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Thread: English Cavalry / Radcnihtas

  1. #1

    Default English Cavalry / Radcnihtas

    The English should get heavy cavalry. This article argues my point well so I will post it rather than simply writing my own, which would be basically the same.


    Re: AS Cavalry (was Norman cavalry at Hastings)

    Tom Cain
    Thu, 17 Jul 1997 01:55:05 +0100

    Well, I'm certainly beleaguered from all sides now. I think I need to deal with different points in seperate posts. I'll also try to defend my position on Anglo-Saxon cavalry - mainly because that's the area I've been working on most recently (I'm working on a paper for publication and gave a paper to the University of London's IHR Early Medieval seminar on the subject in April) and because it will make it easier to discuss the tactical options open to William and Harold in 1066.

    Firstly, to respond to Prof. Bachrach. Bernie says 'There is no reason to believe Harold's force had a cavalry capability'. Up 'till now I've been in broad agreement with Bernie's position - however, here I'm afraid we part company. I'm afraid there's every reason to believe Harold had a cavalry capability - indeed, that the English were very well acquainted with mounted warfare in general and cavalry use in particular.

    As to the 'ruse de guerre', as far as I'm aware - apart from the initial confused route, retreat, recovery and destruction of the pursuing English that Morillo describes - the Norman's did not 'break the shield wall' at all at Hastings. The finale was a result of an over-stretched rear-guard covering too much ground and being picked off in pockets.

    I agree that cavalry was not best suited to breaking up well-emplaced infantry lines, although the Normans did have a tendancy to try to do exactly that - cite Monte Maggiore and Civitate in Italy as examples. Indeed, Davis suggested that the Norman interest in breeding heavy warhorses seems to become more pronounced in the second quarter of the 11thC - exactly the time they are in closest contact with the Byzantines both as mercenaries and as enemies. The couched lance charge was a Byzantine tactic (supported primarily by archery - interesting parallel!!), well attested to in a variety of Byzantine military manuals (see "Sowing the Dragon's Teeth" for a fuller description of 11thC Byzantine tactics). Indeed, it is worth noting that the "gesta Roberti Wiscardi" and the Monte Cassino chronicler only mention cavalry and archery in connection with Civitate - although, like at Hastings, there must have been a substantial infantry contingent present.

    However, most cavalry in the Middle Ages had a fourfold role in any military context.

    Scouting and intelligence gathering.

    Negating opposing cavalry actions.

    Using mobility to perform out-flanking manoeuvres or skirmishing actions.

    Breaking up, harrying and pursuing shaken enemy formations (it is in this category I would place Bernie's 'undisciplined cavalry charge', or indeed, any other type of charge).

    Bernie maintains that the English and Vikings 'did not develop cavalry because they had no use for it'. This implies a determinist approach to cavalry development - "We have a need for men on horses with big sticks! I know! We'll invent cavalry" says Charles Martel before the Battle of Tours (apologies for the flipancy, but you get the point!).

    Unfortunately for his arguement, as he later points out, Germanic warleaders as early as 4thC knew the value of mounted warriors - perhaps not as tactically varied as their Romano-Celtic opponents but with their own stategies for different situations. Indeed, both Procopius and Ammianus Marcellenus give accounts of Germanic armies using similar tactics in different battles - tactics closely reminicent of those identified in the works of later Frankish chroniclers like Nithard. For the early Germanics - as for their later successors - the right to bear arms was a freeman's obligation. The bulk of any Germanic army was drawn from the lower class freemen - those who owned a spear, shield and saex and farmed their own land, serving in war as an obligation to their landlord or king. A much smaller contingent was supplied by the noblemen who made up the personal warbands and household retinues - or comitatus - of more important nobles and kings - the men who were better armed and armoured with mail, shield, helmet, spears of various types, seax and sword and, more importantly, horses. This is as true for the Merovingians, Carolingians and Ottonians as it was for the Visigoths and Lombards - and the English.

    Bernie maintains that the English did not need to develop mounted warfare because there was no significant mounted enemy to fight. However, there is a considerable amount of material to suggest that the comitati of the sub-Roman British warleaders made extensive use of mounted warfare - cite the Gododdin as literary evidence and a variety of supporting archaeological material. The Aberlemno stone - an 8thC Pictish standing stone commemerating the nearby battle at Dunnichen Moss or "Nechtanesmere" - clearly depicts the two wing elements of the Picto-Celtic army as mounted warriors. Their opposition - the Northumbrian army of Ecgfrith - is equally clearly depicted as mounted warriors, brandishing their spears for throwing or thrusting and clad in mail clearly designed for mounted warfare (that is, knee length and split-skirt).

    Contemporary with the Aberlemno stone - but within a wholely English context - is the Repton stone. A funerary stone - probably commemorating Offa's predecessor Aethelbald (who died in 757) - with an equestrian figure of "Aethelbald" based upon Roman triumphal statues, but with distinctively Germanic elements. The figure is distinctly reminicent of the Romano-German equestrian figure on the plate on the Sutton Hoo helmet and on the Plietzhausen Armory disk. There is is similar - but entirely Germanic - equestrian figure on the Vendal helmet, whose similarity to the Sutton Hoo helmet has been long commented on. A final monumental example - amongst many it must be said - is the Stockburn-on-Tees "hogback" number 9. Dated to the mid-10thC, this funerary monument depicts two mounted warriors, armed with spears and shields, armoured including helmets of the Spangehelm type. The two warriors are mounted on running horses, on saddles seriously suggestive of those on the Bayeux Tapestry. Indeed, analysts of the "hogback" describe the saddles as "designed for cavalry warfare" with a high back and cantle - despite no decernable stirrups, these figures are clearly cavalry warriors not merely =91mounted infantry=92. The Harley Psalter - an early 11thC copy of the 9thC Utrecht Psalter (although that has recently been chalenged!!) - contains a line drawing of E11thC composition which even Abels says is wholly original to the Harley manuscript (therefore an English composition), which - fatal to his arguement of English not fighting on horseback - depicts what can only be described as a cavalry action.

    This does not even count in the multitude of references to exercitum equitatum or mounted (cavalry) armies in a variety of Anglo-Saxon and early Anglo-Norman chronicles and the Gerald of Wales reference to Harold's oppression of the Welsh which seems to support the saga accounts of the composition of Harold's army at Stamford Bridge. There is plenty of archaeological evidence for English equestrian equipment as far back as the E7thC - including a Scandinavian copy of a full equesrian gear, stirrups, bits and other brasses probably made for one of Cnut's huscarls in the mid11thC. The heriots of Cnut's lawcodes give the lowest level of thegn a required wargear that included helmet, byrnie or mail, spear, sword, shield and horse and saddle - what the 9thC Beowulf poem called his eorod-geatwe or warband-gear. Following the term eorod is a fruitful line. In the mid10thC Exeter Book's Maxims is one that exhorts, "the eorl (or nobleman) shall sit on his horse's (OE eos) back, the eorod shall ride in formation, the faetha (retainers or infantry) shall stand fast". This maxim is in the context of the conduct of warfare. In this sense, the eos - a male noun which means stallion or warhorse - is clearly what distinguishes the eorl from the ceorl in the shield wall. The lowest form of eorlcund mann was the thegn - whose heriot we already know. The word eorodmeans those who ride warhorses - a collective noun whose singular was eorod-mann and must be cognate to eorlcund mann or thegn. The men are exhorted to ride in formation (in getruma ridan) - not individually but as part of a corporate collective, in other words - a squadron (the original meaning of the Latin term turma anyway). In this sense, therefore, eorod can be seen as a title of the formation - not unlike the Norman conrois.

    Finally, using the above, can we see any Anglo-Saxon battle where these mounted men make a significant contribution - apart from the well known and debatable cases of Stamford Bridge and Hereford (1057). Well, yes! According to the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (sub anno 938) a group of men called eorod-cysta or chosen mounted companies (Garmonsway) took an active role in a major battle - performing at least three of four roles I enumerated above - where they drove and harried a Viking army from the field. What battle? Brunanburh - the classic Anglo-Saxon set-piece battle of Athelstan against the Scots-Norse alliance of Constantine and Olaf. And as an aside, it is known that Athelstan had Bretons and Franks in his household retinue. It doesn't take a leap of logic to suggest that the eorod-men of the chosen eorods were equiped and rode not unlike the warriors ot the contemporary Stockburn 9 hogback and those on the Aberlemno stone, whose equipment would not have been out of place in William's host in 1066.

    Just a small part of the material I have put together to make the case for English cavalry. Harold's knowlege of mounted warfare is well known - after all he distinguished himself in William's campaign against the Bretons. Therefore, if Athelstan had cavalry and if Ecgfrith and Cnut had cavalry (and I haven't even touched the Alfredian and Aethelredian material here), then it's certain Harold had them!

    Tom 8-)
    Tom Cain



    http://scholar.chem.nyu.edu/shm/hast...astings07.html

  2. #2

    Default Re: English Cavalry

    Excerpt from Kelly Devries' book,

    The most frequent battle narrative believed by these historians to have been appropriated by the authors of the
    Norwegian Kings' Sagas is that of the battle of Hastings.41 Of course, there is no question of the cavalry charges
    used by the Normans as their primary tactic against Harold Godwinson's army, thus resolving that issue. In addition,
    there are several other similarities on which to build this comparative case: the stand of one army in a shield wall
    formation to defend against the cavalry charges of their opponents; the formation of that shield wall on high ground
    which forces the horses to charge uphill; the repelling of the first cavalry charge; the breaking of the shield wall to
    pursue the enemy 'fleeing' from the battlefield; the cavalry's turning against this disordered breakout; the remnants of
    the defeated force rallying around a leader; and the death of the defeated leader by an arrow shot into his head.
    The case sounds pretty convincing. However, to make these similarities comparative, some manipulation of both the
    Stamford Bridge and Hastings narratives must be done. First, although there were two shield walls formed by what
    would be the losing side in these conflicts, Haraldr Haršrįši's at Stamford Bridge was formed quickly, a tactic
    which he was forced into to face the English army's arrival which had surprised the Norwegian king, while Harold
    Godwinson's at Hastings was a well-planned tactic, ordered by a leader who had chosen the terrain on which to fight
    a battle and the shield wall as his primary tactic. (In essence, Haraldr Haršrįši's shield wall was a defensive
    formation, while Harold Godwinson's was an offensive one.) Also, the two shield-walls were completely different in
    design, with Haraldr Haršrįši's a circular, and Harold Godwinson's a linear formation. Second, although both
    battlefield narratives contain the eventual, disastrous 'breaking out' from this shield wall, that which Harold
    Godwinson led at Hastings was done when he saw the Norman horses in what appeared to him to be a full retreat.
    Either they were fleeing under the mistaken impression that their leader, William the Conqueror, had been killed, or
    because they were effecting a 'feigned retreat,' but in either case, Harold believed that he and his troops were
    pursuing a defeated opponent. At Stamford Bridge, Haraldr Haršrįši was under no such impression. Although he
    and his soldiers had effectively repulsed the initial charge of Harold Godwinson's cavalry, the English soldiers had
    not broken into a retreat. Haraldr's reaction was to make a charge against what he thought were 'weak' attacks by his enemy; his mistaken belief was that if he made a quick and
    unexpected charge out of his shield wall, he might surprise the Anglo-Saxon troops and, in their confusion, take
    control over the battle. Furthermore, he led this attack under no delusion that the general opposing him was dead.
    Third, the reordering of the shield walls by the losers in both battles was done around different leaders. At Stamford
    Bridge, the remnants of the Norwegian army rallied around Tostig Godwinson, their king having been killed, while
    at Hastings the English rallied around their king. Fourth, the repulse of a cavalry charge, especially an initial one,
    was customary for a medieval shield wall defense, even one which would eventually lose. Indeed, the only means of
    effectively defeating a shield wall was to continually attack it, suffering numerous repulses until the men forming
    the shield wall finally weakened and fled, surrendered, or died. Finally, leaving aside the issue of where the fatal
    arrows wounded the two leaders Haraldr Haršrįši in the throat and Harold Godwinson in the eye the death or
    wounding of a leader in the face or head by archery was also common in medieval battles. The protective nature of
    the kind of armor worn both by Haraldr Haršrįši at Stamford Bridge and Harold Godwinson at Hastings left only a
    few vulnerable spots. Of these, the face and head were the most susceptible to arrows fired by archers at a distance,
    and an arrow shot into this part of the body was usually fatal. One military leader who would survive from such an
    attack was the young Henry V whose cheek was pierced by an arrow at the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403.42
    There are also several major differences in the Norwegian Kings' Sagas' battlefield accounts of Stamford Bridge and
    those others wrote of the battle of Hastings. For example, the discussions between Harold and Tostig Godwinson,
    and between Tostig and Haraldr Haršrįši are novel, although they could be explained as literary flourishes from the
    more literary Saga authors. Of greater importance are the order and magnitude of the deaths of the leaders. While the
    Norwegian Kings' Sagas are writing about Haraldr Haršrįši, his death occurs relatively early in the battle, with
    Tostig Godwinson's coming much later. At Hastings, the culmination of the battle was the death of King Harold
    Godwinson. Such an anti-climactic death of the man whom the authors of the Norwegian Kings' Sagas are focusing
    on cannot so easily be discarded as literary flourish. Then there is the summoning and arrival of Norwegian
    reinforcements from the ships beached at Ricall and, perhaps most importantly, the surprise arrival of Harold
    Godwinson's army to initiate the conflict. There are no equivalents in the Hastings narratives.
    Ultimately, it all comes down to the cavalry charges. Those who want to see the battle of Hastings as the battle used
    for the narrative of the battle of Stamford Bridge by the authors of the Norwegian Kings' Sagas do so for one simple
    reason: cavalry charges are known to have been used at Hastings, but not at Stamford Bridge. Such problems with the Stamford BridgeHastings comparison have proven too great for some recent scholars to
    accept it. At the same time, they have been unwilling to accept that the accounts of Stamford Bridge are about that
    battle. For two of these historians the Norwegian Kings' Sagas' narratives are derived from different battles. For
    Bruce Gelsinger, this is the battle of Jaffa, fought between Richard I (the Lion-Hearted) and Saladin in 1192 and
    diffused to Iceland by at least 1217, and for Shaun F.D. Hughes, it is the battle of Bouvines, fought between Philip II
    (Augustus) of France and an allied army of Germans, Flemings, English, Brabantese, and rebel Frenchmen, led
    chiefly by Emperor Otto IV and Ferrand, count of Flanders, in 1214 and known in Iceland shortly thereafter.43 Yet
    neither of these battles contain even the comparative elements of the battle of Hastings, although both do have
    cavalry charges as their primary offensive tactic, and both have a very tenuous diffusion to where the authors of the
    Norwegian King's Sagas could have easily appropriated them. Consequently, they have not gained prominence or
    favor. Another scholar, Elizabeth Ashman Rowe, has simply dismissed the idea that these authors, in particular
    Snorri Sturluson, whose Saga is the only one of these works which she discusses, has appropriated any battle for
    their narratives of the battle of Stamford Bridge. Instead, they are 'in the largest sense fictional,' written to conform
    not to history but to Snorri's (and, one supposes, by extension also to the other authors') political ideology.44 Nor
    has this view found favor, especially among historians who wish to believe that the authors of the Norwegian Kings'
    Sagas, all of whom describe what they have written as historical accounts, could have been so utterly mendacious,
    even though on the battle of Stamford Bridge they might have 'stretched the truth' somewhat.
    What then is to be done with the Norwegian Kings' Sagas' accounts of the battle of Stamford Bridge? Should they be
    discarded because of the suspicions that they do not describe the battle at all? Or is there some way of considering
    what they report while following the recommendations of caution suggested by J.F. Verbruggen? Muddying the
    waters of resolution is the fact, unconsidered by most of the critics of these battle narratives, that this is not just an
    account found in one Saga, but slightly different accounts found in three, all of which were written about the same
    time in almost the same place (and one compilation of the others written in the fifteenth century). Was there some
    collaboration between the authors of these sagas? Or did they perhaps have a single now lost source for their story?
    Of course, there is the problem that while there seems to be a strong connection between Fagrskinna and
    Morkinskinna (and later between Morkinskinna and Flateyjarbók), the connection between those two, either
    individually or together, with Snorri Sturluson's Heimskringla has never been established, neither historically nor literarily, and Snorri's account contains the most variations from the others
    in it. In addition, what is to be done with the two earlier Norwegian Kings' Sagas, written in the twelfth century,
    Theodoricus' Monumenta historica Norvegioe * and the Įgrip? Both of these briefly describe the battle of Stamford
    Bridge, but without the details found in the later Norwegian Kings' Sagas.45 Are they also to be discarded, even
    though they were written closer to the events, or can they be regarded as credible because they do not explicitly refer
    to English cavalry attacks?
    The purpose of the rhetorical questions in the last paragraph was not to confuse the reader, but to gain sympathy for
    the lack of resolution that is necessary when encountering this issue. It is impossible to accept the Norwegian Kings'
    Sagas' narratives of the battle of Stamford Bridge without questioning their credibility, nor is it responsible as a
    scholar to cursorily dismiss them. In other words, it is necessary to proceed with caution in using these accounts, as
    it is in using any original source, precisely as Verbruggen has recommended. The following will include the
    Norwegian Kings' Sagas, as it will evidence from all of the other original sources available. It will indicate clearly
    what is taken from the Norwegian Kings' Sagas alone, what is taken from the Norwegian Kings' Sagas but with
    support from non-saga sources, and what is derived from sources other than the Norwegian Kings' Sagas. As in all
    historical writing, it will be the reader's responsibility to determine the feasibility of the narrative and its conclusions.
    The reader's responsibility must be used from the very outset of the battle. According to the Norwegian Kings'
    Sagas, on the morning of 25 September, after Haraldr Haršrįši and the Norwegian troops had breakfasted on or near
    their ships in Ricall, they prepared to march to their meeting at Stamford Bridge with the citizens of York. Haraldr
    then met with his army, choosing which of his soldiers were to stay at the camp and which were to travel with him to
    the town. Apparently, although he did not fear an attack from an English army, Haraldr did feel that some of his
    troops should stay behind to guard the ships. Perhaps the Norwegian king did not feel it necessary to show up for his
    meeting with the inhabitants of York in full force; the citizens of York had, after all, already been witness to
    Haraldr's military might. Tostig also prepared to go to Stamford Bridge with the king. The soldiers at the ships, it is
    reported, were under the command of Ólįfr, Haraldr's son, two earls of the Orkney Islands, Pįll and Erlendr, and
    Eysteinn Orri, who is described in the Norwegian Kings' Sagas as 'the son of Žorberg Įrnasonar, the most excellent
    and most noble to the king of all landed men, to whom the king had promised his daughter, Marķu.'46 At this point, Haraldr Haršrįši and Tostig Godwinson made what proved to be a grave error in judgement. Secure in
    their confidence that the day would proceed without incident, with clear weather and a warm sunshine, Haraldr and
    Tostig allowed the troops making what was a reasonably long march to leave their armor behind, taking only their
    weapons, shields, and helmets. As the anonymous author of Morkinskinna writes, 'they were all very cheerful.'47
    Once at Stamford Bridge,48 the Norwegians caught sight of what appeared to be a large force marching to meet
    them. Actually, the authors of the Norwegian Kings' Sagas clearly write that the Norwegians saw a large force 'riding' (reiš) toward them. Confused by this
    spectacle, King Haraldr summoned Tostig to his side and asked what army this might be, as he certainly had
    expected none. Snorri Sturluson describes the leaders' conversation:
    The earl said that he thought that they were probably hostile, but that he thought that it was also possible
    that they were some of his friends and that they sought mercy and friendship from the king in exchange for
    their trust and faith.49
    Liking the latter possibility and still suspecting nothing from Harold Godwinson, Haraldr Haršrįši decided to wait
    until he knew more about these approaching troops. The Fagrskinna reports what happened next: 'now the closer the
    men came, the more the army grew, until, with their weapons glistening, they looked like broken ice.'50 The army
    was Harold Godwinson's.
    The non-Norwegian Kings' Saga sources say much less on what occurred on the morning of 25 September leading
    up to the battle. It cannot even be ascertained for certain from these sources whether Haraldr and Tostig camped
    their armies at Ricall with their ships or at Stamford Bridge, although Saxo Grammaticus does report that in leaving
    their camp, the invaders, 'scorning danger, left off their armor' before marching off to plunder the neighborhood (no
    meeting with the inhabitants of York is mentioned).51 While this seems to give the impression that the battlefield
    was some distance from their campsite, the place of the plundering Saxo refers to could simply have been across the
    bridge onto the flat meadow across the Derwent River from their campground and from the rest of the army. This
    conclusion might be arrived at because it appears that when Harold Godwinson showed up, unexpectedly marching
    with a large army from York,52 some of the Norwegian soldiers were caught on the far side of the river from their
    leaders and the larger part of their army. What were they doing there? From Geoffrey Gaimar, it appears that they
    were rustling cattle.53 The nature of feeding a large number was naturally a major problem for any invading army, and if the opportunity arose to capture a herd of cattle, especially if they were peacefully feeding in a pasture
    only a bridge away from the assigned meeting place with the citizens of York, no one could blame Haraldr and
    Tostig for allowing a foraging party to acquire these cows, particularly if they had no reason to fear an attack of
    those men. Harold Godwinson, on the other hand, was expecting a battle and had marched from Tadcaster with that
    in mind.54 He did not hesitate before rushing onto these poorly armed soldiers, cut off from their main army, and
    slaughtering them.55
    Although seemingly quite different in the events they choose to recount at the start of the battle of Stamford Bridge,
    quite a lot of reconciliation can be made between the Norwegian Kings' Sagas and the non-Saga sources. First, the
    problem of where the Norwegian camp was held on the night of 2425 September is really of little concern. (In the
    absence of any archaeological evidence which might assist in this matter, I am inclined to accept the Norwegian
    Kings' Sagas' placement of the camp at Ricall. Not only would this have been a more secure campground location,
    seemingly not a factor to Haraldr and Tostig, but it also meant that the transportation of foodstuffs and other
    necessary goods from the ships to Stamford Bridge was not necessary.) Far more important to the outcome of the
    battle against the Norwegians was the abandonment of their armor at the camp, wherever it was. This meant that
    they were completely unprepared for any battle with the English army. The abandonment of their armor may even
    have been the primary cause of their ultimate defeat, a reason why the mentioning of it is present in all of the
    Norweigian Kings' Sagas, including the smaller Įgrip and Monumenta historica Norvegioe *, as well as in the more
    contemporary narrative of Saxo Grammaticus' Historia. That it is not recorded in any of the contemporary or nearcontemporary
    Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Norman chronicles may only mean that the authors of those accounts either
    were never told about the abandoning of the armor such an embarrassingly incautious flaw in Haraldr Haršrįši's
    military leadership might not have been discussed by the survivors of the battle with their victors or did not value it
    as a rationalization for the defeat of the Norwegian army at Stamford Bridge.56
    The other fact about the beginning of the battle found in nearly all of the sources, saga or non-saga, is Harold Godwinson's surprise of the Norwegian invaders.57 That his arrival so
    completely astonished his opponents, who seem to have believed that no attack from the king of England this early
    in the invasion was possible, certainly gave the English army the early impetus in the battle. In addition, depending
    on whether they actually did catch some of the Norwegian soldiers cut off from their comrades across the river, this
    surprise may even have led to quite a large number of early casualties among Haraldr and Tostig's troops, casualties
    which they could not spare because of the larger size of Harold Godwinson's army.58
    What about these Norwegian soldiers caught across the river? Does the fact that the Norwegian Kings' Sagas do not
    mention them present an irreconcilable difference between those sources and the more contemporary ones? Not
    really. Indeed, the Norwegian Kings' Sagas emphasize Haraldr's indecision in the wake of his initial sighting of the
    Anglo-Saxon army. His willingness to wait until he determined the hostility of the approaching force not only
    confirms the overwhelming confidence he had in believing that the main English army was still far from him to the
    south, but also supports the possibility that his army was not well organized that day, with some of his troops
    conceivably across the river in a pasture foraging for foodstuffs among a herd of cattle. This hesitation could also
    have delayed the return of these separated troops, inevitably leading to their deaths, especially, as they were not on
    the high ground that Haraldr and Tostig were, if they had failed to see the approaching English army until it was too
    late to again regain the opposite side of the river across the narrow bridge.
    Of course, the English soldiers also needed to cross the bridge before they could engage the larger Norwegian force.
    This led to one of the more heroic, and more often recorded, at least among the more contemporary Anglo-Saxon/
    Anglo-Norman sources, incidents of the battle. The Norwegian soldiers caught by the English on the other side of
    the river were being slaughtered. They must have known that they were going to die, yet, rather than flee, some of
    these half-armed men tried to defend the bridge and thus bought, with their lives, the precious time needed by
    Haraldr Haršrįoi and Tostig Godwinson to reorder their soldiers. The story of one anonymous man in particular was
    retold in several early narratives. In a tale worthy of any Old Norse saga, but surprisingly absent from all of the
    Norwegian Kings' Sagas, it is reported that one Norwegian warrior, who had worn his armor,59 almost singlehandedly
    defended the bridge from constant Anglo-Saxon attack until he had killed more than forty enemy soldiers
    with his battle-axe. William of Malmesbury's recounting of the story is the most detailed:


    The English won the day and put the Norwegians to flight; but the victory of such large and powerful
    forces was interrupted for many an hour (a thing posterity may hardly believe) by a single Norwegian,
    who is recorded to have taken his stand at the entry to the bridge called Stamford Bridge, and by killing
    two or three and then more of our side to have prevented them all from crossing. Called upon to surrender,
    that a man of such physical strength might receive generous treatment from the English, he spurned the
    invitation with a frown and kept taunting the enemy, saying they were a poor lot if they could not deal
    with a single man. So no one went near him, for it seemed unwise to attack at close quarters a desperate
    man who rejected all offers of safe-conduct; but one of the king's bodyguard hurled an iron javelin at him
    from a distance, and as he was demonstrating boastfully, rendered more incautious by justified confidence,
    this pierced him through and he yielded the day to the English.60

    Henry of Huntingdon and a twelfth-century addition to the incomplete Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (C) relate a slightly
    different story, the most significant change being how the Norwegian hero died

    A single Norwegian, worthy of eternal fame, resisted on the bridge, and felling more than forty
    Englishmen with his trusty axe, he alone held up the entire English army until three o'clock in the
    afternoon. At length, someone came up in a boat and through the openings of the bridge struck him in the
    private parts with a spear.61
    60 William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum Anglorum I:42021:

    This Norwegian alone, in the true saga-like spirit of his ancestors, withstood the entire Anglo-Saxon army giving
    Haraldr and Tostig ample time to regroup and order their troops on the high ground beyond the river.
    As mentioned, the Norwegian Kings' Sagas contain nothing about this event or the heroic man who performed it.
    Instead, they record a discussion held between Haraldr Haršrįši and Tostig Godwinson concerning what they should
    do once they realized that the oncoming force was Harold Godwinson's army. Tostig's plan was to retreat from the
    battlefield, return to their ships, and, with the addition of their men there, to fight Harold Godwinson. He said to the
    Norwegian king:

    The first thing to do is to turn back and run very quickly to the ships for the soldiers and our weapons, then
    to put up a defense among them, with the ships on the other side to protect us, and not let the cavalry ride
    over us.62

    But Haraldr rejected this advice. Determined to face his opponent, he sent only three riders back to the ships 'on the
    fastest horses' to inform those left behind of the arrival of Harold Godwinson and to request that they march as fast
    as possible to Stamford Bridge. He told Tostig that the earl and his men could leave the battlefield, but that he and
    the Norwegians would stay and fight: 'the English will have an exceedingly difficult battle before we are killed.'63
    Haraldr then raised his standard, Land-waster, as a symbol to his men that they were to prepare for battle.64
    From their description of this phase of the battle, it seems that there can be no reconciliation between the Norwegian
    Kings' Sagas' and the non-Saga narratives. After all, missing the story of the heroic Norwegian warrior standing
    alone on the bridge over the Derwent River and holding off the entire English army when so many Anglo-Norman
    sources were attracted to it seems to be a serious historiographical flaw. Yet, even though such a scenario would seem precisely to fit the saga style, one can
    see that if it had not become part of the Scandinavian legend of the battle of Stamford Bridge, it would not appear in
    these sagas. Again, if the different perspectives of the battle are examined, this incident, viewed closely by the
    Anglo-Saxon troops would have made a distinct impression on them, while the confused and disheartened
    Norwegians, and especially their leaders, locked as they were in the planning of what to do to counter the surprising
    arrival of Harold Godwinson, would undoubtedly have been less aware of the defense of the bridge. As impressive
    as the incident was, it may well have simply gone unnoticed by those who would eventually pass along their
    versions of what occurred at the battle.
    Last edited by Kitbuqa; August 25, 2011 at 03:44 PM.

  3. #3

    Default Re: English Cavalry

    To sum it all up. There is ample basis for Anglo-Saxon cavalry. Even if no evidence at all existed they most likely would have used them nonetheless for this reason. In warfare, some things a basic universals. Shield walls are an example. The ancient Mesopotamian City States used a shieldwall formation, so did the Irish in the 800s AD. Hammer and Anvil is a near universal tactic, both with cavalry and infantry. So it is more likely that the English did use cavalry for charging, and not just transporting mounted infantry (which serve the same purpose of hammer and anvil except it isn't as swift).

    So......

    PLEASE PLEASE PRETTY PLEASE GIVE THE ENGLISH TRAINABLE CAVALRY!
    Last edited by Kitbuqa; August 25, 2011 at 04:05 PM.

  4. #4

    Default Re: English Cavalry / Radcnihtas

    I'm not a historian, so I can't comment on the validity of the case, but from a modding point of view, we have done what we wanted to do with NI and don't plan to release a patch (which would include such a unit) unless we have enough things to put into it, as we are busy with other things.

    Of course if anyone wants to try his hand at creating a submod with such an addition, that's more than fine with us.

  5. #5

    Default Re: English Cavalry / Radcnihtas

    I see. Well maybe I'll make a submod. I don't know where to begin. I simply want to add a unit to Norway and two England.

  6. #6

    Default Re: English Cavalry / Radcnihtas

    It's not too hard, really. If you wanted, say, to make the English mercenary cav trainable for England, you'd just need to assign it to a barracks building in export_descr_buildings. Alternatively, though it would be a bit more work, you could make an English stable building.

    Either way, there's plenty of guides on how to do such a thing. Just have a look around the forums.
    One of the most sophisticated Total War modders ever developed...

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