If Napoleon Won Waterloo....

[Bobby the Huntsman]

I have been pondering this, and i would like to raise some questions on the area of Napoleons defeat at Waterloo and some contributing factors that could of turned it the other way and seen the emperor regain control of europe..
1) What if Marshal Grouchey had finsihed off the retreating prussians and even killed Gebhard Leberecht von Blucher?
2) What if there had been no rain and the ground had not been softend?
3)What if Napoleon had won?
4) What if Wellington had not decided to fight near waterloo, but instead different location closer or further away from the french?

[Scamander]

I have been pondering this, and i would like to raise some questions on the area of Napoleons defeat at Waterloo and some contributing factors that could of turned it the other way and seen the emperor regain control of europe..
1) What if Marshal Grouchey had finsihed off the retreating prussians and even killed Gebhard Leberecht von Blucher?
2) What if there had been no rain and the ground had not been softend?
3)What if Napoleon had won?
4) What if Wellington had not decided to fight near waterloo, but instead different location closer or further away from the french?

Hello,

Your question has been asked before in a thread. Below is the reply I posted:

The rhetorical force of Napoleon landing from Elba and re-securing France so quickly and easily should not be underestimated. This rocked England. If any of the following had happened the stage would have been set for a potential surviving Bonaparte France.

1) Had the French broken the back of the Prussians at Ligny, Wellington would have withdrawn to England. This would have quite possibly brought down the government. It is quite possible the new government would have sought peace. If the new government had remained committed to war, relations with their Allies would have been seriously strained.

2) Had Ligny played out as it did historically except that Blucher been killed/captured at Ligny (both of which were very real possibilities given the details of the battle), his Chief of Staff Gneisenau would have commanded the Prussian forces and retreated toward Berlin. Again Wellington would have retreated to England and a similar crises in Parliament would have occurred.

3) Had Waterloo been won by France, the remnant of the British coalition force would have retreated to England and the Prussian force would have been vulnerable to attack as it moved toward Berlin. Flanders would have been under French control providing more men for French rosters. Two quick victories would have played to French moral across the country: further securing Napoleon's political situation and diplomatic clout.

a) What is interesting to note is the Allied armies of Austria and Russia had taken little to no action since Napoleon had returned to power. A successful French Flanders Campaign would have put a further question on their taking aggressive action.

b) The most interesting figure in this is Austria. Austria at the Council of Vienna was beginning to see what a post-Napoleon Europe would look like. It was a world where Austria was facing an aggrandized Russia which had occupied Poland (taken from former Prussian holdings) and had actually told Austria if she didn't like it, she was free to try and push the Russian army out. A Prussia that had annexed Saxony and thereby acquired a substantial position vis-a-vis Austria's traditional claims/desire to be the power of German principalities. Austrian gains had increased its population but had done nothing to improve it's strategic situation. Rather, it was in a more dependent position contra Russia on its flank and a Prussian backed Prussia to its immediate North. England was not seen as a reliable counter or partner.

A Bonaparte France offered the following: a real threat and counter check facing Prussia. A France married to the Hapsburg court with a son and heir to the French Imperial throne of Hapsburg blood (as opposed to a returned Bourbon ruling France). A France desirous of allies and wanting peace: meaning any claims Austria may make regarding the Italian Peninsula France would likely not oppose. Italy would likely be seen as under the Austrian sphere. Murat, the King of Naples, had already been rebuffed by Napoleon for his abandoning Napoleon in the later stages of the 1813/14 Campaigns. A chastened Bonaparte France had much to offer Austria. Metternich may very well have worked for a negotiated peace with France.


If either a new government in England had made peace or Austria had made peace with France, any remaining anti-French Coalition would not have had the strength to unseat Napoleon. With a successful Flanders Campaign, there was a very real possibility of a surviving Bonaparte France.

[Tiberius Tosi]

Napoleon would have been overwhelmed by the other massive armies that were marching on France. He had little to no chance after Leipzig, let alone after his first abdication.

[Jihada]

We did all this on the ETW forum. I can't find it now.

[Kolyan]

I have been pondering this, and i would like to raise some questions on the area of Napoleons defeat at Waterloo and some contributing factors that could of turned it the other way and seen the emperor regain control of europe..
1) What if Marshal Grouchey had finsihed off the retreating prussians and even killed Gebhard Leberecht von Blucher?
2) What if there had been no rain and the ground had not been softend?
3)What if Napoleon had won?
4) What if Wellington had not decided to fight near waterloo, but instead different location closer or further away from the french?

1). Wellington would not be fighting at Waterloo - British army would be evacuated from Antwerp . Then, a few weeks later 200,000 Russina army and 210,000 Austrian army (first echelon only) would arrive, link up with remains of the Prussians around 50,000-75,000 including 25,000 positioned at the border as a reserve, and outnumbering Napoleon 5 to 1 - defeat Napoleon with his 100,000 as they did in 1814.

2). Wellington COULD be defeated at Waterloo - the remains of the British army would evacuated from Antwerp . Then, a few weeks later 200,000 Russian army and 210,000 Austrian army (first echelon only) would arrive, link up with remains of the Prussians around 50,000-75,000 including 25,000 positioned at the border as a reserve, and outnumbering Napoleon 5 to 1 - defeat Napoleon with his 100,000 as they did in 1814.

3). The remains of the British army would evacuated from Antwerp . Then, a few weeks later 200,000 Rus army and 210,000 Austrian army (first echelon only) would arrive, link up with remains of the Prussians around 50,000-75,000 including 25,000 positioned at the border as a reserve, and outnumbering Napoleon 5 to 1 - defeat Napoleon with his 100,000 as they did in 1814.

4). Wellington would be surely defeated if fighting without Prussians - the remains of the British army would evacuated from Antwerp . Then, a few weeks later 200,000 Russian army and 210,000 Austrian army (first echelon only) would arrive, link up with remains of the Prussians around 50,000-75,000 including 25,000 positioned at the border as a reserve, and outnumbering Napoleon 5 to 1 - defeat Napoleon with his 100,000 as they did in 1814.

Its been discussed to the death before.

“Factors that could of turned it the other way and seen the emperor regain control of Europe..”

-Austrian and Russian pull out of the coalition.

France of 1815 was no longer the almighty Empire of 1805-1812. After Napoleon's triumphant arrival in Paris, the Allies (Russians, Austrians, Prussian, British, Spaniards, and German and Netherland troops) undertook to provide over 800,000 men between them. According to David Chandler, France's resources (300,000 incl. res.) "were stretched pathetically thinly."


Waterloo - The Most Important Battle in History ?
http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/waterloo_most_important_battle.htm

[Bobby the Huntsman]

Hello,

Your question has been asked before in a thread. .

I am new to posting so i havent seen many threads but thanks for the insight

[♔DoomBunny666♔]

I reckon the Russians would have crushed him...

[Scamander]

I am new to posting so i havent seen many threads but thanks for the insight

My pleasure. Typical replies on this topic assume France being overwhelmed by the new Seventh Coalition. I think such ideas are confused. They fail to consider individual state's interests and the impact a successful Flanders Campaign would have had on any would be French invasion. Austria is one simple example: a Europe with a restored Bourbon France or a Europe with a humbled Bonaparte France keen on allies, with a heir of Hapsburg blood, presented very different pictures for Austria.

[Lord Claremorris]

It is certainly interesting to give it a thought. As Scamander had pointed out, Napoleon offered several advantages to Austria, which is why Metternich sorely tried to get Napoleon to accept a limited peace before he finally committed Austria to the Anti-Bonaparte Coalition before Leipzig.

However, Napoleon was unpredictable and capricious. He could not be trusted. He also subjugated the whole continent and very likely wished to, or considered himself able to if necessary, once again.

Russia, Prussia and Austria may have come to terms with Nappy, but I very highly doubt Britain would. Not ever, as long as France continued to challenge the balance of power in Europe and continued to construct warships at an ever increasing rate, she would find the United Kingdom, as always, arranged against her. Alone if necessary.

In any event, I seriously doubt it would have affected much. Napoleon's reputation as an unpredictable adventurer was too cemented in the minds of the Allied leaders. He had to go, and Russia, Prussia, and Austria combined had more than what was needed to finish him.

[mavyalex]

Hello,

Simple equation: let's say that French line infantry is superior to the Prussians line infantry and British line infantry. So one French line infantryman could take out 2 enemies making a ration of 2:1 for the French (and only 1:1 for the Coalition).

If Napoleon was outnumbered 5 to 1 against the Coalition in 1815, do you think that he could have won agains the Allied Coalition even outnumbered 3 to 1 thanks to the superior warfare tactics and accuracy of Napoleon's army?

Numbers are not all...

[Scamander]

It is certainly interesting to give it a thought. As Scamander had pointed out, Napoleon offered several advantages to Austria, which is why Metternich sorely tried to get Napoleon to accept a limited peace before he finally committed Austria to the Anti-Bonaparte Coalition before Leipzig.

However, Napoleon was unpredictable and capricious. He could not be trusted. He also subjugated the whole continent and very likely wished to, or considered himself able to if necessary, once again.

Russia, Prussia and Austria may have come to terms with Nappy, but I very highly doubt Britain would. Not ever, as long as France continued to challenge the balance of power in Europe and continued to construct warships at an ever increasing rate, she would find the United Kingdom, as always, arranged against her. Alone if necessary.

In any event, I seriously doubt it would have affected much. Napoleon's reputation as an unpredictable adventurer was too cemented in the minds of the Allied leaders. He had to go, and Russia, Prussia, and Austria combined had more than what was needed to finish him.

Hello,

I don't think Napoleon was unpredictable or capricious. I think such ideas more reflect a certain British propaganda than reality. I do agree there was a real and sustained distain for him, including among the English hierarchy. Even so, England had a well established history of doing alliance about-faces. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1763 were both widely seen across Europe as examples of England abandoning its allies for its own interests. Should a new government have come to power following failure in the Flanders, it would very likely be to end the war-without-end and finally allow the nation to turn the page.

In England, there was an opposition block to continued war with France. The brief interlude of peace while Napoleon was in exile had only strengthened this sentiment. Merchants and others wanted to be done with war and be about pursuing profit. Merchantile interests had no small impact on Parliament. Further, the two central foreign policy pegs that had guided England had changed. I am referring to A), the general stance England took (basically from 1689 forward) to oppose the strongest power in Europe in the hope of maintaining the concert of Europe (and thereby England's safety) and, B) the protection of England from direct invasion.

Russia had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as both strong and aggressive. She had pushed ever westward, taking Poland and Finland: being placed to dictate affairs in Eastern and Central Europe directly. Sweden, Prussia and Austria were directly threatened by Russian power and in a appeasement mode. Further, Russia was expanding East during this time and moving toward India. England was becoming aware, The Great Game of Central Asia was beginning. In many ways, Russia was the new power to be concerned with.

Per B) keeping the channel ports via the Dutch from French control had been seen as pivotal to England's safety. They were the most direct route for any large scale invasion of England. This had guided English policy from War of Spanish Succession forward. The stunning victory at Trafalgar in 1805 had removed the threat of invasion from any Napoleonic France, even if it controlled the channel ports. With the loss of Spain as a French ally, there was no fear of any invasion at all. Therefore, the world in 1815 was not the same as when England suspended the Treaty of Amiens and resumed war in 1803 (Recall, England had already shown itself perfectly willing to not only be at peace with France, but actually during the reign of George I (early 18th Century) the two states had been allies).

Despite attempts to personalize a renewed war by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, the reality was his quick return to power in France had shaken some of the larger rhetoric about him being a tyrant. Rather, what many English politicians were seeing was a France behind Bonaparte. Attempts to separate the man from the nation were seen to have failed. In the face of failure in the Flanders (per the assumption of Napoleon winning at Waterloo) a Seventh Coalition against France promised to be a nasty affair.* In 1814 during the defense of France, a Napoleon at the end of his resources had very nearly fought the combined Coalition to a standstill. Since his return form exile, he had in short order been able to quadruple the number of the French Army. With time, France would only become more able to defend herself. Therefore, since Napoleon did not appear to be separable from France and France would not cease to exist, accommodation was a more and more likely reality.


Per Austria: Austria from the conclusion of the war in 1809 had already shown itself the least willing to fight Napoleon. They were the last of the great powers to declare war on Napoleon in 1813. Metternich, as you aptly noted, was not anti-France or anti-Napoleon at all and from the records of the Council of Vienna was very aware of the strategic tight spot Austria was in vis-a-vis an aggressive Russia. Allowing for a Bonaparte France had much to recommend itself to Austria.


* The French Army of 1815 was far superior to the army France had put together in the wake of the 1812 disaster. All the prisoners of war France had lost over the years had been returned: including staff officers etc. Horses were no longer a scarcity. Finally, it was a force that was wildly supportive of Napoleon. Given the behavior of the would be Coalition forces after Napoleon's return (i.e. neither Russian or Austrian forces had moved at all toward France, despite an initial promise to invade France by July 1), they were likely all too aware that trying to fight a war against such, so far from their homeland (in Russia's case)/base would not be an easy affair or something they were keen to pursue. While it's certainly the case Czar Alexander tended to personalize politics and saw things as a battle between himself, as savior of the old order, against the revolutionary Napoleon: Russia had already made remarkable gains in territory and influence. Aside from a crusader like zeal to sustain it, a continued war in France offered little in direct benefits. If Austria did make a separate peace, Russian pursuit of war would have only been further complicated.

If either England or Austria made peace with France, I don't think any remaining forces could have successfully overturned France.