The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - Justified?

[Primo]

We should just keep an atomic bomb thread open in the VV because this debate seems to come up over and over and over and over and over again.

Said, done - So: Were the killings of the up to 240.000 humans justified?

If debatting about the bombings, those agreeing say that there had been only two choices:

1. Use the A-Bombs
2. Invade Japan

They then make a basic comparrison about the estimated killings, and then conclude that the use of the a-bombs was justified and saved lives.

However, they often times neglect the fact that the a-bombs would have been used in the Invasion, too (source), and that if Japan didn´t surrender after the bombings (and several following) the Invasion would have been started.

However, many disagree with that being the only options America had:

"everyone was so intent on winning the war by military means that the introduction of political considerations was almost accidental" (John McCloy, The Challenge to American Foreign Policy, pg. 42)"

"while Allied leaders were immediately inclined to support all innovations however bold and novel in the strictly military sphere, they frowned upon similar innovations in the sphere of diplomatic and psychological warfare" (Ellis Zacharias, The A-Bomb Was Not Needed, United Nations World, Aug. 1949, pg. 29)"

"The choice in the summer of 1945 was not between a conventional invasion or a nuclear war. It was a choice between various forms of diplomacy and warfare." (Sherwin, pg. xxiv)."

Japan wanted to make a peace - That is an established fact, see these intercepted messages:

• July 11: "make clear to Russia... We have no intention of annexing or taking possession of the areas which we have been occupying as a result of the war; we hope to terminate the war".
  
• July 12: "it is His Majesty's heart's desire to see the swift termination of the war".
  
• July 13: "I sent Ando, Director of the Bureau of Political Affairs to communicate to the [Soviet] Ambassador that His Majesty desired to dispatch Prince Konoye as special envoy, carrying with him the personal letter of His Majesty stating the Imperial wish to end the war" (for above items, see: U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873-879).
  
• July 18: "Negotiations... necessary... for soliciting Russia's good offices in concluding the war and also in improving the basis for negotiations with England and America." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/18/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
  
• July 22: "Special Envoy Konoye's mission will be in obedience to the Imperial Will. He will request assistance in bringing about an end to the war through the good offices of the Soviet Government." The July 21st communication from Togo also noted that a conference between the Emperor's emissary, Prince Konoye, and the Soviet Union, was sought, in preparation for contacting the U.S. and Great Britain (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/22/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).
  
• July 25: "it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter." (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 2, pg. 1260 - 1261).
  
• July 26: Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, Sato, to the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Lozovsky: "The aim of the Japanese Government with regard to Prince Konoye's mission is to enlist the good offices of the Soviet Government in order to end the war." (Magic-Diplomatic Summary, 7/26/45, Records of the National Security Agency, Magic Files, RG 457, Box 18, National Archives).

President Truman knew of the messages' content, noting, for instance, in his diary on July 18, "Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap [sic] Emperor asking for peace" (Robert Ferrell, ed., Off the Record - the Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, pg. 53)

The Emperor requested at the meeting of the Big Six at June 22, 1945 that the peace should be sought through the soviet union (which is kind of ironic, in hindsight). The main problem was that Japans leader weren´t ready to accept an unconditional surrender.

But Why? The main point was the the fate of the emperor. The Emperor was believed to be a god by the Japanese. The dean of historians on Japan's surrender, Robert Butow, notes in regard to the military leaders in Japan's government, "To have acted against the express wishes of an Emperor whom they had unceasingly extolled as sacred and inviolable and around whom they had woven a fabric of individual loyalty and national unity would have been to destroy the very polity in perpetuation of which they had persistently declared they were fighting" (Butow, pg. 224). Or as War Minister Anami said after he agreed to surrender, "As a Japanese soldier, I must obey my Emperor" (Pacific War Research Society, JLD, pg. 87-88).

Only because of the emperors direct orders, against the personal wishes of many of the japanese leaders, peace could be achieved - even after the a-bombs. And that even with him having no juristical power to do this.

But unconditional surrender would still leave the central issue unanswered: would surrender allow Japan to retain the Emperor? Japan's Prime Minister Suzuki spelled out the problem of "unconditional surrender" when he publicly announced on June 9, 1945, "Should the Emperor system be abolished, they [the Japanese people] would lose all reason for existence. 'Unconditional surrender', therefore, means death to the hundred million: it leaves us no choice but to go on fighting to the last man." (Pacific War Research Society, DML, pg. 127; Butow, pg. 69(44n)).

"The one thing they could not do was sign a death warrant for the imperial house", and if it appeared that the Allies would take steps against the Emperor, "then even the most ardent advocates of peace would fall into step behind the [pro-war] fanatics" (Butow, pg. 141).

Even Foreign Minister Togo noted in a July 12, 1945 message to Sato, Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, "as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it [the war] through in an all-out effort". The telegram was intercepted by the U.S., decoded, and sent to President Truman (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873, 875-876).

From this time on, if not earlier, the Allies knew that the throne was the primary issue for Japan. Some of Japans leaders still didn´t want to surrender, thats true, but even the a-bombs didn´t change this.

In the end the Emperor was allowed to stay in power, so why didn´t America just seek peace negotiations, allowing only one condition, the one condition Japan wanted, the one condition that was granted even after the "unconditional surrender" of Japan: To let the emperor live and reign?

It would have saved many lives, possibly it would even have ended the war faster (although this is only an assumption).

This third option, allowing peace and the same kind of surrender as the dropping of the atomic bombs resulted in, without all those lives costs - This would have been the way to go. This third option also annihilates the claim that the a-bombs were dropped in order to save lives, as it saves far more lives, and that without killing 240.000 humans.

/discuss

[Greek Firethrower]

Said, done - So: Were the killings of the up to 240.000 humans justified?

The killings of humans is never justified.

[John ''True Grit'' Wayne]

I read somewhere (god knows where) that Japan wanted to surrender but the USA wanted to make a point to Russia and show them their power and used the atomic bombs to show their power.
Has anybody else heard of this?
Is it a conspiracy theory?

[Primo]

I read somewhere (god knows where) that Japan wanted to surrender but the USA wanted to make a point to Russia and show them their power and used the atomic bombs to show their power.
Has anybody else heard of this?
Is it a conspiracy theory?

This is commonly repeated by many. I don´t know whether it is true or not, but I think it isn´t.

The bombings were, after all, the main reason for russia to pursue their atom programm at the high priority they did. (David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pg. 127-129, 132)
It would be illogical for America to make a point that scares Russia into building threats to America.

[hellheaven1987]

Why not used the A-bombs on Japan be honest?

[Manuel I Komnenos]

Good job on presenting the actual intentions of the Japanese in the middle of your text, something I have been arguing for but was never able to present exactly as it was.

[Enemy of the State]

If you're chasing a murder, is it acceptable to go out with a machine gun and mow down everyone on the street in hopes that the criminal you're looking for gets killed in the process?

[hellheaven1987]

If you're chasing a murder, is it acceptable to go out with a machine gun and mow down everyone on the street in hopes that the criminal you're looking for gets killed in the process?

Why not? The only reason why such option seems not attractive is because you would earn unnecessary punishment - if no punishment restricts such actions I would not hesitate to press the trigger.

[alexanderswift]

If you're chasing a murder, is it acceptable to go out with a machine gun and mow down everyone on the street in hopes that the criminal you're looking for gets killed in the process?

Seems unnecessary if the murderer was on his way to surrender to police.



I think the United States Military just wanted a quick and decisive end to the war with Japan which was achieved. Though was the US brass aware of the Japanese intent to surrender?

[hellheaven1987]

Though was the US brass aware of the Japanese intent to surrender?

US was aware the conditional surrender Japanese mentioned to Soviet, but Truman had rejected that call and insisted a unconditional surrender. US's intention of using A-bombs on Japan might have several reasons:

1. To press Japan furthermore and hope to gain an unconditional surrender.

2. To end the war soon so Soviet would not get huge chulk of land, especially at this point there were signs that Allies-Soviet relation was rapidly cooling down both in home and outside.

3. Popular pressure. Truman actually faced heavy popular pressure to end the war soon after the surrender of Germany and it was pretty sure American public could not accept another one million casualty againsting Japan in main island.

4. Desire to test the bomb. I think that is pretty obviously if you put sooooo much effort on the super weapons you want to see some results.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

I think the United States Military just wanted a quick and decisive end to the war with Japan which was achieved. Though was the US brass aware of the Japanese intent to surrender?

Their intention was not to surrender but to negotiate a honorable peace.

[Ketnix]

I was reading a article from a Japanese History author who beleives at the end of the day it was the Soviet Unions beginning of operations in the east that caused Japan to surrender, rather the use of nuclear weapons. He believes if they were not used Japan would of surrendered soon after the Ruskies have moved to the east, so in that case the nukes were not neccasery. I'll have to look around for that quote.

[hellheaven1987]

I was reading a article from a Japanese History author who beleives at the end of the day it was the Soviet Unions beginning of operations in the east that caused Japan to surrender, rather the use of nuclear weapons. He believes if they were not used Japan would of surrendered soon after the Ruskies have moved to the east, so in that case the nukes were not neccasery. I'll have to look around for that quote.

The problem is really, why not used A-bombs on Japan? Allies had already conducted massive terror bombing campaign on Japanese major cities, which purposely targeting on Japanese civilians, even to a point to specially select incendiary bombs so the high heat could effectively burn down the wooden buildings that densely built in most Japanese cities and brutally burned the Japanese civilians alive. The result of Allies fire bombing campaign on Japan was that it killed more Japanese civilians than two A-bombs combined together. So seriously, what is the difference between dropping one bomb and killed 100k Japanese civilians and dropping hundreds bombs and killed 100k Japanese civilians?

In its attacks on Japan the USAAF abandoned its policy of precision bombing, and used a mix of incendiaries and high explosives to burn Japanese cities to the ground. These tactics were used to devastating effect with many urban areas burned out. The first raid using low-flying B-29 Superfortress bombers carrying incendiary bombs to drop on Tokyo was on the night of 24/25 February 1945 when 174 B-29s destroyed around fifty square mile (150 km²) of the city. Changing their tactics to expand the coverage and increase the damage, 279 B-29s raided on the night of 9/10 March, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Approximately 16 square miles (41 km²) of the city were destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the resulting firestorm, more than the immediate deaths of either the Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan atomic bombings.

Source

[Condottiere 40K]

I think that after Yamamoto's death, the Japanese were looking for a way to end the war, but with 1945 the American fleets having unlimited access to the Home Islands, and the termination of the Non Aggression Pact with the Soviets, it became an immediate concern.

It's been always assumed that one of the primary purposes in authorizing the bombing was to gain a psychological upper-hand on the Russians during post war negotiations.

[alexanderswift]

Their intention was not to surrender but to negotiate a honorable peace.

Ah, well it makes more sense in that context, but even so, it seems a bit drastic.

The problem is really, why not used A-bombs on Japan? Allies had already conducted massive terror bombing campaign on Japanese major cities, which purposely targeting on Japanese civilians, even to a point to specially select incendiary bombs so the high heat could effectively burn down the wooden buildings that densely built in most Japanese cities and brutally burned the Japanese civilians alive. The result of Allies fire bombing campaign on Japan was that it killed more Japanese civilians than two A-bombs combined together. So seriously, what is the difference between dropping one bomb and killed 100k Japanese civilians and dropping hundreds bombs and killed 100k Japanese civilians?

There are few things I would say the world would be better off without, but nuclear weapons are most definitely among them, but that's another discussion all together.

[hellheaven1987]

There are few things I would say the world would be better off without, but nuclear weapons are most definitely among them, but that's another discussion all together.

Except no one in 1945 realize the possible horror of nuclear weapons. In fact, before 1960s most people just thought A-bombs were just a super powerful bombs that could do job hundreds bombs needed.

[Condottiere 40K]

I think that the pulp science fiction magazines had stories where they described the likely effects of unleashing the power of the atom, to the extent that when they found out that German scientists were fans and had bootleg copies smuggled in, they worried about security, to the extent they contacted one of the authors, who countered that if he left out their mention, it's more likely that the Germans would realize something was up.

[alexanderswift]

Except no one in 1945 realize the possible horror of nuclear weapons. In fact, before 1960s most people just thought A-bombs were just a super powerful bombs that could do job hundreds bombs needed.

Well aware, its a damn shame is what it is.

I think that the pulp science fiction magazines had stories where they described the likely effects of unleashing the power of the atom, to the extent that when they found out that German scientists were fans and had bootleg copies smuggled in, they worried about security, to the extent they contacted one of the authors, who countered that if he left out their mention, it's more likely that the Germans would realize something was up.

That's pretty funny actually if a bit disconcerting.

[Nik]

The japanese peace proposal were never simply about keeping the emperor.
What most of the "japan wanted to surrender" advocates forget to quote is the rest of the japanese peace proposal:
Keeping their conquered terretories in China.
Not so nice in view that this would only enable Japan to prepare for the next rematch.

Btw, the US put up alot of pressure on stalin to move against the japanese, granting additional lend-lease supply for the SU to do so. The Red Army Offensive in Manchuria was exactly what the western allies had clamored for at the Jalta and Potsdam conferences.

[OTZ]

Is the issue the bomb itself, or the number of casualties inflicted?