Why Do The Americans Think They Won WW2?

[ivan_the_terrible]

Alright, that's a fair assessment.

But I would counter that by the time a western front in France was actually opened, the tide had already turned on the eastern front. Therefore US material help in the eastern front (very substantial help) was more influential than Britain's continued, albeit it cautious, opposition.

[Hanny]

Will you answer to the posts showing that your figures were wrong, or will you continue to be selective with which posts you respond to?

Just my observations of this thread. I particularly like the post where you say you despise liars. Pretty ironic, huh?

Just an observation, but i have posted no incorrect figures. Thank you for contribution, its been impresive in its scope.

How can you so easily be that dishonest? This is mind boggling. It's nice to see that that you are consistent. It's been what, 4 years now, that you've been pushing the whole 4% argument on TWC?

Harrison on the "4%" issue: "the tremendous contribution to the Russian war economy made by scarce commodities delivered under lend-lease cannot be significantly measured in terms of a 'global percentage'"

Who are these "other economist" of which you speak?

Absolutely comical.

Every economist citeied here uses the same 4% value, and still do, its what that $ bought thats has changed in inpretationof LL. Whats is comical is after 4 years here, 65 years in academic works, your still unable to understand why they use it and what it means, as your have misrepresented Harrison yet again. I know you dont have the bookn as you always mis quote it.

Show me any source that says the LL $ value was not 12 Billion, and that it is not 4% of the SU states expenditure. Harrison uses those figures and i quoted him doing so, no one else here has done so correctly.

Harrioson. on the role of 4% LL.
The numbers, though apparently precise, do no more than illustrate the argument. Moreover they rest on significant assumptions of the ceteris paribus kind. They presume that, in the absence of aid, the Soviet domestic product would have remained the same; in fact, one of the major determinants of Soviet wartime GNP was the loss and gain of territory, so anything detracting from the quantity and quality of the Soviet war effort would certainly have reduced the total output of the domestic economy. Quality, as well as quantity: the military effectiveness of a billion rubles laid out on Soviet defence was surely higher if the package included lend-leased means of transport, communication and soldiers' kit. The absence of aid also implied substantial cutbacks of civilian consumption and investment. Without aid, gross investment would have remained below replacement levels, resulting in a steady contraction of the capital stock available for use; this too would have forced Soviet GNP below actually achieved levels in 1942-44, with fewer resources then available for defence. Since there was a limit to the resources freed by cutting investment, living standards would also have been depressed below the levels actually experienced, which were already associated with widespread deaths from starvation. More starvation deaths amongst the working population would have forced an additional decline in domestic output.
Snip.
"Without [Lend-Lease Aid], everyone would have had a worse war. The western Allies would have had to kill and be killed in greater numbers. The Russians would have done less killing and more being killed."

4 years ago, in thread here http://mjollnir.twcenter.net/forums/...184352&page=31 you misused the same data, its also where you copy pasted your incorrect quote from that is contradicted by Harriosn own writtings.http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7...0Union&f=false

Pages 250 onwards he gives the role of LL in the War. A view you have for years contradicted while citeing his works.

Here we see Harrison explain Sokolove inpretation, take issue with it and instead provide a better one.http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ec...blic/jeh90.pdf

Clearly after 4 years you have learnt nothing at all, and are still fumbling around withouta clue, so yes very comical.

[FarKenal]

In all, Lend-Lease supplied nearly 40% of the Soviet Union's total war output

wow, just wow.

are you really willing to stand by this statement...?

The most I have ever seen lend lease to russia quoted as has never been anything higher than 12% of war output or 6.5% of Russia's GDP during 1941-45, and thats from biased pro-USA posters and not including the massive amount war materials they had been stockpiling before then which frequently dwarfed many items of lend lease sent.

Indeed by 1945 nearly two-thirds of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built.

Thats only if you dont include the trucks and stockpiles Russia already had on hand at the beginning of the war... By January 1943 at which time Germany had decisively lost the war, lend lease trucks only made up 5.5% of trucks in service for the Russians, and at the very end of the war when lend lease starting to become more significant, it was 33% NOT 66%

[Vanoi]

wow, just wow.

are you really willing to stand by this statement...?

The most I have ever seen lend lease to russia quoted as has never been anything higher than 12% of war output or 6.5% of Russia's GDP during 1941-45, and thats from biased pro-USA posters and not including the massive amount war materials they had been stockpiling before then which frequently dwarfed many items of lend lease sent.

40% is high. 30% though is the more correct answer. And that isn't coming from US historians. Thats the number coming from Russian historians who reviewed Lend Lease after the Cold War. I posted a source that showed this.

Thats only if you dont include the trucks and stockpiles Russia already had on hand at the beginning of the war...

They lost those in the initial invasion.

By January 1943 at which time Germany had decisively lost the war, lend lease trucks only made up 5.5% of trucks in service for the Russians, and at the very end of the war when lend lease starting to become more significant, it was 33% NOT 66%

No, it was 66%. I have 2 sources confiriming this.

[SLN445]

Alright, that's a fair assessment.

But I would counter that by the time a western front in France was actually opened, the tide had already turned on the eastern front. Therefore US material help in the eastern front (very substantial help) was more influential than Britain's continued, albeit it cautious, opposition.

You potentially require up to 23% of Lend-lease to go through another route as the Germans would be able to Cut of the Arctic Convoys without Britain.

Also without Britain, would America still enact the lend lease program with the USSR?

[Hanny]

No, it was 66%. I have 2 sources confiriming this.

Odd since the two you posted here do not, but instead show 33%.

Every source has the same, heres a further one.

That is the information of the Staff of Red Army's Main Automobiles Department (GAVTU) of 11th February 1944. The document lists the following sources of automobiles deliveries to the Red Army till 1.01.1944:*
1. In the army at the start of the war - 272 605*
2. Recieved under mobilization from civilan economy - 268 095*
3. Received from industry:*
a) from 22.06 to 31.12.41 - 37 321*
b) in 1942 - 25 038*
c) in 1943 - 40 619*
total 102 978*
4. Imported*
a) 1941 - 454*
b) 1942 - 31 690*
c) 1943 - 88 021*
total - 120 165*
So on 1st January 1941 the Army had to have 763 843 automobiles.*
5. In fact 484 604 were available according to the reports of fronts and military districts.*
6. 7 401 automobiles were in depots.*
7. The number of automobiles en route to fronts and districts was estimated as 6 000.*
8. The estimated number of automobiles in reserve of the fronts (were repaired on the plants) - 12 000*
So the estimated number of automobiles in the Red Army equals to 510 005.*
9. In 1943 9 294 army automobiles were handed to civilian economy.*
10. The remaining part of the diference, i.e 244 549 between the avaiable number and the overall recources of automobiles must be first of all attributed to the combat losses.*




Two other documents of GAVTU give the number of foreign autotransport in the RKKA on 1.01.1944. According to the document of 21.01.1944 82 184 foreign automobiles were available. According to the other document of 3.02.1944 the army had 76 856 ones, including 9879 in military districts and 10 555 in reserve amies, other in the fronts. The difference can be expained by the inclusion of autombiles in depots and in capital repair made in the first document.*




As a conclusion in 1941-42 foreign autotransport was received in small doses and was of little importance, in 1943 the deliveries became more sizeable and played a major role in expansion of Red Army autopark. To gove some figures on 1.01.1942 the number of army automobiles equaled to 318 485 and on 1.01.43 to 379 052 (taken from the documents in the same source). So the increase in numbers in 1943 was more than 100 hundreds.*




We can also look at the figures for the entire period 1941-45. When the war ended the Red Army had 664 213 automobiles incl. 73% trucks and truck-based vehicles. Of these number 58% were domestic vehicles, 33% - received from abroad and 9% - trophy vehicles. The number of automobiles the Army should have according to TO&E was 800 017. The losses of automobiles during the war amounted to 351 800. The sources of automobiles deliveries were as follows:*
Available when the war started - 272 605*
Mobilization from economy - 256 179*
Domestic production - 150 400*
From abroad - 312 600*
Trophies - 60 626*
Source: The report on results of the Red Army rear services activities in the period of the war, 26th June 1945, published in "Russkiy Arhiv" vol. 25(14)*

40% is high. 30% though is the more correct answer. And that isn't coming from US historians. Thats the number coming from Russian historians who reviewed Lend Lease after the Cold War. I posted a source that showed this.

No you did not, you used Sokolov who writes 53%. And no its the wrong number.

Lend-Lease supplied a total of 214,607 tons of finished explosives (mostly TNT), compared to domestic Soviet production of about 600,000 tons. 49,000 tons arrived by March 1943, the rest after then.

[Vanoi]

Odd since the two you posted here do not, but instead show 33%.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend_lease

Although most Red Army tank units were equipped with Soviet-built tanks, their logistical support was provided by hundreds of thousands of U.S.-made trucks. Indeed by 1945 nearly two-thirds of the truck strength of the Red Army was U.S.-built.

http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/L/e/Lend-Lease.htm

Most of the trucks supplying the T-34 tanks and PPs-toting infantry that spearheaded Russia's counteroffensive against Germany were made in Detroit. It seems likely that Lend-Lease gave the Russians the margin for survival.

I'll admit it doesn't say 66%, but its says most, which implies it was well over 50%.

No you did not. and no its the wrong number.

Nope.

[Hanny]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lend_lease

This wiki cites Weeks work, cite 17, here is that work http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=-...trucks&f=false in that work Weeks writes : page 8 "By the end of the war 32.8% of the Soviet park of such vechicles were of lend lease vechcles.


So your wiki uses Weeks book that uses the same numbers i have posted, yet wiki turns them around to be 2 thirds.


Wiki is not a reliable source. Had you botherd to read a book on LL you would know its wrong, and why its wrong. But we know your grasp of the subject is limited to the first two hits of google search for LL.

I'll admit it doesn't say 66%, but its says most, which implies it was well over 50%.

It implies that the Moscow offensive was done by LL then is how you read it.

Most of the trucks supplying the T-34 tanks and PPs-toting infantry that spearheaded Russia's counteroffensive against Germany were made in Detroit. It seems likely that Lend-Lease gave the Russians the margin for survival.

In 42 when the SU destroyed the Germans at Stalingrad, LL contibuted 10,000 trucks to that SU effort. The SU contibution 178,000. There was only 79,000 LL MTV in whole of Russia in 42, out of SU park of 378,000. there were 272,600 motor vehicles available at the beginning of the war, 204,900 were received by the Red Army which gave a total stock of 477,500 motor vehicles in the Red Army, of which 159,000 were lost, and 318,500 were available in the beginning of 1942, again Lend Lease is hardly felt here (Krivosheev, pg. 246-258)

So in suma, you dont have two sources, you have 1, and it uses a third source which uses the numbers i have posted.

Lastly

Quote:
Originally Posted by Hanny
No you did not. and no its the wrong number.

Nope.

Incoorect you have it completly wrong. see table page 587 and earlier demolition of Sokolov. SU in 43 was producing the same level as USA munitions without any LLhttp://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ec...blic/jeh90.pdf

[FarKenal]

RE- Lend lease trucks making up two thirds of trucks in Russia service

No, it was 66%. I have 2 sources confiriming this.

This is a general misconception that alot of blindly patriotic americans distort and would have the world believe that america supplied 66% of russias trucks. This however, is how many trucks were supplied by america divided by the amount that russia produced themselves from June 1941 onward and does not take into account the 272,000 trucks that russia already had, or the number of captured trucks in russian service.

the true number of american trucks used in russain service as a percentage is as follows

% of trucks from lend lease

22 June 41 - 0%
1 Jan 42 - 0%
1 Jan 43 - 5.4%
1 Jan 44 - 19%
1 Jan 45 - 30.4%
1 May 45 - 32.8%

(35% of these lend leases trucks were simply packed in crates and assembeled in russian factories anyway)

I don’t know what’s so hard to understand about this, are you simply trying to refuse to admit that you are wrong? Heck we’ve all done it at times, though your stubbornness at refusing to take back misleading information or just general lack of knowledge of the subject is making the credibility of what you post disappear fast.

As for the effects of trucks anyway all not forget that the German divisions relied on horses for more than 80% of their transport requirements. Or that within less than a month of Operation Barbossa, that Army Group South had to replace more than half of its few trucks with local Russian ponies, and yet look at how far and fast they raced into Russia.

So despite having barely any vehicles, and waiting for months on end for spare parts to repair the ones they did have sitting in repair stations, the Germans performed amazing feats with just horses, and I certainly dont think the Russians were ever going to suffer from a shortage of horses.



Re Azoths post that Lend lease made up 40% of Russias wartime production

40% is high. 30% though is the more correct answer. And that isn't coming from US historians. Thats the number coming from Russian historians who reviewed Lend Lease after the Cold War. I posted a source that showed this.

Then why post it, or believe a source that is clearly wrong. You shouldnt have posted it or try to base your arguments on it. Even still though from your other sources I cant see anything saying its 30% either, could you please show us the exact part and statistics to back this assertion up?

[FarKenal]

Getting back to the crux of the OP's post though.

As others have said, the Russians inflicted 80% of all german deaths (including the army, airforce and navy), in addition to that they also fought Germany’s two other forgotten but certainly not insignificant allies in Hungary and Romania, in addition to the large Italian expeditionary force on the Eastern Front (and to a lesser extent Finland) .

Unlike the Hollywood movies and most American posters, I don’t believe that the USA’s non-participation in the war would have changed the outcome. Of the Lend lease they did give to Russia, most of it was very late in the war when the Russians were already pouring into Germany, and while the amounts may seem like a lot, they are dwarfed by the amounts the Russians produced themselves, and every comparison statistic provided does not include Russia's massive pre-war stockpiles or are blatantly manipulated by other means (good examples already in this thread are trucks, rail locomotives, boots etc), in addition they had plenty of gold reserves to purchase/import whatever else they needed.

I do however think that without the British Commonwealth that Russia would have lost though, as without the diversion of planes, AA’s, u-boats & Afrika Korp (even though it was tiny) against the Commonwealth during the crucial years 1940-42, the Germans would have been able to pour more resources into tanks, artillery, stukas, men etc, and given them the edge to win at Stalingrad (which they were so very close to achieving). If they had of won at Stalingrad, then all of Russias oil flowing up the Volga river from the Baku oil fields would have been cut off and their armies and industry would have grinded to a sudden halt and force them to surrender.

After the devastating defeat at Stalingrad, many of Russia's factories recently moved to the Urals, had just started to kick into gear and ramped up production, at which point that with Germany being forced to guard their rear against the Brits & Commonwealth it was just a matter of time until the Russians forced their way into Berlin.


So to summarise in my opinion

Russia could NOT have won the war on its own.
Russia could HAVE won with just Britain & the Commonwealth
Russia could NOT have won with the just the USA (No British & Commonwealth)
USA & British Commonwealth could NOT have won without Russia

[Hanny]

So to summarise in my opinion

Russia could NOT have won the war on its own.
Russia could HAVE won with just Britain & the Commonwealth
Russia could NOT have won with the just the USA (No British & Commonwealth)

This is what is taught to the US Military Officers.


In the end, it is possible to draw two important conclusions about Western economic aid to the Soviet Union during World War II. First, such aid was important but not decisive in determining the outcome on the Eastern Front. Second, Lend-Lease assistance proved to be an extraordinarily wise investment of resources on the part of Britain and the United States. From 22 June 1941, the date that Germany commenced Operation Barbarossa, to the end of the war, German might have concentrated primarily against the Soviet Union. As Russian historians are quick to point out, at no time in the war did the number of German divisions committed against the U.S.S.R. slip below 55 percent of the total directly engaged in combat. Before July 1943 and the Battle of Kursk, that total never dipped below 66 percent. Viewed another way, when during the combat at Stalingrad in November 1942 Germany maintained 268 active divisions on the Eastern Front, only four and one- half divisions fought Anglo-American forces in North Africa. Only in the aftermath of the Normandy invasion of June 1944 did the Western allies first confront as many as one-half the number of German divisions faced by the Soviet Union at the same time. In sum, it is reasonable to argue that although the Soviet Union would in all probability eventually have won the war against Germany on its own, it is doubtful that Anglo-American forces could have won the war in the absence of Soviet support. As acknowledged by Churchill himself, the Red Army bore by far the greater share of the burden, paying a toll in blood that can scarcely be comprehended in the West. Yet, drawing fully on its deep reserves of human and material strength, the Soviet Union prevailed.

-- Robert F. Baumann, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CSI/

[Nikitn]

The main reason for the Soviet casualties were actually the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany, not the scale of fighting.

[SLN445]

Yeh, a LOT of soviet casualties were non-combat related, though they still did lost a vast amount more soldiers in combat then the Germans did.

[OTZ]

Every economist citeied here uses the same 4% value, and still do, its what that $ bought thats has changed in inpretationof LL. Whats is comical is after 4 years here, 65 years in academic works, your still unable to understand why they use it and what it means, as your have misrepresented Harrison yet again. I know you dont have the bookn as you always mis quote it.
Show me any source that says the LL $ value was not 12 Billion, and that it is not 4% of the SU states expenditure. Harrison uses those figures and i quoted him doing so, no one else here has done so correctly.

Oh Hanny...why oh why must you continue to be disingenuous...

Here's a response I got from Mr Harrison:

Dear XXXX

You can find a discussion of the “4%” and what it may have meant in my “The Soviet Economy and Relations with the USA and Britain.” In The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945, pp. 69-89. Edited by Howard Temperley and Ann Lane...In my book Accounting for War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 6, I give a more considered estimate of the contribution of Allied mutual aid as 5 percent of Soviet GDP in 1942 and 10 percent in 1943 and 1944. I think you could call this the current best estimate, which it will remain as long as no else is willing to invest as much effort in checking it as I did in producing it.

I hope this helps.

Mark

In his words:

"...it was still smaller as a fraction of the combined wartime expenditures of the United Kingdom and the United States, which totalled approxiamately $295 billion from mid-1942 through mid-1945; compared with this, aid to the USSR amounted to no more than 4 per cent"

Interesting - he does use 4%! But hold on a minute - that's not 4% in terms of Soviet production! That's 4% of Allied expenditures. He goes on:

"By coincidence, 4 per cent has more than one significance. At the end of 1947 the wartime planning cheif, NA Vonesenskii, published an account of the Soviet wartime economic effort which included referred to the growth of Soviet imports in 1942-43, mainly from Britain and America, compared with the much lower level of 1940, "a comparison between the amount of these allied deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR and the volume of industrial production at the Soviet Socialist enterprises in the same period...will show that the deliveries amounted to only about 4 per cent of the domestic production during the war economy period.: (But whether "the same period" meant 1942-43, or "the war ecomony period" as a whole, was left irritatingly vague. In later writing, east and west, this figure would be extensively misquoted, and was most commonly rendered as the proportion of all Allied deliveries to the total wartime production of the entire Soviet economy with "only" as an additionally wounding qualifier - "only" 4 per cent")"

I have bolded and upsized the relevant portion to ensure you clearly see what Harrison says about "4%".

He continues to deconstruct this myth in the paper, but I see no need to continue.

Harrioson. on the role of 4% LL.

Sorry Hanny, but this part (below) is not Harrison discussing the "4%" - again, you are obscuring the facts.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The numbers, though apparently precise, do no more than illustrate the argument. Moreover they rest on significant assumptions of the ceteris paribus kind. They presume that, in the absence of aid, the Soviet domestic product would have remained the same; in fact, one of the major determinants of Soviet wartime GNP was the loss and gain of territory, so anything detracting from the quantity and quality of the Soviet war effort would certainly have reduced the total output of the domestic economy. Quality, as well as quantity: the military effectiveness of a billion rubles laid out on Soviet defence was surely higher if the package included lend-leased means of transport, communication and soldiers' kit. The absence of aid also implied substantial cutbacks of civilian consumption and investment. Without aid, gross investment would have remained below replacement levels, resulting in a steady contraction of the capital stock available for use; this too would have forced Soviet GNP below actually achieved levels in 1942-44, with fewer resources then available for defence. Since there was a limit to the resources freed by cutting investment, living standards would also have been depressed below the levels actually experienced, which were already associated with widespread deaths from starvation. More starvation deaths amongst the working population would have forced an additional decline in domestic output.
Snip.
"Without [Lend-Lease Aid], everyone would have had a worse war. The western Allies would have had to kill and be killed in greater numbers. The Russians would have done less killing and more being killed."

So now that it should be fairly clear where Harrison stands on the issue, who are these other economists?

[conon394]

Something along these lines:
> Maintained a Threat from Western Europe
> Kept a Front open in Africa
> Restricted German Naval Aspects
> Provided a Spring board for the Bombing war and eventually for the invasion of France.

Without Britain continual involvement, there would not be a western Theater since there is no were else to support the mass troop movements and bombers, and supplies to Russia from the western direction would be completely cut off.

Theirs also the free run for Italy to occupy North Africa and maybe even provide something of worth to Germany.

Though of course i don't consider Britain's continual fighting to be thee pivot point, but it sure did help a lot.

Sort of but you are failing to consider the full ramifications of a British/German Settlement.

First Germany and Italy would have the large drag on petroleum from there naval operations and be in a position to intimidate Turkey into allowing the German and Italian fleets to operate in the Black sea.

Germany would not face a very costly (in terms of diverted high end steel and tools etc) to the U-boat war, getting even more-so with the Elecktoboats

The ETO might not have used up a vast amounts of German manpower, but it did divert the majority of Italian manpower. w/o blockade and the defeats they suffered vs the British in Africa (and recall no fiasco in Greece), Italy could have continued its armaments program and provided far more manpower to the Axis effort in the USSR.

If Britain came to terms that would mean more or less the end of the line for the governments in exile in London. Thus Germany's Axis pal Japan gets the French and Dutch colonies w/o war. It also more or less make occupation easier for Germany were it controls directly and makes it all that much more likely places like Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey etc get the message nobody is going to help you so they either jump for Stalin or Hitler. Consider the comparable data at the time - France crushed, while the Finns made the Red army look foolish, I'm thinking most nations would opt for the best deal they could get from Hitler.

Germany is no longer blockaded, it is free to collaborate with Japan and Japan has no pressing need to attack the US or UK having gotten the petroleum it needs. Germany gets access to the imports perhapse not weapons, but certainly raw materials as do oll the neutrals in Europe and they can more easily act as middlemen for Germany to circumvent any residual US or UK trade restrictions.

Perhaps even a Japanese declaration of war on the USSR. Sure I know the IJA was not in a position to attack, but standing on the defensive would create real problems for the USSR and allow Japan to blockade all Russian ports - so no LL and no cash imports either.

Overall than Germany and its European 'Empire' is not just helped by the removal of negative factors (the actual US/UK war effort) but a whole host of positive ones that people seem to forget.

Without the the UK, Russia would loose oh perhaps not absolutely and not right away but Germany would certainly take most of European Russia - the ability to use the German and Italian navy in the Black sea is all too often ignored - Baku would fall and isolated Russia would have no fuel - game over.

[OTZ]

.http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7...0Union&f=false

Pages 250 onwards he gives the role of LL in the War. A view you have for years contradicted while citeing his works..

I had a look at your Google Book link, and Mr Harrison states the following in the pages you referrenced:

"Therefore without Allied aid, the authorities would been compelled to withdraw major resources from fighting in 1943 in order to stablise the economy; at best, a victory in Europ would have been long postponed."

Hmmm - so the best case scenario (as in everything goes the Allies' way), the Allies still win but it'll take longer. I wonder what the other end of that spectrum is? Heck, I wonder what the mid-point would be? I'm not sure how else to interpret that Hanny - sounds like a flip of the coin in terms of success in this what-if scenario.

[Kitsunegari]

The main reason for the Soviet casualties were actually the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany, not the scale of fighting.

What are you talking about? This was war on a scale never before seen, the largest invasion ever. Also Stalin's stupid orders caused thousands of unnecessary casualties.

That doesn't make sense. What impact did the UK decision to "keep fighting" (in Africa, presumably?) have on Barbarossa? That it delayed it slightly, or that it diverted a minute portion of German personnel?

What exactly was so "pivotal" to the war about it, and in what way?

In fact it hastened the decision to attack the USSR. Hitler stated that he saw the Red Army as the UK's last hope in Europe and believed that defeating it would force the UK to come to terms.

[Hanny]

Oh Hanny...why oh why must you continue to be disingenuous...
Here's a response I got from Mr Harrison:
Dear XXXX
You can find a discussion of the “4%” and what it may have meant in my “The Soviet Economy and Relations with the USA and Britain.” In The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-1945, pp. 69-89. Edited by Howard Temperley and Ann Lane...In my book Accounting for War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 6, I give a more considered estimate of the contribution of Allied mutual aid as 5 percent of Soviet GDP in 1942 and 10 percent in 1943 and 1944. I think you could call this the current best estimate, which it will remain as long as no else is willing to invest as much effort in checking it as I did in producing it.
I hope this helps.
Mark
In his words:
"...it was still smaller as a fraction of the combined wartime expenditures of the United Kingdom and the United States, which totalled approxiamately $295 billion from mid-1942 through mid-1945; compared with this, aid to the USSR amounted to no more than 4 per cent"
Interesting - he does use 4%! But hold on a minute - that's not 4% in terms of Soviet production! That's 4% of Allied expenditures. He goes on:
"By coincidence, 4 per cent has more than one significance. At the end of 1947 the wartime planning cheif, NA Vonesenskii, published an account of the Soviet wartime economic effort which included referred to the growth of Soviet imports in 1942-43, mainly from Britain and America, compared with the much lower level of 1940, "a comparison between the amount of these allied deliveries of industrial goods to the USSR and the volume of industrial production at the Soviet Socialist enterprises in the same period...will show that the deliveries amounted to only about 4 per cent of the domestic production during the war economy period.: (But whether "the same period" meant 1942-43, or "the war ecomony period" as a whole, was left irritatingly vague. In later writing, east and west, this figure would be extensively misquoted, and was most commonly rendered as the proportion of all Allied deliveries to the total wartime production of the entire Soviet economy with "only" as an additionally wounding qualifier - "only" 4 per cent")"
I have bolded and upsized the relevant portion to ensure you clearly see what Harrison says about "4%".
He continues to deconstruct this myth in the paper, but I see no need to continue.

Because A) i stated he uses the 4% of $, which he does. From that $ value which every economist starts from they then calculate the production numbers it allowed to be bought. B) It is others who confused 10%/12% of production bought from 4%$ expended, ( without which no such compuatationm can be adduced) as being the same, not myself. C) your strawman is noted, if only you had bothered to read this thread you will see i made this distinction already.
Its even in the post your startwman is a reply to:

Every economist citeied here uses the same 4% value, and still do, its what that $ bought thats has changed in inpretationof LL

And i started with

Year - % of LL Aid Sent - % of LL Aid/Total Defense Expenditures
1941 - 0 - 0
1942 - 2 - 0
1943 - 14 - 5
1944 - 27 - 10
1945 - 36 - 10
Absolute total - 4%

Which is $ spent, not what is produced from that expenditure, so your strawman has been noted.

Quote:
Harrioson. on the role of 4% LL.
Sorry Hanny, but this part (below) is not Harrison discussing the "4%" - again, you are obscuring the facts.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:

Your problem here, is, its from: Accounting for War, chapter 6.

So now that it should be fairly clear where Harrison stands on the issue, who are these other economists?

Every economist, starts with what is spent, that $ value is 4% of the Russian expenditure, and i have posted
Harrison in several of his works using that value, from which he and other then calculates what it then produced.

I had a look at your Google Book link, and Mr Harrison states the following in the pages you referrenced

You missed the point, and i have given his views, whic do not conform to your speculation."For the SU the Allied aid did not matter very mutch till after Stalingrad."
He makes comparison to ww1 SU imports here:http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ec...blic/ehr93.pdf
Here he shows that UK SU$ value LL was double counted:http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ec...&embedded=true

What are you talking about? This was war on a scale never before seen, the largest invasion ever. Also Stalin's stupid orders caused thousands of unnecessary casualties.
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I think he refers the deliberate starvation of POWs, the deliberate starvation of the occupied SU, under the general plan for the East which called for c25-30 million SU to die from starvation. Its well documented http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Third-Re.../dp/0713997427or online http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hunger_Plan

[Kitsunegari]

Oh i'm well aware of that, but the scale of combat was staggering as well. 250k Axis troops destroyed at Stalingrad, something like 800k Soviet troops lost at Kiev, etc. Combine this with Stalin's orders not to give ground ever and it ensured huge casualties.

[Wulfburk]

British Empire was a joke in WW2. They lost all their ww1 glory by letting their best dude to be defeated by a maniac. They even couldn't hold the stronghold of Asia aka Singapore for a week and their best batteship in the region was sunk to bottom. Indeed, after the war, their 'victory' was they lost all their colonies and international prestige. Without US and Russia, British may speak Japanese and German instead of English right now.

They didnt "let" their best dude to be defeated, their best dude let himself be defeated and dragged with it the whole British expeditionary force.

Singapore may have fallen, but in the same theatre of war the british defeated the japanese, with no help of any ally, in the border between india and burma, Britain was not defeated, they lost two important cities (singapore and rangoon) but managed to fight back and recapture most of the lost territory, forcing major defeats into the japanese in the battle of imphal and Kohima, which had the british forces commanded by probably the best general in the war, William Slim.

Anyone who says UK was a joke in world war 2 is obviously wrong, Italy was a joke, lost at greece, lost at north afrika and lost at east afrika (which they outnumbered the british). France was a joke, the whole fall of france.....

How was UK a joke?? Battle of Britain, El alamein, tunis, raid on barce, mersa matruh, Wadi Akarit, Alam el Halfa, medenine, battle of keren, imphal, kohima, goodwood, (perhaps the most decisive battle in normany, the only reason cobra was so easy) and several other battles in which the british achieved victory.