Why Napoleon lost Russia campaign 1812

[exNowy]

I never said they didn't run away, just that they had no really compelling reason to like the rest of the European soldiers. Also, at Austerlitz and Friedland, the army wasn't filled with mass-conscripted serfs like in 1812.

Hmm, I never said that you said something like that.
But you said that Russian stood and died and this little bit looks or could suggest that Russian did not run away at last dead men did not run.
You also said that

these were men who did not run away when they saw the battle was turning against them, as they had nowhere to run away to.

Therefore I cast some examples when they run away as other European soldiers did it too.

Mass conscription was quite irrelevant to this case.

Finally, we can dismiss your argument of the population because, unlike in Spain or Prussia, they never once conducted any insurrectionist actions. You hear no stories of French Soldiers having to quell riots or insurgencies conducted by the Russian population; no, the only threats in the French Rear were the weather and the odd band of roving Cossacks.

We can not dismiss population as an argument. Russian big population 35-40 millions allowed create vast regular army and many, many irregular units. Russian created them very well in 1812. There serviced thousands new soldiers and they effectively reinforced Russian army during this campaign.

If Russia had smaller population they could not assembled almost half a million men under arms.
Then it was almost 1 to 1 ratio to French and their allies which marched to Russia.

When we take into account that Russain were more resistant it gave them clear advantage.
In Russia severe climate and harsh living condition Russian can outlived many western and southern European.

Initially Napoleon of course outnumbered Russian regular army 2 or 3 to 1, but Russian happily can deployed well their forces. Then they retrated closer to their depots and can reinforced their army many times. Before Borodino Napoleon lost his supperiority in numbers, but he believed that his army is better quality. But he forgot that time played for Russian now.

He did not expect early winter frost and this led to disaster.

[exNowy]

It's not sufficient. Austria was full of Austrians, and Prussia full of Prussia. They were not extreamly pleased to be invaded by the French either, and yet they lost.

These could be disputable.

French Empire had 30-40 milions mainly French, plus several millions their allies.

Prussia had 9,7 million men in 1806, but there lived few millions Polish which did not want to fight for Prrussia. They even uprised against Prussia and organized almost 40.000 soldiers which joined Napoleon. After Tilsit Prussian population was reduced to 4,9 milions in 1807.

Austria had 19-21 million, but there lived many, many quite different nations.
Austrian Germans formed only major minority in this empire. Many other nationalities had not heart to fought for Austrian e.g. some Polish formed many Legionaries which joined French. Some Croats and Slovenes also went into French service. Ruthenian (Ukrainian), Slovacks, Serbs and Romanian waited for their freedom. Czechs, Moravians, Hungarians dreamed about their Kingdoms. There also were many other problems too.

Russia had 35-40 millions men and grand majority it were Russian. Majority populatin can spoke Russian and there was Orthodox Cristianity which still had big influence on Russian, Ukrainian, Belorusian and other eastern serfs.

There also lived many other nations, but it contained smaller parts than in Austria Empire.

Then Russia had bigger, more monolitic and more devoted population.

[Steph]

Good points, what I meant was the size of the population is not sufficient, since the Russian population was not that much bigger than Austria.
There are many other factors at least as important as the size of the population.

[exNowy]

The size of the population of course is not sufficient to won the war, but it was basis for army creation.

Without big population you could not assamble vast army. Without strong and devoted population you can not have strong and devoted soldiers which can fight to the last man.

Therefore Austrian Empire which had 21 million population can assembled vast army and irregular troops.
It was 300,000-350,000 soldiers plus 50,000-100,000 Landwehr and insurrection units in 1805-1809.
Good organization, rich own resources, some British money and quite big population allow create these big forces. However Austrian population was two times smaller than in Russian or French Empires.

But many Austrian multinational subjects unwillingly went into Habsburgs army. They were less devoted or motivated to fought so hard as Russian or French. Many even did not want to fight hard for Austrian or Hungarian. This led to many problems and Austrian commanders can not expected that all their soldiers could fought as like Russian or French. Maybe therefore Austrain were many times defeated.

Russia had 35-40 million population. This included grand majority Russian and other eastern Slavic serfs which were heavily influenced by Orthodox Church. Russian also had harsh discipline, they were accustomed to hursh living conditions and severe climate. Then they were little bit more resistant, were strongly motivated or simply must fight harder, sometimes to the last man.

Russia also conquered many different nations, but they were dispersed over vast territory.
Then low density and long distance made some troubles too. Russian can suppress any uprising when it were spread out over different and far regions.

Russian had clear superiority in their own Empire over Asiatic tribes and smaller populations of other European nations.

[Lowes]

Initially Napoleon of course outnumbered Russian regular army 2 or 3 to 1, but Russian happily can deployed well their forces. Then they retrated closer to their depots and can reinforced their army many times. Before Borodino Napoleon lost his supperiority in numbers, but he believed that his army is better quality. But he forgot that time played for Russian now.

Again you are thinking along the lines of WWII.

Russia lost its main depot in the West when Napoleon captured Smolensk; the length and speed of their retreat also required them to leave behind baggage and burn depots as they went. Make no mistake, the French Army was relatively well provided for (though it had to disperse often to receive its sustenance) for the majority of the march to Moscow.

Napoleon lost his superiority in numbers after Borodino. Off the top of my head, the Russian army numbered aprox. 195,000 in June of 1812, that is, when the Invasion began. At Borodino, they were a 120,000, outnumbered quantitatively and qualitatively at the pounding-match of Borodino by 130,000 'French' of Grand Armee. Casaulties, desertion and attrition destroyed the numerical advantage held by Bonaparte thereafter, as it had been doing for about a month's time at this point in the invasion due to stretched supplies and dwindling abundance in the countryside.

PS: With few exceptions, one can dismiss the 'national' militas raised by the Allies to help reinforce their main armies. The Landwher of 1809 were certainly a failure on the part of the Austrians, with these regiments refusing to fight outside of Austria-proper. Likewise, the Russian Opelchynie where barely armed and certainly in no position to offer concrete resistance, though I don't doubt they all died fanatical deaths when engaged, if they served a purpose, it was as artillery-movers and cannon fodder.

[Prince of Essling]

PS: With few exceptions, one can dismiss the 'national' militas raised by the Allies to help reinforce their main armies. The Landwher of 1809 were certainly a failure on the part of the Austrians, with these regiments refusing to fight outside of Austria-proper. Likewise, the Russian Opelchynie where barely armed and certainly in no position to offer concrete resistance, though I don't doubt they all died fanatical deaths when engaged, if they served a purpose, it was as artillery-movers and cannon fodder.

I think it unfair to dismiss the Opolchenie as mere cannon fodder.

The Russians raised 27 Jager battalions, 71 infantry regiments, 30 infantry cohorts, 31 regiments of horse, 5 artillery batteries - totalling some 255,224 men! Many Opolchenie were used as replacements to fill out depleted regular formations. Some even became regular formations in their own right e.g. Graf Saltykov (Moscow) Hussars became the Irkutsk Hussars.

The Opolchenie also replaced regular troops in performing the duties of garrisons, trains, parks, camps & stores. They also worked as nurses, miners, policemen, prison guards etc.

In 1813-14 the Opolchenie were used predominantly in sieges (e.g. Danzig) & blockades (e.g. Zamosc). Some were attached to the HQs of Barclay de Tolly & Wittgenstein. One Corps of Bennigsen's Reserve Army was composed of Opolchenie..........

[Lowes]

I think it unfair to dismiss the Opolchenie as mere cannon fodder.

The Russians raised 27 Jager battalions, 71 infantry regiments, 30 infantry cohorts, 31 regiments of horse, 5 artillery batteries - totalling some 255,224 men! Many Opolchenie were used as replacements to fill out depleted regular formations. Some even became regular formations in their own right e.g. Graf Saltykov (Moscow) Hussars became the Irkutsk Hussars.

The Opolchenie also replaced regular troops in performing the duties of garrisons, trains, parks, camps & stores. They also worked as nurses, miners, policemen, prison guards etc.

In 1813-14 the Opolchenie were used predominantly in sieges (e.g. Danzig) & blockades (e.g. Zamosc). Some were attached to the HQs of Barclay de Tolly & Wittgenstein. One Corps of Bennigsen's Reserve Army was composed of Opolchenie..........

Of course, of course, but are these not exceptions that prove the rule old boy? Paragraph by paragraph now....

The use of Opelchynie to fill out depleted formations would certainly have a more practical effect then massing these men in seperate regiments, but its not anything out of the ordinary or innovative by 1812; though the intelligence behind this decision is unquestionable. Yes, such recruits would've 'bled out' the overall experience of the unit, but proximity to men who (potentially, in the Russian military) had well over 20 years of indentured service in the ranks may have hardened them to a life on campaign far quicker then being in a genuine Opelchynie organization. Further, as to the Opelchynie that became regular regiments through hard work and experience - well there's many examples of this throughout the Napoleonic wars and amongst different nations, but to suggest it happened on any grand and significant scale...

The 1813 use of the Opelchynie isn't much different then the Austrian use of the Landwher in the initial stages of their 1809 offensive; Landwher being used to blockade French fortresses close to the Bavarian-Austro border. In this regard I cannot deny their usefulness. Now, however, we must examine their usefulness as strategic reserves. I am loathe to use the Austrian's yet again to make a point, but the historical parallel cannot be ignored. Following the disaster at Regensburg (1809), the Generalissumus Charles marched up the Army's immediate reserves - an amalgamated Grenadier regiment, in an attempt to (a) rally the tide of fugitives and (b) failing this, cover their retreat. Immediately, 2 of the 4 Battalions lost all cohesion and were caught up in the panicked rush, without firing a shot.

The question must be begged then, what is there to suggest that an ill-disciplined regiment would fare any better as a reserve? I wish I had an example of Landwher fleeing in such a manner in 1809, but the few Frei and Volunteer battalions present in that war were undoubtedly the cream of the crop.

Regardless my good man, your overall point is worth consideration, + rep.

[Swerg]

On the Russian supply depots, they had mostly been massed in the West due to Bagration's advice to the Tsar regarding a potential offensive campaign against French interests, as well as possible attack by the Austrians/Prussians. Napoleon began his campaign before these preparations were fully completed, though, so many of the Russian supply depots were either captured or destroyed by the retreating Russians.

On the subject of the 'national militia' forces, my reading has lead me to the conclusion that their MAIN purpose was to free up second-line and proper reserve units from their logistical roles, not so much to actually fight in battles, although they DID get used in that role sometimes. Basically, militia's main job was to move heavy stuff around for the real soldiers, and their role in battle was to fill out the ranks a bit. More experienced militiamen would be promoted into 'real' regiments as time went on and they were required.

Basically, every militiaman the Russians raised was a real soldier who wasn't tied down sitting on an oxcart or wrapping cartridges.

This is the origin of Russian soldiers supposedly being armed with pikes and suchlike. Several regiments of the Russian militia WERE issued with such weapons, but, and this is the key point, they never saw combat with those weapons. Basically, they were given placeholder weapons just in case they were really needed, and possibly for policing duty as well, while they were kept well behind the front lines.

[exNowy]

Again you are thinking along the lines of WWII.

Who is thinking along the lines of WWII ?
I always think here according NW and very well know differences between these periods.
Then don’t suggest such things, please.

Russia lost its main depot in the West when Napoleon captured Smolensk; the length and speed of their retreat also required them to leave behind baggage and burn depots as they went. Make no mistake, the French Army was relatively well provided for (though it had to disperse often to receive its sustenance) for the majority of the march to Moscow.

Napoleon lost his superiority in numbers after Borodino. Off the top of my head, the Russian army numbered aprox. 195,000 in June of 1812, that is, when the Invasion began. At Borodino, they were a 120,000, outnumbered quantitatively and qualitatively at the pounding-match of Borodino by 130,000 'French' of Grand Armee. Casaulties, desertion and attrition destroyed the numerical advantage held by Bonaparte thereafter, as it had been doing for about a month's time at this point in the invasion due to stretched supplies and dwindling abundance in the countryside.

Oh, you clearly miss the point regarding Russian forces and their reinforcements.

Russia assembled vast forces used against French invasion in 1812.

In first line near west border stationed three regular armies which had c.a. 195,000 men.

These were gathered in several separated groups placed nearly to Niemen river from Tilsit, to Grodno and around Vilno, Lida as well as far south on Volynia nearly to Lutsk.

Behind them was second line where in several places stationed reinforcements, separated corps and division. There were almost 137,000 men however about 105,000 men were available for defense in June. They were located around Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper Rivers, around Riga, Drissa camp, Borisov, Bobruisk, Krasne, Smolensk, Kiev and few other places.

In the third line there were located next Russian forces which were used against French. There were “approximately 161,000 men of various and highly disparate military values, of which about 133,000 actually took part in the defense.” They were placed far east to Moscow, Kaluga, Tula, Orel and even far north in Finland and far south on Ukraine and south Russia.

Then Russian had quite large forces and many depots placed far east, north and south where were many soldiers and reinforcements which later were used against French invasion.

Altogether Russian assembled “488,000 men, of which 428,000 gradually came into action against the Grand Army.” These included many Cossacks and militiamen and fortresses garrisons. Russian also used some minorities as like Bashkiria, Tatars, Kalmyks and few other which created several irregular units used in this campaign.

We also should remember that at the same time Russia had another forces which stationed far, far east around Ural Mountains and in Siberia, and far south east on Caucasus some forces still were on Persian war.

Napoleon’s forces which crossed Niemen in several places counted 444,000 men in June. Then gradually were sent some reinforces, but historian estimated that about 480,00- 550,00 men crossed Russian borders.

Then initially numerical ratio French to Russian forces near borders were 2 or 3 to 1, but counted altogether forces used in this campaign it was almost 1:1 ratio.

Napoleon lost his superiority in numbers after Borodino. Off the top of my head, the Russian army numbered aprox. 195,000 in June of 1812, that is, when the Invasion began. At Borodino, they were a 120,000, outnumbered quantitatively and qualitatively at the pounding-match of Borodino by 130,000 'French' of Grand Armee.

However sources rather varied widely and there is very hard find right data, but there are many Russian historians which clearly showed that at Borodino were c.a. 130,000 French against 150,000 Russian including many Cossacks and Opolchenie militias. However Russian regulars were c.a. 120,000 men.

Then Napoleon had not quantitively superiority at Borodino. He probably had only qualitatively superiority, however his strong Imperial Guard was never committed to action there. They simply watched at this bloody battle.

[Miralem]

It nicely states on the NTW nation choosing " Russia is a giant if you can mobilise it to face the threat of Napoleon "
That fast mobilisation that they had as probably the most populated nation of that time, including their Asian territories, and the morale they and Montenegrins always had " For the Tsar/King and the Fatherland - Freedom or Death! " has totally destroyed Napoleon

Off-Topic - First post ^.^

[jackwei]

Today marks 200 years since Napoleon's massive allied army crossed into Russia in 1812 thus begun the great invasion which eventually ended in catastrophic defeat which ended up being a very costly campaign indeed.

Some can say general winter or some can say too because Napoleon didn't use his reserve of imperial guards at the end of Borodino and let the Russians escape was very costly at the end. Hmm some can say this campaign was over before it begun as Napoleon was warned of what could happen if he invaded mainland Russia.

[Vercingetorix The Great]

He lost the campaign because he was fighting russian defenders who would not give up even when they lost their capital. He lost a lot of men because he had to travel the same route when he was leaving Russia.

[Swerg]

He lost the campaign because he was fighting russian defenders who would not give up even when they lost their capital. He lost a lot of men because he had to travel the same route when he was leaving Russia.

Russia never lost their capital. Napoleon took Moscow, which hadn't been the capital for nearly a century by that point.

[Aymer de Valence]

Russia never lost their capital. Napoleon took Moscow, which hadn't been the capital for nearly a century by that point.

Yeah exactly, Saint Petersburg was the main capital, though Moscow was very symbolic.

A major reason he lost was because he never found his favoured 'decisive' battle. Borodino was a victory, sure, but the Russians escaped in large numbers.

[Swerg]

Yeah exactly, Saint Petersburg was the main capital, though Moscow was very symbolic.

A major reason he lost was because he never found his favoured 'decisive' battle. Borodino was a victory, sure, but the Russians escaped in large numbers.

It's a historical fact that taking Moscow only makes the Russians even more angry.

[exNowy]

He lost the campaign because he was fighting russian defenders who would not give up even when they lost their capital. He lost a lot of men because he had to travel the same route when he was leaving Russia.

Hmm, Napoleon lost more men when he marched to Moscow. Look at Minards diagram.
He went too far, lost too many soldiers and later must retreat in harsh winter conditions.
It was too late for better operations in late Autumn 1812.

A major reason he lost was because he never found his favoured 'decisive' battle. Borodino was a victory, sure, but the Russians escaped in large numbers.

Yes, this was major reason why he still was seeking decisive battle and marched so fast, so far on east. He lost too many soldiers, horses and equipment on the way, mainly without battles. There were hard marching and living conditions, long supply and comunications lines.

Russian stubbornly fought and retreated. Theater of war was too big and he must dispersed his Grande Armee in many far away places. His army consisted of many different nationalities. Many soldiers did not want to fight hard for Napoleon e.g. Austrian, Hungarian, Czechs, Prussian, many Germans, Dutch etc.

Many were not well situated for this far campaign as like Croates, Illyrians, Italians, Portuguese, Spanish, Swiss, Ruthenians etc.

In general only some French, Polish and few others vigoriously fought against Russian.

Hard terrain, long distances, low population, limited roads, harsh weather conditions made things worse.

But Napoleon still marched like a blind man in a trap.

After Borodino Napoleon thought that Russian would fought for Moscow.
But they also lost too many soldiers and Kutuzov decided that better save army, than save Moscow.

Russian did not give up. However they needed time to recruit new soldiers, reinforce and recover their army.
Napoleon gave them this needed time. He waited in Moscou on negotiations. But instead asked for peace, Russian made some aggresive actions and this was clear that they would continue this war.

Napoleon must retreated and soon early cold winter came. Everything was lost.
French only could happily escaped and saved their lives. But not many were so happy.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

Kutuzov left Moscow, contrary to Alexander's orders. Napoleon believed that taking Moscow would make Russia sue for peace and sign another alliance with Napoleon. The peasants and nobles believed that Napoleon sought to destroy Russia even though this was not the case. Napoleon did not wish to cripple Russia as he wanted Russia as an ally against Britain and wanted to invade India in 1813 along side the Turks and Persians. Russia however wanted to destroy or defeat Persia and the Ottomans and so this was one thing that Napoleon wanted a stop to.
The Tsar did not sue for peace because if he did then the nobles would probably murder him as they had murdered Tsar Paul and he probably knew this. But if the Tsar was too uncooperative with the French, then Napoleon could always replace him with the Duke Constantine (extremely pro-Napoleon) or Nicholas (mostly indifferent, he was 16).
His biggest mistake was his drive on Moscow, why would he not just attack St.Petersburg if it was the Russian capital? A Polish, Austrian and Ottoman drive towards the Ukraine and a French, German and Polish drive towards St.Petersburg. By attacking St.Petersburg he could destroy Russian access to the sea, take their capital, stop things from happening with Bernadotte as he can intercept Swedish reinforcements or threaten Sweden. If he takes Ukraine then he can isolate Pyotr Kotlyarevski's 10,000 men in the Caucasus and have them picked off by the Persians and possibly Ottomans. He can take Russian grain supply as well as have somewhere to retreat while still putting pressure on Russia, should things go badly in the winter, and he can completely stop Russian access to the sea. With these crippling results then Russia would have to sue for peace, if they don't then he can take Moscow in a pincer and I doubt that Russia would risk all that.

[JaM]

True, He should march on St Petersburg instead, thing is, it was not as big as Moscow, and Napoleon indended to spent winter in Russia, so he needed to occupy city large enough to keep his forces intact. Anyway i would say he would be much better with smaller force going towards St Petersburg, while Austrians could drive towards Ukraine. Cutting Russia from their Baltic ports would cripple them considerably, so they would be not able to replace their losses (they could replace men, but not weapons)

[exNowy]

True, He should march on St Petersburg instead, thing is, it was not as big as Moscow, and Napoleon indended to spent winter in Russia, so he needed to occupy city large enough to keep his forces intact. Anyway i would say he would be much better with smaller force going towards St Petersburg, while Austrians could drive towards Ukraine. Cutting Russia from their Baltic ports would cripple them considerably, so they would be not able to replace their losses (they could replace men, but not weapons)

Hmm, march on St. Petersburg was longer and harder. Livonia (Latvia), Estonia and North Russia were low populated, there were big forests, few roads, harder climate. There were not enough food, forage and dwellings needed for vast army.

In this theatre of war could operated Russian navy and marines. Even British Royal Navy or expeditionary corps could support them. Swedes also proposed help for Russian in exchange of Finland.

All this meant too many complications in military operations there.

Napoleon thought that one or two French Corps and some cavalry would be enough to sent in that direction. He exactly ordered X, II and later also VI Corps there. X Corps blockaded Riga and Dinaburg, while II Corps crossed Dvina river, but was beaten back at Klastice by Russian I Corps under Wittgenstein. Then French II Corps together with VI Bavarian Corps defended Dvina line at Polotzk where they fought two bloody battles. They fought nextl battles during Napoleons retreat from Moscow too.

Nevertheless major reason, why Napoleon marched on Moscow, was that he pursued retreating Russian main Army. He wanted to destroy then and their stores and depots. He preferred attack on enemy main forces, than capture any geographic places.

Attack on Ukraine would be better operation, but auxiliary Austrian Corps was too small for such operation. There was deployed bigger Russian III Army under Tormasow which later was strengthened by strong and experienced Danube Army under Chichagov.

Austrian Corps together with VII Saxon Corps could not stopped these Russian forces in their winter advance on Belorussia.

This meant that on Ukraine Napoleon should sent more forces.

I think that he could marched there with all his Grande Armee. There he could found better theater of war. There was bigger population, better climate conditions, more roads, food, forage and dwellings. If Napoleon marched on Ukraine, Turkey eventually could renew their war with Russia. They would like recaptured Besarabia, Yedisan or Crimea, which Russia captured from Ottomans in 1812 or in late 18th century.

In this direction on Volin and Podolia lived many Polish which could joined Poniatowski Polish Army which fought for Napoleon.

Ukrainian Cossacks also could fought against Russian at last Russia destroyed their Hetmanate and Zaporozian Sich in 18th century. In these conditions Crimean Tatars also could abandon Russian Tsar.

All these were fine opportunities, but Austria dreaded that this theater of war could be too close to their borders in Galicia. They also did not want strengthened Polish, Ukrainians and Ottomans because this could made some troubles for their possessions in Galicia which they captured from Poland in late 18th century. Therefore Austrians undermined attack on Ukraine.

Napoleon, married with Austrian Emperors daughter, would not like to spoil his political affairs with Austria. He choose attack on Lithuania and Belorussia direction.
Maybe this was his strategic mistake in this campaign.

[JaM]

several very good points made