To what extent did Philhellenism affect Roman foreign policy?

[Decemvir]

I have recently been doing a lot of research of Rome's involvement in the Hellenic East in the Second Century B.C. and was curious to see what you all thought of the extent (if any) Philhellenism among many leading Romans affected Rome's foreign policy. I'm sure we can all agree that Rome admired some aspects of Greek culture. However what I'm curious about is how you all feel that admiration influenced (did it?) the policy of Rome towards the Hellenic East.
Here are some things to consider/address:
- Why did Rome treat the Greeks differently than they did the Carthaginians, Gauls, Iberians, etc?
- Why did the Romans ally themselves, as near equals, with the Achaeans?
- Did the Romans view the Macedonians as Greeks?
- To what extent did Roman generals (such as Flamininus, Paullus, Galba, Vulso, Marcellus, etc) dictate foreign
policy?
- Was Cato anti-Hellenic or Pro-Roman?
- What were Flamininus' motives in his announcement of Greek Freedom during the Isthmian Games of 196 B.C.?

[Rosacrux redux]

This is a very broad subject, with extreme peculiarities and it requires a rather large essay to even start getting into it. A (very) brief summary, more an outline of my thoughts on it:

- The Romans considered the Greeks their political and cultural forefathers. That does not mean they viewed them not as potential conquests, on the contrary. They just had a firm established notion of a close affiliation with the Greeks and they considered that their republican legacy had much to do with the Greek democratic legacy. Also, they viewed themselves as champion of "the civilized Europe" or "West", and they considered the Greeks as the founders of the "West".

This is the general idea, but of course it is a vague interpretation because a more substantial one should mention relevant sources, refer to the material underlying of the cultural connection of the two civilizations etc. etc.

Brief replies to the questions:
- Why did Rome treat the Greeks differently than they did the Carthaginians, Gauls, Iberians, etc?
Because Rome didn't consider they had any sorts of affiliation with the aforementiond (ethnically or culturally) and considered them "lesser" cultures. The Romans exploited their neighbors in a rather thorough manner, taking the best each had to offer. By the Greeks, they took most of all "culture", and to a lesser extent taxes and the rest of the benefits of a conqueror.

- Why did the Romans ally themselves, as near equals, with the Achaeans?
The Romans knew they were culturally inferior to the Greeks, and also knew they were militarily and politically superior. It all balances out. Besides, they certainly did not ally as "near equals" with anyone: they did conquer the Achaeans when time was ripe. Up to that point, they used the willing Peloponesians to subdue the rest of the Greeks.

- Did the Romans view the Macedonians as Greeks?
Ethnically, definitely. Culturally... yes and no. They were not quick to extent the privileges of the city-states to the Makedonians, and that might point out they thought the Maks not quite on par with others (P.S. they were not the only Greeks that were viewed as "not quite real Greeks", I think a few traditional city states got that ultra-special treatmen only. not to mention the Romans had this thing for classical Greece and considered all 2nd century Greeks as "mostly decadent" )

- To what extent did Roman generals (such as Flamininus, Paullus, Galba, Vulso, Marcellus, etc) dictate foreign
policy?
In certain occassions, if they had the political (and usually economical) power and were adequately popular, they could literally carve their own foreign policy and employ it, provided they could persuade the Senators it was all "for the glory of Rome" (having the plebes on their side always helped, hence "popular" as a requirement).
- Was Cato anti-Hellenic or Pro-Roman?
Cato appears as anti-Hellenic, but in reality is a representative of a very (very) premature "Roman nationalism". His idealized Roman rootage (one that never existed in reality) and his vehement opposition to the Greek "decadence" and "immorality", prove exactly that.
- What were Flamininus' motives in his announcement of Greek Freedom during the Isthmian Games of 196 B.C.?
Self explainatory. Those motives became quite clear in the next five decades, wouldn't you think?

P.S. Excellent topic, but needs time and thought to reply properly

[Marcus Scaurus]

- Why did Rome treat the Greeks differently than they did the Carthaginians, Gauls, Iberians, etc?

I also think it has something to do with the Roman involved in Greece. The Roman army didn't suffer any serious and influential defeat against the Greeks and Macedonians in the period between Zama (202 BC) and Pydna (168 BC) and although the situation was sometimes quite bad for them, they always managed to stay (military) superior to the Greeks. Iberia was a Roman Vietnam: for almost a century service in Spain was very dangerous for both senators and soldiers, and they suffered serious defeats on several occasions against the feared tribes. Same goes for the Gauls: even after they were repelled from Cisalpine Gaul, they still threatened the Romans. At Arausio in 105 BC, the Romans suffered their worst defeat since Cannae, losing more than a hundredthousand men. The Carthiginians were the archenemies of the Romans, and in both the First Punic War and Second Punic War they seriously threatened Rome's position and even her existence.

[Freddie]

Why is it when you watch shows about Roman enemies you will always here about Cannae and Hannibal but the battle of Arausio is hardly ever mentioned despite the fact that the Romans suffered an even bigger defeat?

[Marcus Scaurus]

Why is it when you watch shows about Roman enemies you will always here about Cannae and Hannibal but the battle of Arausio is hardly ever mentioned despite the fact that the Romans suffered an even bigger defeat?

Cannae had a greater impact on history than Arausio. The former battle was fought between the rising Republic of Rome and the declining Carthaginian oligarchy with its army led by one of the greatest generals in history, Hannibal Barca. After Cannae, Rome was very vulnerable and was only saved thanks to the fact that Hannibal didn't had enough troops to lay siege on Rome. The Second Punic War was the beginning of Rome's age of expansion, leading to their dominance over southern Europe. After Arausio, Rome (and in particular Italy) was vulnerable too, but their enemy didn't threaten them as much as Hannibal did. Also, Hannibal's tactics at Cannae are very famous, and are still seen as a masterpiece, especially by the Prussian and German generals of the 19th and early 20th century.

Another decisive battle was Teutoburg Wald (9 AD), where the German warlord Arminius ambushed and annihilated three legions under Varus. At both Cannae and Arausio, the defeat led to a shortage of manpower and threatened Rome's position. But only three of the 25 legions Rome had were destroyed, and Arminius would've been unable to defeat the Romans several times again. But this battle was decisive: it ended Rome's age of expansion and led to the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Germany north of the Rhine and Danube.

[Rosacrux redux]

Why is it when you watch shows about Roman enemies you will always here about Cannae and Hannibal but the battle of Arausio is hardly ever mentioned despite the fact that the Romans suffered an even bigger defeat?

Prolly Hannibal has got much better PR services than Boiorix and Teutobod :laughing:

... I mean, someone had to shed some light on the battle that caused the Marian reforms :wink:

[Marcus Scaurus]

... I mean, someone had to shed some light on the battle that caused the Marian reforms :wink:

Arausio wasn't the only reason why Marius started his reforms. We also have to blame the expansion since Zama, the latifundia and the long wars with different enemies at the same time.

[Mímirswell]

Arausio also convinced a young soldier named Quintus Sertorius that Rome was a beatable enemy. It's importance is more critical to the civil wars than many give credit too.

[SigniferOne]

- Why did Rome treat the Greeks differently than they did the Carthaginians, Gauls, Iberians, etc?

Because the Greeks had an intellectual culture to offer, not so much the current one as the one that vanished. The Greeks of the Hellenistic era were frequently contemptible, and the Romans often treated them as such -- for example when the Seleucid king Antiochus was faced off with the Roman ambassador Gaius Popillius Laenas, and haughtily said he would depart and ponder over Rome's terms, Popillius drew a line in the sand around the king of Asia, and said that the decision would be made before he stepped outside the line. And Antiochus caved in. Even the Greek intellectuals themselves ceded to Rome moral superiority, Stoics like Panaetius and Poseidonius, and of course Polybius. Romans on the other hand admired the earlier Greeks, Aristides, Sophocles, Solon, etc. Rosacrux Redux has it right when saying that the Romans "viewed themselves as champion of "the civilized Europe" or "West"".

- Why did the Romans ally themselves, as near equals, with the Achaeans?

Because by then, the Achaean League had not yet thoroughly embarassed itself by treachery and double-crossing, and Romans were still very much content to leave other people alone, as long as Rome would be left alone (see for example Hiero and autonomous Syracuse; evacuation from Illyria, rather than occupation, after crushing the native pirates; two completely strings-free evacuations from Greece after defending Rome's allies; etc). So there is no wonder that the Achaean League was originally accorded much respect, when it still behaved in an honorable manner.

- Did the Romans view the Macedonians as Greeks?

By the 2nd century, Macedonians were Greeks. Even if ethnically the common population was still different, two centuries of Helleno-centric kings thoroughly Greek-anized the overall culture.

- To what extent did Roman generals (such as Flamininus, Paullus, Galba, Vulso, Marcellus, etc) dictate foreign policy?

To some but not considerable extent. The Senate was still largely the author of decisions, and chief barrier to inconstancy and arbitrary foreign policy, to which even the great generals and victors such as Flamininus and Paullus ceded control over policy decisions.

- Was Cato anti-Hellenic or Pro-Roman?

It's a mistake to view "Hellenism" as one monolithic culture. As I said here and elsewhere in this subforum, the Greek culture over time underwent extreme degradation and corruption, so that by the time Romans became involved in Greece, the culture they encountered was more pathetic than impressive. See, for example, Alexandra by Lycophron (a major Hellenistic poet and intellectual), for an example of a thoroughly embarassing successor to the likes of Sophocles and Homer.

Cato was first and foremost pro-Roman, and secondly anti-Hellenistic, (rightly) viewing the contemporary Greek culture as degenerate and contemptible, if not dangerous to his own countrymen. But Cato was not xenophobic, he did admire the earlier heroic Greeks, and quoted various passages about the virtue of Socrates. Cato was merely a realist, recognizing that the contemporary Hellenistic culture would dazzle the Romans with the inherited culture that was not its own, but merely inherited from earlier better men, while also injecting the contemporary Greek cynicism and sense of hopelessness. And he was right, because the degeneracy was passed on, along with the inherited riches of the past. But still, in despite of that, Rome still went on to produce such literature as the Aeneid, a work of a magnitude to which Lycophron couldn't dream to aspire to.

- What were Flamininus' motives in his announcement of Greek Freedom during the Isthmian Games of 196 B.C.?

Peace and freedom for the Greeks, and rest for the weary Roman men who had won it with their blood?

[Rosacrux redux]

Signifer

you hold a highly romanticized view of the Romans and trust way too much their higher motives rhetoric. Things you can (and should) explain by mere political and powerplay terms, you choose to ascribe to the rhetoric that was used to justify them. Not a very good interpretation of history, I fear, but quite popular in the West nowadays. It's like the current trend in medieval studies, to view the crusades as an expression of piety and religious spirit, rather than take a realistical approach and ascribe it to a very early imperialism.

Rome was an imperialist power even before the 1st Punic war. Of course up until the end of the 2nd Punic war it underwent a gradual imperialist transformation, with rising interests outside the confinments of Latium and Italy in general. From there on, Rome went wherever it felt there was something to gain, and stayed there for good. The few instances they didn't (stay) like those you mention, had merely to do with temporary conditions, unfavorable instances, unripe political situation, drawbacks in homeland politics etc. Rome expanded its sphere of influence and its sphere of dominance constantly and steadily from the mid 3nd century BC on, up to the 1st century AD, with only minor setbacks.

Romans were strong-minded with self-preservance and prosperity. Self-preservance means security and that means they had to make sure no other power had the means to threaten that security. prosperity means they had to take the imperialist route, to empower their economy by conquering areas neighboring their sphear of influence and incorporating them into "the Roman world".

The high rhetoric might be a good way to justify such not quite scrupulous motives to a broad audience, but not a way to interprete the Roman policy.

[SigniferOne]

Signifer

you hold a highly romanticized view of the Romans

Whether my view is romanticized or not is immaterial. Likewise, trying to cling to cynicism does not make one's views any more true. So like I said, whether my view is romanticized is irrelevant; what does matter is -- is the view accurate. You'll have to address me on the facts.

Do I deny that Romans attacked in order to be safe? Certainly not. After all, it was Vegetius who said, "He who wants peace, ought to prepare for war." And the Romans were right.

Nor am I saying that the Romans' motives were only noble ones; pragmatic considerations certainly entered into consideration, and Romans were a practical people if nothing else. So it was a mixture of practicality and idealism that originally motivated their foreign policy in Greece. They invaded twice, only to protect their allies, and completely withdrew their armies back, without so much as a string attached, or a new land conquered. So much for accusations of imperialism and expansionism. Romans didn't want to expand, they didn't want to take Illyria, they didn't want to "take" Greece, and use it to somehow fuel their economy as you incredibly claim. They came only because provoked, and not even because of a threat to them but only because of a threat to men who trusted them, and hoped for their protection. After peace was restored and allies were defended, Romans left.

Nor was this a quasi-mercenary army of Gaius Marius, these were no soldiers who derived their living from war. They were Roman yeomen, men who derived very little from war, and instead spent their lives in peaceful pursuits; they fought in the Roman army mainly due to patriotism and civic virtue, to conquer an enemy to their republic and then go back to their own private pursuits. But they came to Greece not to conquer even a personal threat, merely to defend those who relied on them. As I emphasize, these weren't Marius' mules, they didn't live by pillage, or devote their life to the army. Army for them, just like for the early Americans, was a proper duty in defense of their free country. So with these motivations they came to Greece and with their own arms settled the peace for Greece. Only after Greeks kept betraying and backstabbing, did the Romans very reluctantly came to Greece yet again, and now since they realized they couldn't be left in peace, they decided to remain now, and make it absolutely certain they wouldn't be threatened. And so they did. Greeks couldn't find peace for 600 years, until the Romans came and made sure. Read Plutarch, life of Flamininus. Plutarch is very pro-Hellenic, but there are fewer passages in Greek literature more moving than his tribute to Roman citizens coming and with their own arms finally freeing Greeks from oppression, and from each other's throats.

[Rosacrux redux]

Whether my view is romanticized or not is immaterial. Likewise, trying to cling to cynicism does not make one's views any more true. So like I said, whether my view is romanticized is irrelevant; what does matter is -- is the view accurate. You'll have to address me on the facts.

Why, yes, it is a fact that your view on the Romans is highly overromanticized and has little relevance to reality. Is that better?

They invaded twice, only to protect their allies, and completely withdrew their armies back, without so much as a string attached, or a new land conquered. So much for accusations of imperialism and expansionism. Romans didn't want to expand, they didn't want to take Illyria, they didn't want to "take" Greece, and use it to somehow fuel their economy as you incredibly claim. They came only because provoked, and not even because of a threat to them but only because of a threat to men who trusted them, and hoped for their protection. After peace was restored and allies were defended, Romans left.

Ho, ho, ho... hold your horses lad, this is very untrue. The Romans a) did invade Greece to protect their own interest. b) did enter the Greek politics scene after the alliance of Makedonia to Hannibal, by allying the Aetolians (and playing the Aetolians against the Maks... some nobility there...) to balance things out and make sure Philip didn't come with his phalanxes into Italy to aid Hannibal. c) every time they came into Greece, they gained a foothold. In their first invasion, they culled the Makedonian state, and rendered it incapable of further growth and expansion. In the second, they brought under their "wings" half Greece and became the higher authority for half Greek cities. In their third, they made Makedonia into a province. In their fourth they annexed the whole Greece. d) Becoming an "ally" of Rome is halfway to total annexation, that's another historical given with Rome. The Italians even in the 2nd Punic war were nominally "allies" but they were practically annexed. e) It is considered a common ground among serious historians that the Roman imperialism did precisely that: fuel its economy by the conquered economies. Romans made looting into a real science, nevertheless. And my claim is... incredible? I mean, you are getting your history from VM Manfredi books or what?

Plutarch is very pro-Hellenic, but there are fewer passages in Greek literature more moving than his tribute to Roman citizens coming and with their own arms finally freeing Greeks from oppression, and from each other's throats.

Plutarch might be a Greek, but he is as pro-hellenic as the other romanized Greek historians (Dion comes to mind right now... there are many more of course). He is a friend, apologist and glorifyier of Rome... and even Plutarch views the Romans in less a romantic way than you do.

Next thing you'll tell me is that you actually believe Dubya invaded Iraq to liberate "the people" and get those WMDs, huh? I mean, it's the same rhetoric. Perhaps you'd like to consider distinguishing between rhetoric and facts, those two almost never coincide.

[SigniferOne]

Why, yes, it is a fact that your view on the Romans is highly overromanticized and has little relevance to reality. Is that better?

Rosacrux redux, ad hominems will get you nowhere. What is actually a fact is that your view on the Romans is highly cynical and has little relevance to reality. Is that better?

The Romans a) did invade Greece to protect their own interest. b) did enter the Greek politics scene after the alliance of Makedonia to Hannibal, by allying the Aetolians (and playing the Aetolians against the Maks... some nobility there...) to balance things out and make sure Philip didn't come with his phalanxes into Italy to aid Hannibal. c) every time they came into Greece, they gained a foothold. In their first invasion, they culled the Makedonian state, and rendered it incapable of further growth and expansion. In the second, they brought under their "wings" half Greece and became the higher authority for half Greek cities. In their third, they made Makedonia into a province. In their fourth they annexed the whole Greece. d) Becoming an "ally" of Rome is halfway to total annexation, that's another historical given with Rome.

You are contradicting yourself. If the Romans were trigger-happy to invade and annex as many lands as possible, they wouldn't need FOUR times to annex Greece. They'd come in, wipe everyone out, and take over. But if we take off the cynical Marxist-historian glasses for a second, we'll see that Roman policy was at first motivated by the Macedonian threat to their own safety, and by respect for the Greek culture that constantly kept these Roman fighters from going to Greece, and coming home without annexing anything. If Greece was annexed by the end, because of treachery and backstabbing, then that was the Greeks' own fault, and anyone would have done the same. In fact, the Romans' leniency and restraint are what's remarkable here, when everyone else would come and take over, given just half the chance. Roman "imperialism" somehow kept leaving the countries it invaded. How evil of them.

Next thing you'll tell me is that you actually believe Dubya invaded Iraq to liberate "the people" and get those WMDs, huh? I mean, it's the same rhetoric. Perhaps you'd like to consider distinguishing between rhetoric and facts, those two almost never coincide.

Take this thread to another forum, please. And as a Civitate, I expect you to withhold personal attacks, especially against other Civitates, or I'll be forced to withdraw from further conversations with you.

[SigniferOne]

Probably the very best sign of Romans' Philhellenism is seen from the Greeks themselves: Attalus, king of Pergamum, one of the top three richest, most prosperous, and cultured cities in Greece (along with Alexandria and Rhodes), upon his death actually gave his city away -- and not to some other Greeks, but to the Roman people.

What sort of precedent it is for a king to give his city away. I mean who does that. What king ever gives his kingdom away upon his death? And not just any city, but one of the greatest Greek cities of the time. And he wanted to give it away not to anyone else of the Greeks, but to the Romans instead. Nor was he only one, other kings time and time again choosing to give their kingdoms away, and considering Rome the only worthy recepient. I mean where else in history can you find examples of kings giving cities away to a free republic. It's unheard of. But it was done, for the Romans. We shouldn't pass over facts like these, and consider them as nothing.

So I would suggest that your cynicism is misplaced, and would also recommend that you buy less into the modern pseudo-historic vitriole that passes for historical scholarship nowadays.

[Decemvir]

Was it only greed and domination/imperialism that led Rome to invade Greece & Macedon? I am inclined to agree with Graham Shipley's statement in The Greek World After Alexander

The invasions of Italy by Pyrrhos in 280-275 and by Hannibal in 218 may have conditioned the Romans to take the initiative in aggression rather than let potential invaders act first.

Rome was involved in two major wars in less than a century that both threatened its territory and (argueably) its very survival. Then to find that Philip of Macedon was forming a treaty with Hannibal, at the expense of Rome, it is no wonder that Rome felt a need to invade Macedon.
I'm not sure what to make of Rome's long term intentions towards Greece. If Livy is to be believed, Rome was more interested (initially) in loot and retribution than in any lasting presence in Greece.

And if the Romans capture by forece any cities of these peoples, let it be permitted to the Aitolian people to have these cities and their territories as far as the Roman people is concerned. And {whatever} is captured by the Romans apart from the city and its territory, let the Romans have it.

I'm not sure what to make of this. Was Rome not able to hold onto land in Greece due to events following the Second Punic War and so decided to give the land to its allies or did Rome not forsee (or desire?) any involvement in Greece and so sought only loot?
Yes, eventually Rome decided (or fell into?) a policy of controlling Greece but I wonder when exactly that policy was decided upon.

[Rosacrux redux]

Signifer, I'd expect you as a Civitate to actually justify your romantic views instead of claiming they are gospel, and also to point out what exactly you consider as "ad hominem", because I haven't "attack" you in the slightest, nor was it my intention.

Your calling me "marxist historian" shows precisely where you are standing and I am content to stop this conversation here. Apparently there is little in ways of agreement (and none on common ground) we can find among eachother and in order to keep this topic clean from quarrels, let's just agree to disagree.

[Marcus Scaurus]

If we want to understand the Roman expansion in the 2nd century BC, we have to take a look at Roman politics at that time.

During Augustus and also Caesar's days, (pro)consuls campaigned for several years, and sometimes even raised and led an army without being the Senate's approval. Gnaeus Pompeius raised an army at the age of 26, without being a senator nor a magistrate. The reason for this was that the empire stretched from Spain to Syria, from Gaul to Africa: it was impossible for a praetor/consul to fight a campaign in a single year due to the long time it took to travel from (for example) Rome to Syria.

In the years after the end of the Hannibalic War, Rome's influence stretched from Spain to the Seleucid Empire, but its territory was quite small. Consuls/praetors often led the army for one year, returning to Rome at the end of the year, leaving behind the new consul as the new commander. This system prevented one general from getting to much fame, wealth and prestige, but it also affected the leadership of the legions. An example is Gaius Flamininus (consul 198), a 30-years old consul who fought the Macedonian king Phillip V. Towards the end of his term, he wanted to return to Rome as the victorious consul who ended the conflict with the Macedonians, so he negotiated with Phillip V. Hearing from his friends that he was made proconsul, he continued the war and defeated Phillip that next year.

Why did Flamininus negotiate? Becoming consul was very expensive, especially for a young man (he was 30 in 198) without any serious military experience as a general. He probably arrived as impoverished by an expension election campaign, and he needed to make a quick profit. Phillip's kingdom was large and rich: defeating it costed effort and time, and Flamininus did had the former, but not the latter. Hellenistic kings were most of the time not willing to lose many of their men in battle, as most of them were trained professionals who were valuable and hard to replace, so they often used diplomacy instead of fighting a pitched battle. Forcing Phillip to sign a treaty would've made the consul very rich, especially if Phillip had to give the Romans slaves, money and gold.

[SigniferOne]

I'm not sure what to make of this. Was Rome not able to hold onto land in Greece due to events following the Second Punic War and so decided to give the land to its allies or did Rome not forsee (or desire?) any involvement in Greece and so sought only loot?
Yes, eventually Rome decided (or fell into?) a policy of controlling Greece but I wonder when exactly that policy was decided upon.

You should remember that Rome was a republic, ruled by elections and the choices of the people, not arbitrary choices of emperors. So, much like America now, it was very ambivalent about entering wars, because it was those people who had to fight for the choice they voted on, and unlike America, they didn't have an isolated class of professional soldiers, so everyday people would have to fight and support the decisions they had made at the ballot box. Given all this, it shouldn't be that suprising that Rome was ambivalent about entangling in foreign wars, and they received little bonus from "loot". Remember that regardless of whether Flamininus was a consul or not, how much the election would cost, he was completely powerless to declare war or not to. The people, at the comitia centuriata, held the ultimate sovereignty.

[Decemvir]

Given all this, it shouldn't be that suprising that Rome was ambivalent about entangling in foreign wars, and they received little bonus from "loot".

I would have to disagree with this point. W.V. Harris has shown in his book War and Imperialism in Republican Rome that economic gain did strongly influence Roman decisions to go to war. That is not to say, however, that economic gains were the only reason to go to war but they did strongly affect the decision making process.

No one will suggest that the Romans fought wars primarily to free themselves from their light burden of direct taxation, but the fact remains that in 167, when Aemilius Paullus brought home from Macedon booty to the value of some 120 million sesterces (or quite possibly a much larger sum) and the Macedonian taxation began to flow into the Roman treasury, direct taxation of Roman citizens ceased.

In some ways the Roman military machine was dependent upon conquest in insure its survival. According to Gaetano De Sanctis's study on Roman taxation during the Second Punic War the direct taxation of property of Roman citizens did not exceed 3.6 million sesterces (the actual amount could have been less). This is telling when one considers that a single legion's pay for a year amounted to 2.4 million sesterces. For the years of 200-160 BC Rome had no fewer than five legions mustered at any one time (and in some instances, 190 BC, 11 legions).

Remember that regardless of whether Flamininus was a consul or not, how much the election would cost, he was completely powerless to declare war or not to. The people, at the comitia centuriata, held the ultimate sovereignty.

Also on this point I must disagree. According to R.W. Rich in his Declaring War in the Roman Republic in the Period of Transmarine Expansion Livy only reports four popular war votes in Comitia Centuriata for the years 218-167. It was only during the major wars, such as those against Carthage and the Hellenistic kings that the Comitia Centuriata was consulted.
There were many wars fought by Roman generals without the permission of either the Senate or People of Rome. Flamininus made war upon Nabis of Sparta in 195 BC (I will admit this is argueable depending upon how you interpret Livy 33.45.3 and 34.22.5) and Manlius Vulso also went to war without the Senate's permission in 189 BC against the Galatians (see Livy 38.45-6).
A. Manlius fought in Histria, in 178 BC, from Cisalpine Gaul without authorization from the Senate (see Livy 41.7.7-8). M. Popillius, in 173 BC, attacked the Ligurians, again with no approval from the Senate (see Livy 42.7-10 and 42.21-22). L. Licinius Lucullus made war on the Vaccaei in 151 BC and if the sources are to be believed he did so expressly for loot and a triumph (see Appian. Hisp 51-55). These are some of but a few examples of Roman generals who made war without consulting the Senate or People of Rome. Eckstein's Senate and General treats this subject in great detail and is an invaluable resource. According to his findings the Senate (in the third and second centuries BC) confined itself to dealings within Italy and left foreign policy decisions (except major decisions such as war on Carthage) to generals who were abroad.

[SigniferOne]

Decemvir,

Responding to the second point first, I am not sure what the list of the consuls and their private raids proves. Did the consuls have the capacity to initiate private raids against enemies? Certainly -- they were generals, right? With armies under their command? So of course they could do whatever they wanted. The real question is, were they right in doing so, and were their actions constitutional, or were they on the other hand censured by the Senate and by the subsequent historians? I'll try to briefly refer to each instance that you bring up, together with the ramifications.

"Manlius Vulso also went to war without the Senate's permission in 189 BC against the Galatians (see Livy 38.45-6)."

When he found that the king's subjects remained perfectly quiet and that there was nothing to justify hostilities, he led his troops round against the Gallograeci, a nation against whom no declaration of war had been made either by the authority of the senate or the order of the people. Who else would have ever dared to do such a thing? The wars with Antiochus, Philip, Hannibal and Carthage were fresh in all men's memories; in every one of these the senate issued its decree and the people their mandate; envoys had been sent beforehand frequently to demand satisfaction, and as a final step to declare war. "Which of these preliminaries," the speaker continued, "has been so observed by you, Cn. Manlius, as to make us regard that war as waged by the people of Rome and not simply as a marauding expedition of your own?" (emphasis mine)

"A. Manlius fought in Histria, in 178 BC, from Cisalpine Gaul without authorization from the Senate (see Livy 41.7.7-8)"

Two tribunes of the plebs, Papirius and Licinius, put a multitude of questions to him in the senate about what had happened in Histria, and then they brought him before the Assembly. [...] Then they asked "[...] that he might explain to the people of Rome why he had left the province of Gaul, which had been allotted to him, for Histria. When did the senate make a decree or the Assembly an order for that war?
[...]
He will have to account for all this as an ordinary citizen, since he will not do so as consul."

"M. Popillius, in 173 BC, attacked the Ligurians, again with no approval from the Senate (see Livy 42.7-10 and 42.21-22)"

The senators regarded it as an act of gross cruelty that the Statellati, who alone of all the Ligurians had refused to take up arms against Rome, should actually have been attacked without any provocation, and after trusting themselves to the good faith of the Roman people have been tortured to death with every form of cruelty. That so many thousands of freeborn persons, guiltless of any crime, should have been sold into slavery, in spite of their appeals to the honour of Rome, is a terrible example and warning against any one henceforth making a surrender, and sharing the fate of those who have been dragged off to various places to be the slaves of men who were formerly the enemies of Rome and are hardly even now at peace with her. Moved by these considerations the senate determined that M. Popilius should restore the Ligurians to liberty and return the purchase-money, and see that as much of their property as could be recovered should be given back to them; their arms also were to be restored. All this was to be done as soon as possible; the consul was not to leave his province till he had replaced the surrendered Ligurians in their homes.

"L. Licinius Lucullus made war on the Vaccaei in 151 BC and if the sources are to be believed he did so expressly for loot and a triumph (see Appian. Hisp 51-55)"

Lucullus being greedy of fame and needing money, because he was in straitened circumstances, invaded the territory of the Vaccaei, another Celtiberian tribe, neighbors of the Arevaci, against whom war had not been declared by the Senate, nor had they ever attacked the Romans, or offended Lucullus himself.
[...]
This was the end of the war with the Vaccaei, which was waged by Lucullus without the authority of the Roman people, but he was never called to account for it

The last action Appian reports was apparently not censured by the Senate, or the tribunes. A sign of a faltering republic, and slackening standards of morality? Perhaps. But even the Appian himself states that the consul's action was unconstitutional, and that only the people had the right to authorize what he had done of his own accord. That was my entire point in the first place. Cases of unconstitutional action cannot be examples of how the constitution is supposed to work, just like, for example, the Watergate scandal in America is in no way indicative that the Presidents are allowed what Nixon endeavored to do. So unless I'm mistaken, my point about the consuls and what they are or are not authorized to do still stands.

I'll respond to your first point in a later post, these things take too much time as it is