two categories: voltigeurs (skirmishers) and tirailleurs (sharpshooters). What made French system unique was adoption of living of the land which removed much of equipment from soldiers back and so he became more mobile and could perform light infantry duties. From 1804, each French line or light battalion formed one company of ninety of the best shots to perform role of elite skirmishers. Tirailleurs were part of Imperial Guard of Napoleon I Bonaparte and were organized in 16 regiments by the fall of French Empire. When it comes to equipment skirmishers of that period were sometimes equipped with lighter muskets, some were even rifled or were more accurate variations of general infantry muskets. However, there wasn’t some general supply of skirmishers with special weaponry en masse. It seems it mostly remained in hands of individuals or regiment patrons which weapons they will be equipped with.

    In French Army organization skirmishers were part of organized force of line infantry, cavalry and artillery. Corps system allowed for every individual corps to act on its own as smaller fighting unit or to easily connect with other Corps. This system of mutual support between infantry, skirmishers and artillery proved extremely effective in most battles fought by Napoleon but it wasn’t invincible. If one part of this system was unable to do its job, other elements would loose support and were often exposed to heavy casualties. It is interesting to mention that several sources imply that more than once Napoleon used corps as base of skirmishers. This means that corps, which would be the first to come in contact with the enemy, immediately deployed large number of skirmishers to harass the enemy. Large numbers means more than one company of skirmishers per battalion, essentially making rest of the corps a pool from which skirmishers could be reinforced or replenished. This organization was maintained until rest of Army came in contact with the enemy.

    So with this mentioned, we must ask ourselves following question: if light infantry doctrine (skirmishing) was highly evolved in early 19th Century and skirmishing was American way of fighting, what made Civil War generals to insist on line order of battle with tightly packed companies of men? General John Watts de Peyster in his treatise New American Tactics, advocated abandonment of European line order of battle and making skirmishing as main organization of United States Army. So, why wasn’t he listened?

    One reason can be found in establishing military schools in United States in 19th Century, primarily West Point and Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Such establishments, although they were engineering schools before everything else, were founded on tactics that dominated in time of Napoleonic Wars. In that time, infantry line reigned supreme. In fact, British lines at Waterloo broke all French attacks and established belief that infantry columns can’t penetrate organized and synchronized infantry line. To achieve such outcome, line infantry was supposed to deliver volleys at steady rate. To achieve that all men in company must work as one. These were some of the ideals that cadets of West Point and VMI were taught. However, with appearance of rifled muskets, Napoleonic tactics became suicidal at best but syllabus of military schools didn’t follow technological advance. This discrepancy between technology and theory will ensure high casualties on both sides when Civil War broke out.

    On the eve of battle both Union and Confederacy organized regiments in European style but on American way. There wasn’t enough time to properly train troops, so they were taught how to perform simple march orders and how to reload their muskets. Most of the time, this was the only training they received before being thrown into battle. However, Civil War period sources (especially histories of brigades and regiments by men who served in them) give us valuable information on skirmishers in this Conflict. Because of them we now know that every regiment (of 10 companies) would always used one of the companies as skirmishers in the preliminary of the battle. When battle commenced and two lines came in range, skirmishers were often absorbed by main line.

    Skirmishers in Civil War were constricted to side duties; such as: picket duty, guarding, preliminaries of battle, scouting and counter scouting duty. It is paramount to say that skirmishers weren’t specialized companies in American Civil War Armies. As said before, they were men of line companies ordered to perform skirmish role.

    Another question that comes into view is: why were skirmishers so ineffective? There in no Civil War battle which was decided by skirmishers, that is, where one force was stopped by skirmishers before even reaching opponent. Even locally (parts of battlefield) skirmishers didn’t manage to stop advancing enemies. Being 100men strong in loose formation, picking off individual soldiers and suffering small amount of casualties compared to those inflicted (skirmishers weren’t fired on by line infantry because volley couldn’t achieve its effect on loosely organized skirmishers) there should be some account of them stopping enemies advance. Reason why such accounts don’t exist can be explained by Civil War soldier’s willingness to take casualties. Civil War armies indeed had extremely high morale and they often pressed on even tough they suffered heavy casualties. In such case, skirmishing company could hope to fire 2 to 3 shots before enemy would close with them. Amount of casualties inflicted in that period could be high as 200 (at most) but even then enemy wouldn’t waver and rout. It would press on until it forced skirmishers to merge with main line. Often skirmishers would fire one shot and then rush back to their lines to form with their regiment.

    All of this made skirmisher role under-presented in Civil War. There were some small encounters fought by skirmishers but they weren’t decisive ones. Even small scale battles (such as the Battle of Glorieta Pass of New Mexico Campaign) fought by less than 2,500men on both sides were fought in European fashion.
    Things did change with establishment of sharpshooter units (Confederate armies deployed them in 1863) but there were never so much of them to make battle decisive impact. Sharpshooters could easily hit commanding officers and generals, but in Civil War, generals and officers fell quite often by fire from line infantry, so we can’t say that sharpshooters fulfilled even that role.
    In the end, it is interesting to see how Americans, who developed system of skirmishing/light infantry, were more than willing to abandon it and suffer tremendous casualties inflicted on Civil war battlefields.

    Footnotes
    1 From The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1979). © 2010 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.

    Sources
    Black, J., Waterloo - The Battle That Brought Down Napoleon (2011), Icon Books Ltd., London, UK
    Keegan, J., The American Civil War - A Military History (2010), Vintage, London, UK
    Caldwell, J. F. J., History Of A Brigade Of South Carolinians, Known First As "Gregg's," And Subsequently As "McGowann's Brigade" (1951), Continental Book Company, Marietta, Georgia - USA
    Various Internet Sources



    THEORY OF DEFENCE
    added on February 26, 2013.
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Summary:
    This short article aims to explain some base principles of defensive warfare, particularly on tactical aspect, and its relation to achieving the strategic objective of defensive operations. Key words of this article are: defence, objective, surprise, advantage of the ground and attack from several quarters. All of the theoretical terms and relations are explained with historical examples of American Civil War battles.

    In every conflict, no matter how big or small, one side is always on the defensive. It doesn’t even have to be conflict, this same principle expands on the campaign, battle and even a small scale skirmish. As Carl Maria von Clausewitz (Clausewitz in further text) puts is: “What is defence in conception? The warding off a blow.” (On War, 6, I). From this simple statement comes the character of the defence: expectation or state of expectancy of the blow to come. However, as Clausewitz also pointed out, absolute defence in war is impossible or even a contradictio in adjecto in reference to war itself, as in such case war would be made by only one side. But history shows that in conflict more often than not, a side that is initially on defensive or on defensive for a while will still at some point of time, with smaller or larger success attempt some sort of offensive action.

    The main objective of defence is to preserve (On War, 6, I). The amount of effort that has to be put in preserving some object is by a rule smaller and less costly than the effort that has to be put to achieve or gain something, either strategically or tactically. But advantage to the defending side, comes not only from the active measures of the defender (for example, bold division of an army in face of the enemy done at the battle of Chancerollsville, where Lee ordered Jackson to move his corps and attack the right flank of Union Army) but also from mistakes, erroneous judgement or failings of an enemy (in the same battle, Union commander Hooker, after staging a successful demonstration at Fredericksburg and crossing the Rapidan River wrongly estimated Lee’s strength and failed to attack him, especially after Lee sent Jackson on the flanking march and his centre was held with no more than 15,000 troops while Hooker had some 70,000 troops at his disposal). Another, extremely potent aspect of defending side is the “aid afforded by locality or ground.” (On War, 6, I) which can also be seen both at the battle of Fredericksburg (where Confederates enjoyed strong defensive position provided by Marye’s Heights) and Gettysburg (where Union Centre commanded by Hancock had a great stonewall protection and superior line of sight for an artillery. Having, in mind such an aspects, one must agree with Clausewitz’s assessment: “that the defensive form of War is in itself stronger than the offensive.” (On War, 6, I).

    With difference between tactical and strategicdefence, Clausewitz points out following conditions as the most decisive: surprise, advantage of the ground and the attack from several quarters (On War,6, II). It is possible to question Clausewitz’s approach as he completely ignores superiority of numbers, bravery, discipline or any other quality of the armies engaged, but this absence is explained (by Clausewitz himself) by a fact of their belonging to strategic and not tactical aspect of conducting the war. The commander in chief/of an army more often than not can actually have no influence on the amount, quality and training of the troops he receives.

    The surprise is extremely potent weapon for defence. This enables defender to force the enemy to either commit larger number of troops on a part of a battlefield than he originally planned to do or to drop his objective completely by a means of forcing him to retreat. This was achieved especially by Jackson’s Corps at Chancellorsville, where he managed to push back Union right flank so far that in effect position he occupied at the end of the day threatened not only the flank that was pushed back but was reorganising but also the centre of the Union Army which had some 23,000 Confederates behind its back. This surprise attack effectively made Hooker abandon the Chancellorsville campaign and retreat from his entrenched position.

    The second aspect is the advantage of the ground. In the same battle (Chancellorsville), Jackson’s Corps was able to make a surprise attack just because of the terrain itself. The advantage of the ground doesn’t relate only to possible obstacles for the enemies such as woods, marshes, lakes, rivers etc., but also includes terrain features that help to conceal the movement of the defending forces. Such indeed was the case of Jackson’s Corps, which used some little known roads to get around Union position and then launched a devastating attack on the Union right.

    The third aspect; attack from several quarters, doesn’t relate only to attack from multiple directions. It also means to combined use off all available arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery). This aspect appears as normal for attack, while it might be considered un-natural or even contradictive for defence. However, this isn’t so. Successful combination of different arms on defence as well as a well timed counterattack (which is in itself an essential part of every defence) can prove extremely potent defensive weapon. Let us observe the third day of Battle of Gettysburg (July 3, 1863). At the Union right centre at Cemetery Ridge, Union II Corps under command of Hancock held a strong natural defensive position. The Union strength was multiplied by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top. In the end, left of the Union right centre even moved out and flanked the attacking Confederate forces from the right. This effectively represents the successful combination of available arms as well as manoeuvres that are available for defensive operations, although their character may indicate they belong only to the offense.

    As we can see, there is more to a character of defence and the offense than meets the eye at the first glance. However, it would not be prudent to say that such principles and relations as explained above are applicable in every battle and every situation that may arise on the field. But, such aspects cannot be ignored, and they should always be kept in mind when researching certain battle.

    Sources:
    von Clausewitz, C. M., On War (1997.); Wordsworth Editions Limited, Hertfordshire, UK
    private collection

    Author:
    Minas Moth



    THEORY OF OFFENCE (Part 1)
    added on February 27, 2013.

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    Summary: Article focuses on various aspects of offense as they had been seen by two prominent military theorists of the1 9th Century; Carl Maria von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini. The key words of this article are: Jomini, Clausewitz, offence, object of strategic attack, Jominian style.

    In one of my previous articles I have stated an opinion which is held true by military theorists: defence is stronger form of waging war. That, however, doesn’t mean that defensive battle is devoid of any offense by defending side. Jomini observes that in many cases “an army reduced to the strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack and an army receiving an attack may... take the offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it.” (The Art of War, IV, XXX). Same can be concluded from Clausewitz’s observation “...defensive, without an offensive return blow, cannot be conceived; that this return blow is a necessary constitutive part of the defensive, whilst in the attack, the blow or act is itself one whole idea” (On War, Book VII, II). Such an observation is indeed proven in many historical battles and there is no need to further elaborate on it. There is one thing that requires attention, and that is that both authors tie an offensive action with strategic defence or defensive battle. This must not lead to conclusion that these authors consider an offense to be possible only if it is preceded by a defence. The reason for such appearance is the mere fact that both authors in their respective works dealt with problem of defence before offence (as Jomini wrote about defence in IV, XXX and offence in IV, XXI).

    The defence in itself is never intentionally part of offence, but inevitably it often appears itself as such; in most cases involuntarily or caused by some outer influences. The attack, as a one great momentum of an assailing army or even individual troop can rarely be carried out in a single thrust. This means that, more often than not, an attacking force will have to stop its attack, at some point in time, to recover, rest or resupply. When this does happen, such a force is immediately put on the defensive and remains in such a state as long as it doesn’t continue its advance. On the other hand, if the attack is extremely successful and it enables acquisition of vast territory or capture of some strategic objective, then another type of defence appears; the one were assailing army must protect the territory it captured by detaching parts (bigger or smaller) of its main strength. (On War, Book VII, II)

    Up to this point, both Jomini and Clausewitz had same views and conclusions. But one thing where they differ (in offensive deliberation) is the object of a strategic attack. According to Clausewitz: “The overthrow of the enemy is the aim in war, destruction of hostile militaryforces, the means both in attack and defence” (On War, Book VII, III). On the other hand, Jomini takes a different approach: “The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic manoeuvres to ruin his army completely” (The Art of War, IV, XXXI). By comparing this two, it is easy to see that by Clausewitz, destruction of enemies force is the main goal, not only in battle, but in strategy (for example campaign) also. Destruction of the enemies fighting force is prerequisite that opens all the doors that wanted to be achieved with going to war; be it conquest of the part or a whole of a territory, peace treaty under victor’s condition or some other strategic objective. Therefore, commander of an army must always look for away to completely destroy enemies force. This he may or may not achieve, as the result depends on many factors, but once the battle starts this must be commander’s main goal. Jomini on the other hand, seeks to achieve victory by manoeuvring; either by overthrowing an enemy on some point of his line, or by turning his flank. Such an approach hopes to achieve the goal of winning the battle with as little as possible damage done to the attacker, but consequently to the defender also, as the defender, if attacker manages to turn his flank or capture some point he deems threatens hisposition will abandon the field and retreat. Although Jomini does state that goal of the flanking attack is to attack the defender in the rear in hope to cut off his line of retreat there is no mention of destroying the enemy’s army.

    This view is strongly criticised by Clausewitz, who is strongly opposed to theorists that consider war some mathematic equation where object can be achieved by turning the enemies flank or some other “geometrical” move, while there is no real effort to actually destroy ordisable enemies fighting force. This has some weight to it; history shows us that battles fought in Jominian Style1(especially J. E. Johnston’s retreat defence during Sherman’s March to Sea), will be in many cases inconclusive and enable weaker but resolute defender to give up a territory but constantly pose a threat to invading army. The same can be said for Union campaigns from 1861-July 1863 in the eastern Theatre of American Civil War. Commanders of Union Army of the Potomac always gestured at Richmond as main object of their attack (clearly under the Jomini’s influence) while the paid little or no attention (in their plans) to Southern Armies, which in their plans were supposed to simply abandon their positions when certain point was captured on the field. The flaw of many such plans came exactly from Jomini’s teaching. Union Generals (and some Southern one) were well educated to determine a decisive point which can win a battle but they completely neglected the fact that in order to capture certain decisive point men will have to die. Had they been more focused on destroying the Southern fighting force, instead of waving on to Richmond, War would probably be over faster. When in 1864, Grant wasnamed Commander in Chief of the Union Army, he gave following instructions to G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac: “Lee’s Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also.” Such an approach to war is exactly what is proposed by Clausewitz; eventually it has proven as accurate one, as when Lee surrendered his Army of the Northern Virginia at the Appomattox Courthouse in 1865 war in the east (and soon in the west) was over.

    Clausewitz recognise a combat (destruction of enemy’s armed force) as a means to the end (which Jomini fails to do completely as he is more focused on manoeuvres and orders of battle and gives little place to theory of the offensive objectives on battle). “The only way of destroying the enemy’s armed forces is by combat...” (On War, Book VII, VI). Clausewitz recognised that this can be done in two ways, either directly or through a combination of combats (On War, Book VII, VI). And although the battle is the principal way to achieve destruction of enemy’s force, it is by far not the only one. If assailant were successful in capturing territory or a fortress, this will lead to the same result as this will often mean the enemy’s line of retreat is now blocked, or his supply is cut off, or he is deprived of reinforcements etc. Manoeuvring is also recognised as a possible benefactor for destruction of enemy’s force. However, it is important to point out that manoeuvres,capture of territory and/or fortress will rarely achieve the same effect or have the same value as battle where enemy’s force was destroyed.



    1Jominian Style battles are all the battles that were lead by commanders educated on the Jominian principles. This was especially the case during the American Civil War where West Point, Virginia Military Institute and other schools were indeed using Jominian works as a base for education. Although Jomini correctly identifies many of the principles as existent even before French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, quite often he states that some principles were broken by Napoleon or other general with great success and skill. Therefore it remains a question how was such a view still in existence by 1861?

    Sources:
    von Clausewitz, C. M., On War (1997.); Wordsworth Editions Limited, Hertfordshire, UK
    Baron de Jomini, A-H., The Art of War (2007.); Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, USA
    private collection

    Last edited by Minas Moth; February 28, 2013 at 07:06 AM.

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    Minas Moth's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    reserved

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    Lord Romanus III's Avatar Primicerius
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    The author uses 'we' and the English is ever so slightly off, but they're not bad. Did you write these?

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    Minas Moth's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    Quote Originally Posted by Lord Romanus III View Post
    The author uses 'we' and the English is ever so slightly off, but they're not bad. Did you write these?
    indeed I did, with sources mentioned under every article... I used "we" because "I" seems little to pompous to me. and ofc, English isn't main native language, so it is bound to be off to some degree, but that is something I certainly can improve on.

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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    You are indeed correct about the South's questionable equipment in the early part of the war. At the Battle of Shiloh, the lack of reliable rifles had a role in the Confederate attack going array on the 2nd day. I remember reading there were even some pikes present.

    The Confederate dollar however was not as centralized a currency as a federal greenback - as the southern states opposed the idea of a national bank since the time of the Revolution. A great deal of revenue from cotton exports was exchanged with Britain for Enfield rifles. The Enfields probably made up the largest chunk of Confederate rifles.
    Last edited by Admiral Piett; May 09, 2012 at 07:31 PM.
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    Quote Originally Posted by Future Filmmaker View Post
    The Enfields probably made up the largest chunk of Confederate rifles.
    the ammount of rifle types isn't accounted anywhere... there are mentions of importing Austrian, German, French, British and other rifles. Enfield was popular becuase it had similar caliber .58 while Springfield was .57 (I think) so it was easy to use same type of ammo. I know, that at Shiloh, Confederates managed to collect great number of rifles (especially at Hornet's Nest; Orphan Brigade was nearly fully equipped with rifles after that), and right before Gettysburg, there are reports that Army of Northern Virginia was 90% equipped with rifles (taken from battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville etc) making it (according to some people) even better equipped than the Army of the Potomac...

    When the blockade became efficient, there wasn't significant trade of cotton for rifles. It happened (on larger or better say significant scale) only before the blockade was imposed. After that, South relied on taking arms from Northern soldiers...

    When it comes to pikes, there was even pike armed militia in the south. And I remember one instance where Stonewall Jackson called for pikes (can't remember where exactly) but he clearly called for men armed with pikes and not with bayonets...

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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    Look Here:
    http://www.cfspress.com/sharpshooter...chor-Thi-46655

    Shock Troops of the Confederacy:
    The Sharpshooter Battalions of the Army of Northern Virginia




    Fred L. Ray




    Captain James McKnight’s regular army battery had already been overrun once that foggy October morning at Cedar Creek, losing a gun and several men. Now, as part of George Getty’s division, they waited on a low hill outside Middletown, Virginia, as another Rebel attack materialized out of the mist. The gunners gaped at the Confederate skirmishers loping wolf-like up the hill, howling their trademark yell. “I could not believe they were actually going to close with us,” said one, “until the men on the remaining gun of the left section abandoned it and retreated toward the old graveyard wall. Their front line was not in order, but there was an officer leading them, and I distinctly heard him shout: ‘Rally on the Battery! Rally on the Battery!’” The Yankee gunners managed to get off a last shot of double canister, but “as the Rebel veterans understood this kind of business they ‘opened out’ so that the charge did not hit any of them.” In a moment the Southerners were in amongst the gunners, “amid smoke, fog, wreck, yells, clash and confusion…man to man, hand to hand, with bayonet and musket butt on their side and revolvers, rammers, and hand spikes on ours!”




    The Union gunners’ confusion is understandable – skirmishers were just not supposed to close with a strongly defended enemy position, much less assault it. These, however, were no ordinary skirmishers but the elite Corps of Sharpshooters of Ramseur’s Division’s – the shock troops of the Confederacy. They were, as one former member put it, “the spike-head of Toledo steel” that led both the advance and retreat of the army. The sharpshooters were, in fact, not skirmishers in the normal sense but powerful combat units in their own right. As a tactical innovation, they were fifty years ahead of their time, presaging both the “open order” of the late nineteenth century and the German stosstruppen of WWI. Unfortunately this Southern corps d’elite has received only a passing mention from historians – certainly nothing like the credit they deserve.




    All armies of the day used skirmishers – a thin line of men spread out some distance in front of the main body. These soldiers provided advance warning of an enemy advance, then forced him deploy and harassed his main line. When the army was stationary they acted as pickets. One man swore that skirmishing had been “reduced to a science.” It depended, he said, “on two general rules: every man must keep concealed as much as possible behind trees, logs, fences, buildings, or what not, and each party must run upon the approach of its opponent with anything like determination.” To maximize their effectiveness, the tacticians of the day recommended that skirmishers carry rifles. Since most regiments (especially Confederate ones) were not armed entirely with rifled arms until second half of 1863, a common solution to was to distribute them to the flank companies and designate these as skirmishers. A “line of battle,” by contrast, stood elbow to elbow in a solid formation two ranks deep and fired by volleys.




    Coordinating the skirmish line before the days of radios was a difficult proposition at best, and as it spread across a brigade front of four or five regiments or an entire division, the control problems only got worse. A brigade commander would find himself trying to give orders through his regimental commanders, who in turn had to get the orders up to their company commanders on the skirmish line. It also quickly became obvious that some men (and commanders) were much more suited to this type of work, which required marksmanship and a good deal of individual initiative, than others. Arming a flank company with rifles did not make its soldiers good shots, nor its commander someone who could act decisively without specific orders.




    Two of the first men to explore solutions this tactical dilemma were Confederate Brigadier General Robert Rodes and one of his subordinates, Colonel Bristor Gayle of the Twelfth Alabama infantry. Unfortunately, since neither man survived the war, reconstructing the development of the sharpshooters necessarily involves some speculation.




    At Seven Pines, fought in late May of 1862, Rodes had employed a whole regiment – John Gordon’s Sixth Alabama – as skirmishers across his entire brigade front. Although it provided a unified command for the skirmish line, Rodes had to halt his entire command just short of Casey’s Redoubt to reconcentrate the Sixth Alabama prior to the final assault, a move that cost his brigade dearly in casualties. Significantly, neither Rodes nor anyone else used this arrangement again.




    A month later at Gaines’ Mill, Colonel Gayle (who was not a professional soldier, but who did have some prior military experience) tried something else. When a Yankee artillery battery started firing into his flank, Gayle sent out a detachment to suppress them. The unit came from across the regiment and consisted of four of the best shots from each company. Led by a promising young lieutenant named Robert Park, these riflemen so harassed the battery that it withdrew. One of Park’s men, Sergeant Jason Patton, captured a Union courier with an important dispatch.




    That fall Robert Rodes and his outnumbered Alabama brigade put up a desperate defense against George Meade’s division at South Mountain. Rodes had to string his line out across the mountain so far that the regiments lacked any physical contact. The Alabamians put out skirmishers, but the advancing Yankees gobbled up almost all of them. The intrepid Lieutenant Park once again commanded the skirmishers of the Twelfth Alabama with marked success, but he, too, was captured when those of the neighboring regiment fell back without warning.




    Although Colonel Gayle died at South Mountain, his innovations were not forgotten. That December, at Fredericksburg, Rodes organized the skirmishers of each regiment in the same way Gayle had done for the Twelfth Alabama. Each of the brigade’s five regiments contributed a forty-man detachment under a junior officer, and for the first time Rodes grouped them into an ad hoc battalion. Although Rodes’ brigade was not directly engaged at Fredericksburg, it was these skirmishers – now called sharpshooters – who pushed forward the day after the battle.




    Rodes took the final step in January 1863 when he permanently assigned the young major of the Fifth Alabama, Eugene Blackford, as commander of the consolidated battalion, now to be called the Corps of Sharpshooters. Rodes explained to Blackford that “he had felt the absolute need of trained skirmishers always ready to go to the front instead of the miserable system heretofore existing of calling for details from each company hurriedly when approaching the enemy – who arrived at the head of the column in march all breathless, and utterly ignorant of the duty required of them – and besides company officers when called upon in this manner in entering battle, did not wish to lose a good man & so sent the worst they had. Thus the indifferent men in the brigade, indifferently commanded by any detailed officer, who knew not one of his men or any thing of the skirmish drill, were sent to protect the front. The consequences were inevitable – a feeling of insecurity in the main body – the necessity of keeping a second line for protection, the incessant alarms made by the men in the front, who mistook every movement.”




    Under the new system, each regiment now designated a permanent forty-man company commanded by a lieutenant. They marched and bivouacked with their regiment but could be detached at any time for skirmishing or sharpshooting duties. As an extra inducement, they were exempted from fatigue duties. Blackford only accepted the best – any man who did not meet his strict standards of soldiering, marksmanship, and “fidelity to the Southern cause” went back to his unit. The regimental commanders resisted giving up their best men, but with Rodes’ backing Blackford prevailed.




    Blackford immediately began an intensive program of training. After some experimentation with weapons they settled on the British-made Enfield rifle, which (with British ammunition) could hit a man-sized target out to eight hundred yards. Because of the black powder rifle’s low muzzle velocity, range estimation was an essential skill, and Blackford drilled his men relentlessly in it. He also instituted a rigorous marksmanship program, kept records, and sent back any man who failed to improve. Blackford himself carried a breech-loading Sharps rifle that he used to great effect – he claimed to be the best shot in the battalion. “I always carry a rifle into the action myself and use it faithfully too.”




    Blackford solved the problem of controlling a strung-out skirmish line by using buglers, and even worked out a system of indicating ranges by bugle calls. At the end of January he wrote his mother: “I am very much interested in the instruction of a battalion of Sharpshooters, which has lately been organized in this brigade, and to the command of which I have been assigned. I have lately commenced drilling them by the bugle signals altogether. Tis a beautiful sight to see the line deployed for more than a mile, all controlled by the single sounds of a bugle. I am much in hopes that I shall be able to win some credit in line of battle, this as a general rule Skirmishers have had a poor chance, being brushed off the field early in the action.”




    A month later he wrote that “my battalion of SharpShooters progresses finely. I drill them altogether by the bugle, and the merry clear notes of the bugles may be heard at almost any hour in good weather. I have now declared them fit for service, an have spoken for the first job that comes up.” As an identifying badge he allowed the men to wear “a little red trefoil shaped piece of flannel.”




    Rodes seems to have been pleased with his experiment. When he took command of D. H. Hill’s division that spring he organized sharpshooter battalions on the same pattern in the rest of the division’s brigades as well.




    Blackford and his sharpshooters soon got a chance to show their stuff. At Chancellorsville, the new battalion provided flank security for Jackson’s famous march around Hooker’s right, “marching their laborious way thru swamps & pine thickets.” Then, in a scene immortalized by James Power Smith, “the well-trained skirmishers of Rodes’s division, under Major Eugene Blackford, were thrown to the front” to scout the Union position and protect the Confederate deployment. Smith describes Stonewall sitting on Little Sorrel, “visor low over his eyes, lips compressed, and with his watch in his hand” with Rodes and Blackford in attendance. At Jackson’s command, Rodes nodded to Blackford, who had his bugler sound the advance, “and back came the responses from bugles on the right and the left, and the long line of skirmishers, though the wild thicket of undergrowth, sprang eagerly to their work.”




    On the day after the battle the Sharpshooters drew the unenviable assignment of scouting Hooker’s dug-in position against the Rappahannock. “I lost many men,” wrote Blackford, “under a tremendous fire of grape & canister & musketry. *I was in more danger than I had ever been before, but I saw their forces & their position generally.” The next day they went in again, but this time the Yankees were gone.




    Later that summer at Gettysburg the sharpshooters again proved their worth. On July 1st Rodes’ division attacked the flank of the Union I Corps at Oak Hill, only to be attacked in turn by the advancing Union XI Corps. Rodes assigned Blackford’s battalion to cover the gap between Doles’ brigade and the rest of the division. Although heavily pressed by most of a Federal division, the sharpshooters fell back in good order, taking a heavy toll. It was quite an improvement over South Mountain. (For a detailed account of Blackford and his sharpshooters at Gettysburg, see “Taking Aim at Cemetery Hill” in the July issue of America’s Civil War)




    After the battle Blackford covered the Confederate retreat, which led to another tactical innovation. Rodes put the young major in command of all five sharpshooter battalions of his division, which formed a sort of “demi-brigade” nearly a thousand strong to act as the army’s rear guard.




    Although slow to pursue the Rebels, Meade attempted to cut off the Lee’s retreat at Manassas Gap (near Front Royal, Virginia). When General William French’s III Corps pressed the lone Confederate brigade defending the gap, Rodes threw Blackford’s sharpshooters in on the Union flank. “So near were we that every shot took effect,” he wrote, “and having perfect protection ourselves, we enjoyed the fun highly – losing only three men.” Their deadly accurate fire, plus some artillery, soon forced French’s men to withdraw.




    Impressed by the success of Rodes’ concept, General Lee ordered every infantry brigade in the Army of Northern Virginia to organize its own sharpshooter battalion in early 1864. Like everything else in the Confederate army, their organization varied somewhat. While everyone used the four-men-per-company, forty-per-regiment scheme, Rodes’ sharpshooters seem to have stuck with their five company arrangement, while some other battalions used three companies and others four. All used buglers for communications. After the war General Cadmus Wilcox modestly took credit for the whole idea, and does seem to have translated a French manual on skirmish tactics. Rodes, however, had already implemented the concept a full year before.




    Meanwhile Rodes continued to refine the sharpshooters’ tactical doctrine and organization. He combined the four sharpshooter battalions of his division into a permanent organization, the Division Sharpshooters, under Major Blackford. This gave him the option of using his sharpshooters as a separate “demi-brigade,” under his direct command. Rodes put Blackford in charge of the training. “These drills attracted much attention,” wrote Blackford, “and every morning there was a crowd of officers looking on.” After tactics and drilling they began marksmanship practice. “A thousand or more of them were banging away for hours, until my head would ache from the noise and smell of the saltpetre. This went on daily until the opening of the campaign.”




    Since the Army of Northern Virginia typically fielded around thirty-six infantry brigades, and each brigade had a sharpshooter battalion of some 200 men, this meant that the Confederates now had a corps of over 7000 picked men trained in marksmanship and skirmish tactics available for the spring campaign in 1864. The new battalions soon proved their worth in the Overland campaign, which one sharpshooter characterized as “an endless picket fight.” They made ideal scouts, advance and rear guards for the brigade or division, and could be readily used as a flank guard as well. When the lines stabilized, the sharpshooters pushed forward into a line of shallow rifle pits as close to the enemy line as possible. Some outfits kept the sharpshooters on line for two or three days at a time, then gave them a day of rest while regular infantry took their places. Others put the sharpshooters in line during the day and replaced them with infantry pickets at night. “The battalion was now the very lightest of light troops in every particular,” said one. “They carried absolutely nothing save their arms and haversacks. The last were of but little use. The sharpshooters found it much less burdensome to make a raid for supplies on the line of the enemy than to carry a knapsack.”




    At Spotsylvania the Confederate sharpshooters, complained one Yankee, “commanded completely the position of our line of battle.” They remorselessly tormented the men in the trenches, causing them, as one man quipped, “to spread ourselves on the ground as thin as the butter on a slice of boarding-house bread.” The Federals tried to push out their own line of rifle pits as far as possible to reduce their effectiveness, but this gave little respite from the hissing bullets.




    The Rebels also introduced another unpleasant wrinkle – a small number of men in each battalion now carried the formidable Whitworth rifle. This state of the art weapon, some models of which sported telescopic sights, was said to be able to bring down a man at 1200 yards. As an added bonus, they were no heavier than a service musket. Commanders often gave the Whitworth sharpshooters (the term sniper did not come into use until well after the Civil War) “roving commissions” on the battlefield, allowing them to pick targets of opportunity. Frequently they got their orders directly from division headquarters. One of them picked off Union General John Sedgwick at Spotsylvania (the unfortunate general’s last words were “they couldn’t hit an elephant at this distance”).




    The organic sharpshooter battalions gave the Confederates a degree of tactical flexibility that the Federals simply could not match. The bluecoats suffered from all the organizational problems that the Confederates had already identified, and although they did have their own excellent sharpshooters, these were separate units that had to be dispersed along the line when the army halted, then reconcentrated and moved separately when the battlefield shifted. The Federals tried attaching company-sized sharpshooter units to infantry regiments and brigades, but these were often misused as ordinary infantry by commanders who had no idea of their proper employment. Although some Union sharpshooter units like Berdan’s carried the very effective breech-loading Sharps, others struggled along with heavy civilian target rifles that greatly restricted their mobility. Every Confederate brigade, on the other hand, had a readily-available body of crack shots who were trained in skirmish tactics. All they need do was fall in. In the more or less continuous conflict of the Overland Campaign, they consistently outfought the Yankees at the skirmish line.




    Probably the best example of what the sharpshooters could do was the struggle at Doswell House on May 24th, 1864. As Lee’s army dug in on the North Anna River, General Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps advanced through dense woods toward Confederate positions near Hanover Junction. As they approached, Colonel Thomas Smyth’s brigade pushed forward to clear away Rebel skirmishers and find their main line. Smyth’s two lead regiments, however, encountered withering long range fire from Colonel William Cox’s North Carolina sharpshooters, part of Robert Rodes’ division. Smyth brought up another regiment but the Tarheel riflemen, crouched in rifle pits at the edge of the woods, refused to budge until finally charged with cold steel by a fourth regiment.




    Smyth followed them into the dense woods, but meanwhile Colonel Bryan Grimes’ North Carolina sharpshooters had reinforced Cox’s men. About five hundred yards into the forest, Smyth was again stopped dead by heavy, accurate rifle fire. When he called for reinforcements, his commander, General John Gibbon, committed his entire division. Rodes responded by sending up the sharpshooter battalions of Doles’ Georgia brigade and those of Battle’s Alabama brigade—Blackford’s men—who began to work their way around the Union left flank. The thin gray line, backed by two artillery pieces, amounted to no more than 800 men in hastily-dug rifle pits, but once again they fought the Yankees to a standstill.




    Smyth finally got his attack rolling again late that afternoon. He captured a section of North Carolina rifle pits, only to lose most of it to a fierce counterattack when the Confederates fed in more men from their main line. As a drenching thunderstorm soaked the darkening woods, a savage close-quarter battle broke out, with the Federals (who thought they had captured the main Confederate line) barely managing to hang on to their gains.




    It had been quite a battle. Far from being brushed aside, Rodes’ “skirmishers” had stopped a reinforced Yankee division pretty much on their own. “We drove them with considerable slaughter, losing but few,” exulted Colonel Grimes. The sharpshooters continued their work as Grant shifted south toward Cold Harbor, playing a significant part in that battle on June 2nd and 3rd. Shortly after that, however, the situation in Virginia changed abruptly. While most of the Army of Northern Virginia ended up trench-bound at Petersburg, the Second Corps – including Rodes’ division – was on its way to the Shenandoah.




    The 1864 Valley campaign developed into a war of feint and maneuver as Jubal Early tried *to substitute bluff and movement for numbers – one in which the sharpshooters were very much in their element. In a hundred different skirmishes up and down the Valley they repeatedly demonstrated their grit and tenacity. Indeed, it was the sharpshooters who, except for the big battles like Winchester and Cedar Creek, did most of the actual fighting. Early often employed them as “foot cavalry” to compensate for his notoriously unreliable mounted men, and as the example at the beginning of this article shows, they also saw service as assault troops.




    After clearing the Valley of Federals, Old Jube crossed the Potomac and marched on Washington itself. On July 9th, 1864, he met a defending Union army under Lew Wallace at Monocacy. Blackford and his sharpshooters lit into the Yankees on the National Pike to Baltimore, taking on a hurriedly-raised scratch force of 2,500 men under Brigadier General Erastus Tyler. When the smoke cleared, Tyler’s men were streaming eastward, leaving 83 dead and 236 wounded and missing. Blackford’s losses were light, and Rodes did not bother to engage his infantry brigades. When Early’s army reached Washington a few days later, it was Blackford and his men who began probing the defenses of Fort Stevens on the outskirts of the city. They easily pushed back the inexperienced Yankee skirmishers, and by mid-afternoon on July 11th were almost inside the fort. Only the timely arrival of Union reinforcements prevented its fall and forced the Confederates to withdraw. During the retreat Early put an unemployed colonel, Hamilton Brown, in command of Rodes’ division sharpshooters. Brown’s regiment, the 1st North Carolina, had virtually ceased to exist at Spotsylvania. The remnants had been consolidated with another regiment and transferred to Cox’s North Carolina brigade of Rodes’ division.




    Meanwhile the brigades in the Petersburg trenches had found new uses for their sharpshooters. In addition to their normal duties as scouts, pickets, and sharpshooters, they also performed special intelligence missions. The commander of Lane’s brigade sharpshooters, Major T. J. Wooten, became well known for his technique of “seine-hauling” Yankee prisoners. “He would steal up to the enemy’s skirmish line,” wrote a contemporary, “sometimes crawl until within easy running distance then dash forward, halt on the line of pits, and just as the rear of his command passed him he would order both ranks to face outward and wheel, and they, coming back in single ranks and at a run, would capture everything before them and not fire a gun. In all of his dashes he never lost a man, killed, wounded or captured.”




    When General John Gordon needed a force to storm Fort Stedman and its supporting batteries on March 25th, 1865, Colonel Brown and his Division Sharpshooters got the nod. Infiltrating across no man’s land, Brown and his men took the fort by surprise with unloaded muskets, then held it against fierce Union counterattacks, capturing the Federal general N. B. McLaughlin in the process. When this last Confederate offensive failed, the sharpshooters remained as a rear guard, and Brown and most of his men were captured in Fort Stedman. The remnants of the sharpshooters helped cover the army’s retreat to Appomattox, and were once again in the advance when Grimes’ division made the last attack of the Army of Northern Virginia.




    Yet for all their effectiveness, the collective memory of the war virtually ignored the sharpshooters. Men tended to write about famous individuals, their own regiments, or the great battles rather than about composite units. When ex-Confederate major W.S. Dunlop finally did write a book about the sharpshooters in 1899 he subtitled it “a story of Southern Valor that has never been told.” Still, while they may have been forgotten in their own country, the tactics the sharpshooters had pioneered remained valid. The widespread adoption of long-range repeating rifles in the late 19th Century spelled the end of the close-packed line of battle and the adoption of the “open order” — essentially a skirmish line. At the century’s turn the Boers gave the British a bloody lesson in effectiveness of riflemen, and in WWI the Germans fielded special units for trench warfare. These “shock troops” (stosstruppen) consisted of a “storm” battalion in each infantry regiment especially trained in marksmanship, infiltration, and light infantry tactics. The men were volunteers drawn from across the regiment, and only the best were accepted. These elite units, which nearly turned the tide for Germany late in the war, looked a lot like the sharpshooter battalions that Robert Rodes and Eugene Blackford had organized fifty-five years earlier.
    In addition:
    Colonel Robert Rodes was the inspiration for the creation of the southern sharpshooter. On May 3rd, under his and other officers’ pressure, the Confederate Congress passed General Orders Number 34. This act authorized the establishment of one sharpshooter battalion for each brigade, “to be composed of the men selected from the brigade” (Orders). These orders were put into effect immediately by all commands.

    These newly created sharpshooter battalions did not live up to their legend. In the western theater, privates and generals alike complained about the new commands; lawyer-generals found and exploited loopholes which allowed them to keep their infantry intact (Bivouac). Most sharpshooter battalions were compiled by transferring the excess companies in regiments into the new command, a process used to create the First Battalion of North Carolina Sharpshooters (Wharton). These troops were likely no better than their comrades in ranks, as the marksmen of General Maury’s brigade subjected the Sixth Texas Cavalry to friendly fire during the Battle of Iuka (Bivouac).

    Confederate marksmen would eventually find their mark through trial-and-error in the battles of 1862. The first engagement of the First North Carolina Sharpshooters came at the Battle of Cross Keys, where Major Wharton and his command felt the enemy position, then quickly retreated back to the main line (Wharton). Other battalions began the duties of skirmishers, especially the handpicked men of Captain Blackford’s battalion in General Rodes’ brigade. At Seven Pines, Blackford’s troops skirmished with enemy pickets before the brigade went in (Richmond). Following Blackford’s example, sharpshooter battalions began to train and fight as skirmishers as the year wore on.

    It was in 1863 that Confederate sharpshooters began their rise to the fighting southern soldier of fame. The famed sharpshooters of McGowan’s Brigade started training under Captain William Haskell in January of 1863. These proved their fighting efficiency by combining with two other companies at Gettysburg and helping the Confederates capture the Bliss farmhouse (Dunlop). Sharpshooters of Davis’ and Archer’s brigades skirmished with Union cavalry before Gettysburg on the First of July, pushing the troopers of Herr’s Ridge before the main attack began (Gettysburg). Gettysburg marked the first time that the corps of Confederate sharpshooters as a whole began to live up to its elite status.

    The sharpshooters gained their elite status in the winter of 1863. A reorganization of the units began when young, energetic commanders took command. In McGowan’s brigade, Major William Dunlop enacted a draft on the regiments, taking the best shots in each company into his battalion (Dunlop). These men, like their companion units in other brigades, trained extensively every day. By the spring of 1864, every man was expected to hit a man sized target at 1000 yards, hitting on the first shot at 800 yards (Sharpshooters). These highly skilled units bought themselves fame at the cost of thousands of Union casualties, including General John Sedgwick.

    In the remaining months of the war, the sharpshooter battalions of the Confederacy became known for their deadly accuracy. These troops were often deployed far in advance of the main line, incurring high casualty percentages (Greene). Although enlisting in the sharpshooters was considered a death wish, many young men wished to be known as the feared marksmen of the Confederacy. These were the ragged rebels who could kill a squirrel a mile away. As time has passed, the exploits of the elite sharpshooter battalions have been attributed to the confederate infantryman as well. The chosen few have created an image from which they have been forgotten.

    Works Cited
    Confederate States of America, General Orders Number 34.
    The Bivouac, “Confederate Sharpshooter Selection: From Falstaff’s Army to Fighting Elite,” Gary Yee.
    Regimental History, First Battalion (Sharpshooters), Major R. W. Wharton.
    To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, Stephen W. Sears.
    Lee’s Sharpshooters; Or, the Forefront of Battle, Major W. S. Dunlop.
    Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Noah Andre Trudeau.
    North Against South: Understanding the American Civil War on its 150th Anniversary, “Civil War Sharpshooters,” Richard Billies.
    The Final Battles of the Petersburg Campaign: Breaking the Backbone of the Rebellion, A. Wilson Greene.

    Works Consulted
    Shock Troops of the Confederacy, “Post of Honor: A Sharpshooter’s Gallery,” Fred L. Ray.
    Last edited by Hanny; May 10, 2012 at 07:42 PM.
    “Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote.” Benjamin Franklin

  8. #8
    Minas Moth's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    yes, sharpshooters... not exactly what was understood as skirmishing force... I intentionally left them out from my article... For several reasons... I appreciate your finding, nevertheless...

    I guess you find my article under-rating to sharpshooters (especially in the end). I admit I could express myself better in terms of their role. But the sources I came by (Individual reports of generals, regimental histories etc) didn't persuade me enough to see them as some force that could sway the war in confederate favor, or even gave battle-decisive impact on the field.
    Last edited by Minas Moth; May 11, 2012 at 02:02 AM.

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    Minas Moth's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    added a new article to the OP...

    please, give your opinions, or whatever you have to say regarding the topic it focuses on.

    MM

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    Default Re: American Civil War - Research&Essays

    I have started a series of articles about theory of offence, based on the works of Jomini and Clausewitz with ACW examples to explain theory. The Part I is up, Part II will follow, and then we go and go...

    MM

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