1861
The brigade was formed by Jackson at Harpers Ferry, April 27, 1861, from the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 27th, and 33rd Virginia Infantry regiments and the Rockbridge Artillery Battery of Rockbridge County, 1 unit recruited in or near the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Thirteen companies of the brigade were recruited from western counties that would become part of West Virginia. It was officially assigned to the Virginia Provisional Army, then to the Army of the Shenandoah on May 15, and the Valley District on July 20.
Jackson's brigade was referred to informally as "Virginia's First Brigade" until July 21, 1861, when, at First Manassas, both the brigade and its general received the nickname "Stonewall". General Barnard E. Bee of South Carolina is said to have made his immortal remark as he rallied his brigade for the final phase of the battle. Although the exact words were not recorded at the time, he probably said, "Yonder stands Jackson like a stone wall; let's go to his assistance. Rally behind the Virginians!" This is considered the turning point of the first major battle of the Civil War, when the Union troops were repulsed and retreated back to Washington, D.C. Jackson was promoted to higher command, but the brigade remained in his chain of command until his death. His first replacement as brigade commander was Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett that autumn.
1862
On March 13, 1862, the Valley District was incorporated into the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Joseph E. Johnston. Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade operated in the Valley as part of the left wing of Johnston's army. During Jackson's Valley Campaign, Jackson's first and only defeat of the Civil War occurred at the First Battle of Kernstown on March 25, 1862. After receiving faulty intelligence, the brigade was ordered to attack a much larger Union force. Out of ammunition and almost surrounded by the superior force, Garnett ordered a withdrawal. Jackson was infuriated by this action, taken without his explicit permission, and Garnett was relieved of command and subject to court martial. (Garnett was later killed during Pickett's Charge in the Battle of Gettysburg, attempting to restore his military honour.) For the remainder of the Valley Campaign, Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder commanded the brigade and there were no more defeats in store. The brigade marched over 400 miles in four weeks, was victorious in six significant battles, and helped Jackson achieve a strategic victory in the Eastern Theatre. The brigade's mobility in the campaign (particularly a 57-mile march in 51 hours) earned it the oxymoronic title "Jackson's foot cavalry".
At the end of the Valley Campaign, the brigade moved to reinforce General Robert E. Lee in the Seven Days Battles on the Virginia Peninsula. In the Battle of Gaines' Mill, the brigade assaulted the Federal right and helped Lee achieve a victory. In the Northern Virginia Campaign, the brigade suffered high casualties at the Battle of Cedar Mountain and General Winder was killed on August 9, 1862. Jackson personally rallied his old brigade and won the battle. The brigade would suffer more casualties in the Second Battle of Bull Run. On August 30, 1862, the Stonewall Brigade repulsed the attack of the Union's Iron Brigade and rallied for a counter attack. Its acting commander, Colonel William Baylor, was killed. Colonel Andrew J. Grigsby assumed command and led the brigade through the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam. The brigade defended the West Woods, where the fighting was so severe and attrition so high that Grigsby was commanding the division ("Jackson's Division") by the end of the day.
Grigsby did not receive permanent command of the brigade, for reasons Jackson did not record. Instead, Brig. Gen. Elisha F. Paxton, former commander of the 27th Virginia Infantry, moved from Jackson's staff to brigade command, which he performed in the Battle of Fredericksburg. There, under the division command of William B. Taliaferro, the brigade was on the right flank of the Confederate defense and counterattacked the encroaching Union division of George G. Meade, but was overall lightly engaged.
In 1862, casualties in the brigade surpassed 1,200.
1863
At Chancellorsville, the brigade was part of Isaac R. Trimble's division and participated in Stonewall Jackson's audacious flanking movement of May 2, 1863. The brigade attacked on the Union right flank along the Orange Plank Road, falling in behind J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. More than 600 men out of 2,000 were killed or wounded, and among the killed was General Paxton. This was the same night that Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded. The men of the brigade were devastated to learn that their hero had been struck down by friendly fire and they renewed their attacks on May 3 with extra determination. As Jackson and his staff were returning to camp on May 2, they were mistaken for a Union cavalry force by a Confederate North Carolina regiment who shouted, "Halt, who goes there?," but fired before evaluating the reply. Jackson was hit by three bullets, two in the left arm and one in the right hand. The commander of the 13th Virginia, Colonel James A. Walker, was promoted to brigadier general to replace Paxton. In the Gettysburg Campaign, the brigade was part of Edward “Allegheny” Johnson's division. At the Second Battle of Winchester, the brigade launched a spirited counter attack at Stephenson's Depot that captured six Union regiments. The brigade arrived late in the afternoon of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. They participated in two hard days of futile assaults against Union entrenchments on Culp's Hill.
1864
In the Overland Campaign, at the Battle of the Wilderness, the brigade fought along the Orange Courthouse Turnpike. At Spotsylvania Court House, the brigade was on the left flank of the "Mule Shoe" salient, in the part of the line known as the "Bloody Angle", where Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps launched a massive assault. All but 200 men of the brigade were killed, wounded, or were among the 6,000 captured Confederates following the bloody hand-to-hand fighting. The prisoners included Johnson, the division commander, while Walker was seriously wounded. Spotsylvania Court House was the official end of the road for the Stonewall Brigade. The brigade was disbanded and its surviving members were consolidated into one (small) regiment.
Of the 6,000 men who served in the Stonewall brigade during the war, by the time of the surrender at Appomattox Court House, only 219 soldiers were left, none above the rank
of captain.
Legacy
The military lineage of the brigade has reached modern times in the form of the 116th Infantry Regiment, formerly the 1st Brigade "The Stonewall Brigade" of the 29th Infantry Division (Light), Virginia Army National Guard, which counts historical ties to the 5th Virginia Infantry, one of the five original regiments in the Civil War Stonewall Brigade. As a result of US Army modularization, the 1st Brigade is now the 116th Infantry Brigade Combat Team. The brigade's colours carry battle streamers for the Stonewall Brigade's actions in the Civil War.
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: October 7, 2010 by Britabroad
Iron Brigade - USA
The Iron Brigade, also known as the Iron Brigade of the West or the Black Hat Brigade, was an infantrybrigade in the UnionArmy of the Potomac during the American Civil War. Although it fought entirely in the Eastern Theatre, it was composed of regiments from Western states (states that are today considered Midwestern). Noted for its strong discipline, its unique uniform appearance, and its tenacious fighting ability, the Iron Brigade suffered the highest percentage of casualties of any brigade in the war.
The nickname "Iron Brigade", with its connotation of fighting men with iron dispositions, was applied formally or informally to a number of units in the Civil War and in later conflicts. The Iron Brigade of the West was the unit that received the most lasting publicity in its use of the nickname.
Brigade nickname
The Iron Brigade initially consisted of the 2nd, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry Regiments, along with the 19th Indiana, and was later joined by the 24th Michigan. This composition of men from three Western states led it to be sometimes referred to as the Iron Brigade of the West. They were known throughout the war as the Black Hats because of the black 1858 model Hardee hats issued to Army regulars, rather than the blue kepis worn in most other units.
The all-Western brigade earned its famous nickname while under the command of Brig. Gen.John Gibbon, who led the brigade in its first battle at Brawner's Farm (Gainesville) on August 28, 1862, a prelude to the Second Battle of Bull Run, where it stood up against attacks from a superior force under Maj. Gen.Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. The designation "Iron Brigade" is said to have originated during the brigade's action at Turners Gap, during the Battle of South Mountain, a prelude to the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. Maj. Gen.Joseph Hooker, commanding I Corps, approached Army of the Potomac commander Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, seeking orders. As the Western men advanced up the National Road, forcing the Confederate line all the way back to the gap, McClellan asked, "What troops are those fighting in the Pike?" Hooker replied, "[Brigadier] General Gibbon's brigade of Western men." McClellan stated, "They must be made of iron." Hooker said that the brigade had performed even more superbly at Second Bull Run; to this, McClellan said that the brigade consisted of the "best troops in the world". Hooker supposedly was elated and rode off without his orders. There are a few stories related to the origin, but the men immediately adopted the name, which was quickly used in print after South Mountain.
The unit that became known as the Iron Brigade was activated on October 1, 1861, upon the arrival in Washington, D.C., of the 7th Wisconsin. It was combined into a brigade with the 2nd and 6th Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana, under the command of Brig. Gen. Rufus King. The governor of Wisconsin, Alexander Randall, had hoped to see the formation of an entirely Wisconsin brigade, but the Army unwittingly frustrated his plans by transferring the 5th Wisconsin from King's brigade and including the Hoosiers instead.[2] This brigade was initially designated the 3rd Brigade of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division of the Army of the Potomac, and then the 3rd Brigade, I Corps.[3]
McDowell's I Corps did not join the bulk of the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula Campaign. In June 1862 it was redesignated the III Corps of Maj. Gen. John Pope'sArmy of Virginia. Now under the command of John Gibbon, a regular Army officer from North Carolina who chose to stay with the Union, [4] King's brigade was designated the 4th Brigade, 1st division, III Corps, and it saw its first combat in the Northern Virginia Campaign. Almost immediately following the Union defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run, the III Corps was transferred back to the Army of the Potomac and redesignated the I Corps, under the command of Joseph Hooker; Gibbon's brigade became the 4th Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps.
The 24th Michigan joined the brigade on October 8, 1862, prior to the Battle of Fredericksburg in December. On February 27, 1863, the brigade, now under the command of Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith, was redesignated the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps.
Command
The brigade commanders, disregarding temporary assignments, were:
Brig. Gen. Rufus King: September 28, 1861 – May 7, 1862
Brig. Gen. John Gibbon: May 7, 1862 – November 4, 1862
Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith: November 25, 1862 – July 1, 1863 (wounded at Gettysburg)
The Iron Brigade lost its all-Western status on July 16, 1863, following its crippling losses at Gettysburg, when the 167th Pennsylvania was incorporated into it. However, the brigade that succeeded it, which included the survivors of the Iron Brigade, was commanded by:
Col. William W. Robinson (of the 7th Wisconsin): July 1, 1863 – March 25, 1864
Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler (6th Wisconsin): March 25, 1864 – May 6, 1864
Col. William W. Robinson: May 6, 1864 – June 7, 1864
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bragg (6th Wisconsin): June 7, 1864 – February 10, 1865
Col. John A. Kellogg (6th Wisconsin): February 28, 1865 – April 27, 1865
Col. Henry A. Morrow (24th Michigan): April 27, 1865 – June 5, 1865
In June 1865, the units of the surviving brigade were separated and reassigned to the Army of the Tennessee.
Battle Honours
The brigade fought in the Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Mine Run, Overland, Richmond-Petersburg, and Appomattox campaigns.
The brigade took pride in its designation, "1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps", under which it played a prominent role in the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. It repulsed the first Confederate offensive through Herbst's Woods, capturing much of Brig. Gen. James J. Archer's brigade, and Archer himself. The 6th Wisconsin (along with 100 men of the brigade guard) are remembered for their famous charge on an unfinished railroad cut north and west of the town, where they captured the flag of the 2nd Mississippi and took hundreds of Confederate prisoners.[5]
The Iron Brigade, proportionately, suffered the most casualties of any brigade in the Civil War. For example, 61% (1,153 out of 1,885) were casualties at Gettysburg. Similarly, the 2nd Wisconsin, which suffered 77% casualties at Gettysburg, suffered the most throughout the war; it was second only to the 24th Michigan (also an Iron Brigade regiment) in total casualties at Gettysburg. The latter regiment lost 397 out of 496 soldiers, an 80% casualty rate.
Other Iron Brigades
There have been other brigades known by the same nickname:
Another brigade in the Army of the Potomac had previously been known as the Iron Brigade (later the Iron Brigade of the East or First Iron Brigade to avoid confusion). This unit was the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps, prior to Meredith's brigade getting that designation. It consisted of the 22nd New York, 24th New York, 30th New York, 14th Regiment (New York State Militia), and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters. Although this Iron Brigade of the East served in the same infantry division as the Iron Brigade of the West, press attention focused primarily on the latter. Most of the Eastern regiments were mustered out before the Battle of Gettysburg, where the remaining Eastern Iron Brigade Regiments and the Iron Brigade of the West arguably achieved their greatest fame.
A Confederate cavalry brigade was known as Shelby's Iron Brigade. It was in the division commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph O. (Jo) Shelby in the Army of Missouri and fought in Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's Missouri Expedition in 1864.
Recent scholarship[6] identifies two other brigades referred to by their members or others as "The Iron Brigade":
3rd Brigade, 1st Division, III Corps (17th Maine, 3rd Michigan, 5th Michigan, 1st, 37th, and 101st New York) Reno's Brigade from the North Carolina expedition (21st and 35th Massachusetts, 51st Pennsylvania, and 51st New York)
The 2nd Brigade of the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division has carried the Iron Brigade moniker since 1985 and was previously called the "Black Hat" Brigade.
The 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division is also known as the Iron Brigade. Its unit crest is similar to the medals issued to veterans of the both Western and the Eastern Iron Brigades of the Army of the Potomac.[7]
The 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team of the 2nd Infantry Division (United States) is known as the Iron Brigade as well. Located at Camp Casey Korea, the brigade has a critical role of military deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: October 7, 2010 by Britabroad
Louisiana Tigers -CSA
The Louisiana Tigers was the common nickname for certain infantry troops from the state of Louisiana in the Confederate States Army during the American Civil War. Originally applied to a specific company, the nickname expanded to a battalion, then to a brigade, and eventually to all Louisiana troops within the Army of Northern Virginia. Although the exact composition of the Louisiana Tigers changed as the war progressed, they developed a reputation as fearless, hard-fighting shock troops.
The original Louisiana Tigers The origin of the term came from the "Tiger Rifles," a volunteer company raised in the New Orleans area as part of MajorChatham Roberdeau Wheat's 1st Special battalion, Louisiana infantry. A large number of the men were foreign-born, particularly Irish Americans, many from the city's wharves and docks. Many men had previous military experience in local militia units or as filibusters. They (and the regiments that later became known as the Tigers) were organized and trained at Camp Moore.
Originally, Company B of Wheat's Tigers wore distinctive uniforms similar to the French zouave, with straw hats or red cloth fezzes, blue-striped chasseur-style pants, and short dark blue jackets with red lacing or tombeaux. As time went on, this garb was replaced by Confederate uniforms and what clothing the men could purchase or otherwise obtain from civilians. Within months of arriving in Northern Virginia, Wheat's entire five-company battalion began to be called the Louisiana Tigers. The battalion first saw combat during the First Battle of Manassas, where it anchored the left flank on Matthews Hill for several hours until reinforcements arrived.
Hays' Brigade By then, the nickname "Louisiana Tigers" had expanded to encompass the entire brigade, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays following Taylor's promotion and transfer to the Western Theater. By the Battle of Fredericksburg in late 1862, Hays' Brigade was composed of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana, and was a part of the division of Maj. Gen.Jubal A. Early.
During the 1863 Gettysburg Campaign, Hays' Brigade played a crucial role in the Confederate victory at the Second Battle of Winchester, seizing a key fort and forcing the withdrawal of Union troops under Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy. During the subsequent invasion of southern Pennsylvania, much of the populace feared the thievery and drunkenness often associated with the colorful Louisianans.[1] At the Battle of Gettysburg, Hays' Brigade stormed East Cemetery Hill on the second day and seized several Unionartillery pieces before withdrawing when supporting units were not advanced.
Final organization During the subsequent reorganization of Robert E. Lee's army in late May, the much depleted brigade of Tigers was consolidated with the "Pelican Brigade," formally known as the Second Louisiana Brigade, which had also lost its commander, Leroy A. Stafford, a long-time Tiger. Zebulon York became the new commander.
The nickname Tigers came to encompass all Louisiana infantry troops that fought under Lee. Nearly 12,000 men served at one time or another in various regiments that were destined to be part of the Louisiana Tigers. The name was at times also used for other Louisiana troops, including Levi's Light Artillery Battery and Maurin's Battery, but it was the infantry that is most often associated with the term.
York's consolidated brigade of Tigers fought in Early's army during the Battle of Monocacy and several subsequent battles in the Shenandoah Valley. In late 1864, the Tigers returned to the Army of Northern Virginia in the trenches around Petersburg, Virginia. By the Appomattox Campaign, many regiments were reduced to less than 100 men apiece, and Brig. Gen. William R. Peck had become the Tigers' final commander.
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: October 10, 2010 by Britabroad
Sharpshooters
The term sharpshooter had a more general meaning in the mid-19th Century than it does now. It could mean either a roving precision shooter like the modern sniper (a term that did not come into use until late in the century) or a light infantryman who specialized in the petite guerre: scouting, picketing, and skirmishing. The modern sharpshooter appeared in Central Europe around 1700 (the term comes from the German scharfschutzen).
At the beginning of the American Civil War, thanks to Hiram Berdan, the Army of the Potomac had a definite advantage in sharpshooting and light infantry, and this came as a rude shock to the Confederates during the 1862 Peninsular campaign. In response the Confederates organized their own sharpshooters, beginning with those of an obscure Alabama colonel, Bristor Gayle. Confederate general Robert Rodes organized the first battalion of sharpshooters in his brigade in early 1863, and later in each brigade of his division. In early 1864 General Lee adopted the concept for the entire Army of Northern Virginia, mandating that each infantry brigade field a sharpshooter battalion. These units found ready employment in the Overland campaign, and later in the trenches of Petersburg and in the fast-moving Shenandoah campaign of 1864. Although little has been written about them (the last book, written by a former sharpshooter, appeared in 1899), they played an important and sometimes pivotal role in many battles and campaigns in 1864 and 1865. By the end of the war the sharpshooters were experimenting with tactics that would become standard practice fifty years later. Although most people think of Berdan’s Sharpshooters when the subject comes up, the Confederate sharpshooter battalions had a far greater effect on the outcome of the conflict. Later in the war, in response to the Confederate dominance of the skirmish line, the Federals began to organize their own sharpshooter units at division level, though they never adopted an army-wide system.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 10, 2010 by Britabroad
Irish Brigade - USA
As the threat of civil war loomed over the nation, Thomas Francis Meagher, joined the 69th New York State Militia. This was a ninety-day regiment that first saw action at First Bull Run and was under the command of Colonel Michael Cocoran. The colonel was captured and spent more than a year in a Confederate prison. When the ninety-day enlistment expired, Captain Meagher returned, with his regiment to New York.
Shortly after his return, Meagher began raising a unit of Irish volunteers to serve for a term of three years. This unit would eventually become the 63rd, 69th and 88th New York Voluntary Infantry Regiments. The 69th and 88th regiments were organized at Throgs Neck, New York and enlistments primarily occurred between early September through mid-November, 1861. The 63rd New York was organized at Staten Island, New York. Meagher was appointed brigadier general and took command of the Irish Brigade on February 5, 1862. During the spring of 1862 a non-Irish regiment, the 29th Massachusetts was added to strengthen the Brigade during the Peninsula Campaign. In October, 1862, the men of the 116th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment joined the ranks of the brigade. Composed primarily of Irishmen from Philadelphia they were organized at Camp Emitt and joined the brigade at Harper's Ferry. One month later, in November, 1862, the 29th Massachusetts was traded for another Irish regiment, the 28th Massachusetts. This regiment was organized at Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 13, 1861.
The brigade was assigned to General Edwin V. Sumner's Division, Army of the Potomac. In March of 1862, the brigade became the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, 2nd Army Corps. Throughout its life in the Army of the Potomac, the Irish Brigade was almost always at the foremost position and suffered high casualties as a result. Such was the case at the "Bloody Lane" at Antietem, below Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg, the battle in the Wheatfield at Gettysburg and at Chancellorsville. Efforts were made after the Chancellorsville battle to disband the brigade. General Meagher protested this action and resigned his commission on May 14, 1863. Though his resignation was later cancelled, he never again served in the field with the Irish Brigade.
Though the brigade continued to distinguish itself on the battlefields, increasing casualties forced changes within the brigade. By June, 1864, the brigade had been reduced to that of nearly regimental size. The brigade was officially disbanded in June, 1864, with the 116th Pennsylvania being made part of the 2nd Corps, 1st Division, 4th Brigade, in July. The three New York regiments now comprised the 3rd Brigade. Later in the year, the Second Irish Brigade was created, comprising of the 63rd, 69th, 88th New York, the 28th Massachusetts and the 7th New York Heavy Artillery. The 7th New York was then replaced by the 4th New York Heavy Artillery in the early part of 1865. During its almost four years of service, the Irish Brigade lost more than 4,000 officers and men, more than which served within the brigade at any one time. Though Richard Byrnes, Richard Duryes, Patrick Kelly, Robert Nugent and Thomas Smyth held temporary commands at various times through the brigades existence, Thomas Francis Meagher served as the brigade's only commanding general.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 10, 2010 by Britabroad
Zouaves
ZOUAVE (zoo-ahh-vah) was the name given to native North African troops employed by the French Army as fighters and mercenaries. Their dash, spirit, and heroic style of warfare caught the fancy of many military observers worldwide in the 1800's, including a young American named Elmer Ellsworth. Ellsworth organized the "US Zouave Cadets", the first zouave organization in this country, and toured the north where they participated in parades and drill competitions. The popularity of the cadets caught on in other areas of the nation and it was this idea that gave birth to "zouave regiments" during the American Civil War. A number of zouave regiments were organized in the North and South in 1861, modeled after the zouave regiments of North Africa and Ellsworth's Cadets. The uniforms of these regiments were very distinctive and made them stand out in camp and on the drill field. Regrettably, their bright red trousers and sashes also made them good targets on the battlefield. Never the less, a number of zouave regiments were raised, uniformed, and marched off to war to serve both sides.
Zouave uniforms were difficult to obtain in America, so manufacturers of specialty clothing were employed to make the uniforms. There were many distinct styles and colors, depending on the design submitted by the benefactor of the regiment. Friends of the organizer provided money to pay for the uniforms along with donations from the town where the regiment was organized. John M. Gosline, a prominent citizen of Philadelphia who raised the 95th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry ("Gosline's Zouaves"), secured sufficient funds to purchase a full set of clothing for 1,000 men with enough cash left over to insure that the uniforms could be replenished as they were worn out. When the uniforms of the 114th Pennsylvania Infantry began to wear out, Colonel Charles Collis used his influence with political friends in the state legislature to secure state money to supply new uniforms to those men who needed them. Despite these efforts, a zouave regiment only retained its distinctive dress if the men repaired their clothing and the distinctive zouave uniforms slowly disappeared from the army as time passed. By the time of the Battle of Gettysburg, many of these regiments had lost or worn out their original uniforms and adopted the standard Union uniform. Still, there were a handful of regiments that still had a portion of the zouave uniform- the jacket- such as the 23rd Pennsylvania Infantry and the 95th Pennsylvania Infantry.
Even though many original zouave regiments had gone to standard Union uniforms, there some Union regiments that became zouave regiments. The 146th New York Infantry did not start the service in zouave uniforms, but adopted them in June 1863 jus before the Gettysburg Campaign began. Some of the other regiments in that brigade, including the 140th New York and 155th Pennsylvania Infantry, adopted zouave uniforms later in the war.
A unique presence in zouave regiments was the vivandiere (vi-van-de-air). This was a special person in the regiment because they were female and dressed in a uniform similar to the men. Many zouave regiments had vivandieres who performed a variety of duties, most notably nursing on the battlefield. Mary Tepee, or "French Mary" as she was called, was the vivandiere of the 114th Pennsylvania Infantry. Mary was present on almost every battlefield where the regiment fought and acted as a battlefield nurse and aide. She carried water and bandages into battle and was wounded during the war. Mary was present with the regiment at Gettysburg and was one of the few women with the army to ever experience combat. Her regiment, the 114th Pennsylvania Infantry or "Collis' Zouaves", were one of the more well known zouave regiments of the war, heralded for their precision on the drill field dressed in flashy zouave-style uniforms featuring bright red trousers, white leggings, blue jacket, and red fez. The 114th fought in almost every major battle of the Army of the Potomac, including Gettysburg. In 1864, the regiment was appointed headquarters guard for General Meade. One of the original uniforms that belonged to a solder of the 114th Pennsylvania is currently on display at the Chancellorsville Battlefield Visitor Center at Fredericksburg & Spotsylvania National Military Park.
The young man who started the zouave craze in America did not live long enough to see the zouave regiments his example inspired, march to the battlefield. In 1861, Ellsworth returned to New York (his home state) and organized the 11th New York Infantry, "Ellsworth's Fire Zouaves". The men in the regiment recruited from the many different fire departments in New York City. The 11th New York moved to the defenses of Washington that April where their commander, Colonel Ellsworth, paid a courtesy call on the president. Ellsworth had become an acquaintance of Abraham Lincoln while living in Illinois, and the president was very fond of the dashing 24 year-old officer, viewing him as a symbol of Union and patriotism. On May 24, 1861, the day after Virginia seceded from the Union, the 11th New York Infantry was ordered to seize Alexandria, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington. While securing the city, Colonel Ellsworth personally removed a Confederate flag from the front of an inn known as the Marshall House and was gunned down by the furious innkeeper. A grief stricken President Lincoln ordered Ellsworth's body be laid in state at the White House before the body was taken home to New York for burial. Ellsworth's tragic death became a symbol of the Union cause while northern newspapers and politicians eulogized him as one of the North's greatest patriots. Soon after his burial, his old regiment changed their nickname to "Ellsworth's Avengers".
Source: unknown
Posted: October 11, 2010 by Britabroad
State Militias
The history of militia in the United States dates from the colonial era, such as in the American Revolutionary War.
Based on the British system, colonial militias were drawn from the body of adult male citizens of a community, town, or local region. Because there were usually few British regulars garrisoned in North America, colonial militia served a vital role in local conflicts, particularly in the French and Indian Wars.
Before shooting began in the American War of Independence, American revolutionaries took control of the militia system, reinvigorating training and excluding men with Loyalist inclinations. Regulation of the militia was codified by the Second Continental Congress with the Articles of Confederation. The revolutionaries also created a full-time regular army—the Continental Army—but because of manpower shortages the militia provided short-term support to the regulars in the field throughout the war.
In colonial era Anglo-American usage, militia service was distinguished from military service in that the latter was normally a commitment for a fixed period of time of at least a year, for a salary, whereas militia was only to meet a threat, or prepare to meet a threat, for periods of time expected to be short. Militia persons were normally expected to provide their own weapons, equipment, or supplies, although they may later be compensated for losses or expenditures.
With the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, control of the army and the power to direct the militia of the states was concurrently delegated to the federal Congress. The Militia Clauses gave Congress authority for "organizing, arming, and disciplining" the militia, and "governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States", with the States retaining authority to appoint officers and to impose the training specified by Congress.
The first legislation on the subject was The Militia Act of 1792 which provided, in part: "That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia, ... every citizen, so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock...."During the nineteenth century, each of the states maintained its militia differently, some more than others. Prior to the Civil War, militia units were sometimes used by southern states for slave control. In free states, Republican militias - called "Wide Awakes" - sided with abolitionists in sometimes violent confrontations with Federal authorities.
During Reconstruction after the Civil War, Republican state governments had militias composed almost entirely of freed slaves and populist whites. Their deployment to maintain order in the former Confederate states, caused increased resentment among many Southern whites.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 11, 2010 by Britabroad
Active: March 13, 1863 to August 20, 1865 Allegiance: United States (Union) Branch:Union Army Type:Infantry
The 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment was an infantryregiment that saw extensive service in the Union Army during the American Civil War. The regiment was one of the first official black units in the United States during the Civil War. The 1st South Carolina Volunteer Infantry Regiment, recruited from freed slaves, was the first Union Army regiment organized with African American soldiers in the Civil War, though many had fought in the American Revolution and the War of 1812 on both sides.
History
Statue of Massachusetts Gov. John A. Andrew, who authorized the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry.
The regiment was authorized in March 1863 by the Governor of Massachusetts, John A. Andrew. Commanded by ColonelRobert Gould Shaw, it sprang to life after the passage of the Emancipation Proclamation. Secretary of WarEdwin M. Stanton decided white officers would be in charge of all "colored" units. Colonel Shaw was hand picked by Governor John Andrew. Governor Andrew also selected Norwood Penrose "Pen" Hallowell as the unit's second in command, a rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Like many officers of regiments of African-American troops, both Shaw and Hallowell were promoted several grades, both being captains at the time. The rest of the officers were evaluated by Shaw and Hallowell. Many of these officers were of abolitionist families and several were chosen by Governor Andrew himself. Lt. Col. Norwood Hallowell was joined by his younger brother Edward Needles Hallowell who was eventually appointed major in the regiment and would later command it after Shaw's death. 24 of the 29 officers were veterans, but only six had been previously commissioned.
The soldiers were recruited by white abolitionists (including Shaw's parents). These recruiters included Lieutenant J. Appleton, also the first man commissioned in the regiment, whose recruiting efforts included posting a notice in the Boston Journal and holding a recruiting rally held in Joy Street Church and in which speakers Edward L. Pierce and Wendell Phillips encouraged free blacks to enlist for the regiment. This recruitment group was later known as "The Black Committee".
The 54th trained at Camp Meigs in Readville near Boston. While there they received considerable moral support from abolitionists in Massachusetts including Ralph Waldo Emerson. Material support included warm clothing items, battle flags and $500 contributed for the equipping and training of a regimental band. As it became evident that many more recruits were coming forward than were needed the medical exam for the 54th was described as "rigid and thorough" by the Massachusetts Surgeon-General. This resulted in what he described as the most "robust, strong and healthy set of men" ever mustered into service in the United States. Despite this, as was common in the Civil War, a few men died of disease prior to the 54th's departure from Camp Meigs.
By most accounts the 54th left Boston with very high morale. This was despite the fact that Jefferson Davis' proclamation of December 23, 1862 effectively put both African-American enlisted men and white officers under a death sentence. The proclamation was affirmed by the Confederate Congress in January 1863 and turned both enlisted soldiers and their white officers over to the states from which the enlisted soldiers had been slaves. As most Southern states had enacted draconian measures for "servile insurrection" after Nat Turner's Rebellion the likely sentence was a capital one.
The 54th left Boston to fight for the Union on May 28, 1863. It started off performing only manual labor. The regiment gained notoriety in a raid on the town of Darien, Georgia, after being ordered to loot and burn the town by Col. James Montgomery. The 54th's participation in this raid was minimal and reluctant. Colonel Shaw initially objected to what he called a "satanic action".
The regiment's first action took place in a skirmish with Confederate troops on James Island, South Carolina, on July 16. The regiment stopped a Confederate assault, losing 42 men in the process.
The regiment gained recognition on July 18, 1863, when it spearheaded an assault on Fort Wagner near Charleston, South Carolina. At this battle, Colonel Shaw was killed, along with 29 of his men. 24 more later died of wounds, 15 were captured, 52 were missing in action and never accounted for, and 149 were wounded. The total regimental casualties of 272 would be the highest total for the 54th in a single engagement during the war. Although Union forces were not able to take and hold the fort (despite taking a portion of the walls in the initial assault), the 54th was widely acclaimed for its valor during the battle, and the event helped encourage the further enlistment and mobilization of African-American troops, a key development that President Abraham Lincoln once noted as helping to secure the final victory. Decades later, Sergeant William Harvey Carney was awarded the Medal of Honor for grabbing the U.S. flag as the flag bearer fell, carrying the flag to the enemy ramparts and back, and saying "Boys, the old flag never touched the ground!" While other African-Americans had since been granted the award by the time it was presented to Carney, Carney's is the earliest action for which the Medal of Honor was awarded to an African-American.
Ironically, during the week leading up to the 54th's heroic sacrifice near Charleston, simmering racial strife climaxed in the New York Draft Riots. African-Americans on the city's waterfront and Lower East Side were beaten, tortured, and lynched by white mobs angered over conscription for the Union war effort. These mobs directed their animosity toward blacks because they felt the Civil War was caused by them. However, the bravery of the 54th would help to assuage anger of this kind.
Under the command of Colonel E. N. Hallowell, the 54th fought a rear-guard action covering the Union retreat at the Battle of Olustee. As part of an all-black brigade under Col. Alfred S. Hartwell, they unsuccessfully attacked entrenched Confederate militia at the November 1864 Battle of Honey Hill. In mid-April 1865, they fought at the Battle of Boykin's Mill, a small affair in South Carolina that proved to be one of the last engagements of the war.
Pay controversy
The enlisted men of the 54th were recruited on the promise of pay and allowances equal to their white counterparts. This was supposed to amount to subsistence and $13 a month. Instead African-American soldiers were paid $10 a month with $3 withheld for clothing, equalling $7 in the end of the month. (White troops had nothing withheld from their monthly pay for clothing.) Colonel Shaw and many others immediately began protesting the measure. Although the state of Massachusetts offered to make up the difference in pay, on principle, a regiment-wide boycott of the pay tables on paydays became the norm.
After Shaw's death at Fort Wagner, Colonel E. N. Hallowell took up the fight to get back full pay for the troops. His second in command, Lt. Col. Hooper, took command of the regiment on June 18, 1864 after Hallowell was granted permission to proceed North to press the claims of the regiment for equal pay in person. After nearly a month Colonel Hallowell returned on July 16. Finally the U.S. Congress took action and on September 28, 1864, the men of the 54th were paid from enlistment, most after 18 months of service
.
The Congressional bill authorized equal and full pay to those enlisted troops who were free men as of April 1864. Of course not all the troops qualified. Colonel E. N. Hallowell, a Quaker, rationalized that because he did not believe in slavery he could therefore have all the troops swear that they were free men. Before being given their back pay the entire regiment was administered what became known as "the Quaker oath."
Colonel Hallowell skillfully crafted the oath to say: “You do solemnly swear that on or before the 19th day of April 1864, no man had the right to demand unrequited labor of you so help you lord.”
Hallowell wrote a typo in his hand-written transcript of the oath and actually said "1861" while administering the oath.
Refusing their reduced pay became a point of honor for the men of the 54th. In fact, at the Battle of Olustee, when ordered forward to protect the retreat of the Union forces, the men moved forward shouting, "Massachusetts and Seven Dollars a Month!" Unknown to them, Congress had just voted to pay colored troops the same as white troops.
Legacy
The regiment was disbanded after the Civil War, but retains a strong legacy. A monument, constructed 1884–1898 by Augustus Saint-Gaudens on the Boston Common, is part of the Boston Black Heritage Trail. A famous composition by Charles Ives, "Col. Shaw and his Colored Regiment", the opening movement of Three Places in New England, is based both on the monument and the regiment.
A Union officer had asked the Confederates at Battery Wagner for the return of Shaw's body but was allegedly informed by the Confederate commander, Brigadier General Johnson Hagood, "We buried him with his ni**ers."
Shaw's father wrote in response that he was proud that Robert, a fierce fighter for equality, had been buried in that manner. "We hold that a soldier's most appropriate burial-place is on the field where he has fallen".
As a recognition and honor, at the end of the Civil War, the 1st South Carolina Volunteers, and the 33rd Colored Regiment were mustered out at the Battery Wagner site of the mass burial of the 54th Massachusetts
Depiction of the attack on Fort Wagner in the painting The Old Flag Never Touched the Ground
The Battle of Olustee
Memorial to Robert Gould Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment by Augustus Saint-Gaudens
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: October 11, 2010 by Britabroad
Gregg's Brigade - CSA
The upcountry of South Carolina provided Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia with a five-regiment brigade of infantry that fought fiercely and served faithfully throughout the war. Ably led by by Gen. Maxcy Gregg, a prominent Columbia lawyer, intellectual, and amateur scientist, the brigade served in A.P. Hill's celebrated Light Division and found itself in the middle of the hottest action on several of the war's battlefields.
The brigade was formed in spring 1862 and participated in the Seven Days' battles, where it sustained 971 casualties out of the 2,500 men engaged.
Gregg's Brigade marched with Gen. Stonewall Jackson in his great raid behind Union lines that destroyed the supply depot at Manassas Junction. On the first day of the 2nd Battle of Bull Run, the brigade was positioned behind a railroad cut on the left of Jackson's line and was subjected to repeated federal assaults that pushed them back several times but never succeeded in breaking their line. The brigade ran out of ammunition, endured fierce hand-to-hand fighting, and suffered more than 600 casualties that day. Gregg strode up and down his line, determinedly rallying his men to hold on. "Let us die here, my men. Let us die here." Later, replying to a message from Gen. A.P. Hill, Gregg said, "Tell General Hill that my ammunition is exhausted, but that I will hold my position with the bayonet!"
At Sharpsburg, MD., Gregg's brigade arrived with A.P. Hill's division from Harpers Ferry in time to help save Lee's army from the federal assault on the Confederate right flank. While repulsing a breakthrough in Jackson's line during the December 1862 Battle of Fredricksburg, Maxcy Gregg was killed at the age of 48, Samuel McGowan was made commander of the brigade, which was then known as McGowan's Brigade for the rest of the war.
Fascinating Fact: When the brigade was first formed, there were more than 5,000 members on its rolls. The diseases that swept through army camps at the beginning of the war reduced the effective strength to about 3,000.
Organization
The 20th Maine was organized in the state of Maine on August 20, 1862, with Col.Adelbert Ames as its commander. It became part of Col. Strong Vincent's Brigade of the 1st Division of the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac. The brigade consisted of the 16th Michigan Infantry (with Brady's independent company of sharpshooters attached), 44th New York Infantry, 83rd Pennsylvania Infantry, and the 20th Maine Infantry Regiments. At the time of Gettysburg, the regiment was commanded by Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain. Maj.Ellis Spear took command after Chamberlain was appointed brigade commander in August 1863.
Gettysburg and Little Round Top
The most notable battle was the regiment's decisive role on July 2, 1863, in the Battle of Gettysburg, where it was stationed on Little Round Top at the extreme left of the Union line.
When the regiment came under heavy attack from the Confederate15th Alabama regiment, part of the division led by Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood, the 20th Maine completely ran out of ammunition after three to four hours of continued fighting; it responded to the sight of rebel infantry forming again for yet another push at them by charging downhill with fixed bayonets, surprising and scattering the Confederates, thus ending the attack on the hill.
The 20th Maine and the adjacent 83rd Pennsylvania together captured over 400 men from the 47th and 15th Alabama regiments. Had the 20th Maine retreated from the hill, the entire Union line would have been flanked, and would have most likely lost the battle of Gettysburg.
Union moral and support for the war was wavering, due to many defeats. If the Union had lost the battle of Gettysburg the Confederate army would have been able to march on to Washington D.C. and end the war.
The 20th Main’s action in holding the hill has been credited with helping to turn the tide of the war.
Recent research has found claims by Lt. Holman S. Melcher that he initiated the charge, although Col. Chamberlain has been credited by most historians for ordering the desperate attack. This action is depicted in the novels The Killer Angels and Courage on Little Round Top, and was subsequently an important scene in the movie Gettysburg.
Disbandment
The 20th Maine marched from Appomattox, Virginia, on May 2, reaching Washington, D.C., on May 12, where it was mustered out of service on July 16, 1865.
The 20th Maine had an initial enrollment of 1,621 men, losing 150 dead from combat, 146 dead from disease, 381 wounded, and 15 in Confederate prisons.
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: October 11, 2010 by Britabroad
The Orphan Brigade was formed from several Kentucky units from northern Tennessee and southern Kentucky and was admitted to Confederate States service in late summer and fall of 1861. Volunteers of this Brigade were trained at Camps Boone and Burnett near Clarksville, Tennessee. The Orphan Brigade was formed by 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 9th (previous 5th) Kentucky Infantry Regiments, Cobb’s Battery (1st Kentucky Artillery), Grave’s Battery, Byrne’s Battery and John Hunt Morgan’s Cavalry Squadron. Naturally, some of these units left the Brigade with time, while others joined in, but through most of the War, Orphan Brigade was composed of 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Kentucky Infantry regiments and Cobb’s Battery. The 9th Kentucky Infantry Regiment was known as the Hunt’s 5th Kentucky Regiment when it was formed in 1861. However, there was another regiment in Eastern Kentucky formed as the 5th Kentucky, and this later regiment was organized before the former, so Confederate War Department re-designated Hunt’s 5th Kentucky as the 9th Kentucky in October 1862.
First Brigade Commander was Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge who commanded the Brigade from November 1861 to January 1863. He was then replaced by Brig. Gen Roger W. Hanson who commanded the Brigade until May 1864 when Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Lewis took command and lead the Brigade until the end of War.
The name “Orphan Brigade” is apparently a post-war invention of Brigade’s veterans. There is some speculation that this name was used later in the War, but it wasn’t widespread name as “Hood’s Texas” or “Stonewall” Brigade. It was generally known as Kentucky Brigade or First Kentucky Brigade. It seems that name originated from disastrous assault at Murfreesboro on January 2, 1863 where Brigade suffered heavy casualties from accurate Union Artillery. Gen. Breckinridge rode along their lines, and seeing the amount of casualties, he cried out: “My poor Orphan Brigade! They have cut it to pieces!” In this battle, the Brigade commander, Gen. Roger Hanson was mortally wounded, and Kentuckians lost another commander, Gen. Ben Hardin Helm at Chickamauga, furthering their feeling of being “orphaned”. However, the origin of the name remains uncertain to this day.
At the start of the War, soldiers of Orphan Brigade were poorly equipped. Some of them were armed with US Model 1816 (Flintlock) Musket, others with shotguns and squirrel rifles. Even so, great amount of men was unarmed when Brigade moved to Bowling Green in September 1861. The lack of weapons was reduced at the Battle of Shiloh where many soldiers acquired Union Pattern 1853 Enfield Rifle-Musket from dead Union soldiers at Hornet’s Nest. Kentuckians also employed deadly sharpshooters during the Atlanta Campaign in 1864. This elite corps of the best eleven marksmen of the Brigade was led by Lt. George H. Burton of the 4th Kentucky and they were equipped with long range London Armoury Co. Ltd. Kerr Rifles. This small company distinguished itself by driving of Union Battery that fired the fatal shot at Gen. Leonidas Polk on Pine Mountain in June 1864.
The Orphan Brigade served all across the South (Western Theatre of Civil War) from Bowling Green, Kentucky to Baton Rouge, Louisiana and from Vicksburg, Mississippi to Camden, South Carolina. Brigade fought in most of the major battles of Confederate Army of Tennessee and earned a reputation for steadiness in battle and unequalled prowess in drill. Following the Atlanta Campaign, the Orphans were converted to mounted infantry. By the end of war, they were in South Carolina where the 4th Kentucky Regiment fought one of the last battles east of Mississippi near Stateburg, South Carolina, on 29 April, 1865. The survivors of Orphan Brigade were paroled at Washington, Georgia on 6-7 May, 1865.
Old and lacking information
Orphan Brigade "Soldiers Without A Home"
The 4,000-man 1st Kentucky Brigade was organized in the summer of 1861. Not recognized by their home state, which remained in the Union, the soldiers were forced to train in Tennessee. In February 1862, the Confederate army was forced out of Kentucky, and with it went the 1st Kentucky Brigade, never to return during the war. This forced exile gave the unit its nickname, "Orphan Brigade."
The 1st Kentucky Brigade covered itself with glory in the battles it fought with the Confederacy's Army of Tennessee: the battles of Shiloh, Corinth, Vicksnurg, Baton Rouge, Stones River, Jackson, Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge, as well as throughout the Atlanta campaign and against Sherman during his march to the sea.
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston and Gen. John B. Hood, who served at different times as commander of the Army of Tennessee, both declared the Orphan Brigade the best in their army.
President Abraham Lincoln's brother-in-law, Ben Hardin Helm, was one of the Orphan Brigade's generals until he was killed at Chickamauga. Another of its generals, Roger W. Hanson, was killed in the tragic Confederate charge during the final day of battle at Stones River.
Of the 1,200 members of the Orphan Brigade engaged in the charge, 400 did not return. Division commander and former U.S. vice president John C. Breckinridge rode among the survivors crying, "My poor orphans! My poor orphans!"
Source: unknown
Posted: October 14, 2010 by Britabroad
Lightning Brigade - USA
The men in the Lightning Brigade reflected the fighting spirit of their combative commander. John T. Wilder was an imaginative man who took great pride in his work and was determined to build one of the finest fighting units in the Union Army. Originally from New York, Wilder moved to Ohio when he was 19 and took a job as a draftsman and millwright in a mill in Columbus. Later, he moved to Greensburg, Ind., where he established his own foundry. He became an expert in hydraulic engineering, erecting numerous mills in the North and the upper South.
When the Civil War started, Wilder was determined to form his own artillery battery, and he cast two cannons in his foundry. However, his application was turned down–the state of Indiana had already met its quota of artillery batteries. Undaunted, Wilder joined the 17th Indiana Infantry as a captain and was quickly appointed lieutenant colonel.
As an infantry unit, the 17th Indiana constantly skirmished with Confederate cavalry. One day, frustrated because there was not enough Union cavalry to protect the infantry, Wilder ordered his men to mount mules used to pull the regiment's supply wagons. The mules were not used to being ridden and did not take kindly to the foot soldiers' attempts to ride them. As fast as the men mounted the mules, they were thrown off, much to the amusement of the men from other units who had gathered to watch. Wilder, however, was convinced that his men should be mounted, and he requested permission to do so. Three months later, on February 12, 1863, permission was granted.
Wilder's next goal was to provide his soldiers with the best weapons available, and he attended a demonstration of Christopher Spencer's new repeating rifle. The Spencer had a tubular magazine that held seven rimfire cartridges and, it would soon prove to be one of the most deadly weapons in the Civil War. Wilder arranged for a bank loan back in Indiana to finance the purchase of the Spencers, while his men agreed to have money deducted from their pay to help reimburse their commander. In May 1863, Wilder's men received their new rifles, becoming one of the first mounted infantry units in the Army of the Cumberland to be equipped with repeating rifles.
Wilder's brigade at the start of the Chickamauga campaign consisted of the 17th and 72nd Indiana and the 92nd, 98th and 123rd Illinois. The brigade's artillery support was supplied by Captain Eli Lilly's 18th Indiana Battery, which featured six 3-inch Rodman guns.
The Lightning Brigade had been assigned to Maj. Gen. Joseph Reynolds' division of Maj. Gen. George Thomas' XIV Corps. However, the brigade had what amounted to an independent commission to support all three corps in Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans' army during its advance through Middle Tennessee toward the strategic railroad town of Chattanooga, on the Georgia border.
A legion historically consisted of a single integrated command, with individual components including infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The concept of a multiple-branch unit was never a practical application for Civil War armies and, early in the war, the individual elements were assigned to other organizations.
Organized by Wade Hampton in early 1861, Hampton's Legion initially boasted a large number of South Carolina's leading citizens, including future generals J. Johnston Pettigrew, Stephen Dill Lee, Martin W. Gary, and Matthew C. Butler.
Originally, the Legion comprised six companies of infantry, two of cavalry, and one of light artillery. The infantry and cavalry fought in the First Battle of Manassas, where Colonel Hampton suffered the first of several wounds during the war. In November 1861, the artillery was then outfitted with four Blakely Rifles, imported from England and slipped through the Union blockade into Savannah, Georgia. By the end of the year, each element of the Legion had been expanded with new companies to bolster the effective combat strength.
With the reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia in mid-1862, Hampton's Legion was broken up and reassigned. The cavalry battalion, with an expansion in size and numbers, became the 2nd South Carolina Cavalry under Colonel Butler. It remained directly under General Hampton's control and served in his brigade and then division for the rest of the war. The artillery was converted to horse artillery and renamed Hart's Battery, after its commander, Capt. James F. Hart. Lt. Colonel Gary's infantry element, retaining the designation Hampton's Legion, was initially brigaded with Georgia troops in Stonewall Jackson's command, but was transferred in June to John Bell Hood's "Texas Brigade."
The various elements of the Legion fought in most of the major Eastern operations of 1862, including the Peninsula, Northern Virginia, and Maryland campaigns, suffering substantial losses. The Legion helped to dislodge the Yankees at the battle of Chinn Ridge, and the Second Battle of Bull Run, and to inflict the horrific amounts of casualties on the 5th New York Regiment.
Battered at Antietam, the much depleted Legion infantry was sent to the rear and performed garrison duty for months while refitting and recruiting. It did not participate actively in the early part of the Gettysburg Campaign (unlike the cavalry and artillery elements, which played a major role in several battles during the campaign). It fought a minor rear-guard action at Boonsboro, Maryland, during the army's retreat from Gettysburg. It returned to action in the fall of 1863 in Longstreet's Corps during the Battle of Chickamauga and the subsequent Chattanooga campaign.
The Legion infantry later returned to Virginia and rejoined Robert E. Lee's army. In March 1864, it was converted to mounted infantry and reassigned to Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry brigade. It harassed Federal supply depots throughout northern Virginia, and fought in several actions during the lengthy Siege of Petersburg.
What was left of the Hampton Legion infantry surrendered with General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House in early April 1865. The South Carolina cavalry regiment and the horse artillery (by then renamed as Halsey's Battery after Hart's wounding) participated in the Carolinas Campaign with General Hampton and surrendered at Bennett Place in North Carolina along with the rest of General Joseph E. Johnston's forces on April 26.
Organization of the Legion
Original Composition
Six companies of infantry:
Co. A Washington Light Infantry Volunteers (Charleston)
Co. B Watson Guards (Edgefield)
Co. C Manning Guards (Sumter)
Co. D Gist Riflemen (Anderson)
Co. E Bozeman Guards (Greenville)
Co. F Davis Guards (Greenville) Cavalry battalion:
Co. A Edgefield Hussars (Edgefield)
Co. B Brooks Troop (Greenville)
Co. C Beaufort District Troop (Beaufort) Artillery:
Washington Artillery (Charleston)
Additional units
Infantry:
Co. G Claremont Rifles (Statesburg) 19 Aug 1861
Co. H (1st) German Volunteers (Charleston) 22 Aug 1861
Co. H (2nd) South Carolina Zouave Volunteers 29 Jul 1862
Co. I Capt. D.L. Hall's company 11 Nov 1862
Co. K Capt. John H. Bowen's company 11 Nov 1862 Cavalry:
Co. D Congaree Troop (Columbia) 5 Aug 1861 Artillery:
Co. B German Artillery (Co. H (1st)) 1 Nov 1861
Source: unknown
Posted: November 7, 2010 by Britabroad
Mosby's Partisan Rangers - CSA
The 43rd Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, also known as Mosby's Rangers, Mosby's Raiders or Mosby's Men, was a battalion of partisancavalry in the Confederate army during the American Civil War. Noted for their lightning strikes on Union targets and their ability to consistently elude pursuit, the Rangers disrupted Federal communications and supply lines.
The 43rd Battalion was formed on June 10, 1863, at Rector's Cross Roads, near Rectortown, Virginia, when John S. Mosby formed Company A of the battalion. Mosby was acting under the authority of GeneralRobert E. Lee, who had granted him permission to raise a company in January 1863 under the Partisan Ranger Act of 1862, in which the Confederate Congress authorized the formation of such units. By the summer of 1864, Mosby's battalion had grown to six cavalry companies and one artillery company, comprising about 400 men. After February 1864, the Confederate Congress revoked the authority of all partisan units, except for two, one of which was the 43rd Battalion. The battalion never formally surrendered, but was disbanded on April 21, 1865, after General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House, but not before attempting to negotiate surrender with Major GeneralWinfield S. Hancock in Winchester, Virginia.
Unit organization and muster Exactly what to call the Confederate 43rd Battalion was controversial even at the time: whether they were soldiers, partisan rangers, or (in the Yankee view) unsoldierly guerrillas hiding among civilians, or simply a loose band of roving thieves. According to the memoirs of one of Mosby's men, John Munson--
[o]ur little body of men was called Mosby's Men, and Mosby's Command, and this was largely due to Mosby himself. He took great pride in speaking to us as "my men" and "my Command," but never as "my battalion" or "my troops," or "my soldiers." The Yankees referred to us, as also did the Northern papers, as Guerrillas, in an opprobrious manner, of course, but the term was not applied to us in the South in any general way until after the war, when we had made the name glorious, and in time we became as indifferent to it as the whole South to the word Rebel.
Operating area, purpose, and recruits
The 43rd Battalion was a command in the Confederate States Army (CSA), whose method of operation involved executing small raids with up to 150 men (but usually sized from 20 to 80) behind Federal lines by entering the objective area undetected, quickly executing their mission, and then rapidly withdrawing, dispersing the troops among the welcoming farms of local Southern sympathizers, and melting into the countryside.
Mosby's area of operations was Northern Virginia from the Shenandoah Valley to the west, along the Potomac River to Alexandria to the east, bounded on the south by the Rappahannock River, with most of his operations centered in or near Fauquier County, Virginia, and Loudoun County, Virginia in an area known as 'Mosby's Confederacy'. Mosby's Command operated mainly within the distance a horse could travel in a day's hard riding, approximately 25 miles in any direction from Middleburg, Virginia.
Of his purpose in raiding behind the Federal lines, Mosby said: "My purpose was to weaken the armies invading Virginia, by harassing their rear... to destroy supply trains, to break up the means of conveying intelligence, and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as its different corps from each other, to confuse their plans by capturing their dispatches, are the objects of partisan war. It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in the front. The only difference is in the danger ..."
– Col. John S. Mosby, CSA
Mosby felt that " a small force moving with celerity and threatening many points on a line can neutralize a hundred times its own number. The line must be stronger at every point than the attacking force, else it is broken."
According to the memoirs of former guerrilla Munson, Mosby welcomed volunteers attracted by the glory of the fight and the allure of booty, and he was a shrewd judge of men. He had an eye for intelligence, valor, resourcefulness, and "what Mosby liked best was youth. He agreed with Napoleon, that boys make the best soldiers. . . mere boys, unmarried and hence without fear or anxiety for wives or children." A few guerrillas were wizened old men in their 40's, but most were young men in their late teens or early 20's, some boys even younger. When paroled after the war at Winchester two were only 14 years old. An adolescent boy released from school for the day in Upperville just as Mosby's men were chasing Union troopers out of town "became so excited that he mounted a pony and joined in the chase with no weapon except his textbook. This would be the last day of study for Henry Cable Maddux . . . but the first of many raids with Mosby's men."
Uniforms, Weapons, and Tactics Though the 43rd Battalion were partisans, they wore Confederate gray. Munson said in his memoirs:
'Something gray' was the one requisite of our dress and the cost of it mattered little. Much of it was paid for by Uncle Sam out of the money we got from him directly and indirectly. . . . It has been said that we wore blue to deceive the enemy, but this is ridiculous, for we were always in the enemy's country where a Southern soldier caught dressed in a blue uniform would have been treated to a swift court-martial and shot as a spy. I never knew, nor did I ever hear, of any man in our Command wearing a blue uniform under any circumstances . . . We had no reason to use a blue uniform as a disguise, for there was no occasion to do so. Many of our attacks were made at night, when all colors looked alike, and in daytime we did not have to deceive the Yankees in order to get at them.
Mosby's men each carried two .44 Colt army revolvers worn in belt holsters, and some carried an extra pair stuck in their boot tops. Mosby and his men had a "poor opinion" of cavalry sabres, and did not use them. Munson "never actually saw blood drawn with a sabre but twice in our war, though I saw them flash by the thousand at Brandy Station." Federal cavalry initially armed with the traditional sabre fought at a considerable disadvantage.
The Federal cavalry generally fought with sabres; at any rate they carried them, and Mosby used to say they were as useless against a skillfully handled revolver as the wooden swords of harlequins. As the Mosby tactics became better known, scouting parties from the Northern army began to develop an affection for the pistol, with increasing success I might add. In stubborn fights I have seen the men on both sides sit on their restless horses and re-load their pistols under a galling fire. This was not a custom, however; someone generally ran to cover after the revolvers were emptied. We both did this a good many times but, I believe, without bragging at the expense of truth, that we saw the back seams of the enemy's jackets oftener than they saw ours. . . Revolvers in the hands of Mosby's men were as effective in surprise engagements as a whole line of light ordinance in the hands of the enemy. This was largely because Mosby admonished his men never to fire a shot until the eyes of the other fellow were visible. It was no uncommon thing for one of our men to gallop by a tree at full tilt, and put three bullets in its trunk in succession. This sort of shooting left the enemy with a good many empty saddles after an engagement.
For instance, describing the fight at Miskel's barn Munson says of William H. Chapman (later Lieutenant Colonel of Mosby's command) wheeling his horse in a thicket of Yankees "[t]he pistols were not a foot apart. The Yankee's pistol snapped [misfired] but Chapman's did its deadly work. He fired six shots and emptied five saddles."
A few guerrillas equipped themselves with carbines captured from the Federals, but "they were unhandy things to carry" and unsuited for fighting on horseback, indeed in the thick of a February 1865 fight the carbines' long barrels made them were too unwieldy to fire, and they were used instead as clubs. Mosby tried out some small field artillery pieces including a 12 pound brass Napoleon but artillery proved to be too cumbersome for his fast hit-and-run tactics and not especially helpful in action. Ultimately the Federals found the mountainside hiding places of the cannons and made off with them.
"The rangers had some of the best horses in a region known for raising great horses."
All men had at least two; Mosby himself as many as six, since a few miles at a flat out run would exhaust even the best horse—and Mosby's men were constantly either running toward or away from the Federals. The men were devoted to their horses. During the Mount Zion Church fight on July 6, 1864 guerrilla John Alexander "noticed in one of the charges that his mount was unaccountable dull, and in spite of the most vigorous spurring . . . fell into the wake of the pursuit." After the action he rode his horse some distance toward Fairfax, slid exhausted out of the saddle and fell asleep in a field, and on the following morning:
. . . awoke [and] saw my horse standing at my feet with his head bending over me. His breast and forelegs were covered with clotted blood which had flowed from an ugly bullet wound. How long he had stood there in mute appeal for sympathy and relief, I do not know--perhaps all night. But as I recalled how cruelly I had spurred him to the chase the evening before, how without a groan of protest he responded the best he could, and how patiently he had stood with me, all unconscious of his suffering, on that lonely, miserable watch, I was not ashamed to throw my arms around his neck and weep out of my grief and contrition. . . . That was [our] final ride together.
Speed, surprise and shock were the true secret of the success of Mosby's Command. A small intrepid mounted force could charge a much larger one, and with the terrorizing advantage of surprise, rout them. If attacked themselves the guerrillas would sometimes ride away a brief distance and then round on their attackers and charge back into them, panicking and scattering them in the melee. Or they would simply "skeedaddle," that is scatter to the four winds, and individually make their way back to the farms in Loudon and Fauquier counties where they were welcomed, hidden, and succored. Mosby would then send word telling chosen men when and where to assemble for the next raid.
On April 9, 1865 Gen. Robert E. Lee surrendered the 43rd Battalion's parent command, the Army of Northern Virginia. Immediately Col. Mosby attempted negotiations with the Union commander in Winchester, Virginia to arrange for the surrender of the 43rd Battalion, but could not come to agreeable terms. Therefore, on April 21, 1865, twelve days after Lee's surrender, Col. Mosby gathered his battalion at Salem in Fauquier County, Virginia and read this farewell address to his men:
"Soldiers: I have summoned you together for the last time . The vision we have cherished for a free and independent country has vanished and that country is now the spoil of a conqueror. I disband your organization in preference to surrendering it to our enemies. I am no longer your commander. After an association of more than two eventful years I part from you with a just pride in the fame of your achievements and grateful recollections of your generous kindness to myself. And now at this moment of bidding you a final adieu accept the assurance of my unchanging confidence and regard. Farewell.
Notoriety The newspapers loved carrying articles about Mosby's Rangers. When correspondents were captured in their raids, they were treated well, given liquor and cigars, and Mosby often played up his exploits to gain attention in the press for his unit, and to emphasize the fact that the 43rd Battalion was a legitimate military command within the command structure of the Confederate States of America's army. "The indomitable and irrepressible Mosby is again in the saddle carrying destruction and consternation in his path. One day in Richmond wounded and eliciting the sympathy of every one capable of appreciating the daring deeds of the boldest and most successful partisan leader the war has produced—three days afterwards surprising and scattering a Yankee force at Salem as if they were frightened sheep fleeing before a hungry wolf—and then before the great mass of the people are made aware of the particulars of this dashing achievement, he has swooped around and cut the Baltimore and Ohio road—the great artery of communication between East and West, capturing a mail train and contents, and constituting himself, by virtue of the strength of his own right arm, and the keen blade it wields, a receiver of army funds for the United States. If he goes on as he has commenced since the slight bleeding the Yankees gave him, who can say that in time we will not be able to stop Mr. Trenholm's machine, and pay our army off in greenbacks. If he has not yet won a Brigadier's wreath upon his collar, the people have placed upon his brow one far more enduring."
– Richmond Whig, October 18, 1864
The Military Effectiveness of Mosby's Command It is difficult to evaluate the contribution of Mosby's raids to the overall Confederate war effort. In his memoirs, John Munson stated that if the objective was simply "to annoy the enemy," they succeeded admirably. In discussing as Mosby's "greatest piece of annoyance" the Greenback Raid in which Mosby's men derailed a train and captured a $170,000 payroll from the paymasters of Sheridan's army (each of the 80 raiders received a $2100 share, though Mosby himself took nothing) Munson says that due to Mosby's comparatively tiny force--
. . . [i]t was necessary for the Federal troops to guard every wagon train, railroad bridge and camp with enough active and efficient men to prevent Mosby from using his three hundred raiders in one of his destructive rushes at any hour of the day or night. . . General Grant at one point reported that seventeen thousand of his men were engaged in keeping Mosby from attacking his weak points, and thus away from active service on the firing line. Finally it was not safe to send despatches by a courier unless a regiment was sent along to guard him.
On the other hand, Mosby's guerrilla operations were not highly regarded even within the Confederate Army. Brigader General Thomas Rosser (with the support of Generals Early and Fitz Lee) urged disbanding Mosby's command, in a letter addressed to General Lee listing a number of grievances. Rosser agreed with the Yankees that Mosby's men were not soldiers but glorified thieves—and bad for morale, because his regular troops were jealous: "[Mosby's men] are a nuisance and an evil to the service. Without discipline, order or organization, they roam. . . over the country, a band of thieves, stealing, pillaging, plundering and doing every manner of mischief and crime. They are a terror to the citizens and an injury to the cause [because]
First. It keeps a man out of the service whose bayonet or saber should be counted on the field of battle when the very life or death of our country is the issue.
Second. They cause great dissatisfaction in the ranks from the fact that these irregular troops are allowed so much latitude, so many privileges. They sleep in houses and turn out in the cold only when it is announced by their chief that they are to go upon a plundering expedition.
Third. It renders other troops dissatisfied hence encourages desertion. . . they see these men living at their ease and enjoying the comforts of home, allowed to possess all that they capture . . . .Patriotism fails in a long and tedious war like this to sustain the ponderous burdens which bear heavily and cruelly upon the heart and soul of man. . . .
Finally, General Rosser glowers: "Mosby is of inestimable service to the Yankee army in keeping their men from straggling.""
General Lee sent the letter on to the Confederate War Department with an endorsement recommending "the law authorizing these partisan corps be abolished," but the War Department simply reduced the authorized partisan commands to two, Mosby's and John H. McNeill's. On reflection everybody agreed with Lee that whatever the military utility of the rangers in the larger scheme of things, Mosby was "zealous bold, and skillful, and with very small resources he has accomplished a great deal."
Source :unknown
Posted: December 3, 2010 by Britabroad
Buford's Cavalry - USA
John Buford - Early Life:
John Buford was born March 4, 1826, near Versailles, KY and was the first son of John and Anne Bannister Buford. In 1835, his mother died from cholera and the family moved to Rock Island, IL. Descended from a long line of military men, the young Buford soon proved himself a skilled rider and a gifted marksmen. At the age of fifteen, he traveled to Cincinnati to work with his older half-brother on an Army Corps of Engineers project on the Licking River. While there, he attended Cincinnati College before expressing a desire to attend West Point. After year at Knox College, he was accepted to the academy in 1844.
Becoming a Soldier:
Arriving at West Point, Buford proved himself a competent and determined student. Pressing through the course of study, he graduated 16th of 38 in the Class of 1848. Requesting service in the cavalry, Buford was commissioned into the First Dragoons as a brevet second lieutenant. His stay with the regiment was brief as he was soon transferred to the newly-formed Second Dragoons in 1849. Serving on the frontier, Buford took part in several campaigns against the Indians and was appointed regimental quartermaster in 1855. The following year he distinguished himself at the Battle of Ash Hollow against the Sioux.
After aiding in peace-keeping efforts during the "Bleeding Kansas" crisis, Buford took part in the Mormon Expedition under Colonel Albert S. Johnston. Posted to Fort Crittenden, UT in 1859, Buford, now a captain, studied the works of military theorists, such as John Watts de Peyster, who advocated for replacing the traditional line of battle with the skirmish line. He also became an adherent of the belief that cavalry should fight dismounted as mobile infantry rather than charge into battle. Buford was still at Fort Crittenden in 1861 when the Pony Express brought word of the attack on Fort Sumter.
Buford in the Civil War:
With the beginning of the Civil War, Buford was approached by the Governor of Kentucky regarding taking a commission to fight for the South. Though from a slave-holding family, Buford believed his duty was to the United States and flatly refused. Traveling east with his regiment, he reached Washington, DC and was appointed assistant inspector general with the rank of major in November 1861. Buford remained in this backwater post until Major General John Pope, a friend from the prewar army, rescued him in June 1862.
Promoted to brigadier general, Buford was given command of the II Corps' Cavalry Brigade in Pope's Army of Virginia. That August, Buford was one of a few Union officers to distinguish themselves during the Second Manassas Campaign. In the weeks leading to the battle, Buford provided Pope with timely and vital intelligence. On August 30, as Union forces were collapsing at Second Manassas, Buford led his men in a desperate fight at Lewis Ford to buy Pope time to retreat. Personally leading a charge forward, he was wounded in the knee by a spent bullet. Though painful, it was not a serious injury.
While he recovered, Buford was named Chief of Cavalry for Major General George McClellan's Army of the Potomac. A largely administrative position, he was in this capacity at the Battle of Antietam in September 1862. Kept in his post by Major General Ambrose Burnside he was present at the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13. In the wake of the defeat, Burnside was relieved and Major General Joseph Hooker took command of the army. Returning Buford to the field, Hooker gave him command of the Reserve Brigade, 1st Division, Cavalry Corps.
Buford first saw action in his new command during the Chancellorsville Campaign as part Major General George Stoneman's raid into Confederate territory. Though the raid itself failed to achieve its objectives, Buford performed well. A hands-on commander, Buford was often found near the front lines encouraging his men. Recognized as one of the top cavalry commanders in either army, his comrades referred to him as "Old Steadfast." With Stoneman's failure, Hooker relieved the cavalry commander. While he considered the reliable, quiet Buford for the post, he instead selected the flashier Major General Alfred Pleasanton.
Hooker later stated that he felt that made a mistake in overlooking Buford. As part of the reorganization of the Cavalry Corps, Buford was given command of the 1st Division. In this role, he commanded the right wing of Pleasanton's attack on Major General J.E.B. Stuart's Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station on June 9, 1863. In a day-long fight, Buford's men succeeded in driving back the enemy before Pleasanton ordered a general withdrawal. In the following weeks, Buford's division provided key intelligence regarding Confederate movements north and frequently clashed with Confederate cavalry.
Gettysburg and After:
Entering Gettysburg, PA on June 30, Buford realized that the high ground south of the town would be key in any battle fought in the area. Knowing that any combat involving his division would be a delaying action, he dismounted and posted his troopers on the low ridges north and northwest of town with the goal of buying time for the army to come up and occupy the heights. Attacked the next morning by Confederate forces, his outnumbered men fought a two and half hour holding action which allowed for Major General John Reynolds' I Corps to arrive on the field.
As the infantry took over the fight, Buford's men covered their flanks. On July 2, Buford's division patrolled the southern part of the battlefield before being withdrawn by Pleasanton. Buford's keen eye for terrain and tactical awareness on July 1 secured for the Union the position from which they would win the Battle of Gettysburg and turn the tide of the war. In the days following the Union victory, Buford's men pursued General Robert E. Lee's army south as it withdrew to Virginia.
Final Months:
Though only 37, Buford's relentless style of command was hard on his body and by mid-1863 he suffered severely from rheumatism. Though he frequently needed assistance mounting his horse, he often remained in the saddle all day. Buford continued to effectively lead the 1st Division through the fall and the inconclusive Union campaigns at Bristoe and Mine Run. On November 20, Buford was forced to leave the field due to an increasingly severe case of typhoid. This forced him to turn down an offer from Major General William Rosecrans to take over the Army of the Cumberland's cavalry.
Traveling to Washington, Buford stayed at the home of George Stoneman. With his condition worsening, his former commander appealed to President Abraham Lincoln for a deathbed promotion to major general. Lincoln agreed and Buford was informed in his final hours. Around 2:00 PM on December 16, Buford died in the arms of his aide Captain Myles Keogh. Following a memorial service in Washington on December 20, Buford's body was transported to West Point for burial. Beloved by his men, the members of his former division contributed to have a large obelisk built over his grave in 1865.
*warning: Buford's Cavalry was more of a way to command cavalry force then a fighting unit. For more info read American Civil War Mod's Buford Cavalry unit description.
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: December 23, 2010 by Britabroad
Pennsylvania Bucktails - USA
One of the most recognizable and distinguished units to serve in the American Civil War was the 42nd Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (13th Reserves), popularly known as the Bucktails. Those wishing to enlist in the regiment needed to demonstrate their skills as marksmen in order to be accepted into its ranks. These eager recruits principally came from Crawford, Warren, McKean, Elk, Tioga, and Cameron Counties. The celebrated symbol of the unit originated when the volunteers attached a bucktail to a pole that flew the stars and stripes aboard their vessel as they voyaged down the Susquehanna River to the seat of war. But even earlier, the habit of sporting a bucktail on their caps was credited to James Landregan, who served with the McKean County Rifles (Company I), and survived the war. Others began adjorning their own caps with bucktails, and the 13th Reserves were thus set apart from the typical Federal soldier by their distinctive plumage. In fact, there was a shortage of bucktails to go around, and the men often wrote home imploring of their friends and relatives to send as many bucktails as could be secured. This allowed the fortunate recipients to, not only select the best bucktail for his own adornment, but enabled them to turn a tidy profit by selling these coveted items to comrades. The Bucktails soon won a popular following by their distinctive evocation of the hunterís skill. Subjected to public scrutiny the unit was challenged to meet higher expectations than what was expected of the typical Northern regiment. The Pennsylvanians, who hailed from what was known as the "wildcat district," were up to the challenge: and thanks to a cadre of capable officers, they saw their promise to fulfillment. Exuberant energy and patriotic spirit made these soldiers thirst for battle.
These Pennsylvanians saw early action in the war at the Battle of Drainesville, Virginia, on December 20, 1861. Then, in something that may be unique to Civil War history, the regiment saw fighting on two different fronts simultaneously. Colonel Thomas L. Kane commanded four companies in the Shenandoah Valley, and Major Roy Stone led the additional six companies on the Virginia Peninsula with the Army of the Potomacñboth contingents rendering distinguished service. Kane's men figured prominently at Harrisonburg, Cross Keyes, and Cedar Mountain, while Stoneís soldiers were equally gallant at Mechanicsburg, Gaines' Mill and Charles City Crossroads. Upon reunification of the regiment, they consistently displayed consistent courage and tactial ability on the battlefields of Second Bull Run, South Mountain, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, The Wilderness, and Spotsylvania. Sometimes the Bucktails stood and fought in a line of battle, but often were detailed as skirmishers and sharpshooters where they could employ their deadly talents more effectively. They had the advantage of carrying Sharps Rifles in 1863, and Spencer Repeating Rifles in 1864.
On June 11, 1864, the Bucktails who enlisted after the initial musterin of the regiment, had to serve out the remainder of their term with the 190th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. In the last year of the war, these carried on their proud traditions established byt their original unit.
The gallant service of the original Bucktails led to the call for an entire brigade of Bucktailed regiments for which recruiting began in the summer of 1862. This brigade was to be commanded by veteran officer Roy Stone. Recruiting for this Bucktail brigade progressed rapidly, but was cut short by Leeís invasion of Maryland in September, 1862. In the end, only two Bucktail regiments managed to take the fieldñthe 149th and 150th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. Enlistees for the 149th came from a wider section of Pennsylvania than the volunteers for the 13th Reserves or the 150th. The 149th recruited heavily in Clearfield, Potter, and Tioga counties as well as Allegheny, Clarion, Crawford, Franklin, Huntingdon, Jefferson, Juniata, Lebanon, Luzerne, Mifflin and Perry, while the 150th was predominatly raised in the Philadelphia and Crawford County areas, with a smattering of men from Lancaster, McKean, Mifflin, Northumberland, Snyder, and Vanango Counties.
Though these regiments were recruited in admiration of the noble Bucktail regiment in the field, the original Bucktails felt as if these newcomers were latching on to their famous coattails, and derisively dubbed them the ìBogus Bucktails.î The men of the new Bucktail regiments, sought to placate the prideful veterans with a gift of a new stand of national colors. Time would show that these ìBogus Bucktailsî were worthy of their more famous predecessors. Initially called into service during the 1862 Maryland Campaign, the two regiments served for a time in the vicinity of Washington, DC. One company had the illustrious honor to be assigned the duty of protecting President Abraham Lincoln, and thus served until the end of the war as his bodyguard. The greatest trial by fire for these two regiments came at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. During the desperate struggle, both units distinguished themselves on that bloody field for steadfastness, agressiveness, and discipline, at a cost of 586 killed, wounded and captured. The following day, the original Bucktails shed their blood below Little Round Top and into the Wheatfield.
Serving side by side in teh same brigade, the next blood-letting for the 149th and 150th came during the horrendous fighting at the Battle of The Wilderness in early May, 1864. They continued on with the Army of the Potomac through the actions at Spotsylvania, and in the June 18, 1864, assault on Petersburg. In August, 1864, the two regiments again saw heavy combat along the Weldon Railroad. With the numerical strength of each regiment greatly reduced, they were withdrawn from the lines and sent to Elmira, New York, in early February, 1865. Here they served out the rest of the war, performing guard duty over Confederate prisoners and assisting at the rendezvous camp for Federal draftees.
The Bucktails did the Keystone State proud and earned a noted place in the pantheon of Civil War regiments. Their legacy has had the admiration of many over the years and their fame remains strong today.
Source: article by Patrick A. Shroeder
Posted: December 23, 2010 by Britabroad
Native Americans in the Civil War
Despite decades of scholarship, many misperceptions persist concerning the Civil War. The war is often viewed, for example, as solely a white man's war; it is also often thought to have taken place solely in the East and South. Modern historians are attempting to dispel these notions, both of which serve to obscure the participation of Native Americans in the Civil War.
During the period of 1861 to 1865, Native Americans all over the continent were struggling for autonomy, as peoples with their own organization, culture, and life-style. Some tribes, like the Cherokees, were directly involved in the war. Other Native Americans living in the war-torn areas of the East made individual decisions as to whether they wished to have anything to do with the situation. Still others, living in the mountains, prairies, and deserts of the rest of the country, suddenly realized they had a chance to take back some of their own land, as they saw fewer and fewer U.S. Army soldiers assigned to forts in their tribal areas.
Statistics show that just under 3,600 Native Americans served in the Union Army during the war. Perhaps the best known of their number was Colonel Ely Parker, who served as an aide to General U. S. Grant, and was present at Robert E. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Court House. Statistics for the Confederacy are not reliably available, but most scholars of Native American involvement in the actual fighting of the war are very well acquainted with the major Southern figure among them: Brigadier General Chief Stand Watie, a three-quarter blood Cherokee who was born in December 1806 near what would become Rome, Georgia. Stand Watie was one of the signers of a treaty that agreed to the removal of the Cherokee from their home in Georgia to what was then the Oklahoma territory; this split the tribes into two factions, and Stand Watie became the leader of the minority party.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the minority party gave its allegiance to the Confederacy, while the majority party went for the North. Watie organized a company, then a regiment known as the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles; the regiment fought at Wilson's Creek, Elkhorn, and in numerous smaller fights and skirmishes along the border with what was known as Indian Territory. The warriors found curious the white man's strategy of standing still and allowing people to shoot at them, or lob artillery shells at them; the Cherokee tended to be spectacular at wildly brave mounted charges, but once the artillery began to fire, the warriors wanted nothing to do with it. Stand Watie was unreconstructed to the end; it is believed he never surrendered until June 23, 1865, well after other Confederate commanders had given up. He died in 1871 and is buried in the Old Ridge Cemetery in Delaware County, Oklahoma.
While the war was raging back East, out in the West things were seldom quiet or peaceful. Statistics show that nearly 90 engagements were fought by U.S. troops in the West during the war, most of them involving Native American tribes people. From January to May 1863, there were almost continuous fights in the New Mexico territory, as part of a concerted effort by the Federal government to contain and control the Apache; in the midst of all this, Abraham Lincoln met with representatives from several major tribes, and informed them he felt they would never attain the prosperity of the white race unless they turned to farming as a way of life.
In July 1864, there was fighting against Native Americans in Minnesota; fighting continued throughout the year in New Mexico, as well. Then in November, on the twenty-ninth, there occurred what some historians have called the first major blot of the so-called Indian Wars: the Sand Creek Massacre. Frightened by raids made by warriors in the area around Denver as a result of a reduced military presence in the West, Colorado settlers asked Colonel J. M. Chivington to punish the raiders. Chivington, with 900 volunteer militiamen, attacked a peaceful village of some five hundred or more Arapaho and Cheyenne natives, killing women and children as well as warriors. In his report, Chivington chillingly stated: "It may perhaps be unnecessary for me to state that I captured no prisoners."
Some of the people escaped, however, and at least one of them was pursued by irony in the years to come: Chief Black Kettle of the Cheyenne survived the massacre at Sand Creek, only to die at the hands of George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry in a second attack on a peaceful village some three years later, at a place called the Washita River.
After the Civil War, the white presence in the West rose to new levels. Numerous financial crises and depressions hit the East after the boom of the war years, and many families chose to move onward in hopes of finding gold, or purchasing cheap land to start a farm. Men unable to find work in the cities joined the army. As the tribal peoples fought to defend their sacred places, hunting grounds, and even their very way of life, they attacked crews building railroads and sought to drive off hunters and gold prospectors. Conflicting views of what ownership of the land meant ' as well as numerous other cultural misunderstandings, led to bloodbath after bloodbath; at Little Big Horn and Beecher's Island, the tribes defeated the white man, only to be battered into defeat themselves at places like Wounded Knee. The official army policy was to provide necessities for the tribes during the winter, then to face the reality of fighting the same people when the weather cleared and they wished to change hunting grounds; this policy was known ironically to the common soldier as "feed 'em in winter, fight 'em in summer."
The unofficial government policy, however, was summed up curtly by General Philip Sheridan, the man who in 1864 stated he would so devastate the Shenandoah Valley, breadbasket of the Confederacy, that a crow flying through it would have to "carry his own rations." Sheridan, appointed to command of one of the major administrative departments of the territories in the years after the war, made the now-infamous statement: "The only good Indian I ever saw was dead." With an attitude such as this, it was only a matter of time and attrition before the Native Americans saw their way of life taken from them-not forever, though, as the descendants of those who fought to save the Way are even today striving to bring back the old knowledge and customs.
Sources:
The Civil War Society's "Encyclopedia of the Civil War."
The following order of the President is published for the information and government of all concerned: "EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"Washington, D.C., July 30, 1863.
"It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations and the usages and customs of war as carried on by civilized powers permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.
"The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.
"It is therefore ordered, that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy, or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
By order of the Secretary of War: E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant General
The U.S. Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act in July 1862 that freed slaves of owners in rebellion against the United States, and a militia act that empowered the President to use freed slaves in any capacity in the army. President Abraham Lincoln, however, was concerned with public opinion in the four border states that remained in the Union, as well as with northern Democrats who supported the war. Lincoln opposed early efforts to recruit black soldiers, even though he accepted their use as laborers. Union Army setbacks in battles over the summer of 1862 forced Lincoln into the more drastic response of emancipating all slaves in states at war with the Union. In September 1862 Lincoln issued his preliminary proclamation that all slaves in rebellious states would be free as of January 1. Recruitment of colored regiments began in full force following the Emancipation Proclamation of January 1863.
The United States War Department issued General Order Number 143 on May 22, 1863, establishing a "Bureau of Colored Troops" to facilitate the recruitment of African-American soldiers to fight for the Union Army. Regiments, including infantry, cavalry, light artillery, and heavy artillery units, were recruited from all states of the Union and became known as the United States Colored Troops (USCT). Approximately 175 regiments of over 178,000 free blacks and freed slaves served during the last two years of the war, and bolstered the Union war effort at a critical time. By war's end, the USCT were approximately a tenth of all Union troops. There were 2,751 USCT combat casualties during the war, and 68,178 losses from all causes.
USCT regiments were led by white officers and rank advancement was limited for black soldiers. The Supervisory Committee for Recruiting Colored Regiments in Philadelphia opened a Free Military Academy for Applicants for the Command of Colored Troops at the end of 1863. For a time, black soldiers received less pay than their white counterparts. Notable members of USCT regiments included Martin Robinson Delany, and the sons of Frederick Douglass. Soldiers who fought in the Army of the James were eligible for the Butler Medal, commissioned by that army's commander, Maj. Gen.Benjamin Butler.
Notable actions
USCT regiments fought in all theaters of the war, but mainly served as garrison troops in rear areas. The most famous USCT action took place at the Battle of the Crater during the Siege of Petersburg, where regiments of USCT suffered heavy casualties attempting to break through Confederate lines. Other notable engagements include Fort Wagner and the Battle of Nashville. USCT soldiers often became victims of battlefield atrocities, most notably at Fort Pillow. The prisoner exchange cartel broke down over the Confederacy's position on black prisoners of war. Confederate law stated that blacks captured in uniform be tried as slave insurrectionists in civil courts—a capital offense. Although this rarely, if ever, happened, it became a stumbling block for prisoner exchange. USCT soldiers were among the first Union forces to enter Richmond, Virginia, after its fall in April 1865. The 41st USCT regiment was present at the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. Following the war, USCT regiments served as occupation troops in former Confederate states.
Awards
Sergeant Major Christian Fleetwood was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions with the 4th USCT in the Battle of Chaffin's Farm in Virginia. Fleetwood took up the regimental colors after 11 other USCT soldiers had been shot down while carrying them forward. Many USCT soldiers won some of the nation's highest awards. Sergeant William Harvey Carney of the 54th Massachusetts was another African American Medal of Honor recipient.
Legacy
After the war many USCT veterans struggled for recognition and had difficulty obtaining the pensions rightful to them. The Federal government did not address the inequality until 1890 and many of the veterans did not receive service and disability pensions until the early 1900s. The history of the USCT's wartime contribution was kept alive within the black community by historians such as W. E. B. Du Bois and the subject has enjoyed a recent surge in literature.
The motion picture Glory, starring Denzel Washington, Morgan Freeman and Matthew Broderick, depicted the African-American soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment during their training and several battles, including the second assault on Fort Wagner on July 18, 1863.
A national celebration in commemoration of the service of the United States Colored Troops was held in September 1996. A national museum is located at 1200 U Street, NW, Washington, D.C. The African American Civil War Memorial, featuring Spirit of Freedom by sculptor Ed Hamilton, is located nearby, at the corner of Vermont Avenue and Union Street, NW.
African-American soldiers at an abandoned farmhouse in Dutch Gap, Virginia, 1864.
Sgt. Major Christian Fleetwood, Medal of Honor recipient.
Sgt. William Carney, Medal of Honor recipient.
Company E, 4th US Colored Troops at Fort Lincoln, November 17th, 1865
Last edited by Minas Moth; September 15, 2012 at 04:30 PM.
Next to Robert E. Lee himself, Thomas J. Jackson is the most revered of all Confederate commanders. A graduate of West Point (1846), he had served in the artillery in the Mexican War, earning two brevets, before resigning to accept a professorship at the Virginia Military Institute. Thought strange by the cadets, he earned "Tom Fool Jackson" and "Old Blue Light" as nicknames.
Upon the outbreak of the Civil War he was commissioned a colonel in the Virginia forces and dispatched to Harpers Ferry where he was active in organizing the raw recruits until relieved by Joe Johnston. His later assignments included: commanding lst Brigade, Army of the Shenandoah (May - July 20, 1861); brigadier general, CSA June 17, 1861); commanding 1st Brigade, 2nd Corps, Army of the Potomac July 20 - October 1861); major general, CSA (October 7, 1861); commanding Valley District, Department of Northern Virginia (November 4, 1861 - June 26, 1862); commanding 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia June 26, 1862-May 2, 1863); and lieutenant general, CSA (October 10, 1862).
Leaving Harpers Ferry, his brigade moved with Johnston to join Beauregard at Manassas. In the fight at 1st Bull Run they were so distinguished that both the brigade and its commander were dubbed "Stonewall" by General Barnard Bee. (However, Bee may have been complaining that Jackson was not coming to his support). The 1st Brigade was the only Confederate brigade to have its nickname become its official designation. That fall Jackson was given command of the Valley with a promotion to major general.
That winter he launched a dismal campaign into the western part of the state that resulted in a long feud with General William Loring and caused Jackson to submit his resignation, which he was talked out of. In March he launched an attack on what he thought was a Union rear guard at Kernstown. Faulty intelligence from his cavalry chief, Turner Ashby, led to a defeat. A religious man, Jackson always regretted having fought on a Sunday. But the defeat had the desired result, halting reinforcements being sent to McClellan's army from the Valley. In May Jackson defeated Fremont's advance at McDowell and later that month launched a brilliant campaign that kept several Union commanders in the area off balance. He won victories at Front Royal, 1st Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic. He then joined Lee in the defense of Richmond but displayed a lack of vigor during the Seven Days.
Detached from Lee, he swung off to the north to face John Pope's army and after a slipshod battle at Cedar Mountain, slipped behind Pope and captured his Manassas junction supply base. He then hid along an incomplete branch railroad and awaited Lee and Longstreet. Attacked before they arrived, he held on until Longstreet could launch a devastating attack which brought a second Bull Run victory.
In the invasion of Maryland, Jackson was detached to capture Harpers Ferry and was afterwards distinguished at Antietam with Lee. He was promoted after this and given command of the now-official 2nd Corps. It had been known as a wing or command before this. He was disappointed with the victory at Fredericksburg because it could not be followed up. In his greatest day he led his corps around the Union right flank at Chancellorsville and routed the 11th Corps. Reconnoitering that night, he was returning to his own lines when he was mortally wounded by some of his own men.
Following the amputation of his arm, he died eight days later on May 10, 1863, from pneumonia. Lee wrote of him with deep feeling: " He has lost his left arm; but I have lost my right arm." A superb commander, he had several faults. Personnel problems haunted him, as in the feuds with Loring and with Garnett after Kernstown. His choices for promotion were often not first rate. He did not give his subordinates enough latitude, which denied them the training for higher positions under Lee's loose command style. This was especially devastating in the case of his immediate successor, Richard Ewell. Although he was sometimes balky when in a subordinate position, Jackson was supreme on his own hook. Stonewall Jackson is buried in Lexington, Virginia.
Source: Shotgun's Home of the Civil War site (link) Posted: October 7, 2010 by Britabroad
On "Stonewall" Jackson and bayonets:
Regarding "Stonewall" Jackson and the bayonet, it seems that any affiliation with the use of the weapon was born from two quotes at the 1st Manassas in July of 1861.
The first was spoken to Colonel Bee, who had just reported to Jackson that the enemy were successfully repelling his own men. Jackson is said to have replied, "Then sir, we must give them the bayonet."
The second quote was made later in the battle when he was addressing his troops who had formed up on Henry Hill. Here he is quoted as saying, "Hold your fire until they´re on you. Then fire, and give them the bayonet! And when you charge, yell like furies."
Having seen "God & Generals", both of these quotes were certainly used in this film, although mentioning the use of bayonets twice in one battle, where their use was part of Jackson´s tactics, hardly seems over the top. I guess that these are two famous quotes and so keep being used when Jackson is depicted on film.
I did find another quote from Jackson concerning bayonets - which was from an accompanying letter which he sent along with a requisition for 1,000 "pikes" in April, 1861. In this letter he states the obvious by saying, "Under divine blessing, we must rely on the bayonet when firearms cannot be furnished."
I´m assuming that "pikes" are actually "bayonets", and not the 18 foot long pikes which were used during the 17th century and beforehand.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 8, 2010 by Britabroad
John Singleton Mosby - CSA
(1833-1916)
It has been claimed by some that the activities of partisan ranger bands in northern and western Virginia, especially those of John S. Mosby, may have prevented a Union victory in the summer or fall of 1864. A Virginian with a penchant for violence, Mosby had been practicing law at the outbreak of the war. His assignments included: private, lst Virginia Cavalry (1861); first lieutenant, 1st Virginia Cavalry (February 1862); Captain, PACS (March 15, 1863); Major, PACS (March 26, 1863); major, 43rd Virginia Cavalry Battalion June 10, 1863); Lieutenant Colonel, 43rd Virginia Cavalry Battalion January 21, 1864); and Colonel, Mosby's (Va.) Cavalry Regiment (December 7, 1864).
Originally an enlisted man and officer in the 1st Virginia Cavalry, he came into conflict with that unit's colonel, "Grumble Jones," and joined JEB Stuart's staff as a scout. During the Peninsula Campaign he paved the way for Stuart's famous ride around McClellan. After a brief period of captivity in July 1862 he rejoined Stuart and was rewarded with the authority to raise a band of partisans for service in the Loudoun Valley in northern Virginia. Originally a battalion, his command was raised to a regiment in the last months of the war.
In the meantime he managed to wreak havoc among the Union supply lines, forcing field commanders to detach large numbers of troops to guard their communications. His forays took him within the lines guarding Washington, with Mosby himself often doing the advance scouting in disguise.
Early in 1863, with 29 men, he rode into Fairfax Court House and roused Union General Edwin H. Stoughton from bed with a slap on the rear end. Following the capture of Generals Crook and Kelley by McNeil's partisans, Mosby complimented them, stating that he would have to ride into Washington and bring out Abraham Lincoln to top their success. On another occasion he came near capturing the train on which Grant was traveling.
The disruption of supply lines and the constant disappearance of couriers frustrated army, and lesser-group, commanders to such a degree that some took to the summary execution of guerrillas, i.e. partisan rangers. George Custer executed six of Mosby's men in 1864, and the partisan chief retaliated with seven of Custer's. A note attached to one of the bodies stated that Mosby would treat all further captives as prisoners of war unless Custer committed some new act of cruelty. The killings stopped.
With the surrender of Lee, Mosby simply disbanded his command on April 20, 1865, rather than formally surrender. While the partisans were certainly a nuisance to federal commanders, it is an open question as to how effective they were in prolonging the conflict. Many Southerners were very critical of the partisans, only some Southerners excepting Mosby's command.
Not pardoned until 1866, Mosby practiced law and befriended Grant. For supporting Grant, a Republican, in the 1868 and 1872 elections, he earned the emnity of many Southerners. He received an appointment as U.S. consul in Hong Kong and other government posts. (Jones, Virgil Carrington, RangerMosby)
Source: Ranger Mosby by Virgil Carrington Jones
Posted: October 7, 2010 by Britabroad
Ambrose Powell Hill - CSA
(1825-1865)
Known for his red battle shirt and his hard-hitting attacks at the head of the famed Light Division, Ambrose P. Hill proved to be an example of the Peter principle.
A West Pointer (1847) and veteran artilleryman, he resigned as a first lieutenant on March 1, 1861, and joined the South, where his services included: colonel, 13th Virginia (spring 1861); brigadier general, CSA (February 26, 1862); commanding brigade, Longstreet's Division, Department of Northern Virginia (ca. February 26 - May 27, 1862); major general, CSA (May 26, 1862); commanding Light Division (in lst Corps from June 29 and 2nd Corps from July 27, 1862), Army of Northern Virginia (May 27, 1862 - May 2, 1863); commanding 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia (May 2 and 6-30, 1863); lieutenant general, CSA (May 24, 1863); and commanding 3rd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia (May 30, 1863-May 7, 1864 and May 21, 1864-April 2, 1865).
In reserve at lst Bull Run, he fought at Yorktown and Williamsburg before being given command of a division. On the day he assumed command he directed the fight at Hanover Court House. He then took part in the Seven Days, distinguishing himself. After fighting at Cedar Mountain, 2nd Bull Run, and the capture of Harpers Ferry, he launched powerful counter attacks at the right moment at both Antietam and Fredericksburg. At Chancellorsville he was on Jackson's famed march around the Union right flank. When Jackson was wounded, Hill took command of the corps but was wounded carrying out his chief's orders to "press right in." At the end of the month he was given command of the new 3rd Corps, which he led to Gettysburg where, suffering from a now unidentifiable illness, he put in a lackluster performance.
He was responsible for the disaster at Bristoe Station that fall and, again ill, was virtually circumvented at the Wilderness when Lee in effect took over command of the corps. He relinquished command temporarily after the battle and missed Spotsylvania but returned for the North Anna and Cold Harbor. Taking part in the siege of Petersburg, he was again ill during part of the winter of 1864/65. With the lines around the city collapsing on April 2, 1865, he was shot and killed in an encounter with a stray group of federal soldiers.
Interestingly enough, both Stonewall Jackson and Lee called for Hill and his division in their dying delirium. It must have been the old Hill they were recalling.
Sources:
Hassler, William W., A.P. Hill: Lee's Forgotten General
Schenck, Martin, Up Came Hill - The Story of the Light Division and of its Leaders
Posted: October 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Richard Stoddert Ewell - CSA
(1817-1872)
As Stonewall Jackson's successor, the gallant Richard S. Ewell proved to be a disappointment and the argument as to why is still around today. Some claim it was the loss of a leg, others that it was the influence of the "Widow Brown" who he married during his recovery. But the fact of the matter is that he was ill-prepared by Jackson for the loose style of command practiced by Lee.
A West Pointer (1840) and veteran of two decades as a company officer, he never quite made the adjustment to commanding large-scale units. He once went out foraging for his division and returned-with a single steer-as if he was still commanding a company of dragoons. Resigning his captaincy on May 7, 1861, to serve the South, he held the following assignments: colonel, Cavalry (1861); brigadier general, CSA June 17, 1861); commanding brigade (in lst Corps after July 20), Army of the Potomac (June 20 - October 22, 1861); commanding brigade, Longstreet's Division, Potomac District, Department of Northern Virginia (October 22, 1861 -February 21, 1862); major general, CSA January 23, 1862); commanding E. K. Smith's (old) Division, same district and department (February 21-May 17, 1862); commanding same division, Valley District, same department (May 17 - June 26, 1862); commanding division, 2nd Corps, Army of Northern Virginia June 26 - August 28, 1862); commanding the corps (May 30, 1863-May 27, 1864); lieutenant general, CSA (May 23, 1863); and commanding Department of Richmond June 13, 1864 April 6, 1865).
After serving at lst Bull Run he commanded a division under Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign where he complained bitterly about being left in the dark about plans. Jackson's style of leadership was to prove the undoing of Ewell once Jackson was gone. Ewell fought through the Seven Days and at Cedar Mountain before being severely wounded and losing a leg at Groveton, in the beginning of the battle of 2nd Bull Run. After a long recovery, he returned to duty in May 1863 and was promoted to command part of Jackson's old corps. At 2nd Winchester he won a stunning victory and for a moment it looked like a second Stonewall had come. However, at Gettysburg he failed to take advantage of the situation on the evening of the first day when given discretionary orders by Lee.
He required exact instructions, unlike his predecessor. After serving through the fall campaigns he fought at the Wilderness where the same problem developed. At Spotsylvania one of his divisions was all but destroyed. After the actions along the North Anna he was forced to temporarily relinquish command due to illness but Lee made it permanent. He was given command in Richmond and was captured at Sayler's Creek on April 6, 1865, during the retreat to Appomattox. After his release from Fort Warren in July "Old Baldy" retired to a farm near Spring Hill, Tennessee, where he died on January 25, 1872. He is buried in the Old City Cemetery, Nashville, Tennessee. (Hamlin, Percy Gatling, "Old Bald Head")
Source: Hamlin, Percy Gatling, Old Bald Head
Posted: October 8, 2010 by Britabroad
John Bell Hood - CSA
(1831-1879)
John Bell Hood was born in Owingsville, Kentucky, on June 1, 1831. He grew up hearing popular stories about the Mexican War and tales told by his grandfather about Indian fighting. With help from his uncle, Congressman Richard French, young Hood was able to obtain an appointment to the US Military Academy at West Point.
Although he was a poor student with disciplinary problems, he managed to graduate in 1853. After graduation, he a was assigned to Fort Columbus, New York, then transferred to Fort Jones in northern California. In March of 1855, he was commissioned a 2d lieutenant in the 2d US Cavalry, which had officers including Col. Albert Sidney Johnston, Lt. Col. Robert E. Lee, Maj. William J. Hardee and Maj. George H. Thomas. Early in his military career, Hood began choosing aggressive military tactics over more passive ones. He also developed a boldness, often to the point of recklessness, which contributed to both his later successes and failures.
In April of 1861, Hood resigned from the US Army and joined the Confederates as a 1st lieutenant of cavalry. Serving on recruitment duty in Kentucky for a few weeks, he was then transferred to Yorktown, Virginia. Hood quickly rose through the ranks, and was promoted to brigadier general on March 6, 1862. He took command of the Texas Brigade, which became known as Hood's Texas Brigade. With an aggressive leadership style, he led his troops in several engagements, and acquired an excellent reputation among Confederates for courage and effectiveness. Hood took part in the Peninsula Campaign, as well as the Battles of Gaines' Mill, Malvern Hill and Second Bull Run.
Promoted to major general on October 10, 1862, he was given divisional command under Maj. Gen. James Longstreet. Hood led his division in the Antietam Campaign, and at Fredericksburg. Hood was wounded in the left arm at Gettysburg, but was later able to lead several divisions at Chickamauga. He was wounded again, and doctors had to amputate his right leg, after which Hood spent some time recuperating in Richmond. Hood was promoted to lieutenant general on February 1, 1864, to rank from the Battle of Chickamauga, he commanded a corps in the Atlanta Campaign. He was temporarily given command of the Army of Tennessee in July of 1864, but was reluctant to take over Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's position. When Confederate President Jefferson Davis insisted, Hood accepted, but was unsuccessful later that month at Peachtree Creek and the Battle of Atlanta. In September of 1864, at the Battle of Jonesborough, Hood retreated from Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, trying to draw the Union troops away from Atlanta. This attempt was unsuccessful, as was a subsequent attempt to retake Tennessee and secure Kentucky north to the Ohio River. In the Franklin and Nashville Campaign, Hood and his troops lost many casualties at Franklin, He suffered a decisive defeat by Union forces at Nashville. In January of 1865, Hood was relieved, at his own request, and served in no further field command positions.
He ended his military career when he surrendered at Natchez, Mississippi on May 31, 1865, while he was on orders to join the Trans-Mississippi Department. After the Civil War ended, Hood settled in New Orleans, and worked as a factor and commission merchant. Later, he entered the insurance business. He became moderately wealthy, but later lost much of his wealth when his business faired poorly. On August 30, 1879, a few days after the death of his wife and oldest child, Hood died of yellow fever. He was survived by 10 other children. Hood's friends arranged for his war memoirs to be published, and the proceeds were used to provide for Hood's orphaned children. The book, published in 1880, was entitled "Advance and Retreat," and it became a classic work of Civil War literature.
Source: unknown
Posted: November 3, 2010 by Britabroad
Michael Corcoran & Confederate Irish- CSA
Source General information:
The recent erection of a memorial in Sligo to Carrowkeel man General Michael Corcoran, inspired historian Paul Burns to write this article on the forgotten Irish who fought on the Confederate side:
All discussions of Irish participation in the 1861-65 American Civil War seem to lead, in next breath, to the North’s famous Irish Brigade. Few know that Irish immigrants played an equally important role in the Southern Confederacy. Over 40,000 Irish fought for the Southern cause. They were the largest immigrant group in the army, and they made up about 10% of all Confederate combatants. In contrast, there was less enthusiasm among Irish immigrants to the North, and they were underrepresented in its military.
The Confederate Irish were far more fervent in support of their side’s cause because they could identify in America with the desire for self-determination at home and the right to separate from what was viewed as a repressive government. They had little concern about slavery. The Irish in America were working class, and they competed for jobs with free blacks. Consequently, the Irish in both areas tended to support the pro-slavery Democratic Party. The Southern Irish encountered less animosity and much more religious tolerance than did their Northern brethren. There was no Southern equivalent of the anti-draft riots that occurred in the large Northern cities where the Irish were concentrated.
Although the birthplaces of some Southern Irish are known, many were listed only as “born in Ireland”. The South’s army records never were complete and, since the war was lost, much of what existed disappeared. Certainly there were Confederates born in County Sligo, but none was as well known as General Michael Corcoran, Sligo’s contribution to the Northern cause. Corcoran is often associated with the Union’s Irish Brigade, but he was not. He was commander of the 69th New York that later was a part of that famous brigade, but Corcoran was captured at the first battle of Bull Run. After being exchanged two years later, Corcoran founded the Irish Legion.
The Union’s Irish Brigade, which was perhaps 80% Irish, was unique. No effort was made to consolidate Confederate Irish into large units. For the most part, they were scattered throughout the South’s regionally raised regiments, though many company-sized units, and several battalions, were formed from Irish volunteers--the Emmet Guards of Mobile, Alabama; the Southern Celts and St. Mary’s Volunteers of the 13th Louisiana; the Irish Volunteers of the 5th Georgia; the O’Connell Guards of the 17th Virginia; the Emerald Guards of the 9th Louisiana; the Sarsfield Rangers of the 7th Louisiana—to name just a few of the more than 45 distinctly Irish companies. Additionally, the 10th Tennessee Infantry regiment comprised mainly of Irish volunteers and was known as The Sons of Erin, and a CSA regiment, known as the 1st irish Volunteer Regiment, was organized in 1862.
Many of these units carried variations of the emerald flag with golden harp so favored by Irish military groups everywhere, but company flags were not carried into battle. Since the Irish units were part of geographical regiments, their company flags were never as prominent as the well-known banner of the North’s Irish Brigade, which flew at such well-known battles as Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg.
Col. Patrick Moore and the Battle of Bull Run:
Scattered as they were among dozens of regiments, Irish units probably fought in every major Civil War battle. In one of the earlier fights--called Bull Run in the North and First Manassas in the South--the 1st Virginia regiment, commanded by Galway-born Colonel Patrick Moore, defended strategic Blackburn’s Ford. The regiment’s Montgomery Guards was an Irish unit and it fought effectively as skirmishers. At one point, Col. Moore led a charge against the Yankees shouting, “Feagh a Ballagh!”—perhaps the first Irish battle cry heard in the war. General Thomas Jackson earned the sobriquet “Stonewall” at that engagement, primarily because his troops held so well at the ford. The Montgomery Guards and the 1 st Virginia later were to suffer 120 casualties out of 155 men in Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg.
In a way, Irish troops of the 1st Virginia regiment created the Stonewall Jackson legend by their stand at Blackburn’s Ford— but a similarly named Irish unit ended it. The 1st Virginia Battalion, also called the Irish Battalion, became the provost guard for the Army of Northern Virginia. During the winter of 1862-63 an Irish guard of that battalion failed to recognize General Jackson returning to his bivouac late at night—and shot him.
Did Irish units fight Irish units? Yes. At the battle of Fredericksburg, for example, Cobb’s Brigade, of which the 24th Georgia was part, was entrenched on Marye’s Hill in a sunken road behind a stonewall. A key component of the 24th was McMillan’s Guards, an Irish company that had been raised by Antrim-born Colonel Robert McMillan. McMillan had moved up to command the 24th, and during the battle he took over the brigade when General Cobb was killed. The Union’s Irish Brigade made a suicidal attack across an open field against the 24th’s strong defensive position, and it was almost annihilated. McMillan’s cool leadership cost the Irish Brigade 545 dead and wounded, including three of its five regimental commanders. Ironically, the Irish Brigade’s commanding officer, General Thomas Meagher, was in no danger of becoming a casualty himself, having gone in to town to get his horse.
There were many Irish-born and first-generation Irish officers in the Confederate Army. One of the better known was Major General Patrick R. Cleburne from Co. Cork. Cleburne served in the Army of Tennessee and often was compared to the South’s General Stonewall Jackson. He rose from company commander to regiment, and then to brigade and, after leading his troops to victory in several battles and being wounded at least three times, he was promoted to major general. Late in the war he shot himself in the foot, figuratively speaking, by proposing that the South recruit slaves to fight in exchange for their freedom, an idea that could have changed the course of the war but was quickly rejected by the pro-slavery civilian government. Cleburne was killed late in the war.
Another famous, or infamous, Southern officer was Brigadier General John McCausland, who was born in Missouri of Irish parents. Nicknamed “Tiger John,” McCausland was a “never-surrender” leader who fought his way out of many tight spots. He was best known in the North for a July 1864 raid on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, which he looted and burned when a ransom demand for $500,000 was not paid. McCausland refused to submit even after the war ended and left the USA to travel in Europe and Mexico. Several years later, he rather mysteriously returned with sufficient funds to purchase 6000 acres of farmland in West Virginia. McCausland lived until 1927.
During the war, Irish immigration to the South ceased, because the ports were blockaded. After the war, it recommenced--but slowly. Eventually, as the South recuperated from its devastation, some Irish survivors of the war rose to prominence in industry and government. Today, more than 140 years after the Civil War ended, there is little difference between the Irish of the two areas, but since “history is recorded by the victors,” little is heard about the Irish contribution to the South’s cause, and even less has been written.
Source: article by Paul Burns
Posted: December 3, 2010 by Britabroad
Quantrill was born in Ohio in 1837. He decided to become a schoolteacher as a young man and started his profession. However, he decided to leave Ohio to try and make more money for himself and his family. At this time, Kansas was deeply embroiled in violence between pro-slavery and free soil proponents. He had grown up in a Unionist family, and he himself espoused Free Soil beliefs. He found it hard to make any more money in Kansas and after returning home for a time decided to quit his profession and sign up as a teamster from Fort Leavenworth. His mission was to resupply the Federal Army embroiled in a fight against the Mormons in Utah. During this mission, he met numerous pro-slavery Southerners who deeply affected his beliefs. By the time of his return from this mission, he had become a staunch Southern supporter. He also found that he could make much more money through thievery. Thus, Quantrill began a much less legitimate career. When the Civil War began, he gathered a small band of men and began making profitable hit-and-run attacks against the Federal troops.
His Deeds
Quantrill and his men staged numerous raids into Kansas during the early part of the Civil War. He was quickly labeled an outlaw by the Union for his attacks on pro Union forces. He was involved in several skirmishes with Jayhawkers (pro Union guerilla bands) and eventually was made a Captain in the Confederate Army. His attitude towards his role in the Civil War drastically changed in 1862 when the Commander of the Department of Missouri, Major General Henry W. Halleck ordered that guerrillas such as Quantrill and his men would be treated as robbers and murderers, not normal prisoners of war. Before this proclamation, Quantrill acted as if he were a normal soldier adhering to principals of accepting enemy surrender. After this, he gave an order to give 'no quarter'.
In 1863, Quantrill set his sights on Lawrence, Kansas which he said was full of Union sympathizers. Before the attack occurred, many female relatives of Quantrill's Raiders were killed when a prison collapsed in Kansas City. The Union Commander was given the blame and this fanned the already fearsome flames of the Raiders. On August 21, 1863, Quantrill led his band of about 450 men into Lawrence, Kansas. They attacked this pro Union stronghold killing over 150 men, few of them offering resistance. In addition, Quantrill's Raiders burned and looted the town. In the North, this event became known as the Lawrence Massacre and was vilified as one of the worst events of the Civil War.
Some members of his Raiders: The Missouri Company
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Lt. William "Bloody Bill" Anderson
Jesse James
Frank James
Cole Younger
Jim Younger
Bob Younger
Archie Clement
Captain Lee
Captain Bissett
Sam. ( Samuel ) Hay’s
Up. Hay’s
Bill Marchbank’s
Dick Yeager
George Tood
Bob Marchbank’s
Stand Watie
David Tate
Si. Gordon
Holtzclaw’s
Pitney’s
Perkin’s
Greer
Benton
Hughe’s
Rollen Brother’s
Houx
Child’s
Reid
Jarrett
Clifton
Jackson
Pool
Porter
Thrailkill
Thornton
Taylor
Cockrell
Davis
Hunter
Coffee
Jackman
Baker
Marion
Picken’s
Cooper
Moddox
Shelby
Hancock
Poindexter
Tracy
Peacher
Source: unknown
Posted: January 31, 2011 by Niccolo Machiavelli
Nathan Bedford Forrest - CSA
(1821-1877)
"In his first fight, north east(sic) of Bowling Green, the forty year old Forrest improvised a double envelopment, combined it with a frontal assault - classic maneuvers which he could not identify by name and of which he had most likely never heard..." - Shelby Foote, The Civil War
Uneducated but not illiterate, Nathan Bedford Forrest was a natural tactician who earned the praise of his enemies. Both Grant and Sherman feared this man who entered the Confederate forces a private and left a general. The stories of him are legend.
With Fort Donelson supposedly surrounded he stormed from a meeting where the commanding officers were preparing to surrender and led his cavalry and a number of infantry out of the area without a shot being fired at him.
At Pittsburg Landing(Shiloh) he charged and routed a line of Union skirmishers by himself in defense of the retreating rebel army.
In Murfreesboro, Tennessee he freed a garrison jail of locals imprisoned, according to the Union commander, for attacks on patrols near their farms. Advised to leave after the successful escape the colonel replied, "I did not come here to make half a job of it, I want them all" and proceeded to demand unconditional surrender of the entire garrison. The Union commanders had more men, guns and an entrenched position but surrendered anyway, unaware that Forrest was bluffing.
During Bragg'sretreat through Tennessee he used Forrest repeatedly as his rear guard. Later, protecting the Confederate right during the battle of Chickamauga he won the accolades of Bragg's staff when his men dismounted and attacked as infantry, pressuring the Federals to retreat from their position near the creek to one more in line with other Union troops at the La Fayette Road.
Immediately after the battle it was Forrest who reported the Federals were in full retreat to Chattanooga and the Army of Tennessee should attack, sound advice that Bragg ignored. This widened a rift between Forrest and his commander. Bragg, who was having problems with most of his subordinates after Chickamauga ordered Forrest to "turn his troops over" and report to Gen. Joseph Wheeler, fully aware that Forrest had vowed never to fight with Wheeler again. An angry Forrest confronted Bragg over the orders, threatening the Commander of the Army of Tennessee with bodily harm. Bragg never reported the incident because he realized that Forrest was too important to the cause to be jailed for insubordination. Forrest was assigned to an area further west.
His engagement of Federal troops at Brice's Crossroads on June 10, 1864 is considered by many the perfect battle. Union Major General Samuel D. Sturgis, with 8,000 men was marching south into northern Mississippi to block the cavalry from attacking Sherman's supply lines. When Sturgis ran into Forrest's dismounted horsemen he assembled a perimeter around the crossroads. Forrest flanked him on both sides, the same double envelopment that worked so well near Bowling Green. The bluecoats ran. A bridge over the Tishomingo Creek became a roadblock for the retreating army and ever-vigilant for such opportunity, the Confederate general pounced. Sturgis would later write "What was confusion became chaos..." as the rebels pounded the fleeing blues. With less than three thousand men Forrest had destroyed an enemy more than twice the manpower. Assisting Confederate General John B. Hood in the abortive Nashville Campaign, Forrest could see the end was near for the Confederacy.
After the Civil War, Forrest lent his name to a group of enforcers of the Democratic Party known as the Ku Klux Klan. Disenchanted with the activities of the group he ordered it to disband in 1869, which did not happen. The Klan and Forrest went separate ways but the stigma of his days as slave trader, the Fort Pillow incident and his brief association with the Klan would forever raise questions about one of America's greatest tactical minds.
Birth & Early Life:
Born in Brewer, ME on September 8, 1828, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was the eldest child of Joshua and Sarah Chamberlain. A gifted student, he taught himself Greek in order to attend Bowdoin College in 1848. While at Bowdoin he met Harriet Beecher Stowe and listened to readings of what would become Uncle Tom's Cabin. After graduating in 1852, Chamberlain studied for three years at the Bangor Theological Seminary before returning to Bowdoin to teach. Serving as a professor of rhetoric, Chamberlain taught every subject with the exception of science and math.
Personal Life:
In 1855, Chamberlain married Fanny Adams (1825-1905). The daughter of local clergyman, Fanny had five children with Chamberlain and remained with him until her death in 1905. Of the couple's five children, three died in infancy. As Fanny aged, her sight deteriorated, leading Chamberlain to become a founding member of the Maine Institution of the Blind in 1905.
Military Career:
With the beginning of the Civil War, Chamberlain, whose forefathers had served in the American Revolution and War of 1812, sought to enlist. He was prevented from doing so by the administration at Bowdoin who stated he was too valuable to lose. In 1862, Chamberlain requested and was granted a leave of absence to study languages in Europe. Departing Bowdoin, he quickly volunteered his services to the governor of Maine. Offered command of the 20th Maine Infantry, Chamberlain declined stating he wished to learn the trade first and instead became the regiment's lieutenant colonel.
Serving under Colonel Adelbert Ames, Chamberlain and the 20th Maine mustered in on August 20, 1862. Assigned to the V Corps of the Army of the Potomac, the 20th Maine served at the Antietam, but did not see action. Later that fall, the regiment was part of the attack on Marye's Heights during the Battle of Fredericksburg. Though the regiment suffered relatively light casualties, Chamberlain was forced to spend the night on the cold battlefield using corpses for protection against Confederate fire. Escaping, the regiment missed the fight at Chancellorsville the following May due to a smallpox outbreak.
Shortly after Chancellorsville, Ames was promoted brigade command in the XI Corps, and Chamberlain ascended to command of the 20th Maine. On July 2, 1863, the regiment entered action at Gettysburg. Assigned to hold Little Round Top on the extreme left of the Union line, the 20th Maine beat off repeated attacks from the 15th Alabama. With his men running low on ammunition, Chamberlain boldly ordered a bayonet charge which routed and captured the Confederates. Chamberlain's heroic defense of the hill earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor and the regiment everlasting fame.
Following Gettysburg, Chamberlain fell ill with malaria and temporarily was suspended from duty. Returning to the Army of the Potomac, Chamberlain was promoted to brigade command in May 1864. On June 18, while leading his men during an attack on Petersburg, he was shot through the right hip and groin. Supporting himself on his sword, he encouraged his men on before collapsing. Believing the wound to be fatal, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant promoted Chamberlain to brigadier general as a final act. Over the following weeks, Chamberlain clung to life and managed to recover from his wounds.
Returning to duty in November 1864, Chamberlain served for the remainder of the war. On March 29, 1865, his brigade led the Union attack at the Battle of Lewis' Farm outside Petersburg. Wounded again, Chamberlain was brevetted to major general for his gallantry. On April 9, Chamberlain was alerted to the Confederate's desire to surrender. The next day he was told that of all the officers in the Union army, he had been selected to receive the Confederate surrender. On April 12, Chamberlain presided over the ceremony and ordered his men to attention and carry arms as a sign of respect for their vanquished foe.
Postwar Career:
Leaving the army, Chamberlain returned home to Maine and served as the state's governor for four years. Stepping down in 1871, he was appointed to the presidency of Bowdoin. Over the next twelve years he revolutionized the school's curriculum and updated its facilities. Forced to retire in 1883, due to aggravation of his war wounds, Chamberlain remained active in public life, the Grand Army of the Republic, and in planning events for veterans. In 1898, he volunteered for service in the Spanish-American War and was bitterly disappointed when his request was turned down.
On February 24, 1914, the "Lion of Little Round Top" died at the age of 85 in Portland, ME.
His death was largely the result of complications of his wounds, making him the last Civil War veteran to die from wounds received in battle.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 12, 2010 by Britabroad
George Armstrong Custer holds a unique place in American history. A hero to some, a villain to others, he was controversial in life and his death shocked the nation. Americans have never tired of reading or talking about Custer.
Presented here are some facts pertaining to Custer's early life and career in the Civil War, when he first achieved fame as a dashing cavalry commander.
George Armstrong Custer was born in New Rumley, Ohio, on December 5, 1839. His childhood ambition was to be a soldier. According to family stories, Custer's father, a member of a local militia group, would dress him in a small soldier's uniform at the age of four.
Custer's half-sister Lydia married and moved to Monroe, Michigan, and young "Autie," as Custer was known, was sent to live with her.
Determined to join the military, Custer secured an appointment to the US Military Academy at West Point at the age of 18.
Custer was not a stellar student at West Point, and graduated at the bottom of his class in 1861. In ordinary times, his military career might not have flourished, but his class immediately entered the Civil War.
Custer's West Point class was graduated early and ordered to Washington, DC in June 1861. Typically, Custer was detained for a disciplinary infraction. With the intercession of friends, he was released, and sent to report to Washington in July 1861.
Custer was offered a chance to help train recruits, and reportedly said he'd rather report to a combat unit. So, as a new second lieutenant, he soon found himself at the First Battle of Bull Run, assigned to a cavalry unit.
The battle turned into a rout and Custer joined the long column of Union troops who retreated from the battlefield.
In early 1862, Custer served on the staff of General George McClellan, who led the Union Army into Virginia for the Peninsula Campaign.
At one point Custer was ordered to ascend in the basket of a tethered balloon with pioneering "aeronaut" Thaddeus Lowe to make observations of enemy positions. After some initial trepidation, Custer took to the daring practice and made many other ascents in the observation balloon.
During the Peninsula Campaign in the spring and early summer of 1862 Custer found himself in front of the camera several times.
It has been said that Custer was the most photographed officer in the Union Army during the Civil War.
While in Virginia in 1862 Custer posed for a photograph by James Gibson, Custer poses with a captured Confederate, Lt. James B. Washington.
It's probable that the Confederate, rather than being incarcerated, had been put "on parole," meaning he was essentially free but had promised not to take up arms against the Union in the future.
In September 1862 Custer would be present at Antietam, though in a reserve unit which did not see action. In a photograph Alexander Gardner took of General McClellan and Abraham Lincoln, Custer can be spotted as a member of McClellan's staff.
It's interesting that Custer stood at the far right of the photograph. It appears that he did not want to blend in with McClellan's other staff officers, and he's essentially posing for his own portrait within the larger photograph.
A few months later, Custer returned for a time to Michigan, where he began courting his future wife, Elizabeth Bacon.
In early June 1863 Custer, assigned to a cavalry unit, showed particular bravery when confronting a Confederate force near Aldie, Virginia. Wearing a wide-brimmed straw hat, Custer led a cavalry charge that put him, at one point, in the midst of the Confederate force. Legend has it that the enemy, seeing Custer's distinctive hat, took him for one of their own, and in the confusion he was able to spur his horse and escape.
As reward for his bravery, Custer was appointed a brigadier general, and given command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade. He was only 23 years old.
Custer was known for natty uniforms, and for having portraits taken of himself, but his flair for showmanship was matched by brave action on the battlefield.
Custer fought at Gettysburg, and showed initiative in capturing Confederates fleeing back to Virginia after the battle. At times Custer was described as "reckless," and he was known to lead men into dangerous situations to test their own courage.
Despite any flaws, Custer's skill as a cavalryman made him a noteworthy figure, and he appeared on the cover of the country's most popular magazine, Harper's Weekly on March 19, 1864.
A month earlier, on February 9, 1864, Custer had married Elizabeth Bacon. She was very devoted to him, and after his death she would keep his legend alive by writing about him.
Custer's daring on the battlefield garnered continued press coverage in late 1864 and early 1865.
In late October 1864, in a battle called the Woodstock Races, Custer was sketched by the noted war artist Alfred Waud. In the pencil sketch, Custer is saluting the Confederate General Ramseur. Waud noted on the sketch that Custer had known the Confederate at West Point.
In early April 1865, as the Civil War was coming to its conclusion, Custer was involved in a cavalry raid that was written up in the New York Times. A headline declared, "Another Brilliant Affair by General Custer." The article described how Custer and the Third Cavalry Division captured three locomotives as well as artillery and many Confederate prisoners.
Battlefield artist Alfred Waud sketched Custer just prior to that action. To provide a title, Waud had written below his sketch, "April 6. Custer ready for his 3rd charge at Sailors Creek 1865."
On the back of the pencil sketch, Waud wrote, "Custer charged and charged again here capturing and destroying trains and making many prisoners. On the left are his guns engaging the enemy."
On April 8, 1865, Alfred Waud sketched General Custer as he received a flag of truce from a Confederate officer. That first truce flag would lead to the parley that brought General Robert E. Lee and General Ulysses S. Grant together at Appomatox Courthouse for the Confederate surrender.
As the Civil War ended, George Armstrong Custer was a 25-year-old with the battlefield rank of general. As he posed for this formal portrait in 1865, he may well have been contemplating his future in a nation at peace.
Custer, like many other officers, would have his rank reduced after the end of the war. And his career in the Army would continue. He would, as a colonel, go on to command the 7th Cavalry on the western plains.
And in June 1876 Custer would become an American icon when he led an attack on a large Indian village near a river called the Little Bighorn in the Montana Territory.
Source: McNamara, Robert, The Young and Photogenic Civil War Hero
Posted: October 21, 2010 by Britabroad
Ulysses Simpson Grant - USA
(1822-1885)
Ulysses S. Grant (born Hiram Ulysses Grant; April 27, 1822 – July 23, 1885) was the 18th President of the United States (1869–1877) as well as military commander during the Civil War and post-war Reconstruction periods. Under Grant's command, the Union Army defeated the Confederate military and ended the Confederate States of America. Grant began his lifelong career as a soldier after graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1843. Fighting in the Mexican American War, he was a close observer of the techniques of Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. He resigned from the Army in 1854, then struggled to make a living in St. Louis and Galena, Illinois.
In April 1861, after the American Civil War began, he joined the Union war effort, taking charge of training new regiments and then engaging the Confederacy near Cairo, Illinois. In 1862, he fought a series of major battles and captured a Confederate army, earning a reputation as an aggressive general who seized control of most of Kentucky and Tennessee at the Battle of Shiloh. In July 1863, after a long, complex campaign, he defeated five Confederate armies (capturing one of them) and seized Vicksburg. This famous victory gave the Union control of the Mississippi River, split the Confederacy, and opened the way for more Union victories and conquests. After another victory at the Battle of Chattanooga in late 1863, President Abraham Lincoln promoted him to the rank of lieutenant general and gave him charge of all of the Union Armies. As Commanding General of the United States Army from 1864 to 1865, Grant confronted Robert E. Lee in a series of very high casualty battles known as the Overland Campaign that ended in a stalemate siege at Petersburg. During the siege, Grant coordinated a series of devastating campaigns launched by William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip Sheridan, and George Thomas. Finally breaking through Lee's trenches at Petersburg, the Union Army captured Richmond, the Confederate capital, in April 1865. Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox. Soon after, the Confederacy collapsed and the Civil War ended.
During Reconstruction, Grant remained in command of the Army and implemented the Congressional plans to reoccupy the South and hold new elections in 1867 with black voters. This gave Republicans control of the Southern states. Enormously popular in the North after the Union's victory, he was elected to the presidency in 1868. Reelected in 1872, he became the first president to serve two full terms since Andrew Jackson did so forty years earlier. As president, he led Reconstruction by signing and enforcing civil rights laws and fighting Ku Klux Klan violence. He helped rebuild the Republican Party in the South, an effort that resulted in the election of African Americans to Congress and state governments for the first time. Despite these civil rights accomplishments, Grant's presidency was marred by economic turmoil and multiple scandals. His response to the Panic of 1873 and the severe depression that followed was heavily criticized. His low standards in Cabinet and federal appointments and lack of accountability generated corruption and bribery in seven government departments. In 1876, his reputation was severely damaged by the graft trials of the Whiskey Ring. In addition, his image as a war hero was tarnished by corruption scandals during his presidency. He left office at the low point of his popularity.[1][2]
After leaving office, Grant embarked on a two-year world tour that was received favorably with many royal receptions. In 1880, he made an unsuccessful bid for a third presidential term. In 1884, broke and dying of cancer, he wrote his memoirs. Historians have ranked his Administration poorly due to tolerance of corruption. His presidential reputation has improved among scholars who are impressed by the Administration's support for civil rights for freed slaves.
*warning: personal memoirs of U.S. Grant are available at this site
Source: Wikipedia
Posted: January 1, 2011 by Halvar von Flake
John Brown (May 9, 1800 – December 2, 1859) was a radical abolitionist from the United States, who advocated and practiced armed insurrection as a means to abolish slavery for good. He led the Pottawatomie Massacre in 1856 in Bleeding Kansas and made his name in the unsuccessful raid at Harpers Ferry in 1859. He was tried and executed for treason against the state of Virginia, murder, and conspiracy later that year.
President Abraham Lincoln said he was a "misguided fanatic" and Brown has been called "the most controversial of all 19th-century Americans." Brown's actions are often referred to as "patriotic treason," depicting both sides of the argument.
John Brown's attempt in 1859 to start a liberation movement among enslaved African Americans in Harpers Ferry, Virginia (now West Virginia) electrified the nation. He was tried for treason against the state of Virginia, the murder of five proslavery Southerners, and inciting a slave insurrection and was subsequently hanged. Southerners alleged that his rebellion was the tip of the abolitionist iceberg and represented the wishes of the Republican Party. Historians agree that the Harpers Ferry raid in 1859 escalated tensions that, a year later, led to secession and the American Civil War.
Source: unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 31, 2012 at 04:19 AM.
The Virginia Military Institute the VMI is mentioned a lot in Civil War history, but what was it? Early history On 11 November 1839 the Virginia Military Institute was founded on the site of the Lexington state arsenal and the first Cadets relieved personnel on duty. Under Major GeneralFrancis Henney Smith, superintendent, and ColonelClaudius Crozet, president of the Board of Visitors, the Corps was imbued with the discipline and the spirit for which it is famous. The first cadet to march a sentinel post was Private John Strange. With few exceptions, there have been sentinels posted at VMI every hour of every day of the school year.
The Institute played a valuable part in the training of the Southern armies and participated as a unit in actual battles. VMI cadets were called into active military service on 14 different occasions during the American Civil War and many cadets, under the leadership of General Stonewall Jackson, were sent to Camp Lee, at Richmond, to train recruits. VMI alumni were regarded among the best officers of the South and several distinguished themselves in the Union forces as well. Fifteen graduates rose to the rank of general in the Confederate Army, and one rose to this rank in the Union Army. Just before the Battle of Chancellorsville Stonewall Jackson said, "The Institute will be heard from today." He was commenting on the leadership provided by VMI alumni in his Corps. Three of Jackson's four Division commanders at Chancellorsville, Generals James Lane, Robert Rodes, and Raleigh Colston, were VMI graduates as were a significant number of his field grade officers.
On 15 May 1864 VMI cadets fought as an independent unit at the Battle of New Market. VMI is the only military college or academy in the United States to hold this distinction. The cadets who fought that day ranged in age from 14 to 22, though through the years, claims have been made of cadets as young as 12 fighting.[9] General John C. Breckinridge, the commanding Southern general, held the cadets in reserve and did not use them until Union troops broke through the Confederate lines. Upon seeing the tide of battle turning in favor of the Union forces, Breckinridge stated, "Put the boys in...and may God forgive me for the order." The VMI cadets held the line and eventually pushed forward, capturing a Union artillery emplacement, securing victory for the Confederates. The Union troops were withdrawn and Confederate troops under General Breckinridge held the Shenandoah Valley. VMI suffered fifty-two casualties with ten cadets killed in action and forty-two wounded. The cadets were led into battle by Commandant of Cadets and future VMI Superintendent Colonel Scott Shipp. Shipp was also wounded during the battle. Six of the ten fallen cadets are buried on VMI grounds behind the statue, "Virginia Mourning Her Dead" by sculptor Moses Ezekiel, a VMI graduate who was also wounded in the Battle of New Market.
On 12 June 1864 Union forces under the command of General David Hunter shelled and burned the Institute as part of the Valley Campaigns of 1864. The destruction was almost complete and VMI had to temporarily hold classes at the Alms House in Richmond, Virginia. In April 1865 Richmond was evacuated due to the impending fall of Petersburg and the VMI Corps of Cadets was disbanded. The Lexington campus reopened for classes on 17 October 1865. One of the reasons that Confederate General Jubal A. Early burned the town of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania was in retaliation for the shelling of VMI.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 14, 2010 by Britabroad
Editor's note: This article was originally published in The Charger in the Spring of 2002.
The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York was a very confusing place at the beginning of the American Civil War. In January of 1861, cadets were leaving West Point to return home as their home states withdrew from the Union. The Commandant at the time was none other than the later-to-be-famous Confederate general, P.G.T. Beauregard.
The War Department was in a panic because at this critical time when they needed a thousand new officers, West Point officer cadets were leaving in droves to return home to the South. Under this pressure, the War Department asked Beauregard to step down as Commandant even though he insisted he would stay loyal as long as his home state of Louisiana remained in the Union.
The War Department had anticipated circumstances correctly as Louisiana left the Union two weeks later. The Department also asked that the graduating classes for 1861 and 1862 be graduated in the summer of 1861. This is how George Armstrong Custer graduated a year early.
Cadets at West Point in 1865
Congress was furious that West Point, paid for by the Federal government, was supplying the military leadership for the states in rebellion. In fact opponents of West Point forced Congress to vote on closing the military academy in 1863. However, Union successes led by West Point graduates like Ulysses S. Grant against the failures of civilian commanders like John C. Fremont, Benjamin Butler, and Franz Siegel persuaded Congress to leave West Point open.
The Military Academy also suffered once the war started in earnest as many instructors left to join the army. This may have hurt West Point but was critical to the Union Army as most of the senior military West Point staff joined the Union cause.
Nine hundred and seventy-seven West Point graduates from the classes of 1833 through 1861 were alive when the Civil War began. Of these men, 259 (26%) joined the Confederacy and 638 (65%) fought for the Union. Eight did not fight for either side. Thirty-nine graduates from these classes who had come to West Point from Southern states fought for the Union and 32 who had come from Northern states fought for the Confederacy.
The quality of the Military Academy suffered during the war. The drop out/failure rate reached almost 50% of the cadets. This happened for several reasons: First, many of the long time instructors were away in the Army. Second, good students left early to receive high commissions in the militia's of their home states. Third, the New York City draft riots being only 60 miles away affected West Point. Not only were cadets sent to New York City to help quell the riots, but there was a strong concern that it could spread up the Hudson River to West Point itself
. And finally, it was hard to get students to concentrate on their studies while huge military battles like Gettysburg and Vicksburg were going on.
Ninety-five graduates of West Point were killed in the Civil War and 141 were wounded. The largest number of casualties came from the class of 1854 of which almost half were killed or wounded. The most famous class was that of 1846 which included George McClellan, "Stonewall" Jackson, A.P. Hill, Cadmus Wilcox, George Stoneman, and last in the class, George Pickett.
Most West Point graduates who served in the Civil War did not reach the status of a Lee, Jackson, Grant, or Sherman, nevertheless they did clearly demonstrate the military value of West Point training.
THE CITADEL The Citadel and the South Carolina Corps of Cadets during the Civil War
On December 20, 1860, South Carolina formally seceded from the Union, setting the stage for the great civil war that was to follow. In organizing its military units to prepare for war, the South Carolina General Assembly on January 28, 1861, combined the Corps of Cadets at the Citadel and Arsenal into the Battalion of State Cadets and designated the two institutions as The South Carolina Military Academy. The Battalion of State Cadets was made a part of the military organization of the State.25
During the War, the Arsenal and Citadel continued to operate as military academies, however, classes were often disrupted when the governor called the cadets into military service. Even before January 28, however, the Citadel Academy, its officers and Cadets were called on to perform military duties. A laboratory at the Citadel was set aside for the manufacture of ammunition,26 and on January 9, 1861, Citadel Cadets manning an artillery battery on Morris Island fired the first hostile shots of the Civil War, repulsing the federal steamship Star of the West, carrying supplies and two hundred federal troops dispatched by President Buchanan to reinforce Union Forces garrisoned at Fort Sumter.27 During the Star of the West incident, the Cadets flew as their banner a unique flag, observed by eye witnesses on the federal steamer, and described in a dispatch by a Union Officer at Fort Sumter as "a flag with a red field, and a white palmetto tree."28 A depiction of this flag flying over the Cadet battery on Morris Island can be seen in the Star of the West mural in Daniel Library, and replicas of the flag are now used as the spirit flag of The Citadel Corps of Cadets, known affectionately as "Big Red."29
During April 12 - 13, 1861, Confederate artillery batteries in Charleston harbor and Union forces occupying Fort Sumter exchanged fire culminating in Fort Sumter's surrender on April 13. Officers of the Citadel were directly involved in establishing artillery positions and directing fire on Fort Sumter.30 There are few surviving records of Cadets direct involvement in the Fort Sumter bombardment. It is known, however, that many Cadets were in Charleston at the time, and some attached themselves to various military units manning harbor batteries when the bombardment began on April 12.31 Although most Cadets were officially on leave following the April 9 commencement of the graduating class, a number of Cadets returned to the academy when learning of the bombardment, and were ordered to White Point Gardens to take charge of five, six and twelve pound cannon located at the extreme eastern promenade of the Battery.32
During the Civil War, mounting and manning heavy guns, guard duty and escorting prisoners were among the military duties most frequently performed by Cadets. Early in the war, Cadets were called upon to train raw recruits in newly formed military units.33 Cadets traveled as far north as Virginia to conduct training of troops at the front lines.34 However, members of the Corps of Cadets and its officers actively participated in several campaigns and engagements in defense of Charleston and South Carolina during the War. The regimental colors of the South Carolina Corps of Cadets carries eight battle streamers and one service streamer for the following campaigns and engagements by the Corps of Cadets35:
Star of the West, January 9, 1861
Wappoo Cut, November 1861
James Island, June 1862
Charleston and Vicinity, July to October 1863
James Island, June 1864
Tulifinny, December 1864
James Island, December 1864 to February 1865
Williamston, May 1865
Confederate States Army
The engagement at Tulifinny Creek is of historic importance because it involved the deployment of the entire Battalion of State Cadets from the Citadel and Arsenal Academies as an independent military unit engaged in armed combat with Union forces. In December of 1864, the Governor of South Carolina ordered the Battalion of State Cadets from the Citadel and Arsenal to deploy to Tulifinny Creek south of Charleston to reinforce Confederate troops defending a key railroad bridge against a much larger advancing Union force. On December 7, the Battalion of State Cadets, along with Confederate militia units from North and South Carolina and Georgia, engaged a much larger Union force in pitched battle for several hours, advancing against rifle and cannon fire and forcing the federal troops back to their entrenchments. On December 9, the battalion of cadets successfully repulsed a Union counter-attack on their defensive position by the railroad trestle with their disciplined rifle fire.36 The Battalion of State Cadets suffered eight casualties in the engagement, including one killed,37 and were commended by Major General Samuel Jones, CSA, Commanding General of South Carolina and Georgia Departments, for their gallantry under fire.38 A mural depicting the December 9th engagement at the Tulifinny Creek railroad trestle is on display in the Daniel Library.
A large number of Cadets left the academies to join the War. Among these were a group of Citadel and Arsenal Cadets who left the academies in June of 1862 to form a cavalry unit known as the Cadet Rangers. The Cadet Rangers became part of the 6th Regiment, South Carolina Cavalry,39 and were of incalculable assistance in training the Regiment's officers and non-commissioned officers. They took part in several engagements along the South Carolina coast before deploying to Virginia in 1864.40 The Rangers are best known for their participation in the battle of Trevilian Station, Virginia, considered the largest and bloodiest engagement of Union and Confederate cavalry during the Civil War.41 A mural depicting the Cadet Ranger's successful cavalry charge at Trevilian Station under the command of General Wade Hampton, is on display in Daniel Library.
On February 18, 1865, the Citadel ceased operation as a military academy when Union troops captured Charleston and occupied the Citadel building and grounds. The Citadel remained confiscated property of the federal government for nearly 17 years, and was used as a garrison by federal troops.42 The Arsenal in Columbia was burned by General Sherman's army, and never reopened.
During the War, twelve members of the Battalion of State Cadets were killed or died as a result of wounds or illness suffered in the field.43 In addition, 4 members of the Cadet Rangers were killed in military service.44 Of some 224 graduates living during the Civil War, 209 served in the Confederate armed forces, all but 29 as commissioned officers. 4 graduates attained the rank of general, and 19 attained the rank of full colonel. 36 graduates were killed in action or died from wounds on the battlefield. Another 13 died from wounds or disease while in military service. Some 200 former Cadets who had not graduated are known to have died in military service during the Civil War.45
Source: West Point in Civil War by Dick Crews
Posted: October 20, 2010 by kenniston5
Westpoint Syllabus
The Principles of War
These may be defined as the fundamental truths governing the prosecution of strategy and tactics. The nine that have been adopted by the US Army in modern times are listed and explained below for several reasons. First, many of them are encountered in Civil War literature. Second, they provide in capsule form the fundamentals of strategy and tactics. They are useful, if not essential, in any evaluation of generalship.
The definitions given below are those used in instructing cadets at West Point. They closely follow the US Army's Field Service Regulations,Operations.
The Objective
"Direct all efforts to ward a decisive, obtainable goal." The proper objective ("purpose") in battle is the destruction of the enemy's combat forces. To do this, however, subordinate commanders must be given "terrain objectives" toward which they move. Thus, Richmond was not a proper (terrain) objective for McClellan's army in 1862 because capturing it would not necessarily destroy the Confederate army and the loss of Richmond in 1862 would not have meant defeat of the Confederacy. It was a proper (terrain) objective for Grant in 1864-65 because it had become so important by that time that Lee was forced to defend it even if it meant destruction of his army. Although Grant's objective was Lee's Army of Northern Va. (not Richmond, per se), by directing his efforts toward Richmond he forced Lee to stand and fight him for its defense.
Simplicity
"Prepare uncomplicated plans and concise orders to insure thorough understanding and execution." McDowell at Ist Bull Run violated the principle of simplicity, since his troops were too green to execute properly the maneuver he prescribed.
Unity of Command
"For every task there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander." The Union flagrantly violated this principle after KERNSTOWN. Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign taught Lincoln and Stanton their lesson, and Unity of Command was obtained by creating Pope's Army of Va. (The Federals were nevertheless defeated in the next [2d Bull Run] campaign.)
The Offensive
"Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative." Lee's generalship embodies this principle, whereas it was the fatal deficiency in McClellan's. It is the quality most conspicuous in the make-up of most successful commanders, particularly Stonewall Jackson and Grant, Sheridan and Forrest.
Maneuver"Position your military resources to favor the accomplishment of your mission. Maneuver in itself can produce no decisive results [as Hooker at ChancellorsviIIe failed to realize] but if properly employed it makes decisive results possible through the application of the principles of the offensive, mass, economy of force, and surprise." It is by maneuver that a superior general defeats a stronger adversary (e.g., Jackson's Valley campaign).
Mass
"Achieve military superiority at the decisive place and time." Mass in this sense does not mean "more men." "Military superiority" can be attained against a more numerical enemy if you have superiority in such things as weapons, leadership, morale, and training. "Mass" is generally gained by "maneuver."
Economy of Force
"Allocate to secondary efforts minimum essential combat power." This is a misleading term because it does not mean what it sounds like. It does not mean "do the job with minimum combat power." Note that the principle pertains to "secondary efforts," and it is the means by which a superior general achieves "mass" as defined above. Mass and Economy of Force are on opposite sides of the same coin.
Surprise
"Accomplish your purpose before the enemy can effectively react." Tactical or strategic surprise does not mean open-mouthed amazement. Thus, a corps may be "surprised" by an attack it has seen coming for several hours if this attack is too powerful for it to resist by itself and if no other unit is within SUPPORTING DISTANCE. The fate of the XI Corps at Chancellorsville is an example. The principle of war known as "Security" may be defined as all measures taken to avoid "Surprise."
Security
"Never permit the enemy to acquire an unpredicted advantage," Another definition would be "measures taken to prevent surprise." A unit in bivouac, for example, uses outposts and patrols for security. Lack of security at Shiloh resulted in surprise of the Federals.
Source: The Civil War Dictionary by Mark B. Boatner III
Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Civil War cavalry (uses, tactics, equipment, engagements)
Cavalry in the American Civil War was a branch of army service in a process of transition. It suffered from emerging technology threats, difficult logistics, and sometimes misguided or inept commanders. Nevertheless, it played important roles in many Civil War campaigns and earned its place alongside the infantry and artillery combat arms.
Types of mounted forces
There were four types of mounted forces prevalent in the Civil War.
Cavalry were forces that fought principally on horseback, armed with carbines, pistols, and especially sabers. Only a small percentage of Civil War forces met this definition—primarily Union mounted forces in the Eastern Theater during the first half of the war. Confederate forces in the East generally carried neither carbines nor sabers. A few Confederate regiments in the Western Theater carried shotguns, especially early in the war.
Mounted infantry were forces that moved on horseback but dismounted for fighting on foot, armed principally with rifles. In the second half of the war, most of the units considered to be cavalry actually fought battles using the tactics of mounted infantry. An example of this was the celebrated "Lightning Brigade" of Col. John T. Wilder, which used horses to quickly arrive at a battlefield such as Chickamauga, but they deployed and fought using standard infantry formations and tactics. By contrast, at the Battle of Gettysburg, Federal cavalry under John Buford also dismounted to fight Confederate infantry, but they used conventional cavalry tactics, arms, and formations.
Dragoons were hybrid forces that were armed as cavalrymen but were expected to fight on foot as well. The term comes from the French Army, representing a cross between light cavalry and infantry. The fighting tactics of the forces deployed by Union General Philip Sheridan in 1864, and by Confederate General Wade Hampton after the Battle of Yellow Tavern, fit the dragoon model, although those units did not adopt the term.
Irregular forces (partisan rangers or guerrillas) were generally mounted forces. There is little commonality as to their weapons—in general, any available were used. The Confederacy produced the most famous irregular leaders, including William Clarke Quantrill, John S. Mosby, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and John Hunt Morgan (although the latter two did employ traditional mounted infantry tactics in some campaigns).
Tactics
At the time of the Civil War, the cavalry had five major missions, in rough priority: Reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance screening Defensive, delaying actions Pursuit and harassment of defeated enemy forces Offensive actions Long-distance raiding against enemy lines of communications, supply depots, railroads, etc.
This represented a change from previous eras, in which offensive action was the primary mission. In the Napoleonic Wars, for instance, there were instances of massive cavalry charges used for tactical envelopment of infantry formations. The technology of the rifled musket, which emerged in the 1850s, put an effective end to this practice. While swiftly moving cavalry could overwhelm infantry whose weapons fired accurately only 100 yards, the infantryman with a rifled musket (accurate to 300 yards or more) could fire multiple rounds in the time it took the cavalry to reach his position. And a horse and rider were easy targets.
Reconnaissance was the key to effective cavalry, as it remains today in modern armies (although modern cavalrymen use light armored vehicles or helicopters instead of horses). The cavalry serves as the "eyes" of the army. Reconnaissance was a crucial component in the Gettysburg Campaign, where cavalry under Union General Alfred Pleasonton attempted to find the wide-ranging Army of Northern Virginia on its invasion of the North, and Confederate cavalry under J.E.B. Stuart effectively employed counter-reconnaissance to screen passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and hide Robert E. Lee's movements. Long-distance raids were the most desirable mission for cavalrymen, primarily because of the fame that successful raids would bring, but they were often of little practical strategic value. Jeb Stuart became famous for two audacious raids around the Union Army of the Potomac in 1862; in his third such attempt, during the Gettysburg Campaign, he squandered much of the cavalry forces of the Army of Northern Virginia and deprived Robert E. Lee of adequate reconnaissance at the beginning of the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the principal reasons for the Confederate defeat there. Union attempts at strategic raids had mixed success. George Stoneman's raid in the Battle of Chancellorsville was a failure; Benjamin Grierson's raid in the Vicksburg Campaign was a strategic masterpiece that diverted critical Confederate forces away from Ulysses S. Grant's army; James H. Wilson's massive 1865 raid in Alabama foreshadowed the armored warfare maneuvers of World War II. In general, strategic raids were used more effectively in the Western Theater of the war.
Defensive actions by the cavalry were critical in the retreat from Gettysburg. Pursuit and harassment of enemy forces were often neglected (particularly by the Union after Gettysburg and Antietam), but can be seen in their finest form in the pursuit of Robert E. Lee during the Appomattox Campaign.
Organization Until the nomenclature changed in the early 1880s, cavalry regiments were organized into companies (later, "troops") authorized at up to 100 men, ten companies made up a regiment (increased to twelve post-war). Two or more companies might be organized into ad hoc battalions (later, "squadrons"), two "wings" of six companies each was used through the Indian Wars. Civil War regiments were rarely near authorized strength so that they were commonly brigaded with two to four other regiments. Two to four brigades were combined into divisions. By the end of the war, 272 cavalry regiments were formed in the Union army and 137 in the Confederate army.
Early in the war, most cavalry regiments were dispersed to be under the command of infantry formations, such as divisions or corps. As commanders realized the importance of long-range reconnaissance and raiding, the organizations changed to consolidate more of the regiments into larger units controlled separately. Eventually the Union Army of the Potomac included a Cavalry Corps, which had three divisions. The Army of Northern Virginia, earlier to consolidate under J.E.B. Stuart, organized its force as a cavalry division.
In both armies, the cavalry was accompanied by batteries or battalions of horse artillery, as well as its own train of ammunition and supply wagons.
Equipment The principal item of equipment for a cavalryman was the horse. In the North, over 600,000 cavalry horses were procured by a central agency of the army. They were usually mares or geldings, aged four or five years. During the Civil War, it is estimated that 1.5 million horses died, which includes draft and artillery horses. Equipping a cavalry regiment was an expensive proposition (approximately $100,000 per year for a Union regiment), and they demanded a large logistical infrastructure to support them. A cavalry horse ate 10 pounds (4.5 kg) of grain each day, which had to be transported behind the otherwise fast-moving force.
Horses gave the cavalry forces significant mobility. In some operations, forces were pushed to the limit (such as Jeb Stuart's raid on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in 1862, where his troopers marched 80 miles (130 km) in 27 hours). Such excesses were extremely damaging to the readiness of the units and extensive recovery periods were required. Stuart, during the Gettysburg Campaign the following year, resorted to procuring replacement horses from local farmers and townspeople during his grueling trek northward around the Union army. In York County, Pennsylvania, following the Battle of Hanover, his men appropriated well over 1,000 horses from the region. Many of these untrained new mounts proved a hindrance during the subsequent fighting at East Cavalry Field during the battle of Gettysburg. Some mounted forces used traditional infantry rifles. However, cavalrymen, particularly in the North, were frequently armed with three other weapons:
Carbines, with a shorter barrel than a rifle, were less accurate, but easier to handle on horseback. Most carbines were .52- or .56-caliber, single-shot breech-loading weapons. They were manufactured by several different companies, but the most common were the Sharps, the Burnside, and the Smith. Late in 1863, the seven-shot Spencer repeating carbine was introduced, but it was rarely deployed. A notable exception was Union Colonel John T. Wilder, who equipped an entire brigade with repeaters (purchasing these himself and intended to deduct payment from the mens wages embarrassed the Government into paying Wilder for the weapons at $35 apiece) in May 1863, the first unit so equipped. His mounted infantry gained fame as the "Lightning Brigade" for their swift movements. One Confederate stated that Wilder's men could "load on Sunday and fire all week." (Confederate forces were able to use captured breechloaders but were unable to duplicate the metallic cartridges needed by the Spencer.)
Sabers were used more frequently by Northern cavalrymen. They were terror weapons, more useful for instilling fear in their opponents than as practical offensive weapons; Confederate cavalrymen often avoided them simply because they considered sabers to be outmoded, unsuitable for the modern battlefield. One Southern cavalry commander noted that the only times during the war he used a saber was to roast meat over a fire. (There were instances in the war in which Union cavalrymen taunted their opponents to "Pick up your sabers and fight like gentlemen!") Despite Southern attitudes towards such weapons, there were several notable instances where the saber saw much use by both sides, including the Battle of Brandy Station and the cavalry battles on the third day of Gettysburg. The American Pattern of 1860 Light Cavalry Saber was lighter than the typical European saber, the latter being similar to the older U.S. Model 1840 Heavy Dragoon "wrist breaker". The curved blade of the saber was generally sharpened only at the tip because it was used mostly for breaking arms and collarbones of opposing horsemen, and sometimes stabbing, rather than for slashing flesh. (A notable exception to this was the saber of Nathan Bedford Forrest, which was sharpened on both edges.)
Pistols, which Southern cavalrymen generally preferred over sabers, were usually six-shot revolvers, in .36- or .44-caliber, from Colt or Remington. They were useful only in close fighting since they had little accuracy. It was common for cavalrymen to carry two revolvers, for extra firepower, and John Mosby's troopers often carried four each. Confederate cavalry
A Southerner was, on average, considered a superior horseman to his Northern counterpart, especially early in the war. Roads in the rural South were generally poor, and horses were used more for individual transportation than they were for the carriages and streetcars of the urbanized North, where many of the early Federal cavalry regiments were formed. Furthermore, Southern society was more stratified, which made the soldiers more accustomed to a hierarchy of command and were generally considered more suited to the martial lifestyle. Additionally, the strong militia tradition in the antebellum South and the requirements for local 'slave catcher' patrols led to the development of mounted units prior to 1861. Confederate soldiers owned their horses and were compensated on a monthly basis. If a soldier's horse was sick, injured, or killed, the soldier was responsible for returning home and replacing the horse at his own expense. The general rule was that the soldier had 60 days to return with a new horse or he was forced to become an infantryman, which was considered to be an ignominious fate.
The first prominent Confederate cavalry leader was J.E.B. Stuart, who achieved success in the First Battle of Bull Run against infantry. He was a flamboyant dresser and an audacious commander, wildly popular with the Southern public for his escapades in twice encircling the Army of the Potomac. These long-range reconnaissance missions accomplished little of military value but boosted Southern morale. After Stuart's death in 1864, he was replaced by Wade Hampton, who was a more mature, and arguably more effective, commander. Another Eastern commander of note was Turner Ashby, the "Black Knight of the Confederacy", who commanded Stonewall Jackson's cavalry forces in the Valley Campaign; he was killed in battle in 1862.
In the Western Theater, the most fearless, and ruthless, cavalry commander was Nathan Bedford Forrest, who achieved spectacular results with small forces but was an ineffective subordinate to the army commanders he was supposed to support, resulting in poorly coordinated battles. Much of the same issues could be said of Forrest's counterpart in the Army of Tennessee, John Hunt Morgan. In the Eastern Theater, the Partisan Ranger John Singleton Mosby succeeded in tying down upwards of 40,000 Federal troops defending rail lines and logistical hubs with only 100-150 irregulars. In the Trans-Mississippi Theater, John S. Marmaduke and "Jo" Shelby became prominent.
Union cavalry The Union started the war with five Regular mounted regiments: the 1st and 2nd U.S. Dragoons, the 1st Mounted Rifles, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry. These were renumbered the 1st through 5th U.S. Cavalry regiments, respectively, and a 6th was recruited. The Union was initially reluctant to enlist additional regiments, because of the expense, the understanding that training an effective cavalryman could take as long as two years, and the conventional wisdom that the rough and forested terrain of the United States, being so different from that of Western Europe, would make the deployment of Napoleonic-style cavalry forces ineffective. As the war progressed, the value of cavalry was eventually realized (primarily for non-offensive missions), and numerous state volunteer cavalry regiments were added to the army. The Union cavalry was disadvantaged at the start of the war because Northern soldiers had comparatively less equestrian experience than their Southern counterparts, and over half (104 out of 176) of the experienced U.S. Army cavalry officers had resigned their commissions to fight for the Confederacy. One advantage the Union horseman had over his opponent was the centralized horse procurement organization of the army, relieving him of any responsibility for replacing an injured horse. Commanders often tried to procure specific breeds for their men, with the Morgan being a particular favorite within the Army of the Potomac. Famous Morgan cavalry mounts from the Civil War included Sheridan's "Rienzi"[1] and Stonewall Jackson's "Little Sorrel".
Early in the war, Union cavalry forces were often wasted by being used merely as pickets, outposts, orderlies, guards for senior officers, and messengers. The first officer to make effective use of the Union cavalry was Major General Joseph Hooker, who in 1863 consolidated the cavalry forces of his Army of the Potomac under a single commander, George Stoneman.
Halfway into the war, during the summer of 1863, the Union cavalry came into its own. Widely regarded as inferior to its Southern counterpart up until then, the Battle of Brandy Station, although tactically indecisive, is recognized as the point at which it was acknowledged to have comparable competence. In 1864, Philip Sheridan was given command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and he deployed his horsemen in a more effective, strategic way than his predecessors. Despite the reluctance of his superior, Major General George G. Meade, Sheridan convinced General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant to allow him to deploy the cavalry in long-range raids, the first of which, at Yellow Tavern, resulted in the death of Confederate commander Jeb Stuart. He later employed his cavalry force effectively in the Valley Campaigns of 1864 and the Appomattox Campaign, in pursuit of Robert E. Lee.
In the Western Theater, two effective cavalry generals have not achieved the fame of their Eastern counterparts: Benjamin Grierson's dramatic raid through Mississippi was an integral part of Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign; James H. Wilson was invaluable in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign and in his 1865 Alabama raid.
After the war, the U.S. Army cavalry achieved great prominence on the Western frontier, fighting against the force that most historians consider the best light cavalry in the world, the American Indian.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 31, 2010 by Britabroad
Civil War Strategy
In this military art, troops are maneuvered outside the battlefield to achieve success in a large geographic area. That geographic expanse can be a "front" (in the Civil War, part or all of one state) or a "theater" (several contiguous states possessing geographical, geopolitical, or military unity). When the expanse encompasses an entire country, the corresponding waging of war on the largest scale to secure national objectives is called "grand strategy."
"Offensive strategy" carries war to the enemy, either directly by challenging his strength or indirectly by penetrating his weakness." Defensive strategy" protects against enemy strategic offensives. And "defensive-offensive strategy" (which Confederates often practiced) uses offensive maneuvers for defensive strategic results (e.g., Gen. R. E. Lee and Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson took the offensive May-June 1862 to defend Richmond and Virginia).
Strategic objectives include defeating, destroying, or forcing enemy armies to retreat; seizing enemy strategic sites (supply lines, depots, arsenals, communications centers, and industry) crucial to his military effort; capturing the enemy capital; disrupting his economy; and demoralizing his will to wage war. While seeking such goals, the strategist must correspondingly protect his own army, strategic sites, capital, economy, and populace. He must strike proper balance between securing his rear and campaigning in his front. Supply lines and homelands must be guarded; especially in war between 2 republics, which the Civil War really was, the compelling necessity of protecting the political base cannot be ignored. Yet if too many troops are left in the rear, too few remain to attack or even defend against enemy armies at the front.
Of these objectives, European experience, from which Civil War strategic doctrine derived, emphasized 3 strategies: destroying the enemy's army in 1 battle, seizing strategic sites, and capturing the enemy's capital. In the Civil War, attacking and defending Richmond and Washington consumed much effort, but their actual strategic importance, though great, was more symbolic than substantial, since neither was its country's nerve center, as European capitals were. Also illusory were quests for victory through seizing strategic sites and cutting "lines of communication" (supply lines); only a few Civil War campaigns, such as Holly Springs and Second Bull Run, were decided or even significantly affected by such captures. Most chimerical of all were hopes of annihilating the enemy's army in 1 great Napoleonic victory.
Rather, Civil War strategists used a series of battles--each of them indecisive but cumulatively effective--to cripple the enemy, drive him back, and overrun or protect territory. Some strategies aimed directly at such battles. Other strategies sought first to maneuver so as to gain advantage of ground or numbers and only then to give battle under such favorable conditions. Whatever the overall numbers in the theater, strategy strove to assure numerical superiority on the battlefield; this principle was called "concentrating masses against fractions." Both sides practiced it, but it was especially important to the overall weaker Secessionists, as when Jackson performed it so effectively in the Shenandoah Valley.
Again, each side, particularly the Confederates, used "interior lines" to move forces from quiet fronts through the interior to threatened fronts more quickly than the enemy could move around the military border. But, in practice, Southern supply lines were so primitive and Federal supply lines were so good that, despite longer distance, Northerners often moved in shorter time due to their "superior lateral communications." Even more effective against Confederate reliance on interior lines was Ulysses S. Grants grand strategy of concerting the armed might of the Union for simultaneous advances to pin and defeat Confederate troops on all major fronts.
Besides these approaches, Civil War strategists, especially Union commanders such as William T. Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan, usually reluctantly but increasingly came to make the enemies economy and populace suffer. For the first time since the Thirty Years War, those 2 targets regained legitimacy. While free from the brutality of 1618-48, Federal strategy eventually crippled Southern capability and will to wage war though, to be effective, such strategy could only complement Northern success in maneuver and battle.
Long-range strategic cavalry raids -- in brigade to corps strength -- played some role in such crippling, but those raids rarely had much military effect before collapse became imminent in 1865. Instead, the principal unit of strategic maneuver was the infantry corps, and the basic element of strategic control was the army. And in theaters where I side had several armies, those armies themselves became maneuver units, and control resided at military division headquarters or with the general-in-chief himself.
Whatever the elements and whatever the means, the fundamental goal of strategy remains the same: the overall use of force to accomplish broad military and political objectives.
Source: Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War Editor, Patricia L. Faust
Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Confederate and Union War Strategies
Confederacy The southern commander at Manassas was Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the dapper, voluble hero of Fort Sumter, Napoleonic in manner and aspiration. Heading the rebel forces in the Shenandoah Valley was Joseph E. Johnston, a small, impeccably attired, ambitious but cautious man with a piercing gaze and an outsized sense of dignity. In their contrasting offensive-and defensive-mindedness, Beauregard and Johnston represented the polarities of southern strategic thinking. The basic war aim of the Confederacy, like that of the United States in the Revolution, was to defend a new nation from conquest.
Confederates looked for inspiration to the heroes of 1776, who had triumphed over greater odds than southerners faced in 1861. The South could "win" the war by not losing; the North could win only by winning. The large territory of the Confederacy--750,000 square miles, as large as Russia west of Moscow, twice the size of the thirteen original United States--would make Lincolns task as difficult as Napoleons in 1812 or George III's in 1776. The military analyst of the Times of London offered the following comments early in the war:
". . . It is one thing to drive the rebels from the south bank of the Potomac, or even to occupy Richmond, but another to reduce and hold in permanent subjection a tract of country nearly as large as Russia in Europe. . . No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case. . . Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South. . . ."
Jefferson Davis agreed; early in the war he seems to have envisaged a strategy like that of George Washington in the Revolution. Washington traded space for time; he retreated when necessary in the face of a stronger enemy; he counterattacked against isolated British outposts or detachments when such an attack promised success; above all, he tried to avoid full-scale baffles that would have risked annihilation of his army and defeat of his cause. This has been called a strategy of attrition--a strategy of winning by not losing, of wearing out a better equipped foe and compelling him to give up by prolonging the war and making it too costly.
But two main factors prevented Davis from carrying out such a strategy except in a limited, sporadic fashion. Both factors stemmed from political as well as military realities. The first was a demand by governors, congressmen, and the public for troops to defend every portion of the Confederacy from penetration by "Lincolns abolition hordes." Thus in 1861, small armies were dispersed around the Confederate perimeter along the Arkansas-Missouri border, at several points on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, along the Tennessee-Kentucky border, and in the Shenandoah Valley and western Virginia as well as at Manassas. Historians have criticized this "cordon defense" for dispersing manpower so thinly that Union forces were certain to break through somewhere, as they did at several points in 1862.
The second factor inhibiting a Washingtonian strategy of attrition was the temperament of the southern people. Believing that they could whip any number of Yankees, many southerners scorned the notion of "sitting down and waiting" for the Federals to attack. "The idea of waiting for blows, instead of inflicting them, is altogether unsuited to the genius of our people," declared the Richmond Examiner. "The aggressive policy is the truly defensive one. A column pushed forward into Ohio or Pennsylvania is worth more to us, as a defensive measure, than a whole tier of seacoast batteries from Norfolk to the Rio Grande. The southern press clamored for an advance against Washington in the same tone that northern newspapers cried On to Richmond. Beauregard devised bold plans for an offensive against McDowell. But the question became moot when Beauregard learned of McDowell's offensive against him.
The Confederates eventually synthesized these various stands of strategic theory and political reality into what Davis called an "offensive-defensive" strategy. This consisted of defending the Confederate homeland by using interior lines of communication (a Jominian but also common-sense concept) to concentrate dispersed forces against an invading army and, if opportunity offered, to go over to the offensive, even to the extent of invading the North. No one ever defined this strategy in a systematic, comprehensive fashion. Rather, it emerged from a series of major campaigns in the Virginia-Maryland and Tennessee-Kentucky theaters during 1862, and culminated at Gettysburg in 1863. It almost emerged, in embryonic form, from the first battle of Manassas (Bull Run) in July 1861, a small battle by later Civil War standards but one that would have important psychological consequences in both the North and the South.
Source: Battle Cry of Freedom by James M. McPherson
Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Union
Soldiers and officers are the basic ingredients of all armies. Their strategic dispositions, how they are deployed, what grand strategy directs their movements largely determine the outcome of wars. It is not easy to reconstitute the general air of confusion and uncertainty in which the initial Union strategy took shape. There was a sharp division in the Cabinet and in the army as well over the appropriate strategy to pursue in attempting to subdue the South. At least three grand strategies were proposed. The first, the one favored by William Seward, the secretary of state and the most influential man in the Cabinet, was what Welles called "the border strategy." The notion here was to establish "borders" around the periphery of the Confederacy, assure the Southerners of the goodwill of the North toward them, and wait for pro-Union sentiment in the South to manifest itself and lead to a negotiated peace. This strategy virtually conceded the slavery issue in favor of restoring the Union.
The strategy proposed by Welles likewise rested on the assumption that there were large numbers of Unionists in the South, simply waiting for indications of Northern support to declare themselves. "Instead of halting on the borders, building entrenchments, and repelling indiscriminately and treating as Rebels--enemies--all, Union as well as disunion, men . . . we should," Welles wrote,". . . penetrate their territory, nourish and protect the Union sentiment, and create and strengthen a national feeling counter to Secession.. . . Instead of holding back, we should be aggressive and enter their territory," Welles added. Both strategies were based on an overestimation of the strength of Union sentiment. Moreover, Welles's strategy ignored the fact that invasion of an enemy's territory invariably arouses the most intense hostility on the part of those invaded.
A third "strategy," one almost indistinguishable in its practical effect from that of Welles, was based on the assumption that only an overwhelming display of superior force demonstrated by an invasion of the South at every vulnerable point could force the Confederacy back into the Union. It was this latter policy that was, on the whole, followed, but the emotional predisposition to the first strategy on the part of many Northerners in and out of the army frequently blunted the effect of the invasion strategy and in the most important theater of the war--Virginia--rendered it a nullity. General Scott himself was for what Welles termed "a defensive policy." As one general put it to Welles: "We must erect our batteries on the eminences in the vicinity of Washington and establish our military lines; frontiers between the belligerents, as between the countries of Continental Europe, are requisite."
As the third strategy became clearly the strategy that Lincoln was determined to pursue--aggressive penetration of the South--the inevitable next question was how was that strategy to be best effected. One needs, first of all, to have reference to the map of the South which constitutes the endpapers of this volume. There it is seen that the South had two major lines of vulnerability: several thousand miles of virtually undefended seacoast running from Norfolk, Virginia, around the tip of Florida and along the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans and, in the West, almost a thousand miles of the Mississippi River, stretching from St. Louis to New Orleans, which constituted a line of access into the Deep South and, for the Southerners, an obstacle separating them from their trans-Mississippi allies--Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri. Moreover, the Ohio River entered the Mississippi at Cairo, Illinois, and fifty miles to the east of that conjunction, the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers emptied into the Ohio, coming from a southeasterly direction parallel to each other and roughly parallel to the Mississippi. The South had to defend that river network at all costs. In the hands of the North it would leave the South vulnerable to invasion from a hundred points.
New Orleans was the hinge of the lower South--the point where the coastline joined the great arterial waterway of the Mississippi. The Northern strategy was thus, like all proper strategies, dictated in large part by the terrain. Plans were made immediately for three amphibious operations, two combined land-sea operations, directed at vulnerable points on the North and South Carolina coast--one at Roanoke Island, the other at Port Royal, just south of Charleston; the other expedition was directed at New Orleans itself.
Meanwhile, the Army of the Potomac, with McClellan in command, was organized with the mission of capturing Richmond. As the months passed, a series of additional armies were formed along the line of the Ohio and upper Mississippi--the armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Frontier, Kansas, the Mississippi, the Mountain, the Southwest, the Tennessee, the West Tennessee, and, near the end of the war, the Shenandoah, finally fifteen in all (the Confederacy formed twenty-four "armies"). The real story of the war--the battles and campaigns that finally brought it to its bloody conclusion--took place far away from Washington and Richmond, at Shiloh, Tennessee, Vicksburg, Mississippi, Chickamauga, Georgia, and in a dozen other such engagements. But the facts that the capitals of the North and South were so close together, little more than a hundred miles apart, and that the Confederate capital was, moreover, in the extreme northeastern corner of the geographical area covered by the Confederacy produced a strange distortion, first in the war itself and then in our comprehension of it. The grand strategy developed by Lincoln, his Cabinet, and General Winfield Scott and the actual deployment of Union armies certainly took account of the points of Southern vulnerability, but the focus of public attention remained fixed on the two armies that confronted each other in Virginia--the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia.
Source: Trial By Fire, A People's History of the Civil War and Reconstruction by Page Smith, Volume 5, Chapter 4, Pages 97,98, and 99. Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Civil War Tactics
Tactics is the military art of maneuvering troops on the field of battle to achieve victory in combat. 'Offensive tactics" seek success through attacking; "defensive tactics" aim at defeating enemy attacks. In Civil War tactics, the principal combat arm was infantry. Its most common deployment was a long "line of battle," 2 ranks deep. More massed was the "column," varying from 1 to 10 or more companies wide and from 8 to 20 or more ranks deep. Less compact than column or line was "open-order" deployment: a strung-out, irregular single line.
Battle lines delivered the most firepower defensively and offensively. Offensive firepower alone would not ensure success. Attackers had to charge, and massed columns, with their greater depth, were often preferable to battle lines for making frontal assaults. Better yet were flank attacks, to "roll up" thin battle lines lengthwise. Offensive tacticians sought opportunity for such effective flank attacks; defensive tacticians countered by "refusing" these flanks on impassable barriers. In either posture, tacticians attempted to coordinate all their troops to deliver maximum force and firepower and to avoid being beaten "in detail" (piecemeal). Throughout, they relied on open-order deployment to cover their front and flanks with skirmishers, who developed the enemy position and screened their own troops.
Open order, moreover, was best suited for moving through the wooded countryside of America. That wooded terrain, so different from Europe's open fields, for which tactical doctrine was aimed, also affected tactical control. Army commanders, even corps commanders, could not control large, far-flung forces. Instead, army commanders concentrated on strategy. And corps commanders handled "grand tactics": the medium for translating theater strategy into battlefield tactics, the art of maneuvering large forces just outside the battlefield and bringing them onto that field. Once on the field, corps commanders provided overall tactical direction, but their largest practical units of tactical maneuver were divisions. More often, brigades, even regiments, formed those maneuver elements. Essentially, brigades did the fighting in the Civil War.
Besides affecting organization, difficult terrain helped relegate cavalry and artillery to lesser tactical roles. More influential there was the widespread use of long-range rifled shoulder arms. As recently as the Mexican War, when most infantry fired smoothbore muskets, cavalry and artillery had been key attacking arms. Attempting to continue such tactics in the Civil War proved disastrous, as infantry rifle power soon drove horsemen virtually off the battlefield and relegated artillery to defensive support. Rifle power devastated offensive infantry assaults, too, but senior commanders, who were so quick to understand its. impact on cannon and cavalry, rarely grasped its effect on infantry. By 1864, infantry customarily did erect light field fortifications to strengthen its defensive battlefield positions and protect itself from enemy rifle power; but when attacking, whether against battle lines or fortifications, infantry continued suffering heavy casualties through clinging to tactical formations outmoded by technology. But if infantry was slow to learn, other arms swiftly found new tactical roles. The new mission of the artillery was to bolster the defensive, sometimes with 1 battery assigned to each infantry brigade, but more often with I battalion assigned to a Confederate infantry division and 1 brigade to a Federal infantry corps. With long-range shells and close-in canister, artillery became crucial in repulsing enemy attacks. But long-range shelling to support ones own attack had minimal effect, and artillery assaults were soon abandoned as suicidal. Throughout, artillery depended almost entirely on direct fire against visible targets.
Cavalry, in the meantime, served most usefully in scouting for tactical intelligence and in screening such intelligence from the foe. By midwar, moreover, cavalry was using its mobility to seize key spots, where it dismounted and fought afoot. Armed with breech-loading carbines, including Federal repeaters by 1864-65, these foot cavalry fought well even against infantry. Only rarely did mounted cavalry battle with saber and pistol. Rarer still were mounted pursuits of routed enemies.
Cavalry so infrequently undertook such pursuits chiefly because defeated armies were rarely routed. Size of armies, commitment to their respective causes by individual citizen-soldiers, difficult terrain, and impact of fortifications and technology all militated against the Napoleonic triumph, which could destroy an enemy army--and an enemy country--in just 1 battle. Raised in the aura of Napoleon, most Civil War commanders sought the Napoleonic victory, but few came close to achieving it. 60 years after Marengo and Austerlitz, warfare had so changed that victory in the Civil War would instead come through strategy. Yet within that domain of strategy, not just 1 battle but series of them--and the tactics through which they were fought--were the crucial elements in deciding the outcome of the Civil War.
Source: Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War" Editor, Patricia L. Faust
Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 24, 2012 at 10:41 AM.
The Evolution and Influence of Tactical Warfare in the ACW
At the onset of the US civil war the existing doctrine of military warfare was about to become obsolete. The old lessons of warfare had to be re-written by the American Generals serving in the US Civil war. War took a new turn during the Civil war. Old world tactics and training were inefficient due to modern weaponry. The U.S. Civil war was an event that was unparalleled in the annals of military history. It was a revolution of warfare in itself. U.S. military minds re-wrote military strategy to encompass all aspects of modern technology developed in the private sector. The conflict hosted the first ever use of rail and water ways and armored ships over a larges area of military operations and redefined previous lessons of battlefield deployment. Previously learned infantry tactics quickly proved to be disastrous. American Generals were forced to adapt and even abandon the lessons of antebellum military thought. The railway made armies mobile to a degree that was previously unimaginable. Their development completely altered the entire concept and strategy of managing army's. The civil war laid down lessons to be copied and learned for the up coming "Great War" in Europe. Along with lessons and tactics came the new emphasis on newer and modern units and an increased importance assigned to battlefield preparation and geography. Through observation of the federal military development European observers witnessed the importance of a solid industrialized infra structure supporting the warfront. The North showed the world how strong industry and support can offset valor and other military qualities. European leaders learned from the civil war the proper employment of mass armies, railroads, telegraphs, armored ships, railway, artillery, refilling, and trenches.
With many thanks to Napoleon turning movements became a major part of U.S. military strategy. Napoleon introduced the turning movement witch could be used to threaten enemy lines of communications and either force their withdrawal or force a premature action by the enemy. If an attacking force executed this tactic efficiently and with speed it could reach the enemies rear before an effective retreat could be carried out. A properly carried out turning movement could provide a significant advantage for the aggressors. Now with the defenders communications cut off the defenders would be forced to attack, shifting the fight to a tactical defensive, to the advantage of the attacker. The campaigns of Napoleon formed the bases of formal military education through out the western world. At the start of the civil war European observers were anxious to see to what extent the American campaigns would conform to the accepted doctrines of Napoleonic warfare. In West point the writings of Jomini were used as a textbook through Hennery W. Halleck's "Elements of Military Art and Science", which was essentially a translation of Jomini. As the curriculum at West Point leaned in the direction of engineering, mathematics, fortifications and administration most cadets absorbed this text, as it was the only resource on military strategy. Federal General George B. McClellan took those concepts one step further. After rebuilding the army of the Potomac he devised a turning movement that utilized virtually all fields of military discipline. Had this plan been carried out with full confidence the war may have ended much sooner. Based on the principle of turning movements McClellan planned to fully exploit the North's secure water lines. This would actually be a water based turning movement where the navy directly complemented and necessitated the infantry, in a sense providing land, were none existed. The goal was to accomplish three tasks, getting to the confederate rear, re-claim territory, and capture Richmond. This plan showed the importance of fully exploiting all of a militaries resources for joint success. It also showed the American perfection and expansion of Napoleonic tactics. Jomini, a Swiss aid of Napoleon wrote the "Traite des Grandes Operations Miltaire". Jomini was intrigued by Napoleons strategies and sought to systematize his methods. Jomini emphasized the necessity of good internal lines of operations, presented the concept of lines of operation and stressed the difference between interior and exterior lines. He stressed the importance of proper choice of these lines concerning geographical and geometrical factors. He stressed that solid and reliable interior lines were essential to the fundamental principle of strategy. Since Jomini's theories were included in the text at west Point most of the Commanding Generals felt his influence. For Jomini these were summed up in the following four points:
"1. Bringing, by strategic measures, the major part of an armies forces successively to bear upon the decisive areas of a theater of war and as far as possible upon the enemies communications, without compromising ones own;
"2. Maneuvering in such a manner as to engage ones major forces against parts only of those of the enemy;
"3. Furthermore, in Battle, by tactical maneuvers, bringing ones major forces to bear on the decisive area of the battle field or on that part of the enemies lines which it is important to overwhelm;
"4. Arranging matters in such a fashion that these masses of men be not only brought to bear at the decisive place but that they be up into action speedily and together, so that they make simultaneous effort."
Jomini described a line of operations as part of the entire area of operations covered by an army in the process of executing its objectives. He wrote that an army with tight interior lines can strategically overwhelm the enemy forces one by one. This principle was based on producing rapid maneuvering of troops on foot. The American soldiers where drilled this, and other, Jominian principles at West Point. Like many of the lessons that were taught at school the Americans had to alter these old world tactics to match and include all their resources. Interior lines still held the key to battle field success, but against Jomini's written warning that widely spread lines can produce disorganization; American Planners stretched these lines and with great success. The success and nucleus of this tactical departure was the railroad. Its speed and reliability shortened distances. Now the American Generals morphed this old military maxim into a new standard of warfare. Stressing the importance of these lines the Americans did , however, enforce a Jominian principle. Jomini advised establishing solid interior lines prior to war, much like Adolph Hitler's auto-bahn. This was not possible in the case of the Civil war but measures where taken to protect lines that already existed. Defenses and assaults were wisely planned accordingly, keeping in mind rail and water lines of operation. In a spectacular example of the North exploiting, and expanding the definition of, interior lines Grants army acted as an auxiliary of the Navy working as one to support each other within a common cause. On February 3, 1862 seven gun boats sailed down the Tennessee river followed by a fleet of transport ships carrying 17 thousand of Grants men. Disembarking Grant led his men toward Fort Hennery while the mini armada approached on the river. This was a remarkable departure from the old maxim of marching divided and concentrating for the attack. This use of modern day rapid steam ships granted the Union army unprecedented advantage through their exploitation of interior lines. Grant was also able to minimize casualties as well as minimize expenditures of supplies by utilizing naval bombardments, in effect a floating battery. These interior lines also allowed for a text book execution of McClellan's desired water born turning movement, and with great speed. This set an example for the future usage of combined arms strategy that is the standard of today. Today we can look back and see Grant's example carried out from D-Day to the current war in Iraq. The idea of and infantry assault now without support from the other disciplines is ridicules.
The European emphasis on infantry training revolved around the bayonet. It was believed that firearms were only a threat at great distances, reflected in a pre-campaign order issued by French Emperor Napoleon III. After one of his victories, while being greatly outnumbered, a general reported that "we won back with the bayonet more than we had lost with the fusillade." In 1861 countless hours were wasted learning to use the bayonet hoping it would become the American Sarissa. General McClellan even went as far as to translate the French Manuel of bayonet drills into English. Soldiers quickly learned that this skill was of little use. With the advent of the new rifled musket accuracy, and therefore lethality, was now greatly improved. Napoleon warned not to allow gaps to develop in battle formation; this is one lesson that was better off left on the book shelves. Napoleon spoke of the inaccuracy of muskets. He preached that linear formations should only be two rows deep as the first line would be in danger of being struck by the third line. Though this tactic was essential to battlefield success prior to the Civil War it was now disastrous. The fact that the Civil War soldier could now hit what he aimed at made all the soldiers on the field in formation "sitting Ducks." The 19th century Phalanx proved pointless against a wall of smoke and mini balls. Now the emphasis was on movements and rapidity of fire and marksmanship. The previously issued muskets of the Mexican war were largely replaced by the Springfield and Enfield rifles. Killing distances increased to over a mile. Massed infantry attacks were now nothing more than suicide. A comparison to the effectiveness of the advancement of the modern weaponry can be seen in the following journal entries from soldiers of that time. First from an American in the Revolutionary war followed by a Confederate soldier account. "One of the British soldiers, thinking he could do a bit of mischief by killing some of us…kept firing at us as we passed along the bank. Several of his shots passed between our files, but we took little notice of him…" In a confederate soldiers diary quite a different standard is shown while he reports an encounter with a sniper. "I had taken a rest for my gun by the side of a sapling… Finally we saw him sort o' peep round the tree… and bang! We saw the Yankee tumble out like a squirrel." Two different wars, similar circumstance and different effects based on modern weaponry. Columns loosened and extended to greater lengths. Not long did the tightly shouldered Napoleonic masses of men marching to their deaths last, but frontal assaults still destroyed the ranks. Now extended formations advanced by rushes. Soldiers learned to seek shelter in trenches and earthworks as they rapidly approached enemy lines. By 1863 battlefields became honeycombed with defensive lines for the first time. Flexible formations and swift maneuvers offered the only hope of success against these new defensive innovations. In the North began the beginning of the departure from the old world strategy. When General McClellan took control of the federal army he quickly went to work changing the army to fit his new concept of war. Beginning in the rear he went to work improving supply and communications, interior lines. No longer was it sufficient to rely on couriers, Incompetent officers were discharged, ending the traditional role of societies elite leading peasant armies. He re-organized units into brigades and divisions to make them more manageable and flexible on the field. He saw that head long charges were a waste of life and resources. Great emphasis was put on training. He created an entire battalion of engineers and acknowledged the importance of artillery by increasing the amount of federal artillery by 900 percent. McClellan fully appreciated the potential of long range rifled artillery. The offensive and defensive attributes of artillery would be proven and show the world the awesome killing power of modern ordinance. In Europe cavalry was used to crush an enemy by the force of its charge. With this technique of mass formations cavalry was hurled into infantry ranks to "shock and awe" them into submission. Armed with lance and saber this weapon of war first was proven obsolete by the Mexican army. U.S. cavalry consisted of mounted riffles sided with carbines and colt revolvers. The use of cavalry as a shock element on the battle field never existed in the U.S. military. Thickly wooded and rough terrain made traditional cavalry charges unrealistic coupled with a lack of training time required to execute mass cavalry charges. As weaponries advancements became apparent down went the effectiveness of the old world charge. Cavalry soldiers quickly became highly mobile foot soldiers. CSS General Forrest perfected this new style of fighting. Though Dragoons had utilized this technique in the past never before had it been utilized on such a grand scale. In the North McClellan understood that freedom of movement was essential. In an effort to make Northern cavalry an effective and modern fighting tool he developed the "McClellan Saddle". This allowed for the full exploitation of the mounted infantry.
One of the new, and previously mentioned, technological advancements exploited in the Civil war was the Railroad. The use of the Locomotive on the railroad quickly proved invaluable. In the opening act of the war it quickly proved its usefulness and was fully exploited by Confederate generals. While General Johnston was occupying Federal troops in a valley General Beauregard was preparing to face off with the Federal army. In need of reinforcements but not wanting to free up the occupied Federals in the valley the rail was used. Withdrawing most of his men General Johnston was able to unite with Beauregard before the Federal army knew they had left. This created the ultimate interior lines and the advantage was all Beauregard's. Deception has always been a key to battle field success. In America Generals used the Rail to re-define that as well. During the evacuation of Corinth General Beauregard introduced another use for rapid steam powered transportation as well as introducing the art of deception on a new level. Not wanting the Federal army to know that they were leaving, fearing an attack while on the march, Beauregard ordered that camp fires be left burning and left behind enough drummers to beat reveille. He also had dummy guns and scare crow sentinels placed in the proper locations. This type of deception was repeated during WWII in Africa and in England prior to D-Day in order to throw the enemy forces off the real scent. The main key to this deception was the train. All night an empty car came and went through the town, stopping at different intervals. Along with its whistle could be heard the cheering of men specially detailed for that purpose. Their orders were to raise a general ruckus so the Federal sentinels would believe, and report, that reinforcements were arriving. In fact it was the exact opposite that took place. The next day it was only when smoke rose from burned supply depots that the Federal Commander, General Halleck, suspected the town was empty. Americans were developing ways to use military resources in more ways than originally intended, exploiting the fruits of industrialization to the fullest.
Prior to 1914 French military strategists ignored the discipline of naval warfare. By studying the U.S. civil war and the missions of the Iron Clads a new discipline emerged. After placing iron plating on wooden hulls naval vessels became almost indestructible. In the North the iron clads were fitted with a new advancement, a rotating turret. This meant that fewer cannons were required on a single vessel. This design alone revolutionized naval warfare forever. Thanks to the rotating turret ships no longer needed to turn the entire vessel just to take aim. This also made it possible to keep continues fire on a retreating, or advancing craft while on the move. The first newly constructed iron clad was the Monitor. The monitor also was equipped with yet another American military innovation, the marine screw. The marine screw is the rotating fin that is now used to propel ships and even airplanes. The monitor can also be considered the first semi-submersible ship as all but the pilot house and turret were below the water line. The iron clads gave a new importance to the interior lines and water ways as strategic points. As in the 2nd Greco-Persian war through Alexander seizing Darius's ports through Roman domination of Carthage the importance of controlling the sea was well understood. In the American South, however, it was reaffirmed in modern times. While loosing battles on land the Union showed how controlling sea ports could exhaust and control an adversary. The logistical as well as tactical support provided by the Northern conquest of the Mississippi was studied by the French. As a French Naval officer wrote "The Sea had conquered the land." This lesson made its way across the Atlantic to WWI as the Germans attempted to isolate England with its unrestricted submarine warfare. The Federal strategy to re-conquer the Mississippi was re-enacted to re-open the Mediterranean and lay down the logistics for the landing at Normandy. At sea the steam engine also changed the strategic approach of naval warfare. As History dictates that an enemies ports are essential strategic targets and are the life lines that feed the military as well as the people. Few infrastructures can exist without active ports, air or sea. In the pre-20th century world the port was a window to the world. Due to a lack of Northern ports Union Ships were unable to stay at sea long. This led to the strategy of joint army-naval operations. This newly determined goal led to the use of combined forces. Combined forces movements allowed the Federals to capture key positions and became the standard of military action through modern times. As these joint operations proved successful more and more Confederate ports fell to Union forces and became supply depots. Unable to out fight the new Federal combined forces actions the Confederacy also adapted their naval strategy. With their hands forced and their window to the world closed necessity again dictated strategy. A new type of ship was born, the blockade runner. This ship was built for speed and carried smaller cargos and burned smokeless coal. These blockade runners also carried sails as well as steam engines. They had a low profile just barely above the water line. Another example where U.S. military minds discovered new ways to exploit the steam engine. Another method deployed by the South to combat the Northern blockade was the introduction and development of mines. When a vessel made contact with a mine it would blow a hole in the craft and cause it to sink. The success of this new military development led to another. Confederate Minds developed the first torpedo. The first use was to tow an explosive charge on a line about 200 feet behind a submerged vessel, the first submarine, and with a little luck the explosive would make contact with the ship and the rest is military history. The experience of the American civil war at sea showed all of Europe and beyond that the wooden ship-of-the-line was obsolete. European nations quickly began to convert their own navies based on the new American standard.
Introduced in the Mexican war modern West Point engineers proved a valuable asset, to both sides. The employment of engineers determined not only what the foundation of battle strategies would consist of but also determined the logistical necessities and addressed concerns, as well as provided solutions. Engineers were not only essential for building and design of breast woks and other defenses but the placement of batteries and calculation of the threat of the enemy batteries. Prior to deployment engineers were sent out to determine the features of the landscape that should be both exploited and avoided. They found safe and alternative routs of march, and at times even built them where they did not exist. Engineers where even sent out to scout enemy positions while determining the proper placement of artillery and most likely scenarios for proper defense and attack. With a competent engineer on staff an army on the march was practically unstoppable. At rivers pontoon bridges were used for the first time, much more reliable than Alexander's inflated animal hides. Were interior lines of communication were down engineers brought them back up.
Due to the engineering back grounds of many of the commanding Generals, on both sides, these factors where all considered when conflict strategy came into question. The American Generals showed that there was a much larger picture to be considered and demonstrated the ability to adjust and alter the geography to serve the army in question. As the cross bow made medieval armor obsolete and gun powder undermined the integrity of the fortress it was the engineer that, essentially, wrapped up the equation making nothing sacred. Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach, civil war engineers took in the bigger picture. In the Mexican war many soldiers lost their lives prior to ever firing a single shot. Poor sanitation spread disease through the ranks. Engineers were sent in. Camps were now planned not only for sanitation purposes but also for quick reaction purposes, out hoses were dug as well as drainage systems. The modern military barracks was not only born but quickly evolved into a base, a mini city strategically placed and planned.
European observers, in latter years, recognized that the civil war had produced new forms of tactical warfare. Many of these tactics had either been ignored or misunderstood in Europe. At the onset of the "Great War" these lessons quickly came to light. The necessity of moral, leadership, logistics, strategy as well as the mobilization of Industry and the potential damage, economically, of the blockade. It had become obvious that the civil war was a war of attrition fought, at the end, in the trenches, as well as a struggle between the people not just armies. This war was fought on economic, moral and political arenas as well. Another military first of the civil war was the effects of industrialization. In past conflicts it was often enough to simply defeat an army on the battle field. Due to the new advancements of industry and transportation armies could quickly be re-supplied, re-enforced, re-fitted and re-trained in record time. The only way to surely defeat an army was to defeat its people since the home front was now more important than ever. War was now brought to the people. It was essential to, whenever possible, destroy the enemies' infrastructure. As the war dragged on it was understood that the best way to defeat the opposing army was to attack its home. If the army lost its ability to re-supply and re-train it would eventually implode. No new troops could be raised to take their place. This surely was a lesson that foreign observers took home for implementation in the Royal family feud that dominated the first part of the 20th century. In 1861 Southern Women began to sew flags, underwear, and uniforms to support their departing armies. These women were not able to go to the battle field so found alternate ways to contribute to the cause of secession. This was the will of the people and the enemy army had to attack it as well. Lincoln learned early on that the public viewed the war in terms of battles won and lost. The public did not care about lost or gained territory, they wanted victories. The battles that received the most attention were those fought in the east near Washington. The political significance of these battles won and lost so near the nations capital can be seen today as the novice civil war enthusiast sees only the history of Lee and the army of the Potomac, unaware of the successes in the other theaters. After Lee's defeat at Gettysburg the public saw his camping to invade the North as a failure. What the public failed to consider was that that Lee's invasion destroyed the Unions plan of campaign. Such matters of supply and basic logistics were not factored in when forming public opinion. The significance of the battle of Belmont's success became more evident when its negative effects on Southern resources and morale was observed. Grant began to see the whole of an event when planning and executing his campaigns. The public, on both sides, was watching and he had to take that into consideration. A strategic victory was useless if the public did not understand its significance. Weighted down with this knowledge Lee had to keep this in mind when he drew up campaign orders and strategy. It was clear to Lee that winning battles was nothing without the support of the people. That was the only combination that would work, strong public support gained and maintained through military success. If public support could not be rewarded it would surely wane along with the publics desire to fight on and support its ragged army. One method for destroying the support system of the enemy army was to destroy the will of its people. This was done in a non-violent way through battle field reporting. For the first time ever scenes of the carnage of war was seen by those hundreds of miles away. The one romantic idea of noble war was shattered with these images, as well as with almost immediate reports from the battle front with thanks to the telegraph. People were outraged at the loss of life and with the political implications of a general dip in the moral of the citizenry a new form of psychological warfare emerged. One of the best known campaigns of the Civil War was Sherman's march to the sea. Venturing deep into enemy territory it was impossible for him to maintain lines of communication. Sherman, rather than waist resources trying to do the impossible supplied his army off the land. This not only eliminated the need to maintain long lines of communication but carried out a plan of exhaustion devastating the moral of the Southern people. Sherman's army swarmed across the country like a horde of locusts. By the end of the war the Southern forces were exhausted. A lack of food and clothing as well as general supplies had weekend the Southern cause. Unable to produce the necessary supplies due to Northern raids and unable to import them due to the naval blockade the southern cause was doomed to fail. After the first battle of Bull Run the Confederates built great earth works. These were the predecessors and blue print for those dug in Europe in latter years. The accuracy and greatly extended range of rifled muskets made cover a necessity. The simple fact that one could actually hit what he aimed at made trench warfare unavoidable. Forces became experts at trench works using timber, rocks, and even earth stuffed bags for extra cover. Opposing forces could do nothing but await a charge from the other side. After a few days a general ceasefire would be called to bury the dead and disguise the stench of the dead. As linear formations massed on the field, armed with the newly developed rifled musket, approached one could only seek cover or gamble with death at any distance. Safely protected by earth works and a complete series of trenches a single soldier could safely pick off dozens of approaching soldiers with little to no danger to himself. As previously stressed interior lines of operations was a key to every aspect. Even Xerxes abandoned his, inevitable, conquest of Greece when his own interior lines were compromised at Salamis. As soldiers retreated it was essential to ensure that abandoned, already established, lines were not left operational for enemy use. The tactical retreat was developed and perfected. The once sufficient turn and withdraw method was not enough. Keeping in mind the new advances in long range ordinance and steam power retreats had to be carefully planned and carried out with absolute discipline and foresight.
In England studies of the civil war led to an emphasis on the strategy and the psychology of generalship. The earlier over emphasis on tactics took a back seat as the Americans had shown that their existed a more valuable battlefield quality .The lessons taught by the civil war were of such importance that it occupied a major portion of military college and promotional examinations in England. Military minds would never again think the same as America's trial and error battles formed the new maxims of war. The technological advancements of industrialization proved to serve a dual purpose use and allowed armies to travel and control more area in less time. The old tactics of the great Napoleon and other European greats were no longer relevant. Engineers changed the battle field, literally. With the home front now geared to the support and production of its armies the people now felt responsible for the support of the its armies. War was now brought home with thanks to the telegraph and camera. The horrors of battlefield were now felt in the family parlor.
Source: article by Kelly Snell
Kelly Snell's Sources
Chandler, David G.The Military Maxims of Napoleon. London: Da Capo Press 1995. Clinton, Catherine and Silber,Nina. Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Earl, Edward M. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton University Press, 1943. Eisenhower, John S.D.So Far from God: The U.S: War With Mexico 1846-1848.Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989. Gardner, Alexander.Gardner's Photographic sketch Book of the Civil War. New York: Dover Publications, 1959.
Hattaway, Herman and Jones, Archer.How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991. Luvaas, Jay.The Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance. University of Chicago Press, 1959. McFeely ,William S. Grant. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982. McPherson, James M.Battle Cray of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Ballantine Books, 1989. Pohonka, Brian.McClellan's Way. Produced and directed by Craig Haffner. 45 min. A&E Television Networks, 1993. Videocassette. Ward, Geoffrey C.The Civil War: An Illustrated History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf INC, 1990. Watkins, Sam R. Co. Aytch: A Side Show of the Big Show. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1962. Williams, Harry T.P.G.T. Beauregard: Napoleon in Gray. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1955. Wood, W.J.Civil War Generalship: The Art of Command. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997.
Posted: November 8, 2010 by Britabroad
Causes of the War
Although the subject seems to be able to start a riot, I think that no historical thread about the war would be complete without showing and discussing the causes of the war.
Feelings still run deep, and old loyalties are often brought to the fore whenever I´ve seen this subject discussed. That´s understandable, given that we´re talking about a conflict which only occured 4 or 5 generations ago, and was a civil war - the fallout of which is arguably still being felt in modern US society.
Nevertheless, to ignore the causes would be wrong.
Below is a list of what historians feel were some of the primary causes of the war. It´s by no means complete, but is an objective approach to the subject. Remember, these are the "causes" of the war - and they go way back - they´re not necessarily the reasons why your everyday man in the street fought in the war.
The American Civil War
In U.S. history, the conflict between the Northern states, known as the Union, and the Southern states that seceded from the Union and formed the Confederacy. It took place between 1861 and 1865 and is generally known in the South as the War Between the States, or the War of Northern Aggression, and is also called the War of the Rebellion (the official Union designation), the War of Secession, and the War for Southern Independence. But the name “Civil War”, although much criticized as inexact, is the most widely accepted.
Source: Encyclopedia Brittanica
The Causes The name “Civil War” is misleading because the war was not a class struggle, but a sectional combat having its roots in political, economic, social, and psychological elements so complex that historians still do not agree on its basic causes. It has been characterized, in the words of William H. Seward, as the “irrepressible conflict”. In another judgment, the Civil War was viewed as “criminally stupid, an unnecessary bloodletting brought on by arrogant extremists and blundering politicians”. Both views accept the fact that, in 1861, there existed a situation that, rightly or wrongly, had come to be regarded as insoluble by peaceful means.
Sectionalism - 1783 onwards
In the days of the American Revolution (1775-1783) and of the adoption of the United States Constitution, any differences that existed between Northern and Southern states were dwarfed by their common interest in establishing a new nation. But sectionalism steadily grew stronger. Two camps quickly emerged - those whom supported the idea of strong, independent states bound by a national government who dealt with international and central issues, and those whom supported a stronger central government and weaker state governments. The Constitution Convention & States Rights - Late 18th Century The first organized US government after independence was formed under the Articles of Confederation, forming a loose confederation of states with a weak federal government, but this caused various problems of practicality. The leaders of the time therfore held a secret meeting, known as the Constitutional Convention, where they created the now famous Constitution of the United States. Strong supporters of individual state rights, such as Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry, were not present at this convention, and many felt that the new Constitution ignored the rights of states to act independently. This eventually resulted in the idea of “nullification”, whereby individual states would have the right to rule federal acts as being unconstitutional, but the federal government, perhaps not surprisingly, refused individual states the right of nullification.
However, several leading politicians during the late 18th and early 19th centuries fought vehemently for nullification to be recognised, and when it was not and individual states felt that their wishes were no longer being recognised nor respected, they moved towards “seccession” - the voluntary self-removal from federal authoríty and return to self government.
The Cotton Gin & Southern Agriculture - 1793 onwards In 1793 Eli Whitney invented a machine for separating cotton and seeds more effectively, known as the Cotton Gin. This invention also made the production of cotton much more profitable, which increased the number of plantation owners willing to produce cotton crops, as opposed to tobacco, sugar caine, and corn. The problem was that they would now require a much larger form of cheap labour to assist in this production, ie slaves. Thus the Southern states, where the cotton plant flourished, literally became a one-crop economy which was relíant on slavery, due partly to the small population in these states compared to the North.
During the 19th century the South remained almost completely agricultural, with an economy and a social order largely founded on slavery and the plantation system. These mutually dependent institutions produced the staple crops, especially cotton, from which the South derived its wealth. The North also had its own great agricultural resources, but was always more advanced commercially, and was also expanding industrially.
Abolitionists & The Wilmot Proviso - 1830´s and 1840´s
In the North, moral indignation increased with the rise of the anti-slavery abolitionists in the 1830s. Since slavery was unadaptable to much of the territorial lands, which eventually would be admitted to the Union as free states, the South became more anxious about maintaining its position as an equal in the Union. Southerners thus strongly supported the annexation of Texas (certain to be a slave state), the Mexican War (1846-1848), and even agitated for the annexation of Cuba.
In 1846 a move to ban the use of slaves in all new territories was put forward. Known as the Wilmot Proviso - after its creator, David Wilmot - this idea was disallowed by Congress after much heated debating.
The Missouri Compromise - 1850
Hostility between the two sections grew perceptibly after 1850, the year of the so called Missouri Compromise, which was intended as a permanent solution to the issue in which that hostility was most clearly expressed - the question of the extension or prohibition of slavery in the newly settled Federal Territories of the West. Difficulties over the tax tariff applied to slave owners (8% of the overall southern population), and troubles over internal improvements were also involved, but the territorial issue nearly always loomed largest.
The Fugitive Slave Act - 1850 Part of this Compromise included the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which made any federal official who did not arrest a runaway slave liable to pay a fine, the amount of which depended on the value of the slave in question. Legally recognising slaves as items of property, the Act was seen as being the most controversial part of the Missouri Compromise and caused many pro-abolitionists to increase their efforts to abolish slavery. It also caused an increase in activity in the “Underground Railway” - a secret system of routes by which fleeing slaves made their way to the safety of Canada, assisted by abolitionists, free blacks, and certain religíous groups. Uncle Tom´s Cabin - 1852
The Compromise of 1850 marked the end of the period that might be called the “era of compromise”. The deaths in 1852 of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster left no leader of national stature, but only sectional spokesmen, such as W. H. Seward, Charles Sumner, and Salmon P. Chase in the North and Jefferson Davis and Robert Toombs in the South.
It was also in this year that a book entitled “Uncle Tom´s Cabin” was published. Written by abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe the book, which was designed to illustrate the evils of slavery, became a best seller in the free states and had an enormous impact on how Northerners viewed slavery. It helped further the cause of abolitionists and was later recognized by Abraham Lincoln as being one of the causes of the subsequent war.
Bleeding Kansas - 1854 onwards The Kansas-Nebraska Act, of 1854 allowed these two Territories to implement popular sovereignty over the question of slavery - in other words, to decide for themselves. By 1856, however, Kansas had turned into a hot-bed of violence as pro and anti-slavery forces fought over the states future. Pro-slavery Missourians, known as “Border Ruffians”, would raid pro-abolitionist settlements, and visa-versa, with the situation coming to a head in the town of Lawrence, Kansas in May, 1856. On this occasion, a US Marshal led a posse of 800 pro-slavery Southerners into the town, destroyed several buildings and caused severe panic to the town´s inhabitants. One Lawrence resident was killed by falling masonry during the attack.
The Lencompton Constitution - 1857 In 1857 the Lencompton Constitution was created, allowing Kansas to become a slave state. Pro-slavery supporters, including the US President, James Buchanan, attempted to push the Constitution through the US Congress, but it was rejected and sent back to Kansas for the issue to be decided by way of popular vote. The result was that the majority of those voting decided against the idea, and Kansas consequently became a free state, adding to the turmoil and causing this new state to be known as “Bleeding Kansas”.
The Dredd Scott Case - 1857 In the same year, a slave named Dredd Scott lost his case to prove that he should be free because he had been held as a slave while living in a free state. His petition was disallowed on the grounds that he did not own any property in that state and also, the Court ruled, that although he had been taken into a free state by his “owner”, he was still a slave because, as such, he was the personal property of that owner. This ruling increased the cause of abolitionists further, highlighting the moral and religious issues of one man owning another, as he would an animal.
The South was ever alert to protect its “peculiar institution,” even though many Southerners recognized slavery as an anachronism in a supposedly enlightened age. Passions aroused by arguments over the fugitive slave laws and over slavery in general were further excited by the activities of the Northern abolitionist John Brown, and by the vigorous pro-slavery utterances of William L. Yancey, one of the leading Southern fire-eaters.
John Brown - 1840´s & 1850´s until 1859 John Brown, a radical abolitionist, had been heavily involved in the anti-slavery violence in Kansas. Dissatisfied with the stance of the federal government on this issue, he led a group of seventeen supporters to raid the Federal Arsenal situated at Harper´s Ferry, Virginia. His goal was to start a slave uprising using the captured weapons and, in October, 1859, he and his group succeeded in overpowering the night watchman on guard, and entered the Arsenal complex. However, they were quickly surrounded by local militia and federal troops, led by none other than Colonel Robert E Lee, USMC, and eventually all were arrested or killed. Brown was hanged for treason, but this blow to the radical abolitionist movement also provided them with a martyr for their cause.
The Republican Party - 1860 The “wedges of separation” caused by slavery also split large Protestant sects into Northern and Southern branches and dissolved the Whig party. Most Southern Whigs joined the Democratic Party, one of the few remaining, if shaky, nationwide institutions. The new Republican Party, heir to the Free-Soil Party and the Liberty Party, was a strictly Northern phenomenon. The crucial point was reached in the presidential election of July,1860, in which the Republican candidate, Abraham Lincoln, defeated three opponents; Stephen A. Douglas (Northern Democrat), John C. Breckinridge (Southern Democrat), and John Bell (Constitutional Union Party). The Northern phenomenon had won through, largely due to the fact that the population within the Northern free states numbered some 23,000,000, whilst that in the Southern slave states only numbered some 9,000,000.
Even though his views on slavery and abolition were seen as moderate during his nomination and election, Lincoln's victory was the signal for the secession of South Carolina on December 20th, 1860. This state had previously warned the federal government that it would secede from the Union if Lincoln gained power, claiming that Lincoln shared the views of most other Republicans - that the Southern slave states were becoming too powerful and, therefore, that the institution of slavery would not be extended into any new territories or states subsequently added to the Union.
Secession - December, 1860 to June, 1861 Over the next six months each of the Southern slave states held a referendum on the question of secession. The first to follow South Carolina was Mississippi, on 9th January, 1861 - followed by Florida the next day, Alabama the day after that, Georgia on 19th January, Louisiana on 26th January, and Texas on 1st February.
Immediately the question of Federal property in these states became important, especially the forts in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina. The outgoing President, James Buchanan, a Northern Democrat who was either truckling to the Southern, pro-slavery wing of his party, or sincerely attempting to avert war, pursued a vacillating course. At any rate, the question of the forts was still unsettled when Lincoln was inaugurated in March, 1861.
The Crittenden Compromise - February, 1861 Meanwhile there had been several futile efforts to reunite the two sections, notably the Crittenden Compromise offered by Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden. This motion proposed six constitutional amendments and four Congressional resolutions, but it was rejected by both the House of Representatives and the Senate in February, 1861. This last-ditch attempt to avert war and re-unite the Union had failed. Fort Sumter - April, 1861 Lincoln resolved to hold Fort Sumter, situated in Charleston Harbor, and the new Confederate States of America government, under President Jefferson Davis, and South Carolina itself, were equally determined to oust the Federals. When a deadline to quit the fort was not met, and a threat of resupplying the garrison was made by Lincoln, South Carolina troops began bombarding the fort for more than 30 hours on 12th and 13th April, 1861.
Perhaps surprisingly, there were no fatalities, and the garrison - having formally surrendered the fort in the face of this artillery attack - were safely evacuated by a US naval vessel the next day. In the North this was seen an act of naked military agression by the South; In the South, Lincoln´s refusal to vacate the fort was seen as an act of military occupation. Open warfare was drawing ever closer, compounded by Lincoln´s reaction to the Fort Sumter incident - to call for an army of 75,000 Union volunteers to quell what was seen as a Southern rebellion against the nation´s government.
Showing their solidarity with the other Southern states which had already seceded from the Union, Virginia did likewise four days later, despite the fact that the majority of voters in West Virginia had elected to remain in the Union. Arkansas followed on 6th May, and North Carolina on 20th May. The final slave state to vote in favour of secession was Tennessee, which formally left the Union on 8th June, 1861, but, like Virginia, there were those whom opposed such a move - particularly in the Eastern counties.Opposing Opinions - 1861 onwards The so called “Border States” - Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware - all slave states, voted to remain within the Union. However, Missouri, as well as Kentucky, were claimed by the Confederacy and were subsequently bitterly contested during the following conflict.
These then, according to historians, were the main causes of the outbreak of war between the states mentioned, drawn from a variety of sources. For the landed gentry and agricultural businessmen of the South, slavery was paramount to their operations and continuing wealth. To the majority of southerners, their state rights, social justice, and a perceived threat from the Union brought them to the Colours.
In the North, the initial causes were to prevent secession and preserve the Union in the face of an ever growing secessionist movement in the South, coupled with strong anti-slavery sentiments amongst the abolitionists.
In other words, in its purest form, and like most wars, it was all about power, money, and salvaging political reputations, fueled by propaganda from both sides.
Source: unknown
Posted: November 10, 2010 by Britabroad
Spying in the Civil War
Agents for the Blue and the Gray . . . In an era of hydrogen bombs, guided missiles, and germ warfare, the subject may have an Arcadian sound, the ring of a simpler, more romantic time. But in that respect, as in others, the conflict of North and South was a paradox, a combination of paradoxes.
That war of over one hundred and thirty years ago produced the nation's first mass armies, and a brutality and mechanized slaughter that shocked the sensibilities of the day. It had aircraft-balloons that floated over the lines-submarines, ironclad warships, automatic guns, trenches, a military draft-and the first organized espionage that the country ever knew. On both sides the spying involved treachery, filching of official secrets, the skillful seduction of loyalty. This war between Americans probably saw more espionage, involving more people, than any in our history.
It has been called the first of the modem conflicts; it was also the last of the romantic ones. In its spying, the generation that thrilled in admiration of Sir Walter Scott usually observed "rules" of knightly, or at least gentlemanly, conduct. Had that not been true, had Northern and Southern leaders not played Ivanhoe on endless occasions, scores of undercover agents would never have survived to tell their stories.
It was a spy-conscious war, and sometimes it seemed that everybody was spying on everybody else and talking volubly on the subject, in newspapers, parlors, bars, and at street corners. Nevertheless, few officials did anything to stop the enemy's espionage. The present-day reader may be astonished at the ease with which agents made their way across the lines and through opposition territory. Repeatedly they presented themselves to civilian and military officials, pumped them of information, and rode off with a bright good-by.
The nature of the war made espionage easy to carry on and difficult to stop. A Tennessean looked and acted much like a Pennsylvanian, a Texan like an Ohioan; if he simply paid attention to regional accents, an agent had little trouble. Repeatedly Southern and Northern commands turned apoplectic on discovering that the man whom they had escorted proudly over their fortifications was a spy for the other side. By that time he was usually well on his way to his home base.
Yet by and large these agents for the Blue and Gray played an amateur's game. Espionage had not yet become a high art or achieved the status to which Continental masters soon elevated it. The American spies improvised, experimented, and what they lacked in finesse they made up in energy and determination. They broke rules usually because they had never heard of them. They were a mixed crew, gentle and flamboyant, earnest and brazen, ingenious or crafty. They ranged from shoe clerks to young plantation owners, lawyers to grandes dames, actresses to plump housewives.
The ladies were terrific. In this war they made their American debut in espionage, and never since have the nation's women taken such an active part as spies. No matter how raging a partisan a man might be, his wife or sister was probably still more impassioned. They became the best recruiting sergeants; they were "not at home" to those who lagged in enlisting, and they sent such friends white feathers or boxes containing dresses. They connived endlessly, they took great risks, and they pushed through to success in ways impossible to simple males. They showed again that the female is not only the deadlier of the sexes, but also the livelier.
In the eighteen-sixties the double standard prevailed in spying as in other matters, and to the ladies' benefit. Neither side did a great deal about it, even when the identities of women agents were well established. As the war grew slowly more bitter, men operatives were hanged, one by one. The women received threats, or perhaps a prison term, and then freedom to try again. That war saw no Ethel Rosenbergs, and no Edith Cavells. After all, a lady was a lady. . . . A gentleman could not bring himself to order her shot or swung from a gallows.
In part this is a tale of two cities, Washington and Richmond, with scenes in Louisville and New Orleans, Nashville and St. Louis and Baltimore. By an accident of geography the capitals of North and South lay only a hundred miles apart. Their proximity made them obvious targets for rival armies and no less for rival spies.
At the war's beginning neither Union nor Confederacy had a security organization nor a secret service; the nation had never known one. The general war effort started as an exercise of amateurs. Struggling to create a colossal military machine of a kind that the country had not previously visualized, each side floundered. In no field was the process of trial and error more pronounced than in espionage.
In Richmond and Washington roughly organized intelligence units gradually emerged. Inconspicuously located in the Richmond War Department was an office halfway between that of Jefferson Davis and the War Secretary's. Most Richmonders considered the Signal Bureau only the headquarters of that newfangled branch of operations which used "flagfloppers." Confederates teased the dapper young men who carried blue and scarlet cloths: "Mister, is the flies a-botherin' of you?"
The Signal Bureau, however, had special functions. Its offices carried on an unending correspondence in cipher with Confederate agents in Washington, Baltimore, and other key points in Union territory. Early in the war the North tried to establish "land blockades" to cut off communication as well as thousands of items not available in the non-manufacturing South. But representatives of the Confederate Signal Bureau managed to run courier lines in all directions over land and water.
Several offices beside the Signal Bureau involved themselves in Southern espionage-that of Jefferson Davis, the successive War Secretaries, the provost marshal. So many had a part, in fact, that the effort suffered; responsibilities were scattered, confused, and Union spies appeared to slip in and out of the Confederacy like fish through a wide-meshed net.
The North stumbled on in its own way. Arriving for his inauguration, in the face of threats against his life, Abraham Lincoln lacked even an official bodyguard. In the early months of the war Southern agents had a field day, working almost without hindrance. The first Federal defeat brought an awakening, a shake-up, and the North's first secret service bureau.
Authority over the new service was transient. The State Department supervised intelligence matters in the beginning; then they went over to the War office, and as in Richmond the provost marshal and other officials had a finger in the pie. Sometimes Washington spies seemed to be spying on other spies. But then, if only because of the war's course, which brightened steadily for the North, the Union system became more expert than the Confederacy's, boasting some rare feats of espionage.
Early and late, spies for both sides had a superb asset-the almost unbelievable carelessness of officialdom and citizenry alike. Little or no effort was made to check clacking tongues, and casual gossip told all an enemy needed to know about an impending advance or a strategic installation. A man had an "open face," so he mustbe on our side, you understand.
Another aid to spying lay in the newspaper situation. In Dixie as in the North the press blandly printed vital information. Preparing for the Battle of Chickamauga in Tennessee, Confederate General Braxton Bragg received a New York Times clipping which explained precisely how the Unionists would fool him into a shift of position. Bragg stayed put. Near Vicksburg a Northern spy brought his superior a newspaper story in which a correspondent described in full the Federal plans for a "secret canal" behind the Mississippi. The project had to be dropped.
More than perhaps any other Southern general, Robert E. Lee used secret agents to supply him with every available Northern newspaper. The Virginian studied them by the hour, noting, comparing, questioning. A Southern spy with a copy of the Philadelphia Inquirer provided information of a withdrawal by McClellan; as a result, Lee shifted thousands of troops. The Southerner's military shrewdness kept him from accepting false stories planted for his benefit, and Lee himself once inserted a fake in Confederate papers.
The complete story of American espionage of 1861-65 will, of course, never be known. Much of it was never committed to paper; countless incidents were understood by only three or four people, who never gave out the facts. Innumerable agents died obscure deaths, shot down on a dark road or succumbing to exposure.
When Richmond fell, one of the last acts of Judah Benjamin was reportedly the burning of most of the South's secret service papers. Years later Jefferson Davis discouraged attempts to give out details of Confederate spying. On the Union side General Grenville Dodge similarly opposed efforts to reveal names and activities. Too many people might be hurt.
Nevertheless, a great deal of data is available from a variety of sources. In the Official Records of both armies were recorded thousands of pages of correspondence, orders of inquiry and arrest, some of them carrying evidence of all too human rage and puzzlement over the episodes.
These episodes chiefly concern civilian spies, though related work of military scouts is involved at some points. The story is at times bizarre, almost unbelievable. A plot-maker concerned with credibility would hesitate to let his characters do some of the things these spies did in real life.
Source: Spies for the Blue and Gray by Harnett T. Kane Posted: December 27, 2010 by Britabroad
Europe and the American Civil War
The war had a direct bearing on the United States' foreign relations and the relations that were most important were those with the two dominant powers of Europe, England and France. Each country was a monarchy, and a monarchy does not ordinarily like to see a rebellion succeed in any land. (The example may prove contagious.) Yet the war had not progressed very far before it was clear that the ruling classes in each of these two countries sympathized strongly with the Confederacy-so strongly that with just a little prodding they might be moved to intervene and bring about Southern independence by force of arms. The South was, after all, an aristocracy, and the fact that it had a broad democratic base was easily overlooked at a distance of three thousand miles. Europe's aristocracies had never been happy about the prodigious success of the Yankee democracy. If the nation now broke into halves, proving that democracy did not contain the stuff of survival, the rulers of Europe would be well pleased.
To be sure, the Southern nation was based on the institution of chattel slavery-a completely repugnant anachronism by the middle of the nineteenth century. Neither the British nor the French people would go along with any policy that involved fighting to preserve slavery. But up to the fall of 1862 slavery was not an issue in the war. The Federal government had explicitly declared that it was fighting solely to save the Union. If a Southern emissary wanted to convince Europeans that they could aid the South without thereby aiding slavery, he could prove his case by citing the words of the Federal President and Congress. As far as Europe was concerned, no moral issue was involved; the game of power politics could be played with a clear conscience.
So it was played, and the threat of European intervention was real and immediate. Outright war with England nearly took place in the fall of 1861, when a hot-headed US. naval officer, Captain Charles Wilkes, undertook to twist the lion's tail and got more of a reaction than anyone was prepared for. Jefferson Davis had named two distinguished Southerners, James M. Mason of Virginia and John Slidell of Louisiana, as commissioners to represent Confederate interests abroad, Mason in England and Slidell in France. They got out of Charleston, South Carolina, on a blockade-runner at the beginning of October and went via Nassau to Havana, where they took passage for England on the British mail steamer Trent. Precisely at this time U.S.S. San Jacinto was returning to the United States from a long tour of duty along the African coast.. She put in at a Cuban port, looking for news of Confederate commerce raiders which were reported to be active in that vicinity, and there her commander, Captain Wilkes, heard about Mason and Slidell. He now worked out a novel interpretation of international law. A nation at war (it was generally agreed) had a right to stop and search a neutral merchant ship if it suspected that ship of carrying the enemy's dispatches. Mason and Slidell, Wilkes reasoned, were in effect Confederate dispatches, and he had a right to remove them. So on November 8, 1861, he steamed out into the Bahama Channel, fired twice across Trent's bows, sent a boat's crew aboard, collared the Confederate commissioners, and bore them off in triumph to the United States, where they were lodged in Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. Wilkes was hailed as a national hero. Congress voted him its thanks, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, ordinarily a most cautious mortal, warmly commended him. But in England there was an uproar which almost brought on a war. The mere notion that Americans could halt a British ship on the high seas and remove lawful passengers was intolerable. Eleven thousand regular troops were sent to Canada, the British fleet was put on a war footing, and a sharp note was dispatched to the United States, demanding surrender of the prisoners and a prompt apology. If the general tempo of things had not been so feverish just then, experts on international law might have amused themselves by pointing out that the American and British governments had precisely reversed their traditional policies. In the Napoleonic wars British warships had exercised the right of search and seizure without restraint, stopping American merchant ships on the high seas to remove persons whom they suspected of being British subjects-doing, in fact, exactly what Wilkes had done with a slightly different object. The United States government had protested that this was improper and illegal, and the whole business had helped bring on the War of 1812. Now an American naval officer had done what British naval officers had done half a century earlier, and the British government was protesting in the same way the earlier American government had done. If anyone cared to make anything of it, the situation was somewhat ironic.
It was touch and go for a while, because a good many brash Yankees were quite willing to fight the British, and the seizure of the Confederate commissioners had somehow seemed like a great victory. But Lincoln stuck to the policy of one war at a time, and after due deliberation the apology was made and the prisoners were released. The Trent incident was forgotten, and the final note was strangely anticlimactic. The transports bearing the British troops to Canada arrived off the American coast just after the release and apology. Secretary of State Seward offered, a little too graciously, to let the soldiers disembark on American soil for rapid transportation across Maine, but the British coldly rejected this unnecessary courtesy.
The Trent affair had been symptomatic. The war had put a heavy strain on relations between the United States and Great Britain, and there would always be danger that some unexpected occurrence would bring on a war. Yet the two countries were fortunate in the character of their diplomats. The American Minister in London was Charles Francis Adams, and the British Minister in Washington was Lord Lyons, and these two had done all they could, in the absence of instructions from their governments, to keep the Trent business from getting out of hand. Even Secretary of State Seward, who earlier had shown a politician's weakness for making votes in America by defying the British, proved supple enough to retreat with good grace from an untenable position; and Earl Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, who had sent a very stiff note, nevertheless phrased it carefully so that Seward could make his retreat without too great difficulty.
Much more serious was the situation that developed late in the summer of 1862. At that time, as far as any European could see, the Confederacy was beginning to look very much like a winner-a point which James Mason insistently pressed home with British officialdom. The Northern attempt to capture the Confederate capital had failed, Virginia's soil had been cleared of invaders, and in the East and West alike the Confederates were on the offensive. Minister Adams warned Seward that the British government might very soon offer to mediate the difficulty between North and South, which would be a polite but effective way of intimating that in the opinion of Great Britain the quarrel had gone on long enough and ought to be ended-by giving the South what it wanted. Adams knew what he was talking about. Earl Russell had given Mason no encouragement whatever, but after news of the Second Battle of Bull Pun reached London, he and Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, agreed that along in late September or thereabouts there should be a cabinet meeting at which Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary would ask approval of the mediation proposal. (Implicit in all of this was the idea that if the Northern government should refuse to accept mediation, Britain would go ahead and recognize the Confederacy.) With a saving note of caution, Russell and Palmerston concluded not to bring the plan before the cabinet until they got further word about Lee's invasion of the North. If the Federals were beaten, then the proposal would go through; if Lee failed, then it might be well to wait a little longer before taking any action.
On October 7 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, William E. Gladstone, made a notable speech at Newcastle in which he remarked that no matter what one's opinion of slavery might be, facts had to be faced: "There is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either-they have made a nation." He added, "We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as regards their separation from the North."
Naturally enough, this raised a sensation. Gladstone explained that he had simply been expressing his own opinion rather than that of the government, and when Earl Russell saw the speech, he wrote Gladstone that he "went beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed." His lordship went on to say that he did not think the cabinet was prepared for recognition, but that it would meet very soon to discuss the project.
In all of this there was less of actual hostility toward the North than is usually supposed. Palmerston and Russell were prepared to accept an accomplished fact, when and if such a fact became visible; if the Confederacy was definitely going to win, the fact ought to be admitted and the war ought to be ended. But they were not prepared to go further than that. Gladstone might commit his calculated indiscretion, the upper class might continue to hold the Confederates as sentimental favorites, and the London Times might thunder at intervals against the Northern government; but the British government itself tried to be scrupulously correct, and long before the war ended, ardent Southerners were complaining that the government's attitude had been consistently hostile to the Confederacy. Even the business of the British-built cruisers and ironclad rams did not alter this situation. Legally, vessels like the Alabama were simply fast merchant ships, given arms and a warlike character only after they had left English waters, and the government had no legal ground to prevent their construction and delivery. The famous rams themselves were technically built for French purchasers, and even though it was an open secret that they would ultimately go into the Confederate navy, there was never anything solid for the British authorities to put their teeth into. When the British government finally halted the deal and forced the builders to sell the rams to the British navy, it actually stretched the law very substantially. That it did this under a plain threat of war from the United States did not alter the fact that in the end the Confederacy could not get what it desperately wanted from Great Britain.
Nor was the United States without active friends in England. Such reformers as John Bright and Richard Cobden spoke up vigorously in support of the Lincoln government, and even when the cotton shortage threw thousands of textile workers out of employment, the British working class remained consistently opposed to the Confederacy. But the decisive factor, in the fall of 1862 and increasingly thereafter, was the Battle of Antietam and what grew out of it.
Antietam by itself showed that Lee's invasion was not going to bring that final, conclusive Confederate triumph which had been anticipated. The swift recession of the high Confederate tide was as visible in England as in America, and as the autumn wore away Palmerston and Russell concluded that it would not be advisable to bring the mediation-recognition program before the cabinet.
Far more significant than Antietam, however, was the Emancipation Proclamation, which turned out to be one of the strangest and most important state papers ever issued by an American President.
During the late spring and early summer of 1862 Lincoln had come to see that he must broaden the base of the war. Union itself was not enough; the undying vitality and drive of Northern antislavery men must be brought into full, vigorous support of the war effort, and to bring this about the Northern government must officially declare itself against slavery. Lincoln was preparing such a declaration even before McClellan's army left the Virginia Peninsula, but he could not issue it until the North had won a victory. (Seward pointed out that to issue it on the heels of a string of Northern defeats would make it look as if the government were despairingly crying for help rather than making a statement of principle.) Antietam gave Lincoln the victory he had to have, and on September 22 he issued the famous proclamation, the gist of which was that on January 1, 1863, all slaves held in a state or a part of a state which was in rebellion should be "then, thence-forward and forever free."
Technically, the proclamation was almost absurd. It proclaimed freedom for all slaves in precisely those areas where the United States could not make its authority effective, and allowed slavery to continue in slave states which remained under Federal control. It was a statement of intent rather than a valid statute, and it was of doubtful legality; Lincoln had issued it as a war measure, basing it on his belief that the President's undefined "war powers" permitted him to do just about anything he chose to do in order to win the war, but the courts might not agree with him. Abolitionists felt that it did not go nearly far enough, and border-state people and many Northern Democrats felt that it went altogether too far. But in the end it changed the whole character of the war and, more than any other single thing, doomed the Confederacy to defeat.
The Northern Government now was committed to a broader cause, with deep, mystic overtones; it was fighting for union and for human freedom as well, and the very nature of the Union for which it was fighting would be permanently deepened and enriched. A new meaning was given to Daniel Webster's famous "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable"; the great Battle Hymn now rang out as an American Marseillaise, and Northerners who had wondered whether the war was quite worth its terrible cost heard, at last, the notes of the bugle that would never call retreat. A war goal with emotional power as direct and enduring as the Confederacy's own had at last been erected for all men to see.
And in Europe the American Civil War had become something in which no western government dared to intervene. The government of Britain, France, or any other nation could play power politics as it chose, as long as the war meant nothing more than a government's attempt to put down a rebellion; but no government that had to pay the least attention to the sentiment of its own people could take sides against a government which was trying to destroy slavery. The British cabinet was never asked to consider the proposition which Palmerston and Russell had been talking about, and after 1862 the chance that Great Britain would decide in favor of the Confederacy became smaller and smaller and presently vanished entirely. The Emancipation Proclamation had locked the Confederates in an anachronism which could not survive in the modern world.
Along with this there went a much more prosaic material factor. Europe had had several years of short grain crops, and during the Civil War the North exported thousands of tons of grain-grain which could be produced in increasing quantities, despite the wartime manpower shortage, because the new reapers and binders were boosting farm productivity so sharply. Much as Great Britain needed American cotton, just now she needed American wheat even more. In a showdown she was not likely to do anything that would cut off that source of food.
All of this did not mean that Secretary Seward had no more problems in his dealings with the world abroad. The recurring headache growing out of the British habit of building ships for the Confederate navy has already been noted. There was also Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, who was a problem all by himself.
Napoleon's government in many ways was quite cordial to the Confederates, and in the fall of 1862 Napoleon talked with Slidell and then proposed that France, England, and Russia Join in trying to bring about a six-month armistice. To Slidell the Emperor remarked that if the Northern government rejected this proposal, that might give good reason for recognition and perhaps even for active intervention. Neither Britain nor Russia would go along with him, but early in 1863 Napoleon had the French Minister at Washington suggest to Seward that there ought to be a meeting of Northern and Southern representatives to see whether the war might not be brought to a close. Seward politely but firmly rejected this suggestion, and the Congress, much less politely, formally resolved that any foreign government which made such proposals was thereby committing an unfriendly act. Whether Napoleon really expected anything to come of his suggestion is a question; probably he strongly wanted a Southern victory but was afraid to do anything definite without British support. His real interest was in Mexico, where he took advantage of the war to create a French puppet state, installing the Hapsburg Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Propped up by French troops, Maximilian managed to hang on to his shaky throne for several years, and if his control over the country had been firmer, Napoleon would probably have given the Confederacy, from that base, more active support. Shortly after Appomattox the Federal government sent Phil Sheridan and 50,000 veterans to the Mexican border in blunt warning, Seward filed a formal protest against the occupation, and Napoleon withdrew his soldiers. When the French troops left, the Mexicans regained control, and Maximilian was deposed and executed.
Singularly enough, the one European country which showed a definite friendship for the Northern government was Czarist Russia. In the fall of 1863 two Russian fleets entered American waters, one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. They put into New York and San Francisco harbors and spent the winter there, and the average Northerner expressed both surprise and delight over the visit, assuming that the Russian Czar was taking this means of warning England and France that if they made war in support of the South, he would help the North. Since pure altruism is seldom or never visible in any country's foreign relations, the business was not quite that simple. Russia at the time was in some danger of getting into a war with England and France, for reasons totally unconnected with the Civil War in America; to avoid the risk of having his fleets icebound in Russian ports, the Czar simply had them winter in American harbors. If war should come, they would be admirably placed to raid British and French commerce. For many years most Americans believed that for some inexplicable reason of his own the Czar had sent the fleets simply to show his friendship for America.
Considering the course of the war as a whole, it must be said that Northern diplomacy was highly successful and that Southern diplomacy was a flat failure. At the time, most Northerners bitterly resented what they considered the unfriendly attitude of Britain and France, but neither country did much that would give the South any real nourishment. The British commerce raiders were indeed expensive nuisances to the North, and the famous "Alabama claims" after the war were prosecuted with vigor; but cruisers like the Alabama might have ranged the seas for a generation without ever compelling the North to give up the struggle. The open recognition, the active aid, the material and financial support which the South needed so greatly were never forthcoming. Europe refused to take a hand in America's quarrel. North and South were left to fight it out between themselves.
Source: The American Heritage New History of the Civil War Posted: December 27, 29, 2010 and January 4, 2011 by Britabroad
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 24, 2012 at 10:41 AM.
The United States had long struggled to balance the interests of slaveholders and abolitionists. The events later known as Bleeding Kansas were set into motion by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which nullified the Missouri Compromise and instead implemented the concept of popular sovereignty. An ostensibly democratic idea, popular sovereignty stated that the inhabitants of each territory or state should decide whether it would be a free or slave state; however, this resulted in immigration en masse to Kansas by activists from both sides. At one point, Kansas had two separate governments, each with its own constitution, although only one was federally recognized. On January 29, 1861, Kansas was admitted to the Union as a free state, less than three months before the Battle of Fort Sumter which began the Civil War.
Origins The issue of slavery, deeply embedded in the culture of the Southern United States, had been divisive since the country's formation. Indeed, the United States Constitution probably would not have been ratified had not slavery been preserved. The Constitution's three-fifths compromise, under which three-fifths of a state's slave population was counted for purposes of its congressional representation, was another effort to balance the interests of slave states and free states. The issue became even more contentious as the country expanded and was faced with admitting new states as free states or slave states, threatening to shift the fragile balance of power in either direction. The Missouri Compromise was an attempt to preserve this balance; later, the Compromise of 1850 served a similar purpose, but the nation continued to teeter on the brink of civil war.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 created the Kansas and Nebraska territories and opened the lands to settlement by American pioneers. The Act also established that the question of whether slavery would be allowed in the new states of Kansas and Nebraska would be decided by the inhabitants of the states – essentially repealing the Missouri Compromise. The concept of letting the settlers decide, now known as "popular sovereignty," was an idea advocated by U.S. SenatorStephen A. Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories. Popular sovereignty was an attempt to offer concessions to the Southern states by making possible the expansion of slavery into both western and northern territories. While this doctrine, also known in Kansas Territory as "squatter sovereignty," was not actually formulated by U.S. SenatorLewis Cass, he nevertheless earned the sobriquet "Father of Popular Sovereignty" by providing its ideological framework in a letter published in the Washington Daily Union, which later also secured for Cass the presidential nomination of the Democratic party.
Initially, it was assumed that few slave owners would attempt to settle in Kansas and make it a slave state, because it was thought to be too far north for profitable exploitation of slaves. However, the eastern portion of Kansas along the Missouri River was as suitable for slave-based agriculture as the nearby "black belt" of Missouri in which most of Missouri's slaves were held.
The settlement and the zone formation of the state government in Kansas became highly politicized beyond the borders of the territory. There were a number of reasons for this. Missouri, a slave state, was uniquely exposed to free states, with Illinois and Iowa bordering it on the east and north. Most parts of Missouri held very few slaves, and slave owners were a very small proportion of the state's population. If Kansas entered the Union as a free state, Missouri would have free soil on three sides. Since manumission, abolition activity, and escape were all more common in the border states, the existence of nearby free soil was a threat to Missouri slaveowners.
Also, in the Senate, each state is apportioned two senate seats. A rough balance had existed between free and slave states, but each addition of a state threatened to tip the balance, disrupting the status quo.
Meeting of North and South The first organized immigration to Kansas Territory was by citizens of southern states, most notably neighboring Missouri, who came to the territory to secure the expansion of slavery. Pro-slavery settlements were established by these immigrants at Leavenworth and Atchison.
At the same time, several anti-slavery organizations in the North, most notably the New England Emigrant Aid Company, were organizing to fund several thousand settlers to move to Kansas and vote to make it a free state. These organizations helped to establish Free-State settlements further into the territory, in Topeka, Manhattan, and Lawrence. Abolitionist preacher Henry Ward Beecher collected funds to arm like-minded settlers with Sharps rifles, leading to the precision rifles becoming known as "Beecher's Bibles." By the summer of 1855, approximately 1,200 New Englanders had made the journey to the new territory, armed and ready to fight.
Rumors had spread through the South that 30,000 Northerners were descending on Kansas, and in November 1854, thousands of armed Southerners known as "Border Ruffians," mostly from Missouri, poured over the line in an attempt to steal the election to Congress of a single territorial delegate. Less than half the ballots were cast by registered voters, and at one location, only 20 of over 600 voters were legal residents. The proslavery forces won the election. While Kansas had approximately 1,500 registered voters at the time, not all of whom actually voted, over 6,000 votes were cast. More significantly, the Border Ruffians repeated their actions on March 30, 1855 when the first territorial legislature was elected, swaying the vote again in favor of slave Ry.
The proslavery territorial legislature convened in Pawnee on July 2, 1855, but after one week it adjourned to the Shawnee Mission on the Missouri border, where it began passing laws to institutionalize slavery in Kansas Territory. In August 1855, a group of Free-Soilers met and resolved to reject the proslavery laws passed by the territorial legislature. This meeting led to the drafting of the Topeka Constitution and the formation of a shadow government. In a message to Congress on January 24, 1856, PresidentFranklin Pierce declared the Free-State Topeka government to be a "revolution" against the rightful leaders. Later, in April 1856, a three-man congressional committee investigated the vote. The majority report of the committee found the elections to be improperly influenced.
Open violence In October 1855, John Brown came to Kansas Territory to fight slavery. On November 21, 1855 the (relatively bloodless) "Wakarusa War" began when a Free-Stater named Charles Dow was shot by a pro-slavery settler. The only fatal casualty occurring during the siege was one Free-State man named Thomas Barber. He was shot and killed on December 6, 1855 where the main body of the invaders were encamped, some six miles (ten kilometers) from Lawrence. A few months later, on May 21, 1856, a group of Border Ruffians entered the Free-State stronghold of Lawrence, where they burned the Free State Hotel, destroyed two newspaper offices and their printing presses, and ransacked homes and stores. The following day, on the afternoon of May 22, 1856, Preston Smith Brooks (a Democratic Congressman from South Carolina) physically attacked Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in the Senate chambers, hitting him on the head with his thick cane. Sumner was blinded by his own blood, and staggered away until he collapsed, lapsing into unconsciousness. Brooks continued to beat Sumner until he broke his cane. Several other senators attempted to help Sumner, but were blocked by Rep. Laurence Keitt, who was holding a pistol and shouting "Let them be!" This was in retaliation for insulting language Sumner used against Brooks's relative in a speech Sumner made that denounced Southerners for proslavery violence in Kansas. Sumner was beaten severely and did not return to his Senate desk for three years as a result of his injuries to the head and neck area; he became regarded as an antislavery martyr.
These acts in turn inspired John Brown to lead a group of men in Kansas Territory on an attack at a proslavery settlement at Pottawatomie Creek. During the night of May 24, the group, which included four of Brown's sons, led seven pro-slavery men from their homes and hacked them to death with broadswords. Brown's men let Jerome Glanville and James Harris return home to the cabin of Harris. On June 2, 1856, John Brown took future Confederate Colonel Henry C. Pate and 22 other pro-slavery soldiers prisoner at the Battle of Black Jack.
In 1856, the official territorial capital was moved to Lecompton, a town only 12 miles (19 km) from Lawrence. In April 1856, a three-man congressional investigating committee arrived in Lecompton to look into the troubles. The majority report of the committee found the elections to be improperly influenced by Border Ruffians. The President failed to follow its recommendations, however, and continued to recognize the pro-slavery legislature as the legitimate government of Kansas. In fact, on July 4, 1856, Pierce sent federal troops to break up an attempted meeting of the shadow government in Topeka. In August, thousands of proslavery Southerners formed into armies and marched into Kansas. That same month, Brown and several of his followers engaged 400 proslavery soldiers in the "Battle of Osawatomie." The hostilities raged for another two months until Brown departed the Kansas Territory, and a new territorial governor, John W. Geary, took office and managed to prevail upon both sides for peace. This was followed by a fragile peace broken by intermittent violent outbreaks for two more years. The last major outbreak of violence was touched off by the Marais des Cygnes massacre in 1858, where Border Ruffians killed five Free State men.
In all, approximately 56 people died in Bleeding Kansas by the time the violence completely abated in 1859. Following the commencement of the American Civil War in 1861, additional guerrilla violence erupted on the border between Kansas and Missouri.
Constitutional fight An adjunct to the guerrilla warfare in Bleeding Kansas was the fight over the constitution that would govern the state of Kansas. Several constitutions were drafted, including the 1855 Topeka Constitution, which created the shadow Free-State government to resist the illegitimate government voted in by unregistered Missourian voters.
In 1857, a Kansas constitutional convention was convened, which drafted what has become known as the "Lecompton Constitution," a pro-slavery document. The abolitionist forces boycotted the ratification vote because it failed to offer them a means to vote against slavery. The Lecompton Constitution was accepted by President James Buchanan, who urged acceptance and statehood. Congress disagreed and ordered another election. In the second election the pro-slavery forces boycotted the process, allowing the anti-slavery forces to claim victory by defeating the document. In the end, the Lecompton Constitution died because it was not clear whether it represented the will of the majority.
In mid-1859, the Wyandotte Constitution was drafted; this document represented the prevailing abolitionist view. It was approved by the electorate by a 2-to-1 margin, and Kansas entered the Union as a free state pursuant to its terms on January 29, 1861.
Source: unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Background The events that led to the Wakarusa War began on November 21, 1855, when a Free-Stater named Charles Dow was shot by a pro-slavery settler. Violent reprisals on both sides led to escalating tension. On December 1, 1855 a small army of Missourians, acting under the command of Douglas County, Kansas Sheriff Samuel J. Jones, entered Kansas and laid siege to Lawrence.
Siege During the siege, the main body of the invaders were encamped on the Wakarusa bottoms, some six miles (10 km) from Lawrence. The invading army numbered nearly 1,500 men. They were indifferently armed as a whole, although they had broken into the United States Arsenal at Liberty, Missouri, and stolen guns, cutlasses and cannon, and such munitions of war as they required. In Lawrence, John Brown and James Lane had mustered Free-State settlers into a defending army and erected barricades. No attack on Lawrence was made. A treaty of peace quelled the disorder, and its provisions were generally accepted. The only fatal casualty occurring during the siege was of a Free-State man named Thomas Barber, who had come to the defense of Lawrence. His death was memorialized in a poem by John Greenleaf Whittier titled Burial of Barber.
Source: unknown; reference: Cutler, William G. (1883). History of the State of Kansas Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Notably, only a few of the Border Ruffians actually owned slaves; they were too poor. What motivated them was hatred of the Yankees and abolitionists and the prospect of free blacks living in neighboring areas. Additionally, the presence of bands of both Kansan and Missourian combatants in the area made it difficult for families on the border to retain neutrality.
Actions in Bleeding Kansas The Border Ruffians at times also engaged in larger battles with Free-State forces. On December 1, 1855, a small army, composed mainly of Border Ruffians, laid siege to Lawrence, Kansas, in the nearly bloodless climax to the "Wakarusa War." On May 21, 1856, Border Ruffians in conjunction with pro-slavery Kansans and officers of the territorial legislature, again attacked Lawrence. On the other side, anti-slavery Kansas militants (known as Jayhawkers, Redlegs, and Redleggers) also committed atrocities against residents of Kansas and Missouri they believed to be unsupportive of their cause, even those who did not own slaves. After Kansas was admitted to the United States as a free state and the Civil War commenced in 1861, hostilities continued between pro-Confederate partisans from Missouri and pro-Union partisans from Kansas. Both sides murdered civilians they suspected of harboring sympathies for the opposition. A number of towns in Missouri, such as Osceola, were sacked by Jayhawkers in the days preceding the Civil War.
Abolitionists were referred to as Jayhawkers and is still used as a term of derision by some towards those from Kansas (though Kansans see it as a term of endearment). The term rose when the Jayhawkers "foraged off the enemy".
The less militant bulk of the settlers would have sought to evade the problem of slavery if left unmolested. Pioneer Kansas wanted to be 'lily white'. "We want no slaves and we want no Negroes", was the prevailing sentiment reported by an Abolitionist in 1854. Every fair show of local sentiment showed strong opposition to the presence of Negroes, slave or free. This illiberal cutting of the Gordian knot may well have been illegal. But nobody ever knew, for it was never seriously tested.
Source: J.C. Furnas; The Road To Harpers Ferry 1959 Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Background In 1854, the U.S. Congress had passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act which stipulated that the residents of these territories would decide whether they wished to enter the Union as a slave or free state. This doctrine became known as popular sovereignty. Organized groups from the North sent thousands of abolitionist supporters to Kansas in an attempt to tip the balance in favor of free state advocates, to counter settlement from pro-slavery supporters from Missouri. As a result, pro- and anti-slavery groups had frequent clashes culminating in the Battle of Black Jack.
On May 21, 1856, Henry C. Pate participated with a posse of 750 pro-slavery forces in the sacking of Lawrence, which destroyed the Free State Hotel, two abolitionist newspaper offices and their printing presses. They also looted throughout the village. The next day, Congressman Preston Brooks from South Carolina physically attacked Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in the Senate chambers with a cane. He continued hitting after the senator was bleeding and unconscious. After that, a band of men, led by John Brown and comrade Captain Shore, executed five proslavery men with broadswords at Pottawatomie Creek. Brown's men let Jerome Glanville and James Harris return home to the cabin of Harris. This incident became known as the Pottawatomie Massacre. Following the massacre, three anti-slavery men were taken prisoner, including two of John Brown’s sons.
The Battle On June 2, 1856 Brown and 29 others met Henry Pate and fought the battle of Black Jack. This started after Brown's two sons were captured and held prisoner by Pate. The five hour long battle went in Brown's favor and Pate and 22 of his followers were captured and held for ransom. Brown agreed to release them as long as they released Brown's sons.
Town of Black Jack The town of Black Jack was established in 1855 as a trail town on the Santa Fe Trail. The town became incorporated in 1857 and the threat of border warfare was still a problem in Black Jack. At its peak Black Jack contained a tavern, post office, blacksmiths, a hotel, general store, doctor's office, schools and two churches but by the end of the Civil War, Santa Fe traffic began to dwindle and soon the town was abandoned.
Source: unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Lawrence was established in 1854 by antislavery settlers, many with the help of the New England Emigrant Aid Company, and soon became the center of pro-slavery violence in Kansas Territory. While the village had been besieged in December 1855, it was not directly attacked at that time. The non-fatal shooting of Douglas County Sheriff Samuel Jones on April 23, 1856, while he was attempting to arrest free-state settlers in Lawrence, is believed to have been the immediate cause of the violence. Lawrence residents drove Jones out of town after he was shot and on May 11, federal marshal J. B. Donaldson proclaimed that this action had interfered with the execution of warrants against the extralegal Free-State legislature, which had been set up in opposition to the official pro slavery territorial government. Building on this proclamation and a finding by a grand jury that Lawrence's Free State Hotel was actually built as a fort, Sheriff Jones collected a posse of 750 southerners to enter Lawrence, disarm the citizens, wreck the town's antislavery presses, and destroy the Free State Hotel.
Sacking
On May 21, 1856, a posse of 800 southerners led by Sheriff Jones gathered closer to the town. A large force was stationed on Mount Oread and cannon planted so as to cover and command the place. The house of Lawrence resident, and the first governor of Kansas, Charles L. Robinson was taken as headquarters for the Marshal and the officers of his army. On every road leading to the town and on the opposite side of the river, detachments of troops were posted to prevent escape from the assault. The forces mustered two flags. The blood-red flag, on which was inscribed "Southern-rights," floated side by side that day with the "stars and stripes."
The two printing offices were hacked, the presses destroyed, and the types thrown in the river. The planned work was finished by destroying the Free State Hotel. The first shot was fired from a cannon on the opposite side of Massachusetts Street by David Rice Atchison, but it failed to hit the building. About fifty shots were afterwards fired with little effect upon the solid walls. Next the posse attempted to blow it up. Several kegs of gunpowder were exploded within, with no appreciable damage to the walls. Its destruction was finally caused by an incendiary, and in the early evening it was a roofless, smoldering ruin. This work was followed by petty robberies and looting throughout the half-deserted town. As the men left, they burned Robinson's private dwelling on Mount Oread.
There was one fatality, a slavery proponent killed by falling masonry.
Source: unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
The Pottawatomie Massacre occurred during the night of May 24 and the morning of May 25, 1856. In reaction to the sacking of Lawrence (Kansas) by pro-slavery forces, John Brown and a band of abolitionist settlers (some of them members of the Pottawatomie Rifles) killed five settlers north of Pottawatomie Creek in Franklin County, Kansas. Background John Brown was particularly affected by the sacking of Lawrence, in which a sheriff-led posse destroyed newspaper offices, private houses and a hotel. The violence against abolitionists was accompanied by celebrations in the pro-slavery press, with writers such as Benjamin F. Stringfellow of the Squatter Sovereign proclaiming that pro-slavery forces "are determined to repel this Northern invasion and make Kansas a Slave State; though our rivers should be covered with the blood of their victims and the carcasses of the Abolitionists should be so numerous in the territory as to breed disease and sickness, we will not be deterred from our purpose." Brown was outraged by both the violence of pro-slavery forces, and also by what he saw as a weak and cowardly response by the antislavery partisans and the Free State settlers, whom he described as cowards, or worse. Attack A Free State company under the command of John Brown, Jr., set out, and the Osawatomie company joined them. On the morning of May 22, 1856, they heard of the sack of Lawrence and the arrest of Deitzler, Brown, and Jenkins. However, they continued their march toward Lawrence, not knowing whether their assistance might still be needed, and encamped that night near the Ottawa Creek. They remained in the vicinity until the afternoon of May 23, at which time they decided to return home. On May 23, John Brown, Sr. selected a party to go with him on a private expedition. Captain John Brown, Jr., objected to their leaving his company, but seeing that his father was obdurate, acquiesced, telling him to "do nothing rash." The company consisted of John Brown, four of his sons—Frederick, Owen, Salmon, and Oliver—Thomas Weiner, and James Townsley, whom John had induced to carry the party in his wagon to their proposed field of operations.
They encamped that night between two deep ravines on the edge of the timber, some distance to the right of the main traveled road. There they remained unobserved until the following evening of May 24. Some time after dark, the party left their place of hiding and proceeded on their "secret expedition". Late in the evening, they called at the house of James P. Doyle and ordered him and his two adult sons, William and Drury (all former slave catchers) to go with them as prisoners. (Doyle's 16-year-old son, John, who was not a member of the pro-slavery Law and Order Party, was left with his mother.) The three men were escorted by their captors out into the darkness, where Owen Brown and one of his brothers killed them with broadswords. John Brown, Sr. did not participate in the stabbing but fired a shot into the head of the fallen James Doyle to ensure he was dead.
Brown and his band then went to the house of Allen Wilkinson and ordered him out. He was slashed and stabbed to death by Henry Thompson and Theodore Winer, possibly with help from Brown's sons. From there, they crossed the Pottawatomie, and some time after midnight, forced their way into the cabin of James Harris at sword-point. Harris had three house guests: John S. Wightman, Jerome Glanville, and William Sherman, the brother of Henry Sherman ("Dutch Henry"), a militant pro-slavery activist. Glanville and Harris were taken outside for interrogation and asked whether they had threatened Free State settlers, aided Border Ruffians from Missouri, or participated in the sack of Lawrence. Satisfied with their answers, Brown's men let Glanville and Harris return to the cabin. William Sherman was led to the edge of the creek and hacked to death with the swords by Winer, Thompson, and Brown's sons.
Having learned at Harris's cabin that "Dutch Henry", their main target in the expedition, was away from home on the prairie, they ended the expedition and returned to the ravine where they had previously encamped. They rejoined the Osawatomie company on the night of May 25.
Source. unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
In 1794, George Washington selected the site of Harpers Ferry for the location of a federal arsenal. John H. Hall was contracted to manufacture his rifle in the town. Brown's Preparation John Brown rented the Kennedy Farmhouse, 4 miles (6.4 km) north of Harpers Ferry in Washington County, Maryland. and took up residence under the name Isaac Smith. Brown came with a small group of men minimally trained for military action. His group included 16 white men, 3 free blacks, 1 freed slave, and 1 fugitive slave. Northern abolitionist groups sent 198 breech loading .52 caliber Sharps carbines ("Beecher's Bibles") and 950 pikes (obtained from Charles Blair, in late September), in preparation for the raid. The arsenal contained 100,000 muskets and rifles.[citation needed] Brown attempted to attract more black recruits. He tried recruiting Frederick Douglass as a liaison officer to the slaves. Douglass declined, indicating to Brown that he believed the raid was a suicide mission. The plan was "an attack on the federal government" that "would array the whole country against us." You "will never get out alive," he warned.
Brown’s plan was not to conduct a sudden raid and then escape to the mountains. Rather, his plan was to use those rifles and pikes he captured at the arsenal, in addition to those he brought along, to arm rebellious slaves with the aim of striking terror to the slaveholders in Virginia. He believed that on the first night of action two to five hundred black adherents would join his line. He ridiculed the militia and regular army that might oppose him. Then he would send agents to nearby plantations, rallying the slaves. He planned to hold Harpers Ferry for a short time, expecting that as many volunteers, white and black, would join him as would form against him. He then would make a rapid movement southward, sending out armed bands along the way. They would free more slaves, obtain food, horses and hostages, and destroy slaveholding morale. Brown planned to follow the Appalachian mountains south into Tennessee and even Alabama, the heart of the South, making forays into the plains on either side. The Raid
October 16 On Sunday night, October 16, 1859, Brown left three of his men behind as a rear-guard: his son, Owen Brown; Barclay Coppoc; and Frank Meriam and led the rest into the town. Brown detached a party under John Cook to capture Colonel Lewis Washington, great grandnephew of George Washington at his nearby Beall-Air estate, some of his slaves, and two relics of George Washington: a sword allegedly presented to Washington by Frederick the Great and two pistols given by Lafayette, which Brown considered talismans. The party carried out its mission and returned via the Allstadt House, where they took more hostages. Brown's main party captured several watchmen and townspeople in Harpers Ferry. Brown's men needed to capture the weapons and escape before word could be sent to Washington. The raid was going well for Brown's men. They cut the telegraph wire and seized a Baltimore & Ohio train passing through. An African-American baggage handler on the train named Hayward Shepherd, confronted the raiders; they shot and killed him-- ironically a freed slave became the first casualty of the raid. Then for unknown reasons, Brown let the train continue unimpeded. The conductor alerted the authorities. One of the keys to success was the support of the local slave population. A massive uprising did not occur and the slaves never rebelled. The townspeople soon began to fight back against the raiders. Nevertheless, Brown's men captured the armory that evening.
October 17 Armory workers discovered Brown's men early on the morning of October 17. Local militia, farmers and shopkeepers surrounded the armory. When a company of militia captured the bridge across the Potomac River, any route of escape was cut off. During the day four townspeople were killed, including the mayor. Realizing his escape was cut, Brown took 9 of his captives and moved into the smaller engine house, which would come to be known as John Brown's Fort. The raiders barred off the windows and doors and exchanged the occasional volley with the surrounding forces. At one point Brown sent out his son, Watson, and Aaron Dwight Stevens with a white flag, but Watson was mortally wounded and Stevens was shot and captured. The raid was rapidly deteriorating. One of the raiders named William H. Leeman panicked and tried to escape by swimming across the Potomac River. The townspeople, reportedly drunk, made sport of shooting up Leeman's body. During the intermittent shooting Brown's other son, Oliver was shot and died after a brief period.
By 3:30 that afternoon, President James Buchanan ordered a detachment of U.S. Marines to march on Harpers Ferry under the command of Brevet ColonelRobert E. Lee of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry.
October 18 Lee first offered the role of attacking the engine house to the local militia units on the spot. Both militia commanders declined and Lee turned to the Marines. On the morning of October 18, Col. Lee sent Lt. J.E.B. Stuart, serving as a volunteer aide-de-camp, under a flag of truce to negotiate a surrender of John Brown and his followers. Lee instructed Lt. Israel Greene that if Brown refused, he was to lead the marines in storming the engine house. Stuart told Brown that his men would be spared if they surrendered. Brown refused and Stuart signaled to Lt. Greene and his men. Two marines armed with sledgehammers tried in vain to break through the door. Greene found a wooden ladder and 10 marines used it as a battering ram to knock the front doors in. Greene was the first through the door and with the assistance of Lewis Washington identified and singled out John Brown. Greene later recounted what happened next: "Quicker than thought I brought my saber down with all my strength upon [Brown's] head. He was moving as the blow fell, and I suppose I did not strike him where I intended, for he received a deep saber cut in the back of the neck. He fell senseless on his side, then rolled over on his back. He had in his hand a short Sharpe's cavalry carabine. I think he had just fired as I reached Colonel Washington, for the Marine who followed me into the aperture made by the ladder received a bullet in the abdomen, from which he died in a few minutes. The shot might have been fired by some one else in the insurgent party, but I think it was from Brown. Instinctively as Brown fell I gave him a saber thrust in the left breast. The sword I carried was a light uniform weapon, and, either not having a point or striking something hard in Brown's accouterments, did not penetrate. The blade bent double."
The action inside the engine house happened very quickly. In three minutes, all of the raiders still alive were taken prisoner and the action was over. October 19 Robert E. Lee made a summary report of the events that took place at Harpers Ferry. According to Lee's notes Lee believed John Brown was insane,"...the plan [raiding the Harpers Ferry Arsenal] was the attempt of a fanatic or mad*man". Lee also believed that the African Americans used in the raid were forced to by John Brown himself. "The blacks, whom he [John Brown] forced from their homes in this neighborhood, as far as I could learn, gave him no voluntary assistance." Lee attributed John Brown's "temporary success" by creating panic and confusion and by "magnifying" the number of participants involved in the raid.
Aftermath Colonel Lee and Lt. Greene searched the surrounding country for fugitives who had participated in the attack. John Brown was taken to the court house in nearby Charles Town for trial. He was found guilty of treason against the commonwealth of Virginia and was hanged on December 2. (This execution was witnessed by the actor John Wilkes Booth, who would later assassinate President Abraham Lincoln.) On the day of his execution, Brown wrote his last prophecy, which said, “I John Brown am now quite certain that the crimes of this guilty, land: will never be purged away; but with Blood. I had as I now think: vainly flattered myself that without very much bloodshed; it might be done.” Four other raiders were executed on December 15 and two more on March 16, 1860. John Brown was the first white man to use violence in an attempt to end slavery. This first use of violence by a white man scared many in the South, leading the Southern state militias to begin training for their defense of further raids and, consequently, to the militarization of the South in preparation for a Northern invasion.
The first Northern antislavery reaction to Brown's Raid was one of baffled reproach. William Lloyd Garrison called the raid "misguided, wild, and apparently insane." But through the trial, Brown transformed into a martyr. Though "Harper's Ferry was insane," wrote the religious weekly the Independent, "the controlling motive of his demonstration was sublime." To the South, he was a murderer who wanted to deprive them of their property. The North "has sanctioned and applauded theft, murder, and treason," said De Bow's Review.
Casualties
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
John Brown's raiders Killed John Henry Kagi (Shot and killed while crossing a river. First buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Jeremiah G. Anderson (At age 26, was mortally wounded and killed by a Marine’s bayonet during the final assault on the engine house. Body claimed by Winchester Medical College as a teaching cadaver; last resting place unknown.) William Thompson (First buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Dauphin Thompson (Killed in the storming of the engine house. First buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Oliver Brown (At age 21, being the youngest of John Brown’s three sons to participate in the action, he was mortally wounded on the 17th inside the engine house, resulting in a death the next day. He was first buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied in 1899 in common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Watson Brown (At age 24, was mortally wounded outside the engine house while carrying a white flag, trying to negotiate with the responding militia, resulting in death two days later. The body was claimed by Winchester Medical College as a teaching cadaver which caused College to be burned by Union troops. Reburied in 1882 in a grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Stewart Taylor (First buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) William Leeman (Shot while trying to escape across the Potomac River. First buried in common grave at Harpers Ferry; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Lewis Sheridan Leary (At age 24 being a free African-American, was mortally wounded while attempting escape across the Shenandoah River. He was stationed in the rifle factory with Kagi. Alleged to be buried at John Brown gravesite at North Elba, New York. Cenotaph memorial in Oberlin, Ohio.) Dangerfield Newby (At about 35, being born into slavery [despite father being white and not his master], had permission to move to Ohio along with his mother and siblings, but when he tried to attain freedom for his wife and children, the owner refused, leading Newby to join Brown’s raid. He was the first raider killed [body was mutilated]. His ears, for example, were cut off by someone in the crowd as souvenirs. First he was buried at Harpers Ferry; reburied in 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.)) Captured John Brown (also wounded) Hanged December 2, 1859 in nearby Charles Town. Aaron Dwight Stevens (shot and captured October 18. Hanged March 16, 1860 in Charles Town. First buried in New Jersey; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Edwin Coppock (At age 24, he shot and killed Harpers Ferry mayor Fontaine Beckham during the raid. He was later executed at Charles Town on December 16, 1859 and was buried in Salem, Ohio.) John Anthony Copeland, Jr.(At age 25, being a free African American, joined the raiders along with his uncle Lewis Leary. He was captured during the raid and executed on December 16, 1859 in Charles Town. The body was claimed by Winchester Medical College as a teaching cadaver. The last resting place is unknown. Cenotaph memorial in Oberlin, Ohio.) Shields Green (At about age 23, Green was an escaped slave from South Carolina; captured in the engine house on October 18, 1859 and hanged December 16, 1859 in Charles Town. The body was claimed by Winchester Medical College as a teaching cadaver. The last resting place is unknown. Cenotaph memorial in Oberlin Ohio.) John Edwin Cook (Escaped into Pennsylvania but soon captured. Hanged December 16, 1859 in Charles Town. Body sent to New York.) Albert Hazlett (Escaped into Pennsylvania but soon captured. Hanged March 16, 1860. First buried in New Jersey; reburied 1899 in a common grave near John Brown at North Elba, New York.) Four raiders escaped and were captured about six months later.
Escaped and never captured Barclay Coppock (Died during US Civil War.) Charles Plummer Tidd (Died during US Civil War) Osborne Perry Anderson (Served as an officer in Union Army, and penned a memoir about the raid.) Owen Brown Francis Jackson Meriam (Served in the army as a captain in the 3rd South Carolina Colored Infantry.) Other Casualties
Civilians Hayward Shepherd (African-American B&O baggage handler; killed.) Thomas Boerly (Townsperson; killed.) George W. Turner (Townsperson; killed.) Fontaine Beckham (Town mayor; killed.) A slave belonging to Col. Washington was killed. A slave belonging to hostage John Allstad was killed. (Some claim the two slaves voluntarily joined Brown's raiders, others say Brown forced them to fight. Regardless one was killed trying to escape across the Potomac River, the other was wounded and died in the Charles Town prison.) 9 other civilians were wounded.
Marines Luke Quinn (Killed during the storming of the engine house.) Matthew Ruppert (Shot in the face while storming the engine house.)
Source: unknown
Posted: January 7, 2011 by Britabroad
Order of Secession
The election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 was the final straw for many southerners. In all, 11 states seceded from the Union. Four of these (Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee) did not secede until after the Battle of Fort Sumter that occurred on April 12-13, 1861. Four additional states were Border Slave States that did not secede from the Union: Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland and Delaware.
The order of secession was as follows: South Carolina - December 20, 1860 Mississippi - January 9, 1861 Florida - January 10, 1861 Alabama - January 11, 1861 Georgia - January 19, 1861 Louisiana - January 26, 1861 Texas - February 1, 1861 Virginia - April 17, 1861 Arkansas - May 6, 1861 North Carolina - May 20, 1861 Tennessee - June 8, 1861
Source: unknown
Posted: January 16, 2011 by Britabroad
1860 Census - influence on the troop numbers
Also, I went through the figures for the 1860 US census, state by state, so we also have the population figures for each + the percentage of slaves in the Slave and Border States, which would obviously need to be subtracted from the population for enlistment purposes. Apparently, the rule of thumb is that, on average, 1 fifth of the overall population were of enlistment age, although the percentage of those who actually enlisted differed dramatically from state to state.
Legend: Union Confederate Border/Both
The figures are: Alabama (CSA): 964,000 (-45% slaves) = 530,000 (77,000 possible troops) Arkansas (CSA): 435,000 (-26% slaves) = 322,000 (46,000 possible troops) Delaware (Border):112,000 (-2% slaves) = 109,000 (22,000 possible troops) California (Both): 379,000 (76,000 possible troops) Connecticut (Union): 460,000 (92,000 possible troops) Florida (CSA): 140,000 (-44% slaves) = 78,000 (11,000 possible troops) Georgia (CSA): 1,057,000 (-44% slaves) = 592,000 (84,000 possible troops) Illinois (Union): 1,712,000 (342,000 possible troops) Indiana (Union): 1,350,000 (270,000 possible troops) Iowa (Union): 674,000 (134,000 possible troops) Kansas (Both): 107,000 (only 2 slaves in the state) (21,000 possible troops) Kentucky (Border): 1,155,000 (-20% slaves) = 924,000 (184,000 possible troops) Louisiana (CSA): 708,000 (-47% slaves) = 375,000 (54,000 possible troops) Maine (Union): 628,000 (126,000 possible troops) Maryland (border): 687,000 (13% slaves) = 597,000 (119,000 possible troops) Massachusetts (Union) 1,231,000 (246,000 possible troops) Michigan (Union): 749,000 (149,000 possible troops) Minnesota (Union): 172,000 (34,000 possible troops) Mississippi (CSA): 791,000 (-55% slaves) = 355,000 (71,000 possible troops) Missouri (Border): 1,182,000 (-10% slaves) = 1,063,000 (212,000 possible troops) Nebraska (Union): 29,000 (6,000 possible troops) New Hampshire (Union): 326,000 (260,000 possible troops) New Jersey (Union): 672,000 (134,000 possible troops) New York (Union): 3,880,000 (776,000 possible troops) N. Carolina (CSA): 992,000 (-33% slaves) = 665,000 (133,000 possible troops) Ohio (Union): 2,340,000 (468,000 possible troops) Pennsylvania (Union): 2,906,000 (581,000 possible troops) Rhode Island (Union): 175,000 (35,000 possible troops) S Carolina (CSA): 704,000 (-57% slaves) = 303,000 (60,000 possible troops) Tennessee (CSA): 1,110,000 (-25% slaves) = 832,000 (167,000 possible troops) Texas (CSA): 604,000 (-30% slaves) = 422,000 (84,000 possible troops) Vermont (Union): 315,000 (63,000 possible troops) Virginia (CSA): 1,596,000 (-31% slaves) = 1,100,000 (220,000 possible troops) Wisconsin (Union): 776,000 (155,000 possible troops)
Total population: 31,184,000 13% slaves 8% slaveholders
Average age of ACW soldier = 26 years, of which 55% were married.
Source: unknown
Posted: November 19, 2010 by Britabroad
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 24, 2012 at 10:34 AM.
Texas in the American Civil War "Texans! The troops of other states have their reputations to gain, but the sons of the defenders of the Alamo have theirs to maintain. I am assured that you will be faithful to the trust." ~ Jefferson Davis, President CSA
Men Served CSA: 70,000 Men Served USA: 2,000 Experienced Veterans: Mexican-American War, Texas Revolution Slaves: 30% total state pop (owned by 25% of white pop) *Mexicans were abundant cheap labor force and source of recruitment Confederate Army Units: Cavalry: 45 regiments + 12 battalions Infantry: 23 regiments + 6 battalions (+1 battalion Sharpshooters) Heavy Artillery: 5 regiments Light Artillery: 30 batteries
CSA Texas State Forces: Cavalry: 5 regiments + 4 battalions Infantry: 4 regiments + 1 battalion Light Artillery: 1 Company
(Texas) Union Army Units: [white totals unknown] *there were only 47 known freed black men to serve the Union from Texas Misc: there were numerous units and even Legions raised by private individuals that served the CSA but were not official CSA Units.
Historical and Notable TX Units: Terry’s Texas Rangers (Cavalry regiment): their riding abilities and the versatile weapons they chose to use led to the cavalry regiment often being used as shock troops Walker’s Greyhounds (Infantry Division): It earned its nickname because the men were able to move long distances rapidly on foot. The Texas Brigade(Infantry): comprised mainly of Texas regiments. Known as the "shock troops" of the Army of Northern Virginia
Seizure of Federal Property 1860 Arms: 10,000 rifle muskets Facilities: San Antonio (Alamo mission), Galveston (Port), Houston (Port), Fort Worth
State Economy Cotton Production (trade) Sugar Production (trade) Corn Production (trade) Slaves (trade) Beef (trade) Clothing (to CSA) Arms (to CSA) Supplies/Munitions (to CSA)
see: Mississippi in the American Civil War- wikipedia Mississippi in the American Civil War "Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery--the greatest material interest of the world." ~ Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi
Men Served CSA: 80,000 Men Served USA: 500 + 17,000 black freedmen Slaves: Mississippi was one of only two states in the Union in 1860 where the majority of the population was slaves (55%). A considerable number of freed or escaped slaves joined black regiments in the Union. Experienced Veterans: N/A
Partisans: Cavalry: 1 company Infantry: 4 companies
(MS) Union Army Totals:
[unknown] Misc: there were numerous units and even Legions raised by private individuals that served the CSA but were not official CSA Units
Historical Notable Units: Old “10th Mississippi (Infantry regiment): mustered in 1861 they fought in every major battle in the Western Theater. Was one of the last units in the Army of Tenn to surrender with General Johnson in North Carolina 1865.
Seizure of Federal Property 1860 N/A
Louisiana in the American Civil War wikipedia "…lowest scum of the lower Mississippi...adventurous wharf rats, thieves, and outcasts...and bad characters generally." ~ One observer’s view of the Louisiana Tigers.
Men Served CSA: [unknown] Men Served USA: [unknown] Experienced Veterans: Texas Revolution Slaves: 47% of total population
(MS) Union Army Totals: Cavalry: 2 regiments Infantry: 12 regiments (6 were of African Descent) Heavy Artillery: 1 regiment (of African Descent) Light Artillery: 3 battalions (of African Descent)
MISC: There were various units raised and armed by individuals that served the CSA however they were not official CSA units.
Historical Notable Units: Pelican Brigade (Infantry): Formally known as the Second Louisiana Brigade. Fought in most major battles with the AONV and Gen. Jackson’s campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley. Eventually consolidated with the Louisiana Tigers. Louisiana Tigers(Infantry Brigade): Although the exact composition of the Louisiana Tigers changed as the war progressed, they developed a reputation as fearless, hard-fighting shock troops.
Seizure of Federal Property 1860 New Orleans shipyards Coastal Defenses
State Economy Railroad Junctions (trade) Cotton (to trade) Sugar (to trade) Slaves (to trade) Mississippi River (trade) Shipyard (to CSA)
Unit Breakdown:
(taken from Wikipedia) LA CSA Units
Source: Wikipedia & other
Posted: November 22, 2010 by Hazbones
Alabama
men served CSA: 120,000 men served USA: 2,700 experienced veterans: none Slaves: 45% of total population
As for numbers of men, the optimum number in a Union line infantry regiment was about 1,000. In a Confederate regiment this number was often slightly lower, 750 or so.
Cavalry regiments numbered between 200 and 600 on both sides. There were variations and as the war wore on the military authorities found it easier to form newly raised regiments, as opposed to filling the gaps left by casualties and desertions with new recruits. So by the last couple of years of the war it wasn´t unusual to find older regiments consisting of no more than a couple of hundred men - especially in the CS army. When the 1st Virginia Infantry surrendered their colours at Appomattox in April,1865 it consisted of 37 men, and there´s another regiment (can´t recall which) which paraded only 11 men.
Hope this helps.
Source: unknown
Posted: January 2, 2011 by Britabroad
January, 1861 This month, a Federal ship was fired upon, more southern states seceded, and Washington scrambled desperately for one more compromise to save the Union.
Americans were anxious as 1861 began. South Carolina had recently seceded from the Union, and President James Buchanan declared that the Federal Government had no legal right to stop it. While the South Carolina state militia began massing in Charleston Harbor, many still believed that a state could not defy the Federal Government for long, and that there would be no outbreak of violence. Star of the West In Charleston Harbor, a Federal garrison was isolated at Fort Sumter and soon in need of supplies. South Carolina had prohibited any assistance to the garrison. After weeks of contemplation, President Buchanan dispatched Star of the West, a merchant vessel, to reinforce Fort Sumter. On January 9, South Carolina artillery fired on the ship as it arrived in the harbor. These were considered the first shots of the war, and the ship turned back, leaving the garrison isolated.
The Crittenden Compromise Explaining that the situation was beyond Executive control, President Buchanan urged Congress to adopt a compromise measure introduced by Kentucky Senator John J. Crittenden. The compromise consisted of four measures:
Extend the Missouri Compromise line to its original 36-degree, 30-minute line all the way to the Pacific, and prohibit slavery north of that line
Permit slavery on Federal property in the South
Compensate owners of runaway slaves
Repeal “personal liberty” laws in the North
A Senate Committee approved the measures, but a House Committee defeated them. Then, on January 16, the Senate adopted a resolution that the Constitution “needs to be obeyed rather than amended.” This effectively killed any chance of the Crittenden Compromise being adopted.
More Southern Secession Throughout January, five more southern states joined South Carolina in seceding from the Union: Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana. On January 21, five senators from Florida, Alabama and Mississippi resigned from the U.S. Senate. All of them, including Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis, gave moving speeches expressing sorrow for leaving but determination to defend the South.
Meanwhile, southern state militias began seizing federal property, including forts and arsenals. Alabama troops seized the U.S. arsenal at Mount Vernon and secured forts protecting the vital naval port of Mobile Bay. Georgia troops seized Fort Pulaski near the Savannah River and the U.S. arsenal at Augusta. Florida troops took Fort Marion at St. Augustine. Mississippi troops secured U.S. installations along the Gulf Coast. And Louisiana troops seized the U.S. Mint and Customs House in New Orleans.
Kansas Becomes a State After several years of bitter fighting over the status of slavery in the territory, Kansas became the 34th state - with a constitution prohibiting slavery. The people of Kansas had been allowed to decide for themselves whether or not to allow slavery, prompting a rush of proslavery and antislavery forces into the region to stuff ballot boxes.
At one point, Kansas had both a proslavery government at Lecompton and an antislavery government at Topeka. Elections were marred by fraud, intimidation and violence. John Brown had earned a reputation by murdering proslavery men at Pottawatomie Creek, and towns were terrorized by the warring factions. The region had been nicknamed “Bleeding Kansas.”
President Buchanan favored the proslavery government, and he offered Kansans 23 million acres of federal land to accept it. However voters rejected the government by a seven-to-one margin. When the vote for statehood came up this month, the result was decisively in favor of making Kansas a free state.
Conclusion By the end of January, the situation had escalated from apprehension to crisis, thus growing much worse than many had anticipated. Five more Southern states had seceded, several Federal arsenals and forts in the South had been seized by state troops, and U.S. troops in Fort Sumter were in danger of being starved into submission. All the while, the Buchanan administration stood helpless as President-elect Lincoln’s inauguration was still over a month away.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: De Capo Press, Inc., 1971)
Ward, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1990)
Posted: January 22, 2011 by Britabroad
This month, another state seceded and the Confederate States of America was formed as people in both North and South scrambled for a peaceful settlement.
By this time, secession had given Southerners resolve to form their own independent government. However Northerners were frustrated, anxious and confused. Some Northerners argued that the southern states had a constitutional right to break from the Union and welcomed their departure. Others argued that secession was illegal, but stopping it was not worth going to war. Others continued working toward a peaceful reconciliation, and still others sought to preserve the Union by force.
Texas Secedes Texas became the seventh state to secede from the Union. Brevet Major General David Twiggs surrendered several U.S. military posts to the Texas state militia, an act which many in Washington considered an act of treason. The Texas legislature appointed delegates to attend a convention in Montgomery, Alabama to create a new, independent nation.
The Confederate States of America In Montgomery, a provisional constitution was unanimously adopted. The new constitution was similar to the U.S. Constitution, but the federal government was prohibited from enacting protective tariffs or subsidizing favored businesses. In addition, slavery and state sovereignty were strongly protected. Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, a former U.S. senator and secretary of war, was selected to become the first provisional president of the new Confederacy.
Two Presidents-Elect On February 11, two men left their homes for their respective national capitals. Jefferson Davis left his Briarfield Plantation in Mississippi for Montgomery, arriving at the provisional Confederate capital on February 16. Davis’s inauguration sparked mass celebrations throughout the South, and "Dixie," a Northern song, soon became the Southern anthem. Meanwhile, after delivering a farewell address to the people of his home town, U.S. President-elect Abraham Lincoln left Springfield, Illinois en route to Washington, DC. Along the way, Lincoln’s train made many stops and Lincoln gave speeches attempting to calm the fanaticism that was sweeping both North and South. In Pittsburgh, Lincoln declared, "There is really no crisis except for an artificial one!" Nearly a quarter million people gathered in New York City to greet the president-elect. But as he prepared to leave Philadelphia for Washington, trouble arose.
To get to Washington, Lincoln’s train had to pass through Baltimore, an intensely pro-Southern city. Rumors spread that Lincoln was targeted for assassination once he reached Baltimore. To thwart conspirators, Lincoln traveled through the city in the dark of night, arriving in Washington in the early morning of February 23. Lincoln was widely criticized for this undignified arrival in the nation’s capital.
The Peace Convention In Washington, a "peace convention" of 131 delegates from 21 states had been discussing potential compromises throughout the month. Although none of the seceded states participated, the convention was led by a Southerner: former President John Tyler. The convention adjourned on February 27 after submitting its proposals to Congress.
The proposals included six constitutional amendments protecting slavery in the South and prohibiting it in the North. These proposals satisfied few people and when the Senate rejected them, Tyler recommended that his home state of Virginia secede from the Union.
And all the while, Federal troops remained isolated at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. President James Buchanan, who had stated he could do virtually nothing to stop secession without congressional action, declared that the fort would not be surrendered. Now both sides could only wait.
Conclusion The extremists who called for a separation of North and South appeared to be winning as February ended. While the Buchanan administration did little to stop the secession, Southerners gained confidence and pride in their new country. As the South moved closer to independence, Northerners anxiously awaited the March inauguration of President-elect Lincoln to see how he would address the crisis.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: De Capo Press, Inc., 1971)
Ward, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
Posted: February 3, 2011 by Britabroad
This month, Abraham Lincoln became president amidst the greatest crisis in U.S. history, and there was much anxiety as to what may happen next.
By this time, seven southern states had established their own federal government. In Washington, the outgoing Buchanan administration did nothing as the first Republican administration prepared to enter office. Lincoln had been deliberately quiet as to what his policies may be, so many were fearful as to what he may do. Meanwhile the new southern government began seeking foreign recognition and legitimacy abroad.
One Last Compromise Effort Two days prior to Lincoln’s inauguration, Congress passed a constitutional amendment in a final effort to avoid civil war. The amendment prohibited any future attempt to "abolish or interfere" with the "domestic institutions" of the states, including "persons held to labor or service" (i.e., slavery). This was known as the Corwin Amendment, named for Republican Congressman Thomas Corwin of Ohio.
The amendment was designed to appeal not to the seceded states, but to the border states that permitted slavery. President James Buchanan publicly endorsed the amendment, as did President-elect Lincoln, but it was ignored in the South. Thus the amendment was never ratified by the states and did not become law. The final effort at compromise failed.
Lincoln’s Inauguration There were grave concerns in Washington that the South may launch a military attack, incite riots or even assassinate President-elect Abraham Lincoln before he was inaugurated. On Inauguration Day, March 4, sharpshooters and military personnel were stationed throughout the capital as Lincoln was inaugurated without incident.
In his inaugural address, Lincoln argued that secession was illegal, thus all secession ordinances were null and void, and any southern aggression would be interpreted as a rebellion against the U.S. government. Lincoln declared to the South: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. You can have no conflict, without yourselves being the aggressors." Confederate Overtures The Confederacy sent commissioners to Washington to negotiate with the Lincoln administration on a peaceful separation of North and South. Lincoln instructed his Secretary of State, William Seward, to refuse the commissioners since negotiation would symbolize recognizing the Confederacy as a separate nation. And if the Confederacy was a separate nation, then the secession was valid, something Lincoln would not accept.
Crisis at Fort Sumter Lincoln soon learned that a great crisis was building at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. The fort was occupied by Federal forces under Major Robert Anderson and was surrounded by Confederate batteries. Anderson’s men were in desperate need of supplies if they were to remain in the fort. Anderson sent word to Lincoln that he would need 20,000 men and provisions to keep the fort from falling into Confederate hands.
Lincoln faced a dilemma. If he reinforced Fort Sumter, the Confederacy would consider it an act of war, making Lincoln the instigator and aggressor. If he surrendered Fort Sumter, the North would consider it an act of cowardice and possibly demand Lincoln’s impeachment. If he did nothing, the Federal troops in the fort would be starved into submission.
Deliberation and Planning Throughout the month, Lincoln conferred with his cabinet and General-in-Chief Winfield Scott about Fort Sumter. Many cabinet members thought the fort should be evacuated to avoid provoking a war. If Lincoln fulfilled Anderson’s request to send men and provisions, Scott estimated it would take dozens of warships and transports, which would certainly provoke a war. Thus Scott recommended not provisioning the fort. As the month waned, a decision needed to be made.
Finally on March 31, Lincoln acted. He ordered that supplies be sent to the Federals in Fort Sumter, but no additional men or war equipment. Lincoln’s decision was essentially the same decision made by Buchanan with Star of the West in January. In this way, he could keep Federal control of the fort without provoking a military conflict since merely sending provisions could not be construed as a hostile act. If the Confederates wanted Fort Sumter, Lincoln reasoned, then they would have to fire the first shot. In addition, Lincoln hoped that if the Confederates indeed fired the first shot, the border states that were considering secession, particularly Virginia, Maryland and Kentucky, would remain loyal to the Union. Conversely, many high-ranking Confederates believed that firing the first shot would galvanize the South and inspire the border states to join them.
As the relief expedition prepared to sail for South Carolina, many in both the North and South held their breath. How the relief expedition would be received by the Confederates in Charleston would determine whether or not there would be a war.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971) Ward, Geoffrey; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
Posted: March 1, 2011 by Britabroad
The April 1861 Proclamation was not a war declaration, although Southern States would respond to it as if it was, setting the stage for a long and bloody conflict.
On April 15th, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln issued a Proclamation that called for 75,000 men from the various states “in order to suppress said combinations…” The Proclamation followed the surrender of Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina after P.T. Beauregard’s bombardment. The South had fired the first shot, outraging the North. Excepting the Border States, Lincoln’s Proclamation was well-received but it would be weeks before the mostly untrained militia arrived in the nation’s capital.
Scope of the Proclamation Lincoln opened the Proclamation by addressing the needs for his actions. The Laws of the United States were opposed and their execution “obstructed.” Lincoln listed the offending states: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. These “combinations” represented a force too powerful to be dealt with through ordinary channels of compliance such as the judiciary and the Federal Marshals.
The language of the Proclamation indicates that Lincoln viewed his response as a “police action” designed to “repossess” Federal property, i.e., forts, armories, and other assets. This was not a “Civil War” but an “insurrection.” There was to be no “…devastation…destruction…or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens…” Lincoln was well aware that pro-Union sentiment still existed in the South.
Lincoln, in calling a special July session of Congress, referred to unfolding events as “an extraordinary occasion.” As Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln believed that the Constitution supported his call for state militia volunteers to serve in the armies being planned in defense of Washington and the securing of Border States like Kentucky and Missouri.
As the Proclamation resulted in an outpouring of support and unity in the North, it extinguished lingering pro-Union sympathies in the South. Governor Jackson of Missouri replied to Lincoln that his request for men was “illegal” and “unconstitutional.” Both sides rushed to enlist men, dooming Lincoln’s “police action.” The April 27th, 1861 Harper’s Weekly commented that, “Nobody – outside of lunatic asylums – doubts that civil war is an enormous calamity.”
Results of the Proclamation Initial plans by the end of April suggested three separate army groups. The first, under the command of General Scott, would defend Washington with 50,000 men. A “New York Army” commanded by General Wood would be held in reserve while General Sumner was to encamp around the Cincinnati area with 75,000 men to protect the river systems, ultimately enabling Union troops to control the Mississippi. (“The War,” Harper’s Weekly, April 27, 1861)
Most of the soldiers arriving from various Northern states were ill-trained. It took the troops several weeks to reach Washington, facing hostile opposition in Baltimore. Additionally, some of the army’s best officers resigned their commissions and returned to the South, as did Robert E. Lee, for example. The navy, it was predicted, would ensure that all Southern ports would be “hermetically sealed.”
In the South in the weeks following the Proclamation, war plans were also being refined. William T. Sherman, who visited Virginia months before these events, had already reported then that the South was preparing for war. General Beauregard wanted to attack Washington with 32,000 men but was overruled by Jefferson Davis on advice from Robert E. Lee. Although the advice was given based on military considerations, Davis did not want to be the aggressor, falling back on his oft repeated phrase, “I hope they leave us alone.”
The Proclamation Not a Call to War Lincoln’s purposes were very clear: the Proclamation was not a call to war nor was it a war declaration – only the Congress can declare war. Any such war declaration would have legitimized the Confederate States of America. For Lincoln, the Proclamation was a carefully worded document aimed at recovering Federal property and forcing insurrectionists to comply with Federal law. It was the South that construed the Proclamation as a war declaration and responded accordingly.
Source: Harper’s Weekly, April 27, 1861 (President Lincoln’s Proclamation reprinted, commentary, and daily news)
Shelby Foote, The Civil War: Fort Sumter to Perryville (Vintage Books – Random House, 1986)
Posted: April 3, 2011 by Britabroad
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
The Fort Sumter Incident - April 12th & 13th April, 1861 On December 26, 1860, six days after South Carolina declared its secession, U.S. Army Major Robert Anderson abandoned the indefensible Fort Moultrie and secretly relocated companies E and H (127 men, 13 of them musicians) of the 1st U.S. Artillery to Fort Sumter without orders from Washington, on his own initiative. He thought that providing a stronger defense would delay an attack by South Carolina militia. The Fort was not yet complete at the time and fewer than half of the cannons that should have been available were not, due to military downsizing by President James Buchanan. Over the next few months, repeated calls for the United States evacuation of Fort Sumter from the government of South Carolina and later Confederate Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard were ignored. United States attempts to resupply and reinforce the garrison were repulsed on January 9, 1861 when the first shots of the war, fired by cadets from The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina prevented the steamer Star of the West, a ship hired by the Union to transport troops and supplies to Fort Sumter, from completing the task. After realizing that Anderson's command would run out of food by April 15, 1861, President Lincoln ordered a fleet of ships, under the command of Gustavus V. Fox, to attempt entry into Charleston Harbor and support Fort Sumter. The ships assigned were the steam sloop-of-war USS Pawnee, steam sloop-of-war USS Powhatan, transporting motorized launches and about 300 sailors (secretly removed from the Charleston fleet to join in the forced reinforcement of Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla.), armed screw steamer USS Pocahontas, Revenue Cutter USRC Harriet Lane, steamer Baltic transporting about 200 troops, composed of companies C and D of the 2nd U.S. Artillery, and three hired tug boats with added protection against small arms fire to be used to tow troop and supply barges directly to Fort Sumter. By April 6, 1861 the first ships began to set sail for their rendezvous off the Charleston Bar. The first to arrive was the Harriet Lane, before midnight of April 11, 1861.
On April 11, 1861, Beauregard sent three aides, Colonel James Chesnut, Jr., Captain Stephen D. Lee, and Lieutenant A. R. Chisolm to demand the surrender of the fort. Anderson declined, and the aides returned to report to Beauregard. After Beauregard had consulted the Secretary of War, Leroy Walker, he sent the aides back to the fort and authorized Chesnut to decide whether the fort should be taken by force. The aides waited for hours while Anderson considered his alternatives and played for time. At about 3 a.m., when Anderson finally announced his conditions, Colonel Chesnut, after conferring with the other aides, decided that they were "manifestly futile and not within the scope of the instructions verbally given to us". The aides then left the fort and proceeded to the nearby Fort Johnson. There, Chesnut ordered the fort to open fire on Fort Sumter.
On April 12, 1861, at 4:30 a.m., Confederate batteries opened fire, firing for 34 straight hours, on the fort. Edmund Ruffin, noted Virginian agronomist and secessionist, claimed that he fired the first shot on Fort Sumter. His story has been widely believed, but Lieutenant Henry S. Farley, commanding a battery of two mortars on James Island fired the first shot at 4:30 A.M. The garrison returned fire, but it was ineffective, in part because Major Anderson did not use the guns mounted on the highest tier, the barbette tier, where the gun detachments would be more exposed to Confederate fire. On April 13, the fort was surrendered and evacuated. During the attack, the Union colors fell. Lt.Norman J. Hall risked life and limb to put them back up, burning off his eyebrows permanently. No Union soldiers died in the actual battle though a Confederate soldier bled to death having been wounded by a misfiring cannon. One Union soldier died and another was mortally wounded during the 47th shot of a 100 shot salute, allowed by the Confederacy. Afterwards the salute was shortened to 50 shots. Accounts, such as in the famous diary of Mary Chesnut, describe Charleston residents along what is now known as The Battery, sitting on balconies and drinking salutes to the start of the hostilities. The Fort Sumter Flag became a popular patriotic symbol after Major Anderson returned North with it. The flag is still displayed in the fort's museum.
Source: unknown
Posted: April 6, 1861 by Britabroad
This month, most people accepted that war had come, but they did not yet know what war meant. Both sides rushed to answer the call to arms. As North and South mobilized for war, the Confederacy began courting foreign powers for international recognition and more states seceded from the Union. Missouri became a hotbed of violence and hostilities began in Virginia. Some still hoped for a peaceful reconciliation, while others believed that just one decisive battle would settle the conflict. Few expected the war to last very long.
The Federal Mobilization With Congress in recess, President Abraham Lincoln had virtually unlimited power to put down the rebellion. Through administration orders, U.S. marshals confiscated telegraph messages sent over the past year in their hunt for pro-secession sympathizers. Many complained that this violated civil liberties. In addition, since Lincoln had little experience in executive matters, many northerners worried that he was not capable of handling the crisis effectively.
Meanwhile Federal troops answered Lincoln’s call for volunteers by hurrying into Washington to fortify the capital now that Maryland’s loyalty had been secured. With no ready space to house the troops, many camped in the Capitol, on the White House lawn or even in the White House itself. Soon Washington was the most heavily fortified city in the world.
Rebellion in Missouri Riots erupted in St. Louis when the pro-secessionist state militia protested against Federal forces marching through the city. According to legend, Federal General Nathaniel Lyon had gained access to state militia headquarters at Fort Jackson disguised as a woman, made notes on the fortifications and returned with his men to capture the fort. During the march back from the fort, citizens and militia rioted against the "Hessians" (the Federals were mostly German immigrants), and about 29 people were killed when shouting turned into shooting.
Confederate Politics In Montgomery, Alabama, Confederate President Jefferson Davis signed a congressional resolution declaring a state of war existed between the United and the Confederate States. The Confederacy began processing volunteers to serve for the war’s duration and approving loans to finance the war effort. Knowing that they needed international recognition to secure their independence, Confederate officials began opening diplomatic channels for the European powers of Great Britain and France.
British Neutrality In London, the British Foreign Minister received Confederate commissioners to consider aiding the southern war effort. In Parliament, Lord John Russell announced that Britain would recognize the Confederates as belligerents but would not recognize the Confederacy as a new nation. On May 13, Queen Victoria officially declared that Britain was neutral.
Confederate emissaries continued working to get the Queen to change her mind. However by placing the Confederates in a belligerent status, Britain retained the right to trade with them. This would cause friction with the U.S. government as time went on.
More States Secede As the Lincoln administration worked to keep the border slave states (i.e., Maryland, Delaware, Missouri and Kentucky) from joining the Confederacy, three more southern states seceded this month. These included Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina, bringing the total number of Confederate states to 11.
Meanwhile, meetings were held in Wheeling and Kingwood in western Virginia to protest Virginia’s secession. This region of Virginia, along with portions of eastern Tennessee, would remain pro-Union throughout the war.
Action in Virginia Federal troops occupied Alexandria across the Potomac River from Washington. The troops were led by young Colonel Elmer Ellsworth, a personal friend of President Lincoln. Ellsworth’s troops removed a Confederate flag from a hotel roof, and as they left the building, the innkeeper shot Ellsworth dead. The innkeeper was immediately killed by Federal troops, but Ellsworth’s death shocked the North. Funeral services for Ellsworth were held in the East Room of the White House and were attended by the Lincolns and many other U.S. dignitaries.
The Confederate Congress voted in favor moving the national capital from Montgomery to the more accessible Virginia capital of Richmond. Many southerners believed that Richmond, the largest and most industrialized city in the South, would give the Confederacy a military and psychological advantage, even though it was only 80 miles from Washington.
The Confederate government, including President Davis, began arriving in Richmond on May 29, and the northern war cry became, "On to Richmond!" In Alexandria, General Irvin McDowell took command of Federal forces as they prepared to invade the heart of the state and capture the rebel capital.
Conclusion The military buildup in Virginia continued into June. A large-scale action was inevitable, but nobody knew when it would happen or what its results would be. Few anticipated the horrible carnage that the war would ultimately bring.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971) & Wallechinsky, David and Wallace, Irving: The People’s Almanac (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1975) & Ward, Geoffrey; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
Posted: May 1, 2011 by Britabroad
This month, the Federals won at Philippi and seized control of Missouri, but Confederates won at Big Bethel. A Federal invasion of Virginia was imminent. As both sides continued mobilizing for war, patriotism masked any deficiencies in the process. Volunteers flooded the militia rolls and state regiments were hastily organized and commanded. Those regiments were then hurried off to join the national forces gathering in Washington and Richmond.
Beauregard Assumes Command in Virginia The Confederacy faced greater obstacles than the North because it had to raise both an army and navy from nothing. In addition, equipment such as arms, ammunition, uniforms and food had to be delivered to the troops through the Federal blockade. This proved an easy task at first, as blockade runners ran the gauntlet to make their deliveries. However the Federal Navy’s grip would soon tighten.
On the other hand, many experienced and talented military figures defected from the North to join the Confederate cause. General P.G.T. Beauregard, hero of Fort Sumter, was given command of the troops in northern Virginia. They were the first line of defense against the inevitable Federal invasion.
In Richmond, Confederate President Jefferson Davis denounced the North as an "ignorant usurper," declaring that the South was tasked with "preserving the constitutional liberty of a free government." While many acknowledged that defeating a more powerful Federal force would be very difficult, most southerners were eager for the challenge.
The Federal Blockade Tightens The number of northerners hoping for a peaceful settlement dwindled as tens of thousands of men rushed to answer the call to arms. Federal troops poured into Washington throughout the month, and President Abraham Lincoln regularly visited the growing number of camps. Recruits spent long days drilling and following orders, which dispelled the notion of many that the war would be a fun adventure.
The Lincoln administration continued strengthening the Federal blockade of southern ports, and ground troops were gathering and training for a general invasion of Virginia. Meanwhile, smaller Federal forces began probing into the western part of the state.
Federals Win at Philippi Federal forces began their invasion of Virginia by occupying Alexandria and moving into western Virginia where there was strong northern sentiment. The Federals surprised a Confederate camp at Philippi and sent the southern troops fleeing in what reporters called the "Philippi Races." Although this was a minor skirmish, it helped lead to the Federal conquest of western Virginia.
Federals Control Missouri Clashes between Federal and Confederate sympathizers took place in various places throughout Missouri. Federal General Nathaniel Lyon was determined to suppress Confederate sympathy, but pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne Jackson was raising a militia force to oppose Lyon.
On June 15, Lyon’s Federals captured the state capital of Jefferson City and chased Jackson out of town. The Federals then defeated a pro-Confederate force defending Jackson at Boonville. This not only dispersed the pro-Confederate faction but also gave the Federals control of the Missouri River. For the time being, Missouri was under Federal control.
Confederates Win at Big Bethel Confederate forces repulsed a Federal attack at Big Bethel on the Virginia peninsula between the York and James Rivers. This was considered the first major battle of the war, although it would be small in comparison to later battles. Big Bethel gave southerners confidence that they could repel the Federal invaders.
In Washington, the loss at Big Bethel caused concern. In a special cabinet meeting, General Irvin McDowell, commander of Federal forces in northern Virginia, unveiled a plan to capture Richmond by first attacking Manassas Junction. General Winfield Scott, overall commander of Federal armed forces, proposed an expedition down the Mississippi River. President Lincoln decided that Virginia should be dealt with first, and McDowell’s plan was adopted.
The Federal Invasion of Virginia Federal troops continued pouring into Washington, where they were incorporated into McDowell’s main force. Lincoln urged McDowell to hurry his invasion before enthusiasm for the war waned and the 90-day enlistments expired. Both sides continued massing arms and men, preparing for the great battle that would supposedly decide the war.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, Inc., 1971) & Wallechinsky, David and Wallace, Irving: The People’s Almanac (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1975) & Ward Geoffrey; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
Posted: May 25, 2011 by Britabroad
Three months after the fall of Fort Sumter, the big battle that both sides had been itching for took place in northern Virginia near Bull Run Creek.
In July 1861, Federal forces continued advancing into western Virginia where a series of victories would make a new northern hero. Federals and Confederates continued fighting for control of Missouri’s state government. The Federal blockade tightened, but southern blockade runners were still delivering supplies with relative ease. Soon the great battle that both sides had been seeking would be fought, but it would be considered small by future standards.
In western Virginia, Federal forces attacked Confederates at Rich Mountain and forced the surrender of 555 troops. This victory gave the Federals control of most of the region, paving the way for the eventual creation of the state of West Virginia. This victory was celebrated in the North and the Federal commander, young General George McClellan, became a national hero.
In Missouri, exiled pro-Confederate Governor Claiborne Jackson headed a militia force that repulsed a Federal attack at Carthage. This temporarily stopped the Federal advance into southwestern Missouri. Later this month, a new pro-Federal state government was formed in Jefferson City, replacing the exiled Jackson administration. Skirmishing in Missouri continued throughout the month.
Politics in Washington and Richmond In Washington, a special session of Congress convened on July 4. President Abraham Lincoln delivered a special message vowing to retain all Federal property in the rebelling states. While Lincoln conceded that some of his actions exceeded a president’s constitutional authority, he expressed confidence that Congress would endorse them. Of course lack of southern opposition left Congress with a large pro-Lincoln majority, so Lincoln’s message was met with strong approval.
In Richmond, the Confederate Congress convened on July 20 and President Jefferson Davis delivered a message of his own. He outlined the reasons for secession and the progress in raising armies and swaying public opinion to the cause. Davis declared, "To speak of subjugating such a people, so united and determined, is to speak a language in-comprehensive to them." Tension filled the air as everyone knew that they were on the eve of the greatest battle of the war.
The Battle of Bull Run The Federal Army under General Irvin McDowell left Washington on July 16. The first target on the path to Richmond was Centreville and the vital railroad depot at Manassas Junction. Awaiting the Federals was a Confederate force commanded by the hero of Fort Sumter, General P.G.T. Beauregard, who had arranged for reinforcements under General Joseph Johnston to assist him.
The battle began on July 21 when the Federals attacked the Confederate line along Bull Run Creek. McDowell’s inexperienced troops could not execute his tricky battle plan, while Beauregard’s inexperienced troops had trouble executing his counterattack. The Confederates slowly fell back to Henry House Hill. Then the tide turned.
Johnston’s reinforcements began pouring onto the field from Manassas Junction, marking the first time in history that troops were transported by railroad during battle. On Henry House Hill, the Confederates stood firm under Generals Barnard Bee and Thomas J. Jackson. Bee rallied his troops by shouting, "Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall!" Bee was killed in the fight, but "Stonewall" Jackson became a legend.
When Confederates breached the Federal flank and rear, McDowell was forced to withdraw. The withdrawal was orderly at first, but a Confederate shell destroyed a bridge and the Federals began fleeing in panic. Soldiers collided with congressmen and their wives who had come out with picnic baskets to watch the battle. Many were captured and held as prisoners of war in Richmond. By nightfall, the first Federal stragglers wandered back into Washington and the Confederate victory was complete.
Bull Run Aftermath Nearly 4,900 soldiers were killed, wounded or captured at Bull Run. These numbers horrified both sides, but they would be light compared to later battles. The Lincoln administration resolved to regroup, which included replacing McDowell with the new hero, George McClellan. The new resolve also prompted Congress to pass a resolution declaring that the war was being fought to preserve the Union, not to interfere with slavery.
While July ended with the North in defeat and the South joyous with victory, the war was far from over. Northerners vowed to retool and strike again and southerners vowed to defend their homes against invasion. Both sides still expected the war to be over by winter.
Source: Long, E.B. and Long, Barbara: The Civil War: Day by Day (New York, NY: Da Capo Press Inc., 1971) & Wallechinsky, David and Wallace, Irving: The People’s Almanac (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1975) & Ward, Geoffrey; Burns, Ric; Burns, Ken: The Civil War (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990)
Posted: May 25, 2011 by Britabroad
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 24, 2012 at 10:33 AM.
One of America's favorite Christmas songs had its origins in an earlier war, the American Civil War.The Story Behind "I heard the Bells on Christmas Day" (adapted from longer version):
One of America's best known poets, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-1882), contributed to the wealth of carols sung each Christmas season, when he composed the words to "I Heard the Bells on Christmas Day" on December 25th 1864. The carol was originally a poem, "Christmas Bells," containing seven stanzas. Two stanzas were omitted, which contained references to the American Civil War, thus giving us the carol in its present form. The poem gave birth to the carol, "I Heard the Bells on Christmas Day," and the remaining five stanzas were slightly rearranged in 1872 by John Baptiste Calkin (1827-1905), who also gave us the memorable tune.
"I Heard the Bells on Christmas Day" flowed from the experience of Longfellow-- involving the tragic death of his wife Fanny and the crippling injury of his son Charles from war wounds. Tragedy struck both the nation and the Longfellow family in 1861. Confederate Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard fired the opening salvos of the American Civil War on April 12th, and Fanny Longfellow was fatally burned in an accident in the library of Craigie House on July 10th (her dress caught fire from a candle). Henry frantically attempted to extinguish the flames with a nearby, but undersized throw rug. Failing to stop the fire with the rug, he tried to smother the flames by throwing his arms around Frances-- severely burning his face, arms, and hands. Fanny Longfellow died the next morning. Too ill from his burns and grief, Henry did not attend her funeral.
The first Christmas after Fanny's death, Longfellow wrote, "How inexpressibly sad are all holidays." A year after the incident, he wrote, "I can make no record of these days. Better leave them wrapped in silence. Perhaps someday God will give me peace." Longfellow's journal entry for December 25th 1862 reads: "'A merry Christmas' say the children, but that is no more for me."
Almost a year later, Longfellow received word that his oldest son Charles, a lieutenant in the Army of the Potomac, had been severely wounded with a bullet passing under his shoulder blades and taking off one of the spinal processes. The Christmas of 1863 was silent in Longfellow's journal. Finally, on Christmas Day of 1864, he wrote the words of the poem, "Christmas Bells." The reelection of Abraham Lincoln or the possible end of the terrible war may have been the occasion for the poem. Lt. Charles Longfellow did not die that Christmas, but lived. So, contrary to popular belief, the occasion of writing that much loved Christmas carol was not due to Charles' death. "Christmas Bells"
(The original poem, complete with all seven stanzas)
"I heard the bells on Christmas Day
Their old familiar carols play,
And wild and sweet
The words repeat
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!
And thought how, as the day had come,
The belfries of all Christendom
Had rolled along
The unbroken song
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!
Till, ringing, singing on its way,
The world revolved from night to day,
A voice, a chime
A chant sublime
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!
Then from each black accursed mouth
The cannon thundered in the South,
And with the sound
The carols drowned
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!
It was as if an earthquake rent
The hearth-stones of a continent,
And made forlorn
The households born
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!
And in despair I bowed my head;
"There is no peace on earth," I said;
"For hate is strong,
And mocks the song
Of peace on earth, good-will to men!"
Then pealed the bells more loud and deep:
"God is not dead; nor doth he sleep!
The Wrong shall fail,
The Right prevail,
With peace on earth, good-will to men!"
Source: unknown
Posted: December 25, 2010 by Britabroad
Conversation about "Stonewall" Jackson and his replacements
Originally Posted by October 7, 2010; Chesh
How do people think the war would of gone if Stonewall had lived to the end?
Originally Posted by October 7, 2010; Railin
Hmm I dont know I always wondered that, Maj Gen Jackson was my favorite commander in the Civil War. Despite always being outnumbered and under supplied he always found a way to win. I dont like how in many of the movies he is in he always portrayed with the importance of the bayonet which in fact was seldom used. Who knows Gettysburg might have been different, despite all the "what ifs" he didnt want to live if they CSA didnt win the war.
Originally Posted by October 7, 2010; OneEyeMick
Well just look at the 2 incompetant commanders that replaced Jackson, Ewell and Hill, Jackson surely could have done better, Especially on the 1st Day.
Originally Posted by October 8, 2010; Railin
Hey dont put down AP Hill he tried his best, he probably was the best replacement on hand. He was a competent at both Bulls Runs, came through at Antietem and his reinforcements at Fredricksburg were timely. Hill was wounded plenty of times after he took command of Jacksons post, and later died defending Richmond.
Originally Posted by October 8, 2010; OneEyeMick
Well, I'm just saying Jackson was musch better. He would have taken Cemetery Hill on the first day, unlike Ewell. They were both good commanders (Better than a lot of the Yankee commanders) but we all know Jackson was a Better and More loved commander than Hill and Ewell. (Sorry but this is more of an opinion)
Originally Posted by October 8, 2010; Britabroad
What do you think it was that made Jackson stand out above other commanders?
While he was a Professor at the Virginia Military Institute before the war he was regarded by the cadets there as being a bit weird. Is this just another case of military genius born from eccentricity, or was there something in Jackson´s personality that made the men under his command fight harder or better?
Originally Posted by October 8, 2010; Railin
Its true, many of the men respected Hill but few liked or respected Ewell. We will never know if Jackson could take Cemetery Hill. Maybe, Maybe not, I will tell you though, that he would have probably died trying.....Jackson despite being a little..well really senile was much more than a great commander, his bravery was a huge moral booster to the whole CSA army, including the regiments in the West...
Britabroad besides what I stated above, he proved himself in the Mexican American War. He was an excellent and I mean excellent artillery commander. With 4 cannons and 450 men he made a Mexican army of about 2000 regulars surrender. He was an inspiration and VMI was proud to have him. Although no one thought he would go on to become the Commander of Second Corps, he did exceptionally well despite (as I said) his rash thinking. His fame in his Valley Campaign only proved him to be more of moral booster then an actual commander...........
Originally Posted by October 9, 2010; Britabroad
I guess that he must have enjoyed some standing prior to 1861 to be invited to instruct at the VMI, and I suspect that (I´m not an historian so feel free to challenge this) the attitude of the cadets towards him was probably no more than it would have been to many professors - guy´s twice their age who were resting on their laurels from wars 20 years before, for example. Add Jackson´s famous religious leanings and to an 18 year old, he would seem "weird".
The war itself seems to have brought forth many a senior officer, from the Confederacy and the Union, who came very low down in their West Point class positions, yet turned out to be first class fighting men, tacticians, and who knew how to get the best from their men in combat. Jackson isn´t one of these low attainers, but he definititely rose from obscurity.
Originally Posted by October 9, 2010; elisam
I remember reading somewhere once that there is a theory that when Colonel Bee said that Jackson was 'standing like a stonewall', he meant it as a criticism of his,(Jacksons), slowness in coming to the assistance of Bees' brigade rather than a compliment.
Originally Posted by October 9, 2010; Railin
No one knows exactly how stonewall got his famed nick-name. We only know it came for the First battle of Bull-Run, there have been many theories...
Originally Posted by November 4, 2010; Zom
There is no doubt that the war would have come to the same conclusion, even if the South had two RE Lee's and a dozen Jacksons. The South could never have kept pace with the North's advantages in industry and manpower. It is of course part of the romance of "the lost cause" to dream of what ifs. It would have taken a greater what if than Jackson surviving to have changed the outcome of the war.
Besides, TE Jackson is over rated, IMO. He was a complete failure in the Seven Days. He took a nap instead of crossing White Oak Swamp!! You cannot be the Savior of the South when you are napping.
Originally Posted by November 4, 2010; Railin
Wow really? Jackson was the Savior of the First Battle of Manassas, he conjured up the idea of Chancellorsville, he held the right flank at Fredricksburg. In your statement of not crossing the White Oak...It was flooded and he had no engineers to make a crudge bridge or able way to cross. He found ways to supply his troops, when there were no supplies to be had. A successful valley campaign removing all Northern troops out of the Shenandoah (17000 vs 52000). To also correct you AP Hill attacked without orders because Jacksons troops who weren't there and also were fatigued. Blaming Jackson for someone else's impatience is hardly nice, despite his actions later in the battle.
Not only that but he forced more than 3000 Mexicans to surrender with 1 cannon and 200 troops in the Mexican-American war. He was considered the best artillery commander in Virginia and the Army before the civil war. He was an able commander, remember The South didnt want to go on the great offensive, it was a battle of politics, if the South could scare DC, they would have won... Gettysburg was only one of many blunders which eventually lead to the downfall of the CSA.
Originally Posted by November 5, 2010; chaman07
Jackson had the talent to take decisives opportunities on the battlefield, and optimizes his troops' efficient under his command and therefore a key general.
Lee's biggest mistake was to underestimate the ennemy due to many victories. Union could rise up again after a big defeat but the confederation couldn't
Originally Posted by November 5, 2010; Britabroad
Which is why a swift war was paramount. Hence Lee´s decision to march northwards and take the war to the enemy, as well as forcing the Union Army of the Potomac to follow him out of Virginia.
The result was a great morale blow to the Union, where war weariness was beginning to set in, and had Gettysburg been a Confederate victory, it´s thought that Lincoln would have been forced to sue for peace. But, had he not done so, what could Lee have done next? Had Lee´s army appeared on the outskirts of Washington DC, could Lee have realistically taken the city anyway? If he´d have laid siege, a few thousand more Feds from further north would have appeared behind him. Which would mean that the whole campaign was as much a psychological one as a military one, designed to discredit Lincoln even further, and bring the weight of the anti-war movement down on him.
I have to agree. When it came to manpower, equipment, munitions etc, the North had a distinct advantage, which could have kept them going for many years. But if the Confederacy had succeeded in turning popular opinion a bit more in the North, the Federal government might have had no option but to cease hostilities and recognise the Richmond government. Also, don´t forget that Britain and France were waiting on the sidelines to see how things panned out. Had Gettysburg been a Confederate victory, Britain planned to enter as mediator and entice the Union to accept Richmond. Had they still refused, Britain would have recognised the Confederacy (an act of war with the US), and attacked from Canada while breaking the Southern blockade. France also had plans to occupy Mexico and push up from the south into the Western Theatre. It all doesn´t bear thinking about.
As for Jackson - undoubtedly an aggressive, unflappable commander who knew his stuff. But no one is infallable, not even Lee, and mistakes were made on occasions.
Is he over-rated? Possibly. He was certainly well respected by his men, but had he lived, maybe his leadership abilities wouldn´t be so hyped up. He became a wartime legend, as do many generals etc once they´ve bought the farm. Had Longstreet, or Hill, or Forrest gone the same way, we might be having this discussion about them.
I´ve read of people asking "what if" Jackson had lived and had commanded a Corps at Gettysburg? Would Lee have won? Who knows, but I suggest that when men are fighting, they fight the same, no matter who´s in charge. They aren´t fighting for their general, or their state, or their nation. They fight for themselves, their mates, and their survival. And, as no one can detract from the way the Rebs fought, Jackson´s survival may well have made little difference on the face of it.
Originally Posted by November 5, 2010; Zom
I think you are giving Jackson credit he does not deserve. If I recall correctly, nobody besides Lee and Jackson were privy to the discussion between them before Lee sent Jackson on his flank march. Do keep in mind that it was Lee who split his forces once already to hold at Fredricksburg and to oppose Hooker's flank march. I suspect Lee was thinking about flanking Hooker, without any conjuring needed from Jackson. The maneuver was perfectly obvious when it appeared that Hooker's flank was "in the air." And shouldn't Lee get some credit for holding with only two divisions while he gave Jackson the bulk of the army for the flanking maneuver?
I would say Chancellorsville was Lee's finest hour, not Jackson's.
Give Jackson credit for executing Lee's orders superbly. Blame Jackson for his own foolish death, scouting beyond the lines in the dark; not so smart, you must agree.
Wasn't it Braxton Bragg who invented the flying battery in the Mexican War? Yes, Jackson was considered a fine artillery commander, but I don't know that he can be considered "the best", even if you are limiting to only Virginia.
I don't mean to steal this thread, sorry. Rating the relative merits of commanders in the ACW would take more than a single thread, and the discussion would never end.
Conversation about Abraham Lincoln & Civil War
Originally Posted by January 23, 2011; Pelopidas
Hello there, first of all i sallute your effort
Second i have questions regarding Abraham Lincon. In modern US he is considered a great man for saving the union etc, but what i have learned from reading was that in fact was a political oportunist, and was much to blame for the war itself among others.
I'm interested to know first how people view him, and second what kind of role did he play in regards to the causes of the war with special light to whether or not his political agenda was throughtout his career stable.
Originally Posted by January 28, 2011; Pelopidas
On the subject of this thread I found this interesting
Shiloh was the first battle that showed the country how bloody the Civil War actually would be. It's a fascinating encounter between Albert Sydney Johnston an U.S. Grant in which Johnston was killed. Here's Grant discussing the notion that the Confederate army would have won Shiloh "if" Johnston wasn't killed:
"I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or his ability. But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when Johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured.
Ifs defeated the Confederates at Shiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect. Commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, no hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour."
The Lost Cause is, among other things, a history of "ifs."--"If" Stonewall Jackson had lived. "If" Jeb Stuart had gotten there in time. "If" Lee had never ordered Pickett's Charge etc. The "Ifs" never extend the other way of course--If Meade had pressed on after Gettysburg, for instance.But what I find so moving about this passage is what it says about how people live. How many of us know people who live by the philosophy of "If?"
Originally Posted by January 28, 2011; Britabroad
Hi Pelopidas
Thanks for the kind words.
Sounds like a University course question, which would warrant a 900 word essay.
Lincoln is famous for preserving the Union and ending slavery. He´s also commonly hailed by scholars as one of the greatest US presidents.
The other side of the argument is that, had his policies been different, he wouldn´t have had to preserve the Union in the first place. There is also the fact that slavery was not abolished until 1863 and was used as a carrot to dangle in front of the Southern slaves in order to make life harder for the Confederacy.
Whilst Lincoln was an outspoken critic of the "expansion of slavery", he was not an abolitionist and spoke on more than one occasion about the problems which sudden emancipation would cause throughout American society. (See his Peoria Speech of 1854) This stance secured him his Presidential nomination in 1860 - not any wish to end slavery any time soon - although he did recognise a moral and ethical wrongdoing in enslaving another human being.
Upon Lincoln´s election in November 1860 South Carolina seceeded from the Union. President Buchanan openly said that it was their legal right to do so, and that this could not be lawfully prevented. Lincoln´s answer was to keep various forts occupied, blockade the Chesapeake Bay area, and send troops to occupy Arlington Heights, Virginia - still technically a member of the Union at that time.
He refused to quit Fort Sumter, S Carolina, and when it was bombarded and forced to surrender, his answer was to call for 75,000 volunteers with which to "quell the rebellion", and when Virignia seceded a month later, Union troops occupied the town of Alexandria.
He then set about vigorously exercising unprecedented war powers, such a arresting and imprisoning without trial anyone suspected of holding secessionist views - particularly in the Border States. Their numbers ran into thousands, and included the entire Maryland Legislature. Hardly diplomatic or very American of him.
He closely supervised the war effort personally, selecting and deselecting top generals throughout the war, and combined a variety of different Republican factions in his own cabinet, pressurising them all to co-operate together. He vindicated constant attempts at capturing Richmond throughout the war, and imposed a military governorship on Tennessee and Arkansas in 1865.
He was actually viewed as a moderate, and had many runnings with Radical Republicans who were demanding harsher treatment of the secessioned states and the southern populace. He wasn´t popular and was only re-elected in 1864 due to a sudden surge of military success that year - won by his own politically appointed generals for political reasons. Prior to this, war weariness and a mixture of feelings towards secession and slavery showed him to be highly unlikely to be re-elected.
In fairness, he does appear to have genuinely wanted to heal the rifts left by four years of warfare and showed no real wish to "punish" the south - although it was muted that this was due to his knowledge that his actions had been ilegal from the offset. His assasination fired him into the realms of martyr for the cause and added to his sacrificial image - perversely freeing him from any subsequent accusations.
Love him or hate him, agree with his politics or not, Lincoln was - like all lawyers/politicians - shrewd and intelligent. Highly shrewd and intelligent. And highly ambitious. His personal legacy was all important to him and he did not want to be remembered as the president who lost the Union, at any cost. And so, arguably like all politicians, his politics revolved around himself, his own wishes, and his own gains or potential losses. His rise from the ranks of poverty, self-taught intelect, and ambition are illustrated by his social conscience, but held back by his personal feelings. He knew what was morally correct, but was a 19th century man with 19th century values and views.
As for his political stableness, he actually started out during the 1830´s as a Whig, being instrumental in the formation of the newly raised Republican Party during the late 1850´s. The Republican consisted of disillusioned Democrats, the Free Land Party, some prominent abolitionists, what was left of the Whig faction, and was seen as representing the Free northern states of the Union - where a population of 23 million held the monopoly on political power compared to a free population of 5 million in the southern states. The formation of the Republican Party had caused a great political power shift which was seen as unjust and unrepresentative by the South.
Coversation about Quantrill's Raiders
Originally Posted by January 31, 2011; Britabroad
Hi Niccolo,
Some very nice info. Quantrill´s Raiders were one of those partisan units which were detested by the Union due their guerrilla tactics - which got results but did little for public relations.
These tactics help to illustrate the difference between the Eastern Theatre, which was fought in a mainly conventional manner, and the Western Theatre, where (particularly in Missouri & Kansas)
the tactics were largely unconventional due to the fewer number of regular troops.
Nice one.
edit: I notice Stand Waite was once one of Quantrill´s men, which I wasn´t aware of.
Originally Posted by January 31, 2010; Niccolo Machiavelli
Thanks Britaboard,
This "uncoventtional manner" you speak of is exactly the reason I would love to use them in ACW 3.0. Althought these men are not considered "American Hero's," if the war would have been won by the south, all the "unconventional" actions of the union which took place prior to the war would have been looked at in the same light. He who wins wars writes history. Quantrills Raiders have a special aura about them. If you look at the list and recognize some of the names on it, you should realize that this group of men although were not icons at the time, were the elite confederates. Yes they are not know for their valor, but that is because the south lost. A different outcome and we would all be talking about William Quantrill and his Raiders as hero's. As a testimony to my argument, notice Jesse James, Frank James, Cole Younger, Bob Younger, Jim Younger, Archie Clements, Bill Anderson, and many more. Not any other company in any other war, has had more men of this caliber, and still are fantasized about in movies and books over and over. These men although they lost their homes, land, families, and the cause they were fighting for, they managed to stick around as legends in the American Culture.
Thanks for taking time to read this.
Please let me know if you want me to do any more research on this subject matter. It would be my pleasure.
Oh another fun fact is that after Quantrill 400 men broke into small companies before the end of the war,"Bloody" Bill Anderson was in charge of his own Raiders. Jesse James and his folowers, along with the other Guerrilla Raiders who went with Andreson would scalp their union enemies and tie the scalps to the saddles and bridles of their horses. Quantrill joined them briefly in the fall of 1863 during fighting north of the Missouri River.
Conversation about Border States
Originally Posted by April 3, 2011; Primergy
Thank's for this.
It indicates that the Border States just looked for some "lame excuse" to break with the Union, or? Are there Indications that the decision was already preset?
Originally Posted by April 5, 2011; Britabroad
Hi Primergy. It seems that the so called Border States - which only became Border States after the succession of the South - were allowed to vote freely on the seccession issue, although the only State to pose an initial problem to the Federal Government was Maryland. As Washington DC stands in Maryland, Lincoln could not allow the State to secede and intervened personally when overtly anti - Northern sentiments showed the distinct possibility that the State would rebel.
The below passage explains the situation better and a bit more in depth.
The Lincoln administration regarded Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri as border states, critical because of their geographical positions and questionable in loyalty because of their strong ties to both South and North. Slavery existed in all 4 states, though its importance had diminished in Delaware and Maryland as their prewar economies became increasingly interwoven with the North's.
Delaware rejected an invitation to join the Confederacy early in 1861, and through the war remained loyal to the North, mobilizing its industries to provide supplies for the Union Army; despite some Southern sentiments, it never seriously threatened to leave the Union.
Marylanders were much more divided in their sympathies, being distinctly Southern in character and attached to the South by strong blood ties. They resented radical secessionists and abolitionists alike as the cause of hostilities, urging recognition of the Confederacy. The first blood was spilled during the Baltimore Riots in March 1861, and though the state contributed substantially to the war effort with men and materiel, the Federal government garrisoned troops in the state as a precautionary measure.
Believing Kentucky to be a buffer zone, Governor Beriah Magoffin refused the call for troops and formally declared the states neutrality. But the attempt proved futile: both Union and Confederate recruiters operated in the state, with Kentuckians serving on both sides. When Confederate troops moved into western Kentucky Sept. 1861, and Brig. Gen. U.S. Grant occupied Paducah, the legislature officially endorsed the Union. Pro-South Magoffin established a provisional government at Russellville, ratified the Confederate Constitution, and Kentucky was admitted to the Confederacy in December. The state, like Missouri, suffered the tragedy of a war that pitted father against son, brother against brother.
Missouri attempted neutrality after delegates to a secession convention in February 1861 refused to secede, but Federal invasion in May pushed many Unionists into the Confederate camp. As in Kentucky, pro-Union and pro-Confederate governments were established, the latter run in exile by Governor Claiborne F. Jackson. Missouri became a Confederate state November, 1861. Its thriving prewar economy was devastated, its people terrorized by brutal guerrilla warfare.
The border states represented a serious dilemma for President Lincoln. Convinced they were the key to victory, he could not afford to alienate them with his emancipation policies, thus incurred the scorn of Radicals by failing to abolish border-state slavery until the 13th Amendment, passed in 1865. And in the Western border states Federal troops had to be kept from the front to hold the occupied territory from Confederate invaders. Soldiers also policed the polls to protect loyal Unionists during wartime elections. Though the border states remained pro-Union, even severely divided Kentucky and Missouri, the effort to nurture their loyalty in the face of bitter internal struggles weighed heavily on Lincoln's overall plan to win the war.
Source: "Historical Times Encyclopedia Of The Civil War" edited by Patricia L. Faust
Originally Posted by April 26, 2011; kentuckybandit
Kentucky never recovered fully from the Civil War, the devastation and divisions lasting far into the late 19th century. Many family and local feuds broiled throughout rural Kentucky based solely on Civil War allegiances, and the backward reputation we have gained over the years was set in motion by the sudden stop in the maturation of state infrastructure brought on by the conflict.
Also on the subject of Kentucky, Frankfort is Northwest of Lexington, not South west, but I do not think we have the capability of moving settlements for Empire? Not an issue at all, just makes me giggle a little when I am building there lol.
Conversation about State Units
Originally Posted by April 10, 2012; Genosse
Absolutely, I've looked at comprehensive state by state regiment lists and as you imply, the data out there is a little overwhelming. What I had in mind was compiling links that give a more general look at each state's contribution. For example, http://www.2ndmdinfantryus.org/csunits.html offers a nice, readable summary of each unit, and has MD Federal units on another page.
I guess even this could get complicated for states like North Carolina and New York that I imagine raised dozens of regiments - but I will keep an eye open.
Originally Posted by April 10, 2012; Minas Moth
you're welcome it's a pleasure....
regarding the regiments:
Union regiments usually aren't the problem because Union government had efficient and detailed account of regiments raised (there was around 2050 regiments raised in Union states; including cavalry, artillery, and heavy artillery regiments which were converted to infantry regiments by Gen. Grant in his Overland Campaign i believe).
Confederate regiments are different story. There was around 750 of them raised during the War. but the problem is that most of the internet resources i have access to don't count all the regiments from all the states (so they are missing regiments from Texas etc). part of the problem is that regimental files (as other war documentation such as return) were taken from Richmond (or places they were sent to after Richmond was abandoned) to Washington where they remained "locked" down for some time. they were also partial so it is hard to pin point everything where it went.
if you look only the numbers then you can search this thread (i think somewhere i saw something like that) or browse the net...
Source: A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion - Frederick H. Dyer, 1908
and so on, and so on... if you like more info, pm me and i'll give you the link...
Originally Posted by April 10, 2012; Genosse
Absolutely, I've looked at comprehensive state by state regiment lists and as you imply, the data out there is a little overwhelming. What I had in mind was compiling links that give a more general look at each state's contribution. For example, http://www.2ndmdinfantryus.org/csunits.html offers a nice, readable summary of each unit, and has MD Federal units on another page.
I guess even this could get complicated for states like North Carolina and New York that I imagine raised dozens of regiments - but I will keep an eye open.
Originally Posted by April 13, 2012; Minas Moth
EDIT:
@Genosse
here's what you were looking for: LINK however, it is only union regiments. to see what you want go to:
1. Dyer's Compendium section on the right side
2. then you need the last one named: Organizations Furnished
3. Choose your state of preference...
Corcoran Legion
The 'Corcoran Legion' was made up of four New York regiments recruited by General Michael Corcoran. This group was made up of mostly Irish immigrants. In the beginning, the group was assigned to the Washington, D.C. area and saw no action. In late 1863, Corcoran was killed in a riding accident and was replaced by General Robert Tyler. In 1864, the unit was part of Grant's drive to Richmond and took a large number of casualties. During the Battle of Cold Harbor, almost the entire group was destroyed.
The 1st Delaware
The 1st Delaware first saw action at the Battle of Antietam, where almost 300 of its 650 men were killed. The unit was almost completely wiped out during the Battle of Fredericksburg during a suicidal charge. During the Battle of Gettysburg, they helped to stop Pickett's Charge Its commander, General Thomas Smyth was the last Northern General to be killed in the war.
The 23rd Ohio
The 23rd Ohio is best known for being the unit which contained future Presidents of the United States, Rutherford B. Hayes and William McKinley.
The IX Corps
The IX Corps was created on July 22, 1862 and commanded by General Ambrose Burnside. It has the distinction of having travelled further (seven states) and having lost more of its high ranking officers than any other Northern unit.
The 26th North Carolina Created on August 27, 1861, the 26th North Carolina spent the first year of the war in North Carolina doing nothing. In 1862, they became part of General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and fought at Gettysburg in 1863. 600 of 800 men were killed on the first day at Gettysburg and only 90 survived Pickett's Charge. Almost 1,900 of 2,000 men were killed by the end of the war, an astounding 88 percent loss
The 9th Virginia
The 9th Virginia was also known as Armistead's Brigade. It was created on June 3, 1861. The reputation of the group was damaged after a retreat during the Battle of Seven Pines, but they regained a positive light during Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, where 200 out of 300 were killed including General Armistead.
The 4th Texas
This group of hispanic soldiers was associated with General John B. Hood and fought at Gaines Mill, Second Manassas, Antietam, Gettysburg, Chickamauga and the Wilderness. They were almost completely wiped out at Antietam.
The 15th Alabama
Created in 1861 and commanded by Colonel William C. Oates, this unit fought with Stonewall Jackson and General Longstreet at many of the major battles. They lost almost 350 of 644 men at Gettysburg. Oates later became friends with Joshua Chamberlain, whom he fought against at Gettysburg.
The Michigan Brigade,
sometimes called the Wolverines, the Michigan Cavalry Brigade or Custer's Brigade, was a brigade of cavalry in the volunteer Union Army during the latter half of the American Civil War. Composed primarily of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, 5th Michigan Cavalry, 6th Michigan Cavalry and 7th Michigan Cavalry, the Michigan Brigade fought in every major campaign of the Army of the Potomac from the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863 to the Confederate surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865.
are some more regiments.
Naval Guns Efficency
The hitting power of the American 15-inch Rodman (Army) or Dahlgren (Navy) guns during Civil War ironclad engagements proved time and again that at effective combat ranges, no armour afloat could possibly resist a 450-pound shot propelled by 50-60 lb. service charges. In 1863, the CSS Atlanta was reduced to surrender after three hits from the 15-inch gun of the monitor USS Weehawken, one of which blasted a 3-foot-wide hole in her casemate armour. True, this armour was “laminated” with two layers of 2-inch iron plates. But these were rolled, wrought-iron plates, backed by 24 inches of wood, and angled at nearly 40° to the horizon on point of impact. Furthermore, the shot in question struck at a compound angle, meaning that even more armour and backing was offered to resist the shot, a cored shot of 330 lbs. The same experiment was demonstrated against the 5- and 6-inch thick armour of the CSS Tennessee (at Mobile Bay, 1864) and the 6-inch armour of the CSS Virginia II (at Trent's Reach, 1865) with similar results, demonstrating the effectiveness of the American ordnance.
The primary concern for Union ironclad designers, especially John Ericsson, however, was the 4- and then 6-inch armour plating of ocean going British ironclads, from Warrior to Bellerophon, the Reed-designed “central-battery” broadside-and-sail ironclad. While the Warrior's armour, for example, consisted of solid rolled plates of 4.5-inch thickness backed by 18 inches of teak and a thin iron inner “skin”, the sides of the vessel were vertical; deflection would not assist, as in the case of Confederate casemates. Warrior's plating was also defective at the joints. To confirm by firsthand experience themselves, the American navy, in 1862-63, procured rolled iron plates from the same British and French companies producing armour for their own nations' ironclad fleets. These were then backed by up to 3 feet of wood - and the targets packed against a solid hillside bank of clay. Nevertheless, 15-inch smoothbores tore ragged holes through these structures, not only penetrating the iron and wood but also leaving the plates themselves “shattered” and “brittle” around the point of impact.
All of this, however, argued little for actual British ironclads afloat during the American Civil War; namely Warrior and her sister-ship Black Prince, the Defence and Resistance, Achilles, and a few wooden ironclad conversions - all protected with 4.5-inch iron armour plates. By 1864, the U.S. Army and then Navy had already produced 20-inch guns that packed approximately double the hitting power of the 15-inch varieties. Rates of fire were reduced, but this mattered little when lighter-calibre weapons could effect no appreciable damage in the meantime against the turret armour of the American monitors, by 1864 up to 15 inches in thickness. Armour plates arrayed in a turret structure were also found to be innately stronger overall to resist the force of impact and therefore penetration than thick slabs bolted onto the broadside. Monitor turret armour proved impervious at even point-blank ranges to Confederate 10-inch Columbiads firing shot weighing 168 lbs, as opposed to the 68-pound smoothbores of Warrior and her sisters. Moreover, the monitor form of ironclad at least enabled upgrades without requiring an entirely new design ship to float the armour of equal weight.
Thus, any European ironclad would have done well to stay clear of Union monitors, and a blockade would have been too hazardous for Britain sensibly to risk capital ships. In order to be any real threat to the Union, the Royal Navy needed to invest in a Brown Water ironclad force to operate effectively in North American coastal waters.
Source: Article by Jeremy Black (relying on research by Howard Fuller and William H. Roberts)
Posted: May 13, 2012 by EKWardle
As in many other areas the CSA was at disadvantage. It had far less miles of tracks, often with inferior capacity. The lines were also less integrated than in the North, it was more common for tracks belonging to different companies to lack any physical link to each other even if they had the same gauge. For example the vital Richmond-Fredericksburg and Richmond-Petersburg routes lacked a connection in Richmond, requiring transhipment between the two terminus. Against strong local opposition a rickety track was eventually laid across Richmond streets, one of the very few rail improvements projects the CSA managed to complete,enabling some movements but not heavy traffic. Elsewhere however secondary railroads had to be teared apart to keep the rest going.
The Union railroads too faced issues of shortage of labor and materials, deferred maintenance and increased accidents. Nevertheless there were enough resources to keep the system running and to expand capacity (adding double tracks sections for example); some construction work on the transcontinental railroad was carried out during the war.Union railroads could even indulge in technological innovation, such as the adoption of steel rails.
The consequences of all this became rather evident during the war:
Short study concerning social and economic aspects of army composition.
The first thing we have to be aware of is a fact that in United States there weren't military schools like ones that existed in European countries (mainly France, Russia and Austria). In ante bellum United States most dominate school that had any reference to war was West Point. However we should not think that West Point was in fact military school. It was mostly engineering school with something we could call “army application of engineering principles and studies”. On the other hand it isn't fair to say it had loose ties with waging war or principles of campaigning but I have to stress that syllabus of West Point was “inferior” to the syllabus of present day military schools of Europe.
The annual intake at West Point was really small, classes were often numbering less than 100 students. Number of graduates (who finished 4 years of study) was even smaller. In 1861 there were 239 cadets at West Point. 80 of them were from the Southern States, and 76 of them resigned or were dismissed for they refused to take oath of allegiance to Union. Considering the number of population, we can say that South was over-presented in the West Point. That fact was even more noticeable in the Federal Army, where South had many officers. 313 officers resigned their commission in the Federal (later Union) army and “went with their states”. That left only 440 West Point graduates in Union service. Total number of graduates of serviceable age (over 17 and under 30) was under 3,000. Many West Point graduates returned to duty from retirement. They were usually appointed as commanding officers of volunteer or militia regiments (such was the case of Ulysses S. Grant who was commander in Illinois). Of all West Point graduates 300 became generals in Union Army, and 150 of them became generals in Confederate Army. In the South existed some number of “private” military colleges. Most important were: Virginia Military Institute (VMI), South Carolina Military Academy (known as Citadel), North Carolina Military Institute, Arkansas Military Institute, West Florida seminary. VMI was most important for it yielded 455 graduates in 1861, there were 1,902 graduates of VMI altogether. Of that number 1,791 fought in American Civil War, and it provided one third of all field officers in Confederate Army (majors and colonels).
When it comes to rank and file, it is interesting that both armies were predominantly raised from farming communities. Bell Irvin Wiley, while conducting his study of Confederate Army (CA) soldiers on the 9,000 soldiers in 28 Confederate regiments, discovered that half of them described themselves as farmers (50%), 474 entered the CA as students (both school and university), 472 entered as labourers, 321 as clerks, 318 as mechanics, 222 carpenters, 138 merchants and 116 blacksmiths. More than 50 entered as sailors, doctors, painters, teachers, shoemakers and lawyers. Some entered themselves as “gentleman”, they probably belonged to planter class, and they were notoriously hard to control by unit commanders. The same study was conducted in Union Army (UA). The sample was 12,000 soldiers and the results were exactly similar. However, UA did have considerably more members that entered as teachers, painters etc. This can be credited to higher literacy of Northern population (in region of New England before the war literacy was 95%).
The North had considerably larger population of foreign-born people. In 1860 there were around 1,000,000 Germans in the North. They also supplied 200,000 soldiers in Union Army (10% of total number of soldiers at the end of war). Alongside German soldiers there were 150,000 Irish-born soldiers, 45,000 English-born and 50,000 Canadians. In the South no one counted number of foreign-born soldiers in CA regiments. However, scholars believe that Irish, German, Italian and Polish born soldiers totalled tens of thousands. It is safe to assume that number was lower than 100,000 but we can’t be certain.
With outbreak of war Confederate administration (in 1861) couldn't have mobilised an army to challenge the Union. However, men came unbidden and joined the ranks either as volunteers or as members of militia units. Militia units varied in experience and existence. Some were indeed good and reliable soldiers who have been together for quite some time, while others were quickly assembled as war became reality (from early 1860). The volunteers were so numerous that Confederacy had no need to legislate conscription until April of 1862. In North, there was widespread of volunteering in large numbers. People came from militia units or simply volunteered themselves for the Army. Union soon took legislative attempts to regularise this popular response. This was necessary to raise money for pay and equipment of the soldiers.
On March 6 1861 Confederate Congress authorised creation of 100,000 strong Army. The Army was pretty much already assembled. In May 1861 Army was increased to number of 400,000. Even so War Department was forced to refuse more than half volunteers for lack of weapons and other equipment. It is interesting to point out that Confederates never formed regular army. CA consisted of state forces supervised by War Department. On April 15 1861, Lincoln called to service 75,000 militiamen to Federal service for 90 days. However, state offerings exceeded all expectations. To give you some perspective: Indiana was required to raise 6 regiments, while Governor promised at least 12, Ohio was required to raise 13 regiments, and Governor informed Lincoln that he can’t organise less than 20 regiments. On May 3 1861, Lincoln asked for 42,000 more volunteers to serve with Army for 3 years and 18,000 for the Navy. He also enlarged regular force by 23,000 and Congress sanctioned enlistment for 1,000,000 men for 3 years. Within a year from Fort Sumter incident, Union assembled an Army of 700,000 while Confederacy assembled 400,000 men. This numbers are circumstantial at best because exact numbers are hard to obtain. At the beginning it was quite lucrative to join the Union Army. Volunteers were paid 1000$ on enlistment so calculated desertion and resigning could bring you a fortune. Desertions weren't problem at the beginning, but in the South they began early. This was result of many soldiers being farmers so they left the ranks in order to harvest their crops, many of them had sincere intention to rejoin once they finish their farm jobs and the really did rejoin.
However, at the start of ACW , principal problem was equipment, or lack of it. This proved troublesome for Confederacy especially. Some arms were obtained from seized Federal Arsenals, but those were mostly old-fashioned muskets (unrifeled and flintlocks). They could be rifled and redone to use percussion cap but that took time. For Confederacy main supply of modern weapons was Europe, and acquiring them was main task of Confederate blockade running. In 1861 South started to produce weapons of its own in arsenals at Harpers Ferry, Richmond and Fayetteville. Confederacy especially excelled at improvised munitions production. Two out of three ingredients for gunpowder (charcoal and sulphur) were easily available. However, the third ingredient (saltpetre/nitre/potassium nitrate) wasn't. When Josiah Gorgas was named Chief of Ordnance in April 1861, he decided to find the source of nitre in Confederate territory. Source of it was found in southern Appalachian Mountains. In fact Confederacy never was in danger of defeat through shortage of powder. Purpose-built powder mill in Augusta (Georgia) supplied CA with powder for entire duration of ACW. In 1861 there were around 600,000 small arms in United States; of that number around 240,000 were in Confederate possession. The largest Union small arms producer was Springfield Armoury. Pre war annual output of weapons was around 20,000. When the War broke out it was increased to 200,000 rifles per year (almost 17,000 rifles per month). Both North and South bought weapons overseas. But when Union’s production picked up pace it imported less weapons. South, was hampered by lack of funds and depreciation of Confederate Dollar (it lost 9,000 of its value at the end of war, making it trash and not currency), so by August 1862 Confederacy bought only 50,000 rifles while Union bought 726,000. By the end of ACW Confederacy managed to purchase only around 580,000 rifles.
I tried to summarize this study as much as I could... I have to say that some sources and relevant numbers are really hard to come by, but I did my best.
Minas Moth (author)
Artillery of American Civil War
Before reflecting on the Civil War Artillery we have to look back in order to fully understand usage and benefits as well as setbacks of massive or effective artillery use in Civil War. From the invention of gunpowder, armies have realised the great potential harboured by artillery. However, until 1750’s lack of technology made it extremely difficult to produce good quality artillery pieces. Casting methods of that time weren’t advanced enough to make huge impact and start the process which will later be known as artillery tactics. In fact, it was a common occurrence for cannons of same battery to be of different calibre even though they were produced by same manufacturers.
First glimpses of standardisation began in 1750’s in Europe. The leaders in this field were Austrians who enhanced mobility of their field pieces by reducing their weight using advanced casting techniques. However, from 1760’s onward, it was the French who took over. This can be congratulated to one man; General Jean Baptiste Gribeauval, who’s brilliant innovation put artillery in centre of Napoleonic wars, as well as other future conflicts of 19th Century. Standardisation of artillery pieces enabled more regular fire, and this encouraged development of artillery tactics, which differed from largely desultory and random bombardments of the 17th and great part of 18th Century. Development of munitions, especially grape and canister shot made artillery one of the most potent weapons on the battlefield. Napoleon himself was educated artillery officer, and he used artillery excessively at the Battle of Waterloo. The French were the first to organise artillery pieces into single hard hitting force called Grand Battery. Although usage of Grand Battery as well as its organisation is entirely French invention, it is important to mention that Russians were developing their artillery forces in this way prior the Napoleonic wars, but they never achieved battle winning tactical organisation of Grand Battery. Napoleon’s Grand Battery at Waterloo was made of eighty (80) cannons, of which forty-two (42) were six-pounders, eighteen (18) twelve-pounders and twenty (20) howitzers. The principle usage of Grand Battery by Napoleon as to heavily bombard enemy’s centre and then when it was sufficiently weekend fan out the fire towards flanks. This is just simple presentation, and not Napoleon’s always used tactic, but this will give you some insight on how it worked.
Now, let us turn to the American Civil War period, as this is prime era of our concern. We have to consider some numbers before moving forward. In 1861 Union Army possessed only 5 Napoleon 12-pounders but during the war this number increased to 1,100. The Confederacy acquired around 600, and this is remarkable achievement given its lack of resources, foundries and engineering capability. Thru the War, Union Army also acquired 587 Parrot 10-pounders, 925 Three-inch Ordnance Rifle, 388 12-pounder mountain howitzers and some number of 24-pounder and 32-pounder howitzers. However, during the war, battlefield artillery on both sides was comprised largely of 12- and 10-pounders. And, although American Civil War was primarily war of the rifle, artillery when deployed in sufficient numbers and favourable terrain did extensive damage to the enemy.
But let us start at the beginning. Prior 1850’s US Government showed small interest in inventions and experiments made by various ordnance experts. Opinion of US Ordnance Department was that wars were won by smoothbore cannon’s and nothing else was needed as nothing will change in the future. This, however, didn’t deter inventors who often conducted experiments at their own expense and invested great amount of time before their inventions were even considered by the Ordnance Department. On the other side of the Atlantic, British encouraged their inventors to implement improvements in artillery and small arms department as well. These improvements were primarily rifling of the barrels, but development of new types of projectiles was also encouraged. Rifling is a system of grooves and lands inside the barrel which causes projectile to spin as it leaves the gun barrel. Rifled barrels also needed to be stronger than smoothbores because a greater stressed was inflicted on the gun itself. This was caused by tighter seal (less windage) between projectile and barrel. Such seal caused great pressure in the breech and it was necessary to overcome the friction between the projectile and the rifled bore.
At this time it would be great to make difference between different types of cannons. Weapons can be differentiated by various criteria, either by length of barrel, weight of projectile, weight of cannon itself, but are usually distinguished as guns, howitzers, mortars and siege/coastal defence pieces. Furthering this division, we can also distinguish them by their role on the battlefield: field (light and easy to move around battlefield), mountain (easily broken down for transportation on the horse back), siege/garrison (heavy but movable to different siege works/forts) and coastal (heavy, cumbersome weapons designed primarily and only for coastal forts).
The start of war at 4:30 AM on April 12, 1861 left the Confederacy in “artillery dire” so to speak. Most of the artillery weapons came from captured Federal forts and armouries. But these weapons were mostly heavy siege and coastal guns unfit for field use. The Confederacy also possessed some number of obsolete smoothbores that were distributed to State Militias years before the War. At the start of the War, Confederacy had only one working canon foundry (Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia), so it was an imperative to establish enough political and trading connection with Europe to import sufficient number of weapons.
Guns and howitzers, in terms of artillery, are mostly the first thing people associate with American Civil War. Weapons were formed in batteries (Union battery had 6 and Confederate battery had 4 guns). In Union Army, four cannons were guns and two were howitzers. Normal 6-pounder battery consisted of four 6-pounders and two 12-pounder howitzers, and 12-pounder battery of four 12-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers.
Batteries were often grouped and formed in a line, making strong defensive position. In many occasion batteries were placed in first line of battle. Reasons for this are various. One of the most important was broken terrain that was common feature in America. This landscape was much different from battlefields of Europe which, although not flat, were significantly less broken. Broken terrain made artillery ineffective if it was positioned on high ground where battlefield was criss-crossed with hills, sunken roads, woods and rivers. This made Civil War generals to haul the artillery to the first lines where it could do most damage to enemy, both physically and psychologically. The prospect of advancing against line of guns prepared to fire shrapnel or canister shot doesn’t sit very well with ordinary soldier. But common Civil War soldier used his ingenuity to fight this problem. It was reported more than once that men (sometimes entire companies and regiments) would lie down on the ground or throw themselves in the ditch when gunners were preparing to fire (canister shot). After the shot they would get up, continue their advance and then, after 30 seconds or so, dropped down again.
The principal difference between guns and howitzers is following. Gun is long-barrelled, heavy weapon that fires solid shot over long range with low degree of elevation using a large powder charge. On the other hand, howitzer had shorter barrel and could throw shots and shells over shorter range but at higher elevation and with smaller charge. Also, howitzers were smaller and much more maneuverable than guns. At the outbreak of war, most of the weapons both sides had were smoothbores but re-rifling was started almost immediately to prepare old smoothbores to accommodate new projectiles. However, rifling of a gun was long and expensive process. Also, because of pressure differences it was a very dangerous one. Not all smooth-bores were dependable and safe to use once rifled.
The most common way of designating guns and howitzers was by the year they were designed or sometimes improved in. This leads to the fact that same model by weight of projectile (6-pounder) can have different markings depending on years when it was improved (example: 6-pounder of 1847 has same manufacturer and base model as 6-pounder of 1857, but the late is in fact improved model of former). The Union States produced various guns: iron 6-, 9-pounders (although fewer than thirty 9-pounders were produced) and 12-pounders for field use; iron 12-, 18- and 24-pounders for siege and garrison use; iron 32-, 42- and 64-pounders for navy use. The Confederate States produced iron 6-pounders and bronze 12-pounders for field use. However, as the war progressed bronze became scarce so it was replaced by iron.
Most numerous guns in both armies were dependable Model 1857 (called Napoleon after the French Emperor Louis Napoleon who endorsed development of the gun). It was a smoothbore 12-pounder that was reliable, effective and easily maneuvered. It had range of 1,600 yards (1460 metres) at five degrees elevation, but was most effective around 1,200 yards (1100 metres). The Confederates extensively used Napoleon as their prime artillery weapon. They acquired most of them by capturing Federal guns and producing Confederate made copies of the design. Napoleon 12-pounder was a bronze gun, but as said earlier, when bronze became scarce in the South, pieces were made from iron. One interesting thing about Napoleon Gun is that it is often classified as gun-howitzer because of light weight and relatively shorter barrel. There were other common field guns used in the American Civil War, such as: Model 1841 6-pounder field gun, Model 1841 32-pounder seacoast weapon, Model 1841 42-pounder seacoast gun.
Howitzers were usually smoothbore weapons (in fact most of them were), but many were rifled during the war (3.4-inch Dahlgren Boat Howitzer). Union States produced bronze 12-, 24- and 32-pounder howitzers for field use, iron 24-pounders and 8-inch for siege and garrison, and iron 8- and 10-inch for seacoast defence. Confederate States produced iron 12-pounder and bronze 24-pounder field guns and 8-inch siege and garrison weapon. The standard howitzer was Model 1841 12-pounder which had higher trajectory and a range of more than 1,000 yards (914 metres).
There was a variety of mortars used during the American Civil War. However, they were mostly used for garrison and siege and weren’t included in field artillery. They were even mounted on decks of ships or railroad cars. Seacoast mortars were most numerous. Those were 10- and 13-inch weapons made of iron and were primarily used for defence of rivers and coastal waterways. The siege mortars were lighter so they could be carried by army on the march. They weren’t larger than 10-inch and were also made of iron. The most famous mortar of the American Civil War is probably the “Dictator”. It was a 13-inch Model 1861 seacoast mortar mounted on a specially reinforced railroad car that could hold its weight of 17,000 pounds (7711 kg). It was used at the Siege of Petersburg, Virginia in 1864. It could lob 200 pounds (90 kg) explosive shell at range of 2 and half miles (4 km) and it was used for three moths during the siege.
There was another type of cannon called Columbiad. A Columbiad was a heavy iron artillery piece which could fire shot and shell at high angle of elevation using a heavy powder charge. They were mostly classified as seacoast defence weapons and were mounted on the fortifications of First and Third System built by Federal Government prior the War. In 1861, Lt. Thomas J. Rodman, of the US Ordnance Department, employed Fort Pitt Foundry in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to produce Columbiads using a special casting method he had developed in 1844. His method caused less stress on the gun during casting thereby preventing formation of cracks. This method was very successful and the guns were later known as Rodman guns. The Columbiads were produced in 8-, 10-, 12-, 13-, 15- and 20-inch models and were primarily smooth-bore. The Confederate States produced their Columbiads using old method but were experimenting with banding and rifling the weapon. Confederate Columbiad was capable of firing 225-pound (102 kg) shot at a distance of 1,800 yards (1650 metres). If compared to other cannons, Columbiads saw little action. By the end of the Civil war they were already obsolete and replaced by more effective weapons.
Author: Minas Moth
Artillery pieces of American Civil War
Parrot Cannon
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Robert Parker Parrott spent forty years of his life perfecting a rifled cannon and its projectile. By 1860, he had patented a new technique of attaching the reinforcement band on the gun breech. He wasn’t the first who attempted this technique nut he was the first who used a method of rotating the tube while slipping on the hot band. When cooling, this rotation caused band to uniformly attach to the barrel rather than in few places as was the case with earlier methods. This allowed band to sag in place better than ever before. 10-pounder Parrott gun was patented in 1861 with 20- and 30- pounder guns later that same year. He also patented 6.4-, 8- and 10-inch calibre cannons early in the war. Army classified those guns as 100-, 200- and 300-pounder Parrott. By the end of war, both armies were using Parrott guns. Parrott developed special ammunition for his cannon also. His Parrott projectile was elongated projectile that employed a sabot made of wrought iron, brass, lead or copper that was attached to shell base. When fired, projectile expanded into the rifling of the barrel. Parrott patented his first projectile in 1861. After the War, dispute erupted between Dr. John B. Read (inventor of expansion system) and Parrott himself, who contended he had bought the 1856 and 1857 patents from read before the War. Since then, projectile type is also known as Read-Parrott Projectile.
3-inch Ordnance Rifle
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
3-inc Ordnance Rifle is the Model 1861 3-inch wrought iron rifle. The design itself was patented in 1855, but Civil War Rifle was evolved type of this gun. It featured smoother final profile, and wrought iron, which was wound and welded in criss-crossing spirals in original design, was now done in sheets or plates for the final form of the gun. Ordnance rifle was manufactured at the Phoenix Iron Company in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. Federal Ordnance Department commissioned the Rifle early in 1861. There were other versions of this weapon in production in 1862 and 1863 by various companies, but Phoenix Iron Company’s piece is the only one that is known as 3-inch Ordnance Rifle. The Confederacy also produced their version of this gun. 3-inch Ordnance Rifle was firing Schenkl and Hotchkiss shells accurately at distance of 2,000 yards (1830 metres) at five degrees elevation with one pound charge. The Hotchkiss shell was most common projectile fired by Model 1861 3-inch Rifle. The Hotchkiss shell was designed by Benjamin and Andrew Hotchkiss as a tree piece shell (nose – powder chamber; sabot – soft lead band fitting into an intention in the middle of the shell; and an iron forcing cup at the base – which forced lead sabot to expand when firing). Schenkl projectile was a cone shaped projectile which had ribs along the taped base. Sabot was made of papier-mache which was driven up the taper by the force of the gas produced upon the firing; the sabot expanded and caught the rifling of the barrel.
Blakely Gun
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
A British army officer Cpt. Theophilus A. Blakely pioneered banding system for his rifled cannon. His experiments lead to as much as ten different types of Blakely’s gun. The 3.5-inch calibre, 12-pounder Blakely weapons were developed in nine variants, with tenth variation being a 10-pounder mountain piece. Most of the weapons were made of iron, but 375-pounder Blakely gun was made of semi steel. The most famous Blakely rifle was “The Widow Blakely” used by Confederates during the defence of Vicksburg, Mississippi in 1863.
Whitworth's Gun
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Sir Joseph Whitworth patented his system in Manchester, England, in the late 1850’s. The system was intended for cannons and small arms as well. It used hexagonal bore design instead of the usual rifling methods. Naturally, ammunition was also of hexagonal design in order to follow the bore which allowed better accuracy and greater range. Sir Whitworth’s cannons were produced in both breech-loading and muzzle-loading models. If the Whitworth breech-loader malfunctioned, it could still be used as muzzle-loading canon.
These are some of the most common types of cannons that could be found on the Civil War battlefields. I haven't included siege or coastal pieces in this part. Mainly because they didn't play that important role in the War as did field pieces. As stated before, Civil War was a rifle war, but in some battles most of casualties was caused by the artillery. The battlefields of America didn’t favor massive use of artillery, but they proved to provide great opportunities for bold and imaginative artillery commanders. Confederate Artillery Major John Pelham was the first one to use “Flying Battery” technique. His artillery battery of four guns would unlimber, fire, limber up than rapidly move to new position and repeated the process. This was possible because terrain often concealed his movements. Because of this hit and run approach, Union forces often believed that Confederates had more guns than they really had. However, don’t be confused. Flying Battery wasn’t Confederate Artillery was of fighting. It was adopted by smaller number of batteries and could be used only when terrain allowed it. Also, this technique required use of lighter guns, preferably 6-pounders of Horse Artillery. But, in American Civil War, there wasn’t great number of Horse Artillery Batteries.
Author: Minas Moth
Skirmishers of 19th century and ACW
By definition skirmishers are/were infantry or cavalry soldiers stationed ahead or alongside a larger body of friendly troops formed in skirmish line to harass the enemy. The skirmish line is a battle formation used by rifle squads, platoons, and companies during an advance. In such a formation, troops are deployed in a single line along the front at intervals of 6–8 m (eight to 12 paces). An individual may move slightly forward or to the side to improve his fire position or to better adapt to the terrain, as long as he neither breaks the general continuity of the formation’s front nor hinders his neighbors.1
Skirmishers are known from ancient times, however, our point of interest are 19th Century skirmishers that were used in American Civil War period. In the 18th Century, development in gunpowder weapons enabled introduction of skirmishers armed with muskets. In 18th Century two conflicts were of paramount importance for development of skirmishing branch of infantry. Those were the Seven Years War (French and Indian War) and American War of Independence. What made these two conflicts great for development of such tactics was primarily enemy (especially in Seven Years War) and lack of trained troops (War of Independence).
In Seven Years War, British and their colonists faced French and their Indian allies forming Seven Nations of Canada (Mohawk, Abenaki, Huron and Onondaga). French relied heavily on their Indian allies who were very interesting fighters. They didn’t fight in European style of closely packed battalions of soldiers but were more inclined to act as individuals, using cover, ambush and other such tactics that will later be known as skirmishing. The way to fight such an opponent was to adopt his tactics and turn it against him. This was a process that took some considerable time but will be perfected in North America. British colonists were quick to adept such style of warfare. Even their militia battalions (Minutemen) excelled in such skirmishing duties and soon prominent shots and frontiersmen became widely known figures.
In Europe, situation was different. Except for Austrians, most of European powers didn’t use skirmishers as part of their armies, nor did they pay much attention to incorporate them in their fighting force. Most countries did organize militia units that did rely on skirmishing but they were often mistrusted by their own commanders. It is known fact that Friedrich the Great didn’t trust his Freikorps troops. He explained this by their lack of training he so highly admired. British, who could see potent force of this style of war first-handed, adopted it in their military system by seasonally drafting light infantry regiments as temporary units during field operations. However, when American War of Independence broke out, British still relied on line infantry deployment. Number of skirmishers used by British in their campaigns was confined to dragoon regiments, Indian allies and small number of skirmishers.
On the other hand, Continental Army relied heavily on units that performed skirmisher role. As mentioned above, Minutemen militia really excelled as such operations. There were some highly specialized units of skirmishers also; most known were Morgan’s Riflemen (a band of 96 excellent marksmen that specialized in picking off British officers). To say that skirmishers won the Independence War would be pompous statement at best. But we must acknowledge this tactic as a great contributor to United States independence. Conclusion for such a statement comes from contemporary military observers from Europe who, when witnessing French and Indian War, War of Independence, 19th Century Indian Wars and Mexican War, made term American way of fighting. This way relied more on loosely packed groups of men and didn’t follow European doctrine of tightly packed bodies of men.
When French Revolution broke out; French took skirmisher tactics to entirely new level by devising light infantry doctrine. French also divided light infantry into two categories: voltigeurs (skirmishers) and tirailleurs (sharpshooters). What made French system unique was adoption of living of the land which removed much of equipment from soldiers back and so he became more mobile and could perform light infantry duties. From 1804, each French line or light battalion formed one company of ninety of the best shots to perform role of elite skirmishers. Tirailleurs were part of Imperial Guard of Napoleon I Bonaparte and were organized in 16 regiments by the fall of French Empire. When it comes to equipment skirmishers of that period were sometimes equipped with lighter muskets, some were even rifled or were more accurate variations of general infantry muskets. However, there wasn’t some general supply of skirmishers with special weaponry en masse. It seems it mostly remained in hands of individuals or regiment patrons which weapons they will be equipped with.
In French Army organization skirmishers were part of organized force of line infantry, cavalry and artillery. Corps system allowed for every individual corps to act on its own as smaller fighting unit or to easily connect with other Corps. This system of mutual support between infantry, skirmishers and artillery proved extremely effective in most battles fought by Napoleon but it wasn’t invincible. If one part of this system was unable to do its job, other elements would loose support and were often exposed to heavy casualties. It is interesting to mention that several sources imply that more than once Napoleon used corps as base of skirmishers. This means that corps, which would be the first to come in contact with the enemy, immediately deployed large number of skirmishers to harass the enemy. Large numbers means more than one company of skirmishers per battalion, essentially making rest of the corps a pool from which skirmishers could be reinforced or replenished. This organization was maintained until rest of Army came in contact with the enemy.
So with this mentioned, we must ask ourselves following question: if light infantry doctrine (skirmishing) was highly evolved in early 19th Century and skirmishing was American way of fighting, what made Civil War generals to insist on line order of battle with tightly packed companies of men? General John Watts de Peyster in his treatise New American Tactics, advocated abandonment of European line order of battle and making skirmishing as main organization of United States Army. So, why wasn’t he listened?
One reason can be found in establishing military schools in United States in 19th Century, primarily West Point and Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Such establishments, although they were engineering schools before everything else, were founded on tactics that dominated in time of Napoleonic Wars. In that time, infantry line reigned supreme. In fact, British lines at Waterloo broke all French attacks and established belief that infantry columns can’t penetrate organized and synchronized infantry line. To achieve such outcome, line infantry was supposed to deliver volleys at steady rate. To achieve that all men in company must work as one. These were some of the ideals that cadets of West Point and VMI were taught. However, with appearance of rifled muskets, Napoleonic tactics became suicidal at best but syllabus of military schools didn’t follow technological advance. This discrepancy between technology and theory will ensure high casualties on both sides when Civil War broke out.
On the eve of battle both Union and Confederacy organized regiments in European style but on American way. There wasn’t enough time to properly train troops, so they were taught how to perform simple march orders and how to reload their muskets. Most of the time, this was the only training they received before being thrown into battle. However, Civil War period sources (especially histories of brigades and regiments by men who served in them) give us valuable information on skirmishers in this Conflict. Because of them we now know that every regiment (of 10 companies) would always used one of the companies as skirmishers in the preliminary of the battle. When battle commenced and two lines came in range, skirmishers were often absorbed by main line.
Skirmishers in Civil War were constricted to side duties; such as: picket duty, guarding, preliminaries of battle, scouting and counter scouting duty. It is paramount to say that skirmishers weren’t specialized companies in American Civil War Armies. As said before, they were men of line companies ordered to perform skirmish role.
Another question that comes into view is: why were skirmishers so ineffective? There in no Civil War battle which was decided by skirmishers, that is, where one force was stopped by skirmishers before even reaching opponent. Even locally (parts of battlefield) skirmishers didn’t manage to stop advancing enemies. Being 100men strong in loose formation, picking off individual soldiers and suffering small amount of casualties compared to those inflicted (skirmishers weren’t fired on by line infantry because volley couldn’t achieve its effect on loosely organized skirmishers) there should be some account of them stopping enemies advance. Reason why such accounts don’t exist can be explained by Civil War soldier’s willingness to take casualties. Civil War armies indeed had extremely high morale and they often pressed on even tough they suffered heavy casualties. In such case, skirmishing company could hope to fire 2 to 3 shots before enemy would close with them. Amount of casualties inflicted in that period could be high as 200 (at most) but even then enemy wouldn’t waver and rout. It would press on until it forced skirmishers to merge with main line. Often skirmishers would fire one shot and then rush back to their lines to form with their regiment.
All of this made skirmisher role under-presented in Civil War. There were some small encounters fought by skirmishers but they weren’t decisive ones. Even small scale battles (such as the Battle of Glorieta Pass of New Mexico Campaign) fought by less than 2,500men on both sides were fought in European fashion.
Things did change with establishment of sharpshooter units (Confederate armies deployed them in 1863) but there were never so much of them to make battle decisive impact. Sharpshooters could easily hit commanding officers and generals, but in Civil War, generals and officers fell quite often by fire from line infantry, so we can’t say that sharpshooters fulfilled even that role.
In the end, it is interesting to see how Americans, who developed system of skirmishing/light infantry, were more than willing to abandon it and suffer tremendous casualties inflicted on Civil war battlefields.
Author: Minas Moth
USS Mississippi
She was one of the first side-wheel steam frigates built for the US Navy. It had wooden hull, and she was built by Philadelphia Naval Yard as barque-rigged1 which was extensively used for evaluation of steam power. She was a flagship of Commodore Matthew Perry’s West Indian Squadron in the Mexican War (from 1845-1847) and in 1849-1851 she was in the Mediterranean. In 1852 she sailed for the Far East for Perry’s mission of opening trade with Japan. Except for a brief visit (1855-1856) until 1860 she remained there supporting British and French ships on bombardment of Taku in June 1859 and she also landed US Marines to protect US interests at Shanghai in August the same year.
In 1860 USS Mississippi returned to Boston, and was assigned to blockade duty off Key West in June 1861. When Union Fleet sailed up the Mississippi river in April 1863, it sailed pass the forts below New Orleans and destroyed CSS Manassas. The Mississippi remained at New Orleans for the rest of 1863, and took part in the run past Fort Hudson, the largest Confederate port below Vicksburg. The vessel eventually ran aground, and after loosing 64 men to the shore batteries, her captain ordered the vessel to be abandoned and set on fire.
USS Mississippi Type: side-wheel frigate Tonnage: 3,220 tons displacement Dimensions: L=69.8m (229ft), Beam=20.25m (66ft 6 in), Draft=6.6m (21ft 8 in) Propulsion: two side-lever steam engines delivering 700 hp (522 kW) for 11 kt Armament: 2 254-mm (10-in) and 19 203-mm (8-in) smooth-bore guns Complement: 257
1barque-rigged (in US often spelled bark-rigged)-late 18th Century term describing any vessel with particular sail-plain. This has three (or more) masts, fore-and-aft sails on the aftermost mast and square sails on all other masts.
Author: Minas Moth
CSS Alabama
When one looks upon the history of commerce warfare, one has to recognize as CSS Alabama as one of the most successful raiders ever in terms of the number of vessels she took. In her relatively short career, CSS Alabama managed to capture 55 ships and seize another 10 (this totals to number of 65 ships, although some scholars make it 64, notably John Keegan and few others). This accomplishment must be reviewed in depth to grasp its importance.
Ante-bellum United States Navy was almost entirely Northern area of expertise. Of 7,600 seamen only several went South as a result of secession. North provided manpower for United States merchant navy and had enormous quantity of trained sailors which had no equivalent in the South. However, of the Navy’s 1,554 officers, 373 chose to side with their states (another instance showing South’s great part in all things tied with military), but there was serious lack of sailors. At the outset of war, South had virtually no vessels at all; almost all of the 42 ships in commission were either in Union ports or in distant seas. Stephen Mallory (Confederacy’s Secretary of the Navy) correctly recognized that South, due to lack of ships, will have to buy them abroad, which effectively meant from England. Just for this purpose, former US Navy Captain James Bulloch was sent to Liverpool, where he opened business in June 1861. The problem was circumventing British neutrality law. Under the Foreign Enlistment Act which had naval provisions, British builders would be prosecuted by their government for supplying ships to the rebellious subject of a friendly foreign state (this was exactly the case with Confederacy). So certain amount of ingenuity and creativity was needed by Bulloch in order to get the ships Confederacy needed.
Bulloch ordered a hull (No. 290) from the Laird Brothers’ yard of Birkenhead on the southern shore of the River Mersey. This ship was launched as supposedly mercantile Enrica. She was three-masted wooden vessel of the barque-rigged type with auxiliary steam machinery. Its distinctive characteristic was a single funnel and a propeller which could be lifted from the water to reduce drag when sailing. The Enrica sailed from the river Mersey on July 29, 1862 despite the fact that Charles Francis Adams (US minister in London) correctly claimed that the construction and delivery of the vessel violated the United Kingdom’s 1861 declaration of neutrality. The British government issued an order of detention, but the ship sailed (for trials it was said) on the day before the order was served. Strictly legal, the vessel did not break the neutrality which the United Kingdom had declared. It was not until she had been fitted with armament that she actually became a warship. This however, happened well after vessel’s departure from British waters off the water of Azores Islands. There she received her guns, ammunition and powder from the supply ships Agrippina and Bahama. This enabled her captain; Raphael Semmes, to commission the vessel into Confederate service on 24th August 1862 as the Alabama.
Her armament was relatively light, but with sufficient equipment and supplies, the CSS Alabama cruised initially from region of the Azores northwest to Newfoundland and thence south to the Caribbean Sea. In this early part of her career, CSS Alabama sank 27 ships between September and December 1862. On January 11, 1863, she was encountered by the USS Hatteras. This happened when Captain Semmes attempted to intercept Union seaborne invasion of Texas. Acting on this intelligence, he set out determined to intercept Union transport fleet. To his great disappointment and peril he encountered a squadron of five Union ships and was pursued by USS Hatteras. USS Hatteras was a schooner converted into an auxiliary paddle-wheel gunboat. They came to battle about 20 miles (32 km) south of Galveston in Texas. CSS Alabama won the engagement and rescued the survivors of USS Hatteras who were put ashore in Jamaica. CSS Alabama continued her raiding. On June 20, 1863 she was cruising off the shore of Brazil when she spotted and overhauled mercantile barque Conrad (registered in the Philadelphia Pennsylvania). Conrad surrendered to CSS Alabama, and Semmes armed his prize for service as the CSS Tuscaloosa under the command of Lieutenant John Low. CSS Tuscaloosa cruised in the South Atlantic for six months before she was seized by British in Simon’s Bay, South Africa on the 26th of December. Semmes cruised Alabama to the Pacific as well, where he effectively stopped all Union trade traffic for time being. CSS Alabama reached as far to the east as Singapore and raided Union ships in the Indian Ocean as well. She truly became scourge of the Union shipping. However, extensive sea-faring left a mark on the vessel; her bottom was foul and copper plates protecting her bottom began to peal off, boilers were burned out, so Semmes set course for Europe in order to repair his ship.
CSS Alabama dropped anchor off the northern French port of Cherbourg in the English Channel on June 11, 1864. Semms intended to remain in Cherbourg as long as needed for ship to be repaired, but the Union government had recently persuaded the French authorities to fix a 24-hour limit on the stay in French territorial waters of any vessels flying the Confederacy flag. In the meantime USS Kearsarge (wooden-hulled screw sloop of some 1,490 tons) under the command of Captain John A Winslow arrived at Cherbourg from Flushing in Belgium, sometime during June 14th. Winslow wanted to embark Union prisoners held on the CSS Alabama on the USS Kearsarge. Semmes naturally objected, for he knew those prisoners would be added to USS Kearsarge crew. As USS Kearsarge left the port, Semmes decided he will rather fight than accept something like that. There are reports that Semms also believed it was a matter of honour, he wanted to prove CSS Alabama was a warship, not just commerce raider. Semmes apparently said following words to one of his officers: “Although Confederate government has ordered me to avoid engagement with the enemy cruisers, I am tired of running from that flaunting rag!”
On June 19th CSS Alabama set sail from Cherbourg and opened fire on the waiting USS Kearsarge shortly before 11 o’clock in the morning. Ships were almost perfectly matched. CSS Alabama mounted one 100-pounder pivot gun, one 8-inch pivot gun and 6 32-pounders. USS Kearsarge had 2 11-inch pivot guns, as well as complement of 32-lbs. However, it seems that USS Kearsarge featured hull covered with chains. This improvised armor was concealed with pine planking and proved very effective against CSS Alabama’s shot and shell. Just before 1 o’clock, chief engineer informed Semmes that boiler fires were out, the ship was settling rapidly and was in sinking condition. So, her foul bottom and tired equipment got hold over her. She was no match for USS Kearsarge in that state. Semmes repeatedly struck his flag, but before the USS Kearsarge could rescue the survivors or try to save CSS Alabama, Semmes and some 40 of his men were rescued by British Deerhound. USA considered this act illegal, and in December 1865 Semmes was arrested on the instructions of Gideon Welles, the Secretary of the Navy. Sinking of CSS Alabama had no material effect on the American Civil War. However it was a blow to Southern morale, not a crippling one, but blow non the less. However, her impact on US shipping was tremendous. Although, there were other Confederate commerce raiders none was as successful as Alabama. Their combined action caused damage to Union shipping in amount of 25,000,000$ Dollars. Even greater impact came from sky high cost of ship insurance for Union (United States) ships. The increase was 900 percent. Owners were registering their ships under foreign flags to avoid this enormous cost. This made ante-bellum US Merchant Marine (second largest in the world in that time, and growing rapidly) just wishful dream after the war. The British took hold of sea-trade dominance and they will keep it for 90 more years. After the war United States insisted that United Kingdom was liable for the destruction wrought by British built commerce raiders. Resulting process became known as “Alabama claims”. In the end an international tribunal awarded USA with 15,500,000$ in damages. This process paved way for modern arbitrary tribunals.
CSS Alabama Type: barque-rigged auxillary raider Tonnage: 1,050 tons Dimensions: l= 67.1m (220 ft), Beam=9.65m (31 ft 8 in), Draft=4.25 m (14 ft) Propulsion: one direct-acting steam engine delivering 600 hp (447.5 kW) to one propeller for 13 kt Armour: none Armament: one 163-mm (6.4-in) 100-pdr Blakeley rifled muzzle-loading gun, one 68-pdr smooth-bore guns, six 32-pdr smooth-bore guns Complement: 145
Pivot Gun A pivot gun was a type of cannon mounted on a fixed central emplacement which permitted it to be moved through a wide horizontal arc. They were a common weapon aboard ships and in land fortifications for several centuries but became obsolete after the invention of gun turrets. By mounting a cannon on a pivot, a much wider arc of fire could be obtained than was possible with conventional carriage-mounted cannons. Unlike the latter, however, pivot guns were fixed in one place and could not easily be moved outside of their horizontal arc; they could thus only really be used in fixed positions such as in a fort or on a battleship.
There was no standard size of pivot gun, though they tended to be fairly substantial weapons. Like other cannons, they were muzzle-loaders and could fire either shells or grapeshot (or other types of shot). Their calibres ranged from a few inches to the giant 11-inch Dahlgren guns used by the United States Navy in the mid-19th century.
Pivot guns had a major disadvantage in warfare: they were very difficult to protect in battle and were necessarily very exposed, as they lay close to the surface of a ship's deck and required an open field of view. In the late 19th century they were replaced by "disappearing guns" and ultimately by turrets, which enabled a broad arc of fire while providing the gunners with all-round protection from incoming fire.
Moving the Pivot Gun
Author: Minas Moth
Ironclads and Monitors
Essentially monitor is a mobile battery or heavy artillery, designed with a shallow draft to operate in rivers
as well as coastal waters. The type itself (Monitor)derives from the USS Monitor created by John Ericsson for service in the American Civil War. The ship was built by the Continental Iron Works, and launched in February 1862. She was based on an armoured raft constructed from wood and iron 5 ft (1.5 m) deep. She had slab-sided iron lower hull overhung by the “raft” to the extent if 14 ft (4.25 m) forward, 32 ft (9.75 m) aft and 3 ft 9 in (1.15 m) on each side of the ship for her entire length. This provided protection for the lower hull, rudder and propeller from ram attack. The fully-laden freeboard was just 1 ft 2 in (0.35 m). In design schematics, Ericsson’s original plan featured wrought iron side and deck platting 6 and 2 in (152 and 51 mm) thick, but the weight o such protection would have sunk the ship. This meant that thinner armour, fabricated from 1 in (25-mm or 2.5 cm) was used. They also used thinner plates riveted or bolted together. Turret’s lower edge was bronze made and was rested on bronze deck ring and was traversed by steam power. In the front there was a small pilot house made of iron blocks 9 in (229 mm) thick, and a 3 in (76 mm) glacis was later added round this.
USS Monitor fought her famous battle against Confederate monitor CSS Virginia in Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862. Neither vessel managed to inflict serious damage on the other. CSS Virginia offered battle once more in April 1862 after receiving several improvements, but USS Monitor refused battle. USS Monitor foundered on December 31 1862 while she was under tow. The 10 monitors of the following “Passaic” class (completed in 1862-1865) were improved and enlarged Monitor class design with displacement of 1.875 tons, overall length of 200 ft (61 m), speed of 7 knots and an armament of one 15-in (381-mm) and one 11-in (279-mm) smooth-bore guns. The armament was later in the war improved, probably by introducing rifled guns that featured greater range and accuracy. The following USS Roanoke was completed in June 1863 with displacement of 4,395 tons and was the first world ship with more than two turrets. Forward turret featured one 15-in (381-mm) smooth-bore gun, and of the two after turrets the forward featured single 15-in and 11-in (381-mm and 279-mm) smooth-bore guns, and the after unit one 11-in (279-mm) smooth-bore and one 8-in (203-mm) rifled guns. The USS Onondaga and USS Dictator were another two one-off a kind designs. After them there were four units of the 3,400-ton Miantonomoh class. Only one was completed in time for Civil War service, and was considered the best monitor of that time. Ships were built in four Federal Navy Yards, and featured speed of 10 kt, with two turrets each having two 15-in (381-mm) smooth-bore guns. Nine monitors of the Canonicus class (only seven were commissioned in 1864-1871) were improved Passaic class design with displacement of 2,100 tons, speed of 8 kt and one turret carrying two 15-in (381-mm) smooth-bore guns. Ships were built on lessons US Navy learned in Civil War monitor operations, especially during the first two years of the Civil War. Some of the units were in use even as late as end of 19th Century. The largest class of monitors was the Casco class of shallow-draft vessels intended for riverine service with displacement of 1,175 tons, draft of 6 ft 4 in (1,9 m) and armament of two 11-in (279-mm) smooth-bore guns in a single turret. Some 20 units were built in 1864 and 1865, but only 9 were commissioned into US service. Last of them survived until mid 1870s.
On the other hand, Confederacy was faced with serious lack of resources to produce large amount of monitors and ironclads. They couldn’t match Union’s creation of advanced weapons and never built any turreted monitor. Instead, they focussed on a small number of ironclad vessels offering similar capabilities. The first (and most known of theses) was the initial CSS Virginia, built of the recovered wreckage of the USS Merrimack, which had been partly burned as the Union forces retired from Norfolk, Virginia. She was completed in February 1862. This ship created pattern for all Confederate ships to come: forward and after ends of the hull were awash except for a low coaming at the bows, and amidships was a casemate with inclined sides. The lower edge of the casemate was only 6 in (150-mm) above water, 12 in (305 mm) less than intended. On their withdrawal from Norfolk in May 1862, Confederates burnt the CSS Virginia as she drew too much water to escape up the James River.
The best of Confederate ironclads was second CSS Virginia, completed at Richmond, Virginia, in 1864 and scuttled at the end of the war. She was smaller than the first ship of the name, and her casemate carried four rifled and smooth-bore guns of various calibres and 12-pdr smooth-bore howitzer on the casemate roof. There were another 15 Confederate ironclads, the best of known of them the CSS Tennessee completed in 1864 at Selma, Alabama. She was 209 ft (63,7 m) long, could achieve 5 kt using machinery stripped from the paddle-wheeler Alonzo Child, and was armed with two 7-in (178-mm) and six 6,4-in (463-mm) rifled muzzle-loading guns, these all being Brooke weapons.
In the end we can conclude that despite less resources Confederacy achieved serious feats in ironclad building. Their ironclads featured “slopped armour” that caused ordinary cannon balls to bounce of it. They also armed their ships with rifled guns whenever possible (at least few guns on every ironclad were rifled) which was considerable advantage over Union’s smooth-bore guns. However, they never featured turret design, and they were considerably underpowered. Their speed was rarely over 5 kt, while in reality they never went faster than 3 kt. However, the main enemy of ironclads and monitors weren’t enemy shells and cannon balls. The main problem proved to be rough seas for they were more than inclined to take on the water. For Confederacy problem was lack of friendly ports as the War progressed. This meant that if a port was taken, ships were destroyed by their own crews rather than let them be captured by the Union forces.
USS Monitor Type: ironclad monitor Tonnage: 987 displacement tons Dimensions: l=172 ft (52,4 m), Beam=41 ft 6 in (12,6 m), Draft=10 ft 6 in (3,2 m) Propulsion: one Ericsson vibrating lever steam engine delivering 320 hp (238,5 kW) to one propeller for 6 kt Armour: 2/4.5 in (51/114-mm) sides, 8/9-in (203/229-mm) turret and 1-in (25-mm) deck Armament: two 11-in (279-mm) smooth-bore guns placed in revolving turret Complement: 49
CSS Virginia Type: ironclad warship Tonnage: unknown Dimensions: l=275 ft (83.3 m),Beam=38 ft 6 in (11,75 m), Draft=22 ft (6.7 m) Propulsion: one return sonnecting rod steam engine delivering inknown power to one propeller for 7.5 kt Armour: 4-in (102-mm) casemate, 1-in/3-in (25 mm and later 76 mm) sides Armament: two 7-in (178-mm) Brookes rifled muzzle-loading guns, two 6.4 in (163-mm)Brookes rifled muzzle-loading guns, six 9-in (229-mm) smooth-bore guns, and two 12-pdr smooth-bore howitzers Complement: 320
Author: Minas Moth
Last edited by Minas Moth; September 29, 2012 at 10:09 AM.
General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson - 1st Bull Run/1st Manassas
Report of Brigadier General T. J. Jackson CS Army, commanding First Brigade, Army of the Shenandoah Headquarters First Brigade, Camp near Manassas, Va., July 23, 1861
Major: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade on the 21st.
About 4 in the morning I received notice from General Longstreet that he needed a re-enforcement of two regiments, which were accordingly ordered.
Subsequently I received an order from General Beauregard to move to the support of General Bonham, afterwards to support General Cocke, and finally to take such position as would enable me to re-enforce either, as circumstances might require.
Whilst in the position last indicated I received a request from General Cocke to guard the stone bridge, and immediately moved forward to effect the object in view.
Subsequently ascertaining that General Bee, who was on the left of our line, was hard pressed, I marched to his assistance, notifying him at the same time that I was advancing to his support; but, before arriving within cannon range of the enemy, I met General Bee's forces falling back. I continued to advance with the understanding that he would form in my rear. His battery, under its dauntless commander, Captain Imboden, reversed and advanced with my brigade.
The first favorable position for meeting the enemy was at the next summit, where, at 11.30 a.m., I posted Captain Imboden's battery and two pieces of Captain Stanard's, so as to play upon the advancing foe. The Fourth Regiment, commanded by Col. James F. Preston, and the Twenty-seventh Regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. John Echols, were posted in rear of the batteries; the Fifth Regiment, commanded by Col. Kenton Harper, was posted on the right of the batteries; the Second Regiment, commanded by Col. James W. Allen, on the left, and the Thirty-third, commanded by Col. A. C. Cummings, on his left. I also ordered forward the other two pieces of Captain Stanard's and all those of Colonel Pendleton's battery. They, as well as the battery under Lieutenant Pelham, came into action on the same line as the others; and nobly did the artillery maintain its position for hours against the enemy's advancing thousands. Great praise is due to Colonel Pendleton and the other officers and men.
Apprehensive lest my flanks should be turned, I sent an order to Colonels Stuart and Radford, of the cavalry, to secure them. Colonel Stuart and that part of his command with him deserve great praise for the promptness with which they moved to my left and secured the flank by timely charging the enemy and driving him back.
General Bee, with his rallied troops, soon marched to my support and as re-enforcements continued to arrive General Beauregard posted them so as to strengthen the flanks of my brigade. The enemy not being able to force our lines by a direct fire of artillery, inclined part of his batteries to the right, so as to obtain an oblique fire; but in doing so exposed his pieces to a more destructive fire from our artillery, and one of his batteries was thrown so near to Colonel Cummings that it fell into his hands in consequence of his having made a gallant charge on it with his regiment; but owing to a destructive small-arm fire from the enemy he was forced to abandon it.
At 3.30 p.m. the advance of the enemy having reached a position which called for the use of the bayonet, I gave the command for the charge of the more than brave Fourth and Twenty-seventh, and, under commanders worthy of such regiments, they, in the order in which they were posted, rushed forward obliquely to the left of our batteries, and through the blessing of God, who gave us the victory, pierced the enemy's center, and by co-operating with the victorious Fifth and other forces soon placed the field essentially in our possession.
About the time that Colonel Preston passed our artillery the heroic Lieutenant-Colonel Lackland, of the Second Regiment, followed by the highly meritorious right of the Second, took possession of and endeavored to remove from the field the battery which Colonel Cummings had previously been forced to abandon; but after removing one of the pieces some distance was also forced by the enemy's fire to abandon it.
The brigade, in connection with other troops, took seven field pieces in addition to the battery captured by Colonel Cummings. The enemy, though repulsed in the center, succeeded in turning our flanks. But their batteries having been disabled by our fire, and also abandoned by reason of the infantry charges, the victory was soon completed by the fire of small-arms and occasional shots from a part of our artillery, which I posted on the next crest in rear.
By direction of General Johnston I assumed the command of all the remaining artillery and infantry of the Army near the Lewis house, to act as circumstances might require. Part of this artillery fired on the retreating enemy. The colors of the First Michigan Regiment and an artillery flag were captured--the first by the Twenty-seventh Regiment and the other by the Fourth.
Lieut. Col. F. B. Jones, acting assistant adjutant-general; Lieut. T. G. Lee, aide-de-camp, and Lieut. A. S. Pendleton, brigade ordnance officer, and Capt. Thomas Marshall, volunteer aide, rendered valuable service. Cadets J. W. Thompson and N. W. Lee, also volunteer aides, merit special praise. Dr. Hunter H. McGuire has proved himself to be eminently qualified for his position - that of medical director of the brigade. Capt. Thomas L. Preston, though not of my command, rendered valuable service during the action.
It is with pain that I have to report as killed 11 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, and 86 privates; wounded, 22 officers, 27 non-commissioned officers, and 319 privates; and missing, I officer and 4 privates.
I respectfully call attention to the accompanying reports of the commanders of the regiments and battery composing this brigade.
Your most obedient servant,
T. J. JACKSON, Brigadier-General, Provisional Army, Confederate States
Report - Manassas; USA
General Irvin McDowell - 1st Bull Run/1st Manassas
Report of Brigadier General Irvin McDowell Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Arlington, VA, August 4, 1861
Colonel:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the 21st of July, near Manassas, Va. It has been delayed till this time from the inability of the subordinate commanders to get earlier a true account of the state of their commands.
In my communication to you of the 20th ultimo, I stated it as my intention to move that afternoon and drive the enemy from the east side of Bull Run, so as to enable the engineers to make a sufficiently accurate reconnaissance to justify our future movements. Later in the day they had obtained enough information of the passages across the stream to dispense with this reconnaissance, and it was decided to move without further delay.
It had been my intention to move the several columns out on the road a few miles on the evening of the 20th, so that they would have a shorter march in the morning; but I deferred to those who had the greatest distance to go, and who preferred starting early in the morning and making but one move.
On the evening of the 20th ultimo my command was mostly at or near Centreville. The enemy was at or near Manassas, distant from Centreville about seven miles to the southwest. Centreville is a village of a few houses, mostly on the west side of a ridge running nearly north and south. The road from Centreville to Manassas Junction runs along this ridge, and crosses Bull Run about three miles from the former place. The Warrenton turnpike, which runs nearly east and west, goes over this ridge through the village, and crosses Bull Run about four miles from it, Bull Run having a course between the crossings from northwest to southeast.
The First Division (Tyler's) was stationed as follows: One brigade on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike and on the eastern slope of the Centreville ridge; two brigades on the same road and a mile and a half in advance to the west of the ridge; and one brigade on the road from Centreville to Manassas where it crosses Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, where General Tyler had the engagement of the 18th ultimo.
The Second Division (Hunter's) was on the Warrenton turnpike, one mile east of Centreville.
The Third Division (Heintzelman's) was on a road known as the old Braddock road, which comes into Centreville from the southeast about a mile and a half from the village.
The Fifth Division (Miles') was on the same road with the Third Division, and between it and Centreville.
A map, which is herewith, marked A, will show these positions better than I describe them.
Friday night a train of subsistence arrived, and on Saturday its contents were ordered to be issued to the command, and the men required to have three days rations in their haversacks. (See appendix herewith, marked B.)
Saturday orders (copy herewith, marked c) were issued for the available force to march.
As reported to you in my letter of the 19th ultimo, my personal reconnaissance of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th at Blackburn's Ford showed he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss, and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired.
Our information was that the stone bridge over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run to the west of Centreville was mined, defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abatis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position.
Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and, after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major-General Patterson.
Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north, and move by a wood road around to the upper ford, and then turn south and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division to follow Hunter's as far as the turning-off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's division; the Fifth Division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.
I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas by Blackburn's Ford to Centreville along this ridge, fearing that, whilst we should be in force to the front and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road. For if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field works to strengthen the position.
The Fourth Division (Runyon's) had not been brought to the front farther than to guard our communications by way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. His advanced regiment was about seven miles in rear of Centreville.
The divisions were ordered to march at 2.30 o'clock a.m., so as to arrive on the ground early in the day, and thus avoid the heat which is to be expected at this season. There was delay in the First Division getting out of its camp on the road, and the other divisions were, in consequence, between two and three hours behind the time appointed - a great misfortune, as events turned out. The wood road leading from the Warrenton turnpike to the upper ford was much longer than we counted upon, the general direction of the stream being oblique to the road and we having the obtuse angle on our side.
General Tyler commenced with his artillery at 6.30 a.m., but the enemy did not reply, and after some time it became a question whether he was in any force in our front, and if he did not intend himself to make an attack, and make it by Blackburn's Ford. After firing several times, and obtaining no response, I held one of Heintzelman's brigades in reserve, in case we should have to send any troops back to re-enforce Miles' division. The other brigades moved forward as directed in the general order.
On reaching the ford at Sudley Springs, I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column, and come for-ward separately as fast as possible.
Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over.
The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley Springs south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was, for about a mile from the ford, thickly wooded, whilst on the right of the road for about the same distance the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the ford the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle, through the valley of a small water-course, a tributary of Bull Run.
Shortly after the leading regiment of the First Brigade reached this open space, and whilst the others and the Second Brigade were crossing to the front and right, the enemy opened his fire, beginning with artillery and following it up with infantry.
The leading brigade (Burnside's) had to sustain this shock for a short time without support, and did it well. The battalion of regular infantry was sent to sustain it, and shortly afterwards the other corps of Porter's brigade and a regiment detached from Heintzelman's division to the left forced the enemy back far enough to allow Sherman's and Keyes' brigades of Tyler's division to cross from their position on the Warrenton road.
These drove the right of the enemy (understood to have been commanded by Beauregard) from the front of the field, and out of the detached woods, and down to the road, and across it, up the slopes on the other side. Whilst this was going on, Heintzelman's division was moving down the field to the stream and up the road beyond. Beyond the Warrenton road, and to the left of the road down which our troops had marched from Sudley Springs, is a hill with a farm house on it. Behind this hill the enemy had early in the day some of his most annoying batteries planted. Across the road from this hill was another hill, or rather elevated ridge or table land. The hottest part of the contest was for the possession of this hill with a house on it.
The force engaged here was Heintzelman's division, Willcox's and Howard's brigades on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzelman's division, Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the center and up the road, whilst Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division was on the left, attacking the batteries near the stone bridge. The Rhode Island Battery of Burnside's brigade also participated in this attack by its fire from the north of the turnpike. The enemy was understood to have been commanded by J. E. Johnston.
Ricketts' battery, which did such effective service and played so brilliant a part in this contest, was, together with Griffin's battery, on the side of the hill, and became the object of the special attention of the enemy, who succeeded (our officers mistaking one of his regiments for one of our own, and allowing it to approach without firing upon it) in disabling the battery, and then attempted to take it. Three times was he repulsed by different corps in succession and driven back, and the guns taken by hand (the horses being killed) and pulled away. The third time it was supposed by us all that the repulse was final, for he was driven entirely from the hill, so far beyond it as not to be in sight, and all were certain the day was ours. He had before this been driven nearly a mile and a half, and was beyond the Warrenton road, which was entirely in our possession from the stone bridge westward, and our engineers were just completing the removal of the abatis across the road to allow our re-enforcements (Schenck's brigade and Ayres' battery) to join us.
The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was not more than 9½ miles; and though they had three days' provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt, either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had done much severe fighting. Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the ranks.
It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to break and retire down the hill-side. This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of organization and force.
They returned by the fords to the Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles' division for a brigade to move forward and protect this retreat, and Colonel Blenker's brigade was detached for this purpose, and was ordered to go as far forward as the point where the road to the right left the main road.
By referring to the general order it will be seen that while the operations were to go on in front, an attack was to be made at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) stationed there. A reference to his report, and to that of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery, will show that this part of the plan was well and effectively carried out. It succeeded in deceiving the enemy for considerable time and in keeping in check a part of his force. The fire of the artillery at this point is represented as particularly destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great activity in this direction, much firing, and columns of dust, I became anxious for this place, fearing if it were turned or forced the whole stream of our retreating mass would be captured or destroyed.
After providing for the protection of the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, I repaired to Richardson's, and found the whole force ordered to be stationed for the holding of the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville, on the march, under orders from the division commander, for Centreville. I immediately halted it, and ordered it to take up the best line of defense across the ridge that their then position admitted of; and subsequently, taking in person the command of this part of the Army, I caused such disposition of the forces, which had been added to by the First and Second New Jersey and the De Kalb Regiments, ordered up from Runyon's reserve before going forward, as would best serve to check the enemy.
The ridge being held in this way, the retreating current passed slowly through Centreville to the rear. The enemy followed us from the ford as far as Cub Run, and, owing to the road becoming blocked up at the crossing, caused us much damage there, for the artillery could not pass, and several pieces and caissons had to be abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their places by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but also many of the ambulances carrying the wounded.
By sundown most of our men had gotten behind Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. The condition of our artillery and its ammunition, and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent demoralization of the mass of the Army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted - division and brigade commanders and staff - to admit of no alternative but to fall back; the more so as the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in the possession of the enemy, and he was already turning our left.
On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found, as they reported to me, that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing and hurrying them along.
At - ? O'clock the rear guard (Blenker's brigade) moved, covering the retreat, which was effected during the night and next morning. The troops at Fairfax Station, leaving by the cars, took with them the bulk of the supplies which had been sent there. My aide-de-camp, Major Wadsworth, staid at Fairfax Court-House till late in the morning, to see that the stragglers and weary and worn-out soldiers were not left behind.
I transmit herewith the reports of the several division and brigade commanders, to which I refer for the conduct of particular regiments and corps, and a consolidated return of the killed, wounded, and missing, marked D. From the latter it will be seen that our killed amounted to 19 officers and 462 non-commissioned officers and privates, and our wounded to 64 officers and 947 non-commissioned officers and privates. Many of the wounded will soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our total of killed and disabled from further service under 1,000.
The return of the missing is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be missing having fallen into other regiments and gone to Washington; many of the Zouaves to New York. In one brigade the number originally reported at 616 was yesterday reduced to 174. These reductions are being made daily. In a few days a more correct return can be made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces, coming from them with a flag, admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, and other information shows this to be much under the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New York (Zouaves) and Colonel Heintzelman say that the returns of that regiment cannot be relied on, as many there reported among the casualties have absented themselves since their return, and have gone to New York.
Among the missing are reported many of our surgeons, who remained in attendance on our wounded, and were, against the rules of modern warfare, made prisoners.
The issue of this hard-fought battle, in which certainly our troops lost no credit in their conflict on the field with an enemy ably commanded, superior in numbers, who had but a short distance to march, and who acted on his own ground on the defensive, and always under cover, whilst our men were of necessity out on the open fields, should not prevent full credit being given to those officers and corps whose services merited success if they did not attain it.
To avoid repetition I will only mention here the names of those not embraced in the reports of division and brigade commanders. I beg to refer to their reports for the names of those serving under their immediate orders, desiring that on this subject of persons, &c., they be considered as part of my own.
I claim credit for the officers of my staff and for those acting as such during the day. They did everything in their power, exposing themselves freely when required, and doing all that men could do, communicating orders, guiding the columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them when broken, and providing for them the best the circumstances admitted.
They are as follows:
First Lieut. H. W. Kingsbury, Fifth Artillery, A, D.C. Maj. Clarence S. Brown, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. Maj. James S. Wadsworth, New York Militia, volunteer A.D.C. The latter (who does me the honor to be on my personal staff) had a horse shot under him in the hottest of the fight. Capt. James B. Fry, assistant adjutant-general. Capt. O. H. Tillinghast, assistant quartermaster, who discharged alone the important and burdensome duties of his department with the Army, and who was mortally wounded whilst acting with the artillery, to which he formerly belonged, and in which he was deeply interested. Capt. H. F. Clarke, Subsistence Department, chief of subsistence department. Major Myer, Signal Officer, and Maj. Malcolm McDowell, who acted as aides. Surg. W. S. King and Assistant Surgeon Magruder, Medical Department. Maj. J. G. Barnard, Engineer, and senior of his department with the Army, who gave me most important aid. First Lieut. Fred. E. Prime, Engineer. Capt. A. W. Whipple, First Lieut. H. L. Abbot, and Second Lieut. H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers. Maj. W. F. Barry, Fifth Artillery, chief of artillery. Lieut. Geo. C. Strong, ordnance officer. Maj. W. H. Wood, Seventeenth Infantry, acting inspector-general. Second Lieut. Guy V. Henry, who joined me on the field, and was of service as an aide-de-camp.
The following officers commanded divisions and brigades, and in the several places their duty called them did most effective service and behaved in the most gallant manner:
Brigadier-General Tyler, Connecticut Volunteers. Col. David Hunter, Third Cavalry, severely wounded at the head of his division. Col. S. P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, wounded in the arm while leading his division into action on the hill. Brigadier-General Schenck, Ohio Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, First Division. Col. E. D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, commanding First Brigade, First Division. Col. W. B. Franklin, Twelfth Infantry, First Brigade, Third Division. Col. W. T. Sherman, Thirteenth Infantry, commanding Third Brigade, First Division. Col. Andrew Porter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division. Col. A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division. Col. O. B. Willcox, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, who was wounded and taken prisoner whilst on the hill in the hottest of the fight. Col. O. O. Howard, Maine Volunteers, commanding Third Brigade, Third Division. Col. I. B. Richardson, Michigan Volunteers, commanding Fourth Brigade, First Division. Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers, commanding First Brigade, Fifth Division. Colonel Davies, New York Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Fifth Division.
As my position may warrant, even if it does not call for, some explanation of the causes, as far as they can be seen, which led to the results herein stated, I trust it may not be considered out of place if I refer, in a few words, to the immediate antecedents of the battle.
When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday).
Every facility possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the administrative departments in making the necessary preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and went forward without my ever seeing them and without having been together before in a brigade.
The sending re-enforcements to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further and unavoidable cause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence, &c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed to move.
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 16th ultimo. When I did set out on the 16th I was still deficient in wagons for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being procured in time to follow me.
The trains thus hurriedly gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday.
I could not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled us, so far as they were concerned, to go into action on the 19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and one-half miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and one-half miles; but the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of work, and not used to carrying even the lead of "light marching order."
We crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men of all arms, the Fifth Division (Miles') and Richardson's brigade on the left at Blackburn's Ford and Centreville, and Schenck's brigade of Tyler's division on the left of the road near the stone bridge, not participating in the main action. The numbers opposed to us have been variously estimated. I may safely say, and avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy brought up all he could which were not kept engaged elsewhere. He had notice of our coming on the 17th, and had from that time until the 21st to bring up whatever he had.
It is known that in estimating the force to go against Manassas I engaged not to have to do with the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept in check in the valley by Major General Patterson, or those kept engaged by Major-General Butler, and I knew every effort was made by the General-in-Chief that this should be done, and that even if Johnston joined Beauregard, it should be because he would be driven in and followed by General Patterson. But, from causes not necessary for me to refer to, even if I knew them all, this was not done, and the enemy was free to assemble from every direction in numbers only limited by the amount of his railroad rolling-stock and his supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore, we drove in from Fairfax Court-House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and Centreville, and those under Beauregard at Manassas, must be added those under Johnston from Winchester, and those brought up by Davis from Richmond and other places at the South, to which is to be added the levy en masse ordered by the Richmond authorities, which was ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all this amounted to I cannot say; certainly much more than we attacked them with.
I could not, as I have said, move earlier or push on faster, nor could I delay. A large and the best part, so considered, of my forces were three-months' volunteers, whose terms of service were about expiring, but who were sent forward as having long enough to serve for the purpose of the expedition.
On the eve of the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment of Volunteers and the battery of Volunteer Artillery of the Eighth New York Militia, whose term of service expired, insisted on their discharge. I wrote to the regiment as pressing a request as I could pen, and the honorable Secretary of War, who was at the time on the ground, tried to induce the battery to remain at least five days, but in vain. They insisted on their discharge that night. It was granted; and the next morning, when the Army moved forward into battle, these troops moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the Army. In other words, every day which added to the strength of the enemy made us weaker.
In conclusion, I desire to say in reference to the events of the 21st ultimo, that the general order for the battle to which I have referred was, with slight modifications, literally conformed to; that the corps were brought over Bull Run in the manner proposed, and put into action as before arranged, and that, up to late in the afternoon, every movement ordered was carrying us successfully to the object we had proposed before starting - that of getting to the railroad leading from Manassas to the valley of Virginia, and going on it far enough to break up and destroy the communication, and interpose between the forces under Beauregard and those under Johnston; and could we have fought a day-yes, a few hours-sooner, there is everything to show that we should have continued successful, even against the odds with which we contended.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Irvin McDowell, Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Lieut. Col. E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, DC
Report - Antietam; CSA
General Robert E. Lee - Antietam/Sharpsburg
Report of General Robert E. Lee
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, Sharpsburg, MD, September 18, 1862
Mr. President:
On the afternoon of the 16th instant the enemy, who, you were informed on that day, was in our front, opened a light fire of artillery upon our line. Early next morning it was renewed in earnest, and large masses of the Federal troops that had crossed the Antietam above our position assembled on our left and threatened to overwhelm us. They advanced in three compact lines. The divisions of Generals McLaws, R. H. Anderson, A. P. Hill, and Walker had not arrived the previous night, as I had hoped, and were still beyond the Potomac. Generals Jackson's and Ewell's divisions were thrown to the left of Generals D. H. Hill and Longstreet. The enemy advanced between the Antietam and the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, and was met by General Hill's and the left of General Longstreet's division, where the contest raged fiercely, extending to our entire left. The enemy was driven back and held in check, but before the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Walker - who, upon their arrival on the morning of the 17th, were advanced to support the left wing and center - could be brought into action, that portion of our lines was forced back by superior numbers. The line, after a severe conflict, was restored and the enemy driven back, and our position maintained during the rest of the day.
In the afternoon the enemy advanced on our right, where General Jones' division was posted, who handsomely maintained his position. General Toombs' brigade, guarding the bridge over Antietam Creek, gallantly resisted the approach of the enemy; but his superior numbers enabling him to extend his left, he crossed below the bridge, and assumed a threatening attitude on our right, which fell back in confusion. By this time, between 3 and 4 p.m., General A. P. Hill, with five of his brigades, reached the scene of action, drove the enemy immediately from the position they had taken, and continued the contest until dark, restoring our right and maintaining our ground.
R. E. Lee,
General Commanding
His Excellency President Davis
Richmond, Va.
Report - Antietam; USA
General George McClellan - Antietam/Sharpsburg
Report of Major General George B. McClellan
Battles of South Mountain and Antietam
Near Sharpsburg, MD, September 29, 1862
I have the honor to report the following as some of the results of the battles of South Mountain and Antietam: At South Mountain our loss was 443 killed, 1,806 wounded, and 76 missing; total, 2,325. At Antietam our loss was 2,010 killed, 9,416 wounded, and 1,043 missing total, 12,469. Total loss in the two battles, 14,794.
The loss of rebels in the two battles, as near as can be ascertained from the number of their dead found upon the field, and from other data, will not fall short of the following estimate: Major Davis, assistant inspector general, who superintends the burial of the dead, reports about 3,000 rebels buried upon the field of Antietam by our own troops. Previous to this, however, the rebels had buried many of their own dead upon the distant portion of the battlefield, which they occupied after the battle - probably at least 500. The loss of the rebels at South Mountain cannot be ascertained with accuracy, but as our troops continually drove them from the commencement of the action, and a much greater number of their dead were seen on the field than of our own men, it is not unreasonable to suppose that their loss was greater than ours. Estimating their killed at 500, the total rebel killed in the two battles would be 4,000, according to the ratio of our own killed and wounded. This would make their loss in wounded 18,742, as nearly as can be determined at this time. The number of prisoners taken by our troops in the two battles will, at the lowest estimate, amount to 5,000. The full returns will no doubt show a larger number. Of these about 1,200 are wounded. This gives the rebel loss in killed and wounded and prisoners 25,542. It will be observed that this does not include their stragglers, the number of whom is said by citizens here to be large. It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops during their brief campaign in Maryland.
From the time our troops first encountered the enemy in Maryland until he was driven back into Virginia, we captured 13 guns, 7 caissons, 9 limbers, 2 field forges, 2 caisson bodies, 39 colors, and 1 signal flag. We have not lost a single gun or color. On the battlefield of Antietam 14,000 small arms were collected, besides the large number carried off by citizens and those distributed on the ground to recruits and other unarmed men arriving immediately after the battle. At South Mountain no collection of small arms was made, owing to the haste of the pursuit from that point. Four hundred were taken on the opposite side of the Potomac.
George B. McClellan,
Major-General, Commanding
Report - Gettysburg; Joshua L. Chamberlain
Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain - Gettysburg
Report of Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, Twentieth Maine Infantry
Field Near Emmitsburg - July 6, 1863
Sir:
In compliance with the request of the colonel commanding the brigade, I have the honor to submit a somewhat detailed report of the operations of the Twentieth Regiment Maine Volunteers in the battle of Gettysburg, on the 2d and 3d instant.:
Having acted as the advance guard, made necessary by the proximity of the enemy's cavalry, on the march of the clay before, my command on reaching Hanover, Pa., just before sunset on that day, were much worn, and lost no time in getting ready for an expected bivouac. Rations were scarcely issued, and the men about preparing supper, when rumors that the enemy had been encountered that day near Gettysburg absorbed every other interest, and very soon orders came to march forthwith to Gettysburg.:
My men moved out with a promptitude and spirit extraordinary, the cheers and welcome they received on the road adding to their enthusiasm. After an hour or two of sleep by the roadside just before daybreak, we reached the heights southeasterly of Gettysburg at about 7 am, July 2.:
Massed at first with the rest of the division on the right of the road, we were moved several times farther toward the left. Although expecting every moment to be put into action and held strictly in line of battle, yet the men were able to take some rest and make the most of their rations.:
Somewhere near 4 p.m. a sharp cannonade, at some distance to our left and front, was the signal for a sudden and rapid movement of our whole division in the direction of this firing, which grew warmer as we approached. Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some of our batteries were going into position, our brigade reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which there was a heavy musketry fire, and when about to go forward into line we received from Colonel Vincent, commanding the brigade, orders to move to the left at the double-quick, when we took a farm road crossing Plum Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Granite Spur, or Little Round Top.:
The enemy's artillery got range of our column as we were climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells among the rocks and the tree tops made us move lively along the crest. One or two shells burst in our ranks. Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was to occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left of our general line, and that a desperate attack was expected in order to turn that position, concluding by telling me I was to" hold that ground at all hazards." This was the last word I heard from him.:
In order to commence by making my right firm, I formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough, rocky, and straggling wooded ground.:
The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top. Between this and my position intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. My line formed, I immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill commanding, to extend from my left flank across this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my exposed flank and rear.:
The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right, but it very soon involved the right of my regiment and gradually extended along my entire front. The action was quite sharp and at close quarters.:
In the midst of this, an officer from my center informed me that some important movement of the enemy was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with which we were engaged. Mounting a large rock, I was able to see a considerable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of their line engaged, and passing from the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the front of my left. The close engagement not allowing any change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same time "refusing" my left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right, thus occupying about twice the extent of our ordinary front, some of the companies being brought into single rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength or shelter. My officers and men understood wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire, without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or even to suspect their advantage. But we were not a moment too soon; the enemy's flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst upon my left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank, with great demonstration.:
We opened a brisk fire at close range, which was so sudden and effective that they soon fell back among the rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came. They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break and take shelter.:
They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through our line in several places, and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded were now in our front and then in our rear. Forced from our position, we desperately recovered it, and pushed the enemy down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of the struggle were seized to remove our wounded (and those of the enemy also), to gather ammunition from the cartridge-boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to secure better muskets than the Enfields, which we found did not stand service well. Rude shelters were thrown up of the loose rocks that covered the ground.:
Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on my right, gallantly maintaining his fight, judiciously and with hearty co-operation made his movements conform to my necessities, so that my right was at no time exposed to a flank attack.:
The enemy seemed to have gathered all their energies for their final assault. We had gotten our thin line into as good a shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from the scrub wood in the valley, as well as I could judge, in two lines in echelon by the right, and, opening a heavy fire, the first line came on as if they meant to sweep everything before them. We opened on them as well as we could with our scanty ammunition snatched from the field.:
It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like this now coming on. Our loss had been severe. One-half of my left wing had fallen, and a third of my regiment lay just behind us, dead or badly wounded. At this moment my anxiety was increased by a great roar of musketry in my rear, on the farther or northerly slope of Little Round Top, apparently on the flank of the regular brigade, which was in support of Hazlett's battery on the crest behind us. The bullets from this attack struck into my left rear, and I feared that the enemy might have nearly surrounded the Little Round Top, and only a desperate chance was left for us. My ammunition was soon exhausted. My men were firing their last shot and getting ready to club their muskets.:
It was imperative to strike before we were struck by this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which we could not probably have withstood or survived. At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising; many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we made an extended right wheel, before which the enemy's second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until we had swept the valley and cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade.:
Meantime Captain Morrill with his skirmishers sent out from my left flank, with some dozen or fifteen of the U.S. Sharpshooters who had put themselves under his direction, fell upon the enemy as they were breaking, and by his demonstrations, as well as his well-directed fire, added much to the effect of the charge.:
Having thus cleared the valley and driven the enemy up the western slope of the Great Round Top, not wishing to press so far out as to hazard the ground I was to hold by leaving it exposed to a sudden rush of the enemy, I succeeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who declared they were "on the road to Richmond") in getting the regiment into good order and resuming our original position.:
Four hundred prisoners, including two field and several line officers, were sent to the rear. These were mainly from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama Regiments, with some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas. One hundred and fifty of the enemy were found killed and wounded in our front.:
At dusk, Colonel Rice informed me of the fall of Colonel Vincent, which had devolved the command of the brigade on him, and that Colonel Fisher had come up with a brigade to our support. These troops were massed in our rear. It was the understanding, as Colonel Rice informed me, that Colonel Fisher's brigade was to advance and seize the western slope of Great Round Top, where the enemy had shortly before been driven. But, after considerable delay, this intention for some reason was not carried into execution.:
We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement to seize that crest.:
It was now 9 p.m. Without waiting to get ammunition, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up the mountain side in very extended order, as the steep and jagged surface of the ground compelled. We heard squads of the enemy failing back before us, and, when near the crest, we met a scattering and uncertain fire, which caused us the great loss of the gallant Lieutenant Linscott, who fell, mortally wounded. In the silent advance in the darkness we laid hold of 25 prisoners, among them a staff officer of General Law, commanding the brigade immediately opposed to us during the fight. Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition and some support to our right, which was very near the enemy, their movements and words even being now distinctly heard by us.:
Some confusion soon after resulted from the attempt of some regiment of Colonel Fisher's brigade to come to our support. They had found a wood road up the mountain, which brought them on my right flank, and also in proximity to the enemy, massed a little below. Hearing their approach, and thinking a movement from that quarter could only be from the enemy, I made disposition to receive them as such. In the confusion which attended the attempt to form them in support of my right, the enemy opened a brisk fire, which disconcerted my efforts to form them and disheartened the supports themselves, so that I saw no more of them that night.:
Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the front, with instructions to report to me every half hour during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep on their arms.:
At some time about midnight, two regiments of Colonel Fisher's brigade came up the mountain beyond my left, and took position near the summit; but as the enemy did not threaten from that direction, I made no effort to connect with them.:
We went into the fight with 386, all told 358 guns. Every pioneer and musician who could carry a musket went into the ranks. Even the sick and foot-sore, who could not keep up in the march, came up as soon as they could find their regiments, and took their places in line of battle, while it was battle, indeed. Some prisoners I had under guard, under sentence of court-martial, I was obliged to put into the fight, and they bore their part well, for which I shall recommend a commutation of their sentence.:
The loss, so far as I can ascertain it, is 136-30 of whom were killed, and among the wounded are many mortally.:
Captain Billings, Lieutenant Kendall, and Lieutenant Linscott are officers whose loss we deeply mourn - efficient soldiers, and pure and high-minded men.:
In such an engagement there were many incidents of heroism and noble character which should have place even in an official report; but, under present circumstances, I am unable to do justice to them. I will say of that regiment that the resolution, courage, and heroic fortitude which enabled us to withstand so formidable an attack have happily led to so conspicuous a result that they may safely trust to history to record their merits.:
About noon on the 3d of July, we were withdrawn, and formed on the right of the brigade, in the front edge of a piece of woods near the left center of our main line of battle, where we were held in readiness to support our troops, then receiving the severe attack of the afternoon of that day.:
On the 4th, we made a reconnaissance to the front, to ascertain the movements of the enemy, but finding that they had retired, at least beyond Willoughby's Run, we returned to Little Round Top, where we buried our dead in the place where we had laid them during the fight, marking each grave by a head-board made of ammunition boxes, with each dead soldiers name cut upon it. We also buried 50 of the enemy's dead in front of our position of July 2. We then looked after our wounded, whom I had taken the responsibility of putting into the houses of citizens in the vicinity of Little Round Top, and, on the morning of the 5th, took up our march on the Emmitsburg road.:
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,:
Joshua L. Chamberlain,:
Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers.:
Lieut. George B. Herendeen,:
A. A. A. G., Third Brig., First Div., Fifth Army Corps.
Report - Gettysburg; Robert E. Lee
General Robert E. Lee - Gettysburg
Report of General Robert E. Lee
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, Near Gettysburg, PA., July 4, 1863
Mr. President:
After the rear of the army had crossed the Potomac, the leading corps, under General Ewell, pushed on to Carlisle and York, passing through Chambersburg. The other two corps closed up at the latter place, and soon afterward intelligence was received that the army of General Hooker was advancing. Our whole force was directed to concentrate at Gettysburg, and the corps of Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill reached that place on the 1st July, the former advancing from Carlisle and the latter from Chambersburg.
The two leading divisions of these corps, upon reaching the vicinity of Gettysburg, found the enemy, and attacked him, driving him from the town, which was occupied by our troops. The enemy's loss was heavy, including more than 4,000 prisoners. He took up a strong position in rear of the town, which he immediately began to fortify, and where his re-enforcements joined him.
On the 2d July, Longstreet's corps, with the exception of one division, having arrived, we attempted to dislodge the enemy, and, though we gained some ground, we were unable to get possession of his position. The next day, the third division of General Longstreet having come up, a more extensive attack was made. The works on the enemy's extreme right and left were taken, but his numbers were so great and his position so commanding, that our troops were compelled to relinquish their advantage and retire.
It is believed that the enemy suffered severely in these operations, but our own loss has not been light.
General Barksdale is killed. Generals Garnett and Armistead are missing, and it is feared that the former is killed and the latter wounded and a prisoner. Generals Pender and Trimble are wounded in the leg, General Hood in the arm, and General Heth slightly in the head. General Kemper, it is feared, is mortally wounded. Our losses embrace many other valuable officers and men.
General Wade Hampton was severely wounded in a different action in which the cavalry was engaged yesterday.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R E. Lee,
General
His Excellency President Davis
Richmond
Report - Gettysburg; James Longstreet
General James Longstreet - Gettysburg
Report of James Longstreet, Lieutenant General
Headquarters, 1st Army Corps, Department of Northern VA
Near Culpeper Court House, July 27, 1863
Colonel:
In obedience to orders from the commanding general, my command marched from Fredericksburg, on June 3, for Culpeper Court-House.:
On the 15th, it moved from Culpeper Court-House along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, and, on the 19th, McLaws' division was posted in Ashby's Gap, Hood's at Snicker's Gap, and Pickett's supporting Hood's and guarding points between the two Gaps.
On June 20, I received a dispatch from general headquarters, directing that I should hold myself in readiness to move in the direction of the Potomac, with a view to crossing. As I was ready, and had been expecting an order to execute such purpose, I supposed the intimation meant other preparation, and, knowing of nothing else that I could do to render my preparations complete, I supposed that it was desirable that I should cross the Shenandoah. I therefore passed the river, occupied the banks at the ferries opposite the Gaps, and a road at an intermediate ford, which was practicable for cavalry and infantry.
On the following day, the enemy advanced his cavalry in full force against General Stuart, and drove him into and nearly through Ashby's Gap. I succeeded in passing part of McLaws' division across the river in time to occupy the Gap before night, and, upon advancing a line of sharpshooters the next morning at daylight, the enemy retired. I believe that he engaged the sharpshooters lightly. General Stuart re-established his cavalry, and McLaws' division was withdrawn to the west bank of the Shenandoah before night.
On the 23d, I received orders to march, via Berryville, Martinsburg, and Williamsport, into Maryland. The command moved at early dawn on the following day: First, Pickett's division; second, the Reserve Artillery battalions; third, Hood's division, and, fourth, McLaws' division. Pickett's division and the battalions of Reserve Artillery crossed the Potomac on the 25th, Hood's and McLaws' divisions on the following day. The command reached Chambersburg, Pa., on the 27th, and a halt of two days was made for rest.
On the night of the 28th, one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout was sent to general headquarters, with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains, and bear down to meet the enemy.
I received orders on the following day to move part of my command, and to encamp it at Greenwood. The command, excepting Pickett's division, which was left to guard our rear at Chambersburg, moved on the morning of the 30th, and the two divisions and battalions of Reserve Artillery got into camp at Greenwood about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. General Hood was ordered to put a brigade and a battery on picket at New Guilford, on the road leading toward Emmitsburg.
On the next day, the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett's division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law's brigade, left by Hood on picket at New Guilford. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson's division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the commanding general to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A.P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmitsburg road.
Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 p.m. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.
The enemy's first position along the Emmitsburg road was but little better, in point of strength, than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position, Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws' upon his front. He was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy, taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point, however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General Anderson's division, which were co-operating upon my left, drove one of them back, and, checking the support of the other, caused my left to be somewhat exposed and outflanked. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push farther until my other troops came up.
General Hood received a severe wound soon after getting under fire, and was obliged to leave the field. This misfortune occasioned some delay in our operations. Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson, of his division, was also severely wounded, and obliged to leave the field. In the same attack, General McLaws lost two of his brigadiers (General Barksdale mortally wounded, and General Semmes severely wounded, and since died of his wounds). The command was finally so disposed as to hold the ground gained on the right, with my left withdrawn to the first position of the enemy, resting at the peach orchard. During the combat of this day, four pieces of artillery were captured and secured by the command, and two regimental standards.
On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process, probably, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the commanding general joined me, and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's, and part of Pender's divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be passed over under the fire of the enemy's batteries, and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, Pickett's division alone being fresh.
Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.:
Heth's division, under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery of First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open.
About 2 p.m. General Pickett, who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind our batteries, reported that the troops were in order and on the most sheltered ground. Colonel Walton was ordered to open the batteries. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries opened very handsomely and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combated us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.
Some time after our batteries opened fire, I rode to Major Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon, if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege. The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half way between our position and that of the enemy, a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fire, where a short halt was made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson. He was, therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.
The enemy threw forward forces at different times and from different points, but they were only feelers, and retired as soon as our batteries opened upon them. These little advances and checks were kept up till night, when the enemy retired to his stronghold, and my line was withdrawn to the Gettysburg road on the right, the left uniting with Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's right. After night, I received orders to make all the needful arrangements for our retreat. The orders for preparation were given, and the work was begun before daylight on the 4th.
On the night of the 4th, the troops were withdrawn from our line, and my command took up the line of march, following the corps of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill. Our march was much impeded by heavy rains and excessively bad roads. We succeeded, however, in reaching the top of the mountain early in the night of the 5th.
On the 6th, my command, passing to the front, marched for Hagerstown. As our exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movement, I thought myself fortunate when I found that I could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve our trains at Williamsport, then seriously threatened. Reaching Hagerstown about 5 p.m., our column moved down the Sharpsburg turnpike, and encamped about 2 miles from Hagerstown.
The next day, the command was put in camp on the best ground that could be found, and remained quiet until the 10th, when the enemy was reported to be advancing to meet us. It was supposed at first to be a cavalry force only, but I thought it prudent to move some of the infantry down on the Antietam, at Funkstown. After reaching the Antietam, General Stuart asked for infantry supports for his batteries, and two brigades (Semmes', under Colonel Bryan, and Anderson's, under Colonel White) were sent across, as he desired. For the report of their service, I refer to the report of Major-General Stuart and the brigade commanders. A line of battle was selected, extending from a point on the Potomac near Downsville to the Hagerstown and Williamsport turnpike, my command on the right. The troops were put to work, and, in twenty-four hours, our line was comfortably intrenched. A few of the enemy's sharpshooters came up on the Boonsborough road, and to within long range of our picket line on the 12th.
On the evening of the same day, a light skirmish was brought on by an advance of a line of sharpshooters at the Saint James' College. That night our bridge was completed, and, the day after, I received orders to recross the Potomac after night, and the caissons of the batteries were started back about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The troops marched as soon as it was dark, my command leading. Having but a single road to travel upon, our trains soon came to a halt. I rode on to the bridge, to hasten the movements as much as possible, and sent my staff officers to different points along the line to keep everything in motion. Details were made to keep up fires to light the road at the worst points, and Captain Manning, with his signal torches, lighted us across the bridge.
The natural difficulties in making such movements were increased by the darkness of the night, a heavy rain storm, flooding the road with mud and water, and finally by one of our wagons, loaded with wounded, running off the bridge, breaking it down, and throwing our wounded headlong into the river. We were so fortunate, however, as to rescue them in a few moments. They were made somewhat comfortable in other vehicles, and sent forward. Major Clarke and Captains Douglas and Johnston, of the Corps of Engineers, applied themselves diligently to the work of repairing the bridge, and, in two hours, our line was again in motion.
When the accident occurred at the bridge, I sent back orders for one of my divisions to occupy the redoubts that had been thrown up to protect the bridge, and also directed Colonel Alexander to place his batteries in position on the same line. As soon as the bridge was repaired, I rode back to this line, but finding that the enemy was not pursuing, the troops were again put in motion. The rear of my column passed the bridge at 9 o'clock in the morning, and encamped for the night at Hainesville.
On July 19, at Bunker Hill, I received orders to march with my command for Millwood, in order to obtain possession of Ashby's Gap, with a view to covering our future movements. We marched early on the next day, part of the command reaching Millwood at night. The Shenandoah was found to be past fording, however, and the enemy had driven our cavalry from the Gap, and were in possession down to the river bank. I reported this to the commanding general, and continued my march on the following day-for Manassas and Chester Gaps. Arriving at the Shenandoah at Front Royal, it was found to be past fording, and the work of laying our bridges was hardly begun. Brigadier-General Corse, who had been hurried forward with his brigade to secure the Gaps, succeeded in passing the stream with his men and several batteries. Detaching a regiment to Manassas Gap, he marched his main force into Chester Gap, and succeeded in getting possession of the latter some few moments before the enemy appeared. The enemy was in possession of Manassas Gap, but Colonel Herbert, of the Seventeenth Virginia Regiment, secured a strong position with his regiment, from which he held the enemy in check. The rest of Pickett's division was hurried over by crossing the ammunition and arms in a fiat-boat, the men wading. Re-enforcements were sent to Colonel Herbert, when he drove back the enemy, and secured as much of the Gap as was desirable. Re-enforcements were also sent to General Corse, who was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy, and was threatened by a strong cavalry force. The cavalry withdrew about the time the re-enforcements reached him. The bridges were completed about 12 o'clock at night, and the passage by our trains commenced.
The next day the enemy appeared in stronger force in Manassas Gap, but I had posted Hood's division there, under Brig. Gen. E. M. Law, and he gave us but little trouble. He also reappeared at the foot of the mountain, at Chester Gap. As soon as our men finished cooking their rations, General Wofford's brigade, of McLaws' division, was ordered to disperse the cavalry that was at the foot of the mountain, and endeavor to capture his artillery. General Pickett was ordered to send a force down the mountain by a different route, to get in rear of and intercept the cavalry. After a light skirmish with General Wofford, the enemy made a hasty retreat. Our march was continued, arriving at Culpeper Court-House at noon on the 24th instant.
General Benning's brigade, which had been left on picket at Gaines' Cross-Roads with the Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama Regiments, to await the arrival of Lieut. Gen. A. P. Hill's corps, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry while on the march, each having a smart skirmish.
I desire to mention the following-named officers as among those most distinguished for the exhibition of great gallantry and skill, viz: Major-Generals Pickett, Hood, and Trimble, the two latter severely wounded; Kemper, very seriously wounded; Semmes, severely wounded, and since died of his wounds; Pettigrew, slightly wounded; Kershaw, Law, and G. T. Anderson, the last severely wounded.
Brigadier-General Barksdale was mortally wounded in the attack on the evening of the 2d, while bravely leading his brigade in the assault.
Brig. Gen. R. B. Garnett was killed while gallantly leading his brigade in the assault upon the enemy's position upon the Cemetery Hill.
Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, and Colonel Alexander, Major Dearing, Major Huger, Major Eshleman, and Captain Miller, of the Corps of Artillery, were noted for the courage, zeal, and ability with which they discharged their duties.
The troops all exhibited great determination and courage on the battle field, which, together with the fortitude and endurance subsequently shown by them under circumstances of great trial, justly entitles them to our hearty thanks and highest praise.
Major-General Pickett's division merits especial credit for the determined manner in which it assaulted the enemy's strong position upon the Cemetery Hill.
For valuable and meritorious services on the field, I desire to express my renewed obligations to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Majors Fairfax, Latrobe, Clarke, and Walton, and Captains Goree, Riely, and Rogers.
Major Mitchell, chief quartermaster; Major Moses, chief commissary of subsistence; Surgeon Cullen, medical director; Surgeons Barksdale and Maury, and Captain Manning, signal officer, discharged the duties of their respective departments with zeal and ability.
Statements of the casualties of the campaign, embracing the killed, wounded, and missing, have been already forwarded.
I have the honor to be, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
James Longstreet,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.
Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General.
Last edited by Minas Moth; August 24, 2012 at 10:30 AM.
New Format:
This format was created to be more user friendly. Now all of the information is gathered in a few posts with visible and easy to understand headers.
Original time and name of the poster are provided beneath each of the information.
Future Development:
In the future (if more information appears) thread will be updated accordingly.
Feel free to post as you did before...
I hope you will enjoy this new format, although I will welcome any suggestion
Decisive Battles of American Civil War:
This is the list of the decisive battles fought in the American Civil War. The list was made by The Civil War Sites Advisory Commission. In 1993 the CWSAC reported to the Congress and the American Battlefield Protection Program extensive analysis of battles and battlefields. The report describes 384 battles from 8,000 cases of hostilities that occurred during the War and classifies them in the Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields. The CWSAC also rated the battles in following categories:
Class A - DECISIVE -> direct and observable impact on the direction, duration, conduct or outcome of the War.
Class B - MAJOR -> direct and observable impact on direction, duration, conduct or outcome of the campaign
Class C - FORMATIVE -> observable influence on the direction, duration, conduct or outcome of the campaign
Class D- LIMITED ->contact between the combatants without observable influence on the campaign
Here, as said above, only decisive battles will be presented...
Fort Sumter was a brick fort that rested on artificial island (New England Granite), at Charleston Harbour, South Carolina (SC). Work on the Fort itself began in 1830’s but due to low Federal spending policy it still wasn’t finished when the War broke out. Even worse, it was already obsolete. The Fort could mount around hundred guns, but it severely lacked in manpower. Entire Charleston Harbour garrison consisted of two artillery companies with eighty-five (85) men under command of Major Robert Anderson. As the relations between South and Union worsened Major Anderson recognised that he was in dire position. He knew that he couldn’t defend all of the Charleston Harbour’s fortifications (Fort Sumter, Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, Fort Johnson) and was afraid that SC forces would overwhelm his at Fort Moultrie position; so on the night of December 26, 1860, US troops rowed to Fort Sumter. This naturally didn’t sit well with SC Government and it looked like fighting will surely break out. The SC State troops began constructing the batteries, collected ammunition and hoped to entirely isolate Fort Sumter. Major Anderson faced another problem, he had to find a way to persuade civilian workers to remain at Fort Sumter and finish the Fort if possible. Over the next three months, Anderson’s men 47 guns (26 on the top of the wall and 21 in protected casemate). His opponent, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard ordered his feisty SC troops to build fewer strong batteries rather than every unit build its own weaker position. There were some negotiations between Major Anderson and SC Government but it was clear they won’t amount to much. Anderson did seek guidance from Washington but Buchanan Administration was unwilling to take any responsibility. When Secretary of War, Virginian John Floyd had resigned there wasn’t anyone to decide about the Fort Sumter situation. However, US Government did send an unarmed merchant ship (The Star of the West) with supplies and reinforcement of 200 men. Confederates saw this as reinforcing a garrison on foreign soil and consequently an act of war. On January 9, 1861, Confederate batteries opened fire on the Star and drove it away. Major Anderson refused to fire on the Confederate batteries not wanting to increase already high possibility of conflict. His position was desperate as he depended on others to supply his troops with food and SC forces were in position to easily cut off any communication with the Fort. When Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, things started to develop at faster pace. Lincoln was determined to hold on the Fort Sumter, but a way to accomplish this was still eluding him. By April 4, Lincoln believed that a relief expedition was feasible so he ordered merchant steamers, protected by warships, to carry necessary supplies to the garrison. He also notified Governor of South Carolina, Francis W. Pickens that such a relief will be attempted. With this masterstroke Lincoln set bait to Confederate Government. They had to options, either to let the relief be delivered which would strengthen Major Anderson’s position in the Fort and made it hard to capture it, or, fire on the relief force and therefore officially start the War. There was some debate about how to approach this situation but eventually beleaguered party took sway and it was decided than any attempt will be met with fire from coastal batteries. On April 10, Confederate Cabinet telegraphed General Beauregard that any relief attempt is to be stopped. On April 11, Beauregard demanded Anderson to surrender; he refused but stated that he will be starved out in few days anyway. Beauregard asked Major to specify the date when he will be forced to leave the fort, and Anderson replied he will leave it by noon on April 15 unless he receives any instructions from Washington about incoming supplies. This, however, wasn’t fast enough, and General Beauregard informed Anderson at 3:20 PM, April 12, that their batteries will open fire in one hour. After one hour and ten minutes, Captain George S. James commanding Fort Johnson’s east mortar battery ordered firing of signal shell. In moments, Edmund Ruffin touched off a gun in an ironclad battery at Cummings Point. Major Anderson waited for three hours to return fire, mostly because shortage of powder. Captain Abner Doubleday fired a first return shot. Of the 47 guns that were readied, most didn’t saw any action. Nine or ten casemate guns did return fire, but by noon only six remained in action. Union guns did almost no damage at all; Anderson’s men didn’t fire on the city of Charleston itself and they soon found out that solid shot had little effect on entrenched batteries. Confederate bombardment continued throughout the night. In the morning a hot shot fired from Fort Moultrie set on fire officers’ quarters. Before the noon the flagstaff was shot away. At 2 PM Major Anderson agreed to truce, after realising that help wasn’t coming. In the evening garrison was surrendered. No soldier was killed on either side, and Union soldiers suffered only minor injuries. However, when 100-gun salute to US Flag was fired (Major Anderson’s condition for surrender), a pile of cartridges blew up from spark killing two soldiers. On Sunday, April 14, Major Anderson and his garrison marched out and boarded transport ships to New York. They have defended Fort Sumter for 34 hours, until "the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge walls seriously injured, the magazines surrounded by flames." This marked the beginning of the American Civil War.
First Battle of Bull Run/First Manassas (July 1, 1861)
The first “important” battle of American Civil war was fought on 21 July, 1861, in Fairfax and Prince Williams Counties, Virginia, around the creek called Bull Run. The Confederates named the battle after Manassas Junction southwest of the Bull Run Creek. When this battle came to be, war was still fresh; there was much flamboyancy and music surrounding it. Reports of casualties, killed and wounded kin were still far away. When Irwin McDowell’s army marched through the streets of Washington on July 16, 1861, crowd was cheering. In Washington, there was a belief that this army will brush the rebels aside and end the War in matter of weeks, if that long at all. Wounds were few and not serious, heroes were made and general feeling was so confident that many families decided to picnic and observe the battle. There were at least ten congressmen and senators among spectators. If the crowd was unaware of what was going to happen, Union soldiers were even less so. Soldiers weren’t disciplined, they weren’t trained to carry heavy loads on long marches and they moved very slowly, only five miles on the first day. Straggling for refreshment was common, and officers couldn’t keep their men in ranks for they themselves often sought refreshment. General McDowell’s objective was Manassas Junction; place where railroads from Washington, Richmond and Shenandoah Valley met. By occupying it he would achieve two main goals: security of Washington and supply depot for push on Richmond; and one minor one: making the Shenandoah Valley position unattainable by Confederate forces. This was obvious objective and Confederate Government accordingly positioned Confederate Army of Potomac near the Manassas Junction. Confederate Army wasn’t very strong, numbering 20,000 to oppose Union’s 35,000, but its position was strong with Occoquon Creek on the right and Bull Run Creek in the front. Jefferson Davies also ordered immediate dispatch of reinforcements to Manassas Junction once Union movement was detected. These were troops of Theophilus Holmes from Richmond and Army of Shenandoah under Joseph Johnston. By the morning of 20th July, all Confederate forces were in their position. General Beauregard recalled his forward outposts and strengthened his position along the Bull Run creek with main strength east of the Stone Bridge where there were many fords. McDowell positioned his headquarters at Centreville and at 18th July probed Confederate positions sending Daniel Tyler’s Division (four brigades). Tyler sent forward only two regiments, some number of cavalry and two guns. On the other side of the Bull Run Beauregard positioned a full brigade, and when Tyler’s forces emerged from wooded bank, they gave them a volley. Tyler’s troops bolted and retreated. This effectively cancelled McDowell’s attempt to negotiate the Stone Bridge position. Next two days McDowell organized his men and probed other avenues of advance. Scouts reported that fords west of the Stone Bridge were easier to cross and Confederate forces were weaker in that position. McDowell counted that Confederates were weaker and therefore unable to defend all the fords. So he prepared the feint attack on his left to swing around the Confederate flank on the right. Confederates, however, had different plans. Their forces weren’t as weak as McDowell believed, and they were constantly reinforced. McDowell’s attack had three stages: Hunter’s and Heintzelman’s Divisions with five batteries were the flanking force (McDowell was with this force), Tyler’s Division (less a brigade, but with four batteries) would make secondary attack on Stone Bridge position, and Miles’s Division was to put demonstration at Blackburn’s Ford. Tyler was supposed to move at 2:30 AM. However, Tyler was late in making his move and when he did move, he wasn’t really convincing. He was supposed to pin Confederate left flank, but Confederate commander Evans correctly recognised this being only a feint attack so he left minimal force here and moved most of his force (11 companies and two more guns) on the small hill to the northwest. Meanwhile, Evans’s main body confronted Ambrose Burnside’s Brigade of Hunter’s Division by 10 AM. Burnside however, mismanaged his force and instead of using it as a whole sent it in piecemeal (one regiment at a time) which made it easy to be defeated by Evans’s Confederate troops. Beauregard still believed main effort will be made east of Stone Bridge, but he did reinforce his left with brigades led by Generals Jackson, Bee and Bartow. He also planned to attack, and ordered his centre and right to push forward, but Ewell’s brigade that was supposed to move first never moved so attack never took place. At 10:30 AM, sounds of battle increased on the left and General Beauregard realised this was main area o operations. Union pressure was increasing as more and more forces were pushing on Confederate left flank. General Jackson occupied the Henry House Hill and provided rally point for Confederate forces that brought him great fame and nickname Stonewall Jackson. Beauregard and Johnston also arrived on the Henry House Hill, rallying troops and organizing reinforcements. On the opposite hill General McDowell was doing the same thing. By 2 PM he nearly achieved victory, he’d broken the first Confederate line and the second line was mostly formed from same men rallied by their commanders. McDowell had 10,000 to 11,000 troops to oppose Confederate force of 6,500. Union forces advanced up the Henry House Hill unopposed but when they reached the plateau, heavy fighting began. Two Union batteries (Rickett’s and Griffith’s) deployed on the sides but were soon routed by charge of Virginia 33rd Infantry. But one charge couldn’t win the battle. McDowell continued to feed troops on his right and he eventually pushed Confederate forces back. But at the edge of the woods, Confederates counterattacked. Battle was swaying both ways and McDowell ordered Howard’s Brigade forward but it didn’t make much difference. Confederate General Johnston made good organizing reinforcements. He formed Early’s brigade and Kirby Smith’s Shenandoah Valley brigade and took them west, around Union right flank. Confederate forces on the Henry House Hill held long enough and General Beauregard organised new counterattack which with Early’s and Smith’s brigades rolled down hill. Union forces didn’t put up much fight and they simply left the battlefield. By 6 PM entire Union Army was in retreat. Confederates might capture thousands of prisoners but they were to shaken to organize any pursuit. Casualties of the battle weren’t very high, considering that more then 60,000 men fought that day. Union Army lost 2,896 (460 killed, 1,124 wounded, 1,312 missing or captured) and the Confederates 1,982 (387 killed, 1,582 wounded, 13 missing or captured). Casualties are small because most of the troops weren’t even engaged. Union moved only half its force across the Bull Run, while General Beauregard used around 55% of his force. However, the results were significant. South has won its first major battle, and it was a big step forward in starting a reputation for victory. On the other hand, Northern people, who so flamboyantly escorted their forces on the 16th July, were now in doubt and fear of “mighty” Confederate forces.
The Battle of Wilson’s Creek is also known as Battle of Oak Hills. It took place in Greene and Christian Counties, Missouri on 10 August, 1861. Union Army of the West was commanded by Nathaniel Lyon and Samuel D. Sturgis and fielded around 5,500 men while Confederate forces were made from Missouri and Arkansas State Guard commanded by Sterling Price and Ben McCulloch and numbered around 12,000 soldiers. Union Army of the West was camped at Springfield, Missouri but Confederate troops under Brigadier General Ben McCulloch were fast approaching his position. By the 9 August, 1861, both sides decided to attack their opponent. However, Brig. Gen. McCulloch was confident that his superior numbers will carry the day. Nathaniel Lyon left around 1,000 men to guard his supplies and he led around 5,400 men to the field in the night of August 9. Lyon planned for 1,200 men under Colonel Franz Sigel to swing south flanking right of the Confederate force, while the main body would attack from the north. Element of the surprise was essential for this plan to work. On the other side, Confederate leaders also planned surprise attack but heavy rain in the night of August 9 convinced Brig. Gen. McCulloch to abandon this plan. In the morning of 10 August, Lyon’s force managed to surprise Confederates around 5 AM and drove them back. Union momentum enabled them to overrun several Confederate camps and occupy the crest of ridge that would later be known as “Bloody Hill”. In the vicinity, Confederate Arkansas Pulaski Battery opened fire on Union units and gave Confederate infantry enough time to organize its lines on the hill’s south slope. In next five hours, Confederates attempted three attacks on Union position but failed to break their line. At 9:30 AM, on the Bloody Hill, General Lyon, who was already wounded twice, was killed leading a counterattack and replaced by Major Samuel D. Sturgis. Although Union did achieve considerable success, Confederate managed to rout Sigel’s column south of Skegg’s Branch, this forced Sigel’s men to abandon the field in defeat. After the third Confederate attack, which ended at 11:00 AM, Confederate forces paused. Sturgis saw chance of pressing them but he abandoned it because his forces were exhausted and his ammunition was low. Retreat to Springfield was ordered. Although victorious, Confederate forces were too disorganized to mount a pursuit. Victory of Confederate forces had great impact on southern sympathizers in Missouri, and enabled bold trust north that carried Price and his Missouri State Guard as far as Lexington. In late October, 1861, convention convened by Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson, met in Neosho and passed the ordnance of secession. The Wilson Creek Battle, the most significant one in Missouri in 1861, gave Confederacy control of south-western quarter of Missouri. But that was all that Confederacy could achieve, everything else was held by the Union.
The Battle of Fort Donelson was fought between 11 February, 1862, and 16 February, 1862. It followed the capture of Fort Henry on February 6, 1862, and was one of most important battles for securing the Mississippi for the Union. Union forces were commanded by upcoming Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote who commanded Western Flotilla of United States Navy river fleet. Grant commanded around 24,500 men with naval support. Confederate garrison had around 16,200 men and was commanded Brigadier General John B. Floyd, while Lieutenant Colonel Nathan B. Forest commanded the cavalry force. Original garrison of Fort Henry and fort Donelson was around 2,500 men but after Grant captured Fort Henry, General Albert S. Johnston dispatched 12,000 troops from Bowling Green, Kentucky, under Brig. Gen. J. B. Floyd to reinforce the garrison. Some men arrived from Columbus, the western end of the Confederate defensive lines. Brig. Gen Grant’s initial plan was to attack even before reinforcements arrive but bad weather delayed him and Confederate units managed to reach Fort Donelson. Fort itself was stronger than Fort Henry Grant captured only a week ago. It was larger, it featured bigger garrison and stood 100 feet (33 metres) above the river and on the ridge which significantly reduced manoeuvring space for infantry. Confederates also had a strong line on a ridge outwards from the fort. Grant deployed his two divisions on the February 12, and was waiting for arrival of the third division. On the same day, Brig. Gen John A. McClernand ordered one of his brigades to probe Confederate position despite he received no such orders. Brigade mounted two or three charges and found defences strong and heavily manned. The Union losses were heavy and achieved nothing. On the February 13, third (Lee Wallace’s) division arrived. This enabled Grant to form a tight cordon around the Fort. Next day Flag Officer Foote opened his attack with four ironclads and two wooden gunboats. USS St. Louis (flagship) and USS Louisville had their steering chains shot off and other two ironclads suffered damaged through their thin deck protection. Confederate defenders didn’t lose single man. This development washed away Grant’s original plan of maintaining strong cordon around the Fort and bombarding it to submission by river fleet. Grant’s position wasn’t good. He was now facing a long siege, had inexperienced troops he doubt could take Fort by storm, and Confederates still could supply the Fort using the river. Furthermore, bad weather also hampered any operations. However, Confederates never considered supplying the Fort Donelson using the waterways. This was unconventional style. They preferred to supply the ford by land, but that route was held by Union so no supplies reached the Fort. They also believed (wrongly) that Grant had much more force and that he was constantly reinforced and that Foote will bring another river fleet. At the Council of War that was held at nigh on February 14, they decided to break out. The attack would be led by Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow and clear the road to Nashville and Charlotte. Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner’s men were to keep the road open until entire garrison is evacuated and then they would form again in central Tennessee. The breakthrough almost succeeded; Confederates managed to capture 500 prisoners, 5,000 rifles and a battery. However, on the verge of victory they wavered and Union forces led by Grant himself managed to consolidate their lines and recaptured the lost earthworks. Correctly noting that enemy who retreats on the verge of victory would be easily disposed if attacked with determination, Grant ordered his reserve forward. Confederates managed to put up resistance here and there, but Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner’s men didn’t reach their trenches in time. They resisted for some time, but soon Union managed to break Confederate line. However, not all was lost for Confederates. Brig. Gen McClernand didn’t block the river road which could be used by Confederates to escape. Brig. Gen. Floyd, however, was reluctant to risk his men in trying this path so he held another Council of War. The decision was to surrender the garrison to Grant. Brig. Gen. Floyd was afraid of surrender because he was pre-war US Secretary of War and has used his position to help seceding states. He was under indictment and feared he would be hanged if captured. He hoped on the last steamer to Nashville taking 2,000 Virginia infantrymen with him. Nathan B. Forest also broke out with his regiment of cavalry and some infantry using the river road. Surrender was left to Brig. Gen Simon B. Buckner. Buckner asked Grant for terms, and received Grant’s famous reply:”No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.” Buckner didn’t like that and considered it un-chivalrous but nevertheless, on February 16, 1862, he surrendered 12,000 men garrison. This battle was a major victory for both Grant and the Union while it was disastrous defeat for the South. It ensured that Kentucky will stay in the Union and opened entire central Tennessee to Union advance along the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. It also brought Grant promotion to Major General launching him on his great career and earning him nom de guerre “Unconditional Surrender”.
Battle of Island No. 10 (February 28 - April 8, 1862)
This battle, known also as the Battle of New Madrid, was fought from February 28, 1862, to April 8, 1862, at town of new Madrid, Missouri, and in Lake County, Tennessee. The Confederate garrison was around 7,000 strong and commanded by Major General John P. McCown. Union Army of the Mississippi was commanded by Major general John Pope and was supported by Western Gunboat Flotilla led by Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote. With the surrender of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, both in Tennessee, the Confederate presence at Mississippi river was greatly threatened by Union operations. Things deteriorated further when Confederates were forced to evacuate Columbus, Kentucky. General Beauregard who was commanding Confederate Army of the Mississippi had to rethink about his strategy in this theatre. Next, strong position held by South’s forces, was Island No. 10, some 60 river miles below the Columbus. In this area, river formed a long loop, so guns stationed in the Fort could easily fire on the ships heading down- or up-stream of Mississippi. Furthermore, currents would carry any disabled boats to the beach controlled by the Confederates where they could be easily captured. Nearby was a town of New Madrid, Missouri, which was featuring strong batteries facing river, but those batteries could also be turned to fire inland. Maj. Gen. John pope was given a task to once again open upper Mississippi to Union advance. His Army of the Mississippi was organized at St. Louis and marched southward on the western side of the river. On the February 28, 1862, he started his attack on the New Madrid from Commerce, Missouri. New Madrid was his first objective, but his troops struggled with swampy terrain and transport of heavy artillery, but on March 3, they reached outskirts of New Madrid and started the siege. Confederate commander, Maj. Gen John P. McCown defended the town of New Madrid and Island No. 10 from the fortifications. Although, he nominally commanded 7,000 men, diseases significantly lowered his fighting strength. The Island No. 10 had 19, and New Madrid had 21 heavy guns. Confederate River Flotilla had good mix of light and heavy guns, and there was floating battery CSS New Orleans anchored below the island. Although this was a strong position, it did have one weakness: its supply route. Normally, supplies were moved by river, either all the way to New Madrid and Island No. 10, or at least up to Tiptonville where they were taken over by the troops and carried away by the rode. If the Tiptonville road could be cut, the swampy terrain that protected Confederate eastern flank would become a trap. Maj. Gen. Pope’s army arrived outside New Madrid on March 3, 1862, and soon probed the defences with the 4th Ohio regiment who were caught in heavy cross-fire and retreated. Maj. Gen. Pope recognised the strength of the Confederate position, so he searched for a way to outflank it. On March 6, Union troops overran the battery position at Point Pleasant effectively closing the river as a supply line and making Tiptonville the key position. Pope brought fort his siege guns, which were in place by March 13, and positioned them only 300 yards (275 metres) from Confederate positions. On this day, heavy artillery duel erupted with Confederates being helped by their river gunboat flotilla. However, by the end of the day Maj. Gen McCown correctly observed that Pope had a stronger supply line and would eventually destroy New Madrid’s defences. He hastily evacuated the position, leaving artillery, supplies and even prepared meal behind as his troops were carried by the river craft to the eastern shore. Maj. Gen Pope closed in on the March 14, but without naval support he couldn’t move any further. Flag Officer Foote was convinced that batteries of Island No. 10 were too strong and that duel with them was going to be costly. In order to avoid direct confrontation with batteries, he brought up mortar boats to shell the fortifications and he started to dig a canal through the small piece of land north of Island No. 10. Mortars were firing day and night, but their fire had little effect so the digging of the canal proved to be much more important. However, the work on the canal was going slow, and even when finished it wouldn’t be deep enough for river ironclads to use it. Only small transport rafts could negotiate the canal. For 15 days (from March 20) engineers dug and removed the trees. The work was hard but when they we finished, four transports and six light barges were hauled through the narrow canal. Maj. Gen Pope started converting barges in gunboats, determined to cross the river even if River Flotilla proves unable to do so. Union River Flotilla was strongly opposed, but Commander Henry Walke of the USS Carondelet decided to use cover of darkness and sneak past Confederate batteries. He doused all but one light, diverted smokestack into paddle- boxes and lashed a barge onto the exposed side of the ship. On April 4, during heavy thunderstorm, he managed to pass by with Confederate batteries scoring only two hits but no casualties. Three nights later, USS Pittsburgh also ran the batteries, but by that time USS Carondelet already ranged up and down the river smashing Confederate batteries. With two strong gunboats available, Maj. Gen. Pope covered his crossing and on the April 7, had strong force across the river and cut the Tiptonville road. Brig. Gen. William M. Mackall, who has recently replaced Maj. Gen. McCown, knew there was no way out. Few men tried their luck and escaped through swamps, but most of the garrison (around 7,000 men) surrendered on April 8. With loss of Island No. 10 Confederate presence on Mississippi was all but gone. Only stronghold left in their arms after the fall of New Orleans in April 1862 was Vicksburg. Union controlled entire Mississippi from New Orleans to Vicksburg and from Vicksburg all the way to the north, effectively cutting Confederacy into half.
The Battle of Pea Ridge (also known as Elkhorn Tavern) was fought from March 6 to march 8, 1862, at Benton Counts, Arkansas. Union Army of the Southwest under Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis numbered 10,500 soldiers while Confederate Army of the West commanded by Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn and fielded 16,500 men. The Confederacy was looking to occupy and fortify their position in Missouri so that its star on Confederacy flag would have real meaning. On the other side, President Lincoln wanted to hold as many Border States as possible. After the Battle of Wilson Creek in summer of 1861, odds favoured the Confederacy but when Brig. Gen Curtis was appointed he restored Union fortunes. Reinforced and more aggressive than his predecessor, Gen. Fremont, he secured Missouri and pushed northwest toward Arkansas. Due to bad blood between Brig. Gen McCulloch and Maj. Gen. Price, Jefferson Davies, in spring of 1862, appointed a new commander: Maj. Gen. Van Dorn. He was aggressive general with good reputation achieved during Manassas Campaign. He took up his job seriously and in the opening days of his appointment he tried to find a way melding Price’s Missourians, McCulloch’s Texas-Arkansas contingent and 800 Albert Pike’s pro-Confederate Indians. He was eager to attack Union forces, and he devised relatively simple plan: march soon, while the Union forces are still scattered in their winter quarters, win any battles that may come and secure a way to St. Louis. The first step was to win first battle over Brig. Gen. Curtis’s 10,000 men. Maj. Gen Van Dorn faced a difficult task of attacking competent enemy in constricted terrain where his numerical superiority didn’t mean much. Even worse, Curtis had picked a strong defensive position on a small ridge overlooking a stream with marshy flanks. Knowing that frontal attack will not succeed, Maj. Gen. Van Dorn devised another plan. He wanted to outflank the Union forces by two –pronged night march and fall on their unprotected rear. He counted to achieve victory by surprise and superior numbers. That would cut Brig. Gen. Curtis’s line of retreat and he would capture remnants of the Union Army. The plan was sound and it achieved success in the beginning. Confederates left the camp, but camp-fires were still burning so Union forces didn’t notice them moving out. However, night march proved to be a chaotic affair with some units not arriving where they should and almost all of them were late. This gave Brig. Gen. Curtis enough time to redeploy his line and improve his position. More importantly, Curtis didn’t lose his nerve. He held off smaller Confederate force under McCulloch with cavalry screen, although his men were eventually charged Cherokee-cavalry charge but McCulloch couldn’t keep his momentum and exploit this situation. McCulloch himself fell leading the charge on newly formed Union defensive line, his second in command was killed also, while third in command was captured by Union forces. There was confusion who will take over the command and eventually Albert Pike was selected, but he was unable to press on and this part of battle was over. The stronger Confederate force led by Maj. Generals Price and Van Dorn (who was sick and in ambulance) ran into stronger Union forces led by Eugene Carr. Confederate artillery very effective and Confederates managed to push back Carr through successive defensive lines but Union force managed to keep its cohesion and continued fighting. This didn’t look good for undersupplied Confederate forces (who left their supplies at the camp to be faster on the march) and as day grew to the end, Union line was still intact near the Elkhorn tavern. Maj. Gen. Van Dorn hopped that Brig. Gen. Curtis’s men were damaged and discouraged enough to surrender the next day. But if they don’t, he was facing a problem because his men were tired and short of food an ammunition. Even worse, Union force was now between Confederate forces. Brig. Gen. Curtis didn’t surrender or moved (although some counsels were made to abandon the position) and in the morning he was still standing firm between Confederate forces. He brought up his reserve to, two fresh divisions of Brig. Gen. Sigel’s Corps. Pike’s men remained quiet, tying only few Union forces to the west of Elkhorn Tavern. On the northern flank, the tables were turned. Brig. Gen. Curtis now had more and better artillery and had plenty of ammunition. He also had more infantry whose morale was extremely high. Maj. Gen. Van Dorn started heavy bombardment of Union lines but Union artillery soon silenced his guns and then turned on his infantry. Once the artillery paved the way, Sigel’s men charged and the Confederate line broke. Casualties were heavy; Union lost 1,400 men and Confederacy 4,600 although it seems that many of them were deserters rather than actual battle casualties. This defeat forced Confederacy to abandon plans of invading Missouri. Instead, Brig. Gen Curtis secured northern Arkansas and now it was the Confederacy that was threatened not the Union.
Also known as La Glorieta Pass or Pigeon Ranch, this battle was fought from March 26 to March 28, 1862, at Santa Fe and San Miguel Counties, New Mexico. It was decisive battle of New Mexico Campaign which was launched by Confederacy to secure silver and gold mines in California and Colorado Territory and to secure Southern California ports. Confederate forces were 1,100 men strong and led by Major Charles L. Pyron and Lieutenant Colonel William R. Scurry. Union forces, 1,300 men strong, were led by Colonel John P. Slough and Major John M. Chivington. Glorieta Pass was important strategic location southeast of Santa Fe on the Santa Fe Trail and Apache Canyon. Confederates first immobilised the bulk of Union forces in New Mexico in Valverde and then spread across Rio Grande Valley and destroyed smaller Union garrisons. The last of these garrison was stationed at Fort Union (northeast through pass) and Confederates sent what they believed sufficient force to deal with it. However, Union forces consisted of nearly full 1st Colorado Infantry Regiment which was assembled from tough frontiersmen. In they march to Fort Union they were faster from “Stonewall” Jackson’s Foot Cavalry of Shenandoah Campaign. Preliminary encounter took place in the Canyon when 400 men of Colorado Regiment were sent to deal with Confederate vanguard force reported to be stationed at the other end of the Canyon. On the night of March 25 they encountered Confederate pickets and managed to capture patrols the next morning. Then they encountered Confederate main body which featured one artillery piece so Major Chivington was forced to retreat. However, he managed to rally his men and experienced frontiersmen managed to turn Confederate flanks. Confederates then retreated deeper into the Canyon to narrow position were they hoped to stop Union advance. However, Chivington’s men managed to climb on the sides of the canyon and once again turn the Confederate flank. Union cavalry charged and enemy was broken. Confederates lost around 200 men while Chivington’s men suffered only 20 casualties. On the March 26 both sides received reinforcements. Lieut. Col. Scurry’ men increased Confederate numbers to 1,100 while Colonel Slough brought around 900 men to strengthen Union line. Both Scurry and Slough decided to attack next morning (March 28). During his advance, Scurry noticed Union advance and formed into line, dismounting his cavalry to further strengthen his position. For most of the battle Union forces were on defensive. Battle was fierce and even bayonets and knives were used more than once. Eventually, Union forces were driven back and they retreated towards their camp. Confederates were too shaken to pursuit and after arranging an armistice until noon on next day (March 29) to care for wounded and bury the dead also retreated to their camp. On their return they realised that hey defeated was only one part of the Union force, while the other, under Major Chivington, moved around the main battle and attacked the Confederate camp. They destroyed entire wagon train with ammunition, stores and food and killed all the horses because they could be taken only thru the Canyon where main battle was raging. With this one stroke Confederate expedition was doomed and it started its slow retreat. This effectively meant abandonment of New Mexico Campaign and secured New Mexico territory and lands to the west for Union.
Also known as The Battle of Pittsburg Landing, Battle of Shiloh was fought on April 6 and 7, 1862, at Hardin County, Tennessee. Confederate Army of Mississippi numbering 55,000 men was divided into two forces. One commanded by General Albert S. Johnston and P. G. T Beauregard numbered 45,000 men and advanced from Corinth towards Union position. Union forces numbered 67,000 men and were led by Major General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General Don Carlos Buell. However, Union force was separated with Grant’s forces stationed at Pittsburg landing and waiting for Buell’s men to connect with them in order to concentrate against Confederates. Maj. Gen. Grant’s army was camped at Pittsburg Landing without any form of fortification or scouting detachments or even cavalry screening his position. He did know that enemy had a force that was larger than his and he spent much of his time and energy on training his un-experienced troops. Grants divisions (six in total, led byMaj. Gen.s John A. McClernand and Lew Wallace, and Brig. Gen.s W. H. L. Wallace (replacing Charles Ferguson Smith, disabled by a leg injury), Stephen A. Hurlbut, William T. Sherman, and Benjamin M. Prentiss) were scattered and even brigades were separated on partially wooded ground. Entire area was scarcely populated with heavily wooded or cleared areas as big as 80 acres. There were also a number of creeks and roads splitting the ground. General A. S. Johnston originally planned to move out on April 1 but his forces were slow to concentrate it took some time to combine different forces into one, effective army. He was delayed for two days and was even considering waiting for General Earl Van Dorn and his 20,000 men from Arkansas. General Van Dorn was delayed by high water so Gen. Johnston decided to move about because further delay would mean that Grant and Buell would unite as well. Once the march started, newly assembled Confederate Army of Mississippi, was slow in advance and arrived 9 hours late (4 PM instead of 7AM) and had to postpone the attack until April 6 because there wasn’t enough day light left. Although there were signs of attack, Union forces disregarded them all. Grant telegraphed “I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place.” Gen. A. S. Johnston deployed his forces in three lines with Hardee’s Corps in the lead, Bragg’s Corps in the middle and Polk’s Small Corps as the third line. This kind of deployment meant that no line had its own reserves but would have to rely on the following line to exploit any advantage. At 6 AM Confederates started moving but dense wood made first and second line merge and leaving the third line as reserve for entire battlefield. The advance exploited the gap between Sherman’s and Prentiss’ Division and Confederates broke through. At 7.30 AM Gen. A. S. Johnston committed his third line (Polk to support the left and Breckinridge to the right). Union reinforcements arrived too (McClernand’s and Hurlbut’s Divisions) but almost instantly Prentiss’ Division collapsed. Prentiss managed to rally some men and took up a strong position at a sunken road that will later be known as “Hornet’s Nest”. Badly-coordinated Confederate attacks were repulsed one after another. Gen. A. S. Johnston led one of those attacks, was wounded and died around 2:30 PM and Gen. Beauregard took command. In the morning and afternoon Confederates exploited their numerical superiority over Grant’s single army and pressed hard on Union flanks. There was some fierce resistance but around 3 PM Gen. Bragg led his men in flank attack that collapsed Hurlbut’s Division. When Hardee connected with Bragg some of his division was completely cut of; 2,200 men surrendered. At this time, things were hard for the Union. Many of the green soldiers left the ranks on their own will and entire units dispersed during withdrawals. They advanced to the river were they sheltered under overhanging banks. If Confederates reached the banks they would all have to surrender. Union Col. Joseph Webster organized artillery line of 40-50 guns and Hurlbut managed to gather 4,000 men. Gen. Bragg tried to mount an attack but his forces were tired and scattered. Orders got confused and from two available brigades only one attacked and was repulsed with heavy losses. There was no time to organize another attack this day; Grant’s army managed to survive. Confederates spent the night in old Union camps, units were mingled and there was little order. Meanwhile Gen. Buell’s men where arriving with lead division reaching Pittsburg Landing late on the April 6. Gen. Grant was trying to reorganize his troops and by daylight on April 7 table have turned. Union forces now outnumbered Confederates. Generals Grant and Buell didn’t develop combined plan but their superiority in numbers (Buell’s forces and Lee Wallace’s Division from Grant’s army alone outnumbered the Confederates) gave them confidence they will carry the day. Union forces advanced earls and first contact was made around 5:30 AM. At first Gen. Beauregard, not knowing Buell has arrived, ordered counterattack. Although they managed to halt Union advance, counterattacks never brought Union lines in danger of collapse. Gradually, Confederates were driven back; Gen. Bragg ordered retreat in the early afternoon. Brig. Gen. Breckinridge commanded the rear guard with Nathan B. Forest between him and the enemy. There was no pursuit, and Union advance on the April 8 was stopped when Forest attacked 4th Illinois Cavalry at Fallen Timbers. Casualties were very heavy; Union lost around 13,000 and Confederates 10,000. So far, this was the bloodiest battle of the War. Gen. Grant had beaten Confederates once more. With fall of Island No. 10 and victory at Shiloh, Mississippi was open as far as Memphis. More importantly, Confederates were now on retreat that will last until their mid-August offensive.
Battle of Forts Jackson and St. Philip (April 18 - 28, 1862)
The Battle was fought from April 16, 1862 to April 28, 1862, at Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, between Flag Officer D. G. Farragut’s West Gulf Blockading Squadron and a substantial army expeditionary force (Union Army) and Confederate garrisons of Fort Jackson and St. Philip supported with various weak ships. Confederate forces were commanded by Brigadier General Johnson K. Duncan and Commander John K. Mitchell. In order to accomplish plan of dividing the Confederacy, Union had to take control of Mississippi River. One of the principal tasks of achieving this goal was to move up the mouth of the Mississippi River to the city of New Orleans and capture it; effectively shutting the Mississippi to Confederate ships. In mid-January, 1862, Farragut used his West Gulf blockading Squadron and managed to clear all Confederate positions except Fort Jackson and St. Philip, above the Head of the Passes, some seventy miles below the city of New Orleans. Apart from the forts themselves, Confederates placed obstructions in the river and managed to scramble several ships, including three ironclads (CSS Manassas, Louisiana and Mississippi), two converted merchantmen (CSS McRae and Jackson) and several unarmed support crafts. As base of operations, Farragut chose Ship Island, Mississippi, and on April 8, 1862, assembled twenty four of his vessels and nineteen of Commander David D. Porter’s mortar schooners near the Head of the Passes. On April 16, schooners started a week long bombardment of Fort Jackson but were unsuccessful in silencing its guns. On the night of April 22, some of the Farragut’s ships managed to open a way through river obstacles. On the morning of April 24, Farragut sent his ships north to pass by the forts and continue to the New Orleans. Confederates tried to stop the Union ships but most of the force successfully passed the forts and continued to the New Orleans. On April 25, Union forces laid siege on the New Orleans. Riots broke out and for three days its inhabitants ravaged and sacked their own city. On April 28, Farragut sent two officers and a small detachment of sailors and marines who went to Customs House where they hauled down Confederate flag and ran up Union one. After the fall of New Orleans, Major General Benjamin F. Butler began final preparations to take out two forts that were now in Farragut’s rear. Commander Porter, who was now in command of flotilla below the forts, issued a demand for surrender but Brig. Gen. Duncan refused. Porter continued with bombardment of the forts, preparing a way for Butler’s soldiers to storm the forts. However, in the night of April 29, Confederate garrison mutinied and refused to take any more beating. Although garrison of St. Philip remained loyal, because of their dependant position, Brig. Gen. Duncan could no longer maintain effective resistance. Confederate forces of Fort Jackson and St. Philip capitulated on the April 30, 1862.
Also known as the First Battle of Corinth, this battle was fought from April 29 to June 10, 1862. The location of the battle stretched between several counties (Hardin & McNairy counties, Alcorn and Tishomingo counties in Tennessee and Mississippi).
After the Battle of Shiloh, Union decided to exploit that victory and advance on the city of Corinth. Union advance force consisted of three armies (Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Ohio and Army of the Mississippi) with total number of 120,000 soldiers and under overall command of Major General Henry W. Halleck. Confederates numbered 65,000 soldiers and were under command of General P. G. T. Beauregard. The city of Corinth was vital railroad centre in Mississippi and was bordering Tennessee to the north, so its capture was vital for Union effort of controlling the Mississippi Valley.
However, greave losses at Shiloh, made Major General Halleck extremely careful; he used offensive entrenchment advance with fortifying after each advancement. After moving 3 miles in 5 weeks, on May 25, 1862, Maj. Gen. Halleck’s force was finally in a position to lay a siege to the city of Corinth. Facing overwhelming odds, Confederate Gen. P. G. T Beauregard used a very creative way to save his army. General Beauregard ordered his men to prepare three-day rations and prepare for the advance on the Union position. He suspected that this news will somehow reach the Union forces, and it sure did. Several of the Confederate soldiers delivered the news to Union lines. Union forces began the bombardment and started to move into the position for the attack. On the evening of the May 29, and during the night, Confederates started to move out of the Corinth. They used the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to evacuate the wounded, heavy artillery and great amount of the supplies. Confederate defenders installed a number of “Quaker” guns along their defensive position and effectively deceived Union forces. Confederates were headed to the Tupelo and managed to evacuate their entire force without Maj. Gen. Halleck noticing any of it.
This battle, victory for the Union and consolidation of Union position in the northern Mississippi, didn’t destroy confederate army under General P. G. T. Beauregard who showed admirable skill and organization.
Also known as The Battle of Bowers Hill, it was fought in Fredrick and Winchester County, Virginia. On May 24, 1862, Confederate Army of the Shenandoah Valley under the command of the Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson had captured Union garrison at Front Royal and began its advance toward Winchester where Union Major General Nathaniel P. Banks commanded Federal Division of 6,500 troops. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Army had 16,000 men and was turning Maj. Gen Bank’s position.
With his flank turned, Maj. Gen Banks did the only thing he could; he retreated. This bought him enough time to learn that previous intelligent reports were severely underestimating Confederate strength. Initial reports suggested that Confederate and Union force were matched in term of numbers but new reports showed that Maj. Gen. Jackson commanded a force of 16,000 men. With this, new information it became clear the Maj. Gen. Banks should continue his retreat and avoid contact with the Confederates at all costs.
Maj. Gen. “Stonewall” Jackson had two objectives: he wanted to capture Winchester (which was Union base and supply depot) and to capture Union army lead by Maj. Gen. Banks. His numerical superiority however wasn’t enough to ensure both objectives; heading for one could mean loosing the other. Another important factor was the fact the Union forces were moving along the paved Valley Pike, while Jackson’s men were moving on a dirt road that became muddy from sudden rain. During the May 24, Jackson pressed his advance and raced after Maj. Gen. Banks. On few occasions, Confederates managed to break into the Union column and take some prisoners and supply wagons but Jackson’s men were more concerned with filling their bellies than pressing Union forces. Although he suffered serious losses during the retreat, Maj. Gen. Banks managed to get most of his men safely to Winchester. There he tried to organize his forces and formed a good defensive position on a ridge of hills close to the town. His forces also picketed another ridge further south.
Maj. Gen Jackson (Winder’s Brigade) easily dispatched the Union pickets and moved his guns onto the ridge to engage Union artillery on the Bower’s Hill at a range less than a mile. Union sharpshooters along Abrams Creek began picking off the Confederate artillerymen. Jackson moved up the rest of his guns and artillery duel began. Jackson ordered three brigades (Fulkerson’s, Campbell’s and Elzey’s) to support Winder. Then Maj. Gen. Jackson ordered Richard Taylor’s Louisiana Brigade (spearheaded by Louisiana Tigers) reinforced by two regiments of Fulkerson’s Brigade and supported by the Scott’s Brigade to the left along the Abrams Creek. Taylor’s Brigade marched under heavy Union fire to a position overlapping the Union right and then attacked Union position on the Bower’s Hill. Faced with three enemy brigades from the front and three closing on its right flank, Union Gordon’s Brigade gave way and started its retreat into the town. In the same time Stonewall Brigade attacked the centre and Ewell’s men attacked the Union right on Camp Hill. Panic in the Union ranks was obvious; many of the soldiers retreated even before Confederate forces were upon them. Federal force retreated through Winchester, rested for a short time in Martinsburg, and then continued their retreat to the Potomac River which they crossed at Williamsport. Maj. Gen. Jackson realised the importance of this victory and wanted to pursuit the enemy but his cavalry under the command of Brig. Gen. Turner Ashby was still disorganized from actions on the May 24 and from handling the prisoners. Confederate infantry couldn’t hope to catch up with retreating Federals, they were also exhausted from marching the past week.
In the end, Maj. Gen. Jackson had to be satisfied with the prisoners he rounded up on the battlefield and millions of dollars of captured supplies. This earned Maj. Gen Banks nickname “Commissary” among the Confederates; he was very effective in providing war materiel for the Confederate Army. As the Maj. Gen. Bank’s defeated forces crossed the Potomac, Lincoln was forced to detach more troops from General McClellan’s command if he hoped to save the disaster that Shenandoah Valley Campaign was for the Union. This also meant that Federal plans to concentrate on the Richmond were postponed because any advance toward richmod would have its flank exposed to “Stonewall” Jackson and his experienced troops. Maj. Gen Jackson managed to really beat the Union force; his men inflicted more than 2,000 casualties to Maj. Gen. Banks’ Division and suffered less then 400 casualties.
Also known as the First Battle of Cold Harbor and Battle of Chickahominy River, it took place on June 27, 1862 in the Hannover County, Virginia. It was the third of the Seven Bays Battles during General McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign. Confederate forces numbered over 57,000 men and were under command of General Robert E. Lee. Union forces were under overall command of General George B. McClellan, but most the battle was fought by Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s V Corps with reinforcements from Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s VI Corps (Slocum’s Division numbering some 8,000 men). Union strength in this battle was around 34,000 men.
The Battle of Beaver Damn Creek fought on the June 26, was inconclusive. So, on June 27, Gen. Lee renewed his attack against Union Army’s right flank which was held by Porter’s V Corps. Porter had his men fortify their position and therefore managed to establish strong defensive line behind Boatswain’s Swamp just north of the Chickahominy River. V Corps also received reinforcements for the most of the day. Although this was a strong tactical and defensive position, General Lee correctly observed that it was strategically isolated on the north side of the Chickahominy swamps, with few bridges to retreat or haul in the reinforcements.
However, Confederate attack suffered from poor coordination. A.P. Hill’s Light Division attacked entrenched positions of the Federals and lost 2,000 of its 13,000 men. With previous battles fought, famous Confederate Light Division lost quarter of its men. Also, for the second time in the Seven Days Battles, “Stonewall” Jackson and his troops were late. Jackson’s troops took the wrong turn and were delayed for an hour. Maj. Gen. Porter’s V Corps managed to hold out for five hours of the Confederate disorganised assaults. When Rebels finally mounted coordinated assault at the dusk, Porter’s line broke, and he retreated towards the river. John B, Hood’s Texans and Evander Law’s Alabamians showed exceptional courage as they charged straight through the Union position and firing only one volley managed to break the line. Before their advance, same position was attacked repeatedly and all attacks were repulsed because Confederates lost momentum when they stopped to fire back at the entrenched Federals who had all the advantage in that kind of the fire-fight. This attack by Hood’s Texas and Law’s Alabama Brigade, supported by Pickett’s Virginians sent the Union line reeling and many prisoners were taken.
Gen. George B. McClellan lost his nerve (once again) and ordered a withdrawal across the Chickahominy River. This also meant that he had to give up his base at White House, switching from the York to the James. With gen. McClellan rattled, it was almost guaranteed that he will fall back to this position. General Lee got what he wanted: Richmond was relieved of pressure from possible siege and it provided him with the opportunity to capture the Army of the Potomac. It is estimated that Confederates lost from 8,000-9,000 men at Gaines Mill. Union forces (V and VI Corps) lost around 7,000 men. However, only a smaller portion of Federal Army was engaged at Gaines Mill; Army of the Potomac was still a potent force. Historians agree that had the “Stonewall” Jackson arrived on time and had the Confederates coordinated their attack better, Porter’s V Corps would had been in far greater jeopardy and danger of obliteration.
Also known as the battle of Poindexter’s Farm, this battle was fought in Henrico County, Virginia on July 1, 1862. It was the sixth (and final) battle in the Seven Days Battles of General McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign. The battle was fought between 55,000 Confederate troops (General Robert E. Lee) and 54,000 Federals (General George B. McClellan).
This was the first battle of the Seven days battles in which Union Army of the Potomac managed to occupy favourable position. In all the previous engagements, Federals were retreating towards the James River and were constantly pursued by General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. At Gaines Mill, Union V Corps did occupy strong defensive position but was too isolated to fully exploit its superior tactical position.
Malvern Hill provided extremely favourable ground for artillery. The previous day, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s V Corps prepared the position for effective use of artillery. Gen. McClellan wasn’t present at the field himself because he was ahead of his troops at Harrison’s Landing on the James. Therefore, Maj. Gen. Porter was the most senior of all Corps commanders. Gen. McClellan’s chief of artillery, Colonel Henry J. Hunt ordered slopes to be cleared of all timber and deployed his 250 guns supported by three Federal gunboats. The entire Army of the Potomac was concentrated on the Malvern Hill, with the exception of Casey’s Division. Gen. Lee decide to take the Union position head on instead of flanking it; believing that his artillery will effectively pave the way for his infantry he thought to be in a better shape than Federals. He planned to attack the Federals from the north, down the Quaker Road with divisions of Maj. Gens. T. “Stonewall” Jackson, R. S. Ewell and D. H. Hill. The divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserves after suffering heavy casualties in the previous battle.
Gen. Lee’s complex plan was however, once more, poorly executed. The line of advance was seriously hampered by muddy roads and lacking maps. Maj. Gen. Jackson’s advance was checked by Western Run creek, Maj. Gen. Magruder was led southwest (away from the battlefield) by his guides. Eventually, battle line was assembled from Huger’s Division on the right and D. H. Hill’s Division on the Quaker Road to the left. They waited for Confederate bombardment to start and soften up the Federals. However, Colonel Hunt delivered the first blow; he launched one of the greatest barrages in the entire War (from 1 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.). Union gunners fielded better equipment and had greater experience and disabled most of the Confederate batteries concentrated on a hill north of the Crew House and at Poindexter’s farm to northeast. Massed artillery caused havoc on advancing Confederate columns. However, at 3:30 p.m., Gen. Lee sent forth his infantry, and Armistead’s Brigade managed to make some progress through line of Union’s sharpshooters. Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill advanced with his division along the Quaker Road but never managed to close up with Union positions. His soldiers were stopped 180 metres (200 yards) from Union positions and by nightfall they were repulsed with heavy losses.
After the War, D. H. Hill (in one article) wrote: “It wasn’t war, it was murder!” Gen. Lee’s Army suffered 5,650 casualties which is extremely high when compared with Union’s 2,214. However, Gen. Lee continued to follow Army of the Potomac and when he managed to occupy Evelington Heights, Gen. McClellan’s position became unattainable both tactically and strategically. Confederate artillery easily dominated Union camps from those heights, and although well in range of Union ship guns, they proved extremely well defensive position which Union infantry had no hopes to capture. After the Malvern Hill, Gen. Lee dispatched Maj. Gen. Jackson north to operate against Maj. Gen. Pope’s army along the Rapidan River, effectively starting the North Virginia Campaign. Gen. George B. McClellan reported to Washington that any further advance on Richmond was impossible and started to extract his troops and ship them north to support Pope. This sealed the McClellan’s fate; soon he was to disappear from the battlefields of American Civil War.
Also known as the Second Manassas, this battle was fought from August 28 – 30, 1862, in Prince William County, Virginia. It was the climax of General Robert E. Lee’s Northern Virginia Campaign against Union Major General John Pope’s Army of Virginia. Confederates had 50,000 and Federals 65,000 men.
The introduction to the battle was Maj. Gen. T. J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s capture of the Union supply depot at Manassas Junction; effectively threatening Pope’s line of communication with Washington. Withdrawing to the northwest, Maj. Gen. Jackson took a strong defensive position on Stony Ridge. On August 28, Jackson attacked Union column east of Gainsville, at Brawner’s Farm. On that same day, Maj. Gen J. Longstreet (commanding the Gen. Lee’s wing) broke through light Federal resistance at Thoruoghfare Gap and approached the field.
The first action of actual battle happened on August 28. Maj. Gen. Jackson was lurking with his force around the Junction until he found Union column to surprise. These were the lead elements of Brig. Gen. Rufus King’s division. Night was close and that was possibly Jackson’s last chance to attack; and he did. Despite an element of surprise and artillery shelling Union lines before deploying, he achieved no advantage. The leading Union brigade was John Gibbon’s Midwesterners who were until that point inexperienced unit. That and their resolve helped them to slug it out with Jackson’s troops well into the night. Casualties were heavy; both sides lost every third man. John Gibbon’s brigade will later be known as the Iron Brigade.
Maj. Gen. Pope was convinced he had Jackson and his troops isolated and was determined to destroy them. He ordered the bulk of his force to attack Jackson on the August 29, but his attacks lacked coordination. As a result, Confederates managed to repulse repeated attacks made on their line. The Confederate left, under Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, was starting to waver but Jackson held his confidence that they will hold, and somehow the famous Light Division held its position. It was a close thing though, one Confederate unit ran out of ammunition and had to use rocks; if they had retreated as would be a common sense, or had Union units showed some more resolve and charged in, Jackson’s line would surely snap. Twice Federals managed to break Jackson’s line (Hooker’s Division and Phil Kearny) but in both cases, rebels counterattacked and Maj. Gen. Pope didn’t have enough men to exploit the gap. At the days end, Jackson pulled back his line and left only pickets along the railway line. Maj. Gen Pope interpreted this move as his victory, believing that Jackson used that force to cover his retreat.
Earlier that day, Maj. Gen. J. Longstreet arrived with his wing on Jackson’s left but he didn’t join the battle although Union flank was wide opened to him. Maj. Gen. Longstreet was a cautious man and Gen. Lee didn’t like to throw his troops in piecemeal so Longstreet deployed quietly and remained hidden from Union commander.
On the August 30th, Maj. Gen. Pope organized what he believed to be a pursuit of Jackson’s force. He planned to destroy Jackson’s rearguard and then destroy whatever leftovers he could. He formed his men in three strong lines. Maj. Gen. Jackson once again moved his men to their defensive positions but was aware he will be overrun if he doesn’t receive help. Jackson requested Longstreet’s help from Gen. Lee. Maj. Gen. Longstreet with no Union troops moving across his front and all of his subordinates in their position, moved out. Before Longstreet’s Division moved, 18 artillery pieces under command of Colonel Stephen D. Lee (posted between Jackson and Longstreet on high ground northeast of Brawner Farm) opened up on Union lines.
The shells took Union forces in the flank. The second and third lines of Maj. Gen. Pope’s advance hesitated, then stopped and finally fell back. Longstreet’s advance destroyed any remaining cohesion in Pope’s lines. Without any support, Pope’s first line faced with Jackson’s men to the front and Longstreet’s on the flank decided not to press the attack. Expecting the pursuit of what they thought was a beaten enemy, Federal troops weren’t willing to fight another standing battle. The Union left Flank was eventually crushed and entire army was driven back to the Bull Run. Some isolated resistance was put up by individual units (the 5th and 10th New York distinguished themselves the most) and effective Union rearguard with few brigades that held their nerve, including the Phil Kearny, prevented the replay of the First Manassas. Despite the efforts of the rearguard, retreat to Centreville was chaotic and frenetic.
The Union losses were around 10,000 killed and wounded, Confederate 8,300. Immediately after the battle, Gen. Lee sent Maj. Gen. Jackson on another flanking march around Pope’s army hoping to once again cut off Pope’s line of communication with Washington. However, pope countered this move and fought with Jackson once again at the Battle of Chantilly. Then, Gen. Lee launched his next campaign on September 3, 1862, with vanguard of Army of Northern Virginia crossing the Potomac River and staring the Maryland Campaign which lead to famous battle at Antietam Creek.
Also known as the battle of Sharpsburg, this battle was fought on September 17, 1862 near Sharpsburg and at Antietam Creek, Maryland. It marked the climax of General Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign and was the first major battle fought on the Union soil. It also holds the infamous record of being the bloodiest single day battle in United States history with over 23,000 casualties on both sides. It was fought between Confederate Army of Northern Virginia numbering 38,000 men and under overall command of General Robert E. Lee and Federal Army of the Potomac of 76,000 men under overall command of General George B. McClellan. The fighting throughout the Maryland Campaign was extremely intense. General Lee entered Maryland with 55,000 men. Maj. Gen. T. J. “Stonewall” Jackson captured Harpers Ferry and General McClellan launched an attack through Blue Ridge Mountains. The Battle of South Mountain dragged 17,000 of General Lee’s men away from him and made them late for the Battle of Antietam. General Lee entered Maryland confidently and scattered his forces to maximize the effects of campaign. However, General McClellan started to and managed to concentrate his forces for massive assault, so Lee had no choice but to assemble the forces he could and make his stance. He had chosen an area between the town of Sharpsburg and the Antietam Creek. If day turned ill for the Confederates, Lee would have a ridge to form a defensive position.
General Lee’s left was held by batteries on the Nicodemus Heights. This position was isolated from the main force and a cavalry brigade under command of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart was sent there to provide any necessary support. On the main ridge, anchored around Miller’s farm was a mix of troops from Maj. Gen. J. Longstreet’s and Maj. Gen. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Corps. Next in line was a division under command of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill covered by a sunken road. The rest of the line was lightly defended with infantry but was strongly backed up with an artillery reserve. Further down, Gen. Lee positioned only pickets.
General George B. McClellan had almost twice as many men as Gen. Lee. He fielded two strong Corps; I commanded by Maj. Gen. Hooker, XII commanded by Maj. Gen. Mansfield on his right. Centre was held by II Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Sumner, V Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. Porter and an artillery reserve. On the left Maj. Gen Burnside commanded the IX Corps. In reserve, Gen. McClellan had a Cavalry Division, Maj. Gen. Franklin’s VI Corps and a division from IV Corps. However, such a big army provided a challenge of itself. Gen. McClellan’s staff work was far from perfect. Great numbers of Corps in the Army of the Potomac made McClellan to group them in two –corps “Grand Divisions”. The plan was to have three Grand Divisions which significantly simplified the things for army commander but things didn’t work out as planned. Maj. Gen. Burnside was supposed to supervise IX and XII Corps (which were on the opposite sides of the field). In contrast, Gen. Lee’s command structure was more fluent and flexible, enabling Gen. Lee to easily move divisions or detach single brigades.
The battlefield was mostly farmland. Most of the crop was already harvested, although some corn as still standing in the field. There was moderately wooded area on the Confederate left (northern area) and overlooking the bridge on the right (southern area). Antietam Creek itself was not much of an obstacle; 30-40 feet wide and only a few feet deep. There were two bridges, one in the Federal centre and one on the left (Confederate right), one known ford on the Union right-centre and reports of others, especially below the southern bridge (on Confederate right). The ridge Gen. Lee chose as a defensive position wasn’t very high nor steep and offered only mild defensive advantage. The key feature of the Confederate position was a road running the entire length of their position. It proved extremely important when Maj. Gen. McLaw’s Division marched up that morning. There were some small “bumps” of higher ground on the northern edge of the ridge (barely enough to deploy artillery battery), but there was a spur out from the Dunker Chapel towards the Antietam Creek; it had a small plateau on its top and eroded farm lane.
In the morning (about 5:30 p.m.) on the Union right wing, Maj. Gen. Hooker opened battle with three divisions in line-abreast formation. He managed to push back the Confederates by shier number of his troops. As the Federal line moved through Miller’s Cornfield, Confederate troops stood up and blasted at the Federal lines. Maj. Gen. Hooker realized the danger, halted his infantry and deployed six batteries on a slight rise just to the north. After a few minutes of bombarding the cornfield with shell and canister, Maj. Gen. Hooker wrote: “In the time I am writing, every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been with knife, and the slain lay precisely as they stood in their ranks a few moments before.” That was enough to further the advance but not to achieve the victory. When Federals cleared the cornfield, Rebels blasted at them again. Confederate troops were hardened veterans and they fought fiercely and clawed down Hooker’s troops but, as Maj. Gen. Jackson reported, his men “... were exposed for near an hour to a terrific storm of shell, canister and musketry.” The Confederate left was saved by the batteries positioned on the Nicodemus Hill, because Hooker’s artillery was all massed in the centre and his centre and infantry were concerned about their exposed flank. Despite the heavy losses inflicted, Jackson's line was about to snap; Union infantry could see their objective, the Dunker Chapel and the road junction; it was in their grasp.
Then the Confederates snatched it back. Maj. Gen. John Hood's small division, only two brigades, was called away from breakfast and launched in a counterattack. They were alone, for every formation Jackson had started with was smashed. But Hood's men were enough. The Union infantry were already shaken, and this was too much. The grey columns swept through the cornfield, then formed line on the north side and duelled with the Union remnants and their gun line. Not in direct contact with Hood but attacking nonetheless were Maj. Gen. Early (on the western end) and two of D.H. Hill's brigades. The three strokes were too much for Hooker's men - Meade's now, since Hooker was wounded - who fell back and consolidated. Their losses had been high, but the greatest damage was to their cohesion. They outnumbered Jackson's torn survivors, but they wouldn't make another attack that day.
Gen. McClellan had planned a simultaneous attack, and the second Corps in the north was Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield's XII Corps. They had advanced about the time Maj. Gen. Hooker started, but they were to Hooker's left rear, and by the time they reached the field Hood's counterattack had finished off I Corps. After Mansfield was killed, command of the XII Corps went to Maj. Gen. A. Williams. The XII Corps brushed aside Hood’s men and once again Dunker church was almost in Federal grasp. Gen. Lee had switched Maj. Gen. Walker's small division from the right to the left, gambling that Maj. Gen. McLaws would arrive before anything serious developed on the southern end of the line. They saved the moment in the north, and checked XII Corps' advance. Walker was too weak, however, to push the Union troops back, and Williams' men consolidated their position. Williams sent word that reinforcements would clinch the victory. Maj. Gen. Sumner was bringing those reinforcements, leading Sedgwick's 2nd Division of his II Corps, the strongest in the Army of the Potomac. He was anxious to get into action, and he kept his men in their marching columns as long as he could to speed them into action. However, next wave of Confederate reinforcements had arrived, the divisions of Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson and Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws. Anderson went to reinforce D. H. Hill in the Sunken Road, while McLaws deployed to bolster Walker's thinning ranks. Sumner couldn't see them, but they could see his men. It was almost too easy a target: the Union troops were caught in column rather than line of battle; they were too densely packed to advance or deploy. The only options were running or dying. Plenty - over 2,000 – died.
On the Union left wing with his force split in half, Burnside stationed himself with his old IX Corps. He got an early start on the battle, but wasted it. One division he sent to check rumors of a ford to his left; they got lost for hours. Another division explored the creek on the left. A third he held in Corps reserve. Out of eight brigades, he himself whittled the attack down to two.The odds were against the South, for there were only 550 men under Robert Toombs to hold off the two brigades. Toombs had his men in rifle pits amidst the trees on the slope; they were nearly impossible targets, while the Union infantry exposed their flank for 200 yards to the bridge, then had to pause to cross, had to pick their way across corpses dotted on the bridge and fight uphill once they crossed. Burnside's repeated attacks were repeatedly repulsed. He was no closer to crossing at noon than he'd been at 6am.
From 9:30 a.m. to 1 p.m., bitter fighting raged along deeply cut lane (afterward known as Bloody Lane) as Brig. Gen. French and Maj. Gen. Richardson's division sought to drive the Southerners back. John Gordon commanded the 6th Alabama in D. H. Hill's division; he ordered his men to hold their fire until they couldn't miss. By 1 p.m. about 5,600 killed and wounded troops from both sides lay along and in front of this 800-yard lane. Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson was one of them, and shortly after he fell his division ceased to function; some of the men fought, others didn't; nobody was in control.
Finally, seeing a weak spot in the Confederate line, the 61st and 64th New York regiments penetrated the crest of the hill at the eastern end and began firing volley after volley full length down the sunken line. Then, misinterpreting an order, a Confederate officer pulled his regiment out of the road. The remaining defenders rapidly scrambled out of the lane, over the fence, and fled through the cornfields to the south. Union batteries on the rise east of the Antietam plastered the Confederate gun line. It was a race between the two artilleries, and the Union had the upper hand. Then Hill pulled together no more than 200 soldiers and personally led a counterattack. It wasn't much, and it didn't go far - hardly went anywhere. It may have played a role in persuading Sumner not to press the attack. His decision, so unlike the normally bellicose old man, may have given the Confederacy three more years of life. Yet Sumner had watched as first one, then all of his divisions were shredded. His Corps alone lost over 5,000 casualties that day, and he didn't think his men could take any more. When reinforcements (half of Franklin's Corps) came up he demanded they not attack - they were the last organized, available troops in the sector.
At 3:40pm Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's Light Division, the last men from Harper's Ferry, turned up. They'd been delayed salvaging captured Federal property and paroling prisoners, and had to make the 17 miles in eight hours. Hill's 3,000 men swung straight from the march into action. They formed on the Union left - since some had appropriated Union overcoats, Burnside's men thought it was reinforcements on the left rather than enemies. The left buckled, and Maj. Gen. Burnside's troops were driven back to the heights near the bridge they had taken earlier. The attack across the Burnside Bridge and Hill's counterattack in the fields south of Antietam resulted in 3,470 casualties, with twice as many Union casualties (2,350) as Confederate (1,120).
The next day Federal and Confederate leaders struck an informal truce, and began gathering the wounded and dying. During the evening of the 18th General Lee began withdrawing his army across the Potomac River. The 17th of September, 1862, was the bloodiest day of the Civil War. Federal losses were almost 12,500, Confederate losses nearly 11,000. One in four men engaged in battle that day had fallen. Some historians believe that Lee's failure to carry the war effectively into the North caused Great Britain to postpone recognition of the Confederate government.
Also known as the Battle of Chaplin Hills, this battle was fought on October 8, 1862, in the Boyle County, Kentucky, west of the Perryville. It was the decisive battle of Confederate Heartland Offensive launched by General Braxton Bragg and his Army of Mississippi consisting of 16,000 men. His opponent was Union Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio consisting of one corps with 22,000 men although some sources say that Buell’s Army of the Ohio had nearly 37,000 men.
In his autumn invasion, Gen. Bragg managed to reach the outskirts of Louisville and Cincinnati but was then forced to retreat and regroup his forces. On the October 7, 1862, Maj. Gen. Buell’s Army converged on a small crossroads town of Perryville, Kentucky in three columns. The first fighting broke out when Union units encountered Rebel cavalry on the Springfield Pike. The fight intensified when Confederate infantry arrived. At dawn, October 8, fighting once again began around Peters Hill as the Union division advanced up the pike, stopping just before the Confederate forces.
After noon, Confederate Division under Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham launched an attack against Union left flank. Hard fighting began, with Union 10th Division under command of Brig. Gen. James S. Jackson holding off fierce Rebel attacks. Union battery of eight guns, commanded by Captain Charles Parson and supported by Union’s 33rd brigade made Rebels pay dearly for every yard they took. However, Brig. Gen. Jackson was killed and replaced Brig. Gen. William R. Terrill who ordered 123rd Illinois to make a bayonet charge down hill. Confederates torn the 123rd apart and mounted a successful counterattack, managed to push back the 0th Union Division and capture the Parson’s guns. Maj. Gen Buell had no information on what was happening on his left or he would send some reinforcements. Even without them, after some time Union left managed to stabilize its position and repulse repeated Confederate attacks made by Brig Gens. Stewart’s and Maney’s brigades.
In the centre, rebels didn’t manage to make any progress against Union 9th Brigade under Colonel Leonard Harris. In fact Confederate Colonel Thomas M. Jones’ Brigade was forced back and had to be reinforced with brigade of Brig. Gen. John C. Brown. The Confederate Brigade of Colonel Samuel Powell was ordered to up the Springfield Pike and encountered Brig. Gen. Phillip H. Sheridan’s 11th Division. The confederate attack was repulsed and retreating Confederates were shortly pursued by Colonel William P. Carlin’s 31st Brigade. Union forces managed to occupy favourable ground that oversaw the crossroads and Gen. Bragg’s avenue of withdrawal.
General Bragg, short of men and supplies, withdrew in the night and after pausing for a while at Harrodsburg, continued his retreat through Cumberland Gap into the East Tennessee. The Confederate Heartland Offensive was over and Union secured a firm grip on Kentucky. Union forces lost 4,276 men, the Confederates 3,401. Although Gen. Bragg fought good and managed to achieve tactical victory his position was unattainable strategically because the Union II Corps under Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden advanced on the Springfield Pike. Smaller skirmishes were regularly fought between Gen. Bragg’s rearguard and Union’s vanguard. Requested reinforcements from Kentucky had never came so Gen. Bragg retreated to Tennessee and was soon called to Richmond, Virginia, where he faced serious demands asking for his replacement.
Also known as the Battle of Marye’s Heights, it was fought on December 13, 1862, in the Spotsylvania County and Fredericksburg, Virginia between Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (72,500 men) commanded by General Robert E. Lee and Union Army of the Potomac (114,000 men) under command of Major General Ambrose Burnside. Maj. Gen. Burnside hoped to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and rush towards Richmond before Gen. Lee and his Army could stop him. Delayed pontoon bridges gave Gen. Lee an opportunity to block all the crossings and deny easy transfer of troops to Maj. Gen. Burnside. When the bridges finally did arrive, Union army had to set them in the water while Rebels fired on them from town of Fredericksburg. In the meantime, Gen. Lee deployed his forces on the Marye’s Heights, a strong defensive ridge just south of the Fredericksburg. Federals were fighting the Rebels in Fredericksburg on December 11 and 12, and finally managed to gain control of the town. Remaining Confederates retreated to Gen. Lee’s strong position and awaited for the inevitable Federal attack on December 13.
With General McClellan gone, Major General Ambrose Burnside was to be the new commander oft he Army of the Potomac and he had a few new ideas. He reorganized the Army of the Potomac, formerly seven Corps, into three Grand Divisions and a reserve, which should be easier to command. (Lee had simplified and strengthened his own chain of command by creating two Corps – one for Longstreet, one for Jackson – with divisions and brigades tidily arranged.) The difference was that Maj. Gen. Burnside changed most of his Corps commanders. His new campaign plan was to move quickly eastward, sprout a new base at Aquia Creek, and cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg before Gen. Lee could arrive.
Once he obtained Lincoln’s approval, Maj. Gen. Burnside moved quickly. He got his Right Grand Division commanded by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. “Bull“ Sumner to Fredericksburg before Gen. Lee had more than a few pickets there – but the pontoons were late. Burnside had to wait eight days, from November 17 to 25, for pontoons to arrive. The river was fordable, and Burnside might have begun crossing his infantry, but played things cautiously. Meanwhile Lee was moving rapidly: Maj. Gen. Longstreet’s entire Corps was in position by the 21st. This caused Burnside to pause and concentrate more of his men – which in turn allowed the Confederates to bring Maj. Gen. Jackson's Corps over as well. Jackson took up position on the eastern part of the line, in case Burnside tried to cross downstream of Fredericksburg.
Maj. Gen. Burnside did indeed contemplate how to feint Gen. Lee out of position, and tried some ruses to pull troops east of the town, but made little headway. Burnside also convinced himself that the true surprise would come in doing the obvious: attacking at Fredericksburg. Maj. Gen. Longstreet fortified his men thoroughly, and also prepared roads behind the line so reserves could be shifted anywhere along the line. Guns were emplaced “so that a chicken could not cross the fields”.
So on December 11 massed Union batteries on the heights north of the river opened fire to cover the engineers building bridges. Lee had felt the power of the Union guns at Antietam, and rather than put his men where they could be pummelled, had basically conceded the town and chosen a line along the line of hills south of the river. Brig. Gen. William Barksdale’s brigade of Mississippians (13th, 17th, 18th and 21st Mississippi), scattered through the town, were there to harass the engineers. They certainly did, causing proportionately heavy casualties and inflicting serious delay – it took all day to build the bridges. (Meanwhile, a little downstream, Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin’s Left Grand Division crossed without trouble.) It then took the whole of the 12th for all the Union forces to cross, and by the end of the day there were about 50,000 men in the eastern bridgehead and about 30,000 in the one at Fredericksburg. The delay was plenty of time for Jackson to move his men upstream, and they extended Longstreet’s right.
Longstreet’s men had dug in; Jackson’s men had no such fortifications, and Burnside had first intended his main blow to be on Jackson – but at the last minute, 5:55 am on December 13th, he switched. Maj. Gen. Franklin was to expand his bridgehead, but nowhere to attack in great strength, while Maj. Gen. Sumner on the Union right was to clear the hills behind Fredericksburg – right into the teeth of Longstreet’s defences.
The first move was on the Union left, where Maj. Gen. Franklin untangled Burnside’s order and sent Maj. Gen. George Meade’s 3rd Division of Pennsylvanians forward. Once the morning fog lifted the whole movement was visible, and a battery of Confederate horse artillery under command of Major John Pelham trotted out onto Meade’s flank and proceeded to disorganize everything. It took an entire infantry division to drive “The Gallant Pelham” back, subtracting one of the two divisions intended to support Meade’s charge. Franklin’s batteries shelled the Confederate guns into silence, but destroyed relatively few – Jackson had put some effort into entrenching his batteries, if not his infantry. Then Meade’s charge began. He swept forward and hit a seam in Jackson’s line; in Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's Light Division, there was a gap between brigades of Brig. Gens. James H. Lane and James J. Archer. The first line crumbled, the reserve brigade under command of Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg was surprised and tumbled backward, and it took a vicious counterattack for Jackson to reform his line. Meade’s open left flank provided the opportunity – if Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday had done more than stare at a battery of horse artillery all day, Burnside might have had a partial victory.
Maj. Gen. “Stonewall“ Jackson took command of the counterattack, and drove Maj. Gen. Meade back out of the woods and pursued onto the open fields along the railway tracks. He had the gleam of battle in his eyes, and he wanted to exploit the Union confusion to storm all the way to the river, cutting off and capturing large numbers. But the Union batteries were strong and ready, and inflicted about 500 casualties. Fresh Union divisions replaced the battered front line, and Jackson’s men fell back into the woods.
Meanwhile around Fredericksburg a separate battle was being fought and won – entirely by the Confederates. When the fog burned off the Confederates on Marye’s Heights had a grandstand view of the Union troops clogging the streets of the town below. And the Confederates up there were artillerymen. They began firing into the town, completing the wreckage after the Union bombardment of the 11th and plundering on the 12th. Maj. Gen. “Bull“ Sumner’s men pressed through the streets in column, and had to stay in column to cross a narrow but deep mill-race that carried water from an upstream dam to power waterwheels at a small factory. They crossed under shellfire on the two bridges available, then had to turn right along the stream to deploy under shellfire, then they charged towards Marye’s Heights. But at the bottom of the hill was a small road that had sunk a few feet below the original ground level; by the side of this road was a low stone wall. The combination was enough to give excellent protection to the Confederate brigade under command of brig. Gen. T. R. R. Cobb (soon reinforced) deployed in the road. Successive Union brigades charged the road, and they got successively closer, but not a single man managed to make it to the stone wall. The Confederates were eventually four, even eight, deep, so there was a constant heavy fire as some men loaded and others fired.
Casualties were terrible; Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock’s men left 2,013 of their 5,006 on the battlefield. And Burnside didn’t realize what was going on. In mid-afternoon he wanted Maj. Gen. Franklin to make another, much larger attack (or he may have; yet again Burnside’s orders are imprecise). But Franklin got the news too late in the short winter day to do anything.
Gen. Lee was always looking for a way to turn the victory into a crushing blow, but Maj. Gen. “Stonewall“ Jackson’s abortive morning attack had showed the strength of the Army of the Potomac. Jackson came up with the idea of a night attack (asked how he would identify friend from foe Jackson replied that the Confederates could attack naked) but Lee vetoed it.
The battle was over. Burnside’s losses were over 12,653 against Confederate losses of about 5,377. Well over half the Union losses were in front of the fatal stone wall. When he realized the enormity of the slaughter, Burnside was stunned. At first he thought of continuing the attack the next day, leading it personally to clear his own honour. But his subordinates talked him out of the nonsense. One more casualty would have hardly made much difference, but another charge would have cost hundreds.
Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside withdrew his men across the river on the night of the 15th, leaving only graves behind. He’d lost a battle, and with it a good portion of the confidence of his men. Yet General Lee had won little. He still held the shell Fredericksburg, his men (and Southern civilians) had another victory under their belt. But there was no collapse in Northern morale. It was an attrition victory, and the south needed more than that.
Note: this description is pretty much copied from the e-history site (link provided below) with added names and ranks of commanding officers and edited brigades. MM
Battle of Stones River (December 31, 1862 - January 2, 1863)
Also known as the Second Battle of Murfreesboro, it was fought from December 31, 1862 to January 2, 1863 in Rutherford County, Tennessee, as the main battle of Stones River Campaign. This battle holds infamous record of highest rate of casualties compare to the number of troops engaged. Union Major General William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland (41,400 men) marched from Nashville, Tennessee, on December 26, 1862, to challenge General Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee (35,000 men) at Mufreesboro.
After his retreat from Perryville, Kentucky, Gen. Bragg ordered a concentration at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Both the North and the South were dissatisfied with the performance of their top commanders at Perryville, and both sides made changes in organization. The Federal Dept. (and Army) of the Cumberland was created under Maj. Gen. Rosecrans. The Confederate Army of Tennessee was created under Gen. Bragg. J. E. Johnston was sent to command all Confederate armies in the West (Division of the West).
Three Confederate cavalry operations took place before the armies of Gen. Bragg and Maj. Gen. Rosecrans clashed: Morgan's Second (Lexington) Raid, Oct.1862; Forrest's Second Raid (in West Tennessee), 11 Dec.1862-3 Jan.1863; and Morgan's Third (Christmas) Raid, 21 Dec.1862-1 Jan.1863. Although these raids on the Federal lines of communications did little significant damage, Rosecrans took advantage of this detachment of Confederate cavalry to move out of Nashville and attack Bragg.
Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's Corps advanced southeast along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga R.R., while the other two corps - Maj. Gens. Alexander M. McCook’s and George H. Thomas’s (less two divisions) - advanced to his right. Bragg was known to be deployed between Triune and Murfreesboro, and Rosecrans' plan was to turn the Confederate left while refusing Maj. Gen. Crittenden's Corps.
Gen. Bragg's intelligence sources informed him immediately of Rosecrans' movement. Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's Cavalry Brigade successfully delayed the Federal advance while Bragg concentrated his forces at Murfreesboro. On 31 Dec. the two armies faced each other just west of Stones River. Strangely, each was planning to attack the other's right.
The Confederate division of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge (8,000) was left across the river, northwest of Murfreesboro, while Lieut. Gen. William J. Hardee's other two divisions – Maj. Gen. McCown’s (4,500) and Maj. Gen. Cleburne’s (7,000) - moved into position opposite the Federal right. The Confederate centre was held by Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk's two divisions; Maj. Gen. Withers’ (8,500) in front, and Maj. Gen. Cheatham’s (5,500) to his rear. Maj. Gen. McCown's division was to attack at dawn.
The Federal right, where the initial Confederate blow was about to fall, was held by Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook's Corps; Brig. Gen. Johnson's division (6,300) was on the extreme right flank, on the Franklin Road, with the divisions of Brig. Gen. J. C. Davis (4,600) and Brig. Gen. Sheridan (5,000) extending left to the Wilkinson Pike. Brig. Gen. Negley's division (4,700) of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas' corps was in the centre of the line. Maj. Gen. Crittenden's divisions of Brig. Gen. Palmer (4,400) and Brig. Gen. Wood (5,100) extended the line to the river. In conformity to the Federal plan of attacking with their own left, two divisions were in assembly areas behind this flank: Brig. Gen Rousseau's (6,200) of Maj. Gen. Thomas' corps, and Brig. Gen. Van Cleve's (3,800) of Maj. Gen. Crittenden's. (Two of Thomas' divisions were absent: Brig. Gen. Mitchel's was garrisoning Nashville; Brig. Gen. Reynolds' was pursuing Morgan's raiders. Only one brigade of Brig. Gen. Fry's division took part in the battle; one arrived 2 Jan. and the other was pursuing Morgan.) Maj. Gen. Rosecrans had ordered his attack to start at 7 A.M., after his troops had eaten.
The Federal brigades of Brig. Gens. Kirk and Willich were driven back by the brigades of Brig. Gens. Rains, Ector, and McNair as the battle opened at dawn. Although Kirk's outposts detected the enemy advance, Willich's Brigade was caught by surprise (Horn, 200). As Confederate Maj. Gen. Cleburne's Division kept up the momentum of the attack by moving up on Maj. Gen. McCown's right; the Federal divisions of Maj. Gens. Davis and Sheridan held off the attacks of Lieut. Gen. William J. Hardee's three divisions. A second assault, reinforced by Maj. Gen. Cheatham's division (Polk's corps), was also repulsed. A third effort enveloped Davis' right, forcing him to retreat and thereby exposing Sheridan's right. About 9:30 Sheridan counterattacked with Roberts' brigade and gained sufficient time to withdraw to a new position behind the Nashville Pike and at a right angle to Union Negley's Division. Rousseau's division was brought up to form on Sheridan's right. Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis followed Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson's routed division to the rear, while Confederate Wharton's cavalry brigade (2,000 men) harried his flank from the west.
A renewed attack, all along the Federal front, finally forced Sheridan, whose ammunition was exhausted, to withdraw. This left a gap between Negley and Rousseau which the Confederates exploited. Lieut. Col. Oliver L. Shepherd's brigade of regulars lost 20 officers and 518 killed and wounded in covering a general withdrawal of the Federal right half of the line to a new position. The right of Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer's division also had to withdraw to avoid being enveloped; but his left - Col. William B. Hazen's Brigade - held its strong position on a wooded ridge astride the railroad. This was a four-acre oak grove which reports of the battle call the Round Forest, but which the troops dubbed "Hell's Half Acre." By noon the Federals had been forced back to what turned out to be their final defensive line.
The Federal divisions of Brig. Gen. Van Cleve and Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood, which were scheduled to move north of the river and make Rosecrans, main attack, had been called back to bolster the Federal defence. Van Cleve had crossed, and Wood was ready to follow, when the Confederate attack started. Wood was held back and put into position on the Federal left. Van Cleve was ordered back and arrived about 11 A.M., just in time to reinforce the final defensive line.
In preparation for what he could hope to be the knockout blow, Gen. Bragg called on Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge to send two of his five brigades to reinforce Lieut. Gen. Hardee. Only one was sent in time to be of assistance, however; Brig. Gen. John Pegram's Confederate cavalry had reported the arrival of Van Cleve's division opposite Breckinridge, but had not detected its withdrawal. Breckinridge therefore believed he was in danger of being overwhelmed and could not spare more than one brigade.
The final Confederate assaults were vigorously pressed and effectively repulsed by a well-organized Federal defence. Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers' Confederate brigade which had been waiting 48 hours in shallow trenches and without fires on the extreme right of Maj. Gen. Withers' division attacked shortly after noon against the Round Forest. Having to charge across an open field against a strongly entrenched position, they were cut to pieces by enemy musket and artillery fire. After desperate fighting, in which some regiments lost six to eight color bearers, Brig. Gen. Chalmers was wounded, and his brigade fell back. Brig. Gen. Daniel S. Donelson's Brigade (Cheatham's division) made the next effort. After some initial confusion in reaching the field, and in the face of heavy fire, it penetrated the Federal line just west of the Round Forest and took 1,000 prisoners and 11 guns. However, continued possession of the critical Round Forest position by the Federals forced Donelson to retreat. In this action the 8th Tennessee lost 306, including its commander, Col. W. L. Moore, out of 425 engaged. The 16th Tennessee lost 207 out of its 402 engaged.
Late in the afternoon the four other brigades of Maj. Gen. Breckinridge’s First Division were brought south of the river and committed to action against "Hell's Half Acre." First Brig. Gens. Adams and Jackson, then Preston and Pillow were repulsed with heavy losses.
Special mention should be made of the units that held Round Forest against these attacks. Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft's Brigade had initially been posted in advance of Col. Hazen's Brigade. When Sheridan and Negley were driven back at about 11 A.M., Palmer's right had been exposed. The attacks of Chalmers and Donelson had finally driven back Crufts brigade. The brigade of Col. William Grose, in reserve, had to face to the rear and attack in that direction to enable Brig. Gen. Cruft to withdraw. This left Col. Hazen’s Brigade alone at the tip of the salient against which Gen. Bragg now directed his subsequent attacks. Col. Grose was forced again to change front to enable Col. Hazen to adjust his dispositions while Cruft withdrew.
To repulse the attacks of Breckinridge's last four brigades (see above) Col. Hazen had the 41st Ohio (Lieut. Col. Wiley), 9th Indiana (Col. William H. Blake), and 110th Illinois (Col. John Osborn). In direct support of Hazen, or on his flanks, the following regiments moved up during the last Confederate attacks of Preston and Pillow: 3rd Kentucky, 24th Ohio, 58th Indiana, 100th Illinois, 6th Kentucky, 2ndd Missouri, 40th and 97th Ohio, and the 6th and 26th Ohio. (The units are mentioned in the approximate order of arrival.) Along the riverbank Col. George D. Wagner led two regiments, the 15th and 57th Indiana, in a counterattack that drove back the Confederate infantry on its front before being forced by enemy artillery to withdraw.
After some hesitation Maj. Gen. Rosecrans decided to remain on the field during the night and to resume the offensive if Gen. Bragg did not attack. The battlefield was quiet on January 1, but Confederate cavalry under Wheeler and Wharton were active along Rosecrans' line of communications to Nashville. Wheeler attacked a wagon train near LaVergne, dispersed the guard, and destroyed about 30 wagons. Col. Innes, commanding the 1st Michigan Engineers and Mechanics, held the stockade near the town against several attacks and refused Wheeler's demand to surrender.
When Lieut. Gen. Leonidas Polk observed that the Federals had abandoned the Round Forest during the night he took possession of this position. Gen. Bragg then determined to have Breckinridge re-cross the river and take high ground from which enfilade fire might drive the Federals from their position. Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge went on record as considering this task impossible, and Polk told Bragg he considered the operation would accomplish no worthwhile purpose. Bragg insisted, however, and at 4 P.M., 2 Jan., Breckinridge attacked with 4,500 men.
Rosecrans had realized the importance of this high ground and had occupied it with Van Cleve's division (commanded by Col. Samuel Beatty, since Van Cleve had been wounded). Col. Beatty was reinforced by the brigades of Grose and Hazen.
The Federals were driven from the hill. However, as the Confederates pursued down the forward slope they were slaughtered by the massed fire of 58 guns that Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden's Chief of Artillery, Major John Mendenhall, had posted across the river. Reinforcements hurried across the river; Col. Beatty rallied his troops for a counterattack; and Breckinridge was driven back to his line of departure. He had lost 1,700 men.
On January 3, Maj. Gen. Rosecrans held his defensive perimeter west of the river with the corps of Maj. Gens. Thomas and McCook (less Palmer's division). Crittenden, reinforced with Palmer's division of McCook's Corps, was posted north of the river. The night of January 3 – 4, Gen. Bragg withdrew through Murfreesboro toward Shelbyville. Rosecrans did not pursue. It was not until June that Rosecrans renewed operations in this area when his Tullahoma Campaign set the stage for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns.
Stones River was a tactical victory for the Confederates, but Gen. Bragg lacked the strength to destroy Rosecrans' larger army or drive it from the field. The historian Ropes says, "Few battles have been fought which have better exhibited the soldierly virtues than the battle of Murfreesboro or Stones River. The Confederate assaults were conducted with the utmost gallantry and with untiring energy. They were met with great coolness and resolution. . . ." From a strategic viewpoint, however, the campaign was a Confederate failure.
The Federals had 41,400 troops engaged, of which they lost 12,906. The Confederates lost 11,739 out of 34,739 engaged.
Note: source of description: "Civil War Dictionary", Mark M. Boatner III
Naval artillery was in a flux at the time of the civil war with a wide array of weapons and technical solutions being put in service, often aboard the same ship. I wrote this to provide a short summary of what happened in this area between 1815 and 1861.
The first departure from classical age of sail setup was a trend towards the standardization of the armament on the 32-pdr in the 1830s. This was motivated by the desire to simplify ammunition handling aboard ships, logistics and effects on target deriving from a larger caliber weapon replacing batteries of 12/18/24-pdr. The French for example introduced a brand new 30-pdr gun while the british rebored stocks of 24-pdr to accept 32 pounds shot.
The other and actually much more consequential (and running against the above) innovation was the large scale issue of shells and shell-guns. Firing shells from long guns was not entirely new development, experiments and small scale use had taken place in the 18th century, the french navy for example issued some shells during the revolutionary wars. However reliable shells that did not frequently break in the barrel from the stress of firing, reliable fuzes that did not make the shell burst too early or not at all, large caliber (8-inch or greater) guns that could fire sizable shells with sufficient velocity and reliability were not easy to master, without mentioning legitimate concerns and prejudices over the introduction of such radical innovation in navies that had lived and died by solid shot for centuries. It was not until 1820s that a large caliber shell gun was tested by Paixhans and not until the 1840s that it was widely adopted.
Solid shots like the 32-pdr, when hitting the side of ship of the line, caused only very localized damage to the ship hull. The shot could kill men and damage carriages and others elements of the ship (rigging etc.) but by far the primary effect was splintering as it penetrated in the hull. The penetration channel itself was pretty narrow and the wood fibers and fragments pushed laterally tended to spring back in place once the shot had passed by, so much that a narrow metal probe was often necessary to check for an embedded shot in the hole. If the hit took place at the waterline a cap was easily rammed in place, mostly sealing it. For this reason ships of the line could hurl tons of metal at each other, massacre their crews, dismast each other and after all that they were usually in no danger of sinking and could often be repaired and put back in service. The effect of shells was much more detrimental. A shell embedding itself in the hull and then exploding would create a bigger and unclogged breach and beyond that it tended to dislocate timbers around it. This sort of damage was almost impossible to fix in battle: a single well placed shell could sink a ship of the line. It was not that easy in reality, for as start the dud rate was often astronomical, but still compared to classic state of affairs wooden warships armed with shell-guns became something like eggs with hammers (the need for iron armor to protect against such threat was envisioned by Paixhans himself already in the 1820s).
Shell guns were thus included in the broadside armament of ships with a few of them alongside conventional 32-pdr. To give an example HMS Trincomalee, a Leda class sail frigate built in 1817 carried originally:
Main deck:
20 x18-pdr
Quarter deck and forecastle
6 x 18-pdr
6 x 12-pdr carronade
In the 1850s it had become
Main deck:
10x 8-inch shell guns
8 x 32-pdr
Quarter deck and forecastle
6 x 32-pdr
1 x 10-inch shell gun
Steam technology also indirectly demanded larger guns. As the screw was not demonstrated until the mid 1840s paddle wheels were the only mean of propulsion. A side wheel however could not carry a full broadside as the wheels masked a portion of the hull and would have been too vulnerable in a traditional broadside exchange. Therefore aside from some cases where a conventional style battery was initially issued, few big guns eventually became the armament of choice for paddle wheel steam vessels. Indeed the Karteria, the first steam warship to have participated to substantial engagements, carried a mixture of 68-pdr short guns and carronades, firing primarily hot shot and shell; some French paddle frigates were modified with internal armored bulkheads and armament optimized for head on engagements.
Much as the Paixhans style shell guns were effective, it was felt that their inability to fire solid shot in an effective manner restricted flexibility. Some large caliber shot guns, such as the 64-pdr in the USN, and the 68-pdr in the RN were added, typically as pivot guns at first, but a standardized battery design which would overcome the shot/shell dychotomy was no less desiderable than getting rid of the 12/18/24/32 had been before. To that end in the US Dahlgren developed a family of guns which would eventually range from 8 to 20 inches in caliber, capable of firing both shot and shells. Rifled guns, with their greater accuracy and efficiency, were developed but not without some problems (see for example large caliber Parrot guns tendency to burst).
Source:“Shells, and Shell-guns” by John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren Posted: September 20, 2012 by marcello
Shot Guns
The US Navy fielded a family of 32-pdr variants, suited for a variety of combinations of ships classes, positions aboard and tasks. Dahlgren provides detailed range tables for four of these.
The lightest variant of 32-pdr, a chambered design for the smallest ships with broadside armament, such as brigs like USS Bainbridge.
Used on both sloops and upper deck of frigates, range is provided for both locations.
Used on sloops, such as USS Jamestown.
There were several others types, such as a 51cwt for use as chase gun aboard frigates, but this should be sufficient.
Shell Guns
The US Navy fielded also two main variants of 8-inch shell guns
All these weapons were hardly the state of the art of naval ordnance by 1861 but they were available in large numbers, formed the armament of numerous ships and they could still give good account of themselves against unarmored targets. Both the British and French navies fielded comparable weapons, often with only minimal differences.
By comparison, french (as an example) warships side thickness:
In regards to the effect of shell guns on targets, a number of tests were carried out. The first was by the French navy in 1824 using the decommissioned 80 gun ship Pacificateur as target ship. The devastating effects of shellfire became immediately apparent with the first shots:
“With that of 4 lbs of powder and at 600 yards a shell lodged in the ship's side between two ports, there burst, and caused great havoc amongst planks and lining; opened a breach many feet wide and high its edges very irregular and splintered. All the persons present thought that this shell if it had struck near the line of flotation, must have compromised the existence of the vessel. Besides this decisive effect, the explosion had driven in two masses of iron, weighing together more than 80 lbs and had knocked down nineteen images of men.”
Treatise on fortification and artillery by Hector Straith, Thomas Cook, John T. Hyde
“In 1845 a series of experiments was made at Portsmouth from HMS Excellent, against the Swiftsure, at the distance of 1443 yards, with results favourable to their application. In several instances the shells exploded on striking the side of the vessel, making breaches which on or below the water line could not have been securely stopped at sea. Of those shells two struck within a few feet of each other, making a breach of upwards of 11 feet in length, and varying in breadth from 2 to 4, independently of greatly damaging and splintering the timbers.”
Aide-mémoire to the military sciences, Corps of Royal Engineers 1850-1852
These of course are just one of the possible effects. A shell that failed to penetrate at sufficient depth would only cause limited damage. One that instead penetrated completely and exploded inside would cause a lot of casualties, damage the decks and start fires, but the breach in the hull would not be much different from one caused by shot.
The most significant problem was fuze failures. The British for instance carried out trials using Prince George as target ship in 1838. At a distance of 1200 yards in of 80shells that hit the target 38 failed to detonate and one exploded prematurely. 80% of shells that ricochet off the water failed to explode. Of those that did not contact water one third still failed to go off. Nevertheless shells remained a quantum leap in lethality, even if a temperamental one.
Source:“Shells and shell-guns” by John Adolphus Bernard Dahlgren
Posted: September 23 and 27, 2012 by marcello
Accuracy of Shot and Shell Guns
Comparative accuracy of shot and shell guns. Trial carried out against a 40 x 20 ft target screen at a distance of 1300 yards:
As it can be seen the shell gun is a bit more accurate even if a greater elevation is required.
Range tables for the 9-inch Dahlgren. Designed in 1850 it was one of the most common pieces in the Navy, with over a thousand cast; it was used as broadside piece on the larger/newer frigates, ironclads and as pivot gun on lesser vessels; for example it was used as broadside piece aboard both the USS Cumberland and the CSS Virginia. While it was not suitable for defeating armor it was a powerful weapon against wooden warship.
Range tables for the 10-inch Dahlgren. A relatively rare weapon, I unclude it because it was used as pivot guns on vintage frigates like some of those listed, where the heavier 11-inch was thought not suitable.
Range tables for the 11-inch Dahlgren. Intended as the pivot counterpart to the broadside 9-inch, it was used aboard the Monitor and the New Ironsides, as well as a number of others ironclads, frigates and sloops. It was two of these guns which enabled the Kearsage to shoot to pieces the Alabama, notwithstanding the latter rifled Blakely.
Some possibilities
The fifth rate model could be used to represent the classic american heavy sail frigates, armed with a mixture of 32-pdr and 8-inch shell guns. An additional variant could be made to represent converted frigates and the heavier sloops, carrying few or no guns on the upper deck and 8 or 9-inch guns on the lower deck.
Something similar could be done for the sixth rate, with a basic variant armed with 32-pdr and shell guns and another with fewer heavy guns.
Source: unknown
Posted: October 4, 2012 by marcello
Conversation on Naval Artillery
Originally Posted by Minas Moth, September 29, 2012
nice stuff marcello... however I do have some questions (eager to learn more).
I noticed you mentioned Paixhans several times (for one):
..(the need for iron armor to protect against such threat was envisioned by Paixhans himself already in the 1820s).
so I was wondering who/what is that, do you have any more info?
also, what kind of fuse did the shells incorporate? I thought it to be an "on impact" fuse but than it would be impossible for the shell to actually lodge in the side of the ship and then burst. So, did they use time fuse or impact started time fuse, or something completely different...
You mentioned that hit rate with shells was extremely low (and in lot of cases shells itself proved to be duds) but, was that with smooth-bore or rifle-bore guns. for example, from my research of artillery in ACW period it seems to me that Union Dahlgren type gun (which were almost all smooth-bore) was inferior to the Confederate Brooks type gun (rifle-bore). so I am very interested in that ratio. I got this info from researching the Union and Confederate Ironclads of the period. Confederate ones always featured at least 2 or 3 rifled pieces while Union relied entirely on smooth-bore Dahlgrens.
Originally Posted by marcello, September 29, 2012
who/what is that, do you have any more info?
He was a french artillery officer, born at Metz in 1783, graduated from the ècole polytechnique, saw some combat during the napoleonic wars, developed various artillery pieces, dabbled in politics and died during the 1850s. Never looked that much into his biography but I could try if you feel it is warranted.
what kind of fuse did the shells incorporate? I thought it to be an "on impact" fuse but than it would be impossible for the shell to actually lodge in the side of the ship and then burst.
For artillery in general (not just naval specifically) by and large time fuzes, using a powder train, were the most common. The most basic consisted of a paper tube full special powder composition which was cut to the desire burning lenght and then put in a wooded plug which had been inserted in the shell. When the gun was fired the flames from the propelling charge slipped past the shell and hopefully ignited the powder train which would in turn ignite the powder charge in the shell. Rifled guns could (but often relied on tried & true time fuzes) use percussion fuzes, that is something like a percussion cap at the tip that went off when the shell slammed into the target; this was not possible with spherical shells as there was no way to predict which way they would be pointing when they hit the target. There were some concussion fuzes designs trying to overcome the above issue, but they were pretty tricky and not nice to handle.
Powder train fuzes were probably the norm for naval shells, though I would have to check to be extra sure.
You mentioned that hit rate with shells was extremely low
Actually it was not the hit rate that was low, it was making the shells go off reliably that was hard.
Powder trains were pretty sensitive to moisture, age and manufacturing parameters for instance. Encountering water or sand during the flight was pretty bad also.
The relative accuracy of shells and solid shot was hotly debated topic at that time: in theory a shell was less accurate than a solid shot, assuming equal mass and everything else. In practice of course since not everything else was equal things were a bit more complicated. It seems that the 8-inch shell guns were slighty more accurate than at least some 32 pdr designs, though I would have to dig for the test results.
In regards to Dahlgren vs Brooke. It is a complicated issue and while I am somewhat familiar with the Dahlgren design I can't say the same for the Brooke. Generally speaking rifles offer more accuracy, have less gas from the charge escaping past the projectile, can fire much more aerodynamically efficient elongated shells. On the other hand there are some drawbacks, for example a solid spherical shot can bounce off the water and keep going towards the target most of the time while an elongated projectile will usually dive into the water or head into an unpredictable direction. And while, as I said, the expanding gases cannot as easily escape from windage as in a rifle, the projectile will generate much more friction when engaging the rifling.
Dahlgren smoothbore designs were very safe, while rifles often burst, though Brooke guns were not the worst offenders in this regard.
Bottom line it is probably safe to state that rifles are better at long range. At short range things get murkier.
Originally Posted by Minas Moth, September 29, 2012
I am extremely pleased with the first two points... on the third, however I have some other opinions of my own I would like to discuss with you...
And while, as I said, the expanding gases cannot as easily escape from windage as in a rifle, the projectile will generate much more friction when engaging the rifling.
It is probably safe to state that rifles are better at long range. At short range things get murkier.
The Brooke was essentially a Parrot on steroids, if you like. But, it seems that the design was generally more reliable than the Parrot rifle. that is well known. However, the fact with increased friction is extremely slippery (to say at least). If you follow that logic, then you easily come to the conclusion that a rifled weapon would have smaller muzzle velocity when compared to the rifled one. now, I don't know if same can be said for the naval guns (artillery in general) but I have come on the information that in-fact Brown Bess (English standard infantry musket) and 1853 Enfield Pattern Rifle had around same muzzle velocity (1,000 fps). now if that translates to the guns then with same velocity you receive increased range and accuracy. I believe that issue were the expansion gases itself. That was the main factor for rifled weapons. If you could hold all the gases in the barrel without rupturing the breech itself then you have a superior weapon. also the Dahlgren seems more robust as a weapon although the Brooke rifle was in-fact heavier. for example, 7'' Brooke Rifle weighed almost as a 9'' Dahlgren (both around 9,000 pounds) but that has more to do with casting methods I believe.
Also, if you compare the 32pdr Dahlgren (6.2'' weapon) with 6.4'' Brooke you will notice that Dahlgren used 4 pounds service charge while Brooke used 8-10. So there is little room to claim that Brooke was un-reliable or that it couldn't handle the stress. I hope I interpret those ratios correctly. because it seems that there is no was that Dahlgren could be superior to Brooke of the same weight at any given range. here is the table I took the info from:LINK be free to share your opinions and correct me if I am wrong.
Also, I have to stress out that Withworth Rifle had the longest confirmed hit of that period (can't remember the exact number) and infantry rifles of this pattern were highly praised by Confederate troops.
Hm, I am confused as why would a Rifle be less effective at short range. Having in mind the same muzzle velocity, higher kinetic energy provided by bigger usage of expansion gasses I can hardly see it be less effective. Granted, it seems that Brooke fired slightly lighter ammunition but that wasn't a rule.
Originally Posted by marcello, September 30, 2012
Note, I am not saying that friction is going to be such that it will have necessarily lower MV than a smootbore, but that it is going to reduce the gain you get from reduced gas losses via windage.
I would caution however against comparing something like a Brown Bess and an Enfield, you have to account for a number of factors: bullet mass, powder charge and chemical composition, barrel lenght etc.
Dahlgren guns were relatively conventional weapons in construction: they were cast solid and then drilled (exception were the largest 15 and 20 inch where Rodman hollow casting method was applied IIRC). They derived their strenght from having the weight of metal concentrated around the areas that faced the greater pressure and reduced thickness elsewhere, their shape also eliminated weak spots such as sharp angles which were prone to become points of failure.
In regards to comparison between 32-pdr and Brooke, if you are referring to the 32-pdr of 27 cwt it weighted less than a third than 6,4-inch Brooke, and it was inteded as broadside armament for light vessels. Many of the 32-pdr listed in any case belonged to a previous generation of weapons than the Brooke or Dahlgren (some were designed by Dahlgren predecessor in the 1840s IIRC).
By the "murkier" comment I meant that it is not that rifles were inferior to smoothbores, but that rifles inherent advantages (accuracy, range) would not help much at short range. And short range would be typical for ironclad on ironclad fighting at this stage for example.
Withworth had very good range/accuracy , but from what I understad they had some issues with fouling, breech mechanism (for the breechloaders) and the shells were a bit lacking in explosive power. On land smoothbore cannister performance was often more valuable than ultra long range that, absent modern indirect fire techniques, would be of little use in most cases.
Originally Posted by Minas Moth, September 30, 2012
...but that rifles inherent advantages (accuracy, range) would not help much at short range. And short range would be typical for ironclad on ironclad fighting at this stage for example.
The hitting power of the American 15-inch Rodman (Army) or Dahlgren (Navy) guns during Civil War ironclad engagements proved time and again that at effective combat ranges, no armour afloat could possibly resist a 450-pound shot propelled by 50-60 lb. service charges. In 1863, the CSS Atlanta was reduced to surrender after three hits from the 15-inch gun of the monitor USS Weehawken, one of which blasted a 3-foot-wide hole in her casemate armour.
it would indeed seem that smooth-bore would be "extremely effective" against the confederate ironclads. however, I do accept that info with caution because the text itself offers only three cases where confederate ironclads iron plating was breached. so, if the shot indeed made a 3 foot wide hole, would that be a shell or a shot type of projectile. because, as you said, shot projectile left a small hole that could be easily plugged and repaired. and if it was a shell then it was probably a rifled Dahlgren that had done the damage, correct?
this info further makes me believe that Union smooth-bore Dahlgren would not be as effective as some people (Jeremy Black who wrote the above article) believe:
During the Civil war, USN ironclads achieved a hit rate of 33% against fort Sumter at ranges of upwards of 500 yards. At 100 yards, Monitor had hit Virginia with 20 of 55 shots fired. So with luck, Monitor may have hit warrior 3 times during the 12 minutes.
even so, for an entire duration of the War, only three cases of armor penetration aren't much. I can accept the fact that not all were documented but I would like to stress out the opinion of many historians 8including McPherson, Keegan etc) that not even one Confederate Ironclad was destroyed/captured/disabeled by Union ironclad. In-fact, historians seem to agree that they all either took on to much water and had to be abandoned or were scuffled when Confederate ports were taken by Union forces. to back this up, I know that 3 ironclads defended the Richmond port right up until the end of the War. if Union 15'' Dahlgren gun had been so effective than that would not be the case. at least that is my opinion.
Monitor carried 2 11 inch, turret mounted Dahlgren smooth bores. These had a theoretical rate of fire of a 150lb solid shot every 2-3 minutes, but in action againstthe Virginia, managed only a round every 6-8 minutes.
also if we consider this information then we see that Monitor was armed with 11'' and not 15'' Dahlgren gun, so the penetration was not probable. Only with "Passaic" class monitors did the Union started to fit their monitors with 15'' Dahlgren guns. Only Miantonomoh class monitor (with only one completed during the War) had all the 15'' armament, and before that only USS Roanoke is known to feature one rifled 8'' gun of unknown (but probably Dahlgren) design.
So with all considered, I would be much inclined to believe that any damage that could occur between the monitors themselves was more likely to be a result of foul plating or some engineering failures rather than "power" of both sides guns.
and then there is following information:
During the engagement between Monitor and Virginia, Monitor's 20 hits on Virginia's armour had caused dents to 6 of her 2 inch plates, but failed to penetrate. However, her guns had been served with only half charges, since they were not proofed. We may assume the use of full charges against the Warrior. Monitor in return had been hit by 24 shots from Virginia. Hits on Monitor's pilot house and turret caused considerable plate damage and some crew casualties, but failed to actually penetrate the armour. However, Virginia had been outfitted to combat wooden ships and had very quickly run out of solid shot; leaving her only shells, which were not expected to penetrate armour. In later engagements against largely against forts, vessels similarly armoured to Monitor, suffered little penetrative damage. However damage and crew casualties due to partial penetration, causing plates to spring and shatter and rivets to pop was widespread.
this somehow, confirms the upper premiss, but... once again, there is no report of Confederate Ironclad's armor (that I know of) being penetrated by a Union Ironclad; even when the Passaic class was launched and 15'' Dahlgren guns used.
so, all in all it seems to be some "magic circle" this naval artillery stuff...
Originally Posted by marcello, September 30, 2012
it would indeed seem that smooth-bore would be "extremely effective" against the confederate ironclads. however, I do accept that info with caution because the text itself offers only three cases where confederate ironclads iron plating was breached. so, if the shot indeed made a 3 foot wide hole, would that be a shell or a shot type of projectile. because, as you said, shot projectile left a small hole that could be easily plugged and repaired. and if it was a shell then it was probably a rifled Dahlgren that had done the damage, correct?
this info further makes me believe that Union smooth-bore Dahlgren would not be as effective as some people (Jeremy Black who wrote the above article) believe:
The USS Weehawken was armed with a 11-inch and a 15-inch, both smoothbore. From what I understand one of the 15-inch shot did indeed smash (penetration might not be the most technical correct term in this case) the armor plate but did not get all the way inside. From the outside it was described as an indentation rather than a hole. However the shock was sufficient to turn part of the wooden backing into a shower of splinters that wounded 18 men and with a crew of 140 or so it I suspect was not the sort of losses they could have afforded for long.
Another hit the armored pilot house, and practically demolished it. Again perhaps no technical penetration but very unpleasant for the two unlucky pilots inside.
even so, for an entire duration of the War, only three cases of armor penetration aren't much. I can accept the fact that not all were documented but I would like to stress out the opinion of many historians 8including McPherson, Keegan etc) that not even one Confederate Ironclad was destroyed/captured/disabeled by Union ironclad.
CSS Tennessee was pounded into to surrender at Mobile Bay by three federal ironclads, with 11-inch Dahlgreen probably doing most of the damage: steering gear knocked out, gunports shutters jammed, plates started and plenty of splintering. A 15 inch shot went throught the iron armor and into the wooded backing, with the latter barely stopping it; the wood in that area was pushed inside the casemate by a thickness of two feet, so it was probably a pretty close affair.
Of course there were not that many ironclad on ironclad engagements but one should note that confederate ironclads were largely held back for defense of ports and portion of rivers, typically as part of combined defense which included substantial shore batteries,minefields, obstructions and floating batteries. Dealing with such required large scale attacks.
However, her guns had been served with only half charges, since they were not proofed.
Actually, from I have read it is a sort of misunderstanding. The Monitor used what was the standard service charge. After the battle, as it became clear that it had limited impact on Virginia, Dahlgren did some testing and figured out that a 11-inch that had not used up much of its service life could, if necessary, fire 50 rounds or so with the heavier charge without compromising safety margins. This was a stopgap measure, but given that ironclad on ironclad fighting was rare it would buy time to develop something better. One should note that a large caliber gun bursting inside a monitor turret would have disabled the vessel at least temporarily, so Dahlgren concerns about overloading guns and rushing untried designs in service were not entirely unreasonable.
Originally Posted by marcello, September 30, 2012
Additionally I should probably note that that the seacoast 15-inch Rodman and the 15-inch Dahlgren aboard the monitors were not the same designs, even if they shared some characteristics. The former was heavier, longer and could accomodate a heavier charge.
Last edited by Minas Moth; October 20, 2012 at 03:54 AM.
This research was made by marcello to provide us with solid information and visual reference to American Civil War side-wheeled steam and sailing ships. This was provided to serve as a starting point of a possible development of naval aspect of the mod, as to the current date modding community isn't able to import new ship models to Empire Total War game engine.
Propulsion: sails Displacement: 1,726 t Length: 53 m Beam: 14 m Draft: 6,4 m Crew: 400
Armament
22 × 9-in Dahlgren
1 × 10-in Dahlgren
1 x large rifled piece
Source: unknown
Posted: August 31, 2012 by marcello
USS Constellation (sloop)
Patrol duty in the Mediterranean and blockade operations.
Propulsion: sails Displacement: 1,400 t Length:53,64 m Beam: 12,34 m Draft: 6,4 m Crew: 285 Maximum speed: 14 knots
Armament (1862)
16 × 8-in Dahlgren
4 x 32 pdr
2 x 12 pdr
1 × 20-pdr Parrott
1 x 30-pdr Parrott
Source: unknown
Posted: August 31, 2012 by marcello
USS Portsmouth (sloop)
Attacks against Mississippi forts, blockade duty.
Propulsion: sails Displacement: 1,038 t Length: 46.28 m Beam: 11.35 m Draft: 5,03 m Maximum speed: 14 knots Crew: 227
Propulsion: side-wheel steamer Displacement: 2,489 t Length: 78 m Beam: 14 m Draft: 6.25 m
Armament
12 x 9-inch Dahlgren
2 x 150-pdr Parrot rifles
1-2 x 12pdr rifles
Source: unknown
Posted: September 2, 2012 by marcello
USS Mississippi (side-wheel frigate)
Capture of two blockade runners, destruction of CSS Manassas. Lost during the expedition against Port Hudson.
Propulsion: side-wheel steamer Displacement: 3,272 t Length: 70m Beam: 12m
Armament (1861)
10 x 8-inch shell guns
1 x 9-inch (Dahlgren?)
Armament (1862)
1 x 10-inch Dahlgren
1 x 20-pdr Parrot rifle
19 x 8-inch shell guns (unclear if a typo or actual amount, the latter would seem feasible though given the number of apparent gun-ports)
Source: unknown
Posted: September 2, 2012 by marcello
USS Powhatan (side-wheel frigate)
Blockade duty, hunt for CSS Sumter, reduction of Fort Fisher, capture of two blockade runners.
Armament (November 1861)
10 x 9-inch Dahlgren
5 x 12-pdr guns
1 x 11-inch Dahlgren
Armament (October 1863)
14 x 9-inch Dahlgren
3 x 100-pdr Parrott
1 x 11-inch Dahlgren
Armament (January 1865)
16 x 9-inch Dahlgren
3 x 100-pdr Parrott
4 x 12-pdr guns
1 x 11-inch Dahlgren
Source: unknown
Posted: September 2, 2012 by marcello
USS Saranac (side-wheel frigate)
Commerce protection in the Pacific.
Propulsion: side-wheel steamer Displacement: 1463 tons Length: 65,68 m Beam: 11,51 m Draft: 5,28 m
Armament (October 1862)
1 x 8-inch heavy gun
8 x 8-inch shell guns
2 x 20-pdr Parrott
2 x 12-pdr guns
Source: unknown
Posted: September 2, 2012 by marcello
USS Vermont (ship of the line)
The only ship of the line listed as available and serviceable in 1861 (though New Hampshire was available on the stocks and was eventually commissioned). Having been superseded both by ironclads and the screw equipped ships of the line of the 1850’s it was fit and used only as logistical support ship. The US had built a sizable battle-fleet in the wake of the war of 1812, including a massive four-deck warship that would have put the Santissima Trinidad to shame. The effort however was not kept up with follow on construction or steam conversions so by the civil war not much was left in usable conditions.
Propulsion: sails Length: 60,08 m Beam: 16,31 m Crew: 339 (1863)
Armament (intended)
64 x 32-pdr guns
20 x 8-inch shell guns
Armament (1862)
20 x 32-pdr guns
4 x 8-inch shell guns
Armament (1863)
8 x 32-pdr guns
10 x 8-inch shell guns
Source: unknown
Posted: September 2, 2012 by marcello
Source: unknown
Posted: September 13, 2012 by marcello
Information of possible color schemes for ships
Originally Posted by on August 31, 2012 Minas Moth wrote:
ok, here's my part to your research marcello:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Converted Blockade Runners
Running the Bolckade of Wilmington in 1864
The Banshees
Description
Career
Ordered:
Builder: Jones Quiggin & Co., Liverpool, England
Laid down: 1862 Liverpool, England
Launched: 22 Nov 1862
Commissioned: Jan 1864
Decommissioned:
Fate: captured by USS Grand Gulf and the U.S. Army Transport Fulton on 21 November 1863
General Characteristics
Type:
Area of Operation:
Displacement: 533 tons burthen, 325 GRT
Length: 220 feet
Beam: 20 feet 4 inches
Draft: 10 feet
Propulsion: Side wheels, 2-cylinder oscillating engine (42″ x 3′9″), 2 boilers (built by Laird Brothers, Birkenhead England)
Speed: 12 knots
Complement:
Armament:
Armor: Steel-hulled
Banshee , a 533-ton (burden) side-wheel steamship, was built in Liverpool, England, in 1862 for employment running the Federal blockade of the Confederate coast. Her trans-Atlantic maiden voyage, in April 1863, was a “first” for a steel-hulled ship, though her innovative construction proved troublesome in service. During the next seven months, Banshee was very successful in her intended trade, making seven round-trip voyages between Bermuda or the Bahamas and Wilmington, North Carolina. She was captured by USS Grand Gulf and the U.S. Army Transport Fulton on 21 November 1863, while en route to Wilmington.
Sent North for adjudication by the New York Prize Court, she was purchased in March 1864 by the U.S. Navy, which converted her to a gunboat and, in June 1864, placed her in commission as USS Banshee . The steamer served for the rest of the year with the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. In December she took part in the abortive attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N.C. Banshee was reassigned to the Potomac Flotilla in mid-January 1865 and spent the rest of the Civil War operating on the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. Decommissioned after the fighting ended, she was sold in November 1865.
Her new owners placed her in commercial service under the name T.L. Smallwood (or J.L. Smallwood ). Sold to British interests in 1867, she was renamed Irene and remained in use at least until the 1890s.
“schooner rig, iron frame hull plated with steel, two pole masts. First steel vessel to cross the Atlantic. Engines were unreliable.” from Silverstone CIVIL WAR NAVIES 1855-1883
2.List of Commanders/Crew
3.Painting Information
Books/Articles and other resources
Silverstone CIVIL WAR NAVIES 1855-1883
as shown here, these are all side-wheeled ships and most important we have a color scheme that was likely used on those ships. that will prove most valuable when we decide to re-texture them... it seems that quite a few side-wheeled steamers were present throughout the entire length of War, even as late as 1864...
Originally Posted by on September 1, 2012 marcello wrote:
Well, from what I recall the screw had been a relatively recent innovation and the paddle wheel retained some comparative advantages particularly in the early period, so there was a considerable overlap both in service and construction. The switch was more immediate in the military area, as sidewheelers could not carry a proper broadside armament and the propulsion plant was too vulnerable; even this case however the side-wheel frigates of the 1840's weren't scrapped overnight in the 1850's.
Originally Posted by on September 4, 2012 marcello wrote:
In regards to paint schemes however I would note that the blockade runner mist gray was not the rule. The normal naval paint schemes were like this for example:
European Ships of Civil War Period
Sizable numbers of sail only warships were retained, usually in reserve, in the early 1860's but it is not clear they would have been committed in actual hostilities especially by France and Britain. That said I could list some and perhaps some limited employment might have not been entirely out of the question in 1861-62.
Sources:
The Blockade And The Cruisers by James Russell Soley
The History of the Navy During the Rebellion by Charles Brandon Boynton
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion by United States. War Dept
Armament:
8 x 22 cm shell guns (spar deck)
12 x 30-pdr (gun deck)
Posted: September 18, 2012 by marcello
Britain
HMS Valorous Displacement: 2300 tons Length: 64 m Beam: 11 m Draught:7,47 m Crew: 175
Armament: Middle deck
8 x 32-pdr guns Upper deck
1 x 68-pdr gun
1 x 10-in shell gun
4 x 32-pdr guns
HMS Boscawen
Tonnage: 2048 tons Length: 57,1 m Beam: 15,47 m
The armament of a third rate in this period would have been something like: Gun deck
22 x 32-pdr
4 x 8-inch shell gun
Upper gun deck
26 x 32-pdr
2 x 8-inch shell gun
Spar deck
16 x 32-pdr (probably less here, owing to Crimean war lessons learned)
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Sail only ships of the line were completely obsolete at the time of the Civil War. By 1861 only very few were in commission or in reasonable readiness in the royal navy and these were on their way out, HMS Boscawen itself for example was converted to a training ship in the early months of 1862. Most likely they would have been used only as logistical support ships in the event of war over the Trent affair.
HMS Pique
Tonnage: 1633 tons Length: 49 m Beam: 15 m
Gun deck:
18 x 32-pdr
6 x 8-inch shell gun
Upper works:
16 x 32-pdr
HMS Eurydice
Tonnage: 910 Length: 43,03 m Beam: 11,84 m
Gun deck:
16 x 32-pdr
2 x 8-inch shell gun
Upper works:
8 x 32-pdr
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Sailing frigates and corvettes were obsolete, but unlike ships of the line there were combat tasks they could still fulfill.
HMS Liberty
Tonnage: 428 Length: 30,63 m Beam: 9,86 m Draught: 4,67 m
Armament: 12 x 32-pdr
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
(not HMS Liberty but same class)
Brigs like these were being relegated to coast guard duties in the 1860s, but they could still be encountered.
Blackwall frigate
(merchant ship)
Data relative to Cospatrick
Tonnage: 1199 GRT Length: 58 m Beam: 10 m
These were the East Indiamen of the 19th century. They were built to frigate standards and some were pierced for guns and fitted for conversion to warships. As merchant ships however they carried at most a couple of 32-pdr and with typical crews of 40-60 they could not afford to man more.
Posted: September 18, 22, 2012 by marcello
Spain
Isabel II Displacement: 2880 tons Length: 66 m Crew: 160
Armament:
16 x 8-inch shell guns (two on pivots mounts, rest broadside)
Last edited by Minas Moth; October 20, 2012 at 03:44 AM.
I would note that Kelly Snell's article "The Evolution and Influence of Tactical Warfare in the ACW" makes a lot of dubious claims, to say the least. Railroads had already played a major role in the Franco-Austrian war of 1859, enabling the french to deploy to Italy before the austrians could overrun the sardinian army; both sides further employed them extensively to move troops and supplies. Likewise a great deal civil war technologies, from telegraph to rifled artillery and muskets had been employed extensively. The first ironclads were french and british and as for pontoon bridges they had been standard fare in the 18th century wars, nothing earth shattering there. I could go on but you get the picture.
Last edited by marcello; August 24, 2012 at 04:05 PM.
Historical Info, Research & Discussion thread
Reply With Quote
Originally Posted by October 7, 2010; Chesh
it's a pleasure....
if you like more info, pm me and i'll give you the link...
