RTR VII Preview VI - The Reforms

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Contents

• Introduction
• The Marian Reforms
• The Punic Reforms
• The Greek Reforms
• The Getai Reforms
• Afterword

Introduction

Welcome to the Preview VI of RTR VII. In this preview we are highlighting the reforms that will take place once their prerequisites are satisfied. We are very excited to have four different reforms with their own unique set of conditions. Not only will Rome be able to achieve a reform, but Carthage, Sparta, Antigonids, Aeacid, Atallids(Greek Reforms) and the Getai will also have the opportunity to do so. PatricianS, in coordination with our history department, has put in a considerable amount of time and effort in getting these reforms to work and we are very pleased with the result. So read on and enjoy!

The Marian Reforms

Conditions
You must have three huge cities in Italy, and have control of following provinces:

Africa 4/10
Sicily 5/5
Islands (Sardinia, Corsica, Melita) 2/3
Iberia 9/16
Gaul 1/19
Greece 0/17
Balkans 3/21 (for Illyria)
Asia Minor 0/5

The Marian Reforms – Historical Notes (by bucellarii)


The Roman army was traditionally recruited and organised along strictly timocratic lines and only citizens above a minimum property qualification were eligible for conscription. The distribution among the three lines of the manipular legion was based on age and wealth, with each soldier responsible for furnishing his own equipment (Polyb. 6.21.6, 6.24.2). The three hundred attached cavalrymen were recruited from among the aristocratic equites equo publico, the select group of eighteen equestrian centuries whose horses were provided at the public expense and the equites equis suis, citizen cavalry who provided their own mounts (Liv. 1.43.8-9, 5.7.13).

Despite a track record of battlefield success during the establishment of the Roman hegemony in Italy and the Hellenistic East the manipular system was not well suited to campaigning in Spain where the nature of the fighting, and the supply difficulties in a countryside dotted with hill-forts, necessitated both tactical concentration and strategic dispersion (Tactical Reform in the Roman Republican Army: M. J. V. Bell, 1965). The earliest certain reference to a Roman cohort is under L. Marcius during the bellum Hannibalicum (Liv. 25.39.1), which suggests the unit may have been introduced in Spain by the elder Scipios. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and his successors also deployed the cohort (Polyb. 11.23.1, 11.33.1; Liv. 27.18.10, 28.33.12, 34.14.10, 34. 34.19.10; 34.20.3 etc; Vell. Pat 2.5.2; Front. Strat. 4.1.23), and whilst originally the formation may have been a temporary expedient, it seems that the cohort became the regular tactical sub-unit in the Spanish theatre of operations.

Elsewhere the manipular legion continued to dominate the ancient battlefield. However, the military humiliations at the hands of the Cimbri and Teutoni, the Scordisci and the Numidian king Iugurtha during the closing years of the second century were a catalyst for change. The former two nations in particular may have exposed the limitations of the non-continuous manipular battle line (Polyb. 15.9.7;.Liv. 8.8.5), which as already demonstrated in Spain, was vulnerable to a massive charge by an enemy concentrated into a wedge shaped formation (Liv. 39.31.3, 40.40.2). The beginning of the transition to a legion of ten heavy infantry cohorts, notionally comprising 480 to 600 men who were no longer distinguished by age, wealth and equipment, can be traced to a final reference to manipular deployment dating to the bellum Iugurthinum (Sall.Iug. 49.6). Cohorts were most commonly deployed on the battlefield in a 4–3–3 triple line system - the triplex acies (Caes. BG. 1.24, BC. 1.84) - although they could also be distributed in a single or double line formation (Caes. B. Afr. 13.2, BG. 3.24).

Although C. Marius was not responsible for the creation of the cohort his re-organization during the years 104–103 institutionalized existing trends. Marius extended the practices of Q. Caecilius Metellus in Numidia (Sall. Iug. 45.2) and reduced the baggage train by making the milites (soldiers) carry their own food and equipment, hence the sobriquet ‘muli Mariani’ or Marius’ Mules (Fest. 149M, Front. Str. 4.1.7; Plut. Mar. 13.1). He also continued the weapons training introduced by the consul of 105, P. Rutilius Rufus (Val. Max. 2.3.2; Front. Str. 4.2.2.), and oversaw a modification to the pilum (Plut. Mar. 25.1-2). The adoption of the aquila (eagle) as the sole standard of the legion was also attributed to Marius (Plin. HN 10.16). The most controversial aspect of the changes was Marius’ recruitment of the proletarii (men below the minimum property qualification for military service) following his election to consul. In total Marius may have enlisted between three and five thousand volunteers - “a rather greater number than the senate had decreed” (Sall, Iug. 86.4) - when authorised to raise a supplementum (supplement) for the two legions in Numidia, including an unknown number of proletarii.

The demographic pressures leading to the recruitment of proletarii are contested by scholars. The traditional view, based on a straight forward reading of the ancient sources (App. BC 1.7-11; Plut.TG 8.1-3), is that the long period of Roman transmarine expansion following the bellum Hannibalicum massively increased the number of slaves in Italy and also led to prolonged service in the legions for the assidui, (men above the minimum property qualification for military service), with the Roman citizen body ceasing to grow and perhaps even starting to fall from the late 160s onwards. Conversely many modern commentators argue that there was continuing demographic expansion during second century, but that this expansion was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in the amount of land available for cultivation. "The inevitable outcome was an increase in rural poverty that pushed an ever-growing proportion of the adult male citizen population below the threshold for military service" (Roman Manpwower Resources and the Proleletization of the Roman Army in the Second Century BC: De Light, 2007).

Marius’ enrolment of proletarii volunteers to help prosecute the war in Numidia may also be seen as a populist gesture to the opfices and agrestes (workers and rustics) who had supported his election to the consulship (Sall. Iug. 73.6) and among whom were proletarii more than willing to volunteer for army service in Numidia (Sall. Iug. 84.3-4). It is also probable Marius was motivated by a desire to ensure the swift campaign that he had promised (Sall. Iug. 64.5) was not delayed by any logistical difficulties caused by the levy (Gaius Marius - A Political Biography: Evans, 1994). Whatever the truth of the matter, the recruitment of proletarii was on a limited scale and did not lead to a sudden change in the social structure of the army. The property qualification for military service was not abolished and subsequent levies probably continued to be restricted to assidui until the demands for manpower imposed by the bellum Marsicum and the civil war of 83 - 82 BCE doubtless resulted in the call up of proletarii, either as volunteers or conscripts. These years may have marked a turning point and the minimum property qualification was probably not enforced or abandoned altogether during the post-Sullan era (The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second Century B.C: Rich, 1983). In any case the qualification had already become nearly meaningless by 107, since the difference between the assidui members of the fifth and lowest class of citizens and the proletarii was likely to have been very slight.

Whilst there is no direct evidence about when Roman citizens ceased to serve as cavalry, the efforts of Marius to recruit horsemen from the Latin and Italic allies (Sall. Iug. 84.2, 95.1) suggest that the bellum Iugurthinum was a watershed, from which point the routine deployment of equites Romani (Roman cavalry) was phased out. The last unequivocal testimony to regular citizen cavalry can be dated to 102 BCE when a contingent serving under the consul Q. Lutatius Catulus was routed by the Cimbri at the river Athesis in northern Italy (Val. Max. 5.8.4).

The extent of the army reforms ascribed to Marius is often inflated by commentators. The recruitment of relatively small numbers of proletarii for service in Numidia did not result in the creation of a professional or semi-professional army. Whilst large numbers of proletarii are subsequently presumed to have served in the army during the bitter struggles of the first century the notion that the late-republican legions were essentially client armies, a development partly attributed to Marius, with no loyalty to the Republic is misleading (Sall. Iug. 86.3; App. BC. 1.86, 5.17; Plut. Sull.12; Gell. 16.10.14). In reality the soldiers were more liable to follow their general when the legitimacy of the ruling magistrates and senate could be called into question and there is no evidence that any Roman army embarked upon a revolutionary course of action out of disaffection with the republic itself (The Transformation of the Republic: Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein, 2006). It is also important to place Marius’ tactical re-organization during the years 104–103 within the context of a wider process of military evolution which was already well underway by the time Marius assumed command of the war against the Cimbri and Teutoni. Consequently the significance often attached to his reforms is mistaken and an impediment to a deeper understanding of the period.

The Punic Reforms

Conditions

For a period of three turns you have to meet the following requirements:
- Control Carthage
- Control Carthago_Nova
- Control Gadir
- At war with Rome

The Punic Reforms – Historical Notes (by Vindafarna)

So, what did African "line infantry" use by way of weaponry? In the 4th century and perhaps earlier, they were equipped in the hoplite style, an expression conveying to the reader an overall impression which identifies the Carthaginian soldiery as being equivalent in type to the familiar Greek hoplite. So far, so good. One therefore, sees the Libyans and Carthaginians as wearing armour, carrying a large round shield, and fighting with spear and sword.

By the time of the Punic Wars, where Libyans, Carthaginians, etc. are deployed together (e.g. at Baecula and Zama – Polybios 15. 12. 7 and Livy 28. 14. 4), the pattern of deployment seems essentially as before. Where one encounters African forces at battles such as Bagradas and Zama, they are described by Polybios as being in phalanx (1. 33. 6 and 15. 12. 7), which could be held to indicate that they had retained something of their earlier organisation and equipment - unfortunately Polybios also describes both the Romans and the Carthaginian mercenary line at Zama as being in phalanx (15. 12. 7). Evidently, Polybios uses the term phalanx merely to define "a unit deployed in close order." For what it's worth, one might note that the theoretician Asklepiodotos does not hesitate to apply the term phalanx to cavalry (1.4).

A hoplite ought to use the doru - a long, heavy spear. Unfortunately, this is one word never applied to the weaponry of Carthaginian troops. By the Second Punic War, African soldiery in Polybios are sometimes described as longchophoroi (as in 3.73.7 and 3.91.2) although in context these ought to be light troops. One needs to have recourse to deduction, based upon the fact that Hannibal's Africans could be re-equipped with Roman spoils (Polybios 3.87.3 and 114. 1 and Livy 22.46.4). To what extent re-equipped? Completely, as in armour, shields and weaponry, or only partially? Livy describes a re-equipment so complete that the Carthaginians could have been mistaken for Roman troops (22. 46. 4) This alone effectively rules out any possibility that their previous weaponry had been the pike; it's inconceivable that a pike and scutum could be combined, and hugely unlikely that Hannibal would have retrained an existing pike phalanx; nor would it have been easy to imagine a pike phalanx as being almost indistinguishable from a Roman force. The weaponry carried by these Africans would perforce be a spear of some description, although one would then be left to decide whether the spear in question was the hasta or the pilum. The hastae of the triarii could be adopted readily enough by troops who used a similar long spear.

At this point one might consider Caesar: in B. Civ 1. 44 he describes how the legions of Africanus had adopted the loose-order skirmishing tactics of the Iberian peninsula. If the Carthaginians had gone down the same route, Hannibal's Africans could have been principes in all but name and therefore their usage of Roman weaponry merely an 'upgrading' of familiar equipment, since the pilum could equally be adopted by troops who used a longche (Greek longche always implies a lighter weapon than the doru, one which could also be thrown.) If they happened to be equipped with spears such as saunia or soliferrea, the “change-over” to pila would have been a notional one.

Importantly, neither of these possibilities requires that Hannibal change the style in which his troops fought.

The one account which could be made to support the theory that Africans continued to be hoplite-style spearmen is to be found in Plutarch's Marcellus 12. 2; here, at Nola, he ordered his troops to be re-equipped with long naval spears which were used to outreach the weapons of their opponents – who are described as being without missile weapons and equipped with the aichme. In this scenario, one notes that Marcellus issued very long spears – which implies that the hastae of his troops would not have enjoyed such an advantage in reach; aichme is occasionally used as an alternate term for the hoplite doru.

And just in case there's anyone out there who can read Greek, the text reads –
…diadous dorata ton naumachon megala tois pezois kai didaxas porothen sunterousi paien tous karchedonious akontistas men ouk ontas aichmais chromenous ek cheiros bracheiais…

It’s true to say, however, that the composition of Hannibal’s army at that point was far removed from that seen at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae; that one knows nothing of the ethnicity of the troops in this incident; and that one wonders how numerous any Punic “African Old Guard” might have been.

By the Third Punic War, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the Carthaginians carried spears which were primarily throwing weapons. The only shafted weapons listed as having been surrendered by the Carthaginians are described as belôn kai akontiôn (Appian, Punike 80, Polybios 36. 6. 7) whilst Appian (Punike 94) supplies the information that the weaponry of the Carthaginians was longche/saunion and xiphos.

This leaves the 3rd century situation open to interpretation; African infantry could have continued to be 4th century hoplite-style spearmen, or could have evolved into something very like principes/scutarii. I now think that there is convincing evidence for the latter option; when first I posted this summary I overlooked Livy’s account of Hasdrubal’s defeat at Baecula. Here (Livy, 28, 13 ff) we are told of the strong contingents “…Poeni Numidaeque…” For the fighting itself (ibid, 14);

“…mediam aciem hinc Romani illinc Carthaginienses mixti Afris, cornua socii tenebant—erant autem utrisque Hispani—; pro cornibus ante Punicam aciem elephanti castellorum procul speciem praebebant….”

Famously, Africanus won the battle by attacking the wings, but Livy records some part of the fighting in the centre –

“…et iam conflixerant cornua cum quod roboris in acie hostium erat, Poeni ueterani Afrique, nondum ad teli coniectum uenissent, neque in cornua ut adiuuarent pugnantes discurrere auderent ne aperirent mediam aciem uenienti ex aduerso hosti…”

The crucial first section of which can be rendered in English, “… the wings were already engaged whilst the Carthaginian and Punic veterans (the mainstay of the army) had not yet had the chance to hurl [their] missiles…”

In other words, Livy’s source(s) here identify the backbone of Hasdrubal’s army as being composed of troops who were “African” (Libyans? Carthaginian citizens?) and “Punic” (ethnic Phoenician inhabitants of Spain?) and incidentally, observes that both were armed with “teli” = “missile weapons”.

This makes sense when it is borne in mind that previously (28, 14) the face-off between Romans and Carthaginians is referred to thus; “…medias acies, Romanum Poenumque… pari robore animorum armorumque concursuros…”, which translates as “the Romans and Carthaginians in the centre… fairly matched in courage and in arms…”

Which suggests that in Spain (if nowhere else) “African/Punic” infantry had abandoned hoplite-style weaponry. If this is accepted, almost all of the comments regarding the armament of Hannibal’s troops make sense: Celtic chieftains could re-equip troops who were basically equipped as scutarii; Hannibal’s victorious troops could upgrade their equipment from Roman spoils unhesitatingly because they themselves fought in a style that was essentially identical to the hastati and principes opposite them. It means that there is a potential terminus ante quem (208 bce) for the adoption of what one can label “the 2nd century armament”.

The use of the Africans in battle also makes more sense; the flanking roles allocated to them at Ibera and at Cannae are more credible if we envision the movements of flexible quasi-legionary infantry rather than the ponderous pivot and wheel of blocks of spear-armed hoplites; one can add that the charge downhill at Trasimene (Polyb. 3.84.1-4: Liv. 22.4) would only have disordered a spear-armed phalanx.

So, there you have it: there can be little argument that 2nd century Punic infantry used missile weapons, sword, and the thureos-scutum shield; in 208, Hasdrubal’s Poeni veterani Afrique in Spain were equipped as Romans; in 216 at Cannae, Hannibal’s Africans were indistinguishable in appearance and equipment from their Roman opponents, and had already been re-equipped from Gallic sources during and after their march to Italy; what little we can glean of Polybios’ descriptions of Carthage’s civic infantry levy circa 256 tends to suggest that it was no longer a hoplite-style phalanx.

Realistically, the question is not whether the Carthaginians abandoned the hoplite phalanx, but when. I am now fairly confident that this was a fait accompli by the final quarter of the 3rd century, and that there are indications of it having fallen into disuse at the time of the First Punic War.

Punic Reform - African Infantry

The African Infantry were the most effective line infantry fielded by Carthage during the period of the Second Punic War. They are largely recruited from among the native Libyan population of Africa, but also from among the ‘Poeni’ and ‘Carthaginenses’, these being the Punic and Liby-Phoenician populations of Carthage and the Phoenician colonies in the West.

Throughout the third century BC there was a steady homogenisation of military tactics and equipment throughout the Western Mediterranean. This had led to the evolution of a ‘western military tradition’ in the Hellenistic Age, a military tradition that was distinct from the Macedonian-style phalanx warfare that predominated in Greece, Egypt and Asia following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC. This 'western military tradition' was marked by a largely homogenous panoply and fighting style by the middle of the third century BC, which was the product of Italian, Spanish and Gallic influences, and which was exemplified by the Roman armies of the Republican period. The First Punic War (264-241 BC) and the Barcid conquests in Iberia (237-219 BC) consolidated Carthage as a practitioner of this ‘western military tradition’ of warfare.

Throughout the western Mediterranean the traditional classical hoplite phalanx that featured in Roman, Punic and Etruscan armies in the fifth and fourth centuries BC was steadily abandoned in favour of more flexible tactical formations, which required more flexible heavy infantry, and a fighting style that emphasised swordsmanship and heavy throwing spears.

Until c. 240 BC the Carthaginian army essentially fought as a hoplite army; to enable Carthage to field reliable heavy infantry with which to combat the hoplite armies of the Siciliot-Greeks, she relied upon several sources of military manpower; her own citizens, Libyan subjects, “barbarian” mercenaries (such as Gallic, Ligurian and Iberian) and Greek mercenaries. Carthage employed mercenary Greek hoplites to provide it with reliable heavy infantry throughout its wars in Sicily in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. This practice continued during the First Punic War with Rome; Greek mercenaries are specifically mentioned as forming a part of the Punic garrison at Lilybaeum in 250 BC (Polybius, 1.43.1), and Carthaginian recruiting agents in Greece famously recruited a company of Greek mercenaries that included the Spartan mercenary Xanthippos. However, the practice of hiring large numbers of Greek mercenaries had probably ceased by the end of the First Punic War, and had most certainly ceased completely by the end of the Mercenary War in 237 BC.

Some scholars persist in imagining that Carthaginian and Libyan heavy infantry fought in the manner of classical hoplites or even as Macedonian-style pikemen during the Second Punic War because Polybius often describes bodies of Punic infantry as a ‘phalanx’ (Polybius, 1.33.6; 15.12.7), yet this is anachronistic; Polybius clearly uses the term ‘phalanx’ to describe bodies of men fighting en masse – and he also uses the term to describe Roman hastati (15.12.7). Asclepiodotus also describes bodies of cavalry and light infantry as ‘phalanxes’, suggesting that by the second century BC the term ‘phalanx’ had become synonymous with the term ‘unit’ (Asclep. 1.4).

Unlike Hellenistic Greece and the Successor Kingdoms of Asia and Egypt, the Carthaginians did not adopt the ‘Macedonian Phalanx’. Instead, the classical hoplite heavy infantry fielded by Carthage in the fourth century BC disappeared in favour of the flexible heavy infantry, infantry armed in the increasingly homogenous panoply prevailing throughout the Western Mediterranean in this period. It should be noted that the classical hoplite panoply also disappeared at this time from the Roman (and Etruscan) armies in Italy in the fourth century BC, in large measure as a result of the Roman experience of fighting its Gallic and Oscan (especially Samnite) enemies in the Italian peninsula.

The panoply of the African Infantry included the Gallic-style large oval or oblong shield (Latin: ‘scutum’; Greek: ‘thueros’), and a coat of chainmail (lorica). More open helmet types, enabling better sight and sound, became common, such as the Montefortino helmet, derived from Gallic helmets, and found both with and without cheek-pieces. It was now important for heavy infantry to have better sight and sound on the battlefield, given the new emphasis of individual combat and more complex tactical manoeuvres on the battlefield. While the main hoplite weapon, the thrusting spear (Latin: ‘hastae’; Greek ‘dory’), continued to be found in the equipment of heavy infantry, it was slowly superseded in importance by the cut-and-thrust sword. In addition, heavy infantry were now armed with heavy throwing spears (pilum or the Iberian all-iron soliferrum) and javelins. In this way, heavy infantry came to combine the roles of classical peltasts (heavy skirmishers) and hoplites. Given that it is sometimes thought the Romans themselves adopted the pilum and gladius from the Iberian mercenaries they encountered during the First Punic War, it is no surprise that such equipment was also adopted by the Carthaginians.

Hence, in the 240s and 230s, Hamilcar Barca and his Carthaginian successors built their armies around a heavy infantry core that more closely resembled that of their Roman enemies rather than close-order spearmen.

It was the native subjects of Carthage, referred to respectively by Polybius and Livy as ‘Libyans’ (Libyes) and ‘Africans’ (Afri), that supplied the heavy infantry core of Punic armies after the First Punic War. In the sixth century BC the Carthaginians had ruthlessly conquered the native Libyan chiefdoms located in modern Tunisia; these Libyans were populous, and practised a more settled form of agriculture than their pastoralist cousins, such as the Numidians, Moors and Gaetulians. Carthage was notorious for harshly treating her Libyan subjects, and Carthage had suffered major revolts among her Libyan subjects at various times – including during the Mercenary War of 241-237 BC. Carthage lacked a class of small farmers working land outside the city, and so most of the best agricultural land had been formed into large estates owned by Carthaginian aristocrats and worked by harshly treated Libyan peasants. Libyan villages were forced to pay a crushing level of taxes to Carthage; apparently a quarter of the Libyan crops were demanded in tribute in times of peace, and half in times of war (Polybius 1.72.1-2). In addition, Carthage levied her subject Libyan communities for military manpower, and these conscripts seem to have been equipped by the Carthaginian state, rather than being responsible for supplying their own gear, if the surrender of 200,000 Carthaginian cuirasses to Rome during the Third Punic War is historical (Polybius, 36.6.7; App. Pun. 80). Carthage would never have required so many cuirasses, given that its total population of men, women and children probably did not exceed 400,000. Instead, these cuirasses were likely intended for Carthage’s subject levies.

In describing the battle of Illipa, fought in 206 BC during the Second Punic War, Livy asserts that the ‘Carthaginian’ and ‘African’ heavy infantry were “fairly matched in courage and arms” with the Romans; at one critical stage Livy says “the veteran Carthaginians and Africans, the strength of the enemy army, had not even reached the point when they could throw their spears (Livy, 28.14).” This literary evidence strongly suggests that the ‘Carthaginians’ and ‘Africans’ were equipped and fought like their Roman adversaries; certainly neither hoplites nor phalangites would “throw their spears” prior to engaging. It is for this reason that Hannibal's ‘Africans’ could so readily be re-equipped with Roman spoils, the best of Roman arms, after the battles of Trebia and Lake Trasimene (Polybius, 3.87.3; 1.14.1; Livy, 22.46.4). Indeed, Livy describes a re-equipment so complete that the Carthaginians could have been mistaken for Roman troops. “One might have taken the Africans to be a Roman battle line, for they were armed with captured weapons, some taken at the Trebia, but most of them at Trasimene” (22.46.4). The accounts of Livy and Polybius of the fighting at Lake Trasimene certainly support the hypothesis that the Libyan infantry fought as swordsmen; it is difficult to believe that troops armed as either classical hoplites or Macedonian-style phalangites could have charged downhill from ambush to attack the Romans from all sides (Polybius, 3.84.1-4; Livy, 22.4).

It is hard to imagine how the African Infantry could be mistaken for Romans unless they fought with the scutum (theuros) shield. If the Africans fought as classical hoplites (with the large, round hoplon shield) or as Macedonian-style pikemen (phalangites) with the long pike (sarissa) then it is impossible that they could have been mistaken for a Roman battle line. Nor could they have been re-equipped so readily with Roman arms and armour. If Hannibal’s infantry were trained to fight as close-order phalangites in the ‘Macedonian system’, then he would hardly have embarked upon the task of re-equipping them to fight in a completely new manner in 217 BC, while in the middle of a campaign, in enemy territory!

In order for the Africans to have the same appearance as a Roman battle line required not only that they were equipped in similar panoply as the Romans, but that they also used a similar tactical deployment. Like Roman legionaries, the African Infantry were organised into small, maniple-type formations; the ancient sources refer to such formations as speirai. Such formations made extensive use of standards and officers to command and control the battle line; Livy mentions Punic standards in Carthaginian armies (i.e. Livy, 30.18) and as being taken by the Romans as trophies. The presence of standards and the ability to replace or reinforce tired infantry on the battle line with fresh troops (i.e. Livy, 27.2), in a manner similar to that of the Roman infantry, strongly suggest that the Carthaginians organised their African Infantry into a system of units and sub-units. The officers of these Libyan units and sub-units were likely citizens of Carthage. Interestingly, it must be noted that Greek armies did not use standards at all during the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Hence the very presence of standards in the Punic army suggests the absence of troops equipped and drilled as ‘Macedonian-style’ pikemen.

There are references in Livy to bodies of ‘Poeni’ and ‘Carthaginenses’ also serving in the Punic armies in the Iberian Peninsula; these were likely civic levies from the Punic-Phoenician towns of Iberia, but they may have also included heavy infantry recruited from among the citizens of Carthage itself (Livy, 28.14.4). Just as Carthaginians and Libyans were equipped and fought in the same manner at the Crimesus in 341 BC, so too is it likely that they were equipped and fought in the same manner in the Second Punic War.

Libyan Longchophoroi

The Greek Reforms

The "Cleomenean Reform" for Sparta

The trigger for the Cleomenean Reform should be something like:
- Must be at least 230 BC
- Sparta is at war with either Aeacids, Antigonids or Attalids
- Sparta has been defeated in a major battle by Antigonids or Aeacids (i.e. an army using pikemen)
- Sparta has lost Messene, Argos, MEGALOPOLIS (i.e. the faction is in a "bad way"!)

This reform was a political revolution in Sparta, as the old ephors and Spartiate nobility were overthrown, the Spartiate class was reinforced with the admission of many thousands of new members from previously excluded men, and the Perioikoi class were re-armed with the sarissa and grew more important in Spartan armies.

(Spartan Reform Unit) Perioikoi Pezoi (Pikemen)

The Perioikoi Pezoi became the most important non-mercenary soldiery found in Spartan armies in the late third century BC, forming the core of the line infantry in the Spartan armies.

In Sparta the body of full citizens – the famous homoioi (the “equals”), the Spartiate warriors whose business was national defence, and who lived off the produce of their serf-worked estates – had declined from an original (mid-seventh century BC) figure of some eight or nine thousand to no more than 700 men by 244 BC. By the third century BC the Spartiates had evolved into an elite caste of ultra-conservative landowners into whose hands had fallen the best of the land and a vast preponderance of wealth – a very different picture from the famous 300 warriors who had defied the Persians at Thermopylae. The Spartiates ruled over a population comprised of tens of thousands of non-citizen freedmen (perioikoi), resident aliens (metics) and oppressed serfs (helots) – none of whom had the rights of citizens.

The Perioikoi or "dwellers around," were free men of Sparta, mainly farmers and merchants who lacked the full citizenship of the Spartiates. They lived in perhaps 80 or 100 towns and villages, in the less fertile land of the hills and coasts. They may have been part of the conquered people, but unlike the helots, they kept their freedom. Increasingly, during the fourth and third centuries BC, the Spartans made use of the Perioikoi to bolster the size of their phalanx. The Perioikoi lived as peasants, fishermen, craftsmen, miners and traders, who led relatively free lives in their small towns and villages. However, they had no political independence, and they were expected to serve in Sparta’s armed forces with no share in making its policies.

In late 227 BC King Cleomenes III launched a ‘social revolution’ at Sparta that was supported by those countless Spartiates who had lost their smallholdings, and, as a result, under Spartan law, had either lost their citizenship altogether, or had been reduced to the status of second-class citizens (hypomeiones). Cleomenes' domestic enemies, including the ephors, were exiled, all landed property was put into a common pool, debts were cancelled, and the land was divided into 4,000 Spartan lots. The citizen body was made up to around 5,000 from the metics and perioikoi. The traditional Spartan agoge was re-introduced. These reforms were all launched to further Cleomenes’ reactionary dream: the re-establishment of a strong, numerous and privileged elite, the purging of Sparta’s new and effete luxuries, and the resurgence of a matchless standing army. The so-called ‘Spartan revolution’ aimed to restore a near fatally crippled elite. After his coup, Cleomenes took many of the perioikoi into the Spartiate body, so as to form a corps of 4,000 infantry armed "in the Macedonian fashion", that is, as sarissa-armed pikemen rather than as traditional hoplites (Plu. Cleom. 11.3, 23.2). A revitalised Sparta attracted the financial support of Ptolemaic Egypt, which was always eager to back Greek powers willing and able to oppose the ambitions of the Antigonids of Macedon. Ptolemy III Euergetes (246-222 BC) switched his subsidies from the Achaean League to Sparta, enabling Cleomenes to maintain a large number of mercenaries. Cleomenes aimed at the hegemony of the Peloponnese (Plut. Cleom., 15.1; Arat., 41.3) and wished to regain for Sparta at least some of the power and prestige it had lost at Leuctra in 371 BC and with the liberation of Messenia from Spartan rule in 370 BC. Cleomenes vision of a Spartan hegemony would naturally mean the end of the ‘grand days’ of the Achaean League in the Peloponnese. The oligarchs of the Peloponnese were thus horrified not only at the expansion of Spartan power – but also of a Cleomenean social revolution that might redistribute land and wealth within the city-states.

The "new model" Perioikoi phalanx was manned by men armed as phalangites, with the long Macedonian pike (sarissa), some 18-24 feet long, enabling them to outreach the traditional Greek hoplites and stave off enemy cavalry. The phalangite wore lighter armour, enabling longer endurance and forced marches. In order to wield the sarissa with two hands, the phalangite carried a smaller “Macedonian shield” rather than the larger, heavier apsis of the traditional hoplites. The "Macedonian phalanx" was a slower moving, less flexible formation than the classical hoplite phalanx, relying on a slow inexorable advance rather than the hoplite charge. Given the success of the Macedonian style phalanx throughout the Hellenistic period, the Spartans were actually very slow to adopt it.

The phalangites were well drilled so as to enable them to execute complex maneuvers on the battlefield. They fought packed in a close rectangular formation, the basic unit of which was a file of sixteen men, the dekas; sixteen dekades formed a syntagma of 256 men; these, in turn, were organized into brigades – taxeis – comprised of six syntagma for a total of some 1,500 men. Each phalangite carries as his primary weapon the trademark of the Macedonian phalanx – the sarissa. The sarissa was a double-pointed pike which by the time of the Successors had grown from its original 18 feet to up to 24 feet by 300 BC. The sarissa was so large and heavy that it was wielded with two hands, and so the phalangite carried a small, less concave bronze shield only 2 feet in diameter. This small shield (pelte) lacked a rim, and had an elbow sling, and was suspended over the shoulder with a baldric. At close range the sarissa was of little use, but an intact phalanx was a formidable force, keeping its enemies at bay and capable of an irresistible advance.

The extreme depth of their new phalanx formation (the syntagma) was the strength of the Macedonian system. The pikes of the first five rows of men all projected beyond the front of the formation, so that there were more spearpoints than available targets at any given time, providing a daunting line of attack bristling with pikes. Once engaged with the enemy, the syntagmae were nearly unstoppable as long as their flanks were protected by cavalry. The Macedonians would advance at a steady, unrelenting rate, mowing down attacking cavalry and infantry alike until the battle was won. For close fighting, the phalangite carried a short double-edged sword, the xiphos.

The "Phillipoemem Reform" for the Achaean League

- Must be at least 230 BC
- The Achaean League is at war with Sparta
- The Achaean League has been defeated in a major battle by Sparta or Antigonids or Aeacids
- The Achaeans have lost Messene, Argos, MEGALOPOLIS (i.e. the faction is in a "bad way"!)

This reform was the result of Phillipoemen reorganising the army of the League so that it was not so "old fashioned". Whereas the Achaeans had equipped their troops for quick movement and raiding (i.e. Thureophoroi), and had long relied on mercenaries, by the 220s it was clear that the League needed soldiers who could hold a battle line against heavy infantry.

Lacking enough wealthy citizens to form large forces of hoplitai, they instead adopted the sarissa and trained their men to fight "in the Macedonian fashion".

Thorakitai

(Description by bucellarii)

The thorakitai (lit. 'breastplate wearers’) are mobile armoured infantry equipped with javelins and short two-edged swords for thrusting and slashing, who are able to fight effectively at close quarters protected by their thureoi. They wear a simple chiton (tunic) beneath a mail corselet. In addition to the thureos, protection is provided by an iron or bronze Hellenistic helmet (1 Macc. 6.35).

The emergence of unarmoured Hellenistic thureophoroi during the early third century was followed by the later recognition that these troops were at a disadvantage when closing with more heavily equipped enemy troops (Plut. Phil. 9.1). Whilst it is difficult to closely trace the development of a second class of thureos bearing infantry, this time equipped with body armour (thorakes), it seems clear that Hellenistic armies deployed these troops in the main battle-line as circumstances dictated. Such an interpretation is supported by Polybios' description (5.53.8) of Molon's army during his revolt against Antiokhos III. Molon's main battle-line in the decisive confrontation in 220 BCE was composed of ‘thureophoroi, galatians and generally all the heavy troops’. The thureophoroi in this passage are classed literally as ‘heavy’ infantry and therefore the likelihood of such troops being armoured is increased, at which point they can be more accurately labelled ‘thorakitai’.

Elsewhere Polybios describes the deployment of thorakitai in support of the Achaian light-armed during the same year (4.12.3), and their multi-purpose role at Mantineia in 207 BCE, at one point supporting the flank of the Achaian phalanx (11.11.4; 11.14.1; 11.15.5). The view that thorakitai were essentially armoured thureophoroi, is further supported by Polybios’ description of the Seleukid army’s crossing of the Elburz in 210 BCE (10.29.5-6).

Whilst the precise combat role of thorakitai during the third century remains a subject for debate, the brutal Roman victories at Kynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna, which so cruelly exposed the limitations of the ‘Macedonian phalanx’, doubtless caused the Hellenistic kingdoms to reconsider how thorakes adorned thureophoroi could be most effectively utilised on the battlefield. Consequently the five thousand men ‘armed after the Roman fashion and bearing breastplates of chain-armour’ who took part in the Seleukid military parade at Daphnai in 165 BCE (Polybios 30.25.3) might indicate the adoption of heavier javelins and scuta style shields, with swords rather than thrusting spears becoming the weapon of choice for close combat. Perhaps mail armour also became the norm. However whether a concerted attempt was made to imitate the flexible tactics of the Roman legion remains uncertain.

Reform Phalangites

The Getai Reforms

To acheive the Getai Reforms you must have possession of the following regions.

1. Piroboridava
2. Buridava
3. Helis
4. Histria
5. Tomis
6. Kallatis
7. Apollonia Pontika
8. Oescus
9. Arcidava
10. Singidava
11. Maetonium
12. Petrodava
13. Dacidava
14. Cotini
15. Naissus

Getai Reform triggering Regions in brown(Note map is WIP)






The Getai Reforms – Historical Notes (by anunnak)

According to Iordanes Burebista(Boerebistas), rose to power around 82 BC , when in Rome Sylla took the title of dictator.He was probably born in Argedava - unidentified - sometime in the last decades of the first century BC and inherited the leadership of a powerful tribal union from his father ,witch by force or by diplomacy extended it's borders to encompass most of the lands in witch the Getae tribes lived and beyond. To further develop it's state he took as his aid and viceroy the hermit and high priest of Zalmoxis,Deceneus. Through the teachings of Deceneus, in philosophy, ethics, logic, astronomy and mathematics, according to Iordanes, the Getae learned how to shed themselves of their barbaric customs, and even convinced them to cut down their vines ( Strabo ).

He undertook also a reform in his army, and "through hard work, frugality and discipline" managed to enlarge his domain and conquer neighboring tribes like the Boii lead by Cristasiros, the tauriscii and the Scordiscii around 60 BC. Burebista started also building new fortifications like the fort complex at Sarmisegetuza whichh became his new capital with the help of Greek architects and masons which might have come from the Greek colonies which were eventually conquered around 55 BC from Olbia to Dionysopolis and Apollonia Pontica by defeating Antonius Hybrida.

According to Criton there were some sort of prefects that were responsible for the forts or dava witch were enforced with troops.These troops were probably the private army of the local noble or nobles, the core of getae army, troops witch Burebista tried to transform in a standing professional army. In his court he took as advisor Acornion, a greek citizen and priest of Serapis from Dionysopolis witch he used as a diplomat in his dealings with the Roman Empire. Enlarging his domain put him in a position where a conflict with the romans seemed inevitable and by 49 BC he chose to intervene in the civil war on the side of Pompei in exchange for peace and recognition of his kingdoms bothers. Pompei unfortunately was defeated ar Pharsalos and soon died in Egypt. This action and his rising power made him an enemy of Caesar and soon he began massing troops on the Adriatic coast but a confrontation between the too never took place, both being assassinated in same year.

Soon after Burebista died his state fractured in 4 and then 5 parts Deceneus succeding on his throne in one of them.

Kometai Xiphephoroi (Getai Late Swordsmen)

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Afterword

I hope you have enjoyed this, our sixth preview of RTR VII. We are are hoping these reforms will add a lot of depth and immersion to the RTR VII campaign which is why PatricianS has busted his hump to get the triggers to work despite a few set backs along the way.

In other news - work has continued on the beta since our last update and we are getting closer and closer to a finished product. Although, we did spend the past couple of weeks tracking down a few nasty ctd's that had recently snuck into the beta. All being said, the beta is in great shape, and with a recent influx of new testers we are full steam ahead on balancing and testing.

[Conqistador]

Incredible, the reforms system is very immersive...

[Visarion]

excellent preview guys! you have my respect for not giving up! keep this wonderful project going! thank you guys for all your efforts!

[Pat89]

Nice one Finn

Don't forget the frontpage banner

[Finn]

Pending

[Maurits]

Good work guys!

[Radiso-FIN]

Looking good! It is very nice to see reforms for not only Romans, but for other factions too.

Sparta has been defeated in a major battle by Antigonids or Aeacids (i.e. an army using pikemen)
Sparta has lost Messene, Argos, MEGALOPOLIS (i.e. the faction is in a "bad way"!)

These are very good requirements for reforms to trigger and historically accurate too, I like them.

[Pat89]

These are very good requirements for reforms to trigger and historically accurate too, I like them.

Yes, but they're not definitive yet... As it might be historical correct, but from a gameplay point of view it doesn't make any sense at all. At least as player you will never ever lose these cities, which would make it impossible for the player to get the reforms, unless you intentionally lose them. So we've got a bit of a problem how this can then be done... For the AI this historical trigger might work, but for the player we might have to define in another way that the faction is doing bad. So suggestions as to how to solve this are mostly welcome (or if it's preferred to not solve this issue and simply keep the historical trigger)

[DarthLazy]

Pictures not showing but great preview , very well researched. I especcialy liked the Carthue part

[Finn]

Try reloading the page to see if that helps.

[MathiasOfAthens]

It would be cool to have one more province in Algeria but otherwise awesome preview and the mod is looking great.

[Vrosivs Avgvstvs Rakvs]

Yes, but they're not definitive yet... As it might be historical correct, but from a gameplay point of view it doesn't make any sense at all. At least as player you will never ever lose these cities, which would make it impossible for the player to get the reforms, unless you intentionally lose them. So we've got a bit of a problem how this can then be done... For the AI this historical trigger might work, but for the player we might have to define in another way that the faction is doing bad. So suggestions as to how to solve this are mostly welcome (or if it's preferred to not solve this issue and simply keep the historical trigger)

maybe putting a trigger of type "two cities lost in a row + defeated in major battle" instead of actualising the specific towns might work...

[Praetorian121]

GREAT GREAT and guess what Amazing.

[Windseller]

pretty impressive and informative update finn

i love those reformed units.

[vimy]

0Great work guys, looks exciting
I have a coment I hope yoy will consider regarding Carthaginians.

have you considered the likly hood that the army was more mixed, much like Alexander the greats, with a center of Phalangst - hoplite and wings of heavy pelstatesque troops.

I believe there model was more helenic influenced while the Romans mostly gave up on the hoplites, i suspect, do to the mountainous regions they live in.

As for there missle usage, I believe, (its been quite a few years since I read him,) Livy was refering to the use of missles during the masacres. I dont know if this implies javelin infantry, I suspect it was more a combined effort by all forces, to murder the Romans, pack like sardines as they were, at cannae, using anything and everything they could find. 80000 Romans are a lot of targets and exhausting work to try and butcher.

[Pat89]

maybe putting a trigger of type "two cities lost in a row + defeated in major battle" instead of actualising the specific towns might work...

Hmm, that's not a bad idea actually

[Vrosivs Avgvstvs Rakvs]

Hmm, that's not a bad idea actually

And it will save you time without reducing the actual quality of the mod... Hope I helped, at least a bit...
You guys are doing hell of a job, and I must congratuate you!

[Carados]

Hmm, that's not a bad idea actually

Two problems with it:

Firstly, I'm not sure the computer recognises "any two settlements" as a condition. I'm not 100% sure on it, but I think you would have to specify the town names. Of course, I would like to be proved wrong on this account.

Secondly, what's to stop the reform if you happen to lose two minor regions??


1'000th post

[Maurits]

Congrats!

Besides the settlement trigger, the one ''must be after 230 BC'' stays in place

[Pat89]

Two problems with it:

Firstly, I'm not sure the computer recognises "any two settlements" as a condition. I'm not 100% sure on it, but I think you would have to specify the town names. Of course, I would like to be proved wrong on this account.

As with the Marian Reforms, there are ways to make it unspecified... So there you for example have to conquer only three major regions in the Balkans as part of the trigger, no matter which one.

Secondly, what's to stop the reform if you happen to lose two minor regions??

Just not include them in the script?

1'000th post

Congrats