ARMIES OF AMERICAN CIVIL WARSpoiler Alert, click show to read:
Short study concerning social and economic aspects of army composition.
The first thing we have to be aware of is a fact that in United States there weren't military schools like ones that existed in European countries (mainly France, Russia and Austria). In ante bellum United States most dominate school that had any reference to war was West Point. However we should not think that West Point was in fact military school. It was mostly engineering school with something we could call “army application of engineering principles and studies”. On the other hand it isn't fair to say it had loose ties with waging war or principles of campaigning but I have to stress that syllabus of West Point was “inferior” to the syllabus of present day military schools of Europe.
The annual intake at West Point was really small, classes were often numbering less than 100 students. Number of graduates (who finished 4 years of study) was even smaller. In 1861 there were 239 cadets at West Point. 80 of them were from the Southern States, and 76 of them resigned or were dismissed for they refused to take oath of allegiance to Union. Considering the number of population, we can say that South was over-presented in the West Point. That fact was even more noticeable in the Federal Army, where South had many officers. 313 officers resigned their commission in the Federal (later Union) army and “went with their states”. That left only 440 West Point graduates in Union service. Total number of graduates of serviceable age (over 17 and under 30) was under 3,000. Many West Point graduates returned to duty from retirement. They were usually appointed as commanding officers of volunteer or militia regiments (such was the case of Ulysses S. Grant who was commander in Illinois). Of all West Point graduates 300 became generals in Union Army, and 150 of them became generals in Confederate Army.
In the South existed some number of “private” military colleges. Most important were: Virginia Military Institute (VMI), South Carolina Military Academy (known as Citadel), North Carolina Military Institute, Arkansas Military Institute, West Florida seminary. VMI was most important for it yielded 455 graduates in 1861, there were 1,902 graduates of VMI altogether. Of that number 1,791 fought in American Civil War, and it provided one third of all field officers in Confederate Army (majors and colonels).
When it comes to rank and file, it is interesting that both armies were predominantly raised from farming communities. Bell Irvin Wiley, while conducting his study of Confederate Army (CA) soldiers on the 9,000 soldiers in 28 Confederate regiments, discovered that half of them described themselves as farmers (50%), 474 entered the CA as students (both school and university), 472 entered as labourers, 321 as clerks, 318 as mechanics, 222 carpenters, 138 merchants and 116 blacksmiths. More than 50 entered as sailors, doctors, painters, teachers, shoemakers and lawyers. Some entered themselves as “gentleman”, they probably belonged to planter class, and they were notoriously hard to control by unit commanders. The same study was conducted in Union Army (UA). The sample was 12,000 soldiers and the results were exactly similar. However, UA did have considerably more members that entered as teachers, painters etc. This can be credited to higher literacy of Northern population (in region of New England before the war literacy was 95%).
The North had considerably larger population of foreign-born people. In 1860 there were around 1,000,000 Germans in the North. They also supplied 200,000 soldiers in Union Army (10% of total number of soldiers at the end of war). Alongside German soldiers there were 150,000 Irish-born soldiers, 45,000 English-born and 50,000 Canadians. In the South no one counted number of foreign-born soldiers in CA regiments. However, scholars believe that Irish, German, Italian and Polish born soldiers totalled tens of thousands. It is safe to assume that number was lower than 100,000 but we can’t be certain.
With outbreak of war Confederate administration (in 1861) couldn't have mobilised an army to challenge the Union. However, men came unbidden and joined the ranks either as volunteers or as members of militia units. Militia units varied in experience and existence. Some were indeed good and reliable soldiers who have been together for quite some time, while others were quickly assembled as war became reality (from early 1860). The volunteers were so numerous that Confederacy had no need to legislate conscription until April of 1862. In North, there was widespread of volunteering in large numbers. People came from militia units or simply volunteered themselves for the Army. Union soon took legislative attempts to regularise this popular response. This was necessary to raise money for pay and equipment of the soldiers.
On March 6 1861 Confederate Congress authorised creation of 100,000 strong Army. The Army was pretty much already assembled. In May 1861 Army was increased to number of 400,000. Even so War Department was forced to refuse more than half volunteers for lack of weapons and other equipment. It is interesting to point out that Confederates never formed regular army. CA consisted of state forces supervised by War Department. On April 15 1861, Lincoln called to service 75,000 militiamen to Federal service for 90 days. However, state offerings exceeded all expectations. To give you some perspective: Indiana was required to raise 6 regiments, while Governor promised at least 12, Ohio was required to raise 13 regiments, and Governor informed Lincoln that he can’t organise less than 20 regiments. On May 3 1861, Lincoln asked for 42,000 more volunteers to serve with Army for 3 years and 18,000 for the Navy. He also enlarged regular force by 23,000 and Congress sanctioned enlistment for 1,000,000 men for 3 years. Within a year from Fort Sumter incident, Union assembled an Army of 700,000 while Confederacy assembled 400,000 men. This numbers are circumstantial at best because exact numbers are hard to obtain. At the beginning it was quite lucrative to join the Union Army. Volunteers were paid 1000$ on enlistment so calculated desertion and resigning could bring you a fortune. Desertions weren't problem at the beginning, but in the South they began early. This was result of many soldiers being farmers so they left the ranks in order to harvest their crops, many of them had sincere intention to rejoin once they finish their farm jobs and the really did rejoin.
However, at the start of ACW , principal problem was equipment, or lack of it. This proved troublesome for Confederacy especially. Some arms were obtained from seized Federal Arsenals, but those were mostly old-fashioned muskets (unrifeled and flintlocks). They could be rifled and redone to use percussion cap but that took time. For Confederacy main supply of modern weapons was Europe, and acquiring them was main task of Confederate blockade running. In 1861 South started to produce weapons of its own in arsenals at Harpers Ferry, Richmond and Fayetteville. Confederacy especially excelled at improvised munitions production. Two out of three ingredients for gunpowder (charcoal and sulphur) were easily available. However, the third ingredient (saltpetre/nitre/potassium nitrate) wasn't. When Josiah Gorgas was named Chief of Ordnance in April 1861, he decided to find the source of nitre in Confederate territory. Source of it was found in southern Appalachian Mountains. In fact Confederacy never was in danger of defeat through shortage of powder. Purpose-built powder mill in Augusta (Georgia) supplied CA with powder for entire duration of ACW. In 1861 there were around 600,000 small arms in United States; of that number around 240,000 were in Confederate possession. The largest Union small arms producer was Springfield Armoury. Pre war annual output of weapons was around 20,000. When the War broke out it was increased to 200,000 rifles per year (almost 17,000 rifles per month). Both North and South bought weapons overseas. But when Union’s production picked up pace it imported less weapons. South, was hampered by lack of funds and depreciation of Confederate Dollar (it lost 9,000 of its value at the end of war, making it trash and not currency), so by August 1862 Confederacy bought only 50,000 rifles while Union bought 726,000. By the end of ACW Confederacy managed to purchase only around 580,000 rifles.
I tried to summarize this study as much as I could... I have to say that some sources and relevant numbers are really hard to come by, but I did my best.
Minas Moth
SKIRMISHERS OF 19TH CENTURY AND AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
By definition skirmishers are/were infantry or cavalry soldiers stationed ahead or alongside a larger body of friendly troops formed in skirmish line to harass the enemy. The skirmish line is a battle formation used by rifle squads, platoons, and companies during an advance. In such a formation, troops are deployed in a single line along the front at intervals of 6–8 m (eight to 12 paces). An individual may move slightly forward or to the side to improve his fire position or to better adapt to the terrain, as long as he neither breaks the general continuity of the formation’s front nor hinders his neighbors.1
Skirmishers are known from ancient times, however, our point of interest are 19th Century skirmishers that were used in American Civil War period. In the 18th Century, development in gunpowder weapons enabled introduction of skirmishers armed with muskets. In 18th Century two conflicts were of paramount importance for development of skirmishing branch of infantry. Those were the Seven Years War (French and Indian War) and American War of Independence. What made these two conflicts great for development of such tactics was primarily enemy (especially in Seven Years War) and lack of trained troops (War of Independence).
In Seven Years War, British and their colonists faced French and their Indian allies forming Seven Nations of Canada (Mohawk, Abenaki, Huron and Onondaga). French relied heavily on their Indian allies who were very interesting fighters. They didn’t fight in European style of closely packed battalions of soldiers but were more inclined to act as individuals, using cover, ambush and other such tactics that will later be known as skirmishing. The way to fight such an opponent was to adopt his tactics and turn it against him. This was a process that took some considerable time but will be perfected in North America. British colonists were quick to adept such style of warfare. Even their militia battalions (Minutemen) excelled in such skirmishing duties and soon prominent shots and frontiersmen became widely known figures.
In Europe, situation was different. Except for Austrians, most of European powers didn’t use skirmishers as part of their armies, nor did they pay much attention to incorporate them in their fighting force. Most countries did organize militia units that did rely on skirmishing but they were often mistrusted by their own commanders. It is known fact that Friedrich the Great didn’t trust his Freikorps troops. He explained this by their lack of training he so highly admired. British, who could see potent force of this style of war first-handed, adopted it in their military system by seasonally drafting light infantry regiments as temporary units during field operations. However, when American War of Independence broke out, British still relied on line infantry deployment. Number of skirmishers used by British in their campaigns was confined to dragoon regiments, Indian allies and small number of skirmishers.
On the other hand, Continental Army relied heavily on units that performed skirmisher role. As mentioned above, Minutemen militia really excelled as such operations. There were some highly specialized units of skirmishers also; most known were Morgan’s Riflemen (a band of 96 excellent marksmen that specialized in picking off British officers). To say that skirmishers won the Independence War would be pompous statement at best. But we must acknowledge this tactic as a great contributor to United States independence. Conclusion for such a statement comes from contemporary military observers from Europe who, when witnessing French and Indian War, War of Independence, 19th Century Indian Wars and Mexican War, made term American way of fighting. This way relied more on loosely packed groups of men and didn’t follow European doctrine of tightly packed bodies of men.
When French Revolution broke out; French took skirmisher tactics to entirely new level by devising light infantry doctrine. French also divided light infantry into two categories: voltigeurs (skirmishers) and tirailleurs (sharpshooters). What made French system unique was adoption of living of the land which removed much of equipment from soldiers back and so he became more mobile and could perform light infantry duties. From 1804, each French line or light battalion formed one company of ninety of the best shots to perform role of elite skirmishers. Tirailleurs were part of Imperial Guard of Napoleon I Bonaparte and were organized in 16 regiments by the fall of French Empire. When it comes to equipment skirmishers of that period were sometimes equipped with lighter muskets, some were even rifled or were more accurate variations of general infantry muskets. However, there wasn’t some general supply of skirmishers with special weaponry en masse. It seems it mostly remained in hands of individuals or regiment patrons which weapons they will be equipped with.
In French Army organization skirmishers were part of organized force of line infantry, cavalry and artillery. Corps system allowed for every individual corps to act on its own as smaller fighting unit or to easily connect with other Corps. This system of mutual support between infantry, skirmishers and artillery proved extremely effective in most battles fought by Napoleon but it wasn’t invincible. If one part of this system was unable to do its job, other elements would loose support and were often exposed to heavy casualties. It is interesting to mention that several sources imply that more than once Napoleon used corps as base of skirmishers. This means that corps, which would be the first to come in contact with the enemy, immediately deployed large number of skirmishers to harass the enemy. Large numbers means more than one company of skirmishers per battalion, essentially making rest of the corps a pool from which skirmishers could be reinforced or replenished. This organization was maintained until rest of Army came in contact with the enemy.
So with this mentioned, we must ask ourselves following question: if light infantry doctrine (skirmishing) was highly evolved in early 19th Century and skirmishing was American way of fighting, what made Civil War generals to insist on line order of battle with tightly packed companies of men? General John Watts de Peyster in his treatise New American Tactics, advocated abandonment of European line order of battle and making skirmishing as main organization of United States Army. So, why wasn’t he listened?
One reason can be found in establishing military schools in United States in 19th Century, primarily West Point and Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Such establishments, although they were engineering schools before everything else, were founded on tactics that dominated in time of Napoleonic Wars. In that time, infantry line reigned supreme. In fact, British lines at Waterloo broke all French attacks and established belief that infantry columns can’t penetrate organized and synchronized infantry line. To achieve such outcome, line infantry was supposed to deliver volleys at steady rate. To achieve that all men in company must work as one. These were some of the ideals that cadets of West Point and VMI were taught. However, with appearance of rifled muskets, Napoleonic tactics became suicidal at best but syllabus of military schools didn’t follow technological advance. This discrepancy between technology and theory will ensure high casualties on both sides when Civil War broke out.
On the eve of battle both Union and Confederacy organized regiments in European style but on American way. There wasn’t enough time to properly train troops, so they were taught how to perform simple march orders and how to reload their muskets. Most of the time, this was the only training they received before being thrown into battle. However, Civil War period sources (especially histories of brigades and regiments by men who served in them) give us valuable information on skirmishers in this Conflict. Because of them we now know that every regiment (of 10 companies) would always used one of the companies as skirmishers in the preliminary of the battle. When battle commenced and two lines came in range, skirmishers were often absorbed by main line.
Skirmishers in Civil War were constricted to side duties; such as: picket duty, guarding, preliminaries of battle, scouting and counter scouting duty. It is paramount to say that skirmishers weren’t specialized companies in American Civil War Armies. As said before, they were men of line companies ordered to perform skirmish role.
Another question that comes into view is: why were skirmishers so ineffective? There in no Civil War battle which was decided by skirmishers, that is, where one force was stopped by skirmishers before even reaching opponent. Even locally (parts of battlefield) skirmishers didn’t manage to stop advancing enemies. Being 100men strong in loose formation, picking off individual soldiers and suffering small amount of casualties compared to those inflicted (skirmishers weren’t fired on by line infantry because volley couldn’t achieve its effect on loosely organized skirmishers) there should be some account of them stopping enemies advance. Reason why such accounts don’t exist can be explained by Civil War soldier’s willingness to take casualties. Civil War armies indeed had extremely high morale and they often pressed on even tough they suffered heavy casualties. In such case, skirmishing company could hope to fire 2 to 3 shots before enemy would close with them. Amount of casualties inflicted in that period could be high as 200 (at most) but even then enemy wouldn’t waver and rout. It would press on until it forced skirmishers to merge with main line. Often skirmishers would fire one shot and then rush back to their lines to form with their regiment.
All of this made skirmisher role under-presented in Civil War. There were some small encounters fought by skirmishers but they weren’t decisive ones. Even small scale battles (such as the Battle of Glorieta Pass of New Mexico Campaign) fought by less than 2,500men on both sides were fought in European fashion.
Things did change with establishment of sharpshooter units (Confederate armies deployed them in 1863) but there were never so much of them to make battle decisive impact. Sharpshooters could easily hit commanding officers and generals, but in Civil War, generals and officers fell quite often by fire from line infantry, so we can’t say that sharpshooters fulfilled even that role.
In the end, it is interesting to see how Americans, who developed system of skirmishing/light infantry, were more than willing to abandon it and suffer tremendous casualties inflicted on Civil war battlefields.
THEORY OF DEFENCE
added on February 26, 2013.Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Summary:
This short article aims to explain some base principles of defensive warfare, particularly on tactical aspect, and its relation to achieving the strategic objective of defensive operations. Key words of this article are: defence, objective, surprise, advantage of the ground and attack from several quarters. All of the theoretical terms and relations are explained with historical examples of American Civil War battles.
In every conflict, no matter how big or small, one side is always on the defensive. It doesn’t even have to be conflict, this same principle expands on the campaign, battle and even a small scale skirmish. As Carl Maria von Clausewitz (Clausewitz in further text) puts is: “What is defence in conception? The warding off a blow.” (On War, 6, I). From this simple statement comes the character of the defence: expectation or state of expectancy of the blow to come. However, as Clausewitz also pointed out, absolute defence in war is impossible or even a contradictio in adjecto in reference to war itself, as in such case war would be made by only one side. But history shows that in conflict more often than not, a side that is initially on defensive or on defensive for a while will still at some point of time, with smaller or larger success attempt some sort of offensive action.
The main objective of defence is to preserve (On War, 6, I). The amount of effort that has to be put in preserving some object is by a rule smaller and less costly than the effort that has to be put to achieve or gain something, either strategically or tactically. But advantage to the defending side, comes not only from the active measures of the defender (for example, bold division of an army in face of the enemy done at the battle of Chancerollsville, where Lee ordered Jackson to move his corps and attack the right flank of Union Army) but also from mistakes, erroneous judgement or failings of an enemy (in the same battle, Union commander Hooker, after staging a successful demonstration at Fredericksburg and crossing the Rapidan River wrongly estimated Lee’s strength and failed to attack him, especially after Lee sent Jackson on the flanking march and his centre was held with no more than 15,000 troops while Hooker had some 70,000 troops at his disposal). Another, extremely potent aspect of defending side is the “aid afforded by locality or ground.” (On War, 6, I) which can also be seen both at the battle of Fredericksburg (where Confederates enjoyed strong defensive position provided by Marye’s Heights) and Gettysburg (where Union Centre commanded by Hancock had a great stonewall protection and superior line of sight for an artillery. Having, in mind such an aspects, one must agree with Clausewitz’s assessment: “that the defensive form of War is in itself stronger than the offensive.” (On War, 6, I).
With difference between tactical and strategicdefence, Clausewitz points out following conditions as the most decisive: surprise, advantage of the ground and the attack from several quarters (On War,6, II). It is possible to question Clausewitz’s approach as he completely ignores superiority of numbers, bravery, discipline or any other quality of the armies engaged, but this absence is explained (by Clausewitz himself) by a fact of their belonging to strategic and not tactical aspect of conducting the war. The commander in chief/of an army more often than not can actually have no influence on the amount, quality and training of the troops he receives.
The surprise is extremely potent weapon for defence. This enables defender to force the enemy to either commit larger number of troops on a part of a battlefield than he originally planned to do or to drop his objective completely by a means of forcing him to retreat. This was achieved especially by Jackson’s Corps at Chancellorsville, where he managed to push back Union right flank so far that in effect position he occupied at the end of the day threatened not only the flank that was pushed back but was reorganising but also the centre of the Union Army which had some 23,000 Confederates behind its back. This surprise attack effectively made Hooker abandon the Chancellorsville campaign and retreat from his entrenched position.
The second aspect is the advantage of the ground. In the same battle (Chancellorsville), Jackson’s Corps was able to make a surprise attack just because of the terrain itself. The advantage of the ground doesn’t relate only to possible obstacles for the enemies such as woods, marshes, lakes, rivers etc., but also includes terrain features that help to conceal the movement of the defending forces. Such indeed was the case of Jackson’s Corps, which used some little known roads to get around Union position and then launched a devastating attack on the Union right.
The third aspect; attack from several quarters, doesn’t relate only to attack from multiple directions. It also means to combined use off all available arms (infantry, cavalry and artillery). This aspect appears as normal for attack, while it might be considered un-natural or even contradictive for defence. However, this isn’t so. Successful combination of different arms on defence as well as a well timed counterattack (which is in itself an essential part of every defence) can prove extremely potent defensive weapon. Let us observe the third day of Battle of Gettysburg (July 3, 1863). At the Union right centre at Cemetery Ridge, Union II Corps under command of Hancock held a strong natural defensive position. The Union strength was multiplied by artillery fire from Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top. In the end, left of the Union right centre even moved out and flanked the attacking Confederate forces from the right. This effectively represents the successful combination of available arms as well as manoeuvres that are available for defensive operations, although their character may indicate they belong only to the offense.
As we can see, there is more to a character of defence and the offense than meets the eye at the first glance. However, it would not be prudent to say that such principles and relations as explained above are applicable in every battle and every situation that may arise on the field. But, such aspects cannot be ignored, and they should always be kept in mind when researching certain battle.
Sources:
von Clausewitz, C. M., On War (1997.); Wordsworth Editions Limited, Hertfordshire, UK
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Author:
Minas Moth
THEORY OF OFFENCE (Part 1)
added on February 27, 2013.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Summary: Article focuses on various aspects of offense as they had been seen by two prominent military theorists of the1 9th Century; Carl Maria von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini. The key words of this article are: Jomini, Clausewitz, offence, object of strategic attack, Jominian style.
In one of my previous articles I have stated an opinion which is held true by military theorists: defence is stronger form of waging war. That, however, doesn’t mean that defensive battle is devoid of any offense by defending side. Jomini observes that in many cases “an army reduced to the strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack and an army receiving an attack may... take the offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it.” (The Art of War, IV, XXX). Same can be concluded from Clausewitz’s observation “...defensive, without an offensive return blow, cannot be conceived; that this return blow is a necessary constitutive part of the defensive, whilst in the attack, the blow or act is itself one whole idea” (On War, Book VII, II). Such an observation is indeed proven in many historical battles and there is no need to further elaborate on it. There is one thing that requires attention, and that is that both authors tie an offensive action with strategic defence or defensive battle. This must not lead to conclusion that these authors consider an offense to be possible only if it is preceded by a defence. The reason for such appearance is the mere fact that both authors in their respective works dealt with problem of defence before offence (as Jomini wrote about defence in IV, XXX and offence in IV, XXI).
The defence in itself is never intentionally part of offence, but inevitably it often appears itself as such; in most cases involuntarily or caused by some outer influences. The attack, as a one great momentum of an assailing army or even individual troop can rarely be carried out in a single thrust. This means that, more often than not, an attacking force will have to stop its attack, at some point in time, to recover, rest or resupply. When this does happen, such a force is immediately put on the defensive and remains in such a state as long as it doesn’t continue its advance. On the other hand, if the attack is extremely successful and it enables acquisition of vast territory or capture of some strategic objective, then another type of defence appears; the one were assailing army must protect the territory it captured by detaching parts (bigger or smaller) of its main strength. (On War, Book VII, II)
Up to this point, both Jomini and Clausewitz had same views and conclusions. But one thing where they differ (in offensive deliberation) is the object of a strategic attack. According to Clausewitz: “The overthrow of the enemy is the aim in war, destruction of hostile militaryforces, the means both in attack and defence” (On War, Book VII, III). On the other hand, Jomini takes a different approach: “The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic manoeuvres to ruin his army completely” (The Art of War, IV, XXXI). By comparing this two, it is easy to see that by Clausewitz, destruction of enemies force is the main goal, not only in battle, but in strategy (for example campaign) also. Destruction of the enemies fighting force is prerequisite that opens all the doors that wanted to be achieved with going to war; be it conquest of the part or a whole of a territory, peace treaty under victor’s condition or some other strategic objective. Therefore, commander of an army must always look for away to completely destroy enemies force. This he may or may not achieve, as the result depends on many factors, but once the battle starts this must be commander’s main goal. Jomini on the other hand, seeks to achieve victory by manoeuvring; either by overthrowing an enemy on some point of his line, or by turning his flank. Such an approach hopes to achieve the goal of winning the battle with as little as possible damage done to the attacker, but consequently to the defender also, as the defender, if attacker manages to turn his flank or capture some point he deems threatens hisposition will abandon the field and retreat. Although Jomini does state that goal of the flanking attack is to attack the defender in the rear in hope to cut off his line of retreat there is no mention of destroying the enemy’s army.
This view is strongly criticised by Clausewitz, who is strongly opposed to theorists that consider war some mathematic equation where object can be achieved by turning the enemies flank or some other “geometrical” move, while there is no real effort to actually destroy ordisable enemies fighting force. This has some weight to it; history shows us that battles fought in Jominian Style1(especially J. E. Johnston’s retreat defence during Sherman’s March to Sea), will be in many cases inconclusive and enable weaker but resolute defender to give up a territory but constantly pose a threat to invading army. The same can be said for Union campaigns from 1861-July 1863 in the eastern Theatre of American Civil War. Commanders of Union Army of the Potomac always gestured at Richmond as main object of their attack (clearly under the Jomini’s influence) while the paid little or no attention (in their plans) to Southern Armies, which in their plans were supposed to simply abandon their positions when certain point was captured on the field. The flaw of many such plans came exactly from Jomini’s teaching. Union Generals (and some Southern one) were well educated to determine a decisive point which can win a battle but they completely neglected the fact that in order to capture certain decisive point men will have to die. Had they been more focused on destroying the Southern fighting force, instead of waving on to Richmond, War would probably be over faster. When in 1864, Grant wasnamed Commander in Chief of the Union Army, he gave following instructions to G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac: “Lee’s Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also.” Such an approach to war is exactly what is proposed by Clausewitz; eventually it has proven as accurate one, as when Lee surrendered his Army of the Northern Virginia at the Appomattox Courthouse in 1865 war in the east (and soon in the west) was over.
Clausewitz recognise a combat (destruction of enemy’s armed force) as a means to the end (which Jomini fails to do completely as he is more focused on manoeuvres and orders of battle and gives little place to theory of the offensive objectives on battle). “The only way of destroying the enemy’s armed forces is by combat...” (On War, Book VII, VI). Clausewitz recognised that this can be done in two ways, either directly or through a combination of combats (On War, Book VII, VI). And although the battle is the principal way to achieve destruction of enemy’s force, it is by far not the only one. If assailant were successful in capturing territory or a fortress, this will lead to the same result as this will often mean the enemy’s line of retreat is now blocked, or his supply is cut off, or he is deprived of reinforcements etc. Manoeuvring is also recognised as a possible benefactor for destruction of enemy’s force. However, it is important to point out that manoeuvres,capture of territory and/or fortress will rarely achieve the same effect or have the same value as battle where enemy’s force was destroyed.
1Jominian Style battles are all the battles that were lead by commanders educated on the Jominian principles. This was especially the case during the American Civil War where West Point, Virginia Military Institute and other schools were indeed using Jominian works as a base for education. Although Jomini correctly identifies many of the principles as existent even before French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, quite often he states that some principles were broken by Napoleon or other general with great success and skill. Therefore it remains a question how was such a view still in existence by 1861?
Sources:
von Clausewitz, C. M., On War (1997.); Wordsworth Editions Limited, Hertfordshire, UK
Baron de Jomini, A-H., The Art of War (2007.); Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, USA
private collection