[History] Blitzkrieg and the Fall of France 1940

[Garbarsardar]

Author: Garbarsardar
Original Thread: Blitzkrieg and the Fall of France 1940

Blitzkrieg and the Fall of France 1940

Part 1: Blitzkrieg

Although the word was never used officially by Wermacht-it is absent from any Wermacht document in WW2, it gained notoriety through propaganda and became almost identified with the German military effort. Although at the end of 1941 and forced by the consequences of the failure to capture Moscow 1941 some German papers started claiming that it was the British who invented the term…


What’s in a word?

The term blitzkrieg was first mentioned in 1935, in an article of Deutsche Wehr (German Defense). According to it, blitzkrieg is a strategic doctrine fit for countries poor in supplies and raw materials.
In 1938 in Militar-Wohenblatt (Military Weekly), it is defined as strategic surprise attack with the use of armor, air force and airborne troops.
On September 25 1939 there is the first, non German quote in Time magazine about the Polish campaign: “…a quick war of penetration and obliteration-blitzkrieg, lightening war”.

So, what is Blitzkrieg?

In operational/tactical terms is what we call today “war of maneuver”. Heinz Guderian, implement the idea of Stormtruppen tactics from WW1 (focus on small areas, movement, penetration-instead of rigid lines) to a much larger scale and with the utilization of the novel technology and tactical doctrines: armor and Close Support Aircraft.

In strategic terms, blitzkrieg could mean a combined military, foreign and domestic policy, recruitment and armament, and finally financial approach, dictating a quick gearing up and mobilization to face an internationally isolated opponent. The opportunistic and accidental nature of Hitler’s foreign policy (example; the firm belief that France and the UK would remain neutral about Poland as they did in Chechoslovakia) renders the claim of a “strategic blitzkrieg” concept ridiculous.

Who invented it?

“The fixation on a quick war will be ruinous for us… the possibilities of defeating an equivalent opponent by blitzkrieg are zero” Walter Brauchitsch, commander of the German Army, July 1938.

The campaign in Poland was by no means a blitzkrieg on the operational level; there was absence of deep penetration, independent Panzer action, airborne troops. The subjugation of the Polish army was dictated by geographical factors and by the gamble that the Allies would not attack. The western borders of Germany were sparsely defended, and it took a full 9 months for the Wermacht to recover from the losses in equipment from the Polish campaign. The inferiority of the Polish army and the Russian “assistance” further undermine the blitzkrieg concept here.

The credit for the first operational implementation should go equally to Manstein and Guderian. It is certain that Manstein came up with the “sickle cut” idea; in fact his original plan consisted of a double cut (“Fall Gelb” towards the channel and “Fall Rot” to the south). It is also true that Guderian advised Manstein on the employment of armor (Guderian’s Schwerpunkt) to force the necessary breakthrough. And of course without the stubbornness and disobedience of Guderian this plan would never succeed. The myth of “Fall Gelb” as Hitler inspiration is based on Hitler’s fixation on a Sedan breakthrough; but this was a tactical and not operational idea. Furthermore, quite frankly, Hitler lost his nerve from the beginning, anxious on the exposed flanks, and his lack of operational understanding culminated in the infamous decision of stopping the Panzers before Dunkirk. Come to think of it, Hitler’s indecision in both this case and in front of Moscow deprived Germany of unique (albeit questionable) opportunities for a negotiated peace that would retrospectively create a “strategic blitzkrieg” myth…

Part 2: The Fall of France

The Plan

The Manstein Plan, known as Fall Gelb (case yellow) or Sichelschnitt (sickle cut), was a replay of the Schlieffen Plan (http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m/schlieffen.html ). This time the point of main effort was moved to the south while the German forces in Belgium would bear the brunt of the “revolving door” result: Allied forces would pour into Belgium while armoured spearheads would breakthrough in the south and encircle them by cutting to the channel ports.
At the same time the Allied plans concentrated on the movement of troops to defensive lines from the Ardennes to Belgium, the latest variant being the Dyle line, (Breda variant plan D 1940) and the link-up with Dutch forces in Rotterdam. There was no provision for any kind of offensive.

The Shlieffen plan:



The original OKH plan


The original Manstein plan:


Fall Gelb:


German victory or Allied defeat?

Employment of Tanks and Airplanes

German armored strength May 10 1940: 2439 battle tanks, of which 349 Panzer III and 278 Panzer IV.
Allied armored strength May 10 1940: 4204 battle tanks including 300 Somua and 274 Char B.

(on may 17, a Char B took out 13 Panzer II&III plus two anti air guns and some halftracks; it was destroyed after it was abandoned for lack of petrol and that took 26 hits- a nice prelude to the fate of the King Tigers some 5 years later)

Allied Airforce in continental Europe: 4,469 of which at the front: 1,453
German airforce: 3,578 of which at the front 2,589

Here you can see a Char B2 neutralized through lack of fuel...


The allied forces were plagued by an outdated concept of using armor. In 1940 although the French were far more advanced in the motorization of their forces they still could not accept the use of tanks without infantry support. That determined deployment and counter-offensive speed. The disastrous nature of both counteroffensive attempts, in Montcornet by the French and Arras for the British when precious hours were lost in the process of collecting the tanks distributed to the infantry battalions and then waiting for the same battalions to catch-up is a clear demonstration of this operational regression.
The use of the airforce that could smash the German traffic jams in the Ardennes was again dictated from the idea of a protracted attritional war. 2/3 of the Allied Air force was kept in reserve, the rest was in Belgium.

The Maginot thinking.

It is probably wrong to attribute the defeat to the Maginot line. The idea behind the line was a good one; a series of fortification that would release troops for offensive action elsewhere. But the plans for this kind of action were absent. As we saw earlier there was absolutely no offensive provision in the Allied plans. France having lost 1.4 million men in WW2 (with 4.2 million wounded) concentrated on defense and firepower, apolitically sound but militarily disastrous decision.

The actual course of German forces:


Failure of leadership/communications

The French chain of command did not permit any initiative to small unit leadership. At the same time the communication system was ranging from sparse to non-existent. Gamelin at some point was using a Hotel telephone to find where the front line was. At the same time there can be no doubt about the bravery of the individual French soldier. The b-class units manning the Sedan area put up a really good fight with the A-Class German units when they had the chance. They did not have the chance too often though. The breakdown in command and communications led to the “evaporation” of units considering being encircled. The French armor although superior to the German counterparts lacked radio communication that hampered co-ordination and fire control.

The Germans: Tactics and technology.

After the WW1 and under the Versailles dictate (or treaty if you so prefer) the German army achieved significant breakthroughs both in the operational (schwerpunkt, non-linear approach) and the tactical (initiative, small unit leadership) level. The main characters that made the victory possible, led their units from upfront with Guderian, Rommel and Balck the most advertised examples. Although the real breakthrough was not achieved by armor but by infantry (Grossdeutschland and Panzer grenadier troops) the use of forward observers, radio in all tanks, Luftwaffe-Wermacht liaisons and the logistical triumph are achievements indicating forward thinking in the use of technology in the battlefield that has been the model for every army since 1945.

Concluding the fall of France in 1940 was predetermined (excluding the strategic reasons) by the quality of operational thinking of the opponents and their different approach to the technological advances of the time.



Printed sources:
Karl-Heinz Frieser (2005) The Blitzkrieg Legend. Naval Institute press, Annapolis.
Julian Jackson (2003) The fall of France. Oxford University press.
Michael Burleigh (2000) The third Reich . Hill and Wang, NY.
Internet:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/francedefeat.htm
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/point.../Vol26_1/3.htm
http://badley.info/history/Ardennes-Germany.places.html
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWmanstein.htm
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk..._of_attack.htm
http://www.thehistorynet.com/wwii/blsickle/index2.html