from opinion syllabus, for more details, read the relevant portion of the opinion
4.
It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an
opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives. Pp. 19–24.
(a) The state provision has three limitations: A detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he or she provides a valid Arizona
driver’s license or similar identification; officers may not consider
race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the
privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” P. 20.
(b) This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with
those limits, §2(B) must be held preempted at this stage. Pp. 20–24.
(1) The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal immigration scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration
system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information
about possible immigration violations. See §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c).
The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at
___. Pp. 20–21.
(2) It is not clear at this stage and on this record that §2(B), in
practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees
for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. This
would raise constitutional concerns. And it would disrupt the federal
framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in
custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and
supervision. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. If the
law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the
course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been
released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other conse
quences that are adverse to
federal law and its objectives. Without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law.
Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277. This opinion does not
foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law
as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. Pp. 22–24.
sneaky Supreme Court upholds (for now) key portion of Arizona immigration law
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Originally Posted by bushbush
