What if Britain hadn't diverted troops from North Africa in an attempt to save Greece from Axis invasion?

[Azog 150]

On the 9th February 1941, Churchill ordered troops to halt their highly successful offensive against the Italian's in North Africa (Operation Compass) in order to divert British forces in an ultimately failed attempt to save Greece from Axis occupation.

Operation Compass was an astounding success. From December 1940 to February 1941, a force of 36,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers chased an Italian Army of 150,000 out of Western Egypt and across Eastern Libya. In the process they captured 115,000 Italian soldiers, killed 3,000, destroyed 400 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces and 1,250 aircraft.

Bear in mind that in reality, the war dragged on in North Africa until 1943, ultimately costing the Allies some 238,500 casualties (And the Axis some 620,000-900,000 casualties including POW's along with 8,000 aircraft, 6,200 artillery pieces and 2,500 tanks)

So my question is, what if Britain hadn't redirected its focus from North Africa for Greece and instead pressed on the attack?

Is it possible that the Italians could have been driven from North Africa as early as late 1941 before German forces even had a chance to arrive?

And with that in mind, could we have seen a British invasion of Sicily with limited US support occur as early as 1942? Or did Britain lack those capabilities? Might an early victory in North Africa have given more weight to Churchill's 'soft underbelly' strategy?

And on the issue of Greece, i have heard it mentioned that the British intervention delayed German plans for Operation Barbarossa for a vital month. Is there any weight to these claims? To be honest I am quite unconvinced.

[Tiberios]

I think the British would have driven the Italian out of N. Africa before the Germans could arrive. Whether the British could have invaded Sicily in 1942 I do not now. Perhaps.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

And on the issue of Greece, i have heard it mentioned that the British intervention delayed German plans for Operation Barbarossa for a vital month. Is there any weight to these claims? To be honest I am quite unconvinced.

Nope. It's solely the resistance of the Greek army which was said to have delayed Operation Barbarossa. And this is due to the idea that Germany would not intervene at all had Italy captured Greece in a few weeks like they thought, or had Italy not attacked Greece at all.

It was the defense of the Greek Army which not only halted the Italian advance but also captured a substantial area of Albania. This was the cause for Germany's decision to attack and for the preparations which took place and postponed the German attack on the SU. The only serious resistance during the German invasion came from the Greek bunkers along the Greco-Bulgarian borders. But since the Yugoslavian resistance broke so easily and the German forces managed to flank the Greek forces in the bunkers, the cause was lost. The small Greek and mainly the British forces in the area near the borders of Skopje provided very weak resistance and did not halt the German advance for more than a few days. The British forces were too few and came too late to help provide any support to the Greek army.

If we look through a different view however, the German intervention was justified for two reasons:

*1st and less important was the moral side. The Axis forces were halted for the 1st time since the start of the WW1 in the mountains of Epirus and this was a major moral defeat for them. The Allies had finally seen that the Axis were not invincible and that even a small but brave country like Greece could resist them. The Italians had become laughable and the Germans knew that they had to intervene immediately if they did not want Italy to sustain even more manpower and land losses.

*2nd and most important was the fear of a massive Allied intervention in Greece which would become the starting point for the defeat of the Axis, much like Normandy. The Germans would be occupied in their war against the SU and the British along with their American allies would gain the ability to launch an invasion through Greece.

From this point of view, yes, you can say that the German intervention in Greece happened because of the fear for a massive Allied intervention in this country but practically the British intervention in Greece was too weak and did not alter the German plans to the slightest.

[Erebus Pasha]

On the 9th February 1941, Churchill ordered troops to halt their highly successful offensive against the Italian's in North Africa (Operation Compass) in order to divert British forces in an ultimately failed attempt to save Greece from Axis occupation.

Operation Compass was an astounding success. From December 1940 to February 1941, a force of 36,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers chased an Italian Army of 150,000 out of Western Egypt and across Eastern Libya. In the process they captured 115,000 Italian soldiers, killed 3,000, destroyed 400 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces and 1,250 aircraft.

Bear in mind that in reality, the war dragged on in North Africa until 1943, ultimately costing the Allies some 238,500 casualties (And the Axis some 620,000-900,000 casualties including POW's along with 8,000 aircraft, 6,200 artillery pieces and 2,500 tanks)

So my question is, what if Britain hadn't redirected its focus from North Africa for Greece and instead pressed on the attack?

Is it possible that the Italians could have been driven from North Africa as early as late 1941 before German forces even had a chance to arrive?

And with that in mind, could we have seen a British invasion of Sicily with limited US support occur as early as 1942? Or did Britain lack those capabilities? Might an early victory in North Africa have given more weight to Churchill's 'soft underbelly' strategy?

And on the issue of Greece, i have heard it mentioned that the British intervention delayed German plans for Operation Barbarossa for a vital month. Is there any weight to these claims? To be honest I am quite unconvinced.

In regards to Greece I would say no. I agree with Manuel, the intervention came too late to effectively save Greece from defeat. It was Greek resistance to the Italians that halted Operation Barbarossa.

In regards to North Africa then I think yes. The Italian's morale had collapsed and they were in a headlong retreat back towards Tripoli. Whilst I don't think it would've have been a cakewalk given that the Commando Supremo were sending reinforcements, I think the chances of the Italians avoiding total defeat in North Africa looked slim. I don't think we can simply blame our intervention in Greece for the failure to complete the defeat over the Italians though. I do think we were a touch complacent. O'Connor was withdrawn to a desk job back in Egypt whilst screening forces were deployed to watch the Italians. The British therefore we caught unprepared by the arrival of Rommel and his ability to reorganise the Axis forces and to take the offensive quickly.

[Azog 150]

In regards to North Africa then I think yes. The Italian's morale had collapsed and they were in a headlong retreat back towards Tripoli. Whilst I don't think it would've have been a cakewalk given that the Commando Supremo were sending reinforcements, I think the chances of the Italians avoiding total defeat in North Africa looked slim. I don't think we can simply blame our intervention in Greece for the failure to complete the defeat over the Italians though. I do think we were a touch complacent. O'Connor was withdrawn to a desk job back in Egypt whilst screening forces were deployed to watch the Italians. The British therefore we caught unprepared by the arrival of Rommel and his ability to reorganise the Axis forces and to take the offensive quickly.

But what if, rather then halting Operation Compass, the attack was pressed on? Over 60,000 British and Commonwealth troops were deployed to Greece. That could have been vital against the Italians.

And not only that, Britain redeployed troops from North Africa to East Africa to take part in an offensive against the Italians there.

Saying that, the Italians still had 150,000 troops stationed in Western Libya.

There is still the issue of Vichy French territory in North Africa to consider as well. If Britain had pushed onto Tunisia, would they have crumbled?

[Erebus Pasha]

But what if, rather then halting Operation Compass, the attack was pressed on? Over 60,000 British and Commonwealth troops were deployed to Greece. That could have been vital against the Italians.

As I've stated given the total loss of morale amongst the Italian forces and the experience of the British Commonwealth forces arrayed against them, them I think a complete defeat for the former would've only been a matter of time if British troops hadn't been deployed to Greece. This is not to overstate the British effort and to dismiss the Italians, as I'm the first one to stand up for the Italians in regards to WW2. They showed great courage and bravery during the rest of the North African campaign but Operation Compass had been a terrible defeat for them.

And not only that, Britain redeployed troops from North Africa to East Africa to take part in an offensive against the Italians there.

Another early Allied victory which isn't often mentioned. Although I always think the Italians were in a poor strategic position once the British committed significant forces to the theatre. The victorious end to campaign removed the Italian threat to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and gave the British another risk free supply route through to North African and the Middle East. The East African campaign also highlighted the early talents of Orde Wingate (who led Gideon Force) and the bravery of the Italian forces under commanders such as Carnimeo (at Keren), Duke D'Aosta and Nasi (at Gondar).

Saying that, the Italians still had 150,000 troops stationed in Western Libya.

The Italians had lost many of their best units and equipment during Compass. And what they lacked most of all was effective leadership. Graziani had been woeful.

There is still the issue of Vichy French territory in North Africa to consider as well. If Britain had pushed onto Tunisia, would they have crumbled?

Vichy territory in Tunisia is something to consider. The Axis only invaded Vichy Tunisia when their position in Northern Africa was becoming untenable, so with an early Italian collapse in North Africa then maybe Italian forces could be redeployed there with German support, although how much support would've been available is open to question. But the Axis invasion of Tunisia did face resistance from the French forces there, but then again the British hadn't found the Vichy regime welcoming either and faced a stiff fight when they invaded Syria.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

As I've stated given the total loss of morale amongst the Italian forces and the experience of the British Commonwealth forces arrayed against them, them I think a complete defeat for the former would've only been a matter of time if British troops hadn't been deployed to Greece. This is not to overstate the British effort and to dismiss the Italians, as I'm the first one to stand up for the Italians in regards to WW2. They showed great courage and bravery during the rest of the North African campaign but Operation Compass had been a terrible defeat for them.

I agree with you on that the Italians, as soldiers were at least equal in courage and bravery as any other nation's soldiers.
They fought very well in Epirus, one of the most difficult areas of warfare during the WW2 I might say.
Unfortunately for them, the Italian command wasn't as good as the Greek one.

[Faramir D'Andunie]

Nope. It's solely the resistance of the Greek army which was said to have delayed Operation Barbarossa. And this is due to the idea that Germany would not intervene at all had Italy captured Greece in a few weeks like they thought, or had Italy not attacked Greece at all.

I disagree with this. German high command believed the campaign in the east could not be launched earlier than 15 of June. If anything it's the sudden collapse of the Yugoslavian and Greek fronts that might have been that fatal little detail to Operation Bararossa. If those fronts kept Germans busy for an extra month Barbarossa might have had to be postponed for 1942.


As for the choice to deploy troops from North africa to Greece, I believe it was mostly something that was considered with diplomacy and politics into mind more than war campaigns. One has to keep in mind that during that same time Britain had managed to snatch Yugoslavia from the Axis front, and Churchil was dreaming of a Balkan front with the participation of Turkey as well. But even if such a front was just an illusion, abandoning yet another ally would not sit too well on British diplomacy at the time.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

I disagree with this. German high command believed the campaign in the east could not be launched earlier than 15 of June. If anything it's the sudden collapse of the Yugoslavian and Greek fronts that might have been that fatal little detail to Operation Bararossa. If those fronts kept Germans busy for an extra month Barbarossa might have had to be postponed for 1942.

Why couldn't they launch the Operation at least 1 month earlier? I don't see the logic behind this.
Aside from this, it was a sudden collapse for Yugoslavia, not Greece.
Greece fought as far as it could had ever gone, while Yugoslavia, despite mobilizing 1 million men, fell in a few days. And let's not refer to the capture of Belgrade by an SS motorcyclist.

[Faramir D'Andunie]

It's not exactly hard to understand that the mobilisation required for an operation as large as barbarossa takes a considerable amount of preparations.

And what defense? Original German planning had the Balkan campaign lasting 2 months. Yugoslavian army was destroyed in 10 days, and continental Greece took em another ten despite the presence of British troops there.

Yea the Greek defenders in the fortified borders with Bulgaria were able to hold back the Germans for a long time, but their fight could not affect the outcome.

[Akrotatos]

Greece fell in a month as well when Germany attacked. Though it was because our army was trapped in Albania. Anyway yes the British expedition was doomed from the start. However they could have held Crete which was stupidly lost IMO.

In the end what mattered the most was the Britain could not expect any small country to aid them against the Axis if they abandoned Greece when it had fought so bravely. It would feel like a betrayal. I, for one, am grateful to the Commonwealth forces that fought alongside our men.

[Faramir D'Andunie]

Greece fell in a month as well when Germany attacked. Though it was because our army was trapped in Albania. Anyway yes the British expedition was doomed from the start. However they could have held Crete which was stupidly lost IMO.

In the end what mattered the most was the Britain could not expect any small country to aid them against the Axis if they abandoned Greece when it had fought so bravely. It would feel like a betrayal. I, for one, am grateful to the Commonwealth forces that fought alongside our men.

Trully if Crete was held and turned into a naval/air base it would become a serious troublemaker for the Axis in the Med and perhaps make the Commonwealth campaign worth it in the end.

But yes I agree, this campaign was mostly a political decision.

[Poach]

The loss of Crete was vital to the Allied war effort: it destroyed the German confidence in Fallschrimjagers and inspired the Allies to create their own large-scale Airborne units, which proved a useful asset during Overlord. Had Crete not been defended, Fallschrimjager Divisions may have been used in Barbarossa to deadly effect, and our own Airborne plans may have died an early death, which could have endangered the Normandy landings. Had we won Crete, FJ units would still have been largely abandoned but our own Airborne units would never come into being.

To the topic at hand:

Had we kicked Italy out of North Africa early in the war, the strategic possibilities are many. We probably could have invaded Sicily with the volume of troops that had been freed up, or more likely they may have been sent East to fight the Japanese, making the war against them in Asia easier: perhaps the arrival of these men could have prevented the loss of Singapore? After all, a factor in the ease at which the Japanese overran the forces proecting Malaysia was their lack of equipment: without North Africa to worry about the equipment may have been available to them.

With Singapore still in our hands and North Africa safe, we'd have been in a much better position to perhaps aid the Soviet Union, rather than fighting our own battle for survival.

[Manuel I Komnenos]

It's not exactly hard to understand that the mobilisation required for an operation as large as barbarossa takes a considerable amount of preparations.

And what defense? Original German planning had the Balkan campaign lasting 2 months. Yugoslavian army was destroyed in 10 days, and continental Greece took em another ten despite the presence of British troops there.

Yea the Greek defenders in the fortified borders with Bulgaria were able to hold back the Germans for a long time, but their fight could not affect the outcome.

Let's face it, the German preparations hadn't taken almost at all into consideration the defense of the Greek Army. The two primary problems for Germany would be the enormous Yugoslavian Army which amounted for almost 1 million men and the British Army which had started arriving in Greece.

The main force of the Greek Army was situated in the mountains of Northern Epirus, deep into Albania and would be unable to intervene for two reasons:
1) The Greek Army was pinned down in an enormously mountainous area, with zero ability for transportation. Even when the Greek Army of Epirus surrendered, the Greek soldiers who were honorably let to return to their homes, took months to arrive in their homes (for example my great-grandfather).
2) Although it is not well known, the Greek Army even if it had the ability, it wouldn't retreat at all, because the Greek officers thought it highly dishonorable to allow the Italians to undertake the offensive and capture Greek lands.

Therefore, the German Army, after the -hard, as they thought- fight against the Yugoslavs, would have to move into Greece and face a few Greek divisions in the Greek bunkers with very few guns and ammunition -most of the artillery and ammunition of the bunkers had been transfered to the Epirus front- and most importantly the British Army.

Therefore, it was down to the British to defend the area from the Eastern Epirus mountains to the area of Skopje. The British and the few Greek divisions which were sent to this area failed to stop the German advancement. However, the Greek front had held and no German units had managed to capture ANY bunkers or move around them. No Greek bunker fell to the Germans by fight, they all surrendered honorably, the Greek soldiers were allowed to return to their homes and the Greek officers were allowed to retain their badges and swords. The encirclement and therefore the surrender of the Greek bunkers came from the area of Skopje and Thessaloníki where the Germans moved freely, with the British unable to stop their advance.

From this point on, the Greek Army of Epirus -never defeated in battle- took the right choice and surrendered because there was absolutely no reason to continue the bloodshed in the mountains of Epirus when the German Army was already moving to Athens. However, the Italians continued launching weak offensives even the day of the Greek surrender which were -of course- halted.

In the end what mattered the most was the Britain could not expect any small country to aid them against the Axis if they abandoned Greece when it had fought so bravely. It would feel like a betrayal. I, for one, am grateful to the Commonwealth forces that fought alongside our men.

This is a very right post indeed. The British intervention was mostly a matter of honor towards the world and its allies. Let's face it, the British intervention in Greece had NO chance to achieve anything, considering that the already large German forces could receive reinforcements any time. After the huge effort that Greece had provided for the Allied side, it would seem as a betrayal to let the Greeks alone face the Italians, the Germans and the Bulgarians without any help at all. It was a necessary casualty for Britain and I think that in the moral side, the British did the right thing. However, Crete fell rather stupidly. With a small effort, the German paratroopers suffered enormous casualties, with a bit more effort I'm pretty sure the island could be held, but anyway, I don't think that it would provide anything strategically, other than a moral victory.

[Azog 150]

^^Another thing to bear in mind is that Britain made a promise to help protect Greece (I think in 1939 or 1940) the same way it made promises to protect Poland and Romania from the Axis (although the latter ended up joining te Axis anyway). It had already failed to uphold two of these promises, and hence it didn't want to fail on the third promise

Had we kicked Italy out of North Africa early in the war, the strategic possibilities are many. We probably could have invaded Sicily with the volume of troops that had been freed up, or more likely they may have been sent East to fight the Japanese, making the war against them in Asia easier: perhaps the arrival of these men could have prevented the loss of Singapore? After all, a factor in the ease at which the Japanese overran the forces proecting Malaysia was their lack of equipment: without North Africa to worry about the equipment may have been available to them.

With Singapore still in our hands and North Africa safe, we'd have been in a much better position to perhaps aid the Soviet Union, rather than fighting our own battle for survival.

But would Britain have diverted troops to fight the Japanese when, to the public at home at least, the war in Europe was so much more important?

Although you do make an interesting point. If Britain had managed to retain Singapore, not only would Australia have had much more confidence in Britain, but Britain would have been in a much better position to aid the USA's island hopping campaign. Perhaps with that in mind, Britain's Empire post-WW2 might not have crumbled as fast as it did.


If Britain had taken Sicily in, lets say, 1942, do you think that Churchill's 'soft underbelly' strategy would have held more weight amongst US Commanders? In reality a compromise was agreed, the invasion of Italy as part of Britains 'soft underbelly' strategy and the invasion of Normandy (Which was agreed to be the focus of Allied efforts) as part of the USA's strategy to try and strike straight into the heart of German held territory.

But with Sicily, a strong foothold for further operations against in the Italian Peninsula, as well as Salerno and Corsica (Which could subsequently act as bases for operations in Southern France), perhaps Operation Overlord would have taken more of a backseat then it did with a Mediterranean based campaign being prioritised?

[Poach]

I doubt Churchill's plan would have gained much more weight. The Americans were much more interested in keeping the Russians happy and Roosevelt (in a bout of legendary stupidity) dismissed Churchill's constant attempts at adopting the "underbelly strategy" because (to the effect of) "Just because Stalin can keep Eastern Europe doesn't mean he will. Your Imperial outlook is outdated."

Stalin was pressuring the Americans to attack France, Churchill was pushing for a Balkans campaign. The Italian compromise was of zero worth. The Americans sided with the Russians and got the Cold War out of it.

As for Singapore, I think we would have sent equipment at the very least. Maybe not all 60,000 odd we sent to Greece, but probably a Division or two and a fair amount of aircraft and tanks. Warships would probably have been in shorter supply because we'd still need to deal with the Italian Navy.

[conon394]

Singapore was a waste of men and equipment. Given the war in the ETO and the UK decidedly not up to date CV availability or aircraft types it should never have been defended with more than a token force. The reality was until the US and UK could destroy the IJN CVs and pilots Singapore was a best a prison for troops until it fell.

In any case diverting Operation Compass resources to Greece was noble but stupid. A further advance would have been difficult but the Italians lacked equipment and were at a low ebb, the potential gain of a axis free North Africa was a gain that should not have ignored