Frederick the Great-a military genius or mediocre?

[Roloc]

Auf, Ansbach-Dragoner!
Auf, Ansbach-Bayreuth!
Schnall um deinen Säbel
und rüste dich zum Streit!
Prinz Karl ist erschienen
auf Friedbergs Höh'n,
Sich das preußische Heer
mal anzusehen.

Drum, Kinder, seid lustig
und allesamt bereit:
Auf, Ansbach-Dragoner!
Auf, Ansbach-Bayreuth!
Drum, Kinder, seid lustig
und allesamt bereit:
Auf, Ansbach-Dragoner!
Auf, Ansbach-Bayreuth

[deathdroid29]

Poetic justice is also that Napoleon utterly destroyed Prussian model army at Jena-Auerstad and payed the debts for Rossbach Napoleon was the only military leader to bring Prussia on her knees untill WWI.

Until the Prussians modernized their military in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars and learned a bit from the American Civil War, which fueled their audacity on unifying Germany by "blood and iron". By the way of attacking Austria in 1866, beating them in seven weeks, for hegemony over the northern German states. Also, trying to provoke a war with France by putting a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain, as well as Bismarck appealing to the Southern German States, join us, or the French will get you. With which the Southern German states saw reasoning to it. But what I'm saying is, the poetic justice was paid back after the Prussians surrounded the French Army at Sedan commanded by Emperor Napoleon III, which proved he was not military savvy like Napoleon I was. Eventually, the Prussians marched into Paris, and made the French sign a humiliating treaty therefore unifying Germany, creating the Second German Empire in 1871. Putting the world, steps closer to WWI.

[KEA]

Until the Prussians modernized their military in the decades after the Napoleonic Wars and learned a bit from the American Civil War

What did the Prussian Army learn from the ACW? They had a couple of observers there who wrote lengthy reports (which are interesting to read BTW), but finally came to the conclusion that those armies were nothing but armed amateurs chasing each other around the bushes (Moltke).

[Anna_Gein]

I thin Frederick II is sometimes overestimate as a "military genius" while he was not. Yes he induced tactical changes but he did not revolutionized warfare. And he was unable to adapted his tactics depending of the situation and often dried to play the same trick such as Zorndorf. The opposite of a military genius in my mind.
In the end Frederick succeed through his incontestable good skills and an insane luck. Even in state leadership as a whole he was more than competent but not without flaw.

[Marcus Aemilius Lepidus]

By the way of attacking Austria in 1866, beating them in seven weeks, for hegemony over the northern German states. Also, trying to provoke a war with France by putting a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain, as well as Bismarck appealing to the Southern German States, join us, or the French will get you. With which the Southern German states saw reasoning to it. .

The joining of the Southern German states was a bit diffrent, but the french threat was not the major reason to get them. Irony of history is that the North was much more prosperous than the south and the later had a lot of debts, Bavaria was even bankrupt. One could say Prussia and the North just bought them in to their Federation.

As for Friedrich II. I would like to suggest to look in to his brother Heinrich. There are several Friedrich experts like Johannes Kunisch which would tell you guys that Heinrich was actually the superior commander of both of them. In the deciding victories of Friedrich it is him who is leading the deciding attacks and often he is the guy who has his back. That Friedrich later didn't had to deal with the French is because of his clever tactics to delay attacks and spread their focus on other territories.

[Wulfburk]

If Frederick the great was mediocre, there must be no such thing as a good general. His victories at leuthen and rossbach are pretty much one of the most impressive victories in all time, and i'd say much more impressive than Austerlitz, for example.

[Cyclops]

Fredrick der Grosse was King of Prussia, you're thinking of his less treacherous father who was styled King in Prussia so as not to offend the masters in Vienna.

Frederick is rightly ranked as the greatest military figure between Gustav Adolph and Napoleon. Took on some very brilliant opponents, and wrecked some sacred cows while he was about it. Did to the French at Rossbach what Davout did to the Prussians at Auerstadt (albeit in a very different manner), shattered the brittle ghost of a past power.

We can split hairs and its apples and oranges, but it is fun to compare Napoleon and Frederick. For me the little Corsican is the more imaginative man with better toys, as well as an exponentially more influential military and political figure (oh and cultural as well). Frederick did take a C grade power to B+ in a fairly crowded area, so I can see the arguments in his favour have some validity.

[Ciciro]

What did the Prussian Army learn from the ACW? They had a couple of observers there who wrote lengthy reports (which are interesting to read BTW), but finally came to the conclusion that those armies were nothing but armed amateurs chasing each other around the bushes (Moltke).

They did not care about the tactics of the Americans, but the technology used.

[KEA]

They did not care about the tactics of the Americans, but the technology used.

What technology in particular? The Prussian army was the first to be equipped with breech-loading rifles - long before the ACW. Prussian artillery was at the peak of its time, even though some serious improvements were introduced after the War of 1866. Germany, and Prussia in particular, had the densest net of railroad in Europe, and every mile of it was firmly incorporated into military mobilization. And so on. The Prussian army of the Wars of Unification by far was the most modern in the world, including technology used, tactics, leadership, usage of modern weapons etcpp. The only field Prussia was seriously outclassed was its navy - but no one really cared about n Berlin.

[Ecthelion]

I think the moniker "Fredrick the Lucky" is more appropriate. Had the Russians not just opted out cause of Prussiaphilia, Prussia as a state would have been destroyed.

Freddie was incompetent strategically, going to war over Silesia against pretty much all his neighbors at the same time. And he wasn't even particularly good on the battlefield. He had one trick and one trick only and once people learned it, it was all over.

[hellheaven1987]

The Prussian army of the Wars of Unification by far was the most modern in the world, including technology used, tactics, leadership, usage of modern weapons etcpp.

Nope, Dreyse needle-gun actually was completely outdated in 1870; the only thing that overcame needle-gun's grave weakness was because of human wave + mass assault tactic of Prussian military, but that means you trade human lives over technology weakness. Furthermore, tactic wise Americans actually had best tactic, as Americans tactics were excellent in both defense and offense.

[Cyclops]

.... Furthermore, tactic wise Americans actually had best tactic, as Americans tactics were excellent in both defense and offense.

This is debatable to say the least. There are many examples which suggest a very poor level of proffesionalism all round in the USCW.

At Chancellorsville Lee divided his force in the face of a numerically superior foe, a grave error, and was saved by the fact that Hooker failed to act even though he had intel on the outflank. Blunders like the US being surprised at Shiloh, and the rebs failing to bag them, as well as confused actions like first Bull Run and Cedar Creek demomnstrate there was an overall lack of proffesional military skill in both the regular US army and the hastily raised expanded forces of both sides.

The US army had a very good record in COIN ops and colonial raids in the 19th century, but until WW2 they seem to have been clumsy and inept at mass warfare in the European tradition.

This subject has come up before. I am persuaded that the US cavalry would give the Europeans hell, especialy in broken terrain, but the US inf, intel and leadership at the tactical level has major problems vs Prussians. To imagine the US with absolutley zero experience of mass modern warfare somehow skilled up to a brilliant level in six years is not convincing.

[Mangalore]

Nope, Dreyse needle-gun actually was completely outdated in 1870; the only thing that overcame needle-gun's grave weakness was because of human wave + mass assault tactic of Prussian military, but that means you trade human lives over technology weakness. Furthermore, tactic wise Americans actually had best tactic, as Americans tactics were excellent in both defense and offense.

Human wave tactics... in the Prussian army... trade human lives in a war with a more than 4:1 fatality rate in the Prussians favor ... really? Prussian infantry tactics of the time revolved around looser skirmishing lines because they knew (possibly from the ACW, I'm not sure they spread it through all infantry before) what modern rifles did to concentrated infantry.

What overcame the weakness of the Dreyse gun was the superiority of Krupp field artillery and the general mobility of the Prussian army on the operational level meaning Prussian infantry was rarely meant to storm a place without artillery support.

[Turtler]

As somebody who has studied the era and the Prussian military more than I probably should have, honestly class Frederick as a gifted and spirited neophyte who stood out in an era where- to put it bluntly- military mediocrity was the order of the day after people recoiled from the total wars of the 17th century. He should absolutely not overshadow de Saxe, Malborough, Charles XII, or Eugene of Savoy like he does, as in my estimation they were all far better generals than he was (note that there is more to being a war leader than generalship). Frederick's most brilliant personal victories happened off the field of battle in his reforms and revolutionization of Prussian governance and European diplomacy. But then I could probably say the same about Napoleon and Gustav Adolph; they also obtained the sort of Victories that Frederick only vaguely grasped at.

That said, in the era he was in the fact that someone was trying to specialize in and polish land warfare to the degree he and his predecessors did was notable. Especially sinde de Saxe had gotten out of the game near the start of Frederick's career and the only heads of government to really try that were Charlex XII and Peter the Great (who had ended over half a century before) and William Pitt (who came in towards the end and was an administrator and politician, not a soldier). That I think did shake things up in a very effective way, with a few extremely novel ideas like the introduction of horse artillery. And it helped establish Frederick etc. al.'s reputation as one of the pre-eminent soldiers of his age. And in this age all too many people mistook pre-eminance with greatness (just look at how people lauded Braddock for being pretty thoroughly mediocre and saw catastrophe in the end because of it), and that becomes a lot more understandable when you realize that Frederick had a few impressive victories under his belt and- crucially- the *subordinate generals he had* won plenty more, even though they get crucially overlooked.*

But in the end I do not believe he was a great general, merely a good one who was very imaginative in some ways and mind-bogglingly uncreative in others. I think his record during the Potato War (or the War of the Bavarian Succession) illustrates this the best. After successfully gathering an anti-Habsburg alliance of Bavaria and his old Saxon allies, he and Prinz Heinrich invaded Bohemia and managed to outmanuever the army under the hapless nominal command of Emperor Joseph II and the generally competent one of Franz Moritz von Mercy, as well as the other one under that of von Daun. The end result of all this maneuvering was that Frederick and Heinrich managed to bottle up the main Austrian army on the Konnigratz Heights on admittedly strong defensive positions, but no real way to get out and a phenomenally bad supply situation. Had they been able to defeat the Habsburgs then, the Austrian Empire would have lost the majority of its' equipment, a crippling amount of its' soldiers, and the heir of Maria Theresa that had driven the entire war in the first place, which would have probably had a similarly decisive effect (even if not the same) to the Prussian victory on those grounds about a century later.

There were several options. Frederick could have enveloped them from both sides and overrun the heights to force their surrender or destruction. Ok but you say, the Austrians are much too strong! Von Daun might outflank Heinrich! Even if he won it would be crippling! I deeply, deeply question this line of thought and the idea that a decisive, non-crippling victory was impossible. Especially since the Battle of the Soor and Leuthen saw Frederick attack Austrian troops on high grounds and win, and in the former case even saw him do so on short notice. But for the sake of the argument, let's move on.

He could still have won the forage campaigns that gave The Potato War its' name, and force the starving Austrians on the highlands to surrender or try to manuever out of their defenses for want of food, which would in turn make it easier to attack them. And there are probably even other plans that could have been done, since genius and some hard work is capable of creating all sorts of results.

But Frederick did neither, and he did not even make particularly spirited or competent attempts to do either. Instead, he stood there in that same exact position for Months and Months, in spite of having the main enemy army surrounded and his subordinates warning him about how the supplies he had were running dangerously low since they were eating up everything in Bohemia. As a result the Austrians succeeded in gaining the upper hand in the foraging war and Frederick was forced to come to a compromise peace when he had the chance to devastate his Austrian enemies like his successors would do on the same terrain. And could have done so with a bit more of the genius he supposedly had on the battlefield, a bit more daring, or even some more of his rampant gambling.

I think this says plenty about how seriously he is overrated militarily, and how he suffered when he was either deprived of his supporting commanders or did not use them properly.

*I almost get the feeling this is a side effect of Frederick's highly personal rule, which was noted even at the time.

By and large, I feel that in many ways amongst Prussian military reformers and commanders he falls notably behind the likes of Moltke the Elder, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, etc. He did build the foundation they constructed on, but I do think they did far more with it.

Lucky and brilliant. Fighting a war utterly outnumbered without much technical or tactical superiority of his troops for years and not losing is an achievement.

I agree on it being an achievement, but let's underline one thing.

He did lose.

Not just in the sense of "he lost one battle or another", which he did too. But he lost the game. About as well and truly as Napoleon had in 1814.

The reason why the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg has been attached to the death of the Russian Empress is because by the time it happens, Prussia has for all intents and purposes lost the war. Even Frederick himself conceded this and he expected Kundersdorf to be his mortal wound. The Russians were coming across from the East, the Austro/Imperial troops dominated the Southern theater of the war, the Prussian military had consistently failed to polish off the small Swedish enclaves in the North in a truly ludicrous slap fight that either emphasizes that the Swedish army of the time (which was supposedly in a truly miserable shape) either had more going for it than people understand or the Prussians of Frederick's era were not the world winners people make them out to be. And now the bill was coming due.

The Prussian army was being forced to try and defend a Berlin whose defenses were fundamentally compromised against an overwhelming enemy force with zero real prospects for victory. Prinz Heinrich's army was one of the few formations in good order, and Frederick's statement of prospects are very, very clear. This is Frederick's doing as much as his eventual victory in 1763 and others. While in the era it took place I doubt that the norms of diplomacy or warfare would have allowed the eradication of Prussia or the Hohenzollern altogether, this certainly would have broken them as a power for at least a generation. And it's not inconceivable that Prussia would have been viewed as "Just another German fiefdom" that could be cut up and parceled out as the victors saw fit, like they had just decades before. All of this is Also the legacy Frederick earned.

The death of Elizabeth was nothing less than providence, and ensured that Prussia did not suffer that fate. And the fact that Frederick was able to exploit it to the hilt to recover from it is an unbelievably massive credit to him (in the sense that he was able to cultivate the sort of reputation that led the new Tsar to be such a fanboy of him, that he recognized the sort of line he was being thrown and took advantage of it, and that he commanded the still-unequal fight to victory in 1763).

But let's not mince words. He Still Lost. And even though he deserves the credit for the victory of 1745, the defeat of 1759, and the victory of 1763 the reasons why the axe did not drop on his neck in the middle had very little to do with him personally.

Beyond that I find your analysis to be very good and informative, but immensely slanted. I'll limit my commentary to that which I believe needs clarification.

The French army (not including the navy) numbered between 200.000 and 213.000 in 1756, depending on the source (6), and around 290.000 by war’s end, of which 140.000 were operating on German grounds, with tens of thousands remaining in France still (7). That is not surprising since the Second Treaty of Versailles obligated France to provide 105.000 troops for an offensive and subside further German allies (8). So anyone saying the French were not fully committed to the war is off the mark. That they made such a poor performance in spite their numbers is hardly the fault of Frederick, but rather a result of his strategy and the great defensive operations of his minor allies.

The problem with this is that it looks like it's looking out from Berlin at French actions without trying to understand them, and as a result it looks like it's missing the forest for the sake of the trees. The "operating on German grounds" being left without clarification underlines it and makes it seem like all of those forces were committed to the war with Frederick. Which gives a *spectacularly bad* idea of what the French were actually up to.

The reality is that French policy in this era was a schizophrenic mess. But in terms of military and diplomacy it can basically be generalized into a debate between two camps: An "Atlantique"/Atlantic/maritime camp that advocated for French strength to be directed outwards to the colonies and sea and favored a showdown with the Western Maritime Powers of the British and Dutch, and a "Continental" camp that advocated expansion of French power across the continent and favored wars against those who threatened it. In this case first with the Habsburgs of Austria and in this case with Prussia. These two sides see-sawed back and forth since the days of the Sun King with a pretty disastrous affect on French focus, and you can even see the division in the theaters the French fought in the Seven Years' War and Austrian Succession (amongst others).

So in 1755/6 the French committed themselves to two very different undertakings: continued struggle with the Maritimes on all fronts, and support of the coalition against Prussia in Germany. But by far the larger focus overall- across the war(s) in general- was on the former. So while it's true that the French joined the coalition against Prussia and sent troops across the Rhine into German territory, the two are not identical.

Especially when you actually look at where the troops were going and realize that the majority of them were probably going to Hanover just across the Rhine. Hanover- for the uninitiated- was a German principality that was a part of the "security blanket" of friendly German states around the Netherlands, and most importantly had begun providing the British dynasty ruling at the time. Thus making it tied to France's chief maritime/colonial/Western front enemy. And by and large the defense was mostly conducted by Anglo-Hanoverian troops and those of the "Mercenary Principalities" like Hesse, not Prussia. This is in contrast to things like the campaign that led to Rossbach, where the French skirted around Hanover altogether to link up with Imperial troops and then march into Saxony, which is a clear attempt to threaten Prussia.

And even then, it's worth comparing the figures.

Of the 200,000-213,000 mobilized in 1756, the French sent 100,000 into Hanover in 1756/7. Even when we compare the defeats of that year, the army that was defeated at Rossbach numbered maybe 40,000+ even after it was massively supported by Imperial/Austrian-satilite troops. In contrast, Hastenbeck a few months removed in Hanover saw the French mobilize a full 60,000~ troops *by themselves.* And it wasn't even the largest battle they fought trying to do it, while Rossbach probably was of their war with Prussia.

Likewise, the French accounts of the army they dispatched to join the Imperials is hardly laudatory. Its' own commanders used lovely terminology like saying it was "fit only to be broken upon the wheel" because of its' generally poor level of preparation, discipline, and drill. Which was not a strong point of Seven Years' War French armies in the first place, but they certainly could get things done if they tried.

If this does not scream out that the French were divided about the focus of their war aims and were not wholly committed to the war with Prussia, what does?

While there was some overlap- and the British did indeed send (more) money for Prussian troops to help in the defense of Hanover- French invasion there should be seen as an attempt to attack the British Empire, not Prussia. The French attack on Hanover far outnumbered the forces it sent into the field further East, it was mostly fought and repulsed by Anglo-Hanoverian Redcoats, not Prussian blackcoats, and it was as part of a(nother) wide-ranging war on multiple fronts between the French and British. Most prodigiously in India and the Americas. The fact that they were not bestest buddies with Vienna did not help

When they did not feel they could strike at Britain through campaigning across the Rhine, they generally didn't do it just for Austrian/balance of power interests. When the next round came again with the American Revolution and the Potato War, *even after* France had lost most of its' colonial staging grounds, the French decided not to invade Hanover and completely ignored Prussia. Their diplomats more or less telling Vienna "Sort your problem out yourself."

While France was certainly a big financial player in the European war and to the Imperial states, and it did send troops it was pretty clear they were interested in other things. The fact that most of the French troops operating in Germany were not even focused on the war with Prussia underlines that.

Of course again, one can argue about the exact numbers that were involved in battle, and Kunersdorf is an excellent example. The Prussian army numbers are quite clear, around 48.000-50.000, including the 7.000 troops guarding Frankfurt a.O. The numbers of the Austro-Russian army vary in the sources, ranging from 79.000 to 60.000.

Kunersdorf is not an excellent example. It was the product of the junction between very large and (relatively) experienced Russian and Austrian armies, who faced a spectacularly ill-starred attack by a worn down Frederick. Something that was ferverently protested by many on the staff, including Prinz Heinrich. In large part because of the enemy numbers and quality.

Compare/contrast Austria and Russia's most ambitious joint venture of the war, when they jointly occupied Berlin for a while after defeating a Prussian defense force only a few thousand soldiers fewer than them.

It is more than obvious that Frederick was in a situation of sever numerical inferiority throughout the war, with the exception of Saxony’s invasion. The fact that he did survive this situation must be attributed to his strategy.

It also has to be attributed to the floor dropping out of the coalition's strategy when Frederick's strategy had clearly failed around 1759 and he himself believed oblivion was only a short while away.

And mind, this can't purely be the result of the general bad situation his side was in. 1759 was the Annus Mirabalis- the Year of Miracles- for his British allies. And that not only meant increasing French defeats abroad, but an Anglo-German army (with some minor Prussian auxillaries) proceeding to counterattack the French occupation of Hanover with significant success at the same time as Prussia was fading fast on their Eastern Flank.

Likewise, Frederick's strategy in the war and his approach to it was also not helped by some aspects of his strategy. Not the least of which the messy attempt to invade Bohemia which ended just bleeding the Prussians out because of his failure to conduct a competent siege or encirclement.

The bottom line is that you seem more than willing to attribute Frederick's surival and victories in the war to Frederick himself (even when there were other factors in play), but you seem to Completely Ignore his defeats and the possible role he had in them. Up to and including leaidng himself and his country to the brink of extinction at Kunersdorf and the aftermath. To say that is a double standard is an understatement. Judge them using the same parameters or not at all.

The Russians, French, Austrians did not stop their advances after Kunersdorf –

Frederick himself disagreed.

Rossbach was more or less the first, last, and only major attempt by the French to target Prussia (as opposed to the Maritime Powers by attacking Hanover and other theaters) albeit after being bulked up by German satilite states of Austria and themselves, and it had ended over a year before Kunersdorf. During which time the French were far busier trying to fry the fish labeled "Britain" than Prussia. And at that time they were busy eating an Anglo-German counterattack that was about to drive them back across the Rhine. To say they "did not stop their advances" is nothing less than falsehood.

As for the Austrians/Russians/Imperials, they did make some advances but their failure to follow up and drive to Berlin or even several less ambitious objectives was infamous. It was what earned this instance the term "the Miracle of the House of Brandenburg." During this time, they did not even manage to catch up to and engage Prinz Heinrich, who was in command of one of the few remaining Prussian armies still intact and in the field. Which points to a serious lack of follow up in the field even if they did sit down to take some sieges.

and after years in which whole armies of them were annihilated – because they just did not feel like it, or because they were not so committed… It was Frederick, who still had an operational fighting force, and violently interrupted enemy plans.

Again, Frederick himself disagreed. Which makes me believe that either you believe you knew Frederick's record better than Frederick himself did, or you haven't studied the aftermath of Kunersdorf very thoroughly.

He spent the time after Kunersdorf holed up in Brandenburg (especially Berlin) with a bloated cantonal garrison thinking the end was coming for him like it actually did for Berlin in 1945. His own letters on the subject make it clear where he was, what he was doing, his plans for the defense, and how much optimism he had for victory against an Austro-Russian army coming at him from the South and East.

If there is Any Prussian Army that can be said to still have had an operational fighting force, it was probably those of Prinz Heinrich out West, the troops engaging in the slap fight with the Swedes in the North to no avail, and the auxillaries fighting in Hanover. It was only with the prolonged failure of the Austrian/Russian/Imperial troops to exploit that allowed Frederick to regroup and the deat of the Tsarina opening up massive Russian and British aid that Frederick regrouped the following year (1760) and started to defeat von Daun while he was isolated. Which is a very impressive feat by every means, but certainly not something he was doing since Kunersdorf happened.

Compare/Contrast to Bonaparte's campaigns in France, especially the Six Days. Where he kept swinging even on the heels of the defeats in Russia and Germany, a fiasco of a retreat across the Rhine, and coalition armies bearing down on him marching ever closer to Paris. Yes, he eventually lost because he found himself in a situation like Frederick did in 1759, but his enemies actually kept up the pursuit and there was no miraculous implosion. But he still achieved at least as much and probably more against odds as bad or perhaps even worse than Frederick in the equivalent position.

One can try to belittle that achievement all day long, but as a matter of fact: in the end he never lost a war.

Again, Yes He Did.

By 1759, he basically lost the Seven Years' War. Russia just made an insanely generous separate peace that let him recover.

And in the Potato War, he settled for a compromise peace after losing both confidence in the ability to storm the Konnigratz Heights and any and all (really slapdash) efforts to defeat the Austrians in a forage war. Which resulted in his army being the one that was running out of food in spite of being the besieging one, and him having to rely on diplomatic channels and (again) a threatened force of Russian troops to force the Austrians to a mutually unsatisfactory peace.

Clauswitz- who was nothing if not a produce of Frederician Prussia- stated that war is politics by other means. In this, Frederick's record is relatively uneven at best. He was far better at using politics to other means in war than the other way around in many ways, the initial seizure of Silesia being the outstanding exception.

He won the first Silesian War, Won the Second Silesian War, Lost the War up to 1759 (again, while his British allies were beginning to realy start winning), Won up to 1763, and squandered an adantageous position to gain a compromise peace in the Potato War.

So in effect, 3-1-1, putting it generously. This is not a bad record by any means, especially considering a lot of the odds he fought against. But it is not an overwhelmingly successful ratio. And it could easily have been worse.

And in comparison to Napoleon's 5-2 (or maybe three)- 0 on an even grander scale it certainly says something.

Btw, Napoleon was one of those envious begrudging men...

Yeah, well maybe so. Though he certainly has been given a far harsher step than even he deserved by the like of Tolstoy.

But the fact remains. That envious, begrudging man still knew how to interrupt enemy plans far better than Frederick did. And did far better at the hour of his defeat in the Six Days than Frederick did holed up in Berlin during the latter part of 1759.

When he wrote about Frederick, Napoleon always picked the highest number for the Prussians, the lowest for the enemy etc.

This is flatout false, and confirms my prior point that you seem to know very, very little about French sources. Besides the fact that he regarded Frederick and the army of his era as one of the best, it is a claim that doesn't even get the minutae right.

In one of his writings on the Prussian Army and the Wars of Frederick the Great (I would like to provide a name but I am not sure I want to try and wrap my head around the messy French/Corsican mash that Napoleon's grammar was often like) during the negotiations for Tilsit in 1807, he estimated that the Austrians outnumbered the Prussians in the Battle of Prague, with the former being 65=67,000 and the Prussians being 60-61,000. We know now that was almost exaclty the opposite way around, with the Prussians fielding 67,000~ and the Austrians 60,000~. And it was guesstimated and measured more commonly by plenty of others.

Far from doing what he said you did, he estimated one of Frederick's greatest defeats to be the result of superior enemy numbers *at a battle where he actually outnumbered the enemy.*

It's also worth noting that what he was doing was part of a generalized trend in the era that he helped start (by basically demolishing the Frederican Army at Jena while Davout did similar at Auerstadt) of re-evaluating Frederick's wars and realizing their flaws. Especially drawn by two major things.

A: Bookkeepers often baked their numbers pretty hard (as he himself knew firsthand, just look at his bulletins) and the Prussian cantonal bookkeepers were pretty infamous for it even by the standards of the day. Having a king who dominated the government and sidelined his own bureaucracy did not do anything to help the checks and balances to keep corruption in line when he was't looking.

B: Frederick dominated the picture- by design and/or by accident- and crowded out his own subordinate commanders. Certianly far more than he should have, and everybody knew that his subordinate commanders were exceptionally important in his track record, both victories, defeats, and others.

* "Frederick"'s first battle at Mollwitz was dominated by Count Schwerin, who first advised the King to leave the field of battle for his own safety and then took command of the situation to turn a bad situation into a victory.

* Von Seydlitz's cavalry did the vast majority of the fighting at Rossbach, broke the Austro-Saxons at Hohenfriedenburg, and probably saved the Prussian army from the Russian reifnrocements at Zorndorf.

* Keith was perhaps the closest Frederick came to having a "seige master", since he oversaw the siege that forced the Saxons to capitulate in 1756, defended Leizpig while Frederick dealt with the main Austrian army at Leuthen, and was earmarked to play the same role if Bohemia had gone better.

* Von Zeithen's cavalry (I'm staritng to notice a trend about Prussian cavalry commanders)- in addition to helping out at Hohenfriedenburg and being excellent message carriers in general- salvaged the right flank from the defeat at Kolin and were the decisive blow that broke Charles of Lorraine's army at Leuthen.

* Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau was the drillmaster who furthered "the Soldier-King"'s reforms in training and saved Berlin from an Austro-Saxon winter expedition by smashing them at Kesseldorf while Frederick was still getting ready.

* Prinz Heinrich was perhaps the strongest right hand Frederick had. Serving pretty much throughout his brother's career, he was one of the few people who could actually critizice Frederick when the time came, and in many ways had a more consistently successful record. He was the one who did things like advising against the disaster at Kunersdorf, doing the *actual* mobile army after it, winning at Freiburg, and helping to conduct the encirclement that trapped Joseph II and the main Austrian Army in 1778.

The contributions of all of these and more were scarcely doubted by the experts at the time and certainly aren't now, but you'd be hard pressed to find that much reference to them in non-expert literature, wouldn't you?

While Napoleon was many things, he did do at least as well if not better at acknowledging the talent in his subordinates and elevating them to high rank. Perhaps excessively so. So he was decently versed to at laest try and take a crack at evaluating Frederick's campaigns with this in mind (even if he often fell into similar flaws as "Frederic" did). And today there is just about nobody in their right mind who thinks crediting the work (or lack thereof) of Frederick's support staff is out of line.

So it's pretty odd to gripe about him for being petty or "badmouthing" him when Napoleon was just noticing something that a lot of people did, and which was unquestionably an over-exaggeration in the Cult of Frederick (for both better and worse).

Yes, you say, this is rather trivial is it not? ANd yes, it honestly is.

But the point is you still claimed otherwise. And this alone is more than enough to point out the opposite. If you're condemning someone without having any idea what he actually did or didn't do,

If Frederick the great was mediocre, there must be no such thing as a good general. His victories at leuthen and rossbach are pretty much one of the most impressive victories in all time, and i'd say much more impressive than Austerlitz, for example.

*SPITTAKE*

Seriously?

Ok, Leuthen I can almost understand. But it still involved him going up against a complete edjiot who thought he was living in an Empire Total War game and decided to string out his entire army on a long, long line. Frederick and his subordinate commanders just rolled up the flanks while the panicking Austrians/Imperials tried to desperately adjust, and that was it.

But Rossbach?

Rossbach featured an only slightly outnumbered but far, far superior in quality and organization Prussian army (and especially its' cavalry) falling on a messy, sacrificial, composite Franco-Imperial army whose commanders believed it was "only fit to be broken upon a wheel."

There really is no comparison to Napoleon's holding or hours against two *relatively* competent and strong enemies and resorting to all kinds of tricks and strategies to carry the day.

Is it impressive? Definitely. But I would not say I find any victory's of Frederick's to be equal to it.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

It's interesting that in Napoleon's personal writings he goes into great detail about Frederick as a military commander. Well it's usually claimed that Napoleon believed Frederick to be many times superior to himself or something of that sort, the truth however is the opposite. He doesn't consider Frederick the greatest military commander ever; Napoleon considered him a good military reformer and organizer as well as a very talented tactician that ended up winning in the end mostly out of luck I think.

He's also very critical of Frederick's strategic plans and how he carried out operations. For instance he credits much of the success at Leuthen to luck and the fact that his opponent was not able to see Frederick's flanking maneuver (command being reliant on inferior information gathering and scouting in those days and to the general's telescope, also no observation balloons!). For instance Napoleon is extremely critical of Frederick's maneuvres and his lack of "elan" when the Prussian army was before Prague (essentially Frederick was hesitant and slow as a slug). In Napoleon's opinion Frederick did not display particular skill in sieging or in depth understanding of military matters. What he did have was a basic understanding of front line military matters and a much better understanding of organization and tactics. Apparently he may have struggled between the command of troops on the field and that of a Supreme Commander with a grand strategy. There's lots of other stuff regarding Napoleon's opinion of Frederick the Great (he seems to have studied the subject in depth as he talks more about Frederick than other commanders) but I would have to look around and find this.

[Ecthelion]

Nope, Dreyse needle-gun actually was completely outdated in 1870; the only thing that overcame needle-gun's grave weakness was because of human wave + mass assault tactic of Prussian military, but that means you trade human lives over technology weakness. Furthermore, tactic wise Americans actually had best tactic, as Americans tactics were excellent in both defense and offense.

It was also the fact that the Prussians were the first to master the art of modern strategic maneuver. They understood that modern technology allowed independent smaller armies to outmaneuver larger armies into cauldron battles.

The French had superior weapons, but they maneuvered their army as a singular force as if it were still 1815. The Prussians won their battles even before the first shot was fired due to superior maneuvering. Case in point, the capitulation at Sedan. the French army didn't even really fight.

In light of this, minor deficiencies in weaponry didn't count for much.

[hellheaven1987]

It was also the fact that the Prussians were the first to master the art of modern strategic maneuver. They understood that modern technology allowed independent smaller armies to outmaneuver larger armies into cauldron battles.

That was not true; both military operated in several level of organized.

Human wave tactics... in the Prussian army... trade human lives in a war with a more than 4:1 fatality rate in the Prussians favor ... really? Prussian infantry tactics of the time revolved around looser skirmishing lines because they knew (possibly from the ACW, I'm not sure they spread it through all infantry before) what modern rifles did to concentrated infantry.

Except contradict to what you say, Prussians continued to throw mass infantry into frontal assault during Franco-Prussian War, just not in line formation. That was not much different than how Americans operated in the last two years of ACW, when line formation was more or less abandon.

What overcame the weakness of the Dreyse gun was the superiority of Krupp field artillery and the general mobility of the Prussian army on the operational level meaning Prussian infantry was rarely meant to storm a place without artillery support.

That was in fact only partially true. Krupp was good to knock out French heavy weapons, but proved still not enough to break through French trench system frontally. The only solution left was flanking French trench position. Hence a common situation during Franco-Prussian War was Prussians had to pin down French line first by repeatly throwing men into bloody frontal assault, while using its manpower quantity to send another equal large task force to flank French position - a similar approach how Grant conducted his Overland Campaign in 1864. This approach was only possible because Prussian force was far larger than French (1:2 French to Prussian ratio) and had even larger manpower available at home, hence it was ok for Prussians to waste men on such costly assault (just like Union force). However, a difference between Union force and Prussian force was that Union force also recognized the importance of defense and how to conduct a proper defense using new technology - in this case it means digging trench (note trench digging seems was not an official doctrine of either forces during ACW, just a common practice among troops; on the other hand trench digging was the central point of French official doctrine in 1870 - in other words French was the first one which actually organized a formal trench warfare). In other words, Union military excelled both the defense and offense of its time, while Prussian and French only excelled in one of two areas. Hence why I concluded American military of this period was superior than European military tactically as it could operate flexibly in two different phases.

[Mangalore]

That was not true; both military operated in several level of organized.

The Prussian system allowed to maintain a general control over the armies without micromanaging them. The Prussian general staff had supreme command over the armies, the French general staff had not. The system was also designed to allow individual Prussian armies to suffer setbacks which got offset by other Prussian formation victories and react to each other instead of waiting for orders from home.

The Prussian general staff set up detailed plans for mobilization, marching orders and missions for each Prussian army while not commanding their individual progress, the Prussian artillery was trained (and had superior guns outranging everything the French had) to suppress enemy artillery and provide close support to its infantry negating the necessity for the infantry to duke it out 1:1 against other infantry.

In essence the Prussians had learnt from the Napoleonic era and upped Napoleon's system of divided march, strike together and heavy leaning on artillery.

[hellheaven1987]

The Prussian system allowed to maintain a general control over the armies without micromanaging them. The Prussian general staff had supreme command over the armies, the French general staff had not. The system was also designed to allow individual Prussian armies to suffer setbacks which got offset by other Prussian formation victories and react to each other instead of waiting for orders from home.

Yes, but that was rather because communication was rather difficult in this period, hence most armies adopted a degree of self-management for lower tier of units. In fact, one chief reason why French was defeated in Franco-Prussian War was the French high command gave too much freedom for each army, hence made it very difficult to coordinate each army (each French army literally fought their own war, allowed Prussians to pick them off one by one). Similarly, the high combat casualty rate among Prussian force was largely because of this decentralized command, which Moltke responded by introduced reform to increase central control after Franco-Prussian War.

The Prussian general staff set up detailed plans for mobilization, marching orders and missions for each Prussian army while not commanding their individual progress, the Prussian artillery was trained (and had superior guns outranging everything the French had) to suppress enemy artillery and provide close support to its infantry negating the necessity for the infantry to duke it out 1:1 against other infantry.

Yes it was all nice reforms during peace time, but I already pointed out, the key of Prussian victory was, as tested on battlefield, neither Krupp nor its fluid organization; it was simply because Prussians enjoyed such large quantity of manpower that it could abuse it. The Prussian force, twice the number of French force, could enjoy to pin the French with half of force while flank with another half, while the huge manpower reservoir could guarantee that even the force suffered heavy casualty there were more bodies ready be thrown into future battles. That was in fact what Prussians went into when they discovered none of their advantages were enough to break French's advantage frontally, hence they went to Union's strategy of attrition and flanking. Not surprise, the human price was much heavier than what Moltke expected, forced both Moltke and Frederick III to seek some territory exchange in order to appease the German public (it was noted that Frederick III in fact, during the war, criticized Moltke for estimate the expected casualty too low before the war and leaded him into false judgement of starting the war).

In essence the Prussians had learnt from the Napoleonic era and upped Napoleon's system of divided march, strike together and heavy leaning on artillery.

Nope, Prussians' strategy during Franco-Prussian War was so called "Search and Destroy"; Moltke in fact did not have a general campaign plan besides chasing behind French armies where ever they were, and it only worked because French was quite reluctant to fight a mobile war against Prussians.

[fullapa]

I don't know a lot about Frederick, but from what I've read I like him for his strategics and for what he managed to do for Prussia. I'm interested to know which historical figures he admired?