Why Napoleon lost Russia campaign 1812

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

The fact that he didn't attack Ukraine was his biggest mistake. He should have either attacked St. Petersburg and the Ukraine then done a pincer on St. Petersburg, or he should have attacked Moscow and the Ukraine then gone up to St. Petersburg. But the Ukraine should have played a major role in all of his plans as he could have backing from the Ottomans, Crimeans, Cossacks and Polish and isolated Kotlyarevski in the Caucasus so that Persia could have advanced into Dagestan. He shouldn't have cared what stupid reasons Austria had since he could have just crushed Austria if they decided to make trouble. I think that he should have just annexed Austria as part of his empire and made the rest into a vassal kingdom of Hungary under a general or one of his brothers.

We can definitely say that a three pronged attack into Russia would be a mistake and that he doesn't want to do another Hitler move into Russia.

[arthuros]

Pincer movements across Russia in 1812???
Ukraine? No, absolutely not. Carolus Rex tried that and failed miserably- and he had much better political situation in S.Russia than Napoleon. Strategically, logistically and politicaly invasion of Ukraine was the worst possible option.. don't count on local support, there was not significant polish population eastern of austrian Lamberg/Lwow, cossak uprising supporting Napoleon invasion is a pure fantasy, and the Ottomans were completely incapable of launching any kind of offensive operation in Russia, they were constantly beaten and humiliated in Russo-turkish war by smaller russian forces, in their own territory (also they were not able to suppress serbian uprising for almost 10years! the Ottomans invading Russia & trying "to take Crimea" in 1812 is impossible scenario); climate, population density, road infrastructure were not much better either (probably even worse, especially further east); not to mention strategic nightmare - completely exposed flank and rear to imminent russian coutnerattack from their armies concentrated in Belorussia... Kiev (abandoned and burned) is a death trap for Napoleon and his depleted army, without any hope to even retreat back to Poland (or austria, entire operation is depended on austrian support). Then what? Go for Baku oil fields?

No, Napoleon strategic goal was to destroy russian armies, maybe capture capitol/s, but the main objective was to destroy russian offensive capabilities, then he could impose peace.. maybe he should go for St.Petersburg, but again his flanks are exposed (both of them, with russian baltic fleet and probably RN and swedish fleet- siege of Danzig for example).
So i really believe that he made no important strategic mistakes, maybe a few tactical errors, but he couldnt do anything much different (or better). It was Napoleon after all, he didnt invade Russia without planning

[exNowy]

Ukraine? No, absolutely not. Carolus Rex tried that and failed miserably- and he had much better political situation in S.Russia than Napoleon. Strategically, logistically and politicaly invasion of Ukraine was the worst possible option.. don't count on local support, there was not significant polish population eastern of austrian Lamberg/Lwow, cossak uprising supporting Napoleon invasion is a pure fantasy, and the Ottomans were completely incapable of launching any kind of offensive operation in Russia, they were constantly beaten and humiliated in Russo-turkish war by smaller russian forces, in their own territory (also they were not able to suppress serbian uprising for almost 10years! the Ottomans invading Russia & trying "to take Crimea" in 1812 is impossible scenario); climate, population density, road infrastructure were not much better either (probably even worse, especially further east); not to mention strategic nightmare - completely exposed flank and rear to imminent russian coutnerattack from their armies concentrated in Belorussia... Kiev (abandoned and burned) is a death trap for Napoleon and his depleted army, without any hope to even retreat back to Poland (or austria, entire operation is depended on austrian support). Then what? Go for Baku oil fields?

I'm sorry, but you are wrong.
Carolus XII had much worse situation, he had much smaller and exhausted army. He tried help Ukrainian Cossacks, but Swedes marched on Ukraine too late. Cossacks uprising was already cruelly suppressed by Russian. In Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was civil war at that time and some Polish and Lithuanian fought against Swedes. This also complicated Swedes operations and threatened their supplies and communication lines in Russia and on Ukraine. That was quite different strategic situation, than Napoleon had.

On West Ukraine lived many Polish and Ukrainians which can fought against Russia. Around Tiraspol, east from Lvov, lived Polish in majority. There was Polish uprising against Austria in 1809. Polish insurgents created several cavalry regiments and infantry troops which defeated Austrian forces. Unfortunately Russia allied with Napoleon in that war and they gained this district. Austria still kept Lvov.

On Volinia and Podolia also lived many Polish, therefore Russian Tsar can created several Uhlans regiments, few of them were almost entirely recruited with Polish and Ukrainians. These territories Russia captured in 1793-1795. Many people still looked at their freedom there.

Cossacks many times revolted against Russia. Do not forget their many struggles on Ukraine, Zaporozie or Pugachov rebellion in late 18 century. That was not pure fantasy. Napoleon of course did not want revolts, but it could happened, especially when French would be victorious.

Then Ottomans also could joined that war.
Russia fought Turks along six years in 1806-1812 and several times in 18 century. Russian committed some war atrocities and Turks and Tatars lost many people there. Ottomans lost many territories around north coasts of Black Sea and they would like regain these territories. Alone Turks of course were incapable to fought against stronger Russia, but in coalition they could helped Napoleon. They did such case during Crimean War several years later.

On Ukraine was better climate (not so cold as in north or central Russia) and bigger population density. Road infrastructure was not much better, but there were more roads which gave more possibilities in military operations. Ukrainian grain and grass also would be well come to Grande Armee. Supply in food and forage would be much better in this conditions. This meant better living conditions, more dwellings and better supply.

Problem with eventually exposed French left flank was not so dangerous. On north Ukraine and south Belorussia were large marshes on Polesie. These could hellped French stopped Russian bigger offensives.
In such conditions Russian counterattack from Belorussia would be well come, at last Napoleon sought for decisive battles. He did not find them until Borodino located far, far on east. Maybe he could found them on Volina. This was nearer to French depots and reinforcements in Poland.

No, Napoleon strategic goal was to destroy russian armies, maybe capture capitol/s, but the main objective was to destroy russian offensive capabilities, then he could impose peace..

He could destroy Russian offensive capabilities only in long war, but he would like to lead next brilliant and short campaign. This is why he tried attack on Russian main forces, then rapidly marched and pursued Russian Army so fast and so far on east. This was strategic mistake.

maybe he should go for St.Petersburg, but again his flanks are exposed (both of them, with russian baltic fleet and probably RN and swedish fleet- siege of Danzig for example).

March on St. Petersburg was not qood option. Too many troubles French could met there.
Ukraine, Lithuania and Belorussia were better for bigger operations.

So i really believe that he made no important strategic mistakes, maybe a few tactical errors, but he couldnt do anything much different (or better). It was Napoleon after all, he didnt invade Russia without planning

Oh, everybody makes mistakes. Napoleon also made them many times. Planning did not help too much, especially when plans can break down. Napoleon planned great campaign in Russia. He assembled multinational Grande Armee and sought decisive battles near borders. But Russian did not want play in his game. They constantly retreated far, far east and waited for cold winter. Russian long retreat, their avoidance from decisive battles, scorched earth tactic, changeable hot and rainy summer, early cold winter, long distances and French plans for this campaign dropped down. That plan was clear mistake.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I have to agree with exNowy, Ukraine was crucial for Russian existence. I agree with what he said but we should also take into account that arthuros is right about pincer movements being too dangerous in Russia in the 1800s. Unless Napoleon is able to recruit lots of troops from Poland and the Ukraine, both armies could have been isolated (if Napoleon attacks St. Petersburg and Ukraine). I think the reason that Napoleon only attacked Moscow was because he planned a quick campaign and to make Russia his ally. If he captured Ukraine then Russia would be ruined and he would have to put up with Ukrainian and Polish rebels that say down with Russia and also an unwilling and humiliated Russian ally. So it is basically a game of who do you prefer as an ally: the more powerful Russia or the fanatically loyal Poland (keep in mind that Napoleon believed that Russia would be loyal to him as he thought that Alexander was like his brother). Napoleon did attack St. Petersburg with Davouts corps but it was heavily guarded so Davout retreated before he was even close to the city, that along with his marshals which constantly retreated or did not gain enough victories and thus failed to accomplish Napoleon's planned encirclements.

Someone before mentioned that Napoleon could not attack St. Petersburg because Napoleon needed a large city like Moscow to put his troops in and Moscow had better roads anyway, also not to mention that they could be exposed to British ships, Russian ships or Swedish reinforcements in the Baltic road which could have led to strategic failure.
But I propose that if Napoleon had attacked both Moscow and the Ukraine then he could have isolated Russia's most important regions and their means of survival. If Napoleon attacks both places then it would be unlikely
that Russia could encircle or trap one of those armies since both armies are relatively close. Also if Napoleon does this he can have the Ukraine's shipping and grains but he also has an incentive for the Ottomans to join and he isolates Pyotr Kotlyarevsky's army in the Caucasus to be constantly attacked by the Persians and/or Ottomans. He can also have a secure supply line to Moscow and a place to retreat should things go badly up north.

To be fair to Napoleon he did plan to retreat to Ukraine after Moscow, but Kutuzov's army fought him at Maloyaroslavets and his troops were probably too exhausted to fight their way to Ukraine against half or all of Kutuzov's army (if Kutuzov takes the army east from Moscow southwards then Napoleon would have to fight them all at once, but either way they would converge on Napoleon and so Napoleon was right to retreat straight back to France).

[exNowy]

Hmm, I do not advocate pincer maneuvers in Russia, but I must admit that French initially executed these maneuvers on Lithuania and Belorussia in the summer 1812.

Napoleon with his main army marched on east north. Then parts of Davout Corps was sent to the southward where Polish, and Westphalian Corps marched against 2nd Russian Army on south Belorussia. French quickly captured Vilno, Minsk, Vitebsk and Mohilev, but Russian retreated or better say run away so quickly that advanced French can not captured them. Russian escaped from Napoleon’s trap. This was clear pincer maneuver, but Russian did not want to fight decisive battles near borders. They feared that they were heavily outnumbered and they can not withstand famous Napoleon’s strategy. They simply tried save their armies, therefore they quickly run away screened with crowds of Cossacks. Several fierce rearguard actions and that was all what French could met on their way.

Few separated French units were successfully attacked, but that was not so dangerous. French every day lost much more soldiers without combats on the way.

Napoleon wanted and sought decisive battles, therefore he pursued Russian so fast and so far on east. Meanwhile Russian executed scorched earth tactic. French soon get in troubles with lack of food, forage, drinkable water and dwellings, but they still marched on dusty or muddy roads, far on east on hard road in hot weather and several rainy days. They every day lost thousands strugglers, marauders, deserters, astray, disconnected, detached, weakened or sick soldiers. They also garrisoned some soldiers in the rear to watch over long communication and supply lines. Napoleon ordered some French or their allies Corps to guard flanks. All these weakened and dispersed his forces and French Emperor every day had less soldiers in his direct disposition.

In such hard conditions rapid march far on east was strategic mistake.

However Napoleon smartly maneuvers far on east and caught up Russian armies at Smolensk, but they again avoided decisive battle. There was few days bloody struggles, but Russian did not engage all their forces which stood on right (north) bank of Dnieper. Many Russian even did not watch at that battle which took place on the left bank around Smolensk walls and then they retreated again. Soon French fought next not so successful action at Valutina Gora/Lubino and Russian retreated again. French lost next occasion to caught up all Russian army on the one battleground. This was until Borodino located far, far on east and to that time French lost many, many soldiers on the way, even without decisive battles. French lost their advantage in quantity and their advantage in tactical quality in such hard condition could be disputable.

This was serious Napoleon’s mistake.

He tactically won pyrrhic bloody Battle of Borodino, but Russian made good their escaped or retreated again. Napoleon sought next battle before Moscow, but Kutuzov decided better save army, than defend Moscow. French emperor again did not find any decisive battle there.

He tried negotiate and waited for Russian answers. This was his next mistake, Napoleon gave time for Russian which can reinforced and recovered their beaten and weakened army. Meanwhile Russian sacrificed and fired Moscow, this way French lost there needed large base and winter quarters. French got booty, but this also undermined their morale. Many did not want to fight, they thought how carried their captured prizes. They did not attack on Russian weakened army and did not retreat on time, before cold Russian winter can caught them on the roads or in the frozen fields.

This led to late French decision march on south, but Russian blockaded that roads at Malojaroslavetz. Russian tactically lost next battle there, but strategically French decided retreat on the road to Smolensk. This was their next problem. Soon came early cold winter and French every day and night lost many soldiers frozen on bivouacs. This was horrible, catastrophic retreat. Napoleon lost more than half of his weakened main army on the way from Moscow to Smolensk. Then Russian campaign was lost! Napoleon tried escape and save his life.

These costs French next horrible casualties at Berezina and on frozen winter roads across Belorussia and Lithuania. Almost all Napoleon’s plans for this campaign were ruined.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

The reason Napoleon gave the Russians time to negotiate was because if he destroyed Russia then they would be useless allies and he can't control Russia himself. I agree that this was a mistake and he should have attacked Kutuzov's army.

Meanwhile Russian executed scorched earth tactic. French soon get in troubles with lack of food, forage, drinkable water and dwellings, but they still marched on dusty or muddy roads, far on east on hard road in hot weather and several rainy days. They every day lost thousands strugglers, marauders, deserters, astray, disconnected, detached, weakened or sick soldiers. They also garrisoned some soldiers in the rear to watch over long communication and supply lines. Napoleon ordered some French or their allies Corps to guard flanks. All these weakened and dispersed his forces and French Emperor every day had less soldiers in his direct disposition.

This part convinces me that Napoleon should have taken the Ukraine, he could have solved most of his problems but his army might be overstretched, although I doubt that the Russians could go down from Moscow and encircle an army in the Ukraine.

[exNowy]

This part convinces me that Napoleon should have taken the Ukraine, he could have solved most of his problems but his army might be overstretched, although I doubt that the Russians could go down from Moscow and encircle an army in the Ukraine.

Yes, Napoleon could attack on Ukraine. He should better planned, prepared and led longer campaing in Russia.
Problem was that he wanted to led short campaign, less than one or at last two years long.

Problem also was that two main Russian Armies stationed on Lithuania and Belorussia and Napoleon usually attacked enemy forces, manoeuvred on their rear, cut their communication and supply lines.

On west Ukraine was gathered only one Russian 3rd Reserve Army and next one, Danube Army was far on south yet.
They probably could retreated and Napoleon wanted to fought decisive battles near to borders.

Therefore he planned intercept main Russian Army. He did not want to led long campaign.
He did not see advantages in pure occupation of strange geographic places. These could be important only in longer campaign.

If he marched on enemy rears, he threatened their communications and suply lines, depots etc. Then he attacked nearest enemy main force. He did it in Italy, Austria, Germany and Prussia. But in Russia such plan was not possible. Theater of war here was too big.

There were many options for Russian armies to withdraw in different directions, but generally far, far on east.

Additionally there were large marshes on south Belorussia in Polesie. These marshes eventually could divided this theater of war and there could be hard manouvres from both sides on Ukraine and Belorussia.

On Ukraine was uneven terrain, many revers run from south to north and diagonally from north to south, and big Dnieper river was wider and wilder. These terrain obstacles were crosswise to predicted lines of movements. These could made difficulty in fast marches or movements and Napoleon preferred fast manouvres.

In Napoleon's mind Kiev was strange and not so important point. This town was located too far from borders and he planned decisive battles nearer to borders. Vilno, Riga and Minsk were at much close distance and he thought that Russian could defend these towns.

He disliked divided his forces too much on quite different fronts and did not want to disperse or spread his Gande Armee across long distances, however in practice he did it.

In such conditions Napoleon chose attack on enemy main army, but it looks that he forgot that they can retreated and avoided decisive battles near borders. Then he useless and stragically dangerous pursued Russian armies far, far on east.

[JaM]

So practically, only thing he could do better than he really did, was to use his light cavalry and light infantry more aggressively on strategical level to harrass main Russian force..

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

What exNowy said,
@JaM perhaps but even then when this was done with the vanguards out of Russia, they were engaged in Guerrilla wars with peasants. Mostly though just the deserters fought the peasants. I think light troops may have been more useful on a tactical level. The British and Spanish did this and it wasn't very effective instead of damaging supplies. If the French did this in Russia they would be at disadvantage because they were not in their home turf and because Russia is too large to go far enough, and thus not have much effect.

Part of the reason Napoleon didn't attack Ukraine was because he didn't want to encourage minorities in fighting Russia if indeed Russia was meant to be his ally. Also if he took Ukraine then Russia would collapse economically and then Russia would be useless in a war effort against Britain as Britain can put an economic stranglehold on Russia.

[JaM]

What I wanted to point out was that this was failure because of French Army was unable to catch Russian army, which was something that never happened before.. Before, Napoleonic Corps system was able to outmaneuver rigid Allied armies without problems.. thing is, Russians in 1812 were not the same Russians as in those previous wars... Napoleon strategy didn't worked as intended because he didn't expected Russians to avoid direct battle... What he needed was further decentralisation and independence of his Corps commanders,and proper cavalry screening for his advance in many directions at once to cut off Russians and force them to stand and fight. But this was impossible in unknown Russian countryside with big logistical problems on French side...

[exNowy]

So practically, only thing he could do better than he really did, was to use his light cavalry and light infantry more aggressively on strategical level to harrass main Russian force..

Hmm, I doubt that he could do it.
Russian got many jagers units and many light cavalry supported with crowds of Cossacks.
They knew better these countryside and quite smartly organized tactical ambushes and trapped many French or their allies cavalry in battles and skirmishes e.g. Mir, Romanov etc.

Murat tried operate with cavalry more aggressively, but these cases went even worse e.g. battles at Ostrovno or Krasne. These were phyrric French cavalry victories. Then at Borodino they sufferd bloody casualties, when they tried break Russian center.

Murat was famous cavalry leader, but in Russia he operated sometimes too aggressively and sometimes he was not prepared to enemy surprise attacks e.g. when Napoleon ordered him to be more steady, Murat forgot that Russian still could be aggressive and he was trapped at Taurutino. In this case Murat was saved thanks to Polish help, but they paid next casualties.

Worse that Murat did not take every day care about French cavalry and this was next large mistake.

French lost too many horses and cavalrymen in the summer. These was because they lacked in food, forage, drinkable water and many soldiers can not take care about their horses in these hard conditions. Then in the late summer and autumn they fought bloody battles, where cavalry suffered bloody casualties and later in the winter conditions many cavalrymen must walked on their feet. Then Napoleon had not enough real cavalry.

What I wanted to point out was that this was failure because of French Army was unable to catch Russian army, which was something that never happened before..

French can not catch Russian because they quickly retreated. Russian had many options to did it well, because theater of war was big and terrian gave some advantages to made some fierce rearguard actions. They known better these countryside and were better aclimatized to this climate and more resistant in this harsh conditions. They and their horses can eat even less and worse food and forage.

What he needed was further decentralisation and independence of his Corps commanders,and proper cavalry screening for his advance in many directions at once to cut off Russians and force them to stand and fight. But this was impossible in unknown Russian countryside with big logistical problems on French side...

Yes, you are right there.

But Napoloen's Marshals were tired with constanly waged wars, which they experienced many years.
They became little bit lazy and were accustomed with Napoleons orders, they waited for his decisions.

What is more Napoleon lacked in experienced great commanders which can operate independently.
He had brave Marshals, they operated quite good under his orders, but they lacked in own initiative.

Few Corps commanders played their own games as like Schwarzenberg, were quite useless as like Jerome Bonaparte, went astray in foreign country as like Eugene Beauharnais or Junot, commanded multinational mixt or many reserve and young soldiers as like Oudinot or Augereau, comanded devoted and fierce soldiers, but also many raw recruits as like Poniatowski, commanded foreign soldiers which had not many interests in that far war as like Saint Cyr, Victor or Reynier or commanded forced Prussian allies as like Macdonald, and Cavalry Corps commanders usually waited for orders.

Davout, Ney and Murat also had their bad days in that campaign.

Therefore Napoloen had many bad commanding problems.

Few Army Corps were spread over long distances and were cramped in their initiative, few were kept in main army and sought decisive battles. All Cavalry Corps were kept mainly in reserve and waited for decisive battles, but in the meantime French lost their men, horses and equipement. Sometimes they led aggressive actions, fought some battles, but it inflicted next loses. These operations were inconclusive and there were not decisive French victory. But time operated for Russian and things went worse and worse.

[JaM]

I wouldn't put Davout to that list... Davout was military genius, on comparable level to Napoleon. While your description is accurate for Ney,Murat and others, Davout was way above those..

[exNowy]

I wouldn't put Davout to that list... Davout was military genius, on comparable level to Napoleon. While your description is accurate for Ney,Murat and others, Davout was way above those..

I admire Davout's military achievements and commanding skills, but in Russia he got some bad days too.

He start this campaign with c.a. 72,000 in his I Corps, but how many lives he saved in the end?
How many remnants were still alive and operated under his orders? This was clear catastrophe.
His I Corps virtualy cased to exist as real military formation!

Worse that Davout took even depot battalions for that campaign and later there were big problems to rebuilt or recover these destroyed units. Napoleons was furious with that.

In the mid summer 1812 Napoloen ordered Davout to take command under French right wing forces consisted of few fine Fench divisions, Polish and Westphalians Corps, and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps. Davout was ordered to intercept 2nd Russian Army. He even won at Mohilev, but Russian escaped this strategic trap and joined 1st Russian Army at Smolensk. Strategically it was French failure.

During Battles of Smolensk and Borodino Davout's I Corps fought hard, but his achievements were not brillant. He lost many soldiers there and French did not won decisive battles.

During winter retreat Davout's Corps was trapped at Viazma and again he lost many soldiers.

Every day he lost next soldiers.

From five infantry divisions, two light cavalry brigades, c.a. 180 guns and many wagons which were under Davout's command lived only some remnants in the end. That was ...

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

I'll have to agree with ExNowy on the Davout thing. Davout did not technically make any progress in the strategic level with his troops. It seems that Russia was his breaking point and although he performed well, the circumstances and the campaign did not allow him to win. Even after this he didn't do as well although that might be Napoleon's fault for putting him in Hamburg and then later on when he wasn't at Waterloo.

[JaM]

Didnt do well in Hamburg? Defense of Hamburg is one of the famous defenses of all time...

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Oh he did well at Hamburg, but would Davout have accomplished more being place elsewhere is what I'm saying.

[JaM]

True, bigest mistake was leaving him defending Paris and not taking him to Belgium.. If it was him and not Grouchy to delay Prussians, Waterloo would be a major British defeat...

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Knowing Davout, if he doesn't find the Prussians then he would have gone to Waterloo and surprised Wellington. Either way Napoleon wins. But Hamburg might have been well enough since it was the only thing preventing Napoleon from being encircled at Leipzig. If Napoleon still lost with Davout and Hamburg falls then Napoleon isn't making it back to Paris.
But 1815 was slightly different since one wonders if it were necessary for Davout to defend Paris.

[exNowy]

Hmm, could these years after Russia campaign change Napoleon's collapse?
I suppose that was determined in the end of 1812. In Russia Napoleon lost his Grande Armee, many veterans and experienced soldiers, officers, generals, many, many horses, guns, wagons and equipment. His army, as well as his supporting allies, were crushed. Worse that he lost his fame as invincible commander.

Soon Prussia and later Austria switched sides, and as like Russia nad Sweden joined anti Napoloen's coalition. Many French allies also suffered horrible casualties and many lost their hearts for Napoleon.
Then they unwillingly supported French.

In such conditions Napoloen can not won. However his genius allow French to won several battles in 1813.
Even in 1814 he managed won next battles, but these can not change nothing. French were heavily outnumbered and quite wear out.

In 1815 Napoleon needed devoted and fully trusted man in Paris. Do not forget that he was betrayed even with his Marshals in 1814. Then he was forced to first abdication.

In Napoleon's plans Davout could not help him in Belgium too much, but he could keep order and organized new units in Paris. Do not frorget that French were not well prepared to this campaign, they had not enough time, resources and manpower.

Davout was quite smart organizer and he can keep disciplined order at last he was known as Iron Marshal.

However in Russia he had his bad days.

[JaM]

Actually loss of men wasnt that huge for French as it was for their allies.. Biggest problem was a loss of trained horses that was not possible to replace.. Guns could be cast new, but you cant train warhorses in few months... it takes years... and without his cavalry, Napoleon couldn't break enemy positions the way he did before..

And regarding 1815 - i think he should have played one card game and only rely on his army - if he won, it would certainly shattered opposition a lot, while any loss would not help his situation anyhow no matter who would be defending Paris... war was lost