Page 8 of 9 FirstFirst 123456789 LastLast
Results 141 to 160 of 163

Thread: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

  1. #141

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    nope, ALL of the mechanized reserves were withdrawn, all of it. The Soviets had nowhere near enough soldiers to defend themselves against such huge number of Finns.
    Soviet 23rd Army had amongst other formations the X Mechanized Corps (10th that is) in Isthmus at the onset of the war, from it 21st and 24th Tank Divisions were pulled against Germans. However the 198th Mechanized Division remained, though only to be beaten by the Finns and forced to be evacuated over lake Ladoga - casualties were not terribly high but it did suffer heavy losses of equipment.

    Keeping in mind that Soviet formations were not yet reduced level Finns did have superior numbers but it was far from overwhelming superiority. Finns had 7 divisions facing Soviet forces consisting of 4 rifle divisions, 1 mechanized division and 1 division strength fortified region. Later on Soviets received reinforcements like 265th (& 291st) Division and certain regiments from Leningrad. But as said these did not make up for the losses suffered.

  2. #142

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    I now have a glimpse of a totally different perspective of this conflict - I'm surprised that Stalin didn't just cut his losses and try to negotiate a peace settlement restoring the former border.
    Eats, shoots, and leaves.

  3. #143

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    Meh can you try to make a decent argument instead of grasping at straws? Fact is, the Finns mobilized huge amounts of forces. Most of these were sent to the Isthmus. For example, there were around 12 divisions in march 1940 against 3 or so in november 1939.

    The Soviet army could send NO reinforcements to the isthmus in 1941. Actually, as I said 900 times before, troops were withdrawn from the isthmus to protect Leningrad from the Germans.
    You know what? I could tell you exactly what divisions were transferred from Stavka reserve and what new ones raised to be used by the Karelian and Leningrad fronts during 1941, but why bother, for someone who simply does not seem to understand first thing about what he is talking about and is happy making things up and denying reality when ever it suites the illusion he has about Soviet Union and WWII.

    No point bothering.
    Last edited by Kagemusha; February 19, 2012 at 11:20 AM.

  4. #144

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Condottiere 40K View Post
    I now have a glimpse of a totally different perspective of this conflict - I'm surprised that Stalin didn't just cut his losses and try to negotiate a peace settlement restoring the former border.
    He did try to do exactly that. However as Finland was far from being self-sufficient and by this time dependent on German (or German controlled) food deliveries on just avoiding famine and starvation - as well as hosting around 100 000 German troopers in northern Finland - it was not exactly something Finns could agree to, even had they wanted to. And after Soviets had used in 1940 promised food shipments for political blackmailing and extortion there was shall we say a mild suspicion that Soviets might not deliver required amounts of food. Then there was the fear of the possible (and probable) German retaliations for such actions.

  5. #145

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    Tiwaz:
    1) Uneven ice doesn't get inside anywhere, what are you talking about? It obviously is just as dangerous as flat ice.
    Friction. Read up on it. Uneven ice has far more friction that smooth ice. Ergo, you can walk on it as it if was plain gravel.

    I jog cross country around a 500m hill over here every weak, and it doesn't matter if some snow has fallen on the ice. Of course if ALLOT of snow has fallen on it from the night before and not frozen into ice, then it's a different story.
    Thick snow becomes surface or it's own. You clearly do not run on ice ever, since you have no actual grasp of it's behavior.

    2) Heavy tanks were a rarity. The vast majority of armoured tanks were probs T-26s etc.
    And yet huge part of tanks were taken out by men in close combat. Also, heavy tanks being rare is irrelevant. Finns had none. And no weapons to take them out, besides molotov coctails or satchel charges.

    3) What you think doesn't matter - in total on the isthmus around 400 tanks were taken out by molotov cocktails and such - 1000 were taken out by AT guns. This is according to that Finnish propaganda website I mentioned earlier, so expect the real casualties to possibly be lower.
    So ratio of AT-guns (and artillery!) vs improvised AT-weapons was 2-1.

    Could you list countries with equally abysmal rates?

    4) Nope, a huge part of the isthmus was thick forests, and maybe an extremely small part farmland and open plains. Plenty of awesome defensive positions. If you insist on this fantasy then post sources like I did.
    Extremely small? Even lowest estimate of wide open land is 25%.

    5) Of course the Finnish reserves were used. Why wouldn't they?
    EXACTLY! There WERE NO MORE RESERVES! EVERY MAN POSSIBLE WAS AT THE FRONT!
    Thus your fantasy about there being hundreds of thousands of soldiers not yet deployed is pure, blatant lie.

    6) The vast majority of Finnish recruits came from the country, not from the cities. Also, the vast majority of Finland is forested, even the coastal areas have plenty of forests around the farms and cities. And even if the majority of them weren't experienced with forests, the fact that so many were would make it easy to learn.
    And you consider this to be irrelevant detail. Make up your mind. Either Finnish army was exceptional, as there aren't any other armies with same level of forest combat expertise, or it was not.

    7) Of course if a part of the isthmus is elevated => the terrain of the isthmus is uneven. And do you really think that the elevation in the centre of the Isthmus is steady, kind of like a big, even hill? Nah, almost all highly elevated landscape usually is hilly. Not flat.
    Elevated does not equal uneven. All your map shows is the height of the area from sea level
    Isthmus area is very flat, with very small differences in altitude. Hills are few and very low, providing neglible advantage in defense.

    Fact that topographic map shows so uniform level proves that there were no radical altitude differences. Else it would not be uniform green and plotch of uniform yellow. Go look topographic maps of genuinely uneven ground. They have much different shades in same area.


    Everyone is warhero, genius and millionaire in Internet, so don't be surprised that I'm not impressed.

  6. #146

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    1) What do you mean with "uneven"? Are you talking about cracks in it or the texture? Ice which is flat or has bumps are both equally slippery.
    2) Nope, after two days or so it turns to ice. At least partially.

    Anyway point is that the ice is freaking slippy and not suiteable for careless running while under fire. Any guide to ice-fishing or whatever ice activities warns the reader to be cautious and not slip.

    3) Many AT guns or not, the Finns didn't need so many due to Karelia being almost all forest.
    4) Provide a source that 75% of the isthmus wasn't forests in 1940.
    5) I was saying that the Finns mobilized a few hundred thousand men, and THEN sent them as reserves to the front. Like reinforcements. Just look at how many times more Finnish soldiers were in the Isthmus in march 1940 than in november 1939.
    6) Provide a source that the Isthmus is flat then.
    7) Just because Finns had good local knowledge doesn't mean they're good soldiers.

    Quote Originally Posted by WandererRTF View Post
    Soviet 23rd Army had amongst other formations the X Mechanized Corps (10th that is) in Isthmus at the onset of the war, from it 21st and 24th Tank Divisions were pulled against Germans. However the 198th Mechanized Division remained, though only to be beaten by the Finns and forced to be evacuated over lake Ladoga - casualties were not terribly high but it did suffer heavy losses of equipment.

    Keeping in mind that Soviet formations were not yet reduced level Finns did have superior numbers but it was far from overwhelming superiority. Finns had 7 divisions facing Soviet forces consisting of 4 rifle divisions, 1 mechanized division and 1 division strength fortified region. Later on Soviets received reinforcements like 265th (& 291st) Division and certain regiments from Leningrad. But as said these did not make up for the losses suffered.
    1) Soviet rifle divisions were far smaller than Western ones. Like 1/2 strength + the divisions weren't mobilized at the start of the war so they lacked manpower and equipment. The Finns practically swarmed the Soviets.
    2) All of the 10th corps was retreated to be used against Germans.
    Last edited by Nikitn; February 20, 2012 at 06:38 AM.

  7. #147

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    5) I was saying that the Finns mobilized a few hundred thousand men, and THEN sent them as reserves to the front. Like reinforcements. Just look at how many times more Finnish soldiers were in the Isthmus in march 1940 than in november 1939.
    Finns did mobilize few hundred thousand men, but they were not used as reserves, they were used as reservists to fill the line units - small standing army formed a cadre which was filled with reservists. They were not reinforcements and they had been mobilized and sent to their units already before the war had even started. As said before the increase in number of units was due to the units being transferred from less vulnerable sections of the front, or by being relieved by Svenska frivilligkåren, or by ad hoc fashion by forming a 'division' from assortment of independent battalions and regiments. Not by newly mobilized reserves.

    1) Soviet rifle divisions were far smaller than Western ones. Like 1/2 strength + the divisions weren't mobilized at the start of the war so they lacked manpower and equipment. The Finns practically swarmed the Soviets.
    2) All of the 10th corps was retreated to be used against Germans.
    Soviet divisions ended up being smaller during the war (list strength around 10 000, with actual strength quite often around 7 000 men), however that was not the situation at the start of the war. The divisions were still in the pre-war organization with strengths of 14 000 to 16 000 men.

    http://www.rkka.es/Estructura/asigna...stavSA1941.pdf - shows clearly that despite that X Mechanized Corps (ie. the corps HQ) left the area 198th Mechanized Division did not (see pages 7, 15, 22, 30, ... etc.).

  8. #148
    Hopit's Avatar Praepositus
    Join Date
    Jun 2008
    Location
    FINLAND!!!
    Posts
    5,355

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    1) What do you mean with "uneven"? Are you talking about cracks in it or the texture? Ice which is flat or has bumps are both equally slippery.
    2) Nope, after two days or so it turns to ice. At least partially.

    Anyway point is that the ice is freaking slippy and not suiteable for careless running while under fire. Any guide to ice-fishing or whatever ice activities warns the reader to be cautious and not slip.

    3) Many AT guns or not, the Finns didn't need so many due to Karelia being almost all forest.
    4) Provide a source that 75% of the isthmus wasn't forests in 1940.
    5) I was saying that the Finns mobilized a few hundred thousand men, and THEN sent them as reserves to the front. Like reinforcements. Just look at how many times more Finnish soldiers were in the Isthmus in march 1940 than in november 1939.
    6) Provide a source that the Isthmus is flat then.
    7) Just because Finns had good local knowledge doesn't mean they're good soldiers.



    1) Soviet rifle divisions were far smaller than Western ones. Like 1/2 strength + the divisions weren't mobilized at the start of the war so they lacked manpower and equipment. The Finns practically swarmed the Soviets.
    2) All of the 10th corps was retreated to be used against Germans.
    1) no it is not, find a frozen lake and walk on it
    2)snow doesn't just magically turn to ice, or we'd all, by your logic, be slipping and falling all over the place during winter time.
    3)no it was not.
    4)provide a source it was
    5)and that few hundreds of thousands is more than half of the overall man power
    6)provide a source it isn't
    7)provide a source they had good local knowledge.

    Quote Originally Posted by SgtScooter View Post
    If you went to the Skyrim forums you'll see a lot posts about how it's somehow been watered down and hampered by money men making the decisions. Fact is, it's a great game and people still complain. It's the same thing as the TW franchise.

  9. #149

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    USSR makes series of appallingly stupid decisions. Nikitin attempts to explain this as Comrade Stalin's master plan. More news at 7.
    Last edited by Rolling Thunder; February 20, 2012 at 09:43 AM.
    Quote Originally Posted by Denny Crane! View Post
    How about we define the rights that allow a government to say that isn't within my freedom.

  10. #150

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by WandererRTF View Post
    Finns did mobilize few hundred thousand men, but they were not used as reserves, they were used as reservists to fill the line units - small standing army formed a cadre which was filled with reservists. They were not reinforcements and they had been mobilized and sent to their units already before the war had even started. As said before the increase in number of units was due to the units being transferred from less vulnerable sections of the front, or by being relieved by Svenska frivilligkåren, or by ad hoc fashion by forming a 'division' from assortment of independent battalions and regiments. Not by newly mobilized reserves.
    Irrelavent, point is the isthmus area recieved massive reinforcements.

    PS: a few divisions were kept in reserve, hence they were called reserve-infantry-division 13 or something
    Soviet divisions ended up being smaller during the war (list strength around 10 000, with actual strength quite often around 7 000 men), however that was not the situation at the start of the war. The divisions were still in the pre-war organization with strengths of 14 000 to 16 000 men.
    Theoretical strength of an unmobilized rifle division would be around 7000 - in reality it was typically much smaller. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisio...ifle_Divisions

    The Finns outnumbered the Soviets by a huge margin.
    http://www.rkka.es/Estructura/asignacion_terrestre/BoevojSostavSA1941.pdf
    - shows clearly that despite that X Mechanized Corps (ie. the corps HQ) left the area 198th Mechanized Division did not (see pages 7, 15, 22, 30, ... etc.).
    If you read it closely you'll see it stands "bez ap" written behind the 198th in Russian, where bez=without. I have no clue what it was without, ie what "AP" is, but perhaps the 198th was stripped of all effective strength to put the other two mechanized divisions up to strength.

    Regardless, my point stands. The Soviets were ridiculously outnumbered and didn't have enough soldiers to cover their front.

  11. #151

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    Irrelavent, point is the isthmus area recieved massive reinforcements.

    PS: a few divisions were kept in reserve, hence they were called reserve-infantry-division 13 or something
    They received reinforcements, but these had nothing to do with mobilization. Nor were the reinforcements fresh or massive. Bulk of the Finnish was on the Isthmus already at the start of the war, there were no magical sources of massive reinforcements.

    Theoretical strength of an unmobilized rifle division would be around 7000 - in reality it was typically much smaller. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divisio...ifle_Divisions
    You did read what the text says did you? Only those divisions in the internal areas are left in low strength, those in threatened areas were not. Instead they were reinforced.

    Also do not stare at Soviet style listing of 'rifle strength', all Finnish formations for example are listed according to their full strength not according to their fighting strength - ie. Soviet 10 000 'bayonet' division with 7 000 'rifles' is a 10 000 men division. Otherwise you are comparing apples with oranges and all the resulting conclusions will be false.

    The Finns outnumbered the Soviets by a huge margin.
    Finns did outnumber the Soviets, but it was not a huge margin.

    [URL="http://www.rkka.es/Estructura/asignacion_terrestre/BoevojSostavSA1941.pdf"] If you read it closely you'll see it stands "bez ap" written behind the 198th in Russian, where bez=without. I have no clue what it was without, ie what "AP" is, but perhaps the 198th was stripped of all effective strength to put the other two mechanized divisions up to strength.
    Two other divisions of the X Mechanized Corps were armored divisions, not mechanized divisions. And yes, after Finns had beaten the 198th against the northern shore of lake Ladoga - and forced it to be evacuated with loss of equipment - the 198th was not refitted but instead 'demoted' from a mechanized into a rifle division. However that does not alter the fact that Finns did face mechanized formations, and soundly beat them as when the fighting took place (early August) 198th was still mechanized division.

    Regardless, my point stands. The Soviets were ridiculously outnumbered and didn't have enough soldiers to cover their front.
    Nope, it does not.

  12. #152

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by WandererRTF View Post
    They received reinforcements, but these had nothing to do with mobilization. Nor were the reinforcements fresh or massive. Bulk of the Finnish was on the Isthmus already at the start of the war, there were no magical sources of massive reinforcements.
    Are you able to read? I just told, with sources, some of you Finnish old-boys a few pages back that the divisional strength of Finnish army in the isthmus tripled from 1939 to 1940. If we take into account that the pre-war divisions weren't at full strength, then the strength might have quadrupled. Stop talking nonsense.
    You did read what the text says did you? Only those divisions in the internal areas are left in low strength, those in threatened areas were not. Instead they were reinforced.

    Also do not stare at Soviet style listing of 'rifle strength', all Finnish formations for example are listed according to their full strength not according to their fighting strength - ie. Soviet 10 000 'bayonet' division with 7 000 'rifles' is a 10 000 men division. Otherwise you are comparing apples with oranges and all the resulting conclusions will be false.
    You claimed that a Soviet infantry divison was 16k men. Now it turned out to be 7k-10k ON PAPER. In practice the average Soviet division was nowhere near the strength it was supposed to be.
    Finns did outnumber the Soviets, but it was not a huge margin.
    Are you reading this? The Soviets had around 4 understrength, unmobilized divisions with no available reinforcements facing 8 mobilized full-strength Finnish infantry divisions filled with farmers who knew forests and hunting. The Soviets didn't even have the men to create a proper frontline.
    Two other divisions of the X Mechanized Corps were armored divisions, not mechanized divisions. And yes, after Finns had beaten the 198th against the northern shore of lake Ladoga - and forced it to be evacuated with loss of equipment - the 198th was not refitted but instead 'demoted' from a mechanized into a rifle division. However that does not alter the fact that Finns did face mechanized formations, and soundly beat them as when the fighting took place (early August) 198th was still mechanized division.
    The mechanized division obviously didn't have the equipment necessary. Most likely it was a mechanized division in theory only.

    The Finns didn't beat any mechanized divisions - typically Soviet armoured forces lacked fuel, trucks, spare parts and ammunition. So the Finns had little to do with the Soviet division losing its equipment.

    Nope, it does not.
    I'm getting tired of this.
    Yes, the Finnish army outnumbered the Soviets by a huge margin in 1941.
    Yes, the Soviet army had no available reinforcements to send to the isthmus in early 1941.
    And thus, YES, the Soviet positions were completely untenable due to the conditions.

    Oh, and YES, the Finnish army was absolutely nothing special. As I said previously, there is no reason to believe that the Finns would perform any better than Romanians (getting slaughtered in every battle) under equal circumstances.
    Last edited by Nikitn; February 22, 2012 at 10:03 AM.

  13. #153

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Are you able to read? I just told, with sources, some of you Finnish old-boys a few pages back that the divisional strength of Finnish army in the isthmus tripled from 1939 to 1940. If we take into account that the pre-war divisions weren't at full strength, then the strength might have quadrupled. Stop talking nonsense.
    You were answered about that and noted that your initial strength for the Finns in the Isthmus was totally wrong. It wasn't even near what the numbers were in reality. Before the war, at the end of the war. Finns started with 6 divisions + one divisions worth of independent units and ended with 12 divisions worth of formations (including 2 coast defence groups, transferred divisions from Lapland and elsewhere etc.). In other words strength did not even double in the whole duration of the war.

    You claimed that a Soviet infantry divison was 16k men. Now it turned out to be 7k-10k ON PAPER. In practice the average Soviet division was nowhere near the strength it was supposed to be.
    Now you go off twisting the words again, I only noted the strenght values as examples, they were not listed as such anywhere, instead the page noted that Soviet division strengths were brought up to 14k - 12k range. Which as it happens matches the full strength of Finnish division (14k).

    Are you reading this? The Soviets had around 4 understrength, unmobilized divisions with no available reinforcements facing 8 mobilized full-strength Finnish infantry divisions filled with farmers who knew forests and hunting. The Soviets didn't even have the men to create a proper frontline.
    First Finnish attacks against Soviet Union started in early July (10th), which is as it happens full two weeks after Soviet bombed Finnish civilians in 25th of June. In addition the attack into the Karelian Isthmus did not take place before until July 31, which left Soviets well over a month to get their act together, it was not exactly a surprise attack without declared state of war which seems to have been preferred by the Soviets.

    Now then, looking at the Soviet unit listing for the August 1 1941 (p.30), we can see that 23rd Army (responsible for the Isthmus) consisted of 19 Rifle Corps with (115, 142 and 168 Rifle Divisions), along with 43 and 123 Rifle Divisions, two 'fortified regions', 27th and 28th, and as a sugar in the bottom, the 198th Mechanized Division. Which yields Soviets around 7 divisions worth of formations (without taking supporting formations into account), quite a bit different from your description.

    The mechanized division obviously didn't have the equipment necessary. Most likely it was a mechanized division in theory only.

    The Finns didn't beat any mechanized divisions - typically Soviet armoured forces lacked fuel, trucks, spare parts and ammunition. So the Finns had little to do with the Soviet division losing its equipment.
    And know their lack of equipment as a fact? That particular outfit was created a mechanized division - and it remained listed as such until Finns beat it. Yet the fact remains that 198th was a mechanized division which was beaten by the Finns. Furthermore 198th was a fresh unit when it met Finns, it had not expended ammo nor had it been transferred a long distance - so claims of ammo, fuel or spare part shortages are not exactly sound.

    Just because you do not like it does not make any less of a fact.

    I'm getting tired of this.
    Yes, the Finnish army outnumbered the Soviets by a huge margin in 1941.
    Yes, the Soviet army had no available reinforcements to send to the isthmus in early 1941.
    And thus, YES, the Soviet positions were completely untenable due to the conditions.

    Oh, and YES, the Finnish army was absolutely nothing special. As I said previously, there is no reason to believe that the Finns would perform any better than Romanians (getting slaughtered in every battle) under equal circumstances.
    So far we have only seen that your claims have not exactly been valid, for example your 4 divisions turned out to be in reality at least 7 without a shred of evidence that any of the Soviet divisions in question would have been as understrength as you claim them to have been.

    If the Finnish army was nothing special then care to explain why Soviets failed miserably in beating them in 1939 as well as 1944, let alone in abortive Soviet counterattacks in Svir and near Povonets (x2) in 1942 which did not even move the front line but still cost thousands or Soviet casualties. Given that Soviets had in all of the mentioned cases far greater superiority in numbers than what Finns had result should have been according to your logic 'a slaughter' but that never happened.

  14. #154

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    1) Allright, so there were 5 divisions beforehand (1 division in reserve) which were understrength. This later increased to 12 divisions in 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps + a few divisions from a variety of other formations. Like coastal defence groups.

    So fine, the divisional number only increased 2-3 times instead of 3 times. Doesn't change the fact that the pre-war divisions weren't properly mobilized, or the fact that hundreds of thousands of Finnish men were conscripted into the army. My point stands, the strength roughly quadrupled + there were PLENTY of reinforcements available for Finland.

    2) I'm twisting your "arguments" to pieces, not words. Big difference . Anyway as I said, the Soviet rifle divisions at that time had barely 7-10k strength ON PAPER. That's ridiculously far away from your outlandish claim of a strength of "at least 16k".

    Now, remove that Finnish crap and listen up: There were 2 Soviet rifle corps, 19th and 50th facing the Finns. In between them they had 5 divisions. Take that 196th "mechanized" division, and you got 6 understrength divisions with a total strength of maybe ~ 45-50k. Compare this with the 7 Finnish divisions with 15k each - that gives the Finns well over twice as many men as the Soviets. If the Soviets even had enough men to properly cover the front line, then the Finns simply wouldn't have broken through (or rather sneaked through the ,as they did in 1941).

    3) Obviously the division was mechanized in name only, Soviet mechanized forces were lacking everything at the start of the war. Why should this unit be an exception? As I said, the mechanized division didn't lose its trucks and tanks because of Finns, but because they had no fuel or spare parts for the vehicles.

    4) In 1939 the Finns fought under extremely favourable conditions. In 1944 the Soviets pretty much destroyed the Finns and forced them into a conditional surrender (vyborg petrazavodsk offensive - the Soviets took similar casualties as the Finns despite the Finns being dug into forests and hills).

  15. #155

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post

    Oh, and YES, the Finnish army was absolutely nothing special. As I said previously, there is no reason to believe that the Finns would perform any better than Romanians (getting slaughtered in every battle) under equal circumstances.
    gosh, this topic is still going, somehow keep alive by pathetic attempts of nikitin to prouve how right was stalinist propaganda

    Nikitin, Romanian forces beat the hell out of Red Army in mountains of Crimeea and Caucasus. Finns did the same in forests of the north and in Karelia isthmus.

    And guess why? Because Soviets was good only in stepes and open fields where they can took advantage of their huge numbers in troops, tanks and artilery. When they wasnt able to use that, they usually lost, or win very hard, with lots of losses.
    Red Army have huge losses even in open field (where they usually met the Germans, with good tactics and weaponry), especially until the last phases of the war, because at the begining its comand was inept, with little knowledge of tactics, and simply used masses of "chioloveks" throwed toward the enemy. They didnt care about the life of common people, they was expendables for them.
    This is how they win (ofcourse, the big material help from US counted a lot as well). Sure, toward the end of the war, especially after Stalin let some more competent comanders to lead how they know, and get more use of intelligence network, Soviets was able to become a more competent force, but still relaying on their big numbers.
    The amount of losses of Soviet military, and their ability to absorb that was unparalled, and this is how they win at the end

  16. #156

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    1) Allright, so there were 5 divisions beforehand (1 division in reserve) which were understrength. This later increased to 12 divisions in 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps + a few divisions from a variety of other formations. Like coastal defence groups.

    So fine, the divisional number only increased 2-3 times instead of 3 times. Doesn't change the fact that the pre-war divisions weren't properly mobilized, or the fact that hundreds of thousands of Finnish men were conscripted into the army. My point stands, the strength roughly quadrupled + there were PLENTY of reinforcements available for Finland.
    Those divisions were already at the start of the war at their wartime strength. Unlike Soviets in 1941 Finns had in 1939 chosen to mobilize the units before the invasion - with so called 'additional refresher training'. And those 12 already include all those division style structures like coastal defence groups, the whole of Finnish army had 13 divisions. Divisional strength did not double - (6 + change) x 2 > 12 - In other words the Finnish strength in the Isthmus did not triple, or quadruple, it did not even double. And those already included all the reinforcements, those 'hundreds of thousands' of men were already included to the army.

    2) I'm twisting your "arguments" to pieces, not words. Big difference . Anyway as I said, the Soviet rifle divisions at that time had barely 7-10k strength ON PAPER. That's ridiculously far away from your outlandish claim of a strength of "at least 16k".

    Now, remove that Finnish crap and listen up: There were 2 Soviet rifle corps, 19th and 50th facing the Finns. In between them they had 5 divisions. Take that 196th "mechanized" division, and you got 6 understrength divisions with a total strength of maybe ~ 45-50k. Compare this with the 7 Finnish divisions with 15k each - that gives the Finns well over twice as many men as the Soviets. If the Soviets even had enough men to properly cover the front line, then the Finns simply wouldn't have broken through (or rather sneaked through the ,as they did in 1941).
    Then show that those divisions had strength of 7-10k. You can not use the average of the Eastern Front for that value since bulk of the Soviet divisions in the Eastern Front had already taken part (and beating) from the Germans. However the units of the 23rd Army were still pristine. That estimate simply does not hold up. As for the division type, look at the organization listing. It is all there. And you do no one credit by ignoring what is said there - you are only discrediting yourself. There is no evidence apart from you unfounded claims that those Soviet divisions would have been understrength, nor is there any support for your the claim that the 198th would not have been fully functional mechanized division. As for the type of advance, of course Finns went around the Soviets, who would be stupid enough to attack fortified units from the front when they could easily avoid it?

    3) Obviously the division was mechanized in name only, Soviet mechanized forces were lacking everything at the start of the war. Why should this unit be an exception? As I said, the mechanized division didn't lose its trucks and tanks because of Finns, but because they had no fuel or spare parts for the vehicles.
    And you know this because of what? Soviet own records states that the division was activated as a mechanized division, just because you do not like it does not change that fact. And you know that Soviet equipment losses were not caused by Finnish actions, how exactly?

    4) In 1939 the Finns fought under extremely favourable conditions. In 1944 the Soviets pretty much destroyed the Finns and forced them into a conditional surrender (vyborg petrazavodsk offensive - the Soviets took similar casualties as the Finns despite the Finns being dug into forests and hills).
    Soviets failed to destroy any of the Finnish formations in 1944. And due to the German arms shipments and remobilization (Finns partially demobilized in 1942) Finnish army had never been stronger than after the Soviet offensive of 1944. As for he losses, Soviet casualties were far greater than Finnish casualties, do not be fooled by for example Krivosheyev's values who manages to exclude the losses from the heaviest fighting (battles of Tali-Ihantala, Vuosalmi, bay of Viipuri) by carefully limiting the scope of his data. Unless you correct for such errors you can not use the Finnish values for comparison since they are for the whole duration of the offensive, it is again comparing apples with oranges. Also as a minor detail, only thing Finns and Soviets agreed there was a cease-fire, nothing more. None of the documents state anything even hinting towards capitulation or surrender.

  17. #157

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by diegis View Post
    gosh, this topic is still going, somehow keep alive by pathetic attempts of nikitin to prouve how right was stalinist propaganda

    Nikitin, Romanian forces beat the hell out of Red Army in mountains of Crimeea and Caucasus. Finns did the same in forests of the north and in Karelia isthmus.

    And guess why? Because Soviets was good only in stepes and open fields where they can took advantage of their huge numbers in troops, tanks and artilery. When they wasnt able to use that, they usually lost, or win very hard, with lots of losses.
    Red Army have huge losses even in open field (where they usually met the Germans, with good tactics and weaponry), especially until the last phases of the war, because at the begining its comand was inept, with little knowledge of tactics, and simply used masses of "chioloveks" throwed toward the enemy. They didnt care about the life of common people, they was expendables for them.
    This is how they win (ofcourse, the big material help from US counted a lot as well). Sure, toward the end of the war, especially after Stalin let some more competent comanders to lead how they know, and get more use of intelligence network, Soviets was able to become a more competent force, but still relaying on their big numbers.
    The amount of losses of Soviet military, and their ability to absorb that was unparalled, and this is how they win at the end
    Nonsense, the Romanians got destroyed in mountain terrain, or not.

    As for your ludicrous claims of Soviet numbers - the Soviets lost 7 million men in action during WW2. The Axis lost 4,4 million men in action in the east.

    If your fantasy was correct, soviet military losses would be far greater than that http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern...%29#Casualties

    wanderer:
    1) What exactly is wrong? The Finns had 14 divisions afterwards, 6 before. Obviously the pre-war divisions weren't properly mobilized, so we see maybe a triple of strength. Now how this is relevant to anything is beyond me.
    2) What "average"? I don't use average strength of Eastern front, I use the theoretical strength these divisions were supposed to have, ie 7-10k men. Is this hard to understand? Now in reality Red Army divisions in June 1941 were often under-equipped and lacked manpower, thus these divisions were understrength by a significant margin and thus the Finns outnumbered the Soviets over 2 times.

    Yeah, the Finns went around exactly because the Soviets didn't have enough men to cover the entire frontline. Had they had 50k more or so then the Finns wouldn't find anywhere to go around. Fact is, the Soviet positions were untenable.

    3) I know it because pretty much every Soviet mechanized division was in such a state. YOU need to source why this 198th should be an exception.

    4) Nonsense, the Finns were forced out of the war in 1944 due to the Vyborg petrazavodsk operation. Stalin could've easily kept pressing and made Finland a satellite state, but the effort wasn't worth the losses.

    Why else would the Finns sue for peace and conditionally surrender with the conditions being: agree to attack their German allies, pay massive war reparations and give up all their Eastern territories? Because the Soviets asked nicely? lmao

    As for those Finnish estimates - I don't really care what Finnish sources claim about Soviet losses. In reality the losses were roughly equal (despite massive Finnish advantage in terrain).

  18. #158

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    1) What exactly is wrong? The Finns had 14 divisions afterwards, 6 before. Obviously the pre-war divisions weren't properly mobilized, so we see maybe a triple of strength. Now how this is relevant to anything is beyond me.
    Your numbers are wrong, Finns had originally 7 divisions worth of troops in the area, and in the end merely 12 divisions worth of troops in the area. To keep it in perspective the whole of Finnish army had total of 13 official divisions. Also the pre-war divisions were already fully mobilized - unlike certain dimwits Finns mobilized their forces before the war. There had been a full month time for the Finns to do so.

    Only reason this is being discussed is because you insisted that Finns received reinforcements from mobilization which would have tripled their strength, while in reality the even the list strength was never even doubled. Now that it has been seen that mobilization was done before the war so that did not increase the Finnish strength during the war and also that even with the reinforcements, Finnish strength never even doubled from the initial number.

    2) What "average"? I don't use average strength of Eastern front, I use the theoretical strength these divisions were supposed to have, ie 7-10k men. Is this hard to understand? Now in reality Red Army divisions in June 1941 were often under-equipped and lacked manpower, thus these divisions were understrength by a significant margin and thus the Finns outnumbered the Soviets over 2 times.
    Reduced strength divisions had not yet been introduced in during the summer of 1941, they were later invention. You should be using contemporary front-line division strengths not those which were introduced only after the fighting in the Isthmus had died down. Several sources state that divisions actually at the front at the time were reinforced to level of 12k to 14k men.

    Yeah, the Finns went around exactly because the Soviets didn't have enough men to cover the entire frontline. Had they had 50k more or so then the Finns wouldn't find anywhere to go around. Fact is, the Soviet positions were untenable.
    Equally untenable as the whole of the front line from 1939-1944 facing the Finns. In other words that is just a clumsy excuse but if believing it makes you happier then keep doing so. Utter stupidity of their commanders (and their orders) was the worst enemy of the Soviets in Isthmus.

    3) I know it because pretty much every Soviet mechanized division was in such a state. YOU need to source why this 198th should be an exception.
    Not really, division was listed from the start of the war to the end of the Finnish offensive as a mechanized division, but it was not 'demoted' into rifle division until Finns had already beaten them. So now that we have proven that Finns faced mechanized formations you start claiming that none of the Soviet mechanized formations were really operational, could you please make up your mind on which excuse you are supporting?

    4) Nonsense, the Finns were forced out of the war in 1944 due to the Vyborg petrazavodsk operation. Stalin could've easily kept pressing and made Finland a satellite state, but the effort wasn't worth the losses.

    Why else would the Finns sue for peace and conditionally surrender with the conditions being: agree to attack their German allies, pay massive war reparations and give up all their Eastern territories? Because the Soviets asked nicely? lmao
    You may not be aware of that but Finns had been willing to negotiate for cease fire since 1943, the offensive achieved nothing in that regard. Finns rejected the Soviet proposal in spring 1944 because it demanded too big reparations and allowed too little time to drive Germans out of Finland, what did the Soviet post-offensive proposal do? It addressed exactly the points in question which had caused Finns to reject the spring 1944 proposal - cut the reparations in half, gave far more time to pay them off and greatly increased the time limit for the expulsion of the Germans.

    And with what would Soviets have progressed exactly? The forces of the armies sent against Finns were spent, even vaunted guards formations and breakthrough tank units shattered. Sure Soviets could have made another push with month or two to prepare but there still would have been no certainty that it would gain anything. There was no easy advance left. Whole offensive gained pretty much nothing for the Soviets, apart from greater casualty count. Soviets could achieved the very same result via negotiations which is pretty much the reason why the Soviet offensive surprised the Finns.

    As for those Finnish estimates - I don't really care what Finnish sources claim about Soviet losses. In reality the losses were roughly equal (despite massive Finnish advantage in terrain).
    Finnish values for Soviet losses are from date from Soviet archives. So if you do not believe those you are not believing your own archival data. As it happens there is a tendency in Soviet/Russian historiography to ignore the less successful moments. Feel free to check Krivosheyev's values, he notes that Leningrad Front's offensive would have ended in 20 June while it in reality ended in mid July - even though there exists even STAVKA orders for the Leningrad Front to continue offensive (issued on 21 June - Ставка ВГК. 1944-1945 гг. Том 16 (5-4); № 120 doc). Rewrite your own history as much as you like but do not expect others believe things that can easily be proven to be false.

  19. #159

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    1) Even if the divisional count didn't triple, but increased from 6 to 14, isn't relevant. The point is, the Finns received reinforcements in the Isthmus during 39-40.
    2) Reduced strength has always been so. You claimed the divisions were of 16k strength. I proved that they could be no bigger than 10k, and most likely far less. I posted the link, stop repeating spam please.
    3) Nah, if the Soviets were outnumbered by the Finns 2-3 to one, didn't have the proper supplies and couldn't even cover the front - yeah the positions were untenable. Anyone with half a brain can see that. The Finns constantly had the advantage, from 1939 up to and including 1944.
    4) Why do you insist on spamming? I told you already, what the Soviet papers say are irrelevant. On paper the Soviets had the biggest tank force in the world during 1941, but in reality they didn't have anywhere near the spare parts, fuels or trucks to keep those tanks operational. This was the case almost always. Why should it be different in the Isthmus? Stop posting nonsense, the Soviets abandoned their equipment due to lack of supplies, not Finns.
    5) What are you babbling about? The Finns were loyal allies to Hitler until the offensive which pretty much opened the path to Helsinki and forced the Finns into a conditional surrender. Provide a non-Finnish source for your claims.
    6) Cherry-picking statistics could prove many lies as truth. The Soviet statistics for losses are correct, but obviously the Finnish imbecile who estimated losses based on the statistics is not. Fact is, the Soviets took quite low casualties considering they had to fight through Finns dug into 3 extremely strong defensive lines + the ridiculously easily defensible terrain.
    Last edited by Nikitn; February 23, 2012 at 08:35 AM.

  20. #160

    Default Re: Why the 1939 Finnish-Soviet Winter War was, well in the winter?

    Quote Originally Posted by Nikitn View Post
    1) Even if the divisional count didn't triple, but increased from 6 to 14, isn't relevant. The point is, the Finns received reinforcements in the Isthmus during 39-40.
    No one has denied that Finns got reinforcements. What has been denied is that it would have massive reinforcements or that they would have been provided by mobilization - both of which were your initial claims. Also there never were 14 divisions worth of Finnish forces in the Isthmus and the initial strength in the Isthmus was 7 divisions (6 actual divisions & independent formations), sorry.

    2) Reduced strength has always been so. You claimed the divisions were of 16k strength. I proved that they could be no bigger than 10k, and most likely far less. I posted the link, stop repeating spam please.
    Actually the data shows they were more likely to be in 12k to 14k range. Reduced strength divisions were introduced after 1941.

    3) Nah, if the Soviets were outnumbered by the Finns 2-3 to one, didn't have the proper supplies and couldn't even cover the front - yeah the positions were untenable. Anyone with half a brain can see that. The Finns constantly had the advantage, from 1939 up to and including 1944.
    You are missing one little detail, that diagram is true, for the 22 June, however it does not reflect the situation in 31 July when the Finnish offensive in the Karelian Isthmus began. Which happened after the Soviet reinforcements had been moved to the area. Once again you are comparing apples with oranges.

    4) Why do you insist on spamming? I told you already, what the Soviet papers say are irrelevant. On paper the Soviets had the biggest tank force in the world during 1941, but in reality they didn't have anywhere near the spare parts, fuels or trucks to keep those tanks operational. This was the case almost always. Why should it be different in the Isthmus? Stop posting nonsense, the Soviets abandoned their equipment due to lack of supplies, not Finns.
    So according to you what you are saying is the whole truth and all the archived Soviet/Russian information is just filled with lies... Because that is what you are currently saying.

    5) What are you babbling about? The Finns were loyal allies to Hitler until the offensive which pretty much opened the path to Helsinki and forced the Finns into a conditional surrender. Provide a non-Finnish source for your claims.
    Offensive failed to open path to Helsinki (Battle of Tienhaara, Battle of Tali-Ihantala), as it happened it also failed open any paths out from the Karelian Isthmus. Please show where in the cease fire documents there is a single mention of the event being capitulation or a surrender. Feel free to read for example Henrik Lunde's book Finland's War of Choice. It handles this matter fairly well.

    6) Cherry-picking statistics could prove many lies as truth. The Soviet statistics for losses are correct, but obviously the Finnish imbecile who estimated losses based on the statistics is not. Fact is, the Soviets took quite low casualties considering they had to fight through Finns dug into 3 extremely strong defensive lines + the ridiculously easily defensible terrain.
    Cherry picking statistics only provides false results, nothing more, nothing less. Listed Soviet losses (like the aforementioned Krivosheyev) makes just that error, they cherry pick the values (like setting prematurely the ending date for the fighting). Finns did estimate the Soviet losses, however those values are not the ones currently represented. Current values have been researched directly from the Soviet era archival data, something Russians are oddly unwilling to do themselves. Russian loss rate of more than 3 to 1 is not exactly something to cheer about is it?

    Again, you are free to use the values from Krivosheyev but you need to note that they can not be compared with Finnish values since the scope of the data is totally different. Finnish scope extends from 9 June to August, Soviet data does not. It extends merely from 9 June to 20 June for Leningrad Front, even when it is a known fact that Leningrad Front was engaged in heavy fighting against the Finns until mid July, and for Karelian front it extend from June 21 to August 9, even though fighting extended to mid August conveniently hiding away quite a bit of the losses. So again, feel free to use your values, but do not expect any one believe any comparison you do with them.

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •