Alliance Balancing: A Case Study on Czech Republic and Slovakia
On March 20, 2003, after months of futile diplomatic embroilment, the US-led coalition attacked Iraq. Under a guise of preemptive defense against Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), President Bush resolved to invade this country. Despite mounting criticism, most vociferously represented by the Franco-German coalition, and various manifestations of public discontent, President Bush and his allies embarked on this unpopular detour of the mission to rid the world of terrorism. To make up for the lack of a mandate from the international community (i.e., UN General Assembly and Security Council), he had assembled a coalition that would outnumber, at least in terms of its participating members, the previous coalition sent into Iraq. It would be dubbed “the coalition of the willing” or instead, “the coalition of bribed,” depending on one’s point of view.
When Colin Powel listed the members of the “coalition of the willing,” on March 18, 2003, two days before the military strike ensued, approximately half (14 out of 30) comprised countries from the former Soviet bloc. Thus, it is a historic moment not only for US, but Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well. Those CEE countries conferred an immense amount of legitimacy on the US-led war against Iraq. As difficult as it was for President Bush to justify his initiative to the international community, and more importantly to his constituency, without his CEE allies the task would have been much more difficult. Stripped of these fourteen countries, skeptics and critics could more easily make the argument that dismissed US actions as unilateral, thereby distorting its image of a benevolent hegemon.
Of those fourteen countries, Czech Republic and Slovakia stand out as a great source for study in the field of “most similar system” research design. They share a multitude of similarities going back to the ancient “Czecho-Slovak” aggregation within the Great Moravian Empire. In the last century both countries have found a common cause in a united state, but for various cultural and political reasons this union ended in a “velvet divorce.” Ever since, Slovakia has been the one trying to catch up with its “big brother” in realms of political and economic development.
The purpose of this project is to study the events leading up to the decisions of Czech Republic and Slovakia to support US military efforts in the War on Iraq. This will be a comparative study, which will try to identify relevant similarities and differences between the decision-making processes in the two countries. It is also intended to use these similar cases to test some existing theories on alliance formation.
The two countries’ decisions to support the US-led invasion of Iraq are surprising, considering that public opinion in the Czech Republic and Slovakia opposed the war. Moreover, both of these countries were waiting to be accepted as EU members at the time. The fact that France and Germany, the key players within EU, were highly critical of the war put tremendous pressure on CEE countries to deny any support to the US.
At the same time, there were some crucial differences between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Slovakia was led by a distinctly center-right coalition, which have a tendency to support the US more, while Czech Republic was led by a three-party coalition with representation from both ends of the political spectrum. At a time when Slovakia was only waiting to be accepted into NATO, Czech Republic was already its member. This relieved much of the pressure from Czech Republic that burdened Slovak elites when deciding between the US and Franco-German position.
What cost/benefit calculations or cultural factors can help us understand the two countries’ decisions? Where the aforementioned differences enough to cause the different response of the two countries? This research will endeavor to answer this question.
The answers are relevant both for practical and theoretical reasons. The decision-making processes in the two countries can offer us several underlying arguments regarding the decisions of virtually all CEE countries to support the US. This is important because, of the coalition, more than half comprise countries of the former Soviet sphere of influence. The number of countries backing the US was significant. The more “multilateral” the coalition was perceived to be, the more legitimate it was considered by the international community as well as by the American public.
Can the US count on the assistance of CEE countries in the future? Or were the factors in 2003 unique and not likely to repeat? The international relations (IR) theories have long occupied themselves with the question of “balancing,” asking how countries decide between joining two powerful camps. The decisions of CEE countries, balancing between the US, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, are relevant in understanding the application of these theories.
Popular Support
Most of us probably still remember the vivid images of millions of protesters filling the squares and plazas of their capitals around the world weeks before and during the War in Iraq to let their governments and US leaders know how they felt about the expected war. Western European and US cities, alike, experienced a tidal wave of protests involving massive amount of people. This did not happen on the same magnitude in Prague and Bratislava, which went through negligible, if any, civil unrest. The biggest protest in Bratislava occurred on March 27, during the period of actual combat. In total, around 300 participants took part in these protests, which were organized by the Slovak Communist party (KSS) . On March 16, about 1000 people stood in Prague’s Old Town Square and demonstrated against the possible attack on Iraq. Those two demonstrations were the biggest to occur in the two countries. If this low turnout would have been any indication of the public level of discontent, it would be reasonable to believe that the political elites had close to a free reign on the issue and enough leverage to implement more pro-US policies. This was not the case, however, as many polls showed the public in both countries strongly opposed the US acting unilaterally and their governments directly supporting this with a military aid. So what could have prompted this low response?
Czech News Agency (CTK) offers some clues when they conducted interviews with leading psychologists and public opinion experts. Lenka Sulova, the head of the Social Psychology Department at the Charles University in Prague, said, “The people in the Czech Republic think in general that they have a limited chance of affecting public affairs." Perception of low amount of political efficacy is part of the heritage that lingers on from the communist era, in which political participation was limited to the politburo. Therefore, Czech Republic lacks a tradition of civic participation and responsibility that comes in part with the political socialization in democratic establishments. "There are really few affairs due to which we, Czechs, would go out in the streets and it rarely concerns something happening outside the Czech Republic," said Jan Herzmann, the director of polling agency TNS Factum. Same arguments can be used on Slovakia, which shares in this heritage. As it will be discussed further on, the positions adopted by these two countries were fairly mild with indeterminate rhetoric, most especially in the Czech Republic. This also played a factor in the low participation in demonstrations. Because the governments of the two countries have held back from unconditionally supporting the US, in form of military assistance, the general public did not think itself personally affected. This is connected to the previous point of lack of concern for foreign affairs.
In the mid September 2002, Polis Slovakia agency conducted a poll asking the public of its opinion about the possible war on Iraq. Only 11.3% supported the US and British initiative, while 70% were against it. Interestingly enough, 44.9% supported the idea that at least political support be offered by their government, but only 6.7% stressed that military help should also be accorded. Findings of the TNS Factum agency in the Czech Republic were similar to those in Slovakia, although somewhat different questions and opinions were being asked. Even though only 48% completely rejected a possible attack, if we add the 33% who thought that UN mandate was necessary, the total number of respondents who rejected the US approach was 81%. Furthermore, 31% allowed the use of Czech military as an auxiliary force, while only 13% could imagine sending them into the direct combat.
Correlated to the shrinking support for the US anti-terrorist initiative was the support for the NATO accession in Slovakia. The result of the survey conducted by the Focus agency was that a sizeable drop in support from 60.2% in April 2002 was registered, so that by October 2002, it dwindled around 52.1%. The popularity has inevitably decreased, as the NATO rhetoric became more tied up with US alliance and backing against Iraq. "Behind the drop in support for our entry is the problem of the United States' possible attack on Iraq," stated Marian Slosiarik from the Focus agency attempting to interpreted the decline. The misconception that US steers NATO around at its whim and joining this organization means becoming an unconditional US ally is still widely held and accepted. The Government spent very little amount of resources to promote Slovak accession into NATO among its citizens. This is because, unlike in the EU, referendum is not required and lack of popular support for the accession does not immediately translate into its debacle. However, EU membership carries with itself a number of broadly acknowledged incentives by the general public, such as freedom of movement and pursuit of employment, which is something that NATO membership lacks. Nevertheless, Slovakia’s accession would not be harmed over the issue of low popular support.
When in October the RCA Research institute conducted a poll in Czech Republic and Slovakia concerning the possible Iraq War, the findings confirmed the continuing trend that an overwhelming majority disagrees with US position. Only 30% of Czechs and 23% Slovaks were willing to support US intervention. The biggest percentage of support stemmed from the younger people, age 25-34, (39% in Czech Republic and 29% in Slovakia) and those with a higher education (32% in Czech Republic and 29% in Slovakia). The fact that the poll was conducted by a single agency increased the possibility of more uniform approach and conditions of the sampling, which makes for a much more accurate comparison between the opinions of the two countries. Despite that these figures and those from the previous month were collected by different companies with different questions being asked, the general notion that the public support for the war is fairly small remains consistent.
A survey administered in January by STEM agency in the Czech Republic found that 39% of respondents were willing to support Czech participation in military action in Iraq. This figure is somewhat misleading, because three fourths considered a UN mandate important and an overwhelming majority of the 39% fall within those three fourths. Similar survey in Slovakia, which came out in February, was organized by Polis Slovakia agency. Of the 550 participants, 11.6% have agreed to sending troops to Iraq, 20.4% have qualified Slovak participation with a UN mandate, and 60.3% gave a definite ‘no’ (the rest could not decide). While there seems to be a big difference between Czech and Slovak supporters, let’s not forget that to truly compare them we have to combine the two percentages for Slovaks supporting war with or without any qualifications (11.6% and 20.4%), which comes up to 32%.
Because these polls ask military and not political support, certain problems arise when comparing them to the poll conducted in October, which asked only political support. The ones in September, which asked both, show only slight and inconsistent change. In the Czech Republic the combined military support decreased from 44% (33% for Czech soldiers as auxiliaries and 13% for Czechs in direct combat) to 39%. This change is inversely related to Slovakia’s where the support for direct military aid increased from 6.7% to 11.6%. Whether this is caused by the different approach taken by the polling companies or a real shift in opinion, or most likely both, the general trend of popular rejection to the US initiative surrounding Iraq continued.
During the weeks that precluded the military conflict, this trend eventually transformed popular opinion into public manifestations, however small in number of their participants. With such pressure from the electorate, political elites would have to try to maneuver between them and their own convictions so they could stave off a backlash in the election seasons ahead. The result was that although both governments sent a small number of troops to Kuwait and eventually to Iraq, they did not take part of an actual combat. This way they could satisfy US appeals, without upsetting too much the people who have elected them into their office.
Rhetoric
When on January 22, 2003, Rumsfeld divided the European continent into “old” and “new,” the “new” being the pro-US camp ready to join EU, it sent shock waves through the European community. To western leaders campaigning against US efforts to invade Iraq, Rumsfeld’s message underlined what has been feared for some time already. It was like a déjà vu to have another “outside power” cleave off a chunk of Europe for itself. His statement implied something that seemed inevitable, polarization of Europe closer to the US. Thus, Rumsfeld’s simple dichotomy has been adopted as a reliable device to explain the relationship among the European states today. The focus was so much concentrated on the strife between the “Old Europe” and US that the opinions and actions of “New Europe” lost importance or even relevance. In truth, Rumsfeld’s words caught many CEE leaders in disagreement. Even the staunchest US supporter, Poland took it as an offense. On April 3, Czech President, Vaclav Klaus, visited his Polish counterpart, Aleksander Kwasniewski, who said, refereeing to Rumsfeld’s comments, "It is a false debate, especially when you talk about the Czech Republic and Poland. We are a part of the very old Europe." He further commented: "We are against exploiting countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland, by trying to use us when they tell us to choose between Europe and the United States."
SUPPORT FOR THE WAR
The rhetoric in Slovakia surrounding the possibility of an attack on Iraq started to shape itself after September 2002. This was the time of Parliamentary elections and it was clear that politicians were reluctant to even touch this sensitive subject. Judging from the polls shown above, it would have had a serious recourse on many of the “closeted” US supporters. Also, it was still soon to come up with any definitive position as battle lines between pro and anti-war camps were only beginning to be drawn. Therefore, Slovak Foreign Minister, Eduard Kukan of the Christian Democratic Union (SDKU), was not merely deflecting journalistic inquisition when he said that, “Slovakia will wait with taking stand on prepared US strikes against Iraq until it gets all the evidence.” However, after the elections were over with similar faces in the government and the immediate burden from pursuing seats in the parliament lifted, Kukan showed a different tone. He vaguely stated: “Slovakia is determined to always act as an ally of the USA.”
Czech Republic experienced elections few months earlier in June, so there was more discussion during this time. Czech Foreign Minister, Cyril Svoboda, already at this early stage allowed for the possibility for US to circumvent UN restrictions and still retain its legitimacy and his adherence. Svoboda said: “The important thing is that whatever happens, it has the backing of the UN Security Council, of the alliance [NATO] or, possibly, of a coalition.” Vaclav Havel, the Czech President at that time, who was a known supporter of US and liberated in the fact that he could not run for another reelection, was reported to say: "It would not be good at all if this were to be the USA's solo action. If the UN Security Council fails to provide a solution issuing an ultimatum asking Iraq to meet its demands, the operation should be carried out by a broader international coalition of which NATO should not be a negligible part."
Slovakia, too, had its strong pro-US polarizer in the person of its Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda of the Christian Democratic Union (SDKU). He had much more in common with the Czech President than his own counterpart, Vladimir Spidla of the Social Democrats (CSSD), who regarded “the UN mandate as exceptionally important." Dzurinda, who said, “If our basic values are clear and if it is clear to us who is our ally we should not be cowards and we should not be evasive,” was opposite in temper, if not completely in opinion, to Spidla when it came to Iraq.
Dzurinda’s remarks after the first post-election cabinet meeting, in which he retained his seat, showed a definite commitment towards alliance with US and a desire for Slovakia to become a member of EU and NATO. "Back at the 1999 NATO summit, I said that Slovakia would be a NATO ally in reality even if we were not formally signatories to the treaty, a 'de facto' member of NATO even if we were not a member 'de jure’” said PM Dzurinda. Because Slovakia, unlike Czech Republic, was not a member of NATO at that time, the message of acting like one resonated strongly within the rhetoric of the right-wing elites who ruled the country. Even those who would not eventually support the war, like the Christian Democrats (KDH), thought it necessary to join NATO.
This begs the question: why would European countries want to join the alliance in this day and age? The more obvious answer is prestige. To become a member of this organization means becoming a part of the most powerful alliance on this planet. There are also real and perceived security advantages that draw these post-communist countries into NATO. While external security threats have all but vanished on the European continent, joining NATO closes that possibility definitely. NATO also extends an umbrella of internal stability by requiring democratization as an important criterion for its membership. The aforementioned attributes are largely attached to the US leadership within the organization. To these small countries it is essential that US retains this role, because “U.S. is the natural leader of the democratic world, the only country capable of global responsibility,” as was noted by PM Dzurinda. Jeff Gedmin, a European security expert who is director of the Aspen Institute in Berlin, sums it up nicely for us: "One of the important features of the NATO enlargement is that the eastern European countries who were under Soviet domination really want to keep the U.S. involved in Europe […] They do not want to entrust their safety to a loose European security system run by France; they want to join a strong NATO that has the American security guarantee -- and that is going to be a big influence on the future politics of NATO."
With the importance of NATO clearly understood by the ruling elite, joining the organization became a matter of persuading its “gatekeeper,” the United States. All member nations pass a vote in their parliament about admitting new members into NATO, but because the US legislation is so removed from the executive, which deals with these countries, convincing the US Senate is extra challenging. Therefore, acceding countries must not only keep an eye out for European parliaments, which tend to be easier to convince, but they have to vie for the acceptance in the US Senate. Latching on to the crisis in Iraq as means to prove their loyalty was an important part of the strategy that would ensure the prospect countries their membership. Slovak President Rudolf Schuster kept a good appearance of his country when he came out publicly in support of the US on the very first day of the war.
PUBLIC MANIFETOES
Before the actual combat started, two public declarations in support of the US were signed, the letter of eight (L-8) and the Vilnius ten (V10) declarations. L-8 carried more political weight, because it was supported by five EU members (Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and UK) and three CEE countries that have already been accepted into NATO (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). The V10 was formed by EU and NATO hopefuls (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). Because of this, V10 countries were deprived of two major venues where they could express or exert their views, but they, nevertheless, possessed a great potential to polarize the two organizations closer to the US in the future. This fear was manifested in the reaction of the anti-US camp, where both declarations managed to generate a strong reaction. It resulted in a backlash of colorful rhetoric directed at them mostly from the French side via President Chirac, who called them “childish and reckless,” going as far as threatening their chances of accession into EU. Interestingly enough, he managed to exclude from his criticism signatories who were already EU members, as reflected in the opinion of Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan who said, "I do not comprehend why Mr. Chirac is not criticizing Italy, Spain or Portugal. After all, they said exactly the same... I do not like it, and I do not think this way of marking us out is justified."
From this we can infer that not only was the CEE support crucial for US, but it has become a thorn in the side of “Old Europe.” Some scholars have argued that France has for a long time tried to build up Europe into a power that would countervail US hegemony. Others argue still that France is more or less neutral and that there is “no evidence of French effort to either balance or buck-pass when it comes to American preponderance.” If France is indeed trying to unite Europe to increase its bargaining power with the US, it saw its chances come to a halt as these manifestoes drew a sharp rift between the two camps. In a moment of disappointment, the rhetoric turned inflammatory. Fueled by the confident US acknowledgement of its allies, this perception was accepted in the West by both, the “Old Europe” and the US camp. However, the story was quite different back in the CEE region.
One noteworthy event for formation of a CEE position on Iraq, which precluded the signing of two pro-US declarations, L-8 and V10, was the Right Wing Conference in Prague, partly organized by the US International Republican Institute. What came out of this conference was a statement in which one of the points pledged support to President Bush in his attempt to wage war on Iraq. Vaclav Klaus, head of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) party which helped to organize this conference, signed on. Ultimately, this declaration had a very limited amount of influence precisely because virtually all of the signatories (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Latvia) played a limited role as opposition in their respective countries. Klaus’ acceptance to sign on seems strange in hindsight, since he would become very opposed to US actions as the Czech President.
The real demonstration of pro-US support arrived in the form of the aforementioned L-8 and V10 declaration, both released within a span of just few days in late January and early February. This came as a mountain of moral support for US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who at the time was presenting a pro-US case at the UN. This V10 declaration was not the first of its kind. The V10 countries have proved their alliance to the US in November during the NATO Summit. They pledged support to US initiative to disarm Iraq and if it continued to breach UN Security Council’s resolutions, they would join in an ‘ad hoc’ coalition. When the V10 presented a declaration at the NATO Summit in Prague, it was hailed as a manifestation of an unconditional US support against Iraq. Seven of those countries were invited to join NATO at that summit (all except Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia). Within the close circle of diplomats, insulated from the public opinion in their countries, strong language was the norm. Even Slovak Foreign Minister, Eduard Kukan, admitted that, “This is a very strong declaration.”
There is no question that the group environment had a major role in stamping out dissent. Slovak foreign policy analyst Ivo Samson summarizes it well: "All the candidate countries are pro-American. Slovakia has only followed suit." However strong the rhetoric was at the summit and removed from the reality of public opinion, it was interpreted very differently at home. The foreign ministry spokesman denied that the document carried any legal obligation. "The Foreign Ministry thus wants to stress this is not a confidential document as has been reported by some media," the spokesman added.
The situation with L-8 was similar in respect to the group environment and domestic interpretation. Furthermore, there was more dissent among the Czech coalition government elites. As a signatory to L-8, Vaclav Havel, a chief of state, stood out from a crowd of Prime Ministers, who headed their respective governments. The reason for it was that Czech PM, Vladimir Spidla, refused to sign the declaration. The task was passed on to the obvious substitute. The United States needed a moral support for its cause, regardless of its legal validity, and it was able to extract this from a President with virtually no legislative or executive competencies in his last few days in the office. The reaction from the Government was not welcoming. They resented the fact that their foreign policy was being (mis)represented by someone outside the policymaking loop. Czech Foreign Ministry issued a statement which stressed that the official position is reflected “in the relevant governmental resolutions,” not in the personal conviction of Vaclav Havel. Vladimir Spidla held a similar point-of-view. He added: "The stance of foreign policy is determined by official decision making, not by newspapers and newspaper articles, even though they are signed by important people.”
Those two examples do a great job of illustrating the different meanings that were attributed to the L-8 and V10 declarations by Czech Republic and Slovakia. The same can be applied to virtually all the CEE countries that took part. Had the “Old Europe” paid more attention to the internal matters of these countries, they would realize that their worries were largely unfounded and signatures on these manifestoes were devoid of an actual commitment to an alliance. Vaclav Havel was in a unique position. Because of his recognized authority in and outside the country and freedom from the pressure of reelection, he had more elbow room to act on his own conviction and add to the prestige of the US position. Other Slovak and Czech leaders, especially those who endorsed the US position on Iraq, were caught up between the internal (public opinion and their peers) and external (pro and anti-US camps) pressures before they could offer a position of their own. The result is a collection of signatures that is hardly worthy of the fanfare it got.
DISAPROVAL OF THE WAR
The only marginal sign of rebellion in the Slovak coalition government was the official position of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) endorsed by its chairman, Pavol Hrusovsky. He refused “war as an instrument to resolve” the problems regarding Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDs. While KDH did not support the War on Iraq, it allowed its members to vote according to their own conscience. This was not enough for PM Dzurinda who scolded the KDH leadership, by comparing them to the ultra-nationalist party (SNS). By passing conservative resolutions that recognized the importance of UN mandate, the Slovak government averted any bigger crisis and thereby presented a united position.
While Slovak coalition Government had something to unite behind, in form of NATO membership, Czechs lacked this shared desire and interest, which could bring them closer together on Iraq. Small signs of difference amongst the coalition members were beginning to appear in November when Vladimir Spidla was gathering support for what he thought would be a UN approved attack on Iraq. Defense Minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, who was also of the Social Democrats (CSSD), indicated that UN mandate was not necessarily required for Czech Republic to play at least a role of non-combating auxiliaries. Christian Democrats (KDU-SCL) in Czech Republic, who were also in the coalition, were undecided on the issue. Their opinion ranged from Petr Pithart’s, a Senate chairman: “I am convinced that the operation [against Iraq] does not have to take place at all” to Cyril Svoboda’s, a Foreign Minister who believed that even the latest resolutions at the time could be interpreted to allow for an attack against Iraq.
The most numerous party in the parliament, CSSD, was itself divided. Vladimir Spidla continued to emphasize the role of UN, while Jaroslav Tvrdik maintained his position: “I would probably say, though with much hesitation, yes [to engaging Czech troops in Iraq].” The situation turned critical after the war, in which Czechs decided not to participate. The CSSD conference came up with a resolution that condemned the war. It read: “The conference is convinced that the legitimate goal of the international community, that is disarmament of the regime of Saddam Hussein, could have been attained by peaceful means had not the warring states decided to ignore the UN.” Furthermore, UN should assume control over administering Iraq after the war. One of the draftees of the resolution was Jan Kavan, who presided over the UN General Assembly at the time. Deputy Libor Roucek issued a counter-resolution defending the position maintained by the Government. One member of the CSSD went so far to call the actions of US “a crime […] not in accordance with law.”
Clearly, Czech Republic suffered deep divisions within its Government. Two important causes, one direct and internal and the other indirect and external, are at the root of this. Makeup of the government directly contributed to the disarray over Iraq. The coalition consisted of parties on both sides of the left-right spectrum, with center-left Social Democrats (CSSD) leading it. The center-right Christian Democrats (KDU-SCL) and right-wing Freedom Union completed the tapestry. In comparison, Slovakia was led by a decidedly center-right coalition, with Christian Democratic Union (SDKU) at its head. The intrinsic differences in party ideologies spilled into fundamental rifts between party positions on Iraq. CSSD went back and forth on the issue with Spidla as its moderator and KDU-SCL was undecided. Only the right-wing Freedom Union remained the stronghold of US support. Such is the difference in the composition of the two governing coalitions.
The issue of NATO membership was an added incentive that pulled a fairly united Slovak coalition further together. Both countries were waiting to be admitted by the EU, but the concept of ‘acting like an EU member’ when it came to security issues, more specifically the Iraq War, was not present in the rhetoric of the ascending countries. That didn’t deter the French President, Jacques Chirac, from trying to make the candidate countries aware of such a concept. Europe’s division on the subject created enough space for Slovak and Czech elites to find allies even within the organization they were about to join. As much as NATO served to unite Slovak government on the issue of Iraq, EU failed to do the same for the Czech government. The lack of unity in EU on the issue surrounding Iraq was an indirect and external reason for the division inside the Czech coalition government. Had the EU been more united, Czech government would have been forced to align itself more accordingly. Opposing a more united Europe would carry negative repercussions for Czech and Slovak EU memberships.
Deployment
Perhaps some of us still remember key moments from the presidential debates of 2004. One of the memorable highlights was Kerry’s accusation that the alliance construed by President Bush was not a “grand coalition” by any means. Kerry further listed off the few countries which have participated in the actual combat. Poland was not included. Bush’s immediate reaction was: “Well, actually, he forgot Poland.” This statement has quickly become a favorite among political analysts and late night show hosts, alike. Poland was the only CEE country that participated in the Iraq War with its contingent of 54 parachute troopers. Because of lack of contribution on the part of most US allies many critics pointed at Bush’s failure in organizing a meaningful coalition that would unburden the task of American military. After Saddam Hussein was ousted and the combat phase had ended many CEE countries sent a number of military units to serve various humanitarian and non-combating tasks, such as removal of mines. Slovakia and Czech Republic were among them.
Long before any battle plans were drawn out and arrangements for Czech and Slovak troops were made, speculations were circulating already as to what contribution could these two countries offer in case of a war. President Havel’s words on his visit in Washington back in September of 2002 give a very good estimate: "Nevertheless, in my view it is clear that our participation would most probably involve our anti-chemical and anti-bacteriological warfare unit.” Chief of Staff, Jiri Sedivy, debunked the speculation that Czech Republic was already committing itself to any operations in Iraq. He also clarified that the troops stationed in Kuwait at the time had nothing to do with Iraq. The 251 soldiers of the anti-chemical unit stationed in Doha operated under the premise of Operation Enduring Freedom, which was a more general anti-terrorist operation associated mainly with the war in Afghanistan. By late December, this unit was recalled back home where it was placed on an alert in case the decision is made to redeploy quickly.
By January 8, PM Vladimir Spidla, in a radio interview, revealed the first US requests relating to the war in Iraq. Flights over Czech territory, transfer of military units on it, and deployment of anti-chemical units which could be used in an event of WMD attack by Iraq were the three requests. To the first two, PM Spidla added “that this request is really limited and relates to very short, interim periods.” At that time Slovakia had not been officially approached yet by the US. Perhaps the discrepancy in NATO membership made a difference on how US entreated its CEE allies. In any event, the coalition government continued to deny any involvement in future planning. "The government has not yet discussed the matter," said cabinet spokesman Martin Maruska. Even so, the Defense Minister, Ivan Simko admitted that certain preparations were already being made under his predecessor Jozef Stank. On January 10, the talks of a possible cooperation in the anti-chemical unit stationed in Kuwait were under way between Jaroslav Tvrdik and Ivan Simko, Defense Ministers for Czech Republic and Slovakia, respectively.
Before the war started, all the help that Slovakia and Czech Republic amounted to was a joint anti-chemical unit consisting of 59 and 357 personnel respectively, for whom US covered the travel expenses. They could not join the operation in Iraq without the UN mandate and would be activated only in a case of Iraqi use of WMDs. "We are not members of Operation Iraqi Freedom," exclaimed PM Vladimir Spidla as battles raged in Iraq. Yet still, these countries figured on the list of American supporters of the war. As Spidla’s words were being uttered and CSSD conference came out against the war, Czech Republic was sending a military hospital to Iraq. Of course, all this was interpreted within the confines of relevant UN resolutions which called on all its members to help alleviate the suffering in the war-torn country.
After the war, Czech Republic and Slovakia parted ways from their joint venture in Kuwait and each played a different role in post-war peacekeeping. From April to December 2003, Czech Field Hospital operated in Basra under the British leadership. Afterwards, the focus shifted to training Iraqi police. Around 100 men remain behind as a military police contingent fulfilling the aforementioned task. Slovakia participated under Polish leadership in Southern Iraq. It has sent a 100 men engineering unit in July responsible for clearing the land from mines, ammunitions, and other explosives. The mission remains active to this day.
While it can be argued whether Slovakia and Czech Republic offered political support to US as it waged war in Iraq, it is more difficult when military contribution is concerned. Clearly, of the two, Slovak government was more outspoken when it came to helping US disarm Iraq. However, when we compare the numbers of soldiers deployed, Czech Republic leads in absolute terms. Their commitment never overstepped the bounds of UN mandate either, even though Czechs were more apt to point that out. Because of divided interests pulling at not only those two, but other CEE countries as well, these countries could not afford to demonstrate unrestrained dedication to the US. Under the pressure from domestic (public opinion) and external (most of EU) factors, even the rightwing elite of Slovakia had to balance between the two poles.
Theoretical Explanation
Because of its bias towards great powers, the literature on balance of power is very limited to give us a satisfactory explanation for the behaviors of small countries, such as Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, we can use the template already provided to try to find theoretical basis for their decisions to grant limited support to the US.
Of the two obvious choices, balancing and bandwagoning, balancing is completely ruled out. While the actual act of balancing can be difficult to identify, its purpose rings clear to scholars studying this theory. Traditionally, balancing has been used to “prevent a rising power from assuming a hegemony.” It can also be used to countervail hegemony that is already in existence. Because of hegemon’s sheer power, balancing against it brings costly repercussions to the great powers that attempt to employ this strategy. However, the traditional concept of balancing (also labeled hard balancing), which relies on two simple indicators, military build up and alliance formation, to identify itself in progress, failed to account for the behavior of states after the collapse of Soviet Union. In this new era, “The empirical evidence of limited hard balancing in contemporary world politics attests powerfully to the need for broadening the concept of power balancing.” Soft balancing was developed to better describe the informal diplomatic arrangements made by many great powers since 1991 in an attempt to prevent the US from acting unilaterally. Franco-German cooperation against the US efforts to invade Iraq is a case in point. Thus far, such soft balancing has not been able to prevent the US from acting unilaterally, “but by depriving the US of the legitimacy of a Security Council resolution, they certainly made it more expensive.” Czech Republic and Slovakia, because they were closer to the US rather than France and Germany on Iraq, could hardly be classified as balancing.
Up until this time, the actions of the CEE countries have been simply accepted as bandwagoning. Whether the focus was on the military conflict against Iraq, or diplomatic embroilment against France and Germany, the actions of Czech Republic and Slovakia, would fit nicely into the realist conception of bandwagoning. “Bandwagoning by small powers makes sense.” Because of their small size, they are not as desirable of an ally of great powers attempting to balance against a hegemon, and because of their vulnerability, the hegemon, being the stronger of the two, provides more security. Stephen Walt, who has done much to update the balance of power theories, gives us an insight into bandwagoning. According to him, “states sometimes bandwagon with a powerful state, especially if that state offers them security and economic advantages.” Despite all the incentives in place (security offered via NATO and economic advantages via contracts to rebuild Iraq) Czech Republic, Slovakia and rest of CEE countries, were cautious enough that they decided against giving US the support that it had sought. Neither CEE country participated in the War on Iraq in any significant matter, nor was the response of these countries uniformly in support of the US. The aforementioned remarks of Czech PM Spidla, who denied that Czech Republic was part of the “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” attest to this.
But there is yet another choice, often overlooked because of its tight association to great power behavior before the World War II. “Appeasement refers to the granting of concessions to the great power threatening to gain ascendance over others in international system.” This definition given by Mark R. Brawley is a historical description of the actions undertaken by the UK and France, which appeased Hitler with some territorial accessions in order to prevent another Great War. He later postulates that the EU is generally “appeasing Washington by going along with actions its members do not wholeheartedly support.” These two statements combined together to give a clearer picture describing the actions of CEE countries. Although Czech Republic and Slovakia were not giving concessions to a “power threatening to gain ascendance,” they did give some concessions, by way of varying political support and nominal military support, to a power that served as a vehicle for security on the European continent. And although Czech Republic and Slovakia were not EU members at the time, they too showed lukewarm support in terms of military participations and, especially in the case of Czech Republic, in terms of political backing, much like most of the continent. In fact, their desire to become EU members served as an incentive to carefully balance between appeasing the two conflicting sides, and not to completely forsake France and Germany, two of the most powerful EU countries.
Conclusion
As convenient as it was to interpret the situation in CEE using terms, such as “New Europe” and “the coalition of the willing,” provided by President Bush’s cabinet, we must move away from this labeling to truly understand complexities that shaped the decision-making in this region. While those terms were adopted and acknowledged by both sides of the conflict, the reality was far from the extreme. To dismiss the actions of CEE countries as just another case of bandwagoning misses some fundamental truths about the severity of the situation. In reality, more modest measures were taken by CEE ruling elites, which resulted from their difficult position of having to appease the US and anti-US camp, public pressure, and their own convictions.
The public opinion in Czech Republic and Slovakia was very opposed to the Iraq war. This left little leeway to the pro-American elites to implement their policies. However, in Slovakia, a substantial minority (over 40%) agreed that at least political support be offered. This could only bolster Dzurinda’s unrelenting rhetorical endorsement of US initiative against Iraq. While it is intangible, we should not underestimate the value of rhetorical support. Bush administration placed much emphasis on building a coalition fortified by a slew of confident proclamations as a substitute for a real military coalition since powerful countries, like France and Germany, which could have done much to relieve the burden placed on the American military, greatly disapproved of US actions.
Can the US expect to continue to hold sway over CEE elites so that it may always tap into this reservoir of political reinforcement? With new members gained by the NATO, it seems that US has lost some of its direct and indirect leverage. Directly, US can no longer wave this “carrot” in front of full fledged members and the pool of prospect members is getting smaller. Indirectly, with V10, which served as a consultation body for future members of the NATO, losing its purpose, the US will have to address these members individually. Such environment is less conducive to conformity. Czech Republic is a prominent case of this. Its government had distanced itself from the kind of rhetorical support that has been given by Poland and most countries ascending into the NATO. Although the V10 could hardly be called an international organization, it did have a loose meeting structure in place and a narrow set of goals. The L-8 countries lacked the kind of cohesion exhibited by the V10. The US could not address them as a group making the decision to sign the declaration a purely individual. Its lukewarm support was, however, enough to President Bush that he considered Czech Republic an ally in the coalition and he was able to convince others of this as well.
So, whose side did the CEE countries take? Such question becomes less relevant as the international community is becoming more interdependent and states substitute hard balancing for soft balancing. The more appropriate question would ask the level of commitment showed to both sides of the conflict. The Cold War dichotomy of clear-cut losers and winners on the plane of international system no longer applies. Now, there are more than two sides to join or positions to adapt for smaller countries. CEE states are no longer forced to bandwagon in conformity to the wishes of a single benefactor. They are able to demonstrate more uniqueness in their foreign policy, even though this is limited to the extent that they can appease the two balancing coalitions. Thus, countries of the former Soviet bloc are able to carve out a niche different from the two extremes on the opposing sides of the Atlantic without jeopardizing their relations with either of them.
Alliance Balancing
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Originally Posted by Simetrical
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