Causes and Effects of the Franco-German War
Carl Von Clausewitz’s most famous, and often quoted, dictum that “War is a continuation of policy with and admixture of other means”[1] has never been truer of a conflict than of the Franco-Prussian war. In this essay, I propose to discuss the role that the policies of Otto Von Bismarck played in the build up to war. I will use the examples of Bismarck’s handling of the Hohenzollern Candidacy and his provocative re-writing of the Ems Telegram in his attempts to provoke the French. It also seems helpful to discuss the role that Helmuth Von Moltke (the elder) played, as chief of staff, in Prussia’s readiness for war. This readiness then lead to a rise in tensions and a sort of arms race between France and Prussia. I also propose to explore the tangible effect that the war had on the creation of a unified German state under one Kaiser. This single united Germany would de-stabilise European power-politics and would eventually lead to the outbreak of World War I.
The origins of the war can be traced back to the Sleswig – Holstein affair in 1864 where Bismarck used the tempting bait of French acquisitions to keep them quiescent during what was a rather shameful land-grab by Prussia[2]. The promise of glory proved too much for Napoleon II whose regime was desperately in need of a prop if it was going to survive[3]. The swift victory over Austria was a stunning reaffirmation of all that the ‘revolutionaries’ of Scharnhorst had set out to do after the humiliation of Jena-Auerstadt.[4] Bismarck used this sensational victory to tighten his grip on the deputies of the Reichstag; he also used the strength of the armed forces as a base for further diplomatic action. The real question that came to be on everyone’s lips was whether or not, from 1866 onwards, Bismarck was preparing for war with France. The Hohenzollern candidate, which he was at pains to point out was a matter for the Royal Family and not of the Prussian state[5]. When news of Leopold’s decision to ascend to the throne became public knowledge an outcry began in Paris. Gramont, who was head of the French diplomatic corps, sent le Sourd who was the Charge d’Affaires in Berlin to enquire at the Foreign office of Prussia if this ‘base plot’[6] was anything to do with the Prussian state. Sourd was brushed off by the foreign office when Under-Secretary Thile said that “he, and by extension the foreign office, knew nothing of this” Smarting at this offhand rebuttal le Sourd informed Paris of this lack of progress. Gramont then ordered Benedetti to come back from his holiday and try to resolve the situation.
Benedetti, who was the French Ambassador in Berlin, was then sent to Bad Ems to speak to the King directly. William, who was not at all in favour of seeing a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain agreed to withdraw Leopold from the candidature. Bismarck was then telegrammed and told that Leopold had ‘voluntarily stepped down’[7]. Galvanised, Bismarck came from his estate to Berlin, thence to Ems. It was now that Napoleon played directly into Bismarck’s hands and lost the opportunity to win a stunning diplomatic victory. Napoleon, via Gramont in a private order, told Benedetti to get from the Prussian King that he approved of the withdrawal and a refutation of any future designs on the Spanish throne. Napoleon’s going behind the backs of his deputies was to have grave repercussions later, but the most immediate result of this foolishness was that Bismarck was able to intercept and re-write a telegram sent by the King to Gramont. The text of the infamous Ems telegram read thusly
-“The King had informed the French Ambassador through his A.D.C that he had nothing further to tell him”-
This was an obvious and calculated snub, designed to enrage French national sentiment[8] When Bismarck reported this in the Reichstag, he also claimed that Benedetti had come up to and addressed the King against his will, which was a grievous slur on the Royal prerogative. In truth the King had addressed Benedetti, but by the time he knew of the affair it was too late for him to change course. Bismarck had, in a master stroke, sent the telegram to papers in Munich, St. Petersburg, Paris and London. When the King opened his paper he declared “But this means war!”[9] The King, who was the only one with the constitutional power to declare war, had effectively been sidestepped by Bismarck. In France meanwhile, the cabinet was in a state of extreme agitation and in a cabinet meeting in the Tuileries they voted unanimously to call out the reserves. This overt preparation for war was guaranteed to make the already tense situation untenable, in effect they had voted for war, though the declaration had not yet come.
The French were confident that they had the military advantage and according to the minister of war Marshal le Boeuf that “everything was prepared and that France had a start of at least fifteen days over Prussia”[10] this belies the arrogance and pride of a French military that had not engaged in a large European war since the ill-fated expedition in the Crimean. Yet despite these assurances the cabinet dithered for four days until, forced by the popular will and the hostile deputies, they declared war on Prussia. This uncertainty and dithering by the French, so reminiscent of the Prussians before Jena-Auerstadt, was to continue throughout the entire war. While the Prussians acted with a unity, speed, aggression and efficiency not seen in Europe since the days of Napoleon.[11]
One of the other, less noted, factors was the Franco-phobia of Helmuth Von Moltke who had been preparing for a war with France since eighteen sixty-seven[12]. Indeed Prussia, never known for its pacific tendencies, was now under the rule of a professional soldier. It was the King’s predisposition towards soldiers and their craft that allowed the Prussian General Staff a free hand in preparing the logistics, transport and plans for invasion. Naturally the preparedness for a war against France led to a rise in confidence that the French could be beaten swiftly. Prussia had possibly the most advanced rail system on the continent and in Von Moltke had a man who had been fascinated by rail since before the first line was even laid in Prussia[13] this enabled the armies of Prussia to move six times faster than had those of Napoleon, giving both an added edge and a greater challenge to the army and the general staff.
Meanwhile the French, after modernising their military equipment, did not have the funds to prepare adequate infrastructure for rapid mobilisation against Prussia[14] la Boeuf’s ill-informed assertion aside. It was this very disparity in speed that would so shock the world, particularly France, when war opened. After the declaration of war the Prussian general staff took control of the forces of the armies of all the German states. The French armies meanwhile were on the defensive, with the emperor Napoleon taking personal charge of the ‘Army of the Rhine’. Instead of following the French strategy and attacking into the Palatinate or further south, Napoleon with his ever-present indecisiveness (so different from his forbearer) waited to see what the Prussians would do. The Prussians meanwhile advanced into France on three axes, because of some last minute changes in the deployment order by Napoleon the French mobilisation, already chaotic, was almost incapable of putting up an organised resistance.[15]
Within weeks the Prussians had pushed the majority of the French forces into the fortress at Metz. Napoleon put himself at the head of an army to go and relieve the fortress, this relief force was attacked by the Prussians at Sedan and on the second day of fighting Napoleon was made a prisoner of war. Napoleon offered the surrender of his sword to William and Bismarck seemed to take this as the surrender of the French, this was not, however, to be. On the fourth of September Napoleon was declared to have lost his throne and in his place arose the third Republic, led by a ‘Council of National Defence’ in Paris. Thus began the legendary commune of Paris, and the armies of national liberation in the south. The final six months of the war saw a dangerous build up of bitterness on both sides, the Prussians resented the pointless prolonging of the war while the French were outraged at the treatment of the Francs-tireurs and the city of Paris.[16]
The two most far-reaching after-effects of the war were the toppling of the second empire and the rise of the third French republic and the creation of a unified German state under the new German Empire under Kaiser William I. The coronation of the Kaiser had a smack of the surreal about it, he wrote to his wife, complaining that this was ‘the most morose day of his life’[17] the reason, as Eyck puts it, “makes not a blind bit of difference to an uncrowned head” the King wanted to be Emperor of Germany not German Emperor. Because Bismarck insisted the new-crowned Kaiser openly and humiliatingly snubbed Bismarck by not even looking at his ever-faithful ‘Iron Chancellor’[18]
Scant days before William ascended to the imperial purple Bismarck was carefully weaving his way between the maddening small German princes, trying to get them to accept William as Kaiser. The oddest of these was the King of Bavaria, Louis II. Bismarck had to get the Bavarian King to write a letter to his King so that he would feel duty-bound to accept the crown.[19] Louis II had previously stated that he would never allow a Hohenzollern on the throne of Germany, yet it would seem that Bismarck paid him an exorbitant bribe from the vast fortune taken from George V of Hannover.[20] Bismarck’s reason for doing this was that the King would not accept the purple if he thought it was coming from the people, should it come from his ‘brother Princes’ then he would feel compelled to accept. Even with the letter from Louis II, William did not give his assent, demanding similar requests from every German Prince. The reason for the King’s reluctance was that he did not want to lose the power that came with being the King of Prussia, and as Eyck puts it “There was no room in his head or heart for anything but Prussia”[21]
Once Bismarck rushed the approval for the coronation through the Riechstag they were discarded, set to re-write the constitution to allow for the Kaiser and the Reich, no representative from the Reichstag was invited to the ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. Another man rendered conspicuous by his absence was Prince Luitpold of Bavaria. Yet with the coronation of the Kaiser the unification of Germany had been achieved by the liberal use of both stick and carrot. That this unity was achieved in the reflected glory of a victorious campaign amongst heightened nationalistic sentiment served to make it all the more attractive to the majority of Germans and served to make the unity strong enough to have lasted to the present day.
The real fallout from the Franco-Prussian war was the handing over of the hegemony of Europe. Hitherto France had been acknowledged as the most powerful state on the continent. After the dazzling Prussian victories had cemented the Imperial crown on the head of Kaiser Wilhelm I the balance of power tipped decidedly in the favour of Germany which was a united empire for the first time. Gone were the fractious princes, in their place was a modern and unified Germany with Prussia solidly at its centre. In France meanwhile the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was a bitter blow, as was their military humiliation. They set about building up a decidedly ant-German power bloc with England and Russia as their main allies. The build up to World War I and all that followed has its roots in the brilliantly Machiavellian policies that Bismarck followed. While the military machine that fought Europe to a standstill was learning still more from their most recent victories.[22]
[1] Clausewitz C Von. On War (Paret and Howard)
[2] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[3] Howard M. – The Franco Prussian War: German Invasion of France
[4] Holborn H. – The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff.
[5] Eyck E. - Bismarck and the German Empire
[6] Steefel L. D. – Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-German war of 1870
[7] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[8] Steefel L.D - Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870
[9] Steefel L.D - Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870
[10] Steefel L.D – Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870
[11] Howard M. – The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871: The German Invasion of France
[12] Rothenberg G.E – Moltke and Schlieffen Pp. 296 - 325 in Makers of Modern Strategy (Ed. Paret P.)
[13]Holborn H. The Prussio-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff In Makers of Modern Strategy Ed. Paret P
[14]Holborn H. The Prussio-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff In Makers of Modern Strategy Ed. Paret P
[15] Grenville J.A.S – Europe Reshaped 1848 - 1878
[16] Grenville J.A.S – Europe Reshaped 1848-1878
[17] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[18] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[19] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[20] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire
[21] Eyck E. – Bismarck and the German Empire.
[22] Rothenberg G.E – Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment in Makers of Modern Strategy Ed. Paret P
Bibliography
· Darmstaedter F.B. – Bismarck and the Creation of the Second Reich Transaction Publishers 2008
· Dawson W.H. – The German Empire – 1867-1914 Allen & Uniwn 1966
· Gall L. Bismarck Vol I - 1815-1871 (Trans Underwood J.A.) - Allen & Unwin 1986
· Gall L. Bismarck Vol II – 1871 – 1898 (Trans Underwood J.A) – Allen &Unwin 1986
· Holborn H. The Prussio-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff Pp281 – 295 - In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age Ed. Paret P. O.U.P 2010
· Howard M. The Franco-Prussian War Methuen & Co Ltd 1981
· Pflanze O. – Bismarck and the Development of Germany Princeton 1963
· Rothenberg G.E. – Moltke, Schlieffen and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment Pp 296 – 325 in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Modern Age Ed. Paret P. O.U.P 2010
· Williams R.L. – The French Revolution of 1870-1871 Lowe & Brydone 1969
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Originally Posted by Markas
) Are you from Britain Magister? I suspect there may be some difference here between countries. I've seen other essays from European posters that have a similar introductory style.
