Originally Posted by
The Dude
This is a bit of a bother for me. This is one of the things that I have to know for my upcoming medieval philosophy exam and I still can't quite figure out how he managed to link one with the other.
From what I understand Boëthius argues that Plato and Aristotle essentially believed the same thing except that they expressed it differently. He intends to demonstrate this by arguing that there are two levels on which something can participate in Platonic forms, and two levels on which something can have Substance in Aristotelian methaphysics.
But that's where I get confused. From what I understand he argues that the substance common in things (for example, trees in general) is derivant from a participation in a certain Form, but that this Form is not essentially Good. And while I get where he's trying to go with that it seems a bit of a strange conclusion to draw since if he had sat next to Aristotle, Aristotle would've probably just said "no, you're wrong and you really don't understand what I have said at all". Plato might've agreed, though.
Which makes it impossible for me to really grasp what he's trying to get at since it just seems a total lapse in logic from where I'm standing.
Is there anyone who can help to shed some light on this?