What was the military doctrine of Western Allies?

[Cyclops]

Indeed. It is also the essence of all mobile warfare, more notably laid out by Colonel Fuller and Basil Liddel-Hart, rather than some mystical legacy stretching back to a completely different era and style of warfare. Dynamic warfare pre-WW1 meant pitched battles, movement and concentration of force against a single point in the form of armies. WW1 and mass mobilization changed that dynamic eternally.

The Kaiser's armies in WW1 developed other doctrines, most notably Falkenhayn's horrific attritional policies (eg Falkehayns killing fields at Verdun) to deal with this reality. However classic manouevre with flexible well led forces lead to victory in the East, and thetactical solutions developed there nearly led to some kind of victory in the West (the French at least went to the brink with Michael).

Hitler basically shouted down most of OKW when he gave the go ahead for Fall Gelb, for Czechoslovakia, indeed for Barbarossa itself.

Yes but in with the changes from Gelb he was backing a subordinate's initiative. The rot set in with Typhoon, generals asking to retreat smacked of the defeats in 1918 and the "stab in the back" which for ideological reasons Hitler couldn't swallow. Even with Barbarossa he gave some flexibiliuty of approach such as the huge switch of panzers to encircle Kiev: this was classic manouevre again, dynamic and opportunistic, although some feel it was fatal to Barbarossa (not me though and IIRC from an earlier thread you arrived at a similar conclusion).

Losses are an irrelevance, the maintenance of strategic initiative is paramount, and in the post-Kursk environment the Russians possessed said initiative and the capacity to absorb whatever casualties the Germans inflicted without risking loss of said initiative. As I said: They could steamroller over any German counterattacks. They simply had the reserves to do so.

The post-Kursk environment was the result of the Uranus success, which was a textbook deep operation. It is also as you say theuy matched doctrine to available strengths. Human wave was effective for the Chinese in Korea, upo to apoint (the point being US ap[plication of superior firepower, another effective doctrine).

Hmm, I must concede the ambition of Bagration.

Not as ambitious as Overlord of course.

- 500 tanks knocked out, some 60,000 casualties, and the Germans driven back across the Seine. The number which escaped - substantial, but they escaped without any of their heavy equipment, their weapons, their guns, tanks, their trucks and soft skinned vehicles, all of which were far more valuable to the Germans than mere manpower.

That bad? I had no idea. I do recall the German's slipped out signifcant force so they were able to fight another day.

The US decided to use material, the Soviets, bodies. The Soviets may have faced 60% of the Nazis' manpower, but in material terms both fronts were relatively equal. You also ignore the fact that the Soviets were permitted to take Berlin, because Eisenhower had no desire to embark in a mad, casualty-inflicting race for a vainglory trophy when he could act in a measured, appropriate fashion, collect the cream of German industry and expertise, arrive in Germany with a functional army (in case Stalin got overambitious) and declare victory without having to spend American lives fighting the pointless battle for Berlin.

The war was ended by killing Hitler. Stalin and Eisenhower could not know this, bu in the event the symbolic prize of Berlin was the stop button on Hitlers destruction engine.

US doctrine since WW2 (or even WW1?) seems to include 1. establishing complete air and sea supremacy, 2. massive application of force. WW2 saw really excellent handling of tough allies: Ike worked with Monty and De Gaulle(!), tricky French and British Imperial interests were resolved in favour of the US (Australia was turned from the Commonwealth to a loyal US ally) or at least smoothed over until the war was won.

Bush snr in 1st Irq is another example, his masterful alliance building and window dressing (he was justified but made sure people knew it) is in contrast to the unpopular wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan (I mean if there was a justified invasion, this was it) and 2nd Iraq. Is this a return to Monroe style isolationism?

I am interested in the development of US doctrine. I believe the 19th C US army had an extremely effective anti-guerilla doctrine used against native americans as well as Mexican bandit incursions and uprisings in the Philipines.

Was this dropped in favour of mass warfare doctrines in the world wars? They were underskilled for counter-insurgency in Vietnam (although they could wipe massive numbers of Chinese in Korea) and non too flash in the recent round of conflicts.

[Nik]

Actually, the Soviet Union disfavored human wave attacks from 1943 onwards. They simply had lost the manpower to use this doctrine in the two preceding years.
That's one of the clichés often being handed around of a soviet brute force approach relying less on skill and more on mass.
While on a company level, the red army still had it's deficits in leadership (after all, appalling losses in junior grade leader ranks were the common nature of all armies, moreso for the soviets who had lost it's trained prewar cadre in 1941), the soviets reached that bottom first, and compensated by masterfully concentrating their forces on a strategical level and achieving their operational goals through maneuver, not simply frontal attacks (with a few, often frowned upon counterexamples like the oder battles or the liberation of leningrad).
Except for guard units, almost no red army division ever reached it's strength on paper. The food chain for replacement assignment was clear. Guard units first, followed by units in the 5 tank armies, then mechanized units in general and at the end the lowly rifle division. From 1943 onward, most rifle divisions had an effective strength of 2-4000 men instead of the established 10500, and most mechanized "corps" had the size of a full strength tank division. By 1945, the red army had more or less consumed it's manpower reserve, and could not have gone into another 2 or 3 years of offensive warfare.

[ikalugin]

I would suggest reading this link, I would make a long post in GMT evening.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...ad.php?t=41862

[Hakkapeliitta]

Actually, the Soviet Union disfavored human wave attacks from 1943 onwards. They simply had lost the manpower to use this doctrine in the two preceding years.
That's one of the clichés often being handed around of a soviet brute force approach relying less on skill and more on mass.

It's a somewhat propagandistic cliché that is often used to describe how communist regimes fight wars that emerged during the Cold War. Usually, like for example as a description of tactics the Chinese used in the Korean War, it's not at all true.

[ikalugin]

It's a somewhat propagandistic cliché that is often used to describe how communist regimes fight wars that emerged during the Cold War. Usually, like for example as a description of tactics the Chinese used in the Korean War, it's not at all true.

Mostly based on books done by the 3 big german authors in the 50s, which had no or little references to factual sources (like the archives).
In general I would suggest Glantz for WW2 history.

[Gatsby]

Actually, the Soviet Union disfavored human wave attacks from 1943 onwards. They simply had lost the manpower to use this doctrine in the two preceding years.
That's one of the clichés often being handed around of a soviet brute force approach relying less on skill and more on mass.
While on a company level, the red army still had it's deficits in leadership (after all, appalling losses in junior grade leader ranks were the common nature of all armies, moreso for the soviets who had lost it's trained prewar cadre in 1941), the soviets reached that bottom first, and compensated by masterfully concentrating their forces on a strategical level and achieving their operational goals through maneuver, not simply frontal attacks (with a few, often frowned upon counterexamples like the oder battles or the liberation of leningrad).
Except for guard units, almost no red army division ever reached it's strength on paper. The food chain for replacement assignment was clear. Guard units first, followed by units in the 5 tank armies, then mechanized units in general and at the end the lowly rifle division. From 1943 onward, most rifle divisions had an effective strength of 2-4000 men instead of the established 10500, and most mechanized "corps" had the size of a full strength tank division. By 1945, the red army had more or less consumed it's manpower reserve, and could not have gone into another 2 or 3 years of offensive warfare.

I'm not disputing the fact that the Red Army was consistently below it's on-paper strength, but I think mechanised corps were the size of a division by design. I know that the Soviets replaced the division with the corps in their tank formations (tank corps=division, tank army=oversized corps) and I think it was the same with mechanised formations.

I'm may be wrong.

Edit: A quick check on Wikipedia suggests that the Red Army intially used Western-standard mechanised "corps" but reformed them as the type of "corps" used for the tanks.

[Cyclops]

... By 1945, the red army had more or less consumed it's manpower reserve, and could not have gone into another 2 or 3 years of offensive warfare.

I have read this somewhere, do you have a source? Its one of those interesting variables when considering counterfactuals such as "Patton keeps going".

IIRC the Soviets were pulling workers out of the factories to keep the fronts rolling, so the 6-12 month outlook wasn't good. Is this true?

I would suggest reading this link, I would make a long post in GMT evening.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forum...ad.php?t=41862

Thnx, helpful read.

[Nik]

I have read this somewhere, do you have a source? Its one of those interesting variables when considering counterfactuals such as "Patton keeps going".

Gantz, "When titans clashed".
Although it's not as if the germans were much better of. They had to reduce the frontline strength of their divisions as well. The number of infantry battalions per division was reduced from 9 to 6 and the Battalion was reduced from around 1200 men down to 850 and later even less.

IIRC the Soviets were pulling workers out of the factories to keep the fronts rolling, so the 6-12 month outlook wasn't good. Is this true?

Depends, for a limited operation like their offensive in Korea, they more than enough experience, battle hardened units. For a full scale war against the western allies, probably less. The Red army also aggressively pressed every male russian in the liberated areas into the red army, and created "fortified regions", an equipment heavy/personell light unit that could take over the place of a rifle division in less threatened/non offensive sectors. Given germanys impending collapse, I think they had more than enough strength to defeat the wehrmacht, but not enough for a full blown war against the anglo-american armies. But than again, I would like to avoid another round of "what if western vs eastern allies" mudpit.

[Cyclops]

Ye sthe Russians definitely "tooled up" , they implemented the machine war doctrine extensively. I guess lend lease really helped here with mechanising forces and supply chains.

[ikalugin]

Ye sthe Russians definitely "tooled up" , they implemented the machine war doctrine extensively. I guess lend lease really helped here with mechanising forces and supply chains.

The mobile groups have used tanks and spg weapons for their mobility, ie trucks played a minor role in the "Deep" part of "Deep battle". Also, remember, most of artillery was still horse drawn in non tank formations even in the end of the war.

[Rolling Thunder]

The mobile groups have used tanks and spg weapons for their mobility, ie trucks played a minor role in the "Deep" part of "Deep battle".

BWHAHAHAHA!

What do you think moved the massive infantry support elements, the tanks?

[Jagdpanzer]

BWHAHAHAHA!

What do you think moved the massive infantry support elements, the tanks?

Russian mechanized infantry was often carried into battle by the tanks. Never heard of tank desant before?

[Hakkapeliitta]

But wouldn't trucks still be pretty important to ferry ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, etc to the troops in order to sustain the attack? Without trucks wouldn't the offensives have been shorter as "strokes".

[Jagdpanzer]

yes.

[DarthShizNit]

If you really want to knwo Americas strategy in the war...

[TWWolfe]

But wouldn't trucks still be pretty important to ferry ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food, etc to the troops in order to sustain the attack? Without trucks wouldn't the offensives have been shorter as "strokes".

Trucks and jeeps were actually one of the most important items lend-lease shipped to the Soviet Union.

[Rolling Thunder]

Russian mechanized infantry was often carried into battle by the tanks. Never heard of tank desant before?

No, some small elements of mechanised infantry were carried into battle by tanks. This was an exception, as infantry riding tanks suffered horrendous casualties. This was not at all the norm. Infantry were either motorised, or foot-borne.

[ikalugin]

BWHAHAHAHA!

What do you think moved the massive infantry support elements, the tanks?

You would notice that red army discarded those massive support elements due to their mobility, horse drawn artillery and so on (no rifle divisions in tank armies).
The late wae mobile groups themselves were pretty much fully mechanized, with self propelled artillery (Su76 Su122 Su152) and infantry on the tanks/spg.

What is funny is that W.Allies failed to create those mobile groups, failed to exercise initiative (a trait attributed normally to the soviet commanders by the western historians) even that they did have a massive advantage in motorization and had sufficient number of armored vehicles to do that.

[Rolling Thunder]

You would notice that red army discarded those massive support elements due to their mobility, horse drawn artillery and so on (no rifle divisions in tank armies).
The late wae mobile groups themselves were pretty much fully mechanized, with self propelled artillery (Su76 Su122 Su152) and infantry on the tanks/spg.

And your point being what, exactly?

What is funny is that W.Allies failed to create those mobile groups,

It would be hard to create "mobile groups" when the entirety of armies were mechanized.

failed to exercise initiative

Uhm, source?

[Dick Cheney.]

USSR have the deep battle and the Germans used blitzkrieg. What about the Western Allies? I searched online but I couldn't get straight answers.

Strategic bombing.