Did Diocletian have a master plan for reconstruction of the empire, or was the Tetrarchy the result of ad hoc series of responses to needs. Lets hear the Communis opinio

[Constantius]

The thread title says it all, and both views have a number of learned adherents, but I would like to hear, what you all think.
It was not long after Carinus was killed by his own troops and Diocletian went to Italy, that he made the first step to the Tetrarchy, by appointing to the rank of Caesar Aurelius Maximianus, whom had served with Diocletian in Carus' army, later he was elevated to Augustus and taking the gentilicium of Valerius- some say he did this because he was formerly adopted- but it is quite likely a display of subservience to the father figure of Diocletian. But the debate of adoption aside, were theses steps part of an initial plan? Or was it simply the need for a colleague to meet the military threats and share responsibilities of government, there was not any formal division of territory at this stage, and later in 286 the Augusti begin using the epiphets Iovius and Herculius. So please share your thoughts, hopefully will be an interesting discussion

[Diocle]

Diocletianus had a strategy and a plan, sadly Constantinus (UT EUM DII DEAEQUE PERDANT!) destroied them both!!!

[Constantius]

Come on now Diocle, I didn't ask for your opinion on Constantine, your feelings on Christian emperors is very clear. But what I hoped for is a discussion on Diocletian's plans if any for repairing empire, was the tetrarchy always his plan?
I will happily discuss Constantine within the context of the question, but 'I don't like him because he ruined the empire' is not really what I was hoping for

[Diocle]

Constantius, we read a lot of books, and various historians, in my studies I was taught to approach the History books taking into account the political and religious or philosophical point of view of the authors!

What I want to say is that about Diocletianus and Constantinus (UEDDP!) the debate will never cease, why? Because the same historical sources are read in opposite ways by the historians of different schools, in this way the question is, and ever will be unsolvable.

[Constantius]

If you don't want to discuss don't, I proposed a question because I would like to hear the view points of others, and it could be an interesting discussion, and it has already been derailed after three posts!!

[Diocle]

No, please don't be polemic, dear friend!....IMO The thread is of great interest and importance, I was only explaining that the discussion is not easy!.....and probably it involves religious and political feelings more than you or me may expect!! Anyway it is a very good idea!!

[Pompeius Magnus]

Thank you for the invitation Constantius. Your question is fair. However, unfortunately I am not an expert here on sociological issues of the empire or the question regarding the inner administration.
My area of expertise is the army - and even if all themes encroach in himself, so my focus is different.
What my research has brought to daylight is that there was no specific agenda, an agenda which the Army would change to its foundations.
I wouldn't speak anymore - from my present perspective - from a profound reform of Diocletian and Constantine (concerning the army!).
It was a natural slow process of change - which took place in previous centuries again and again.
And it would not remain with the one "change". As we all know, there were also mini-reforms and reforms in general in later eras.

The creation of new commands and offices (e.g. Magistri... etc) in the army followed simply the political situations. Strictly speaking, the change began with Gallienus, followed by Aurelianus and so on. And so each of the following Emperors had contributed its own share to the "change". Sometimes more - sometimes less.
Even a conscious neglect and reduction of border troops was neither desired nor promoted.
The foundation of tactical warfare was in a continuous process of constantly new developments however also continue to use proven.
Which means that old things with new things always went hand in hand equally.
Insofar - and this was another aim from my side - was to show that even the east-roman army was still very roman in the 6th century.
By the way, I have started to write a Notitia Dignitatum of the 6th century (which will be published officially in latin this year) and meanwhile I found more than 100 units (and it's still not finished)! The grafical presentation and the academical analysis of sources needs however more time since that project is quite unique.
Mommsen and Grosse have written in their books that a ND of the 6th century would probably look similar like the version from 420/430AD. For this reason I have checked and re-read at least 400 greek written Papyri, books of Simokatta, Agathias and many others. And yes, finally I may say that it's very similar. But back to topic...

I have written an elaboration which hopefully helps to clean up most of the stereotypes:
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=514257

[Constantius]

Thank you for your contribution Pompeius Magnus, you raised several points that I wish to address, especially concerning changes made by Gallienus that were continued by Diocletian, but first I hope with your input it might attract further discussion

[Emperor Caesar]

I think Diocletian probably did have some kinda plan to kickstart the empire again, but noone wants to give up absolute power of course. I think that he did have a plan yeah. SO maybe the teratarch was not the exact plan but maybe it was I guess we'll never know unless we were there.

[M. Licinius Ibeii]

noone wants to give up absolute power of course.

Except, of course, Diocletian

One of the things I most respect about Diocletian is that he is the ONLY emperor in the entire history of Rome to actually retire. If you haven't seen his retirement palace in Split, I recommend you go there - it is like something out of an M. John Harrison book (check out his Viriconium series) - a medieval town squeezed within the ruins of imperial grandeur. Constantine's propagandists may have excused his eventual murder on the grounds that he was thinking of coming back, but I don't believe it.

Lotsa things to say here and not enough time to say them:

1) Diocletian did have a plan, but it was a plan born in the quarter century before him. Diocletian just happened to be in the happy position of having a stable enough empire to institute it. The plan was fairly straightforward: divide the Empire in two and split it between the two most powerful men in the Empire. Then (and this is the genius bit!) DESIGNATE THEIR SUCCESSOR! The idea was that this gave the four most powerful and ambitious generals in the Empire a vested interest in working together to preserve the status quo, rather than attempting to usurp each others' positions. Of course, it didn't work - and it didn't work because after Diocletian abdicated, the new Tetrarchs failed to designate the succession to the most ambitious man below them - Constantine.

2) The other part of the plan was what Luttwak called 'Defense in Depth'. I think he was wrong to see this as a 'Grand Plan', because I don't think any emperor actually thought in those terms. However, I do believe that Diocletian realised that the ad-hoc strategy developed by Gallienus and Aurelian, who used cavalry to harass the enemy towards the imperial exercitus whilst defending hardpoints and key choke-points with dedicated fortified border garrisons, was best suited to the new realities of the times. I think he 'regularised' what had gone before, giving it official status and official officers (magistri, duces, vicarii etc - though the vicarii may not have appeared until Constatine's reforms). In fact, I'm of the opinion that much of what you see in the Notitia Dignitatum was first tried out by Diocletian - but that is just an opinion.

3) We certainly know that Diocletian made clibanarii cataphracts a regular part of the army, because we find clibanaria armour factories first attested under him. He also made great use of smaller units such as numeri and cunei, and probably instituted the recruitment of smaller units which start to appear in the chalet forts of the Fourth Century. To be honest, I can't remember offhand what his stance was on foederati - but I can say that foederati predated Diocletian (the first fully-attested 'foederati' appear under Probus - that's if you don't count marcus Aurelius' equites Sarmatae, or the probable foedus Gallienus negotiated with the father of Pipa).

4) Finally, you cannot ignore Diocletian's financial reforms. He realised that one of the great problems of the late C3 was hyper-inflation and set out systematically to repair the empire's finances. The 'solidus' was intended to re-establish a credible benchmark against which imperial coinage could be measured, and the Price Edict was intended to prevent runaway prices on basic items. Of course, it didn't work because you can't regulate a free market like that, but it was a valiant try.

So yes, Diocletian had a plan: I'm just not sure that militarily it was an original one.
M<

[Pompeius Magnus]

However, I do believe that Diocletian realised that the ad-hoc strategy developed by Gallienus and Aurelian, who used cavalry to harass the enemy towards the imperial exercitus whilst defending hardpoints and key choke-points with dedicated fortified border garrisons, was best suited to the new realities of the times.

That cavalry became increased in importance is of course correct. That's also suggested by having a closer look at the troops mentioned in the ND in the east regarding the Illyriciani and their spreading - which was however the result of the war against the Palmyrenian empire. However, my researches have shown that we shouldn't overrate the cavalry too much during this time-frame. More than 90% of the ad-hoc Vexillations were still composed by infantry only during the 3rd century.
CIL 3 1890 ; 14370 ; 14433
...and even the sacro comitatu (the first attested name of Comitatenses) was few in number.

That Aureolus, officer of Gallienus, was really declared as leader of all cavalry is difficult to say - since that information comes from Zosimus (I 40,1), who has written his work between 498 and 502 AD. (also picked up by Zonaras XII 25).
Since we know that the Usuper Aureolus was attacked in Mediolanum by strong cavalry regiments he was probably the leader of Vexillations or a kind of mobile field army in Italy - but probably not from all cavalry forces.

Those regiments (Vexillations) were, as shown above, mostly formed by infantry. When Zosimus has written his book a Vexillation was always referred to cavalry. That has probably lead to a misinterpretation between the work/book of the latin original which maybe has described Aureolus as Dux totium Vexillationum (speculation of course).

My suspicion is supported by the fact that we find even in the 4th century still Promoti units which are clearly connected to a Legion.
e.g. Papyri II 1897 no 74 - which speaks about Promoti of Legio II Traiana in 300 AD.

also described here:
http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=514257

3) We certainly know that Diocletian made clibanarii cataphracts a regular part of the army, because we find clibanaria armour factories first attested under him.

That would suggest that Clibanarii were definitively quite different compared to Catafractarii. According my research we cannot say when the first regiment was deployed consisting of pure Clibanarii - or better said a cavalry unit called Clibanarii which was for sure different compared to other cavalry.
It is even still under debate if Vegetius' soldiers of Loricati and Contari were different in armament (3 16+17; Vegetius himself suggest indirectly that both groups were equally armed; loricati ... later named as contati).

It would be nice if you can give at least some sources which supports that theory.
That esp. the few Clibanarii-units in the east were to some degree a copy of Sasanian/Palmyrenian cavalry (and therefore different in armamanet) seems plausible - but does it has something to do with a grand-strategy - or was it just a "Roman-Answer" to current military problems?

I don`t want exclude the possibility of a fundamental reform or deny it at all. But the inflationary use of stereotypes and paradigms such as "grand strategy" or "general-reform" does not reveal itself immediately to me - especially concerning the army it is a very difficult chapter to decide if a certain progress was whished - or if the roman authority was forced to react on something.
The Codex of Theodosius should be taken to get some answers on the most important questions regarding the army - and I mean the distinction between Limitanei and Comitatenses is mostly taken pars pro toto (so to speak) as the principal witness to describe the Refoms.

That troops on the borders should be garrisoned in fixed camps on fixed positions is described in several of the Regulation (Theod. VIII 5, 33 §1) - however, that should not lead to the misinterpretation that we are speaking about something "new" - or that we are speaking about something "special" - since all troops were garrisoned there since Octavian Caesar.
The first time that the term Limitanei appears (in the meaning of a clear disctinction between Limitanei and other troops) is in a Regulation listed in the Theod. Cod. XII 1,56 from the year 363 AD.
That sometimes the ripenses (Theo. VII 20 4 from 325AD) are taken to prove the existence of a distinction between a field army and static troops during the early 4th century is not valid - since Grosse has explained well enough that ripenses were mostly garrisoned in the Hinterland, partially far away from all external borders, and so they are better called garrison-troops. And indeed, there are certain indication that those troops became known as castriciani (Theo. VII 15 2 from 400AD) or even castriani (vita aurel XXXVIII 4 "ripariensium et castrianorum") which describes those troops as castle-troopers.
So, the first serious naming of Limitanei is from 363 - and even here there is absolutely no indication that those troops were inferior compared to the mobile troops.
It needs another 9 years (Theod. VII 22 8) that a Regulation of 372AD orders that all strong and tall men should be transferred to the mobile troops.
Now, another 37 years later (!) we have the first attested Regulation (Theod. VII 15 1) from 409 AD which regulates the first time the property of land concerning the Limitanei. It clearly says that the land became property of the soldiers in return for defending the Limes - and moreover, it can also be inherited by the children..... (!)100 years after the abdication of Diocletian - and nevertheless 70 years after Constantine.

[Emperor Caesar]

That is true, almost forgot that Diocletian did retire, thanks for reminding me. And I couldn't visit the palace until I am much older cause I am still in HS for now.

[Lionheart]

Well my opinion on this issue is based only on my readings. I'm often accused of stating opinion and not give any biography in the end or even remember the name of the writter i read so you have to excuse but i will not use quotes of any kind.
Well my view is based in three or four points.
The first is the overall situation of the Roman Empire during the 3 century crisis. We all can concur that one of the factors that was important in make rome was is army. Indeed is my personnal opinion that during the Julio-Claudian dinasty the army did have a great deal of loyalty towards the emperor even if he was a clearly nutjob case like Caligula. But the army persisted in is loyalty to the imperial house. Well Neron did have it rough but by that time if i'm nos mistaken all the members of the line were already dead and he was the last one. The army begun to change is views in the first case in the first year of the four emperors( Galba, Otho, Vitelius and then Vespasianus). Vespasianus was a men that come from the army and in some way restaured the glory of rome, sadly destroyed by is lunatic second son Domitian. The we enter in the golden age with the adopte emperos that sadly ended up in the worst possible manner when the great Marcus Aurelius makes a very serious mistake by appointing Commodus to the imperial throne. Then we have again a second year of the four emperors (Clodius Albinus, Pescenius Niger, Septimius Severus and other guy that i dont remember now). In the severian dinasty the army gains more power and become aware that the power only rested on then. Then begun the 3 century crises with several generals coming from the border regions or from Illyria. Due to war the legionaries i feel loose their loyalty to rome and become loyal to is commander, or to is familly since or to the region were they are living. Mainly because Caracalla had already given citizenship to all innabitants of the empire and there was also a emperor that make a law allowing the legionaries to stablish themselves on the region were is legion was stationed. So is my sincere conviction that for instance a britain legionary will be very reluctant to come on the aid of rome for instance in the syrian or african border. So they transfered their loyalty to their commander or because they feel that their commander they know well will make a must more interesting emperor than some faraway guy in rome or other town that in several cases was not even capable to pay then. Besides this we have the populations of the province that look out to is brethren, the legionaries, that they are there to protect then from barbarians or bandits and not to go off in faraway wars. Diocletian comes to power in a moment when several legit or usurpers had claimed power based in military force. By this time a commander that could find even a minor for instance alamanic raid will be considered a great commander and thus a good emperor, no matter if he had skills in administration or not he was a good commander and that was enough, this is related with psycology of the people that feel the need to have protection close by, they also needed protection to their crops, their trade, their women and children, thus the legionaries become the close protection and the heroes not a distant emperor and so on. When Diocletian take the throne this ideia was roaming for almost a century so i think he made a wise choice. He was a good commander one of the most sucessfull and one of the great commanders in rome so he had the insight to share power with the other great general of that time Maximianus. So when the two most sucessfull and powerfull generals of the time we allies the spectrum of civil war was less likely. On other hand he also had the insight to see faraway from the diarchy so he looked and what are the other two great commander or that could become so he added then all to power. Now with the for most powerfull in charge they made the obvious choice, each will take charge of parts of the empire, they will defend it, they will give that sense of protection to the population, they also through carisma controled the army and protected trade, persons and crops it was a wise decisition specially because Diocletian constantly remembered is fellow co-rulers that he was the first and all of then were in debted to him. So with the empire safe or apparently safe he was also able to reform the empire himself, he make smaller provinces, he begun the reorganization of the army in the way to prevent great legions and make speady troops that could move swifly to supress raiders from outside or inside, to protect commerce and so on.
So in conclusion the tetarchy resulted from external conditions: need of protection from raiders from outside, stable borders, stable trade routes and the image that the empire was strong enough to the outside world. Internal: a away to destroy internal rebelions, protect the cities, the crops, the trade routes and the persons and also end with the cronic civil war, making provinces smaller, dividing the legions and make more smaller corps of troops that could act swifly and could not become a treat to the men in power. And finally in my opinion it was also a form to reform the empire at is core in terms of administration, smaller provinces allowed to collect taxes in a more swift way, it allows to control alot better the people knowing how many were living in that province and i'm convinced that it was also a way to smash the great corruption that always plaged the empire specially in terms of tax revenues. because central power could have a better way to control that. And a military reform prevent great large of troops under the control of one men this will ended in preventing some commander after achieving a small victory perhaps be tempted by power and creating new offices that only answeared to the emperor in the high hierarchy of the army in the empire. I dont recall if the missi dominici were a creation of Diocletian or Constantine in any case creating a corps of policy, yes i consider then in that way was also a good thing to crack down corruption.
Well this is my opinion on the subject.

[Constantius]

Another good post, I realise I haven't really said what side of the fence I come down on, just glad this is becoming a good thread, will wait before I say my view...feels right as I posed the question

[First Citizen Gallienus]

Interesting paragraph. Somewhat difficult to read, but nonetheless.

[Pompeius Magnus]

Hey Lionheart,

since you say that everything is your own opinion I don't want pick up the single thesis.
I just want remind that the military-units became indeed smaller, however, that was neither a development of the Tetrachs nor anything "new" which derives the term of a "reform".

Smaller and flexible Vexiallations can be observed since the early Principate and we can trace them back to the 2nd century.

example:
the inscription 3.7449 from Montana; dated 155 A.D.

T(iti) Flavii Longini leg(ati) Aug(usti)
pr(o) pr(aetore) vexillat(io) leg(ionis) XI
Cl(audia) sub cura Fl(avii) Maximi (centurionis) [...]

means:
Of Titus Flavius Longinus, legatus of Augustus with
the praetorian authority (or power), the detachment (vexillatio) of Legio Claudia XI
under the command of Flavius Maximus, centurion of that Legion [...] etc etc
I'm able to give at least 15 more inscriptions from that time periode.

On the other hand, we can be fairly sure that during the reign of Diocletian new full assembled Legions were deployed, still numbering 5500 to 6100.
Mommsen (Militärwesen; pages 203 to 213) has proven perfectly that the Legions III Diocletiana, I Iovia and II Herculia were detached - respectively splitted in 5 up to 7 parts much later - and those single parts are shown in the Notitia as well.
So, regarding military units we must be careful when declaring something as part of a "reform" - made during the Tetrarchy.

The installation of the military ducates, under the command of Duces was of course an important reform. We can however ask again the question if it was part of a grand strategy or was it just a reaction to the edgy and confusing years of the 3rd century.

I believe that the real reform is only related to the imperial administration.
Keywords: currency reform, division of the provinces, administrative reform, separation of Military and Civil order etc.
And even here is is still highly disputed (Reece 2004) in modern history how much percent of this flowing process was started before the Tetrarchs, during the reign of Diocletian or much later.
For many of those so-called reforms, it was probably more a matter to put the old system to a new foundation.

[Lionheart]

FC35: Diocletian's reforms & the later Roman Empire (284-395)

When Diocletian took the throne in 284, he found an empire in shambles from 50 years of civil wars, invasions, and plague. The population was decimated and demoralized. Many of the peasants had become serfs tied to the soil for local lords in return for protection. Large sections of the empire's agriculture and trade were wrecked. The coinage was debased to the point of being almost worthless. The frontiers were under constant pressure. And the army was in serious need of reforms. Everywhere he looked Diocletian saw serious problems, while the means to solve those problems were horribly damaged. Therefore, he concentrated on three issues: defense, creating a more efficient government, and protecting the emperor against revolts and assassination.

Turning to the army, Diocletian saw two needs that worked against each other: the need for efficient defense against the growing threats on his frontiers, and the need for insurance against revolts. The larger the army he created, the more potential there was for revolt. But too small an army meant invasions, which was even worse. Therefore, he increased the army to twice its size under Augustus. And since there were now simultaneous threats on several frontiers, Diocletian also split this army into two parts: stationary frontier militia who could stop small invasions and slow down big ones, and mobile legions, increasingly made of cavalry, that could rush to any trouble spots that the militia could not handle.

Unfortunately, the Roman populace, unused to military service after the Pax Romana and reduced in numbers by the recent anarchy, could not provide the number and quality of recruits that were needed. As a result, the government resorted more and more to recruiting Germanic tribesmen who were willing to fight for Rome for a price. While these recruits were warlike enough, they were generally unwilling to submit to the level of discipline and training that had made the Roman army so effective through the centuries. As a result, the Roman army, especially in the West where roughly half the recruits were Germanic, decayed to a pathetic shell of its former greatness.

However, this larger army further increased the danger of revolts by powerful generals. Diocletian did three things to protect himself against this. First, he broke the army into smaller commands for each general, while keeping part of the mobile legions under his personal command. Second, he split the control of each province between civil and military authorities. This made it harder for a rebellious general to command such resources as food and money needed for a successful revolt. However, it also meant that civil governors and generals might not cooperate against invasions. Finally, Diocletian isolated himself with elaborate court ritual similar to that of the Persians. Not only did this physically separate him from potential assassins, it also gave him a semi-divine status that made attacking the emperor seem like a sacrilege.

Finally, the empire needed a more efficient government than it had had in the calmer days of the Pax Romana. For one thing, the empire was much too large for one emperor to defend, especially now that several frontiers would come under attack at the same time. Therefore, Diocletian split the empire between the Latin speaking West and the Greek speaking East, with an emperor, known as an Augustus, and separate administration in each half. Technically, there was still one Roman Empire, but more and more it functioned as two independent and, at times, competing empires. Overall, splitting the empire aggravated the natural split between Greek East and Latin West and prevented cooperation when it was most needed.

Unfortunately, a larger army, bureaucracy, and elaborate court required heavy taxes. This merely stifled people's initiative to work hard. In order to ensure a stable tax base, people and their descendants were tied to their stations in life. Not only did a shoemaker, soldier, or farmer have to remain in his profession for life, but his sons had to follow in his footsteps, as did their sons after them and so on. This plus the high taxes reduced people's incentive to work hard and helped create a stagnant economy. The depressed economy meant a lower tax base to draw taxes from, which forced the government to further raise taxes, thus catching Roman society in a vicious feedback cycle similar to the one that triggered the anarchy of the third century.

The Roman Empire under Diocletian presents a depressing picture, with its frontiers under constant pressure, oppressive taxes, and people stuck in their positions in society. However, it was more secure from invasion, which did allow trade and agriculture to revive some. One might doubt whether Roman security was worth the price paid for it. However, Diocletian did accomplish one thing of importance for later civilization. He propped the Roman Empire back up for two more centuries, allowing the new tribes along the northern frontiers to become more accustomed to Roman civilization through trade, raiding its borders, and serving as mercenaries in its army. When the western half of the empire finally fell by 500 C.E., these tribes were more willing to try to preserve Roman civilization and pass its heritage on to the Middle Ages and eventually to our own culture.

Artcicle retrieved from here: http://www.flowofhistory.com/units/birth/4/fc35

[Lionheart]

Just sharing this resumed article also now i will had a image that was attached to the previous article.

[Lionheart]

Diocletian stabilized the Roman Empire, introducing economic, administrative and social reforms. His actions laid the foundations for the division of the empire.

Diocletian saved an empire collapsing under its own weight. He reformed the way the empire was administered by introducing the division of responsibilities amongst a tetrarchy. His reforms were often extreme and not always successful but ensured that for the twenty five years of his reign, the Roman Empire enjoyed renewed stability.
Diocletian’s Rise to Power

Born in approximately 240AD, Diocletian began life as Diocles. His exact origins were obscure but certainly modest. Born near Salonae (modern Splitt) in Dalmatia, he may have been the freedman of a senator Anulinus. What is certain is that he rose through ability and commitment, becoming commander of the Emperor’s bodyguard. He was elected as emperor by the army in 284 after the murder of the existing imperial dynasty.

Once emperor, he changed his name to Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus. His reign was autocratic. All had to prostrate themselves before him and refer to him as ‘Imperator’ or ‘Our Lord’. Despite this, Diocletian worked hard for the empire he inherited.

Frontier Revolts

Diocletian inherited an empire collapsing under its own weight. The early third century was marked by an increasingly dominant army. It became customary for legions to offer the empire to the highest bidder. Civil wars soon broke out amongst rival factions. This internal turmoil provided the perfect chance for opportunistic barbarians and client states to attack the empires’ frontiers. For the first ten years of his reign, Diocletian and his colleague Maximian were preoccupied with revolts in places as diverse as Gaul, Persia and Egypt as well as attacks from barbarian tribes such as the Alemanni and the Sarmatians. At the same time, it was necessary to reclaim Britain after it became part of the mini empire of Carausius. The revolts were brought under control and the empire stabilised by a series of reforms.
The Tetrarchy

Diocletian’s realised that the empire was too large for one man to manage. His answer was to divide the overall administration between two emperors or Augusti, one for the east and one for the west. Each Augustus would appoint a Caesar, a deputy who was also their effective heir. The Caesars and Augusti were mobile, moving wherever they were required rather than having a one set base. Diocletian himself used Nicomedia in Asia Minor, Sirmium near Belgrade and Trier in Germany, rather than Rome which was of diminishing importance.

The result of this new system, known as a tetrarchy was that the frontiers were quickly brought back under control. The system was also supposed to prevent fighting over the succession, since the heirs were already nominated and in place. This worked, at least whilst Diocletian was emperor.

The first tetrarchy was established in 294AD with Diocletian as the eastern Augustus with Galerius as his Caesar and Maximian Augustus of the west, with Constantius Chlorus, the father of the future Constantine I as Caesar. However, despite the division of power, Diocletian remained in overall control.
Administrative Reforms

In addition to dividing overall control of the empire, Diocletian subdivided the empire into 13 large units or dioceses each governed by a vicarious, a substitute or proxy administrator for the emperor Only the provinces of Achaea, Asia and Africa remained under proconsular control.

Diocletian’s also separated military administration from civil. As emperor, he ensured that he had direct control of the army.
Economic Reforms

Diocletian’s economic reforms were less successful. By the time of his reign, the coinage of the empire was so debased it was basically worthless. Diocletian attempted to rescue it, by re issuing new coins. However, there was not enough gold and silver available to support it. As a compromise, Diocletian then reformed the tax system, allowing payment in kind rather than money.
Social Reforms

As part of his long term rescue plan for the empire, Diocletian drew up a list of occupations essential to the strength of the empire. Soldiers, farmers, civic officials fell into this list. To ensure that these professions were always well manned, Diocletian made them hereditary, effectively inhibiting social mobility.
Diocletian and Religion

A religious conservative, Diocletian was devoted to the old ways. He instigated a series of measures that became known historically as the ‘Great Persecutions’, forcing Christians to sacrifice to the old gods. This was despite the fact that his wife Prisca and daughter Valeria were reputed to be at the very least Christian sympathisers.
Diocletian’s Retirement

In 303, Diocletian celebrated 20 years in power with his first visit to Rome. However, the following year, he fell seriously ill and took the unprecedented decision to stand down as emperor. Forcing Maximian to do the same, Galerius and Constantius Chlorus became Augusti, appointing new Caesars in their turn.

Diocletian retired to a magnificent palace he built in his hometown. Retirement suited him and he did not miss power. He resisted a recall to power in 308AD, despite the disintegration of his system of tetrarchy, with the words ‘if you could see at Salonae the cabbages raised by our hands, you surely would never judge that a temptation.’ He died in 313 AD.
Sources

The Style of Life and manners of the Imperatores (39) by Sextus Aurelius Victor

Diocletian by Ralph W Mathisen De Imperatoribus Romanis

Who’s Who in the Roman World by John Hazel. Routledge: London and New York

Article retrieved here: http://natasha-sheldon.suite101.com/diocletian-a48431

[Lionheart]

5. THE REFORMS OF DIOCLETIAN AND CONSTANTINE

The reforms associated with emperors Diocletian (A.D. 284-305) and Constantine (306-337) should be seen as attempts to deal with the problems mentioned above. They formed the basic organization of society in the early Byzantine period and are notable as an important attempt to regulate the life of a state through legislative fiat. The reforms were inaugurated piece by piece at various times in response to the continuing crisis and many of the details are uncertain, but they are probably best understood together.

A. Political

1. The reign of Diocletian put and end to the political chaos which had plagued the empire; simply by remaining on the throne for twenty years he stabilized the situation considerably.

2. Administrative reforms: their purpose was two-fold--to provide effective government and to avoid usurpation.

a. Many new provinces were created by the subdivision of old provinces.

b. Civil and military functions of office were separated; provincial governors no longer had military powers and military commanders had to seek funding from the civil administration.

c. An elaborate civil hierarchy was created alongside a military chain of command: at the top of the civil hierarchy, just below the emperor, was the praetorian perfect (praefectus paetorio), in charge of one of the 3 or 4 prefectures; below the prefect was the vicar (vicarius), in charge of a diocese, and the provincial governor (normally praeses), in charge of a province. Each province was made up of a number of cities (civitates, poleis), each administered by a council of leading citizens (curia, boule).

d. At the top of the military hierarchy, in a position similar to that of the praetorian prefect, was magister militum; below him were the comes (pl. comites) and the dux (pl. duces)

e. In addition there was an elaborate court: such officials as the magister officiorum, comes sacrarum largitionum, comes rei privatae, praepositus sacri cubiculi.

3. The person of the emperor was considerably elevated and separated from ordinary men.

a. The emperor was surrounded by a bodyguard and his everyday activities were associated with elaborate ceremonial.

b. He became an "oriental despot" in theory and practice.

c. The emperor was supposed to be chosen by the gods rather than by the people.

d. The origins of this development were based on Hellenistic kingship,

which was influenced by Mesopotamian ideas; but the immediate model

was probably the example of Sassanid Persia.

4. The Tetrarchy was Diocletian's attempt to solve some of the political problems by creating four emperors and (in effect but not in theory) dividing the empire into four administrative spheres.

a. There were two senior emperors (the Augusti) and two junior emperors (the Caesars [Caesares]).

b. The Caesars were to replace the Augusti when they died or resigned, and they were then to appoint two new Caesars.

c. This was to regulate the problem of the succession, decrease the likelihood of usurpation, and provide for more immediate local rule.

d. Ultimately the Tetrarchy failed, but it left its mark on the administration of the state and showed that the empire as a whole could be divided.

B. Military

1. As we have seen, the military command was extensively reformed and separated from the administration of the provinces.

2. The army was composed of various kinds of troops:

a. The limitanei--the old border troops, stationed permanently along the frontier; now little more than militia (primarily infantry).

b. The comitatenses--mobile field armies stationed in the interior, ready to go wherever the emperor sent them (primarily cavalry).

c. The imperial guards (scholae, etc.)--the "private" army of the emperor, stationed near the emperor's residence.

C. Economic

1. In A.D. 301 Diocletian attempted to stop inflation by imperial order, the so- called Edict on Prices.

2. The coinage was reformed: Constantine's gold solidus (struck at 72 to the pound) became the world's standard coin for the next thousand years.

3. An effective tax structure was devised, based on the annona and the indictio.

a. The annona was a land-tax determined by the quality to the land and the manpower available to work it (capitatio-iugatio).

b. The tax base was calculated periodically, eventually every fifteen years (the indictio).

c. The tax was originally collected in kind (normally grain), but money payments were soon substituted.

d. The new system allowed the preparation of annual budgets and put the financial system of the state on a relatively secure footing.

D. Cultural

1. Diocletian and Constantine followed the religious trends of the day and supported their political and military positions by reference to religious ideals.

a. Diocletian called himself Jovius and his junior associate Herculius.

b. This probably explains the last great persecution of Christianity, since the Christians naturally refused to support this program.

2. Authoritarianism, uniformity, rigidity, and appeals to strength are usually seen as the characteristics of the age.

Retrieved also here: http://isthmia.osu.edu/teg/50501/5.htm

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