Why do people think Hitler "almost" won in the East?

[Sirota]

Let's assume the defense of Moscow fails in 1941, Stalingrad and the Volga is completely overrun and the Leningrad/Murmansk front fails too - does this mean the Russians would throw down their weapons and shout "Zdayomsya!"? Of course not, the Russians would still have huge reserves of men and supplies, the factories would be well at work behind the Urals and there would still be fierce resistance in the occupied territories. The Germans were not even close to defeating the Soviets - even with all Hitler's domestic mistakes (which were by far surpassed by Stalin's stupidity).

[Manuel I Komnenos]

With all their major cities and manpower pool lost I don't think the Soviets could do anything else than surrender..
Even Stalin himself had said that if the Germans captured Moscow he would die there defending it..

[Sirota]

With all their major cities and manpower pool lost I don't think the Soviets could do anything else than surrender..
Even Stalin himself had said that if the Germans captured Moscow he would die there defending it..

Which in turn would be better for all the Russias.

[Pious Agnost]

With all their major cities and manpower pool lost I don't think the Soviets could do anything else than surrender..
Even Stalin himself had said that if the Germans captured Moscow he would die there defending it..

That's because Stalin used Moscow as propaganda when assured by his generals that it would not fall.

Imagine the massive popularity he got from staying in a city threatened by the Germans when he could have escaped to central Siberia at whim.

If the Germans were running out of steam then, then they would not like the mountains to the east.

[Antwerpen]

That's because Stalin used Moscow as propaganda when assured by his generals that it would not fall.

Imagine the massive popularity he got from staying in a city threatened by the Germans when he could have escaped to central Siberia at whim.

If the Germans were running out of steam then, then they would not like the mountains to the east.

Seconded, Moscow and Leningrad were not of an utmost strategic value, but they were the cultural and ideological capitals of the USSR.

It would be a psychological shock and a morale killer for the Red Army and the Soviet people if Moscow or Leningrad were taken. Most of all, because Leningrad is named after Lenin who was the most worshiped man in Soviet Russia (apart from Stalin) and Moscow contained Lenin's body. Germans taking these cities would mean a destruction of Soviet ideals.

The same went with Stalingrad: it, of course, was a major industrial city, had a tank factory and held Volga, one of the naval gates to Moscow, but one of the main principles of protecting it till last breath was that it carried Stalin's name. It would again hit the morale of the Soviet people and Stalin's personality cult as well.

But, the possibility of Soviets continuing the war if Moscow was taken is not ruled out. The Soviet government already had a plan B in case Moscow is taken: move the capital and all the governmental structures to Kuybyshev, a city not far away from Ural. In addition, many factories and plants were evacuated to Siberia. It was only Stalin's order which stopped the government from evacuating to Ural and leaving Moscow to the Nazis.

[Sirota]

Seconded, Moscow and Leningrad were not of an utmost strategic value, but they were the cultural and ideological capitals of the USSR.

It would be a psychological shock and a morale killer for the Red Army and the Soviet people if Moscow or Leningrad were taken. Most of all, because Leningrad is named after Lenin who was the most worshiped man in Soviet Russia (apart from Stalin) and Moscow contained Lenin's body. Germans taking these cities would mean a destruction of Soviet ideals.

The same went with Stalingrad: it, of course, was a major industrial city, had a tank factory and held Volga, one of the naval gates to Moscow, but one of the main principles of protecting it till last breath was that it carried Stalin's name. It would again hit the morale of the Soviet people and Stalin's personality cult as well.

But, the possibility of Soviets continuing the war if Moscow was taken is not ruled out. The Soviet government already had a plan B in case Moscow is taken: move the capital and all the governmental structures to Kuybyshev, a city not far away from Ural. In addition, many factories and plants were evacuated to Siberia. It was only Stalin's order which stopped the government from evacuating to Ural and leaving Moscow to the Nazis.

Let me begin that nobody had worshiped Stalin but the regime itself. With Russian/Soviet end to any form of collaboration with the Fascists and doubt in their own establishment, the will of the people would unite like never before.

[Antwerpen]

Let me begin that nobody had worshiped Stalin but the regime itself. With Russian/Soviet end to any form of collaboration with the Fascists and doubt in their own establishment, the will of the people would unite like never before.

You are now denying Stalin's cult of personality? People worshiped Stalin, that's why they were loyal to him even when he sent his own people to death and torture into GULAG camps? Propaganda did its thing.

[conon394]

It was only Stalin's order which stopped the government from evacuating to Ural and leaving Moscow to the Nazis.

By October quite a bit of the government had been moved, and many skilled workers - even a fair bit of the population been leaving. Stalin stayed but he had special trains, planes and cars waiting.

[Antwerpen]

By October quite a bit of the government had been moved, and many skilled workers - even a fair bit of the population been leaving. Stalin stayed but he had special trains, planes and cars waiting.

Yes, you are right, but still, it was Stalin who decided to stay in Moscow till the last drop of blood and pretty much was an inspiration for the Red Army to win the Siege of Moscow.

[conon394]

I would not argue that.

To the OP:

Let's assume the defense of Moscow fails in 1941, Stalingrad and the Volga is completely overrun and the Leningrad/Murmansk front fails too - does this mean the Russians would throw down their weapons and shout "Zdayomsya!"? Of course not, the Russians would still have huge reserves of men and supplies, the factories would be well at work behind the Urals and there would still be fierce resistance in the occupied territories. The Germans were not even close to defeating the Soviets - even with all Hitler's domestic mistakes (which were by far surpassed by Stalin's stupidity).

I think you can pin the ideal on a couple different things..

First the high profile of post-war German generals and the biographies. They all look to blame Hitler for Germany's defeat or in some cases each other, but in general you get the if only Hitler didn't do this that or the other thing we would have won. That point of view is sort of fully digested in western CW.

Second the ideal that the Germans fooled themselves with - the supposed weakness of the Soviet state, which is I suppose appealing to many what with the cold war and the obvious unsavory nature of Stalinist rule. There always just one one more step that would have pushed it over the edge to some French-like collapse. In reality France was unique in that no other major power ever cracked until utterly defeated - and that was simply outside of German means in 41 or 42.

Third a general failure to recognize there is not much more Germany could have done in 41 no matter how much the evil Nazi fairy-godmother waved her wand. The USSR had to many resources men,industry, etc beyond the reach of any feasible German advance and thus even had Moscow and Leningrad been surrounded [or Assaulted but I don't see how Germany could sustain that cost given surrounding Moscow kinda of implies leaving a much stronger Soviet position in the South]. In any case the Soviets would still have their winter counter offensive to launch against a weaken and overextended German army

The Gamble was not a bad one from the German perspective - but that's because the Germans totally underestimated the scale of Soviet industry, it capacity in the East, and the size of its armed forces. That was fine an all but the fact that Germany did recognize its own mistake till late 42 doomed the German effort.

Forth people tend to get over excited by the 42 offensive and fail to notice it require shifting almost all offensive assets to one sector of the front, and that even had Germany capture Baku intact (very very unlikely) it had no way to get Soviet oil back to Germany (something Hitler, and his Generals all liked to ignore as well). Thus Germany would still have no oil, an even more over extended front and still not be in a position to destroy the USSR.