Couldn't Julian simply have taken Ctesiphon by storm?

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

While it is perfectly clear that a protracted siege would've left Julian's southern army vulnerable to the main Sassanid force, was he not capable of simply storming Ctesiphon? Its fortifications were hardly up to Roman standards, and razing the Persian capital to the ground once again would have been disastrous for them. Shapur would likely lose all his authority!

Storming the city couldn't have been difficult, since it was only protected by paighan - the cavalry was with the king. After that, the Romans would save their face even as the worst case scenario. The best case scenario would be the collapse of Sassanid authority, and thus a repeat of Trajan's conquests, and more.

[Diocle]

Cthesiphon had already been conquered by Galerius in 298, after the same Galerio had defeated the Persian army in the wonderful battle near the today Erzerum, (the Persian royal famyly was in the hands of the Romans) Persia was in Roman hands, Diocletianus, using this wonderful victory of his Caesar Galerius, imposed on the Perians a peace treaty in 299, very advantageus for the Roman Empire which lasted 40 years!!!
But the men were different, Diocletianus was a political genius!!, the times were different and the Roman army was very different!!!

IMO the entire the Persian campaign of Julianus was poorly designed, badly managed and above all without clear objectives and strategical finality!!! This is IMO the real limit of Julianus: He never was a real politic and an intelligent strategist!

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

Indeed, but storming Ctesiphon would have been a tactical decision. The city was extremely easy to take, it had been done some 6 times before!

[Diocle]

Probably He did not know the real position/intentions of the Persians, probably He was afraid of being trapped in a long siege, maybe he did not know exactly how the city was defended and by how many troops, He maybe feared for the discipline of his troops once they entered the city and started the plunder! or He preferred going on fearing a trap by the Persians, maybe He want the king and not the city!! In the end it is not an easy task enter in a conquered city and then exit!!! We need a good disciplined army to do a such thing! The men once entered, immediatly desperse themselves, indulging in robberies, searching for women and gold, killing and burning, are we sure that when the Emperor says stop! the men stop? And the loot, the army must carry the loot in the future advance in the enemy territory, thing that could slow the already slow march!

Who can say exactly what were His intentions during the failed Persian Campaign? one thing is very likely: He had few reliable informations about the Persian mouvements, and this led us to a new criticism about Julianus military competence: very few intelligence! No informations!! Galerius knew exactly where and when to attack the Persian army, Julianus improvised his choices.

Now I'll stop, I love Julianus and I suffer if I am assaulted by too dubts about his military capacity!! For me it is a pain also to think about his last days!!! I'll repeat: I like the Emperor Julianus very, very much, for my personal cultural and political reasons, I feel his death like a real defeat for every man who loves the religious freedom and loves the Ancient Greek-Roman Values!

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

While I don't see anything in common between persecuting Christians and religious freedom (not that sending some zealots to die in the arena is in any way bad ), I too see the defeat as a low ebb for Rome.

From what we know, Shapur II was somewhere east of the Tigris with his cavalry force, and it took quite a while for Julian to reach him. But as I said, Julian didn't need to fear a long siege because Ctesiphon was not much of a fortress.

[Knonfoda]

Its fortifications were hardly up to Roman standards

On what are you basing this?

Storming the city couldn't have been difficult, since it was only protected by paighan

Again, how do you purport to know the exact garrison defending the city? Do you have any sources for your allegations?

Julian didn't need to fear a long siege because Ctesiphon was not much of a fortress.

And yet again, I have to call you on this. How do you know it wasn't much of a fortress? Just because the Romans sacked the place a few times a few centuries/60 years earlier does not mean the place could not have been heavily fortified in those times and even then does not mean that by 363 A.D it had been refurbished, which given it's status as the Sassanid capital, and the aforementioned sacks, is a likely possibility.

Indeed, one of our eye-witnesses, the ever reliable Ammianus, has little to say, but what he says is useful:

Julian, having discussed with his chief officers the plan for the siege of Ctesiphon, it appeared to some of them that it would be an act of unseasonable temerity to attack that city, both because its situation made it almost impregnable, and also because King Sapor was believed to be hastening to its protection with a formidable army. - Ammianus Marcellinus, Book 24, 7

As we can see, he says it was nearly impregnable. But also, the circumstances were very different from says Galerius' incursion in 298. In the Battle of Satala, he captured nearly the King's entire family, and most importantly, his treasury. We can also assume a large part of the army was destroyed, as they were caught by surprise. Under these circumstances, a siege would not have been difficult, even IF Ctesiphon had formidable defences, because Galerius had A) time on his side and B) an enemy without a big army or any money to catch him from behind. The same cannot be said of Julian's expedition.

Indeed, Adrian Murdoch (Julian The Apostatate and the Death of the Ancient World) also seems to think the army must have found the capital's defences to be more than expected. If we add this with the fact an even larger enemy army than the one previously defeated roamed free under the command of Shapur II, then a siege becomes even more untenable.

Finally, Murdoch points out the failure to storm the city after Julian's victory could be the result of two things, A) the overzealousness (and reasonable) suspicion by Lucillianus (who was himself wounded with an arrow to the shoulder) that his troops could have been trapped within the massive city and slaughtered piecemeal and B) that the Romans were too keen to plunder the Persian dead, rather than pursuing them into the city and the result was that the Persians were able to retreat into the city and close it.

So there appears to be a number of factors to consider when we take into account why Julian (or the commanders under him) did not order an assault. Having said that, I think it's a risk Julian should have taken. It's one of those all or nothing moments. If he had survived, his campaign would have been a fiasco anyways, as aside from burning a few forts and towns and winning a few battles, it would have achieved nothing.

Julian should have thought well, I am here, in front of the enemy capital, with walls in front of me and an enemy behind me, I might as well gamble. He would have won everything had he succeeded, and if he lost, I suspect it would have been in greater glory than that in which he died, leading a retreating army crumbling to pieces, led by him.

[Diocle]

I agree with you Knonfoda the situation of Julianus is very different from the times of Galerius. I think we should judge Julianus' choice from the point of view of the Julianus' objectives in his campaign; and here IMO start the difficulty: what was the main objective of the last campaign of the Imperator Iulianus? Occupy Persia? Capture the Persian king and/or royal family? A punitive expedition? A deep destructive raid for intimidate the Persians? An exibition of military Power/Organization? The response to internal Roman political pressures? Conquer few cities and maybe the capital and destroy them? Inflict a sufficent number of defeats to the eternal enemy in his own territory?

I read and read again Ammianus and other authors but for me the real objectives of this expedition remain not clear! so I cannot exprime a real conclusive opinion, only a deep feeling: I feel all this campaign wrong from the start to its inevitable end.

No clear objectives, no strategical planning well coordinated with clear political objectives (here the comparison with the military operations against Persia of Diocletianus & Galerius is merciless for our Julian), so what to do in front of Ctesiphon's walls? what to do after? In the end what were the objectives of Julianus? if his objectives were to inflict a great symbolic defeat to the Great king of the Persians, and maybe destroy his internal political consensus, well Ctesiphon should be taken at all costs, but if the objectives were to advance more deeply into enemy territory and find the final great battle against the main Persian Army, the siege had to be avoided at all costs!
Do you see? If you change the objectives the answer and judgement about the choices of Julian changes accordingly!

I , for me, would have avoided the siege for sure!! With a IV century Roman army the risk of a trap or the consequences of an eventual sak of the conquered city would be worst than searching for a resolutive open battle, but this is only my opinion for definition very questionable.


A last observation for Blatta: If the Julian political intention was the abolition of the Christianity as State Religion, IMO his battle was right!! If his battle was to return to the old Politeistic Roman Pantheon it was a right battle! I'm not against the Christianity as Religion, well my Religion is the Atheism but IMO all the religious beliefs have the right to be guaranteed, and the Old Roman Pantheon did exactly this! So if Julian wanted to restore the religious molteplicity in the Roman Empire I can adfirm his battle was for the religious freedom compared to the obscurantism of the Costantine's policies.
But again take this like a personal belif or as an opinion!

[wulfgar610]

Julian seem to have the aspect of genius, although they say that can walk hand in hand with some madness.

Julian marched his army into Iraq and when things weren't going his way he decided to march out. If he had marched out in good order he could've come back later and had more success. His army was full time, the Sassanian's part time feudal. Something the Sassanian's only began to correct two centuries after this.

He certainly did better than Crassus or Marc Anthony!

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

Marc Antony was a humiliation. He could've easily conquered all of Persia with his army. If only he wasn't left without siege weapons in winter!

Crassus was an idiot, though.

[Valentinian Victor]

There was at least initially a slim chance that Julian could have taken Ctesiphon as when the Romans defeated the Sasanid army outside the walls of that city, the Roman pursuit reached the gates and Roman and Sasanid troops were intermingled and in all likelyhood going through the gates together. The Roman general Victor, although wounded, managed to recall the troops. From his tone, I suspect Ammianus feels this was a mistake and that if the Romans had been allowed to get into the city proper then there was a slight chance they could have captured the city without a siege.

As it was, Sharpur was on his way with a large army and Julian got wind of this and weighing up a number of factors, not the least being that the forces he despatched to Armenia to link up with the Armenians to support the assault in a proposed two-pronged attch, never arrived and this was probably the deciding factor which lead to Julian attempting to lead his army back to safe Roman territory (it would be interesting for someone to investigate if there are any historical accounts why the northern detachment never turned up, was it down to treachery and was Julian worried about whether they had aligned themselves to Sharpur and would in fact hit his army in a pincer movement?).

[Diocle]

Maybe aligned with Shapur not! But disloyal, for political reasons, to Iulianus yes! What I find really unlikely is the fact that an entire Roman Army could, only think, to pass en masse on the Persian side, I find very reasonable the hypothesis of political betrayal, the religious and political choices of Iulianus created many enemies.

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

Shapur was a weak king and a pathetic coward, IMHO. He would have fallen to his nobles' daggers if the capital fell.

[Knonfoda]

There was at least initially a slim chance that Julian could have taken Ctesiphon as when the Romans defeated the Sasanid army outside the walls of that city, the Roman pursuit reached the gates and Roman and Sasanid troops were intermingled and in all likelyhood going through the gates together. The Roman general Victor, although wounded, managed to recall the troops. From his tone, I suspect Ammianus feels this was a mistake and that if the Romans had been allowed to get into the city proper then there was a slight chance they could have captured the city without a siege.

As it was, Sharpur was on his way with a large army and Julian got wind of this and weighing up a number of factors, not the least being that the forces he despatched to Armenia to link up with the Armenians to support the assault in a proposed two-pronged attch, never arrived and this was probably the deciding factor which lead to Julian attempting to lead his army back to safe Roman territory (it would be interesting for someone to investigate if there are any historical accounts why the northern detachment never turned up, was it down to treachery and was Julian worried about whether they had aligned themselves to Sharpur and would in fact hit his army in a pincer movement?).

I have since returned Adrian Murdoch's book to the library, but will take a shot at this while it is still fresh in my memory.

Adrian, using what sources I do not know, implies there was a series of disagreements between Procopius and Sebastianus, and that Arsaces was less than forthcoming with troops. He doesn't go into detail about how this played out, but I think it's fair to suppose very few troops were provided by Arsaces, who probably sat on the fence so to speak and waited to see how the situation would play out. Disagreements and less troops aside, we still don't know why Procopius was delayed. I would hazard a guess that they must have faced fierce resistance of some sort. But that is all it is, a guess.

Maybe aligned with Shapur not! But disloyal, for political reasons, to Iulianus yes! What I find really unlikely is the fact that an entire Roman Army could, only think, to pass en masse on the Persian side, I find very reasonable the hypothesis of political betrayal, the religious and political choices of Iulianus created many enemies.

Does anyone know whether Procopius was a Christian or Pagan? As for Arsaces, we can see from the sources (Ammianus mostly) that he was less than enthusiastic in supporting Julian, and that to all intents and purposes, he had to be coerced to cooperate. Julian himself regarded him as a 'coward and a scroundrel'. The funny thing is, by not aiding Julian, he may have thought he was playing it safe should the Persians win, which they did, but in the end, he still died anyway after they took Nsibis. In essence, he signed his own death warrant.

[Diocle]

The reasons why Iulianus didn't take Ctesiphon, and more in general the reason of his Persian expedition always harrassed my mind, I cannot understand the Iulianus course of actions, his choices from every perspective remain for me unexplained, and probably here we find the real reasons behind his premature end.
For these reasons I find this thread very interesting, it touches the fundamental problem for those interested in the life of the Emperor Iulianus; so I want to give you a well-deserved reputation, IMO here you are doing very well!.........................+rep for Blatta!!

[Diocle]

Duble post sorry! but seeing that this interesting thread hasn't new posts, I want to tray to give an answer to the question posed by Blatta, 'Why Julian did not storm and took Ctesiphon?', using only the words of Ammianus so I'll quote again here, the liber XXIV, because the text is the answer.
IMO this is a turning point of the entire Persian Campaign, and slowly I'm convinced that the suggestion of Blatta might be right: Julian had to take Ctesiphon, it was the only useful thing to do!



So here Ammianus, Historiae (XXIV, 1-2):

"Digesto itaque consilio cum primatibus super Ctesiphontis obsidio, itum est in voluntatem quorundam, facinus audax et inportunum esse noscentium id adgredi, quod et civitas situ ipso inexpugnabilis defendebatur et cum metuenda multitudine protinus rex adfore credebatur.
2. vicit sententia melior, cuius utilitate princeps sollertissimus adprobata, Arintheum cum manu peditum expedita ad populandas regiones circumsitas misit, armentis laetas et frugibus, hostes pari persecuturum industria, quos dispalatos nuper densi tramites et latebrae texere notissimae; hinc opulenta .."

"Julian, having discussed with his chief officers the plan for the siege of Ctesiphon, it appeared to some of them that it would be an act of unseasonable temerity to attack that city, both because its situation made it almost impregnable, and also because King Sapor was believed to be hastening to its protection with a formidable army.
2. The better opinion prevailed; and the sagacious emperor being convinced of its wisdom, sent Arinthaeus with a division of light infantry, to lay waste the surrounding districts, which were rich both in herds and in crops, with orders also to pursue the enemy with equal energy, for many of them were wandering about, concealed amid overgrown by-ways, and lurking-places known only to themselves. The booty was abundant."



Here the official answer to Blatta, Julianus discussed with his Officers, some of them said not! Do not attack Ctesiphon! and the better opinion prevailed: Julianus accepted the opinion of 'some of his Officers'! He did not take Ctesiphon! But they (that group of them) did not suggested him what decision now should be taken: Going on, searching for the king and the final battle? Or going back into Roman lands under constant attack by the Persians? They let him alone, the only thing they (the group) knew and told him, was that the siege had to be avoided! It was too dangerous!
Because going on, into Persian lands without water and supply was not a dangerous choice! and in this painful situation, engaging the Sassanian Army, on a battlefield obviously chosen by the enemy, was not a dangerous decision! and returning under attack and without water and supply, and the moral of the troops steadly declining, was not a dangerous choice, for these great and loyal Officers!

In the end Blatta asked us, why He did not take the city? and Ammianus answer: because some of the Officers opposed to the idea of taking the city, it was too dangerous!!!!

Now my questions are: why he accepted the suggestion of some of them? They had a strong influence on the Emperor's decisions? How great was the influence of Julianus on his officers at this stage of the Persian campaign? My last malevolent and personal suggeston is that here, under the walls of Ctesiphon, we can see in a clear way, the presence of an influential group of officers, who is able to impose their will on Julian! Here I can see the signs of the future events.

[Gäiten]

But did Julian not proved that he only listened to his officers/advisors if he wanted to do so?

Imho, there was a multitude of reasons.

Ctesiphon was far more strongly fortified than the Romans knew.
They did not defeat the garrison forces decisivily in the encounter in front of the gates, they were intact.
Shapur Royal army was rapidly approaching.

[Diocle]

Good suggestions and thanks Gaiten! But where was the army of Shapur? How many days/weeks was the Persian army?

If the Romans took the city before arrival of the King they had the occasion to fight a battle on a field chosen by them and in a quite difficult place for the quality of the Persian army, or they could open a negotiation with the King holding his capital city and many hostages, and Shapur (having lost his capital) probably might be politically weakened.

In my opinion Julianus was alone, the Officers refused the idea of the siege but they did not offer him good suggestions about the next moves or many other alternatives.

Obviously these are only personal feelings, nothing more, reading Ammianus (for the fourth time, and is always a pain for me reading the book XXIV and XXV), but I repeat the feeling of something of strange between Julian and his Officers or a part of them remains.

[Constantius]

But did Julian not proved that he only listened to his officers/advisors if he wanted to do so?

Imho, there was a multitude of reasons.

Ctesiphon was far more strongly fortified than the Romans knew.
They did not defeat the garrison forces decisivily in the encounter in front of the gates, they were intact.
Shapur Royal army was rapidly approaching.

And just to add insult to injury-Iulian had burnt his supply ships! must qualify this remark with if you believe the accounts of Ammianus- I say this because in his account Iulian took the advise of his Persian guides- there are in my mind two problems with this (1) Roman historian always use the deceitful foreign guide as an excuse for failure, plus Iulian had studied previous campaigns and had Hormisdas with him.( 2) It doesn't seem like something a general who up until this point had made fairly logical and strategical sound decisions. He had to get out of there as soon as he realised the futility of his campaign as there was a large Persian army on route, and Iulians releif force had not arrived

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

Ctesiphon was far more strongly fortified than the Romans knew.

And? Given that they expected it to be a piece of cake, that doesn't make it too heavily fortified. They were probably trained for assaulting Roman-style forts - if one could take those nothing was beyond ones reach back then.

They did not defeat the garrison forces decisivily in the encounter in front of the gates, they were intact.

They were completely and utterly routed, even if the loss of life wasn't great. An entire army of 30 thousand routed on contact - the fact speaks volumes about the quality of such a force.

Shapur Royal army was rapidly approaching.

Why not take the city and then march out to meet it? The royal army not only fled from the Roman force once it turned to face it, it was defeated several times. Including the one Julian got killed - had he not died at the hands of traitors, that would've been another Roman victory.

[Knonfoda]

Good suggestions and thanks Gaiten! But where was the army of Shapur? How many days/weeks was the Persian army?

If the Romans took the city before arrival of the King they had the occasion to fight a battle on a field chosen by them and in a quite difficult place for the quality of the Persian army, or they could open a negotiation with the King holding his capital city and many hostages, and Shapur (having lost his capital) probably might be politically weakened.

In my opinion Julianus was alone, the Officers refused the idea of the siege but they did not offer him good suggestions about the next moves or many other alternatives.

Obviously these are only personal feelings, nothing more, reading Ammianus (for the fourth time, and is always a pain for me reading the book XXIV and XXV), but I repeat the feeling of something of strange between Julian and his Officers or a part of them remains.

Well, Ammianus *seems* to imply his previous sieges could take anywhere from two days to short of a week, and that is only with small to medium sized fortresses and cities in Julian's path. Given the size and protection of Ctesiphon, it may have taken considerably longer, and it was not unheard of in antiquity for sieges to last months and more.

And you say a field chosen by them, but whatever field he chose, he would still be caught between a revitalised city garrison made up of the survivors of the Battle of Ctesiphon, which numbered in the thousands, and the other thousands in front of him by Shapur II.

And even if he was alone, I have said before, whenever he heard something he didn't want to, he ignored it. He was well known for going against the odds. The mere 'advice' of his officers to not besiege the city would not have been enough to convince him of this, clearly other matters must have be taken into consideration. These must be, that the city defences were more formidable than previously thought, that the enemy army was still at bay, that a siege could potentially take a long time thus trapping him between armies, and as the previous poster said, that he decided to burn his boats and path of retreat.

Julian was by no means stupid. If taking Ctesiphon was easy as some people here are suggesting, does it not follow that he would have?

And? Given that they expected it to be a piece of cake, that doesn't make it too heavily fortified. They were probably trained for assaulting Roman-style forts - if one could take those nothing was beyond ones reach back then.

They were completely and utterly routed, even if the loss of life wasn't great. An entire army of 30 thousand routed on contact - the fact speaks volumes about the quality of such a force.

Why not take the city and then march out to meet it? The royal army not only fled from the Roman force once it turned to face it, it was defeated several times. Including the one Julian got killed - had he not died at the hands of traitors, that would've been another Roman victory.

Expectations rarely match up to reality. Wasn't it Cyrus the Great who said, how many times had cities, under the wisest of advice, made war on their neighbours, only to be utterly destroyed by a venture that was sure to be a success? I

t's not a case of Ctesiphon being outside the reach of the Romans, it was more a case of him not having the time necessary to invest in such a siege. Also, they were not routed 'on contact' - far from it, the Persians held their ground from the middle of the night all the way to the morning and early afternoon, hours and hours and hours of continuous fighting! To me that suggests a professionally trained, well lead and disciplined army, a far cry from the peasants and serfs you usually portray them to be.

And again your last point, marching out and meeting the army implies having the time to pursue and finish the siege, something clearly that wasn't available. Another point is that the army under Shapur was reportedly much larger than the previous one defeated, and that Julian had not received his backup forces marching down from Armenia.

I fall back on my deeply held belief. If Ctesiphon was easy to take, he would have done so.